Meaning of Life, Liberty or Property

Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization vs. PBM, 51 SCRA 189

Facts: Philippine Blooming Employees Organization (PBMEO) decided to stage a mass
demonstration in front of Malacaang to express their grievances against the alleged abuses of the
Pasig Police.

After learning about the planned mass demonstration, Philippine Blooming Mills Inc., called for a
meeting with the leaders of the PBMEO. During the meeting, the planned demonstration was
confirmed by the union. But it was stressed out that the demonstration was not a strike against
the company but was in fact an exercise of the laborers inalienable constitutional right to freedom
of expression, freedom of speech and freedom for petition for redress of grievances.

The company asked them to cancel the demonstration for it would interrupt the normal course of
their business which may result in the loss of revenue. This was backed up with the threat of the
possibility that the workers would lose their jobs if they pushed through with the rally.

A second meeting took place where the company reiterated their appeal that while the workers
may be allowed to participate, those from the 1st and regular shifts should not absent themselves
to participate , otherwise, they would be dismissed. Since it was too late to cancel the plan, the
rally took place and the officers of the PBMEO were eventually dismissed for a violation of the No
Strike and No Lockout clause of their Collective Bargaining Agreement.

The lower court decided in favor of the company and the officers of the PBMEO were found guilty
of bargaining in bad faith. Their motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied by the Court
of Industrial Relations for being filed two days late.
Issue: Whether or not the workers who joined the strike violated the CBA.

Held: No. While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of human rights over
property rights is recognized. Because these freedoms are "delicate and vulnerable, as well as
supremely precious in our society" and the "threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost as
potently as the actual application of sanctions," they "need breathing space to survive," permitting
government regulation only "with narrow specificity." Property and property rights can be lost thru
prescription; but human rights are imprescriptible. In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of
free expression and of assembly occupy a preferred position as they are essential to the
preservation and vitality of our civil and political institutions; and such priority "gives these
liberties the sanctity and the sanction not permitting dubious intrusions."

The freedoms of speech and of the press as well as of peaceful assembly and of petition for
redress of grievances are absolute when directed against public officials or "when exercised in
relation to our right to choose the men and women by whom we shall be governed.

Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization vs. PBM, 51 SCRA 189
FACTS: Petitioners herein alleged that they informed the respondent Philippine Blooming Mills of
their decision to have a mass demonstration at Malacaang, in protest against alleged abuses of
the Pasig police. The company respondent pleaded to exclude the employees in the first shift to
join the mass demonstration, however the petitioners still included them. As a result, the company
respondent filed a case thru the city prosecutor and charged the demonstrating employees of
violation of the CBA. Trial court rendered judgment in favor of the respondent company, and the
petitioners failed to file a timely motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE: WON the case dismissal as a consequence of a procedural fault violates due process.

HELD: Yes. The decision of the CIR to dismiss the petition based on technicality (being 2 days
late) was rendered null and void. (The constitutional rights have dominance over procedural rules.)
And, the company was directed to reinstate the eight officers with full backpay from date of
separation minus the one day's pay and whatever earnings they might have realized from other
sources during their separation from service. (The removal from employment of the officers were
deemed too harsh a punishment for their actions)









G.R. No. L-38415 June 28, 1974 CONSTANTINO A. NUEZ, Petitioner, vs. HON. ALBERTO
V. AVERIA and EDGARDO H. MORALES, substituted by RODOLFO DE LEON, Respondents.
TEEHANKEE, J.:
The Court sets aside respondent court's questioned order of dismissal of the pending election
protest before it on the authority of its recent decision of April 15, 1974 in Cases L-36927-28, L-
37715 and L-38831 1 ruling that courts of first instance "should continue and exercise their
jurisdiction to hear, try and decide the election protests" filed before
them.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Petitioner is the protestant in Election Case No. TM-470 of respondent court contesting the
November 8, 1971 election results in certain precincts for the mayoralty of Tarnate, Cavite on the
ground of fraud, irregularities and corrupt practices. Original protestee was the proclaimed mayor-
elect Edgardo Morales, who was ambushed and killed on February 15, 1974 in a barrio of Tarnate
2 and hence was succeeded by then vice-mayor Rodolfo de Leon who as the incumbent mayor is
now substituted in this action as party respondent. 3 chanrobles virtual law library

Respondent court had in its questioned order of January 31, 1974 granted protestee's motion for
dismissal of the election protest on the ground "that this court has lost its jurisdiction to decide
this case for the reason that the same has become moot and academic," citing the President's
authority under General Order No. 3 and Article XVII, section 9 of the 1973 Constitution to remove
from office all incumbent government officials and employees, whether elective or
appointive.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Petitioner filed a timely appeal. Upon receipt of respondent's comment the Court resolved to
consider petitioner's petition for review on certiorari as a special civil action and the case
submitted for decision for prompt disposition thereof.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library

The Court in its unanimous joint decision en banc in the above-cited cases of Paredes, Sunga and
Valley has already declared such dismissal orders as "clear error," ruling that "(I)t must be
emphasized that the `right' of the private respondents to continue in office indefinitely arose not
only by virtue of Section 9 of Art. XVII of the New Constitution but principally from their having
been proclaimed elected to their respective positions as a result of the November 8, 1971
elections. Therefore, if in fact and in law, they were not duly elected to their respective positions
and consequently, have no right to hold the same, perform their functions, enjoy their privileges
and emoluments, then certainly, they should not be allowed to enjoy the indefinite term of office
given to them by said constitutional provision," and that "(I)t is erroneous to conclude that under
Section 9, Art. XVII of the New Constitution, the term of office of the private respondents expired,
and that they are now holding their respective offices under a new term. We are of the opinion
that they hold their respective offices still under the term to which they have been elected,
although the same is now indefinite." chanrobles virtual law library

The Court further stressed therein that "(T)he Constitutional Convention could not have intended,
as in fact it did not intend, to shield or protect those who had been unduly elected. To hold that
the right of the herein private respondents to the respective offices which they are now holding,
may no longer be subject to question would be tantamount to giving a stamp of approval to what
could have been an election victory characterized by fraud, threats, intimidation, vote buying, or
other forms of irregularities prohibited by the Election Code to preserve inviolate the sanctity of
the ballot." chanrobles virtual law library

In upholding the continuing jurisdiction of courts of first instance to hear, try and decide election
protests, the Court pointed out that "(S)ection 7 of Art. XVII of the New Constitution provides that
`all existing laws not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative until amended,
modified or repealed by the National Assembly.' And there has been no amendment, modification
or repeal of section 220 of the Election Code of 1971 which gave the herein petitioners the right to
file an election contest against those proclaimed elected," and that it is expressly provided under
Article XVII, section 8 of the 1973 Constitution that "`All courts existing at the time of the
ratification of this Constitution shall continue and exercise their jurisdiction until otherwise
provided by law in accordance with this Constitution, and all cases pending in said courts shall be
heard, tried and determined under the laws then in force.' . . . ." chanrobles virtual law library

ACCORDINGLY, respondent court's dismissal order of January 31, 1974 is hereby set aside and
respondent court is directed to immediately continue with the trial and determination of the
election protest before it on the merits. In line with previous precedents involving election cases,
this decision shall be immediately executory upon promulgation hereof. SO ORDERED.

Makalintal, C.J., Castro, Makasiar, Esguerra and Muoz Palma, concur.
G.R. No. L-33237 April 15, 1988
GREGORIO T. CRESPO, in His Capacity as Mayor of Cabiao, Nueva Ecija, petitioner, vs.
PROVINCIAL BOARD OF NUEVA ECIJA and PEDRO T. WYCOCO, respondents.

PADILIA, J.:

Petitioner was the elected Municipal Mayor of Cabiao, Nueva Ecija, in the local elections of 1967.
On 25 January 1971, an administrative complaint was filed against him by private respondent,
Pedro T. Wycoco for harassment, abuse of authority and oppression. 1 As required, petitioner filed
a written explanation as to why he should not be dealt with administrdatively, with the Provincial
Board of Nueve Ecija, in accordance with Section 5, Republic Act No. 5185. 2

On 15 February 1971, without notifying petitioner or his counsel, public respondent Provincial
Board conducted a hearing of the aforecited administrative case. During the hearing, private
respondent Pedro T. Wycoco was allowed to present evidence, testimonial and documentary, ex
parte, and on the basis of the evidence presented, the respondent Provincial Board passed
Resolution No. 51 preventively suspending petitioner from his office as municipal mayor of Cabiao,
Nueva Ecija. 3

In this petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with prayer for preliminary injunction,
petitioner seeks to annul and set aside Resolution No. 51 of public respondent Provincial Board,
preventively suspending him from office and to enjoin public respondent from enforcing and/or
implementing the order of preventive suspension and from proceeding further with the
administrative case.

According to petitioner, the order of preventive suspension embodied in Resolution No. 51 issued
by the Provincial Board is arbitrary, high-handed, atrocious, shocking and grossly violative of
Section 5 of Republic Act No. 5185 which requires a hearing and investigation of the truth or falsity
of charges before preventive suspension is allowed. In issuing the order of preventive suspension,
the respondent Provincial Board, petitioner adds, has grossly violated the fundamental and
elementary principles of due process. 4

On 3 May 1971, this Court issued a preliminary injunction. 5 We agree with the petitioner that he
was denied due process by respondent Provincial Board.

In Callanta vs. Carnation Philippines, Inc. 6 this Court held:

It is a principle in American jurisprudence which, undoubtedly, is well-recognized in this
jurisdiction that one's employment, profession, trade or calling is a "property right," and the
wrongful interference therewith is an actionable wrong. The right is considered to be property
within the protection of a constitutional guaranty of due process of law. 7

Undoubtedly, the order of preventive suspension was issued without giving the petitioner a chance
to be heard. To controvert the claim of petitioner that he was not fully notified of the scheduled
hearing, respondent Provincial Board, in its Memorandum, contends that "Atty. Bernardo M.
Abesamis, counsel for the petitioner mayor made known by a request in writing, sent to the
Secretary of the Provincial Board his desire to be given opportunity to argue the explanation of the
said petitioner mayor at the usual time of the respondent Board's meeting, but unfortunately,
inspire of the time allowed for the counsel for the petitioner mayor to appear as requested by him,
he failed to appeal." 8

The contention of the Provincial Board cannot stand alone in the absence of proof or evidence to
support it. Moreover, in the proceedings held on 15 February 1971, nothing therein can be
gathered that, in issuing the assailed order, the written explanation submitted by petitioner was
taken into account. The assailed order was issued mainly on the basis of the evidence presented
ex parte by respondent Wycoco.

In Azul vs. Castro, 9 this Court said:

From the earliest inception of instutional government in our country, the concepts of notice and
hearing have been fundamental. A fair and enlightened system of justice would be impossible
without the right to notice and to be board. The emphasis on substantive due process and other
recent ramifications of the due process clause sometimes leads bench and bar to overlook or
forget that due process was initially concerned with fair procedure. Every law student early learns
in law school definition submitted by counsel Mr. Webster in Trustees of Dartmouth College v.
Woodward (4 Wheat. 518) that due process is the equivalent of law of the land which means "The
general law; a law which hears before it condemns, which proceeding upon inquiry and renders
judgment only after trial ... that every citizen shall hold his life, liberty, property, and immunities
under the protection of the general rules which govern society.

A sporting opportunity to be heard and the rendition of judgment only after a lawful hearing by a
coldly neutral and impartial judge are essential elements of procedural due process.

We had occasion to emphasize in Santiago v. Santos (63 SCRA 392), which, unlike the case before
us now, was only a summary action for ejectment that:

In an adversary proceeding, fairness and prudence dictate that a judgment, based only on
plaintiffs evidence adduced ex parte and rendered without hearing defendant's evidence, should be
avoided as much as possible. In order that bias may not be imputed to the judge, he should have
the patience and circumspection to give the opposing party a chance to present his evidence even
if he thinks that the oppositor's proof might not be adequate to overthrow the case for the plaintiff.
A display of petulance and impatience in the conduct of the trial is a norm of conduct which is
inconsistent with the "cold neutrality of an impartial judge". 10

The petition, however, has become moot and academic. Records do not show that in the last local
elections held on 18 January 1988, petitioner was elected to any public office.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The preliminary injunction issued by this Court on 3 May
1971 is LIFTED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Yap, Melencio-Herrera, Paras and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.
Chavez vs. Romulo G.R. No. 157036, June 9, 2004

FACTS: This case is about the ban on the carrying of firearms outside of residence in order to
deter the rising crime rates. Petitioner questions the ban as a violation of his right to property.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not the revocation of permit to carry firearms is unconstitutional
Whether or not the right to carry firearms is a vested property right

HELD:Petitioner cannot find solace to the above-quoted Constitutional provision.

In evaluating a due process claim, the first and foremost consideration must be whether life,
liberty or property interest exists. The bulk of jurisprudence is that a license authorizing a person
to enjoy a certain privilege is neither a property nor property right. In Tan vs. The Director of
Forestry, we ruled that a license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be
unlawful, and is not a contract between the authority granting it and the person to whom it is
granted; neither is it property or a property right, nor does it create a vested right. In a more
emphatic pronouncement, we held in Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr. that:

Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a
contract, property or a property right protected by the due process clause of the Constitution.
xxx

In our jurisdiction, the PNP Chief is granted broad discretion in the issuance of PTCFOR. This is
evident from the tenor of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of P.D. No. 1866 which state
that the Chief of Constabulary may, in meritorious cases as determined by him and under such
conditions as he may impose, authorize lawful holders of firearms to carry them outside of
residence. Following the American doctrine, it is indeed logical to say that a PTCFOR does not
constitute a property right protected under our Constitution.

