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Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 92163 June 5, 1990
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, petitioner
vs.
JUDGE JAIME SALAZAR (Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City [Br. 103], SENIOR STATE
PROSECUTOR AURELIO TRAMPE, PROSECUTOR FERDINAND R. ABESAMIS, AND CITY ASSISTANT CITY
PROSECUTOR EULOGIO MANANQUIL, NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION DIRECTOR ALFREDO LIM, BRIG. GEN.
EDGAR DULA TORRES (Superintendent of the Northern Police District) AND/ OR ANY AND ALL PERSONS WHO MAY
HAVE ACTUAL CUSTODY OVER THE PERSON OF JUAN PONCE ENRILE, respondents.
G.R. No. 92164 June 5, 1990
SPS. REBECCO E. PANLILIO AND ERLINDA E. PANLILIO, petitioners,
vs.
PROSECUTORS FERNANDO DE LEON, AURELIO C. TRAMPE, FFRDINAND R. ABESAMIS, AND EULOGIO C.
MANANQUIL, and HON. JAIME W. SALAZAR, JR., in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City,
Branch 103, respondents.
NARVASA, J .:
Thirty-four years after it wrote history into our criminal jurisprudence, People vs. Hernandez
1
once more takes center stage as
the focus of a confrontation at law that would re-examine, if not the validity of its doctrine, the limits of its applicability. To be sure,
the intervening period saw a number of similar cases
2
that took issue with the ruling-all with a marked lack of success-but none,
it would Beem, where season and circumstance had more effectively conspired to attract wide public attention and excite
impassioned debate, even among laymen; none, certainly, which has seen quite the kind and range of arguments that are now
brought to bear on the same question.
The facts are not in dispute. In the afternoon of February 27, 1990, Senate Minority Floor Leader Juan Ponce Enrile was arrested
by law enforcement officers led by Director Alfredo Lim of the National Bureau of Investigation on the strength of a warrant issued
by Hon. Jaime Salazar of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City Branch 103, in Criminal Case No. 9010941. The warrant had
issued on an information signed and earlier that day filed by a panel of prosecutors composed of Senior State Prosecutor Aurelio
C. Trampe, State Prosecutor Ferdinand R. Abesamis and Assistant City Prosecutor Eulogio Mananquil, Jr., charging Senator
Enrile, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio, and Gregorio Honasan with the crime of rebellion with murder and multiple
frustrated murder allegedly committed during the period of the failed coup attempt from November 29 to December 10, 1990.
Senator Enrile was taken to and held overnight at the NBI headquarters on Taft Avenue, Manila, without bail, none having been
recommended in the information and none fixed in the arrest warrant. The following morning, February 28, 1990, he was brought
to Camp Tomas Karingal in Quezon City where he was given over to the custody of the Superintendent of the Northern Police
District, Brig. Gen. Edgardo Dula Torres.
3

On the same date of February 28, 1990, Senator Enrile, through counsel, filed the petition for habeas corpus herein (which was
followed by a supplemental petition filed on March 2, 1990), alleging that he was deprived of his constitutional rights in being, or
having been:
(a) held to answer for criminal offense which does not exist in the statute books;
(b) charged with a criminal offense in an information for which no complaint was initially filed or
preliminary investigation was conducted, hence was denied due process;
(c) denied his right to bail; and
(d) arrested and detained on the strength of a warrant issued without the judge who issued it first having
personally determined the existence of probable cause.
4

The Court issued the writ prayed for, returnable March 5, 1990 and set the plea for hearing on March 6, 1990.
5
On March 5,
1990, the Solicitor General filed a consolidated return
6
for the respondents in this case and in G.R. No. 92164
7
Which had been
contemporaneously but separately filed by two of Senator Enrile's co-accused, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio, and
raised similar questions. Said return urged that the petitioners' case does not fall within the Hernandez ruling because-and this is
putting it very simply-the information in Hernandez charged murders and other common crimes committed as a necessary means
for the commission of rebellion, whereas the information against Sen. Enrile et al. charged murder and frustrated murder
committed on the occasion, but not in furtherance, of rebellion. Stated otherwise, the Solicitor General would distinguish between
the complex crime ("delito complejo") arising from an offense being a necessary means for committing another, which is referred
to in the second clause of Article 48, Revised Penal Code, and is the subject of the Hernandez ruling, and the compound crime
("delito compuesto") arising from a single act constituting two or more grave or less grave offenses referred to in the first clause
of the same paragraph, with which Hernandez was not concerned and to which, therefore, it should not apply.
The parties were heard in oral argument, as scheduled, on March 6, 1990, after which the Court issued its Resolution of the
same date
8
granting Senator Enrile and the Panlilio spouses provisional liberty conditioned upon their filing, within 24 hours from
notice, cash or surety bonds of P100,000.00 (for Senator Enrile) and P200,000.00 (for the Panlilios), respectively. The Resolution
stated that it was issued without prejudice to a more extended resolution on the matter of the provisional liberty of the petitioners
and stressed that it was not passing upon the legal issues raised in both cases. Four Members of the Court
9
voted against
granting bail to Senator Enrile, and two
10
against granting bail to the Panlilios.
The Court now addresses those issues insofar as they are raised and litigated in Senator Enrile's petition, G.R. No. 92163.
The parties' oral and written pleas presented the Court with the following options:
(a) abandon Hernandez and adopt the minority view expressed in the main dissent of Justice
Montemayor in said case that rebellion cannot absorb more serious crimes, and that under Article 48 of
the Revised Penal Code rebellion may properly be complexed with common offenses, so-called; this
option was suggested by the Solicitor General in oral argument although it is not offered in his written
pleadings;
(b) hold Hernandez applicable only to offenses committed in furtherance, or as a necessary means for the
commission, of rebellion, but not to acts committed in the course of a rebellion which also constitute
"common" crimes of grave or less grave character;
(c) maintain Hernandez as applying to make rebellion absorb all other offenses committed in its course,
whether or not necessary to its commission or in furtherance thereof.
On the first option, eleven (11) Members of the Court voted against abandoning Hernandez. Two (2) Members felt that the
doctrine should be re-examined.
10
-A In the view of the majority, the ruling remains good law, its substantive and logical bases
have withstood all subsequent challenges and no new ones are presented here persuasive enough to warrant a complete
reversal. This view is reinforced by the fact that not too long ago, the incumbent President, exercising her powers under the 1986
Freedom Constitution, saw fit to repeal, among others, Presidential Decree No. 942 of the former regime which precisely sought
to nullify or neutralize Hernandez by enacting a new provision (Art. 142-A) into the Revised Penal Code to the effect that "(w)hen
by reason, or on the occasion, of any of the crimes penalized in this Chapter (Chapter I of Title 3, which includes rebellion), acts
which constitute offenses upon which graver penalties are imposed by law are committed, the penalty for the most serious
offense in its maximum period shall be imposed upon the offender."'
11
In thus acting, the President in effect by legislative flat
reinstated Hernandez as binding doctrine with the effect of law. The Court can do no less than accord it the same recognition,
absent any sufficiently powerful reason against so doing.
On the second option, the Court unanimously voted to reject the theory that Hernandez is, or should be, limited in its application
to offenses committed as a necessary means for the commission of rebellion and that the ruling should not be interpreted as
prohibiting the complexing of rebellion with other common crimes committed on the occasion, but not in furtherance, thereof.
While four Members of the Court felt that the proponents' arguments were not entirely devoid of merit, the consensus was that
they were not sufficient to overcome what appears to be the real thrust of Hernandez to rule out the complexing of rebellion with
any other offense committed in its course under either of the aforecited clauses of Article 48, as is made clear by the following
excerpt from the majority opinion in that case:
There is one other reason-and a fundamental one at that-why Article 48 of our Penal Code cannot be
applied in the case at bar. If murder were not complexed with rebellion, and the two crimes were punished
separately (assuming that this could be done), the following penalties would be imposable upon the
movant, namely: (1) for the crime of rebellion, a fine not exceeding P20,000 and prision mayor, in the
corresponding period, depending upon the modifying circumstances present, but never exceeding 12
years of prision mayor, and (2) for the crime of murder, reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death,
depending upon the modifying circumstances present. in other words, in the absence of aggravating
circumstances, the extreme penalty could not be imposed upon him. However, under Article 48 said
penalty would have to be meted out to him, even in the absence of a single aggravating circumstance.