Consequently, a PTCFOR, just like ordinary licenses in other regulated fields, may be revoked any
time. It does not confer an absolute right, but only a personal privilege to be exercised under
existing restrictions, and such as may thereafter be reasonably imposed. A licensee takes his
license subject to such conditions as the Legislature sees fit to impose, and one of the statutory
conditions of this license is that it might be revoked by the selectmen at their pleasure. Such a
license is not a contract, and a revocation of it does not deprive the defendant of any property,
immunity, or privilege within the meaning of these words in the Declaration of Rights. The US
Supreme Court, in Doyle vs. Continental Ins. Co, held: The correlative power to revoke or recall a
permission is a necessary consequence of the main power. A mere license by the State is always
revocable.


Republic v. Rosemoor Mining

FACTS: Four respondents were granted permission to look for marble deposits in the mountains of
Biak-na-Bato. When they discovered marble deposits in Mount Mabio, they applied for license to
exploit said marble deposits and they were issued such license. However, in a letter, Ernest o
Maceda (newly-appointed Minister of the Department of Energy and Natural Resources) cancelled
their license. Prclamation No. 84 was then issued, confirming the cancellation of the license.
RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT:
The privilege granted under respondents license already became a property right, which is
protected unde the due process clause. License cancellation, without notice and hearing was
unjust. Moreover, the proclamation, which confirmed the cancellation of the license was an ex post
facto law.
RULING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS:
CA affirmed the decision of the Trial Court.
It adds that the Constitution provides for the non-impairment of obligations and contracts, which
implies that the license of the respondents must be respected.

ISSUES:
1.WON the license was valid.
Petitioners: License was issued in violation of PD 463 a quarry license should cover not more
than 100 hectares in any given province. The license was issued to Rosemoor Mining and
Development Corporation and covered a 330-hectare land.
Respondents: The license was embraced by 4 separate applications, each for an aread of 81
hectares. Also, the issue has been mooted because PD 463 has already been repealed by RA 7942
or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995.
2.WON Proclamation No. 84 which confirmed the cancellation of the license, is valid.
Petitioners: The license was validly declared a nullity and terminated. Macedasletter did not cancel
or revoke the license, but merely declared its nullity. Also, the respondents waived their right to
notice and hearing in their license application.
Respondents: Their right to due process was violated because there was no notice and hearing.
Proclamation No. 84 is not valid because it violates the clause on non-impairment of contracts, it is
an ex post facto law and/or a bill of attainder, and it was issued by the President after the
effectivity of the 1987 Constitution.

RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT:
Tbe Petition is GRANTED.
SC set aside the decision of the CA and TC.
1.THE LICENSE IS NOT VALID.
The issue has not been mooted because while RA 7942 has expressly repealed provisions of
mining laws that are inconsistent with its own, it respects previously issued valid and existing
licenses.
When the license was issued, the governing law was PD 463. Thus, it was subject to the terms and
conditions of PD 463, including the part where it says that the quarry license shall cover an area of
not more than 100 hectares in any one province and not more than 1000 hectares in the entire
Philippines. The license in question was issued in the name of Rosemoor Mining Development
Corporation and not the 4 individual stockholders. It clearly violates PD 463 because the license
covered an area of 330-hectares.
2.PROCLAMATION NO. 84, CONFIRMING THE CANCELLATION OF THE LICENSE, IS VALID.
Respondents license may be revoked or rescinded by executive action when the national interest
so requires because it is not a contract, property or a property right protected by the due process
clause of the Constitution. The license itself provides such condition. The license can also be validly
revoked by the State in the exercise of police power, in accordance with the Regalian doctrine.
Also, since the license is not a contract, the non-impairment clause may not be invoked. Even if it
were, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the State.
The proclamation cannot also be said to be a bill-of-attainder, which is a legislative act which
inflicts punishment without judicial trial. The proclamation only declares the nullity of the license.
It does not declare guilt or impose punishment.
The proclamation can also be said to be an ex post facto law because it does not fall under any of
the six recognized instances when a law is considered as such. It is not even criminal or penal in
nature.
Lastly, when President Aquino issued Proclamation No. 84, she was still validly exercising
legislative powers under the Provisional Constitution of 1986.






Chavez vs. Romulo G.R. No. 157036, June 9, 2004

A mere license is always revocable

FACTS: This case is about the ban on the carrying of firearms outside of residence in order to
deter the rising crime rates. Petitioner questions the ban as a violation of his right to property.

ISSUE: Whether or not the revocation of permit to carry firearms is unconstitutional
Whether or not the right to carry firearms is a vested property right

HELD: Petitioner cannot find solace to the above-quoted Constitutional provision.

In evaluating a due process claim, the first and foremost consideration must be whether life,
liberty or property interest exists. The bulk of jurisprudence is that a license authorizing a person
to enjoy a certain privilege is neither a property nor property right. In Tan vs. The Director of
Forestry, we ruled that a license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be
unlawful, and is not a contract between the authority granting it and the person to whom it is
granted; neither is it property or a property right, nor does it create a vested right. In a more
emphatic pronouncement, we held in Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr. that:

Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a
contract, property or a property right protected by the due process clause of the Constitution.
xxx

In our jurisdiction, the PNP Chief is granted broad discretion in the issuance of PTCFOR. This is
evident from the tenor of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of P.D. No. 1866 which state
that the Chief of Constabulary may, in meritorious cases as determined by him and under such
conditions as he may impose, authorize lawful holders of firearms to carry them outside of
residence. Following the American doctrine, it is indeed logical to say that a PTCFOR does not
constitute a property right protected under our Constitution.

Consequently, a PTCFOR, just like ordinary licenses in other regulated fields, may be revoked any
time. It does not confer an absolute right, but only a personal privilege to be exercised under
existing restrictions, and such as may thereafter be reasonably imposed. A licensee takes his
license subject to such conditions as the Legislature sees fit to impose, and one of the statutory
conditions of this license is that it might be revoked by the selectmen at their pleasure. Such a
license is not a contract, and a revocation of it does not deprive the defendant of any property,
immunity, or privilege within the meaning of these words in the Declaration of Rights. The US
Supreme Court, in Doyle vs. Continental Ins. Co, held: The correlative power to revoke or recall a
permission is a necessary consequence of the main power. A mere license by the State is always
revocable.

CANLAS vs NAPICO HOMEOWNERS GR No. 182795, June 5, 2008

Facts:Petitioners are settlers in a certain parcel of land situated in the Brgy. Manggahan, Pasig
City. Their dwellings have either been demolished as of the time of filing of the petition, or is about
to be demolished pursuant to a court judgment.Petitioners claim that respondents hold fraudulent
and spurious titles. Thus, the petition for writ of amparo. The rule on writ of amparo is a remedy
available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with
violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee or of a private individual or
entity. The writ shall cover extralegal killings or disappearances.

Issue: WON the writ of amparo is a correct remedy for the petitioners.

Ruling: No. The writ of amparo does not cover the cause of the petitioners. The threatened
demolition of a dwelling by a virtue of a final judgment of the court is not included among the
enumeration of rights covered by the writ. Also, the factual and legal basis for petitioners claim to
the land in question is not alleged at all in the petition.


G.R. No. 34163 September 18, 1931
GREGORIO PEDRO, petitioner-appellant, vs. THE PROVINCIAL BOARD OF RIZAL, ET AL.,
respondents-appellees.

VILLA-REAL, J.:

This case is before us by virtue of the appeal taken by the petitioner Gregorio Pedro from the
judgment of the Court of First Instance of Rizal dismissing his action for the annulment of an
ordinance, with costs against him.

In support of his appeal, the appellant assigns the following alleged errors as committed by the
trial court in its judgment, to wit:

1. The lower court erred in holding that Ordinance No. 36, series of 1928, approved by the
acting councilors, is valid and legal.

2. The lower court erred in denying the petitioner an acquired right, notwithstanding
Ordinance No. 35 and the permit giving him by the president in accordance therewith.

3. The lower court erred in holding that the opening, maintenance, and operation of the
Galas cockpit is injurious to the consumptive patients of the Santol Sanatorium.

4. The lower court erred in abstaining from making any ruling regarding the legality of the
action taken by the provincial board, suspending the effects of Ordinance No. 35 of the municipal
council of Caloocan, and in finally disapproving it, according to the resolutions enacted by it and
numbered 1135, series of 1928, and 154, series of 1929.

5. The lower court erred in dismissing this case and in not declaring permanent the
injunction sought, and in not sentencing the plaintiffs [respondents] jointly and severally to pay
the damages claimed in the complaint.

The following relevant facts are necessary for the decision of the question raised by the instant
appeal:

On May 8, 1926, there was organized in the municipality of Caloocan, Province of Rizal, an
association for the construction and exploitation of cockpits, called "La Sociedad Bighani."

On May 22, 1926, Eugenio Tansioco, the president of the association, applied to the municipal
president of Caloocan and obtain a permit to construct a building of strong materials at Galas, in
said municipality, to be used as cockpit, upon payment of the proper fees. (Exhibit 1.)

While the construction was under way, Pablo, then president of Caloocan, addressed a
communication to Eugenio Tansioco on June 15, 1926, warning him that the site of the building
was not the one designated by the chief of police, and that it was within the radius of 1,500
meters from the hospital of the Philippine Antituberculosis Society in Santol, in direct
contravention of Ordinance No. 15, series of 1926, enacted on May, 1926.

The permit having been annulled, and the payments theretofore made forfeited, the "Sociedad
Bighani" filed civil case No. 30537 in the Court of First Instance of Manila on September 21, 1926,
against said Pablo Pablo, as municipal president of Caloocan, et al., for a preliminary injunction
requiring them to refrain from impeding or obstructing the operation and exploitation of the
Bighani cockpit, which at that time was completed and ready to be thrown open to the public.

On August 26, 1927, the Court of first Instance of Manila rendered judgment absolving the
defendants from the complaint, which was affirmed by this court on October 15, 1928. (Company
"Bighani" vs. 53 Phil., 886.)

On September 18, 1927, the municipal council of Caloocan enacted Ordinance No. 34, providing in
the first section, among other things, that outside the barrios of Loma, Talipapa, and Novaliches,
where only one cockpit might be established, cockpits might be established at a distance of not
less than 1,500 meters from another licensed cockpit, public schoolhouse, or any hospital or
charitable institution existing within the municipal radius.

As a result of the general election held on June 5, 1928, in the municipality of Caloocan, Rizal, the
municipal council, formerly comprising Pablo Pablo, as president, Blas Bernardino, as vice-
president, and Severino Paganiban, Diego Justo, Esteban Sanchez, Patricio Galuran, Raymundo
Andres, Emiliano Samson, Vicente Sevilla, Lucas Pascual, Placido C. del Mundo, Delfin Rodriguez,
Jorge Nadurata, Anacleto Victoria, Emilio Acab, and Mateo Austria, as councilors, was substituted
by another comprising the newly elected Dominador Aquino, as president, Diego Justo, as vice-
president, and Blas Bernardino, Flaviano de Jesus, Pedro Galang, Celestino C. Celosa, Nicolas
Carpio, Lucas Pascual, Basilio Biglang-awa, and Lucas Bustamante, as councilors, who were
inducted into office on October 16th of that year.

On December 21, 1928, the plaintiff herein, Gregorio Pedro, acquired by absolute sale all the
rights and interests of the "Sociedad Bighani" in the cockpit bearing its name. (Exhibit M.)

On the same date, December 21, 1928, said plaintiff, Gregorio Pedro, addressed a communication
to the municipal council of Caloocan soliciting a permit to open, operate, maintain, and exploit said
cockpit for a period of four years, binding himself to observe to the letter all municipal ordinances
on cockpits. (Exhibit A.)

On December 26, 1928, the municipal council of Caloocan passed resolution No. 202 approving
Ordinance No. 35, series of 1928, amending section 1 of Ordinance No. 34, series of 1927,
providing, among other things that only one cockpit could be established in each of the barrios of
Galas, Loma, Talipapa, and Novaliches, and any other place outside said barrios, provided, in the
latter case, said cockpits are at a distance of not less than 1,000 meters from another licensed
cockpit, and 500 meters from any hospital or charitable institution within the municipality of
Caloocan. (Exhibit C.)

On the same date, December 26, 1928, the municipal councilors of Caloocan, Blas Bernardino,
Flaviano de Jesus, and Pedro Galang, signed and forwarded to the provincial governor of Rizal an
accusation against Dominador Aquino, the municipal president, and the other councilors who
approved Ordinance No. 35, series of 1928, alleging that they had been bribed to vote in favor of
that ordinance. (Exhibit 4.)

The provincial governor endorsed the accusation to the provincial board of Rizal, which through
resolution No. 1110 dated December 27, 1928, ordered the temporary suspension of the members
denounced pending the administrative investigation of the accusation. By virtue of said resolution
No. 1110 of the provincial board of Rizal, and using one of the powers conferred upon him by law,
the provincial governor of Rizal, Eligio Naval, suspended the municipal president and the
denounced members from their respective offices on December 28, 1928. (Exhibits 5 to 5-E.)

On the same date, December 28, 1928, between 9 and 10 o'clock in the morning, the appellant
Gregorio Pedro paid into the municipal treasury the sum of P2,050 as a license fee on his cockpit
for the first quarter of the year 1929, and the proper receipt (Exhibit L), and the permit (Exhibit
D), were issued to him authorizing him to operate, maintain, exploit, and open to the public a day
cockpit in the barrio of Galas, Caloocan, Rizal, for a period of four years.

On December 29, 1928, the municipal council ad interim in Caloocan, passed resolution No. 9,
series of 1928, approving Ordinance No. 36, series of 1928, suspending the effects of resolution
No. 202 of the suspended council, approving Ordinance No. 35, series of 1928, while a special
committee created by the same ordinance investigated the expediency of permitting the
exploitation and opening of the Galas cockpit at the site applied for by the proprietor, Gregorio
Pedro. (Exhibit 6.)

On the same date, December 29, 1928, the provincial board of Rizal passed resolution No. 1135
suspending the effects of resolution No. 202 of the municipal council of Caloocan approving
Ordinance No. 35, series of 1928, pending final decision on the validity of said ordinance by said
board. (Exhibit H.)

On January 16, 1929, the Director of the Santol Tuberculosis Sanatorium addressed a
communication to the temporary president of the municipal council of Caloocan, Flaviano de Jesus,
stating that a cockpit established in the barrio of Galas, owing to the noise and clamor of the
crowd, would retard the recovery of the patients in said sanatorium, and would tend to increase
the danger of spreading the disease among those visiting the cockpit. (Exhibit 11.)

On February 1, 1929, the Chief of the Executive Bureau confirmed the resolution of the provincial
board of Rizal holding the respondents in the administrative investigation mentioned above guilty
of maladministration, and imposing upon each of them a punishment of thirty days' suspension.
(Exhibit 7.)

On the same date, February 1, 1929, following the decision of the Executive Bureau mentioned
above, the provincial board of Rizal, through resolution No. 154, disapproved said resolution No.
202 of the municipal council of Caloocan, approving Ordinance No. 35, series of 1928. (Exhibit 1.)

On February 2, 1929, the president of the third sanitary division of Rizal, acting upon the
appellant's application filed on January 30, 1929, issued a certificate to the effect that after a
proper inspection of the Galas cockpit, he had found it to be in good sanitary condition.

On February 7, 1929, Gregorio Pedro furnished a bond of P10,000 in favor of the municipality of
Caloocan to secure the payment of the fees accruing during the years from 1929 to 1932, which is
the period included in the license issued to him for the opening and operation of his cockpit in
Galas, and this bond was accepted and approved by the respondent municipal president,
Dominador Aquino, and certified by the provincial treasurer, Jose Villegas. (Exhibit E.)

On February 13, 1929, councilor Lucas Bustamante submitted a resolution at a special session of
the municipal council of Caloocan, whereby said council appealed to the Executive Bureau from the
aforementioned resolution No. 154 of the provincial board of Rizal, but the resolution did not pass
owing to the lack of two-thirds of the members necessary, with five members voting in favor and
three against it.

On February 14, 1929, the appellant Gregorio Pedro sent the municipal president of Caloocan a
communication, informing him that having fulfilled all the requirements of the law and the
ordinances then in force, he would open his cockpit in Galas to the public in the morning of
February 17, 1929. (Exhibit J.)

On February 15, 1929, the respondent municipal president of Caloocan addressed a
communication to the appellant Gregorio Pedro informing him that under no circumstance could
said president permit the appellant to open his cockpit in Galas, Caloocan, to the public, for
Ordinance No. 35, series of 1928, under which a permit had been given him to open and exploit
his aforesaid cockpit had been disapproved by the provincial board of Rizal in its resolution No.
154, series of 1928, as a result of which the aforementioned ordinance became null and void.

The first question to decide in this appeal is that raised in the first assignment of error, to wit,
whether Ordinance No. 36, series of 1928, approved by the temporary councilors, is valid.

The appellant argues for the nullity of Ordinance No. 36, series of 1928, approved on December
29, 1928, by the temporary councilors appointed by the provincial governor of Rizal, Eligio Naval,
on the ground that (1) it impairs the acquired rights of said appellant; (2) it was enacted on
account of prejudice, because it was intended for a special and not a general purpose, namely to
prevent, at any cost, the opening, maintenance, and exploitation of the cockpit of the said
petitioner-appellant; and (3) it provides for special committee composed of persons who are not
members of the council, vested them with powers which of their very nature, cannot be delegated
by said council to that committee.

The petitioner-appellant contends that, having obtained the proper permit to maintain, exploit, and
open to the public the cockpit in question, having paid the license fee and fulfilled all the
requirements provided by Ordinance No. 35, series of 1928, he has acquired a right which cannot
be taken away from him by Ordinance No. 36, series of 1928, which was subsequently approved.
This court has already held that an ordinance regulating the functioning of cockpits does not create
irrevocable rights and may be abrogated by another ordinance. (Vinco vs. Municipality of
Hinigaran, 41 Phil., 790; Joaquin vs. Herrera, 37 Phil., 705; 12 Corpus Juris, 958, sec. 494; 37
Corpus Juris, 168.)

The petitioner-appellant also contends that said Ordinance No. 36 was passed due to prejudice
"because it was intended for a special and not a general purpose, namely to prevent, at any cost,
the opening, maintenance, and exploitation of the cockpit of the said petitioner." The aforesaid
Ordinance No. 36 was not approved for the purpose of injuring the petitioner, but to correct an
irregularity consisting in the passage of Ordinance No. 35, which had been enacted to favor the
said petitioner-appellant. The "Sociedad Bighani," from which the herein petitioner-appellant
acquired the ownership of the cockpit here in question, was denied a license to operate it, because
it had been constructed in violation of Ordinance No. 15, series of 1926, later amended by
Ordinance No. 34, series of 1927. The "Sociedad Bighani" instituted proceedings against the
president and municipal council of Caloocan, Rizal, in civil case No. 30537 of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, to prevent said defendants from impeding the operation and exploitation of the
Bighani cockpit, and the court decided in favor of said defendants, absolving them from the
complaint on the ground among other reasons, that the Bighani cockpit had been constructed
within the prohibited distance from the Antitubercular Sanatorium of Santol, and that decision was
affirmed by this court on appeal. (Company "Bighani" vs. Pablo, supra.) The cockpit in question
now is the former Bighani cockpit mentioned above; it occupies the same site; and the same
hygienic reasons which prompted the enactment of Ordinance No. 15, amended by Ordinance No.
34, cited above, exist now; therefore, when this was amended by Ordinance No. 35, reducing the
distance between a cockpit and any hospital, so that the Bighani cockpit would be beyond said
distance, the municipal council which amended it acted with partiality towards a certain person,
namely, the petitioner-appellant, to the prejudice of the patients in the aforesaid sanatorium.
According to Elliot in his work "Municipal Corporations," cited by said petitioner-appellant himself,
said Ordinance No. 35 is void because it is partial. (Elliot, Municipal Corporations, sec. 147; Dillon,
Municipal Corporations, p. 915).

Ordinance No. 36, which seeks to correct said irregularity, suspended the effects of said Ordinance
No. 35, impliedly reestablishing Ordinance No. 34, is therefore valid.

The other reason given by the petitioner-appellant to show that Ordinance No. 36, is void is that
the municipal council in approving it delegated its legislative powers to a special sanitary
committee.

Section 2 of Ordinance No. 36, series of 1928, provides as follows:

SEC. 2. A committee is hereby provided for, to be composed of the president of the third
sanitary division of Caloocan, Rizal, a practising physician residing in this municipality, and a
member of the municipal council, whose duty it shall be to make the necessary investigation to
determine whether or not the exploitation of the cockpit in the barrio of Galas for which Gregorio
Pedro has applied for a permit, would be injurious to any public or private interest. This special
committee shall make such investigation and submit a report in due form to this municipal council
within the shortest time possible for its definite action.

The municipal council of Caloocan pro tempore therefore does not delegate by that ordinance to
the special committee thereby created any legislative function, but only entrusts to it the study of
the effect of the operation and exploitation of the cockpit under consideration upon public and
private interests, in order to determine whether or not the license should issue. Informational work
of this nature, owing to its technical character, may be entrusted to technical committees. (12
Corpus Juris, 846.)

Having arrived at the conclusion that Ordinance No. 36 is valid and that the petitioner-appellant
has acquired no irrevocable right by virtue of the license granted him under Ordinance No. 35,
approved to favor him, which is therefore void, we need not discuss the other assignments of error
by the petitioner-appellant.

Wherefore, we are of opinion and so hold: (1) That a license authorizing the operation and
exploitation of a cockpit is not property of which the holder may not be deprived without due
process of law, but a mere privilege which may be revoked when the public interests so require;
(2) that the work entrusted by a municipal council to a special sanitary committee to make a study
of the sanitary effects upon the neighborhood of the establishment of a cockpit, is not legislative in
character, but only informational, and may be delegated; and (3) that an ordinance, approved by
a municipal council duly constituted, which suspends the effects of another which had been
enacted to favor the grantee of a cockpit license, is valid and legal.

By virtue whereof, finding no error in the judgment appealed from, it is hereby affirmed,
with costs against the appellant. So ordered.

Avancea, C.J., Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Villamor, Ostrand, Romualdez, and Imperial, JJ.,
concur.

CANLAS vs. NAPICO HOMEOWNERS (Reyes, R.T., J.)
GR No. 182795, June 5, 2008

Facts:
-Petitioners are settlers in a certain parcel of land situated in the Brgy. Manggahan, Pasig City.
Their dwellings have either been demolished as of the time of filing of the petition, or is about to
be demolished pursuant to a court judgment.
-Petitioners claim that respondents hold fraudulent and spurious titles. Thus, the petition for writ
of amparo.
-rule on writ of amparo: is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and
security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or
employee or of a private individual or entity. The writ shall cover extralegal killings or
disappearances.

Issue: WON the writ of amparo is a correct remedy for the petitioners.

Ruling: No.
RD: The writ of amparo does not cover the cause of the petitioners. The threatened demolition of a
dwelling by a virtue of a final judgment of the court is not included among the enumeration of
rights covered by the writ. Also, the factual and legal basis for petitioners claim to the land in
question is not alleged at all in the petition.

G.R. No. L-22545 November 28, 1969

BALDOMERO S. LUQUE AND OTHER PASSENGERS FROM THE PROVINCE OF CAVITE AND
BATANGAS; AND PUBLIC SERVICE OPERATORS FILOMENA ABALOS, AND OTHERS,
petitioners,
vs.
HON. ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS, MAYOR OF MANILA; MUNICIPAL BOARD OF MANILA;
MANILA POLICE DEPARTMENT; HON. ENRIQUE MEDINA, PSC COMMISSIONER; PUBLIC
SERVICE COMMISSION; SAULOG TRANSIT, INC.; AND BATANGAS TRANSPORTATION CO.,
INC., respondents.

Samuel Bautista, Arturo J. Clemente, Emigdio Arcilla, Delfin Villanueva and Baldomero S. Luque for
petitioners.
Generoso O. Almario and Paulino S. Gueco for respondents Enrique Medina and The Public Service
Commission.
Graciano C. Regala and Associates for respondents Saulog Transit, Inc. and Batangas
Transportation Co., Inc.
Gregorio A. Ejercito and Felix C. Chavez for respondents Antonio J. Villegas, et al.

SANCHEZ, J.:

Challenged as unconstitutional, illegal and unjust in these original proceedings for certiorari and
mandamus are two substantially identical bus ban measures: (1) Ordinance No. 4986 of the City
of Manila approved on July 13, 1964, entitled "An Ordinance Rerouting Traffic on Roads and
Streets in the City of Manila, and for Other Purposes," and (2) Administrative Order No. 1, series
of 1964, dated February 7, 1964, and Administrative Order No. 3, series of 1964, dated April 21,
1964, both issued by Commissioner Enrique Medina (hereinafter referred to as the Commissioner)
of the Public Service Commission.

Original petitioners are passengers from the provinces of Cavite and Batangas who ride on buses
plying along the routes between the said provinces and Manila. Other petitioners are public service
operators operating PUB and PUJ public service vehicles from the provinces with terminals in
Manila, while the rest are those allegedly operating PUB, PUJ or AC motor vehicles operating within
Manila and suburbs.

Ordinance 4986, amongst others, provides that:

RULE II. ENTRY POINTS AND ROUTES OF PROVINCIAL PASSENGER BUSES AND JEEPNEYS

1. Provincial passenger buses and jeepneys (PUB and PUJ) shall be allowed to enter Manila, but
only through the following entry points and routes, from 6:30 A.M. to 8:30 P.M. every day except
Sundays and holidays:

xxx xxx xxx

(m) Those coming from the south through F. B. Harrison shall proceed to Mabini; turn right to
Harrison Boulevard; turn right to Taft Avenue and proceed towards Pasay City;

(n) Those coming from the south through Taft Avenue shall turn left at Vito Cruz; turn right to
Dakota; turn right to Harrison Boulevard; turn right to Taft Avenue; thence proceed towards Pasay
City;

Loading and unloading shall be allowed only at Harrison Boulevard, between A. Mabini and Taft
Avenue;

xxx xxx xxx

RULE III. FLEXIBLE SHUTTLE BUS SERVICE

1. In order that provincial commuters shall not be unduly inconvenienced as a result of the
implementation of these essential traffic control regulations, operators of provincial passenger
buses shall be allowed to provide buses to shuttle their passengers from their respective entry
control points, under the following conditions:

(a) Each provincial bus company or firm shall be allowed such number of shuttle buses
proportionate to the number of units authorized it, the ratio to be determined by the Chief, Traffic
Control Bureau, based on his observations as to the actual needs of commuters and traffic volume;
in no case shall the allocation be more than one shuttle bus for every 10 authorized units, or
fraction thereof.

(b) No shuttle bus shall enter Manila unless the same shall have been provided with identification
stickers as required under Rule IV hereof, which shall be furnished and allocated by the Chief,
Traffic Control Bureau to each provincial bus company or firm.