Thus, said provision, if construed in conformity with the theory of the prosecution, would be unfavorable to
the movant.
Upon the other hand, said Article 48 was enacted for the purpose of favoring the culprit, not of sentencing
him to a penalty more severe than that which would be proper if the several acts performed by him were
punished separately. In the words of Rodriguez Navarro:
La unificacion de penas en los casos de concurso de delitos a que hace referencia este
articulo (75 del Codigo de 1932), esta basado francamente en el principio pro reo.' (II
Doctrina Penal del Tribunal Supremo de Espana, p. 2168.)
We are aware of the fact that this observation refers to Article 71 (later 75) of the Spanish Penal Code
(the counterpart of our Article 48), as amended in 1908 and then in 1932, reading:
Las disposiciones del articulo anterior no son aplicables en el caso de que un solo hecho
constituya dos o mas delitos, o cuando el uno de ellos sea medio necesario para cometer
el otro.
En estos casos solo se impondra la pena correspondiente al delito mas grave en su grado
maximo, hasta el limite que represents la suma de las que pudieran imponerse, penando
separadamente los delitos.
Cuando la pena asi computada exceda de este limite, se sancionaran los delitos por
separado. (Rodriguez Navarro, Doctrina Penal del Tribunal Supremo, Vol. II, p. 2163)
and that our Article 48 does not contain the qualification inserted in said amendment, restricting the
imposition of the penalty for the graver offense in its maximum period to the case when it does not exceed
the sum total of the penalties imposable if the acts charged were dealt with separately. The absence of
said limitation in our Penal Code does not, to our mind, affect substantially the spirit of said Article 48.
Indeed, if one act constitutes two or more offenses, there can be no reason to inflict a punishment graver
than that prescribed for each one of said offenses put together. In directing that the penalty for the graver
offense be, in such case, imposed in its maximum period, Article 48 could have had no other purpose
than to prescribe a penalty lower than the aggregate of the penalties for each offense, if imposed
separately. The reason for this benevolent spirit of article 48 is readily discernible. When two or more
crimes are the result of a single act, the offender is deemed less perverse than when he commits said
crimes thru separate and distinct acts. Instead of sentencing him for each crime independently from the
other, he must suffer the maximum of the penalty for the more serious one, on the assumption that it is
less grave than the sum total of the separate penalties for each offense.
12

The rejection of both options shapes and determines the primary ruling of the Court, which is that Hernandez remains binding
doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed on the occasion thereof, either as a
means necessary to its commission or as an unintended effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion.
This, however, does not write finis to the case. Petitioner's guilt or innocence is not here inquired into, much less adjudged. That
is for the trial court to do at the proper time. The Court's ruling merely provides a take-off point for the disposition of other
questions relevant to the petitioner's complaints about the denial of his rights and to the propriety of the recourse he has taken.
The Court rules further (by a vote of 11 to 3) that the information filed against the petitioner does in fact charge an offense.
Disregarding the objectionable phrasing that would complex rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder, that indictment
is to be read as charging simple rebellion. Thus, in Hernandez, the Court said:
In conclusion, we hold that, under the allegations of the amended information against defendant-appellant
Amado V. Hernandez, the murders, arsons and robberies described therein are mere ingredients of the
crime of rebellion allegedly committed by said defendants, as means "necessary" (4) for the perpetration
of said offense of rebellion; that the crime charged in the aforementioned amended information is,
therefore, simple rebellion, not the complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder, arsons and robberies;
that the maximum penalty imposable under such charge cannot exceed twelve (12) years of prision
mayor and a fine of P2H,HHH; and that, in conformity with the policy of this court in dealing with accused
persons amenable to a similar punishment, said defendant may be allowed bail.
13

The plaint of petitioner's counsel that he is charged with a crime that does not exist in the statute books, while technically correct
so far as the Court has ruled that rebellion may not be complexed with other offenses committed on the occasion thereof, must
therefore be dismissed as a mere flight of rhetoric. Read in the context of Hernandez, the information does indeed charge the
petitioner with a crime defined and punished by the Revised Penal Code: simple rebellion.
Was the petitioner charged without a complaint having been initially filed and/or preliminary investigation conducted? The record
shows otherwise, that a complaint against petitioner for simple rebellion was filed by the Director of the National Bureau of
Investigation, and that on the strength of said complaint a preliminary investigation was conducted by the respondent
prosecutors, culminating in the filing of the questioned information.
14
There is nothing inherently irregular or contrary to law in
filing against a respondent an indictment for an offense different from what is charged in the initiatory complaint, if warranted by
the evidence developed during the preliminary investigation.
It is also contended that the respondent Judge issued the warrant for petitioner's arrest without first personally determining the
existence of probable cause by examining under oath or affirmation the complainant and his witnesses, in violation of Art. III, sec.
2, of the Constitution.
15
This Court has already ruled, however, that it is not the unavoidable duty of the judge to make such a
personal examination, it being sufficient that he follows established procedure by personally evaluating the report and the
supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor.
16
Petitioner claims that the warrant of arrest issued barely one hour and
twenty minutes after the case was raffled off to the respondent Judge, which hardly gave the latter sufficient time to personally go
over the voluminous records of the preliminary investigation.
17
Merely because said respondent had what some might consider
only a relatively brief period within which to comply with that duty, gives no reason to assume that he had not, or could not have,
so complied; nor does that single circumstance suffice to overcome the legal presumption that official duty has been regularly
performed.
Petitioner finally claims that he was denied the right to bail. In the light of the Court's reaffirmation of Hernandez as applicable to
petitioner's case, and of the logical and necessary corollary that the information against him should be considered as charging
only the crime of simple rebellion, which is bailable before conviction, that must now be accepted as a correct proposition. But the
question remains: Given the facts from which this case arose, was a petition for habeas corpus in this Court the appropriate
vehicle for asserting a right to bail or vindicating its denial?
The criminal case before the respondent Judge was the normal venue for invoking the petitioner's right to have provisional liberty
pending trial and judgment. The original jurisdiction to grant or deny bail rested with said respondent. The correct course was for
petitioner to invoke that jurisdiction by filing a petition to be admitted to bail, claiming a right to bail per se by reason of the
weakness of the evidence against him. Only after that remedy was denied by the trial court should the review jurisdiction of this
Court have been invoked, and even then, not without first applying to the Court of Appeals if appropriate relief was also available
there.
Even acceptance of petitioner's premise that going by the Hernandez ruling, the information charges a non-existent crime or,
contrarily, theorizing on the same basis that it charges more than one offense, would not excuse or justify his improper choice of
remedies. Under either hypothesis, the obvious recourse would have been a motion to quash brought in the criminal action
before the respondent Judge.
18

There thus seems to be no question that All the grounds upon which petitioner has founded the present petition, whether these
went into the substance of what is charged in the information or imputed error or omission on the part of the prosecuting panel or
of the respondent Judge in dealing with the charges against him, were originally justiciable in the criminal case before said Judge
and should have been brought up there instead of directly to this Court.
There was and is no reason to assume that the resolution of any of these questions was beyond the ability or competence of the
respondent Judge-indeed such an assumption would be demeaning and less than fair to our trial courts; none whatever to hold
them to be of such complexity or transcendental importance as to disqualify every court, except this Court, from deciding them;
none, in short that would justify by passing established judicial processes designed to orderly move litigation through the
hierarchy of our courts. Parenthentically, this is the reason behind the vote of four Members of the Court against the grant of bail
to petitioner: the view that the trial court should not thus be precipitately ousted of its original jurisdiction to grant or deny bail, and
if it erred in that matter, denied an opportunity to correct its error. It makes no difference that the respondent Judge here issued a
warrant of arrest fixing no bail. Immemorial practice sanctions simply following the prosecutor's recommendation regarding bail,
though it may be perceived as the better course for the judge motu proprio to set a bail hearing where a capital offense is
charged.