(c) All such shuttle buses are not permitted to load or unload or to pick and/or drop passengers
along the way but must do so only in the following places:

xxx xxx xxx

(3) South

(a) Harrison Boulevard, between Dakota and Taft Avenue.

Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1964, issued by the Commissioner, in part, provides:

2. All public utilities including jeepneys heretofore authorized to operate from the City of Manila to
any point in Luzon, beyond the perimeter of Greater Manila, shall carry the words "For Provincial
Operation" in bold and clear types on both sides or on one side and at the back of the vehicle and
must not be less than 12 inches in dimension. All such vehicles marked "For Provincial Operation"
are authorized to operate outside the perimeter of Greater Manila in accordance with their
respective certificates of public convenience, and are not authorized to enter or to operate beyond
the boundary line fixed in our order of March 12, 1963 and July 22, 1963, with the exception of
those vehicles authorized to carry their provincial passengers thru the boundary line up to their
Manila terminal which shall be identified by a sticker signed and furnished by the PSC and by the
Mayors of the affected Cities and municipalities, and which shall be carried on a prominent place of
the vehicle about the upper middle part of the windshield.

xxx xxx xxx

All such public utility vehicles authorized by this Order to enter the City of Manila and to carry their
passengers thru the boundary line, are not permitted to load or unload or to pick and/or drop
passengers along the way, but must do so only in the following places:

xxx xxx xxx

c. Vehicles coming from the SOUTH may load or unload at the San Andres-Taft Rotonda; at Plaza
Lawton or at the Corner of Harrison and Mabini Streets near the Manila Zoo.

On April 21, 1964, the Commissioner issued Administrative Order No. 3 which resolved motions for
reconsideration (of the first administrative order Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1964)
filed by several affected operators. This order (No. 3), amongst others, states that only 10% of the
provincial buses and jeepneys shall be allowed to enter Manila; however, provincial buses and
jeepneys "operating within a radius of 50 kms. from Manila City Hall and whose business is more
on the Manila end than on the provincial end are given fifteen per cent to prevent a dislocation of
their business; provided that operators having less than five units are not permitted to cross the
boundary and shall operate exclusively on the provincial end." This order also allocated the
number of units each provincial bus operator is allowed to operate within the City of Manila.

1. On the main, nothing new there is in the present petition. For, the validity of Ordinance 4986
and the Commissioner's Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1964, here challenged, has
separately passed judicial tests in two cases brought before this Court.

In Lagman vs. City of Manila (June 30, 1966), 17 SCRA 579, petitioner Lagman was an operator of
PU auto trucks with fixed routes and regular terminals for the transportation of passengers and
freight on the Bocaue (Bulacan) Paraaque (Rizal) line via Rizal Avenue, Plaza Goiti, Sta. Cruz
Bridge, Plaza Lawton, P. Burgos, Taft Avenue, and Taft Avenue Extension, Manila. He sought to
prohibit the City of Manila, its officers and agents, from enforcing Ordinance 4986. His ground was
that said ordinance was unconstitutional, illegal, ultra vires and null and void. He alleged, amongst
others, that (1) "the power conferred upon respondent City of Manila, under said Section 18 (hh)
of Republic Act No. 409, as amended, does not include the right to enact an ordinance such as the
one in question, which has the effect of amending or modifying a certificate of public convenience
granted by the Public Service Commission, because any amendment or modification of said
certificate is solely vested by law in the latter governmental agency, and only after notice and
hearing (Sec. 16 [m], Public Service Act); but since this procedure was not adopted or followed by
respondents in enacting the disputed ordinance, the same is likewise illegal and null and void"; (2)
"the enforcement of said ordinance is arbitrary, oppressive and unreasonable because the city
streets from which he had been prevented to operate his buses are the cream of his business";
and (3) "even assuming that Ordinance No. 4986 is valid, it is only the Public Service Commission
which can require compliance with its provisions (Sec. 17[j], Public Service Act), but since its
implementation is without the sanction or approval of the Commission, its enforcement is also
unauthorized and illegal." This Court, in a decision impressive because of its unanimity, upheld the
ordinance. Speaking through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, we ruled:

First, as correctly maintained by respondents, Republic Act No. 409, as amended, otherwise known
as the Revised Charter of the City of Manila, is a special law and of later enactment than
Commonwealth Act No. 548 and the Public Service Law (Commonwealth Act No. 146, as
amended), so that even if conflict exists between the provisions of the former act and the latter
acts, Republic Act No. 409 should prevail over both Commonwealth Acts Nos. 548 and 146. In
Cassion vs. Banco Nacional Filipino, 89 Phil. 560, 561, this Court said:

". . . for with or without an express enactment it is a familiar rule of statutory construction that to
the extent of any necessary repugnancy between a general and a special law or provision, the
latter will control the former without regard to the respective dates of passage."

It is to be noted that Commonwealth Act No. 548 does not confer an exclusive power or authority
upon the Director of Public Works, subject to the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, to promulgate rules and regulations relating to the use of and traffic on national
roads or streets. This being the case, section 18 (hh) of the Manila Charter is deemed enacted as
an exception to the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 548.

xxx xxx xxx

Second, the same situation holds true with respect to the provision of the Public Service Act.
Although the Public Service Commission is empowered, under its Section 16(m), to amend, modify
or revoke certificates of public convenience after notice and hearing, yet there is no provision,
specific or otherwise, which can be found in this statute (Commonwealth Act No. 146) vesting
power in the Public Service Commission to superintend, regulate, or control the streets of
respondent City or suspend its power to license or prohibit the occupancy thereof. On the other
hand, this right or authority, as hereinabove concluded is conferred upon respondent City of
Manila. The power vested in the Public Service Commission under Section 16(m) is, therefore,
subordinate to the authority granted to respondent City, under said section 18 (hh). . . .

xxx xxx xxx

That the powers conferred by law upon the Public Service Commission were not designed to deny
or supersede the regulatory power of local governments over motor traffic, in the streets subject
to their control is made evident by section 17 (j) of the Public Service Act (Commonwealth Act No.
146) that provides as follows:

"SEC. 17. Proceedings of Commission without previous hearing. The Commission shall have
power, without previous hearing, subject to established limitations and exceptions, and saving
provisions to the contrary:

xxx xxx xxx.

(j) To require any public service to comply with the laws of the Philippines, and with any provincial
resolution or municipal ordinance relating thereto, and to conform to the duties imposed upon it
thereby, or by the provisions of its own charter, whether obtained under any general or special law
of the Philippines." (Emphasis supplied)

The petitioner's contention that, under this section, the respective ordinances of the City can only
be enforced by the Commission alone is obviously unsound. Subsection (j) refers not only to
ordinances but also to "the laws of the Philippines," and it is plainly absurd to assume that even
laws relating to public services are to remain a dead letter without the placet of the Commission;
and the section makes no distinction whatever between enforcement of laws and that of municipal
ordinances.

The very fact, furthermore, that the Commission is empowered, but not required, to demand
compliance with apposite laws and ordinances proves that the Commission's powers are merely
supplementary to those of state organs, such as the police, upon which the enforcement of laws
primarily rests.

Third, the implementation of the ordinance in question cannot be validly assailed as arbitrary,
oppressive and unreasonable. Aside from the fact that there is no evidence to substantiate this
charge it is not disputed that petitioner has not been totally banned or prohibited from operating
all his buses, he having been allowed to operate two (2) "shuttle" buses within the city limits.1

The second case for certiorari and prohibition, filed by same petitioner in the first case just
mentioned, is entitled "Lagman vs. Medina" (December 24, 1968), 26 SCRA 442. Put at issue
there is the validity of the Commissioner's Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1964, also
disputed herein. It was there alleged, inter alia, that "the provisions of the bus ban had not been
incorporated into his certificate of public convenience"; "to be applicable to a grantee of such
certificate subsequently to the issuance of the order establishing the ban, there should be a
decision, not merely by the Commissioner, but, also, by the PSC, rendered after due notice and
hearing, based upon material changes in the facts and circumstances under which the certificate
had been granted"; and "the ban is unfair, unreasonable and oppressive." We dismissed this
petition and upheld the validity of the questioned order of the Commissioner. On the aforequoted
issues, Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, speaking for an equally unanimous Court, said

Petitioner's claim is devoid of merit, inasmuch as:

1. The terms and conditions of the bus ban established by the Commissioner are substantially
identical to those contained in Ordinance No. 4986 of the City of Manila 'rerouting traffic on roads
and streets' therein, approved on July 30, 1964. In G.R. No. L-23305, entitled "Lagman vs. City of
Manila, petitioner herein assailed the validity of said ordinance," upon the ground, among others,
that it tended to amend or modify certificates of public conveniences issued by the PSC; that the
power therein exercised by the City of Manila belongs to the PSC; and that the ordinance is
arbitrary, oppressive and unreasonable. In a decision promulgated on June 30, 1966, this Court
rejected this pretense and dismissed Lagman's petition in said case.

2. Petitioner's certificate of public convenience, like all other similar certificates, was issued subject
to the condition that operators shall observe and comply [with] . . . all the rules and regulations of
the Commission relative to PUB service," and the contested orders issued pursuant to Sections
13 (a), 16 (g) and 17 (a) of Commonwealth Act 146, as amended partake of the nature of such
rules and regulations.

xxx xxx xxx

4. The purpose of the ban to minimize the "traffic problem in the City of Manila" and the "traffic
congestion, delays and even accidents" resulting from the free entry into the streets of said City
and the operation "around said streets, loading and unloading or picking up passengers and
cargoes" of PU buses in great "number and size" and the letter and spirit of the contested
orders are inconsistent with the exclusion of Lagman or of those granted certificates of public
convenience subsequently to the issuance of said orders from the operation thereof.

xxx xxx xxx

9. The theory to the effect that, to be valid, the aforementioned orders must be issued by the PSC,
not merely by its Commissioner, and only after due notice and hearing, is predicated upon the
premise that the bus ban operates as an amendment of petitioner's certificate of public
convenience, which is false, and was not sustained by this Court in its decision in G.R. No. L-
23305, which is binding upon Lagman, he being the petitioner in said case.2

The issues raised by Lagman in the two cases just mentioned were likewise relied upon by the
petitioners in the case now before us. But for the fact that the present petitioners raised other
issues, we could have perhaps written finis to the present case. The obvious reason is that we find
no cause or reason why we should break away from our ruling in said cases. Petitioners herein,
however, draw our attention to points which are not specifically ruled upon in the Lagman cases
heretofore mentioned.

2. Petitioners' other gripe against Ordinance 4986 is that it destroys vested rights of petitioning
public services to operate inside Manila and to proceed to their respective terminals located in the
City. They would want likewise to nullify said ordinance upon the averment that it impairs the
vested rights of petitioning bus passengers to be transported directly to downtown Manila.

It has been said that a vested right is one which is "fixed, unalterable, or irrevocable."3 Another
definition would give vested right the connotation that it is "absolute, complete, and unconditional,
to the exercise of which no obstacle exists . . . ."4 Petitioners' citation from 16 C.J.S., pp. 642-
643,5 correctly expresses the view that when the "right to enjoyment, present or prospective, has
become the property of some particular person or persons as a present interest," that right is a
vested right. Along the same lines is our jurisprudential concept. Thus, in Benguet Consolidated
Mining Co. vs. Pineda,6 we put forth the thought that a vested right is "some right or interest in
the property which has become fixed and established, and is no longer open to doubt or
controversy"; it is an "immediate fixed right of present and future enjoyment"; it is to be contra-
distinguished from a right that is "expectant or contingent." The Benguet case also quoted from 16
C.J.S., Sec. 215, pp. 642-643, as follows: "Rights are vested when the right to enjoyment, present
or prospective, has become the property of some particular person or persons as a present
interest. The right must be absolute, complete, and unconditional, independent of a contingency,
and a mere expectancy of future benefit, or a contingent interest in property founded on
anticipated continuance of existing laws, does not constitute a vested right. So, inchoate rights
which have not been acted on are not vested."7

Of course, whether a right is vested or not, much depends upon the environmental facts.8

Contending that they possess valid and subsisting certificates of public convenience, the
petitioning public services aver that they acquired a vested right to operate their public utility
vehicles to and from Manila as appearing in their said respective certificates of public convenience.

Petitioner's argument pales on the face of the fact that the very nature of a certificate of public
convenience is at cross purposes with the concept of vested rights. To this day, the accepted view,
at least insofar as the State is concerned, is that "a certificate of public convenience constitutes
neither a franchise nor a contract, confers no property right, and is a mere license or privilege."9
The holder of such certificate does not acquire a property right in the route covered thereby. Nor
does it confer upon the holder any proprietary right or interest of franchise in the public
highways.10 Revocation of this certificate deprives him of no vested right.11 Little reflection is
necessary to show that the certificate of public convenience is granted with so many strings
attached. New and additional burdens, alteration of the certificate, and even revocation or
annulment thereof is reserved to the State.