19
It is, in any event, incumbent on the accused as to whom no bail has been recommended or fixed to claim the right to
a bail hearing and thereby put to proof the strength or weakness of the evidence against him.
It is apropos to point out that the present petition has triggered a rush to this Court of other parties in a similar situation, all
apparently taking their cue from it, distrustful or contemptuous of the efficacy of seeking recourse in the regular manner just
outlined. The proliferation of such pleas has only contributed to the delay that the petitioner may have hoped to avoid by coming
directly to this Court.
Not only because popular interest seems focused on the outcome of the present petition, but also because to wash the Court's
hand off it on jurisdictional grounds would only compound the delay that it has already gone through, the Court now decides the
same on the merits. But in so doing, the Court cannot express too strongly the view that said petition interdicted the ordered and
orderly progression of proceedings that should have started with the trial court and reached this Court only if the relief appealed
for was denied by the former and, in a proper case, by the Court of Appeals on review.
Let it be made very clear that hereafter the Court will no longer countenance, but will give short shrift to, pleas like the present,
that clearly short-circuit the judicial process and burden it with the resolution of issues properly within the original competence of
the lower courts. What has thus far been stated is equally applicable to and decisive of the petition of the Panlilio spouses (G.R.
No. 92164) which is virtually Identical to that of petitioner Enrile in factual milieu and is therefore determinable on the same
principles already set forth. Said spouses have uncontestedly pleaded
20
that warrants of arrest issued against them as co-
accused of petitioner Enrile in Criminal Case No. 90-10941, that when they appeared before NBI Director Alfredo Lim in the
afternoon of March 1, 1990, they were taken into custody and detained without bail on the strength of said warrants in violation-
they claim-of their constitutional rights.
It may be that in the light of contemporary events, the act of rebellion has lost that quitessentiany quixotic quality that justifies the
relative leniency with which it is regarded and punished by law, that present-day rebels are less impelled by love of country than
by lust for power and have become no better than mere terrorists to whom nothing, not even the sanctity of human life, is allowed
to stand in the way of their ambitions. Nothing so underscores this aberration as the rash of seemingly senseless killings,
bombings, kidnappings and assorted mayhem so much in the news these days, as often perpetrated against innocent civilians as
against the military, but by and large attributable to, or even claimed by so-called rebels to be part of, an ongoing rebellion.
It is enough to give anyone pause-and the Court is no exception-that not even the crowded streets of our capital City seem safe
from such unsettling violence that is disruptive of the public peace and stymies every effort at national economic recovery. There
is an apparent need to restructure the law on rebellion, either to raise the penalty therefor or to clearly define and delimit the
other offenses to be considered as absorbed thereby, so that it cannot be conveniently utilized as the umbrella for every sort of
illegal activity undertaken in its name. The Court has no power to effect such change, for it can only interpret the law as it stands
at any given time, and what is needed lies beyond interpretation. Hopefully, Congress will perceive the need for promptly seizing
the initiative in this matter, which is properly within its province.
WHEREFORE, the Court reiterates that based on the doctrine enunciated in People vs. Hernandez, the questioned information
filed against petitioners Juan Ponce Enrile and the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio must be read as charging simple
rebellion only, hence said petitioners are entitled to bail, before final conviction, as a matter of right. The Court's earlier grant of
bail to petitioners being merely provisional in character, the proceedings in both cases are ordered REMANDED to the
respondent Judge to fix the amount of bail to be posted by the petitioners. Once bail is fixed by said respondent for any of the
petitioners, the corresponding bail bond flied with this Court shall become functus oficio. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Gancayco and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Medialdea, J., concurs in G.R. No. 92164 but took no part in G.R. No. 92163.
Cortes and Grio-Aquino, JJ., are on leave.
Separate Opinions
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J ., concurring:
I join my colleagues in holding that the Hernandez doctrine, which has been with us for the past three decades, remains good
law and, thus, should remain undisturbed, despite periodic challenges to it that, ironically, have only served to strengthen its
pronouncements.
I take exception to the view, however, that habeas corpus was not the proper remedy.
Had the Information filed below charged merely the simple crime of Rebellion, that proposition could have been plausible. But
that Information charged Rebellion complexed with Murder and Multiple Frustrated Murder, a crime which does not exist in our
statute books. The charge was obviously intended to make the penalty for the most serious offense in its maximum period
imposable upon the offender pursuant to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, no bail was recommended in the
Information nor was any prescribed in the Warrant of Arrest issued by the Trial Court.
Under the attendant circumstances, therefore, to have filed a Motion to Quash before the lower Court would not have brought
about the speedy relief from unlawful restraint that petitioner was seeking. During the pendency of said Motion before the lower
Court, petitioner could have continued to languish in detention. Besides, the Writ of Habeas Corpus may still issue even if
another remedy, which is less effective, may be availed of (Chavez vs. Court of Appeals, 24 SCRA 663).
It is true that habeas corpus would ordinarily not he when a person is under custody by virtue of a process issued by a Court.
The Court, however, must have jurisdiction to issue the process. In this case, the Court below must be deemed to have been
ousted of jurisdiction when it illegally curtailed petitioner's liberty. Habeas corpus is thus available.
The writ of habeas corpus is available to relieve persons from unlawful restraint. But where the detention
or confinement is the result of a process issued by the court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or
sentence, the writ ordinarily cannot be availed of. It may still be invoked though if the process, judgment
or sentence proceeded from a court or tribunal the jurisdiction of which may be assailed. Even if it had
authority to act at the outset, it is now the prevailing doctrine that a deprivation of constitutional right, if
shown to exist, would oust it of jurisdiction. In such a case, habeas corpus could be relied upon to regain
one's liberty (Celeste vs. People, 31 SCRA 391) [Emphasis emphasis].
The Petition for habeas corpus was precisely premised on the violation of petitioner's constitutional right to bail inasmuch as
rebellion, under the present state of the law, is a bailable offense and the crime for which petitioner stands accused of and for
which he was denied bail is non-existent in law.
While litigants should, as a rule, ascend the steps of the judicial ladder, nothing should stop this Court from taking cognizance of
petitions brought before it raising urgent constitutional issues, any procedural flaw notwithstanding.
The rules on habeas corpus are to be liberally construed (Ganaway v. Quilen, 42 Phil. 805), the writ of
habeas corpus being the fundamental instrument for safeguarding individual freedom against arbitrary
and lawless state action. The scope and flexibility of the writ-its capacity to reach all manner of illegal
detention-its ability to cut through barriers of form and procedural mazes-have always been emphasized
and jealously guarded by courts and lawmakers (Gumabon v. Director of Bureau of Prisons, 37 SCRA
420) [emphasis supplied].
The proliferation of cases in this Court, which followed in the wake of this Petition, was brought about by the insistence of the
prosecution to charge the crime of Rebellion complexed with other common offenses notwithstanding the fact that this Court had
not yet ruled on the validity of that charge and had granted provisional liberty to petitioner.
If, indeed, it is desired to make the crime of Rebellion a capital offense (now punishable by reclusion perpetua), the remedy lies
in legislation. But Article 142-A
1
of the Revised Penal Code, along with P.D. No. 942, were repealed, for being "repressive," by
EO No. 187 on 5 June 1987. EO 187 further explicitly provided that Article 134 (and others enumerated) of the Revised Penal
Code was "restored to its full force and effect as it existed before said amendatory decrees." Having been so repealed, this Court
is bereft of power to legislate into existence, under the guise of re-examining a settled doctrine, a "creature unknown in law"- the
complex crime of Rebellion with Murder. The remand of the case to the lower Court for further proceedings is in order. The Writ
of Habeas Corpus has served its purpose.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J ., concurring:
I join the Court's decision to grant the petition. In reiterating the rule that under existing law rebellion may not be complexed with
murder, the Court emphasizes that it cannot legislate a new-crime into existence nor prescribe a penalty for its commission. That
function is exclusively for Congress.
I write this separate opinion to make clear how I view certain issues arising from these cases, especially on how the defective
informations filed by the prosecutors should have been treated.
I agree with the ponente that a petition for habeas corpus is ordinarily not the proper procedure to assert the right to bail. Under
the special circumstances of this case, however, the petitioners had no other recourse. They had to come to us.
First, the trial court was certainly aware of the decision in People v. Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515 (1956) that there is no such crime in
our statute books as rebellion complexed with murder, that murder committed in connection with a rebellion is absorbed by the
crime of rebellion, and that a resort to arms resulting in the destruction of life or property constitutes neither two or more offenses
nor a complex crime but one crime-rebellion pure and simple.
Second, Hernandez has been the law for 34 years. It has been reiterated in equally sensational cases. All lawyers and even law
students are aware of the doctrine. Attempts to have the doctrine re-examined have been consistently rejected by this Court.
Third, President Marcos through the use of his then legislative powers, issued Pres. Decree 942, thereby installing the new crime
of rebellion complexed with offenses like murder where graver penalties are imposed by law. However, President Aquino using
her then legislative powers expressly repealed PD 942 by issuing Exec. Order 187. She thereby erased the crime of rebellion
complexed with murder and made it clear that the Hernandez doctrine remains the controlling rule. The prosecution has not
explained why it insists on resurrecting an offense expressly wiped out by the President. The prosecution, in effect, questions the
action of the President in repealing a repressive decree, a decree which, according to the repeal order, is violative of human
rights.
Fourth, any re-examination of the Hernandez doctrine brings the ex post facto principle into the picture. Decisions of this Court
form part of our legal system. Even if we declare that rebellion may be complexed with murder, our declaration can not be made
retroactive where the effect is to imprison a person for a crime which did not exist until the Supreme Court reversed itself.
And fifth, the attempts to distinguish this case from the Hernandez case by stressing that the killings charged in the information
were committed "on the occasion of, but not a necessary means for, the commission of rebellion" result in outlandish
consequences and ignore the basic nature of rebellion. Thus, under the prosecution theory a bomb dropped on PTV-4 which kills
government troopers results in simple rebellion because the act is a necessary means to make the rebellion succeed. However, if
the same bomb also kills some civilians in the neighborhood, the dropping of the bomb becomes rebellion complexed with
murder because the killing of civilians is not necessary for the success of a rebellion and, therefore, the killings are only "on the
occasion of but not a 'necessary means for' the commission of rebellion.
This argument is puerile.
The crime of rebellion consists of many acts. The dropping of one bomb cannot be isolated as a separate crime of rebellion.
Neither should the dropping of one hundred bombs or the firing of thousands of machine gun bullets be broken up into a hundred
or thousands of separate offenses, if each bomb or each bullet happens to result in the destruction of life and property. The same
act cannot be punishable by separate penalties depending on what strikes the fancy of prosecutors-punishment for the killing of
soldiers or retribution for the deaths of civilians. The prosecution also loses sight of the regrettable fact that in total war and in
rebellion the killing of civilians, the laying waste of civilian economies, the massacre of innocent people, the blowing up of
passenger airplanes, and other acts of terrorism are all used by those engaged in rebellion. We cannot and should not try to
ascertain the intent of rebels for each single act unless the act is plainly not connected to the rebellion. We cannot use Article 48
of the Revised Penal Code in lieu of still-to- be-enacted legislation. The killing of civilians during a rebel attack on military facilities
furthers the rebellion and is part of the rebellion.
The trial court was certainly aware of all the above considerations. I cannot understand why the trial Judge issued the warrant of
arrest which categorically states therein that the accused was not entitled to bail. The petitioner was compelled to come to us so
he would not be arrested without bail for a nonexistent crime. The trial court forgot to apply an established doctrine of the
Supreme Court. Worse, it issued a warrant which reversed 34 years of established procedure based on a well-known Supreme
Court ruling.
All courts should remember that they form part of an independent judicial system; they do not belong to the prosecution service.
A court should never play into the hands of the prosecution and blindly comply with its erroneous manifestations. Faced with an
information charging a manifestly non-existent crime, the duty of a trial court is to throw it out. Or, at the very least and where
possible, make it conform to the law.
A lower court cannot re-examine and reverse a decision of the Supreme Court especially a decision consistently followed for 34
years. Where a Judge disagrees with a Supreme Court ruling, he is free to express his reservations in the body of his decision,
order, or resolution. However, any judgment he renders, any order he prescribes, and any processes he issues must follow the
Supreme Court precedent. A trial court has no jurisdiction to reverse or ignore precedents of the Supreme Court. In this particular
case, it should have been the Solicitor General coming to this Court to question the lower court's rejection of the application for a
warrant of arrest without bail. It should have been the Solicitor-General provoking the issue of re-examination instead of the
petitioners asking to be freed from their arrest for a non-existent crime.
The principle bears repeating:
Respondent Court of Appeals really was devoid of any choice at all. It could not have ruled in any other
way on the legal question raised. This Tribunal having spoken, its duty was to obey. It is as simple as
that. There is relevance to this excerpt from Barrera v. Barrera. (L-31589, July 31, 1970, 34 SCRA 98)
'The delicate task of ascertaining the significance that attaches to a constitutional or statutory provision,
an executive order, a procedural norm or a municipal ordinance is committed to the judiciary. It thus
discharges a role no less crucial than that appertaining to the other two departments in the maintenance
of the rule of law. To assure stability in legal relations and avoid confusion, it has to speak with one voice.
It does so with finality, logically and rightly, through the highest judicial organ, this Court. What it says
then should be definitive and authoritative, binding on those occupying the lower ranks in the judicial
hierarchy. They have to defer and to submit.' (Ibid, 107. The opinion of Justice Laurel in People v. Vera,
65 Phil. 56 [1937] was cited). The ensuing paragraph of the opinion in Barrera further emphasizes the
point: Such a thought was reiterated in an opinion of Justice J.B.L. Reyes and further emphasized in
these words: 'Judge Gaudencio Cloribel need not be reminded that the Supreme Court, by tradition and in
our system of judicial administration, has the last word on what the law is; it is the final arbiter of any
justifiable controversy. There is only one Supreme Court from whose decisions all other courts should
take their bearings. (Ibid. Justice J.B.L. Reyes spoke thus in Albert v. Court of First Instance of Manila (Br.
VI), L-26364, May 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 948, 961. (Tugade v. Court of Appeals, 85 SCRA 226 [1978]. See
also Albert v. Court of First Instance, 23 SCRA 948 [1968] and Vir-Jen Shipping and Marine Services, Inc.
v. NLRC, 125 SCRA 577 [1983])
I find the situation in Spouses Panlilio v. Prosecutors Fernando de Leon, et al. even more inexplicable. In the case of the
Panlilios, any probable cause to commit the non- existent crime of rebellion complexed with murder exists only in the minds of
the prosecutors, not in the records of the case.
I have gone over the records and pleadings furnished to the members of the Supreme Court. I listened intently to the oral
arguments during the hearing and it was quite apparent that the constitutional requirement of probable cause was not satisfied.
In fact, in answer to my query for any other proofs to support the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the answer was that the
evidence would be submitted in due time to the trial court.
The spouses Panlilio and one parent have been in the restaurant business for decades. Under the records of these petitions, any
restaurant owner or hotel manager who serves food to rebels is a co-conspirator in the rebellion. The absurdity of this proposition
is apparent if we bear in mind that rebels ride in buses and jeepneys, eat meals in rural houses when mealtime finds them in the
vicinity, join weddings, fiestas, and other parties, play basketball with barrio youths, attend masses and church services and
otherwise mix with people in various gatherings. Even if the hosts recognize them to be rebels and fail to shoo them away, it
does not necessarily follow that the former are co-conspirators in a rebellion.
The only basis for probable cause shown by the records of the Panlilio case is the alleged fact that the petitioners served food to
rebels at the Enrile household and a hotel supervisor asked two or three of their waiters, without reason, to go on a vacation.
Clearly, a much, much stronger showing of probable cause must be shown.