We need but add that the Public Service Commission, a government agency vested by law with
"jurisdiction, supervision, and control over all public services and their franchises, equipment, and
other properties"12 is empowered, upon proper notice and hearing, amongst others: (1) "[t]o
amend, modify or revoke at any time a certificate issued under the provisions of this Act
[Commonwealth Act 146, as amended], whenever the facts and circumstances on the strength of
which said certificate was issued have been misrepresented or materially changed";13 and (2)
"[t]o suspend or revoke any certificate issued under the provisions of this Act whenever the holder
thereof has violated or wilfully and contumaciously refused to comply with any order, rule or
regulation of the Commission or any provision of this Act: Provided, That the Commission, for good
cause, may prior to the hearing suspend for a period not to exceed thirty days any certificate or
the exercise of any right or authority issued or granted under this Act by order of the Commission,
whenever such step shall in the judgment of the Commission be necessary to avoid serious and
irreparable damage or inconvenience to the public or to private interests."14 Jurisprudence echoes
the rule that the Commission is authorized to make reasonable rules and regulations for the
operation of public services and to enforce them.15 In reality, all certificates of public convenience
issued are subject to the condition that all public services "shall observe and comply [with] ... all
the rules and regulations of the Commission relative to" the service.16 To further emphasize the
control imposed on public services, before any public service can "adopt, maintain, or apply
practices or measures, rules, or regulations to which the public shall be subject in its relation with
the public service," the Commission's approval must first be had.17

And more. Public services must also reckon with provincial resolutions and municipal ordinances
relating to the operation of public utilities within the province or municipality concerned. The
Commission can require compliance with these provincial resolutions or municipal ordinances.18

Illustrative of the lack of "absolute, complete, and unconditional" right on the part of public
services to operate because of the delimitations and restrictions which circumscribe the privilege
afforded a certificate of public convenience is the following from the early (March 31, 1915)
decision of this Court in Fisher vs. Yangco Steamship Company, 31 Phil. 1, 18-19:

Common carriers exercise a sort of public office, and have duties to perform in which the public is
interested. Their business is, therefore, affected with a public interest, and is subject of public
regulation. (New Jersey Steam Nav. Co. vs. Merchants Banks, 6 How. 344, 382; Munn vs. Illinois,
94 U.S. 113, 130.) Indeed, this right of regulation is so far beyond question that it is well settled
that the power of the state to exercise legislative control over railroad companies and other
carriers 'in all respects necessary to protect the public against danger, injustice and oppression'
may be exercised through boards of commissioners. (New York, etc. R. Co. vs. Bristol, 151 U.S.
556, 571; Connecticut, etc. R. Co. vs. Woodruff, 153 U.S. 689.).

xxx xxx xxx

. . . . The right to enter the public employment as a common carrier and to offer one's services to
the public for hire does not carry with it the right to conduct that business as one pleases, without
regard to the interests of the public and free from such reasonable and just regulations as may be
prescribed for the protection of the public from the reckless or careless indifference of the carrier
as to the public welfare and for the prevention of unjust and unreasonable discrimination of any
kind whatsoever in the performance of the carrier's duties as a servant of the public.

Business of certain kinds, including the business of a common carrier, holds such a peculiar
relation to the public interest that there is superinduced upon it the right of public regulation.
(Budd vs. New York, 143 U.S. 517, 533.) When private property is "affected with a public interest
it ceases to be juris privati only." Property becomes clothed with a public interest when used in a
manner to make it of public consequence and affect the community at large. "When, therefore,
one devotes his property to a use in which the public has an interest, he, in effect, grants to the
public an interest in that use, and must submit to be controlled by the public for the common
good, to the extent of the interest he has thus created. He may withdraw his grant by
discontinuing the use, but so long as he maintains the use he must submit to control." (Munn vs.
Illinois, 94 U.S. 113; Georgia R. & Bkg. Co. vs. Smith, 128 U.S. 174; Budd vs. New York, 143 U.S.
517; Louisville, etc. Ry. Co. vs. Kentucky, 161 U.S. 677, 695.).

The foregoing, without more, rejects the vested rights theory espoused by petitioning bus
operators.

Very little need be added to show that neither do bus passengers have a vested right to be
transported directly into the City of Manila. It would suffice if a statement be here made that the
alleged right of bus passengers, to a great extent, is dependent upon the manner public services
are allowed to operate within a given area. Because, regulations imposed upon public services
directly affect the bus passengers. It is quite obvious that if buses were allowed to load or unload
solely at specific or designated places, a passenger cannot legally demand or insist that the
operator load or unload him at a place other than those specified or designated.

It is no argument to support the vested rights theory that petitioning passengers have enjoyed the
privilege of having been continuously transported even before the outbreak of the war directly
without transfer from the provinces to places inside Manila up to the respective bus terminals in
said City. Times have changed. Vehicles have increased in number. Traffic congestion has moved
from bad to worse, from tolerable to critical. The number of people who use the thoroughfares has
multiplied.

3. It is because of all of these that it has become necessary for the police power of the State to
step in, not for the benefit of the few, but for the benefit of the many. Reasonable restrictions
have to be provided for the use of the thoroughfares.19 The operation of public services may be
subjected to restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort.20 No franchise or
right can be availed of to defeat the proper exercise of police power21 the authority "to enact
rules and regulations for the promotion of the general welfare." 22 So it is, that by the exercise of
the police power, which is a continuing one, a business lawful today may in the future, because of
the changed situation, the growth of population or other causes, become a menace to the public
health and welfare, and be required to yield to the public good."23 Public welfare, we have said,
lies at the bottom of any regulatory measure designed "to relieve congestion of traffic, which is, to
say the least, a menace to public safety."24 As a corollary, measures calculated to promote the
safety and convenience of the people using the thoroughfares by the regulation of vehicular traffic,
present a proper subject for the exercise of police power.25

Both Ordinance 4986 and the Commissioner's administrative orders fit into the concept of
promotion of the general welfare. Expressive of the purpose of Ordinance 4986 is Section 1
thereof, thus "As a positive measure to relieve the critical traffic congestion in the City of
Manila, which has grown to alarming and emergency proportions, and in the best interest of public
welfare and convenience, the following traffic rules and regulations are hereby promulgated."
Along the same lines, the bus ban instituted by the Commissioner has for its object "to minimize
the 'traffic problem in the City of Manila' and the 'traffic congestion, delays and even accidents'
resulting from the free entry into the streets of said City and the operation 'around said streets,
loading and unloading or picking up passengers and cargoes' of PU buses in great 'number and
size.'"26

Police power in both was properly exercised.

4. We find no difficulty in saying that, contrary to the assertion made by petitioners, Ordinance
4986 is not a class legislation.

It is true that inter-urban buses are allowed to enter the City of Manila, while provincial buses are
not given the same privilege, although they are allowed shuttle service into the City of Manila.
There is no point, however, in placing provincial buses on the same level as the inter-urban buses
plying to and from Manila and its suburban towns and cities (Makati, Pasay, Mandaluyong,
Caloocan, San Juan, Quezon City and Navotas). Inter-urban buses are used for transporting
passengers only. Provincial buses are used for passengers and freight. Provincial buses, because of
the freight or baggage which the passengers usually bring along with them, take longer time to
load or unload than inter-urban buses. Provincial buses generally travel along national highways
and provincial roads, cover long distances, have fixed trip schedules. Provincial buses are greater
in size and weight than inter-urban buses. The routes of inter-urban buses are short, covering
contiguous municipalities and cities only. Inter-urban buses mainly use city and municipal streets.

These distinctions generally hold true between provincial passenger jeepneys and inter-urban
passenger jeepneys.

No unjustified discrimination there is under the law.

The obvious inequality in treatment is but the result flowing from the classification made by the
ordinance and does not trench upon the equal protection clause.27 The least that can be said is
that persons engaged in the same business "are subjected to different restrictions or are held
entitled to different privileges under the same conditions."28

Neither is there merit to the charge that private vehicles are being unjustifiably favored over public
vehicles. Private vehicles are not geared for profit, usually have but one destination. Public
vehicles are operated primarily for profit and for this reason are continually operated to make the
most of time. Public and private vehicles belong to different classes. Differences in class beget
differences in privileges. And petitioners have no cause to complain.

The principles just enunciated have long been recognized. In Ichong vs. Hernandez,29 our ruling is
that the equal protection of the law clause "does not demand absolute equality amongst residents;
it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions
both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced"; and, that the equal protection clause "is
not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it
applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction
between those who fall within such class and those who do not."30
FOR THE REASONS GIVEN, the petition herein is denied.
Costs against petitioners. So ordered.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee and
Barredo, JJ., concur.

US vs. Toribio

Facts: Respondent Toribio is an owner of carabao, residing in the town of Carmen in the province
of Bohol. The trial court of Bohol found that the respondent slaughtered or caused to be
slaughtered a carabao without a permit from the municipal treasurer of the municipality wherein it
was slaughtered, in violation of Sections 30 and 33 of Act No. 1147, an Act regulating the
registration, branding, and slaughter of Large Cattle. The act prohibits the slaughter of large cattle
fit for agricultural work or other draft purposes for human consumption.

The respondent counters by stating that what the Act is (1) prohibiting is the slaughter of large
cattle in the municipal slaughter house without a permit given by the municipal treasurer.
Furthermore, he contends that the municipality of Carmen has no slaughter house and that he
slaughtered his carabao in his dwelling, (2) the act constitutes a taking of property for public use
in the exercise of the right of eminent domain without providing for the compensation of owners,
and it is an undue and unauthorized exercise of police power of the state for it deprives them of
the enjoyment of their private property.

Issue: Whether or not Act. No. 1147, regulating the registration, branding and slaughter of large
cattle, is an undue and unauthorized exercise of police power.

Held: It is a valid exercise of police power of the state.

Police power is the inherent power of the state to legislate laws which may interfere with personal
liberties. To justify the state in the exercise of its sovereign police power it must appear (1) that
the interest of the general public requires it and (2) that the means are reasonably necessary for
the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.

The court is of the opinion that the act applies generally to the slaughter of large cattle for human
consumption, ANYWHERE, without a permit duly secured from the municipal treasurer, For to do
otherwise is to defeat the purpose of the law and the intent of the law makers. The act primarily
seeks to protect large cattle against theft to make it easy for the recovery and return to owners,
which encouraged them to regulate the registration and slaughter of large cattle.

Several years prior to the enactment of the said law, an epidemic struck the Philippine islands
which threatened the survival of carabaos in the country. In some provinces seventy, eighty and
even one hundred percent of their local carabaos perished due to the said epidemic. This drove the
prices of carabaos up to four or five-fold, as a consequence carabao theft became rampant due to
the luxurious prices of these work animals. Moreover, this greatly affected the food production of
the country which prompted the government to import rice from its neighboring countries.

As these work animals are vested with public interest for they are of fundamental use for the
production of crops, the government was prompted to pass a law that would protect these work
animals. The purpose of the law is to stabilize the number of carabaos in the country as well as to
redistribute them throughout the entire archipelago. It was also the same reason why large cattles
fit for farm work was prohibited to be slaughtered for human consumption. Most importantly, the
respondents carabao was found to be fit for farm work.

These reasons satisfy the requisites for the valid exercise of police power.

Act No. 1147 is not an exercise of the inherent power of eminent domain. The said law does not
constitute the taking of carabaos for public purpose; it just serves as a mere regulation for the
consumption of these private properties for the protection of general welfare and public interest.
Thus, the demand for compensation of the owner must fail.














US vs. Toribio

FACTS:
Luis Toribio slaughtered for human consumption a Carabao without a permit from the
municipal treasurer violating Act 1147
o Act 1147, Sec. 30. No large cattle shall be slaughtered or killed for food at
the municipal slaughterhouse except upon permit secured from the
municipal treasurer
o Act 1147, Sec. 31. No permit to slaughter carabaos shall be granted by the
municipal treasurer unless such animals are unfit for agricultural work or
for draft purposes
Application of Toribio for a permit was denied since animal was not
found to be unfit for agricultural work or draft purposes.
It is contended by Toribio that statute is applicable only to slaughter done in a municipal
slaughterhouse and that the statute is unconstitutional sine it penalizes the slaughter of
carabaos without a permit amounting to a taking by the government of the right of the
person over his property amounting to an exercise of eminent domain without just
compensation or an undue exercise of police power by the State.

ISSUE:

1. W/N the statute is applicable only to slaughter done in a municipal slaughterhouse

The statute seeks to protect the large cattle of the Philippines from theft and to
make easy their recovery by providing an elaborate and compulsory system of
branding and registration
By limiting the application of the statue to those done only in the municipal
slaughterhouse, the purpose of the article is greatly impaired if not totally
destroyed since these animals could now be slaughtered for human consumption
without need of showing proof of ownership.
Statute should be construed so as to give effect to the manifest intent of the
lawmaker and promote the object for which the statue was enacted.
Statute therefore prohibits and penalizes the slaughter of large cattle for
human consumption anywhere without the permit provided for in the Act.

2. W/N the statute is unconstitutional
Because of the statue the use and enjoyment of the owners over their cattle are in
a way impaired therefore it is not a taking but a just restraint of injurious
private use of property police power of the State.
Rights of property, like all other social and conventional rights, are subject to such
reasonable limitations in their enjoyment as shall prevent them from being
injurious (to the equal enjoyment of others having an equal right to the enjoyment
of their property or to the rights of the community), and to such reasonable
restraints and regulations established by law, as the legislature, under the
governing and controlling power vested in them by the constitution, may thing
necessary and expedient.
Disease threatened the total extinction of carabaos in the Philippines resulting in
famine from the insufficiency of work animals to cultivate the fields.
o Given these circumstances and conditions, the general welfare
necessitated the enactment of the statute
To justify the exercise of police power of the state: first, that
the interests of those of a particular class require such
interference; and second, that the means are reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not
unduly oppressive upon individuals.

CHURCHILL vs. RAFFERTY, G.R. NO. L-10572, December 21, 1915 ( 32 Phil 580)
FACTS:
Plaintiffs put up a billboard on private land in Rizal Province "quite a distance from the road and
strongly built". Some residents (German and British Consuls) find it offensive. Act # 2339 allows
the defendent, the Collector of Internal Revenue, to collect taxes from such property and to
remove it when it is offensive to sight. Court of first Instance prohibited the defendant to collect or
remove the billboard.

ISSUE:
1.May the courts restrain by injunction the collection of taxes?

2.Is Act # 2339 unconstitutional because it deprives property without due process of law in
allowing CIR to remove it if it is offensive?

RULE:
1.an injunction is an extraordinary remedy and not to be used if there is an adequate remedy
provided by law; here there is an adequate remedy, therefore court may not do so.

2.unsightly advertisements which are offensive to the sight are not dissociated from the general
welfare of the public, therefore can be regulated by police power, and act is constitutional.

RATIONALE:
1.Writ of injunction by the courts is an extraordinary preventive remedy. Ordinary (adequate)
remedies are in the law itself. Sections 139 and 140 of the Act forbids the use of injunction and
provides a remedy for any wrong. _Plaintiffs say that those sections are unconstitutional because
by depriving taxpayers remedy, it also deprives them of property without due process of law and it
diminishes the power of the courts_. Taxes, whether legal or illegal, cannot be restrained by the
courts by injunction. There must be a further showing that there are special circumstances such as
irreparable injury, multiplicity of suits or a cloud upon title to real estate will result. Practically, if
the courts can do so then there will be an insane number of suits enjoining the collection of taxes
by tax avoiders. The state will not function since taxes are not paid (and judges will become
unpaid!). There is, of course, no law nor jurisprudence that says it is not allowed to sue after
having paid the tax, and such is the usual course in bringing suits against illegal(?) taxes. Pay it
under protest. As to the diminishment of power of the courts, the Philippine courts never had the
power to restrain the collection of taxes by injunction. It is said par 2 sec 56 Act 136 confers
original jurisdiction upon CFI to hear and determine all civil actions but civil actions at that time
had a well-defined meaning. The legislature had already defined the only action previously and
that is the payment of the tax under protest then suit. Civil actions like injunction suits are of a
special extraordinary character. Section 139 also does not diminish power of the courts because
the power is still there if there is no adequate remedy available but sec 140 gives an adequate
remedy.

2.sec 100 of act 2339 gives power to the CIR to remove offensive billboards, signs, signboards
after due invstigation. The question becomes is that a reasonable exercise of police power
affecting the advertising industry? Police power is reasonable insofar as it properly considers public
health, safety, comfort, etc. If nothing can justify a statute, it's void. State may interfere in public
interest but not final. Court is final. Police power has been expanding. blahblahblah (consti1). The
basic idea of civil polity in US is gov't should interfere with individual effort only to the extent
necessary to preserve a healthy social and economic condition of society. State interferes with
private property through, taxation, eminent domain and police power. Only under the last are the
benefits derived from the maintenance of a healthy economic standard of society and aka damnum
absque injuria. Once police power was reserved for common nuisances. Now industry is organized
along lines which make it possible for large combinations of capital to profit at the expense of
socio-economic progress of the nation by controlling prices and dictating to industrial workers
wages and conditions of labor. It has increased the toll on life and affects public health, safety and
morals, also general social and economic life of the nation, as such state must necessarily regulate
industries. Various industries have regulated and even offensive noises and smells coming from
those industries. Those noises and smells though ostensibly regulated for health reason are
actually regulated for more aesthetic reasons. What is more aesthetic than sight which the ad
industry is wooing us with. Ads cover landscapes etc. The success of billboards lie not upon the
use of private property but on channels of travel used by the general public. Billboard that cannot
be seen by people are useless. Billboards are legitimate, they are not garbage but can be offensive
in certain circumstances. Other courts in US hold the view that police power cannot interfere with
private property rights for purely aesthetic purposes. But this court is of the opinion that unsightly
advertisements which are offensive to the sight are not dissociated from the general welfare of the
public.

CHURCHILL vs. RAFFERTY, G.R. NO. L-10572, December 21, 1915 ( 32 Phil 580)

Facts: The case arises from the fact that defendant, Collector of Internal Revenue, would like to
destroy or remove any sign, signboard, or billboard, the property of the plaintiffs, for the sole
reason that such sign, signboard, or billboard is, or may be offensive to the sight. The plaintiffs
allege otherwise.

Issue: Was there valid exercise of police power in this case?

Held: Yes. There can be no doubt that the exercise of the police power of the Philippine
Government belongs to the Legislature and that this power is limited only by the Acts of Congress
and those fundamentals principles which lie at the foundation of all republican forms of
government. An Act of the Legislature which is obviously and undoubtedly foreign to any of the
purposes of the police power and interferes with the ordinary enjoyment of property would,
without doubt, be held to be invalid. But where the Act is reasonably within a proper consideration
of and care for the public health, safety, or comfort, it should not be disturbed by the courts.
"The power vested in the legislature by the constitution to make, ordain, and establish all manner
of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not
repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the
commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same."
"The police power of the State, so far, has not received a full and complete definition. It may be
said, however, to be the right of the State, or state functionary, to prescribe regulations for the
good order, peace, health, protection, comfort, convenience and morals of the community, which
do not ... violate any of the provisions of the organic law."
"It [the police power] has for its object the improvement of social and economic conditioned
affecting the community at large and collectively with a view to bring about "he greatest good of
the greatest number."Courts have consistently and wisely declined to set any fixed limitations
upon subjects calling for the exercise of this power. It is elastic and is exercised from time to time
as varying social conditions demand correction."
"It may be said in a general way that the police power extends to all the great public needs. It
may be put forth in aid of what is sanctioned by usage, or held by the prevailing morality or strong
and preponderant opinion to be greatly and immediately necessary to the public welfare."
"It is much easier to perceive and realize the existence and sources of this police power than to
mark its boundaries, or to prescribe limits to its exercise."

Rubi v. Provincial Board 39 Phil 660

Facts:
The Provincial Board of Mindoro adopted a resolution which required all Mangyans to stay in one
permanent settlement. The said resolution was approved by the Secretary of Interior as required
under Sec. 2145 of the Revised Administrative Code. This provision authorized the establishment
of non-Christian sites to be selected by the provincial governor. Sec. 2145 of the RAC is now
herein assailed on ground that it is an unlawful delegation of legislative power to the provincial
officials.

Issue: Whether or not Sec. 2145 of the RAC is valid

The provision is valid, as an exception to the general rule. The legislature is permitted to delegate
legislative powers to the local authorities on matters that are of purely local concerns.


















RUBI VS. PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO [39 PHIL 660; NO. 14078; 7 MAR 1919]

Facts: The provincial board of Mindoro adopted resolution No. 25 whferein non-Christian
inhabitants (uncivilized tribes) will be directed to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied
public lands. It is resolved that under section 2077 of the Administrative Code, 800 hectares of
public land in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake be selected as a site for the permanent
settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro. Further, Mangyans may only solicit homesteads on this
reservation providing that said homestead applications are previously recommended by the
provincial governor.

In that case, pursuant to Section 2145 of the Revised Administrative Code, all the Mangyans in the
townships of Naujan and Pola and the Mangyans east of the Baco River including those in the
districts of Dulangan and Rubi's place in Calapan, were ordered to take up their habitation on the
site of Tigbao, Naujan Lake. Also, that any Mangyan who shall refuse to comply with this order
shall upon conviction be imprisoned not exceed in sixty days, in accordance with section 2759 of
the revised Administrative Code.

Said resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro were claimed as necessary measures for the
protection of the Mangyanes of Mindoro as well as the protection of public forests in which they
roam, and to introduce civilized customs among them.

It appeared that Rubi and those living in his rancheria have not fixed their dwelling within the
reservation of Tigbao and are liable to be punished.

It is alleged that the Manguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the provincial
officials of that province. Rubi and his companions are said to be held on the reservation
established at Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, and one Dabalos is said to be held under the
custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run away form the reservation.

Issue: Whether or Not Section 2145 of the Administrative Code deprive a person of his liberty pf
abode. Thus, WON Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional.

Held: The Court held that section 2145 of the Administrative Code does not deprive a person of
his liberty of abode and does not deny to him the equal protection of the laws, and that
confinement in reservations in accordance with said section does not constitute slavery and
involuntary servitude. The Court is further of the opinion that section 2145 of the Administrative
Code is a legitimate exertion of the police power. Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917
is constitutional.

Assigned as reasons for the action: (1) attempts for the advancement of the non-Christian people
of the province; and (2) the only successfully method for educating the Manguianes was to oblige
them to live in a permanent settlement. The Solicitor-General adds the following; (3) The
protection of the Manguianes; (4) the protection of the public forests in which they roam; (5) the
necessity of introducing civilized customs among the Manguianes.

One cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered without when the degree of
civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own good and the
general good of the Philippines.

Liberty regulated by law": Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of the individual
and for the greater good of the peace and order of society and the general well-being. No man can
do exactly as he pleases.

None of the rights of the citizen can be taken away except by due process of law.

Therefore, petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty. Habeas corpus
can, therefore, not issue.










Rubi, et al. vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro G.R. No. L-14078. March 7, 1919
Facts:
Rubi and various other Manguianes in the province of Mindoro were ordered by the
provincial governor of Mindoro to remove their residence from their native habitat and to
established themselves on a reservation at Tigbao in the province of Mindoro and to remain there,
or be punished by imprisonment if they escaped. Manguianes had been ordered to live in a
reservation made to that end and for purposes of cultivation under certain plans. The Manguianes
are a Non-Christian tribe with a very low culture. These reservations, as appears from the
resolution of the Provincial Board, extend over an area of 800 hectares of land, which is
approximately 2000 acres, on which about 300 Manguianes are confined. One of the Manguianes,
Dabalos, escaped from the reservation and was taken in hand by the provincial sheriff and placed
in prison at Calapan, solely because he escaped from the reservation. An application for habeas
corpus was made on behalf of Rubi and other Manguianes of the province, alleging that by virtue
of the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro creating the reservation, they had been illegally
deprived of their liberty. In this case the validity of section 2145 of the Administrative Code,
reading: With the prior approval of the Department Head, the provincial governor of any province
in which non-Christian inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a course is deemed
necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their habitation on
sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him and approved by the provincial board, was
challenged.

Issue:
Whether or not the said law is not in line with the constitutional provision of freedom of religion.

Held:
No. By a vote of five to four, the Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of this section of
the Administrative Code. Among other things, it was held that the term non-Christian should not
be given a literal meaning or a religious signification, but that it was intended to relate to degrees
of civilization. The term non-Christian it was said, refers not to religious belief, but in a way to
geographical area, and more directly to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of
civilization. On the other hand, none of the provisions of the Philippine Organic Law could have had
the effect of denying to the Government of the Philippine Islands, acting through its Legislature,
the right to exercise that most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers, the sovereign police
power, in the promotion of the general welfare and the public interest. when to advance the public
welfare, the law was found to be a legitimate exertion of the police power, And it is unnecessary
to add that the prompt registration of titles to land in the Philippines constitutes an advancement
of the public interests, for, besides promoting peace and good order among landowners in
particular and the people in general, it helps increase the industries of the country, and makes for
the development of the natural resources, with the consequent progress of the general prosperity.
And these ends are pursued in a special manner by the State through the exercise of its police
power. The Supreme Court held that the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro was neither
discriminatory nor class legislation, and stated among other things: . . . one cannot hold that the
liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered with when the degree of civilization of the Manguianes is
considered. They are restrained for their own good and the general good of the Philippines. Nor
can one say that due process of law has not been followed. To go back to our definition of due
process of law and equal protection of the laws, there exists a law; the law seems to be
reasonable; it is enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and it applies
alike to all of a class.



















BINAY vs DOMINGO, G.R. NO. 92389, September 11, 1991 (201 SCRA 508)

Facts: The Burial Assistance Program (Resolution No. 60 assisting those who only earn less than
P2,000/month of burial assistance in the amount of P500.00) made by Makati Mayor Jejomar
Binay, in the exercise of the police power granted to him by the municipal charter, was referred to
the Commission on Audit after the municipal secretary certified the disbursement of four hundred
thousand pesos for its implementation was disallowed by said commission of such disbursements
because there cannot be seen any perceptible connection or relation between the objective sought
to be attained and the alleged public safety, general welfare, etc. of its inhabitants. Hence, this
petition revolving around the pivotal issue on whether or not Resolution No. 60 of the Municipality
of Makati is a valid exercise of police power under the general welfare clause.

Held: Resolution No. 60 of the Municipality of Makati is a valid exercise of police power under the
general welfare clause. The police power is a governmental function, an inherent attribute of
sovereignty, which was born with civilized government. It is founded largely on the maxims, Sic
utere tuo et ahenum non laedas (use your property so as not to impair others) and Salus populi
est suprema lex (the welfare of the people is the supreme law). Its fundamental purpose is
securing the general welfare, comfort and convenience of the people. Police power is the power to
prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and
general welfare of the people. It is the most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers. In a
sense it is the greatest and most powerful attribute of the government. It is elastic and must be
responsive to various social conditions. The care for the poor is generally recognized as a public
duty. The support for the poor has long been an accepted exercise of police power in the
promotion of the common good.

G.R. No. 77224 FEDERICO R. AGCAOILI, petitioner, vs. HON. RAMON FELIPE
R E S O L U T I O N
Cortes, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for writ of preliminary
injunction by a taxpayer and registered voter challenging the constitutionality of Section 198 (d) in
relation to Sections 262, 263 and 264 of the Omnibus Election Code which requires the indelible
marking of the forefinger as requisite or condition to the exercise of suffrage and insofar as it
penalizes failure to comply or refusal to submit to said requisite.