In Salonga v. Cruz Pao, 134 SCRA 438 (1985), then Senator Salonga was charged as a conspirator in the heinous bombing of
innocent civilians because the man who planted the bomb had, sometime earlier, appeared in a group photograph taken during a
birthday party in the United States with the Senator and other guests. It was a case of conspiracy proved through a group picture.
Here, it is a case of conspiracy sought to proved through the catering of food.
The Court in Salonga stressed:
The purpose of a preliminary investigation is to secure the innocent against hasty, malicious and
oppressive prosecution, and to protect him from an open and public accusation of crime, from the trouble,
expense and anxiety of a public trial, and also to protect the state from useless and expensive trials.
(Trocio v. Manta, 118 SCRA 241; citing Hashimn v. Boncan, 71 Phil. 216). The right to a preliminary
investigation is a statutory grant, and to withhold it would be to transgress constitutional due process.
(See People v. Oandasa, 25 SCRA 277) However, in order to satisfy the due process clause it is not
enough that the preliminary investigation is conducted in the sense of making sure that a transgressor
shall not escape with impunity. A preliminary investigation serves not only the purposes of the State. More
important, it is a part of the guarantees of freedom and fair play which are birthrights of all who live in our
country. It is, therefore, imperative upon the fiscal or the judge as the case may be, to relieve the accused
from the pain of going through a trial once it is ascertained that the evidence is insufficient to sustain a
prima facie case or that no probable cause exists to form a sufficient belief as to the guilt of the accused.
Although there is no general formula or fixed rule for the determination of probable cause since the same
must be decided in the light of the conditions obtaining in given situations and its existence depends to a
large degree upon the finding or opinion of the judge conducting the examination, such a finding should
not disregard the facts before the judge nor run counter to the clear dictates of reason (See La Chemise
Lacoste, S.A. v. Fernandez, 129 SCRA 391). The judge or fiscal, therefore, should not go on with the
prosecution in the hope that some credible evidence might later turn up during trial for this would be a
flagrant violation of a basic right which the courts are created to uphold. It bears repeating that the
judiciary lives up to its mission by vitalizing and not denigrating constitutional rights. So it has been
before. It should continue to be so. (id., pp. 461- 462)
Because of the foregoing, I take exception to that part of the ponencia which will read the informations as charging simple
rebellion. This case did not arise from innocent error. If an information charges murder but its contents show only the ingredients
of homicide, the Judge may rightly read it as charging homicide. In these cases, however, there is a deliberate attempt to charge
the petitioners for an offense which this Court has ruled as non-existent. The prosecution wanted Hernandez to be reversed.
Since the prosecution has filed informations for a crime which, under our rulings, does not exist, those informations should be
treated as null and void. New informations charging the correct offense should be filed. And in G.R. No. 92164, an extra effort
should be made to see whether or not the Principle in Salonga v. Cruz Patio, et al. (supra) has been violated.
The Court is not, in any way, preventing the Government from using more effective weapons to suppress rebellion. If the
Government feels that the current situation calls for the imposition of more severe penalties like death or the creation of new
crimes like rebellion complexed with murder, the remedy is with Congress, not the courts.
I, therefore, vote to GRANT the petitions and to ORDER the respondent court to DISMISS the void informations for a non-
existent crime.
FELICIANO, J ., concurring:
I concur in the result reached by the majority of the Court.
I believe that there are certain aspects of the Hernandez doctrine that, as an abstract question of law, could stand reexamination
or clarification. I have in mind in particular matters such as the correct or appropriate relationship between Article 134 and Article
135 of the Revised Penal Code. This is a matter which relates to the legal concept of rebellion in our legal system. If one
examines the actual terms of Article 134 (entitled: "Rebellion or Insurrection-How Committed"), it would appear that this Article
specifies both the overt acts and the criminal purpose which, when put together, would constitute the offense of rebellion. Thus,
Article 134 states that "the crime of rebellion is committed by rising publicly and taking arms against the Government "(i.e., the
overt acts comprising rebellion), "for the purpose of (i.e., the specific criminal intent or political objective) removing from the
allegiance to said government or its laws the territory of the Republic of the Philippines or any part thereof, or any body of land,
naval or other armed forces, or depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of their powers or
prerogatives." At the same time, Article 135 (entitled: "Penalty for Rebellion or Insurrection.") sets out a listing of acts or particular
measures which appear to fall under the rubric of rebellion or insurrection: "engaging in war against the forces of the
Government, destroying property or committing serious violence, exacting contributions or diverting public funds from the lawful
purpose for which they have been appropriated." Are these modalities of rebellion generally? Or are they particular modes by
which those "who promote [ ], maintain [ ] or head [ ] a rebellion or insurrection" commit rebellion, or particular modes of
participation in a rebellion by public officers or employees? Clearly, the scope of the legal concept of rebellion relates to the
distinction between, on the one hand, the indispensable acts or ingredients of the crime of rebellion under the Revised Penal
Code and, on the other hand, differing optional modes of seeking to carry out the political or social objective of the rebellion or
insurrection.
The difficulty that is at once raised by any effort to examine once more even the above threshold questions is that the results of
such re-examination may well be that acts which under the Hernandez doctrine are absorbed into rebellion, may be
characterized as separate or discrete offenses which, as a matter of law, can either be prosecuted separately from rebellion or
prosecuted under the provisions of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, which (both Clause 1 and Clause 2 thereof) clearly
envisage the existence of at least two (2) distinct offenses. To reach such a conclusion in the case at bar, would, as far as I can
see, result in colliding with the fundamental non-retroactivity principle (Article 4, Civil Code; Article 22, Revised Penal Code; both
in relation to Article 8, Civil Code).
The non-retroactivity rule applies to statutes principally. But, statutes do not exist in the abstract but rather bear upon the lives of
people with the specific form given them by judicial decisions interpreting their norms. Judicial decisions construing statutory
norms give specific shape and content to such norms. In time, the statutory norms become encrusted with the glosses placed
upon them by the courts and the glosses become integral with the norms (Cf Caltex v. Palomar, 18 SCRA 247 [1966]). Thus,
while in legal theory, judicial interpretation of a statute becomes part of the law as of the date that the law was originally enacted,
I believe this theory is not to be applied rigorously where a new judicial doctrine is announced, in particular one overruling a
previous existing doctrine of long standing (here, 36 years) and most specially not where the statute construed is criminal in
nature and the new doctrine is more onerous for the accused than the pre-existing one (People v. Jabinal, 55 SCRA 607 [1974];
People v. Licera, 65 SCRA 270 [1975]; Gumabon v. Director of Prisons, 37 SCRA 420 [1971]). Moreover, the non-retroactivity
rule whether in respect of legislative acts or judicial decisions has constitutional implications. The prevailing rule in the United
States is that a judicial decision that retroactively renders an act criminal or enhances the severity of the penalty prescribed for an
offense, is vulnerable to constitutional challenge based upon the rule against ex post facto laws and the due process clause
(Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 US 347,12 L. Ed. 2d 894 [1964]; Marks v. U.S., 43 US 188, 51 L. Ed. 2d 260 [1977]; Devine v.
New Mexico Department of Corrections, 866 F. 2d 339 [1989]).
It is urged by the Solicitor General that the non-retroactivity principle does not present any real problem for the reason that the
Hernandez doctrine was based upon Article 48, second clause, of the Revised Penal Code and not upon the first clause thereof,
while it is precisely the first clause of Article 48 that the Government here invokes. It is, however, open to serious doubt whether
Hernandez can reasonably be so simply and sharply characterized. And assuming the Hernandez could be so characterized,
subsequent cases refer to the Hernandez doctrine in terms which do not distinguish clearly between the first clause and the
second clause of Article 48 (e.g., People v. Geronimo, 100 Phil. 90 [1956]; People v. Rodriguez, 107 Phil. 659 [1960]). Thus, it
appears to me that the critical question would be whether a man of ordinary intelligence would have necessarily read or
understood the Hernandez doctrine as referring exclusively to Article 48, second clause. Put in slightly different terms, the
important question would be whether the new doctrine here proposed by the Government could fairly have been derived by a
man of average intelligence (or counsel of average competence in the law) from an examination of Articles 134 and 135 of the
Revised Penal Code as interpreted by the Court in the Hernandez and subsequent cases. To formulate the question ill these
terms would almost be to compel a negative answer, especially in view of the conclusions reached by the Court and its several
Members today.
Finally, there appears to be no question that the new doctrine that the Government would have us discover for the first time since
the promulgation of the Revised Penal Code in 1932, would be more onerous for the respondent accused than the simple
application of the Hernandez doctrine that murders which have been committed on the occasion of and in furtherance of the
crime of rebellion must be deemed absorbed in the offense of simple rebellion.
I agree therefore that the information in this case must be viewed as charging only the crime of simple rebellion.
FERNAN, C.J ., concurring and dissenting:
I am constrained to write this separate opinion on what seems to be a rigid adherence to the 1956 ruling of the Court. The
numerous challenges to the doctrine enunciated in the case of People vs. Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515 (1956) should at once
demonstrate the need to redefine the applicability of said doctrine so as to make it conformable with accepted and well-settled
principles of criminal law and jurisprudence.
To my mind, the Hernandez doctrine should not be interpreted as an all-embracing authority for the rule that all common crimes
committed on the occasion, or in furtherance of, or in connection with, rebellion are absorbed by the latter. To that extent, I
cannot go along with the view of the majority in the instant case that 'Hernandez remains binding doctrine operating to prohibit
the complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed on the occasion thereof, either as a means necessary to its
commission or as an unintended effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion" (p. 9, Decision).
The Hernandez doctrine has served the purpose for which it was appealed by the Court in 1956 during the communist-inspired
rebellion of the Huks. The changes in our society in the span of 34 years since then have far-reaching effects on the all-
embracing applicability of the doctrine considering the emergence of alternative modes of seizing the powers of the duly
constituted Government not contemplated in Articles 134 and 135 of the Revised Penal Code and their consequent effects on the
lives of our people. The doctrine was good law then, but I believe that there is a certain aspect of the Hernandez doctrine that
needs clarification.
With all due respect to the views of my brethren in the Court, I believe that the Court, in the instant case, should have further
considered that distinction between acts or offenses which are indispensable in the commission of rebellion, on the one hand,
and those acts or offenses that are merely necessary but not indispensable in the commission of rebellion, on the other. The
majority of the Court is correct in adopting, albeit impliedly, the view in Hernandez case that when an offense perpetrated as a
necessary means of committing another, which is an element of the latter, the resulting interlocking crimes should be considered
as only one simple offense and must be deemed outside the operation of the complex crime provision (Article 48) of the Revised
Penal Code. As in the case of Hernandez, the Court, however, failed in the instant case to distinguish what is indispensable from
what is merely necessary in the commission of an offense, resulting thus in the rule that common crimes like murder, arson,
robbery, etc. committed in the course or on the occasion of rebellion are absorbed or included in the latter as elements thereof.
The relevance of the distinction is significant, more particularly, if applied to contemporaneous events happening in our country
today. Theoretically, a crime which is indispensable in the commission of another must necessarily be an element of the latter;
but a crime that is merely necessary but not indispensable in the commission of another is not an element of the latter, and if and
when actually committed, brings the interlocking crime within the operation of the complex crime provision (Art. 48) of the
Revised Penal Code. With that distinction, common crimes committed against Government forces and property in the course of
rebellion are properly considered indispensable overt acts of rebellion and are logically absorbed in it as virtual ingredients or
elements thereof, but common crimes committed against the civilian population in the course or on the occasion of rebellion and
in furtherance thereof, may be necessary but not indispensable in committing the latter, and may, therefore, not be considered as
elements of the said crime of rebellion. To illustrate, the deaths occurring during armed confrontation or clashes between
government forces and the rebels are absorbed in the rebellion, and would be those resulting from the bombing of military camps
and installations, as these acts are indispensable in carrying out the rebellion. But deliberately shooting down an unarmed
innocent civilian to instill fear or create chaos among the people, although done in the furtherance of the rebellion, should not be
absorbed in the crime of rebellion as the felonious act is merely necessary, but not indispensable. In the latter case, Article 48 of
the Revised Penal Code should apply.
The occurrence of a coup d' etat in our country as a mode of seizing the powers of the duly-constituted government by staging
surprise attacks or occupying centers of powers, of which this Court should take judicial notice, has introduced a new dimension
to the interpretation of the provisions on rebellion and insurrection in the Revised Penal Code. Generally, as a mode of seizing
the powers of the duly constituted government, it falls within the contemplation of rebellion under the Revised Penal Code, but,
strictly construed, a coup d'etat per se is a class by itself. The manner of its execution and the extent and magnitude of its effects
on the lives of the people distinguish a coup d'etat from the traditional definition and modes of commission attached by the
Revised Penal Code to the crime of rebellion as applied by the Court to the communist-inspired rebellion of the 1950's. A coup
d'etat may be executed successfully without its perpetrators resorting to the commission of other serious crimes such as murder,
arson, kidnapping, robbery, etc. because of the element of surprise and the precise timing of its execution. In extreme cases
where murder, arson, robbery, and other common crimes are committed on the occasion of a coup d' etat, the distinction referred
to above on what is necessary and what is indispensable in the commission of the coup d'etat should be painstakingly
considered as the Court should have done in the case of herein petitioners.
I concur in the result insofar as the other issues are resolved by the Court but I take exception to the vote of the majority on the
broad application of the Hernandez doctrine.
BIDIN, J ., concurring and dissenting:
I concur with the majority opinion except as regards the dispositive portion thereof which orders the remand of the case to the
respondent judge for further proceedings to fix the amount of bail to be posted by the petitioner.
I submit that the proceedings need not be remanded to the respondent judge for the purpose of fixing bail since we have
construed the indictment herein as charging simple rebellion, an offense which is bailable. Consequently, habeas corpus is the
proper remedy available to petitioner as an accused who had been charged with simple rebellion, a bailable offense but who had
been denied his right to bail by the respondent judge in violation of petitioner's constitutional right to bail. In view thereof, the
responsibility of fixing the amount of bail and approval thereof when filed, devolves upon us, if complete relief is to be accorded
to petitioner in the instant proceedings.
It is indubitable that before conviction, admission to bail is a matter of right to the defendant, accused before the Regional Trial
Court of an offense less than capital (Section 13 Article III, Constitution and Section 3, Rule 114). Petitioner is, before Us, on a
petition for habeas corpus praying, among others, for his provisional release on bail. Since the offense charged (construed as
simple rebellion) admits of bail, it is incumbent upon us m the exercise of our jurisdiction over the petition for habeas corpus
(Section 5 (1), Article VIII, Constitution; Section 2, Rule 102), to grant petitioner his right to bail and having admitted him to bail, to
fix the amount thereof in such sums as the court deems reasonable. Thereafter, the rules require that "the proceedings together
with the bond" shall forthwith be certified to the respondent trial court (Section 14, Rule 102).
Accordingly, the cash bond in the amount of P 100,000.00 posted by petitioner for his provisional release pursuant to our
resolution dated March 6, 1990 should now be deemed and admitted as his bail bond for his provisional release in the case
(simple rebellion) pending before the respondent judge, without necessity of a remand for further proceedings, conditioned for his
(petitioner's) appearance before the trial court to abide its order or judgment in the said case.
SARMIENTO, J ., concurring and dissenting:
I agree that People v. Hernandez
1
should abide. More than three decades after which it was penned, it has firmly settled in the
tomes of our jurisprudence as correct doctrine.
As Hernandez put it, rebellion means "engaging m war against the forces of the government,"
2
which implies "resort to arms,
requisition of property and services, collection of taxes and contributions, restraint of liberty, damage to property, physical injuries
and loss of life, and the hunger, illness and unhappiness that war leaves in its wake. ..."
3
whether committed in furtherance, of as
a necessary means for the commission, or in the course, of rebellion. To say that rebellion may be complexed with any other
offense, in this case murder, is to play into a contradiction in terms because exactly, rebellion includes murder, among other
possible crimes.
I also agree that the information may stand as an accusation for simple rebellion. Since the acts complained of as constituting
rebellion have been embodied in the information, mention therein of murder as a complexing offense is a surplusage, because in
any case, the crime of rebellion is left fully described.