The Solicitor General duly filed Continent and the petitioner a Reply.

Considering the pleadings filed and the arguments raised therein:

Considering further the Philippine milieu and recalling the Holmes aphorism that The life of the
law has not been logic; it has been experience, the Court takes judicial notice of the continuing
concern over the pernicious practice of multiple or flying voting which subverts the electoral
process;

Considering furthermore that the will of the sovereign people expressed through suffrage is a
human right guaranteed by the constitution and by the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights to which the Philippines is a party;

Considering moreover that in prescribing ways of safeguarding the integrity of the ballot the state
may adopt appropriate and reasonable measures regulating the electoral process such as the
marking of the forefinger of voters to prevent multiple voting

Considering finally that (1) the petitioner has failed to make a clear, palpable and plain showing
that the statute complained of violates the constitution by encroaching on his dignity as a human
person; (2) that the petitioner seeks to substitute his judgment through this Court in place of that
of the legislature on the wisdom of the appropriation of public funds for the purchase of silver
nitrate and commassie blue to be used in said marking of the forefinger during the election as a
safeguard against multiple or flying voting; and (3) that the petitioners objection to having his
forefinger marked and the long-term remedies he suggests to counter flying voting must yield to
the greater, immediate and compelling public interest to safeguard the integrity of the right of
suffrage, which is a human right guaranteed to the totality of electors who are the sovereign
people.

WHEREFORE, the Court resolved to DISMISS this petition for want of merit.

Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco,
Padilla, Bidin and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.
Fernan, J., took no part.

RUBI VS. PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO
[39 PHIL 660; NO. 14078; 7 MAR 1919]

Facts:

The provincial board of Mindoro adopted resolution No. 25 wherein non-Christian inhabitants
(uncivilized tribes) will be directed to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands.
It is resolved that under section 2077 of the Administrative Code, 800 hectares of public land in
the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake be selected as a site for the permanent settlement of
Mangyanes in Mindoro. Further, Mangyans may only solicit homesteads on this reservation
providing that said homestead applications are previously recommended by the provincial
governor.

In that case, pursuant to Section 2145 of the Revised Administrative Code, all the Mangyans in the
townships of Naujan and Pola and the Mangyans east of the Baco River including those in the
districts of Dulangan and Rubi's place in Calapan, were ordered to take up their habitation on the
site of Tigbao, Naujan Lake. Also, that any Mangyan who shall refuse to comply with this order
shall upon conviction be imprisoned not exceed in sixty days, in accordance with section 2759 of
the revised Administrative Code.

Said resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro were claimed as necessary measures for the
protection of the Mangyanes of Mindoro as well as the protection of public forests in which they
roam, and to introduce civilized customs among them.

It appeared that Rubi and those living in his rancheria have not fixed their dwelling within the
reservation of Tigbao and are liable to be punished.

It is alleged that the Manguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the provincial
officials of that province. Rubi and his companions are said to be held on the reservation
established at Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, and one Dabalos is said to be held under the
custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run away form the reservation.

Issue:

Whether or Not Section 2145 of the Administrative Code deprive a person of his liberty pf abode.
Thus, WON Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional.

Held:

The Court held that section 2145 of the Administrative Code does not deprive a person of his
liberty of abode and does not deny to him the equal protection of the laws, and that confinement


BINAY VS DOMINGO

FACTS: On September 27, 1988,Petitioner Makati, through its Council, approved Resolution No.
60. The resolution provided for a burial assistance program where qualified beneficiaries (to be
given P500.00) are bereaved families whose gross monthly income does not exceed 2 thousand
per month. It will be funded by the unappropriated available funds in the municipal treasury.

Metro Manila Commission approved the resolution. The municipal secretary certified a
disbursement fund of P400,000.00 for the implementation of the program. When it was referred to
the COA it disapproved Resolution 60 and disallowed in audit the disbursement of funds. COA
denied the petitioners reconsideration as Resolution 60 has no connection or relation between
the objective sought to be attained and the alleged public safety, general welfare of the
inhabitant of Makati. Also, the Resolution will only benefit a few individuals. Moreover, it is
not for a public purpose. It only seeks to benefit a few individuals.

The Municipal Council passed Resolution No. 243 which reaffirmed Res. No. 60.
However, the program has been stayed by COA Decision No. 1159.

ISSUE: WON Resolution No. 60, re-enacted under Resolution No. 243, of the Municipality of
Makati is a valid exercise of police power under the general welfare clause

HELD: YES.
RATIONALE: The police power is a governmental function, an inherent attribute of
sovereignty, which was born with civilized government. It is founded largely on the
maxims, "Sic utere tuo et ahenum non laedas and "Salus populi est suprema lex Its
fundamental purpose is securing the general welfare, comfort and convenience of the people.
Police power is inherent in the state but not in municipal corporations). Before a
municipal corporation may exercise such power, there must be a valid delegation of such power
by the legislature which is the repository of the inherent powers of the State. A valid
delegation of police power may arise from express delegation, or be inferred from the mere fact of
the creation of the municipal corporation; and as a general rule, municipal corporations
may exercise police powers within the fair intent and purpose of their creation which are
reasonably proper to give effect to the powers expressly granted, and statutes conferring
powers on public corporations have been construed as empowering them to do the things
essential to the enjoyment of life and desirable for the safety of the people. Municipal
governments exercise this power under the general welfare clause: pursuant thereto they
are clothed with authority to "enact such ordinances and issue such regulations as may be
necessary to carry out and discharge the responsibilities conferred upon it by law, and such
as shall be necessary and proper to provide for the health, safety, comfort and convenience,
maintain peace and order, improve public morals, promote the prosperity and general welfare
of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and insure the protection of property therein."
And under Section 7 of BP 337, "every local government unit shall exercise the
powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary
and proper for governance such as to promote health and safety, enhance prosperity,
improve morals, and maintain peace and order in the local government unit, and preserve
the comfort and convenience of the inhabitants therein. "Police power is the power to
prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and
general welfare of the people. It is the most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers. In a
sense it is the greatest and most powerful attribute of the government. The police power of a
municipal corporation is broad, and has been said to be commensurate with, but not to exceed,
the duty to provide for the real needs of the people in their health, safety, comfort, and
convenience as consistently as may be with private rights. It extends to all the great public
needs, and, in a broad sense includes all legislation and almost every function of the municipal
government. It covers a wide scope of subjects, and, while it is especially occupied with whatever
affects the peace, security, health, morals, and general welfare of the community, it is
not limited thereto, but is broadened to deal with conditions which exists so as to bring out
of them the greatest welfare of the people by promoting public convenience or general
prosperity, and to everything worthwhile for the preservation of comfort of the inhabitants of
the corporation. Thus, it is deemed inadvisable to attempt to frame any definition which shall
absolutely indicate the limits of police power. COA is not attuned to the changing of the times.
Public purpose is not unconstitutional merely because it incidentally benefits a limited
number of persons. As correctly pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General, "the
drift is towards social welfare legislation geared towards state policies to provide adequate
social services, the promotion of the general welfare social justice (Section 10, Ibid) as well
as human dignity and respect for human rights. The care for the poor is generally recognized
as a public duty. The support for the poor has long been an accepted exercise of police
power in the promotion of the common good. There is no violation of the equal protection
clause in classifying paupers as subject of legislation. Paupers may be reasonably classified.
Different groups may receive varying treatment. Precious to the hearts of our legislators, down to
our local councilors, is the welfare of the paupers. Thus, statutes have been passed giving rights
and benefits to the disabled, emancipating the tenant-farmer from the bondage of the soil,
housing the urban poor, etc. Resolution No. 60, re-enacted under Resolution No. 243, of the
Municipality of Makati is a paragon of the continuing program of our government towards
social justice. The Burial Assistance Program is a relief of pauperism, though not complete. The
loss of a member of a family is a painful experience, and it is more painful for the poor
to be financially burdened by such death. Resolution No. 60 vivifies the very words of the late
President Ramon Magsaysay 'those who have less in life, should have more in law." This
decision, however must not be taken as a precedent, or as an official go-signal for
municipal governments to embark on a philanthropic orgy of inordinate dole-outs for motives
political or otherwise.

LUPANGCO VS. CA
Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) issued Resolution No. 105 as part of its
"Additional Instructions to Examinees to all those applying for admission to take the licensure
examinations in accountancy.
Under said resolution, : No examinee shall attend any review class, briefing, conference
or the like conducted by, or shall receive any hand-out, review material, or any tip from any
school, college or university, or any review center or the like or any reviewer, lecturer, instructor
official or employee of any of the aforementioned or similar institutions during the three days
immediately preceding every examination day including the examination day.
Petitioners, all reviewees preparing to take the licensure examinations in accountancy
filed with the RTC Manila, a complaint for injunction for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction against PRC to restrain the latter from enforcing the above-mentioned resolution and to
declare the same unconstitutional.

ISSUE: Was the regulation valid?
SC: NO.
We realize that the questioned resolution was adopted for a commendable purpose
which is "to preserve the integrity and purity of the licensure examinations However, its good aim
cannot be a cloak to conceal its constitutional infirmities. On its face, it can be readily seen that it
is unreasonable in that an examinee cannot even attend any review class, briefing, conference or
the like, or receive any hand-out, review material, or any tip from any school, college or
university, or any review center or the like or any reviewer, lecturer, instructor, official or
employee of any of the aforementioned or similar institutions The unreasonableness is more
obvious in that one who is caught committing the prohibited acts even without any ill motives will
be barred from taking future examinations conducted by the respondent PRC. Furthermore, it is
inconceivable how the Commission can manage to have a watchful eye on each and every
examinee during the three days before the examination period.
Resolution No. 105 is not only unreasonable and arbitrary, it also infringes on the
examinees' right to liberty guaranteed by the Constitution. PRC has no authority to dictate on the
reviewees as to how they should prepare themselves for the licensure examinations
They cannot be restrained from taking all the lawful steps needed to assure the fulfillment of their
ambition to become public accountants. They have every right to make use of their faculties in
attaining success in their endeavors. They should be allowed to enjoy their freedom to acquire
useful knowledge that will promote their personal growth. As defined in a decision of the United
States Supreme Court: "The term 'liberty' means more than mere freedom from physical restraint
or the bounds of a prison. It means freedom to go where one may choose and to act in such a
manner not inconsistent with the equal rights of others, as his judgment may dictate for the
promotion of his happiness, to pursue such callings and vocations as may be most suitable to
develop his capacities, and giv to them their highest enjoyment."
Also, it violates the academic freedom of the schools concerned. PRC cannot interfere
with the conduct of review that review schools and centers believe would best enable their
enrolees to meet the standards required before becoming a fullfledged public accountant.
Making the examinees suffer by depriving them of legitimate means of review or preparation on
those last three precious days-when they should be refreshing themselves with all that they have
learned in the review classes and preparing their mental and psychological make-up for the
examination day itself-would be like uprooting the tree to get ride of a rotten branch. What is
needed to be done by the respondent is to find out the source of such leakages and stop it right
there. If corrupt officials or personnel should be terminated from their loss, then so be it. Fixers or
swindlers should be flushed out. Strict guidelines to be observed by examiners should be set up
and if violations are committed, then licenses should be suspended or revoked. These are all within
the powers of the respondent commission as provided for in Presidential Decree No. 223. But by all
means the right and freedom of the examinees to avail of all legitimate means to prepare for the
examinations should not be curtailed.
Balacuit v CFI G.R. No. L-38429 June 30, 1988
Facts: Petitioners, theater owners, assailed the constitutionality of Ordinance No. 640 passed by
the Municipal Board of the City of Butuan on April 21, 1969. This called for a reduction to of the
ticket price given to minors from 7-12 years old. There was a fine from 200-600 pesos or a 2-6
month imprisonment
The complaint was issued in the trial court. A TRO was then issued to prevent the law from being
enforced. The respondent court entered its decision declaring the law valid.
Petitioners attack the validity and constitutionality of Ordinance No. 640 on the grounds that it is
ultra vires and an invalid exercise of police power. Petitioners contend that Ordinance No. 640 is
not within the power of' the Municipal Board to enact as provided for in Section 15(n) of Republic
Act No. 523 where it states that the Muncipal board can only fix license fees for theaters and not
admission rates.
The respondent attempts to justify the enactment of the ordinance by invoking the general welfare
clause embodied in Section 15 (nn) of the cited law.

Issue: Does this power to regulate include the authority to interfere in the fixing of prices of
admission to these places of exhibition and amusement whether under its general grant of power
or under the general welfare clause as invoked by the City?