4

At any rate, the government need only amend the information by a clerical correction, since an amendment will not alter its
substance.
I dissent, however, insofar as the majority orders the remand of the matter of bail to the lower court. I take it that when we, in our
Resolution of March 6, 1990, granted the petitioner "provisional liberty" upon the filing of a bond of P100,000.00, we granted him
bail. The fact that we gave him "provisional liberty" is in my view, of no moment, because bail means provisional liberty. It will
serve no useful purpose to have the trial court hear the incident again when we ourselves have been satisfied that the petitioner
is entitled to temporary freedom.
PADILLA, J ., dissenting:
I concur in the majority opinion insofar as it holds that the ruling in People vs. Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515 "remains binding doctrine
operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed on the occasion thereof, either as a means
necessary to its commission or as an unintended effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion."
I dissent, however, from the majority opinion insofar as it holds that the information in question, while charging the complex crime
of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder, "is to be read as charging simple rebellion."
The present cases are to be distinguished from the Hernandez case in at least one (1) material respect. In the Hernandez case,
this Court was confronted with an appealed case, i.e., Hernandez had been convicted by the trial court of the complex crime of
rebellion with murder, arson and robbery, and his plea to be released on bail before the Supreme Court, pending appeal, gave
birth to the now celebrated Hernandez doctrine that the crime of rebellion complexed with murder, arson and robbery does not
exist. In the present cases, on the other hand, the Court is confronted with an original case, i.e., where an information has been
recently filed in the trial court and the petitioners have not even pleaded thereto.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court, in the Hernandez case, was "ground-breaking" on the issue of whether rebellion can be
complexed with murder, arson, robbery, etc. In the present cases, on the other hand, the prosecution and the lower court, not
only had the Hernandez doctrine (as case law), but Executive Order No. 187 of President Corazon C. Aquino dated 5 June 1987
(as statutory law) to bind them to the legal proposition that the crime of rebellion complexed with murder, and multiple frustrated
murder does not exist.
And yet, notwithstanding these unmistakable and controlling beacon lights-absent when this Court laid down the Hernandez
doctrine-the prosecution has insisted in filing, and the lower court has persisted in hearing, an information charging the
petitioners with rebellion complexed with murder an multiple frustrated murder. That information is clearly a nullity and plainly
void ab initio. Its head should not be allowed to surface. As a nullity in substantive law, it charges nothing; it has given rise to
nothing. The warrants of arrest issued pursuant thereto are as null and void as the information on which they are anchored. And,
since the entire question of the information's validity is before the Court in these habeas corpus cases, I venture to say that the
information is fatally defective, even under procedural law, because it charges more than one (1) offense (Sec. 13, Rule 110,
Rules of Court).
I submit then that it is not for this Court to energize a dead and, at best, fatally decrepit information by labelling or "baptizing" it
differently from what it announces itself to be. The prosecution must file an entirely new and proper information, for this entire
exercise to merit the serious consideration of the courts.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to GRANT the petitions, QUASH the warrants of arrest, and ORDER the information for rebellion
complexed with murder and multiple frustrated murder in Criminal Case Nos. 90-10941, RTC of Quezon City, DISMISSED.
Consequently, the petitioners should be ordered permanently released and their bails cancelled.
Paras, J., concurs.
Separate Opinions
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J ., concurring:
I join my colleagues in holding that the Hernandez doctrine, which has been with us for the past three decades, remains good
law and, thus, should remain undisturbed, despite periodic challenges to it that, ironically, have only served to strengthen its
pronouncements.
I take exception to the view, however, that habeas corpus was not the proper remedy.
Had the Information filed below charged merely the simple crime of Rebellion, that proposition could have been plausible. But
that Information charged Rebellion complexed with Murder and Multiple Frustrated Murder, a crime which does not exist in our
statute books. The charge was obviously intended to make the penalty for the most serious offense in its maximum period
imposable upon the offender pursuant to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, no bail was recommended in the
Information nor was any prescribed in the Warrant of Arrest issued by the Trial Court.
Under the attendant circumstances, therefore, to have filed a Motion to Quash before the lower Court would not have brought
about the speedy relief from unlawful restraint that petitioner was seeking. During the pendency of said Motion before the lower
Court, petitioner could have continued to languish in detention. Besides, the Writ of Habeas Corpus may still issue even if
another remedy, which is less effective, may be availed of (Chavez vs. Court of Appeals, 24 SCRA 663).
It is true that habeas corpus would ordinarily not he when a person is under custody by virtue of a process issued by a Court.
The Court, however, must have jurisdiction to issue the process. In this case, the Court below must be deemed to have been
ousted of jurisdiction when it illegally curtailed petitioner's liberty. Habeas corpus is thus available.
The writ of habeas corpus is available to relieve persons from unlawful restraint. But where the detention
or confinement is the result of a process issued by the court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or
sentence, the writ ordinarily cannot be availed of. It may still be invoked though if the process, judgment
or sentence proceeded from a court or tribunal the jurisdiction of which may be assailed. Even if it had
authority to act at the outset, it is now the prevailing doctrine that a deprivation of constitutional right, if
shown to exist, would oust it of jurisdiction. In such a case, habeas corpus could be relied upon to regain
one's liberty (Celeste vs. People, 31 SCRA 391) [Emphasis emphasis].
The Petition for habeas corpus was precisely premised on the violation of petitioner's constitutional right to bail inasmuch as
rebellion, under the present state of the law, is a bailable offense and the crime for which petitioner stands accused of and for
which he was denied bail is non-existent in law.
While litigants should, as a rule, ascend the steps of the judicial ladder, nothing should stop this Court from taking cognizance of
petitions brought before it raising urgent constitutional issues, any procedural flaw notwithstanding.
The rules on habeas corpus are to be liberally construed (Ganaway v. Quilen, 42 Phil. 805), the writ of
habeas corpus being the fundamental instrument for safeguarding individual freedom against arbitrary
and lawless state action. The scope and flexibility of the writ-its capacity to reach all manner of illegal
detention-its ability to cut through barriers of form and procedural mazes-have always been emphasized
and jealously guarded by courts and lawmakers (Gumabon v. Director of Bureau of Prisons, 37 SCRA
420) [emphasis supplied].
The proliferation of cases in this Court, which followed in the wake of this Petition, was brought about by the insistence of the
prosecution to charge the crime of Rebellion complexed with other common offenses notwithstanding the fact that this Court had
not yet ruled on the validity of that charge and had granted provisional liberty to petitioner.
If, indeed, it is desired to make the crime of Rebellion a capital offense (now punishable by reclusion perpetua), the remedy lies
in legislation. But Article 142-A
1
of the Revised Penal Code, along with P.D. No. 942, were repealed, for being "repressive," by
EO No. 187 on 5 June 1987. EO 187 further explicitly provided that Article 134 (and others enumerated) of the Revised Penal
Code was "restored to its full force and effect as it existed before said amendatory decrees." Having been so repealed, this Court
is bereft of power to legislate into existence, under the guise of re-examining a settled doctrine, a "creature unknown in law"- the
complex crime of Rebellion with Murder. The remand of the case to the lower Court for further proceedings is in order. The Writ
of Habeas Corpus has served its purpose.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J ., concurring:
I join the Court's decision to grant the petition. In reiterating the rule that under existing law rebellion may not be complexed with
murder, the Court emphasizes that it cannot legislate a new-crime into existence nor prescribe a penalty for its commission. That
function is exclusively for Congress.
I write this separate opinion to make clear how I view certain issues arising from these cases, especially on how the defective
informations filed by the prosecutors should have been treated.
I agree with the ponente that a petition for habeas corpus is ordinarily not the proper procedure to assert the right to bail. Under
the special circumstances of this case, however, the petitioners had no other recourse. They had to come to us.
First, the trial court was certainly aware of the decision in People v. Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515 (1956) that there is no such crime in
our statute books as rebellion complexed with murder, that murder committed in connection with a rebellion is absorbed by the
crime of rebellion, and that a resort to arms resulting in the destruction of life or property constitutes neither two or more offenses
nor a complex crime but one crime-rebellion pure and simple.