Held: The ordinance is under neither and thus unconstitutional. Petition granted.
Ratio:
1. Kwong Sing v. City of Manila- the word "regulate" was interpreted to include the power to
control, to govern and to restrain, it would seem that under its power to regulate places of
exhibitions and amusement, the Municipal Board of the City of Butuan could make proper police
regulations as to the mode in which the business shall be exercised.
In this jurisdiction, it is already settled that the operation of theaters, cinematographs and other
places of public exhibition are subject to regulation by the municipal council in the exercise of
delegated police power by the local government.
People v. Chan- an ordinance of the City of Manila prohibiting first run cinematographs from selling
tickets beyond their seating capacity was upheld as constitutional for being a valid exercise of
police power.
The City of Butuan, apparently realizing that it has no authority to enact the ordinance in question
under its power to regulate embodied in Section 15(n), now invokes the police power as delegated
to it under the general welfare clause to justify the enactment of said ordinance
To invoke the exercise of police power, not only must it appear that the interest of the public
generally requires an interference with private rights, but the means adopted must be reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
The legislature may not, under the guise of protecting the public interest, arbitrarily interfere with
private business, or impose unusual and unnecessary restrictions upon lawful occupations. In other
words, the determination as to what is a proper exercise of its police power is not final or
conclusive, but is subject to the supervision of the courts.
Petitioners maintain that Ordinance No. 640 violates the due process clause of the Constitution for
being oppressive, unfair, unjust, confiscatory, and an undue restraint of trade, and violative of the
right of persons to enter into contracts, considering that the theater owners are bound under a
contract with the film owners for just admission prices for general admission, balcony and lodge.
Homeowners Association- the exercise of police power is necessarily subject to a qualification,
limitation or restriction demanded by the regard, the respect and the obedience due to the
prescriptions of the fundamental law
The court agreed with petitioners that the ordinance is not justified by any necessity for the public
interest. The police power legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and welfare, and a
reasonable relation must exist between purposes and means.
The evident purpose of the ordinance is to help ease the burden of cost on the part of parents who
have to shell out the same amount of money for the admission of their children, as they would for
themselves. A reduction in the price of admission would mean corresponding savings for the
parents; however, the petitioners are the ones made to bear the cost of these savings. The
ordinance does not only make the petitioners suffer the loss of earnings but it likewise penalizes
them for failure to comply with it. Furthermore, as petitioners point out, there will be difficulty in
its implementation because as already experienced by petitioners since the effectivity of the
ordinance, children over 12 years of age tried to pass off their age as below 12 years in order to
avail of the benefit of the ordinance. The ordinance does not provide a safeguard against this
undesirable practice and as such, the respondent City of Butuan now suggests that birth
certificates be exhibited by movie house patrons to prove the age of children. This is, however, not
at all practicable. We can see that the ordinance is clearly unreasonable if not unduly oppressive
upon the business of petitioners. Moreover, there is no discernible relation between the ordinance
and the promotion of public health, safety, morals and the general welfare.
Respondent further alleges that by charging the full price, the children are being exploited by
movie house operators. We fail to see how the children are exploited if they pay the full price of
admission. They are treated with the same quality of entertainment as the adults.
Moreover, as a logical consequence of the ordinance, movie house and theater operators will be
discouraged from exhibiting wholesome movies for general patronage, much less children's
pictures if only to avoid compliance with the ordinance and still earn profits for themselves.
A theater ticket has been described to be either a mere license, revocable at the will of the
proprietor of the theater or it may be evidence of a contract whereby, for a valuable consideration,
the purchaser has acquired the right to enter the theater and observe the performance on
condition that he behaves properly. Such ticket, therefore, represents a right, Positive or
conditional, as the case may be, according to the terms of the original contract of sale. This right is
clearly a right of property. The ticket which represents that right is also, necessarily, a species of
property. As such, the owner thereof, in the absence of any condition to the contrary in the
contract by which he obtained it, has the clear right to dispose of it, to sell it to whom he pleases
and at such price as he can obtain.
In no sense could theaters be considered public utilities. The State has not found it appropriate as
a national policy to interfere with the admission prices to these performances. This does not mean
however, that theaters and exhibitions are not affected with public interest even to a certain
degree. Motion pictures have been considered important both as a medium for the communication
of Ideas and expression of the artistic impulse. Their effects on the perceptions by our people of
issues and public officials or public figures as well as the prevailing cultural traits are considerable.
While it is true that a business may be regulated, it is equally true that such regulation must be
within the bounds of reason, that is, the regulatory ordinance must be reasonable, and its
provisions cannot be oppressive amounting to an arbitrary interference with the business or calling
subject of regulation. A lawful business or calling may not, under the guise of regulation, be
unreasonably interfered with even by the exercise of police power.
A police measure for the regulation of the conduct, control and operation of a business should not
encroach upon the legitimate and lawful exercise by the citizens of their property rights. 34 The
right of the owner to fix a price at which his property shall be sold or used is an inherent attribute
of the property itself and, as such, within the protection of the due process clause.
Although the presumption is always in favor of the validity or reasonableness of the ordinance,
such presumption must nevertheless be set aside when the invalidity or unreasonableness appears
on the face of the ordinance itself or is established by proper evidence.

BANAT vs. COMELEC , GR 17927 [ April 21, 2009 ]
Facts: Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) filed before the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a petition to proclaim the full number of party list
representatives provided by the Constitution. However, the recommendation of the head of the
legal group of COMELECs national board of canvassers to declare the petition moot and academic
was approved by the COMELEC en banc, and declared further in a resolution that the winning party
list will be resolved using the Veterans ruling. BANAT then filed a petition before the SC assailing
said resolution of the COMELEC.
Issues:
(1) Is the 20% allocation for party-list representatives provided in Sec 5 (2), Art VI of the
Constitution mandatory or is it merely a ceiling?
(2) Is the 2% threshold and qualifier votes prescribed by the same Sec 11 (b) of RA 7941
constitutional?
(3) Does the Constitution prohibit major political parties from participating in the party-list
elections? If not, can major political parties participate in the party-list elections?
Held:
(1) Neither the Constitution nor RA 7941 mandates the filling up of the entire 20% allocation of
party-list representatives found in the Constitution. The Constitution, in paragraph 1, Sec 5 of Art
VI, left the determination of the number of the members of the House of Representatives to
Congress. The 20% allocation of party-list representatives is merely a ceiling; party-list
representatives cannot be more then 20% of the members of the House of Representatives.
(2) No. We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of
the two percent threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause
of Sec 11(b) of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent threshold makes
it mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of available party-list seats when
the available party-list seat exceeds 50. The continued operation of the two percent threshold in
the distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20%
of the members of the House of Representatives shall consist of party-list representatives.We
therefore strike down the two percent threshold only in relation to the distribution of the additional
seats as found in the second clause of Sec 11 (b) of RA 7941. The two percent threshold presents
an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Sec 5 (2), Art VI of the Constitution and
prevents the attainment of the-broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group
interests in the House of Representatives.

(3) No. Neither the Constitution nor RA 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating
in the party-list system. On the contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the
major political parties to participate in party-list elections through their sectoral wings. However,
by vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing major political
parties from participating in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly.

PEOPLE V. SITON G.R. NO. 169364, SEPTEMBER 18 2009
FACTS: Siton et al. were charged with vagrancy pursuant to Art.202(2) of the RPC.1 They filed
separate motions to quash on the ground that Art. 202(2) is unconstitutional for being vague and
overbroad. The MTC denied the motions and declared that the law on vagrancy was enacted
pursuant to the States police power and justified by the maxim salus populi est suprema lex.2
The MTC
also noted that in the affidavit of the arresting officer it was stated that there was a prior
surveillance conducted on Siton et al. in an area reported to be frequented by vagrants and
prostitutes who solicited sexual favors. Siton et al. thus filed an original petition for certiorari and
prohibition with the RTC, directly challenging the constitutionality of Art. 202(2). Siton et al.s
position:
(1) The definition is vague
(2) The definition results in an arbitrary identification of violators (the definition includes persons
who are otherwise performing ordinary peaceful acts)
(3) Art. 202(2) violated the equal protection clause because it discriminates against the poor and
unemployed
The OSG argued that the overbreadth and vagueness doctrines apply only to free speech cases. It
also asserted that Art. 202(2) must be presumed valid and constitutional. Siton et al. failed to
overcome this presumption. The trial court declared Art. 202(2) as unconstitutional for being
vague and for violating the equal protection clause. Citing Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, it
held that the void for vagueness doctrine is equally applicable in testing the validity of penal
statutes.3 The court also held that the application of Art. 202(2), crafted in the 1930s, to our
situation at present runs afoul of the equal protection clause as it offers no reasonable
classification. Since the definition of vagrancy under the provision offers no reasonable indicators
to differentiate those who have no visible means of support by force of circumstance and those
who choose to loiter about and bum around, who are the proper subjects of vagrancy legislation, it
cannot pass a judicial scrutiny of its constitutionality.

ISSUE: Whether or not Art. 202(2) is unconstitutional.
OSGs position:
(1) Every law is presumed valid and all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of its
constitutionality
(2) The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines have special application to free speech cases only
and are not appropriate for testing the validity of penal statutes
(3) Siton et al. failed to overcome the presumed validity of the statute
(4) The State may regulate individual conduct for the promotion of public welfare in the exercise of
its police power

Siton et al.s position:
(1) Art. 202(2) on its face violates the due process and the equal protection clauses
(2) The due process vagueness standard, as distinguished from the free speech vagueness
doctrine, is adequate to declare Art. 202(2) unconstitutional and void on its face
(3) The presumption of constitutionality was adequately overthrown

HELD: CONSTITUTIONAL. The power to define crimes and prescribe their corresponding penalties
is legislative in nature and inherent in the sovereign power of the state as an aspect of police
power. Police power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty. The power is plenary and its scope is
vast and pervasive, reaching and justifying measures for public health, public safety, public
morals, and the general welfare. As a police power measure, Art. 202(2) must be viewed in a
constitutional light. In exercising its power to declare what acts constitute a crime, Congress must
inform the citizen with reasonable precision what acts it intends to prohibit so that he may know
what acts it is his duty to avoid. This requirement has come to be known as the void for-
vagueness doctrine which states that a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act
in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of law.

The underlying principles in Papachristou are that: (1) the assailed Jacksonville ordinance fails to
give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the
statute; and (2) it encourages or promotes opportunities for the application of discriminatory law
enforcement. The Papachristou doctrine is not applicable in the Philippines since ignorance of the
law excuses no one from compliance therewith. Moreover, the Jacksonville ordinance was declared
unconstitutional on account of specific provisions.4 The U.S. Supreme Court declared the
ordinance unconstitutional, because such activities or habits as nightwalking, wandering or
strolling around without any lawful purpose or object, habitual loafing, habitual spending of time at
places where alcoholic beverages are sold or served, and living upon the earnings of wives or
minor children, which are otherwise common and normal, were declared illegal. These are specific
acts or activities not found in Art. 202(2). The closest to
Art. 202(2) from the Jacksonville ordinance would be persons wandering or strolling around from
place to place without any lawful purpose or object. But these two acts are still not the same:
Art. 202(2) is qualified by without visible means of support while the Jacksonville ordinance
prohibits wandering or strolling without any lawful purpose or object, which was held by the U.S.
Supreme Court to constitute a trap for innocent acts.
The requirement of probable cause provides an acceptable limit on police authority that may
otherwise be abused in relation to the search or arrest of persons found to be violating Art.
202(2). The fear exhibited by Siton et al. that unfettered discretion is placed in the hands of the
police to make an arrest or search, is therefore tempered by the constitutional requirement of
probable cause, which is one less than certainty or proof, but more than suspicion or possibility.
The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when the suspicion that the person to be arrested is
probably guilty of committing the offense is based on actual facts (i.e. supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be
arrested). As applied to the instant case, it appears that the police authorities have been
conducting previous surveillance operations on Siton et al. prior to their arrest. On the surface,
this satisfies the probable cause requirement. There is no basis for saying that Art. 202(2) could
have been a source of police abuse in their case. Art. 202(2) does not violate the equal protection
clause; nor does it discriminate against the poor and the unemployed. Offenders of public order
laws are punished not for their status (poor or unemployed) but for conducting themselves under
such circumstances as to endanger the public peace or cause alarm and apprehension in the
community. Being poor or unemployed is not a license or a justification to act indecently or to
engage in immoral conduct. Vagrancy is a public order crime repugnant and outrageous to the
common standards and norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered society, as
would engender a justifiable concern for the safety and well-being of members of the community.
Instead of taking an active position declaring public order laws unconstitutional, the State should
train its eye on their effective implementation, because it is in this area that the Court perceives
difficulties. The dangerous streets must surrender to orderly society. Art. 202(2) should be
presumed valid and constitutional. When confronted with a constitutional question, it is elementary
that every court must approach it with considerable caution bearing in mind that every statute is
presumed valid and every reasonable doubt should be resolved in favor of its constitutionality. The
policy of the courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional questions and to presume that the acts of
the political departments are valid in the absence of a clear showing to the contrary. This
presumption is based on the doctrine of separation of powers. The theory is that as the joint act of
Congress and the President, a law has been
carefully studied, crafted and determined to be in accordance with the Constitution before it was
finally enacted.

White Light Corp., vs. City of Manila Police Power Not Validly Exercised Infringement
of Private Rights
FACTS: On 3 Dec 1992, then Mayor Lim signed into law Ord 7774 entitled An Ordinance
prohibiting short time admission in hotels, motels, lodging houses, pension houses and similar
establishments in the City of Manila. White Light Corp is an operator of mini hotels and motels who
sought to have the Ordinance be nullified as the said Ordinance infringes on the private rights of
their patrons. The RTC ruled in favor of WLC. It ruled that the Ordinance strikes at the personal
liberty of the individual guaranteed by the Constitution. The City maintains that the ordinance is
valid as it is a valid exercise of police power. Under the LGC, the City is empowered to regulate the
establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns,
pension houses, lodging houses and other similar establishments, including tourist guides and
transports. The CA ruled in favor of the City.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ord 7774 is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled that the said ordinance is null and void as it indeed infringes upon individual
liberty. It also violates the due process clause which serves as a guaranty for protection against
arbitrary regulation or seizure. The said ordinance invades private rights. Note that not all who
goes into motels and hotels for wash up rate are really there for obscene purposes only. Some are
tourists who needed rest or to wash up or to freshen up. Hence, the infidelity sought to be
avoided by the said ordinance is more or less subjected only to a limited group of people. The SC
reiterates that individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be
required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare.
(Aspects of due process Procedural Due Process)