Second, Hernandez has been the law for 34 years. It has been reiterated in equally sensational cases. All lawyers and even law
students are aware of the doctrine. Attempts to have the doctrine re-examined have been consistently rejected by this Court.
Third, President Marcos through the use of his then legislative powers, issued Pres. Decree 942, thereby installing the new crime
of rebellion complexed with offenses like murder where graver penalties are imposed by law. However, President Aquino using
her then legislative powers expressly repealed PD 942 by issuing Exec. Order 187. She thereby erased the crime of rebellion
complexed with murder and made it clear that the Hernandez doctrine remains the controlling rule. The prosecution has not
explained why it insists on resurrecting an offense expressly wiped out by the President. The prosecution, in effect, questions the
action of the President in repealing a repressive decree, a decree which, according to the repeal order, is violative of human
rights.
Fourth, any re-examination of the Hernandez doctrine brings the ex post facto principle into the picture. Decisions of this Court
form part of our legal system. Even if we declare that rebellion may be complexed with murder, our declaration can not be made
retroactive where the effect is to imprison a person for a crime which did not exist until the Supreme Court reversed itself.
And fifth, the attempts to distinguish this case from the Hernandez case by stressing that the killings charged in the information
were committed "on the occasion of, but not a necessary means for, the commission of rebellion" result in outlandish
consequences and ignore the basic nature of rebellion. Thus, under the prosecution theory a bomb dropped on PTV-4 which kills
government troopers results in simple rebellion because the act is a necessary means to make the rebellion succeed. However, if
the same bomb also kills some civilians in the neighborhood, the dropping of the bomb becomes rebellion complexed with
murder because the killing of civilians is not necessary for the success of a rebellion and, therefore, the killings are only "on the
occasion of but not a 'necessary means for' the commission of rebellion.
This argument is puerile.
The crime of rebellion consists of many acts. The dropping of one bomb cannot be isolated as a separate crime of rebellion.
Neither should the dropping of one hundred bombs or the firing of thousands of machine gun bullets be broken up into a hundred
or thousands of separate offenses, if each bomb or each bullet happens to result in the destruction of life and property. The same
act cannot be punishable by separate penalties depending on what strikes the fancy of prosecutors-punishment for the killing of
soldiers or retribution for the deaths of civilians. The prosecution also loses sight of the regrettable fact that in total war and in
rebellion the killing of civilians, the laying waste of civilian economies, the massacre of innocent people, the blowing up of
passenger airplanes, and other acts of terrorism are all used by those engaged in rebellion. We cannot and should not try to
ascertain the intent of rebels for each single act unless the act is plainly not connected to the rebellion. We cannot use Article 48
of the Revised Penal Code in lieu of still-to- be-enacted legislation. The killing of civilians during a rebel attack on military facilities
furthers the rebellion and is part of the rebellion.
The trial court was certainly aware of all the above considerations. I cannot understand why the trial Judge issued the warrant of
arrest which categorically states therein that the accused was not entitled to bail. The petitioner was compelled to come to us so
he would not be arrested without bail for a nonexistent crime. The trial court forgot to apply an established doctrine of the
Supreme Court. Worse, it issued a warrant which reversed 34 years of established procedure based on a well-known Supreme
Court ruling.
All courts should remember that they form part of an independent judicial system; they do not belong to the prosecution service.
A court should never play into the hands of the prosecution and blindly comply with its erroneous manifestations. Faced with an
information charging a manifestly non-existent crime, the duty of a trial court is to throw it out. Or, at the very least and where
possible, make it conform to the law.
A lower court cannot re-examine and reverse a decision of the Supreme Court especially a decision consistently followed for 34
years. Where a Judge disagrees with a Supreme Court ruling, he is free to express his reservations in the body of his decision,
order, or resolution. However, any judgment he renders, any order he prescribes, and any processes he issues must follow the
Supreme Court precedent. A trial court has no jurisdiction to reverse or ignore precedents of the Supreme Court. In this particular
case, it should have been the Solicitor General coming to this Court to question the lower court's rejection of the application for a
warrant of arrest without bail. It should have been the Solicitor-General provoking the issue of re-examination instead of the
petitioners asking to be freed from their arrest for a non-existent crime.
The principle bears repeating:
Respondent Court of Appeals really was devoid of any choice at all. It could not have ruled in any other
way on the legal question raised. This Tribunal having spoken, its duty was to obey. It is as simple as
that. There is relevance to this excerpt from Barrera v. Barrera. (L-31589, July 31, 1970, 34 SCRA 98)
'The delicate task of ascertaining the significance that attaches to a constitutional or statutory provision,
an executive order, a procedural norm or a municipal ordinance is committed to the judiciary. It thus
discharges a role no less crucial than that appertaining to the other two departments in the maintenance
of the rule of law. To assure stability in legal relations and avoid confusion, it has to speak with one voice.
It does so with finality, logically and rightly, through the highest judicial organ, this Court. What it says
then should be definitive and authoritative, binding on those occupying the lower ranks in the judicial
hierarchy. They have to defer and to submit.' (Ibid, 107. The opinion of Justice Laurel in People v. Vera,
65 Phil. 56 [1937] was cited). The ensuing paragraph of the opinion in Barrera further emphasizes the
point: Such a thought was reiterated in an opinion of Justice J.B.L. Reyes and further emphasized in
these words: 'Judge Gaudencio Cloribel need not be reminded that the Supreme Court, by tradition and in
our system of judicial administration, has the last word on what the law is; it is the final arbiter of any
justifiable controversy. There is only one Supreme Court from whose decisions all other courts should
take their bearings. (Ibid. Justice J.B.L. Reyes spoke thus in Albert v. Court of First Instance of Manila (Br.
VI), L-26364, May 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 948, 961. (Tugade v. Court of Appeals, 85 SCRA 226 [1978]. See
also Albert v. Court of First Instance, 23 SCRA 948 [1968] and Vir-Jen Shipping and Marine Services, Inc.
v. NLRC, 125 SCRA 577 [1983])
I find the situation in Spouses Panlilio v. Prosecutors Fernando de Leon, et al. even more inexplicable. In the case of the
Panlilios, any probable cause to commit the non- existent crime of rebellion complexed with murder exists only in the minds of
the prosecutors, not in the records of the case.
I have gone over the records and pleadings furnished to the members of the Supreme Court. I listened intently to the oral
arguments during the hearing and it was quite apparent that the constitutional requirement of probable cause was not satisfied.
In fact, in answer to my query for any other proofs to support the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the answer was that the
evidence would be submitted in due time to the trial court.
The spouses Panlilio and one parent have been in the restaurant business for decades. Under the records of these petitions, any
restaurant owner or hotel manager who serves food to rebels is a co-conspirator in the rebellion. The absurdity of this proposition
is apparent if we bear in mind that rebels ride in buses and jeepneys, eat meals in rural houses when mealtime finds them in the
vicinity, join weddings, fiestas, and other parties, play basketball with barrio youths, attend masses and church services and
otherwise mix with people in various gatherings. Even if the hosts recognize them to be rebels and fail to shoo them away, it
does not necessarily follow that the former are co-conspirators in a rebellion.
The only basis for probable cause shown by the records of the Panlilio case is the alleged fact that the petitioners served food to
rebels at the Enrile household and a hotel supervisor asked two or three of their waiters, without reason, to go on a vacation.
Clearly, a much, much stronger showing of probable cause must be shown.
In Salonga v. Cruz Pao, 134 SCRA 438 (1985), then Senator Salonga was charged as a conspirator in the heinous bombing of
innocent civilians because the man who planted the bomb had, sometime earlier, appeared in a group photograph taken during a
birthday party in the United States with the Senator and other guests. It was a case of conspiracy proved through a group picture.
Here, it is a case of conspiracy sought to proved through the catering of food.
The Court in Salonga stressed:
The purpose of a preliminary investigation is to secure the innocent against hasty, malicious and
oppressive prosecution, and to protect him from an open and public accusation of crime, from the trouble,
expense and anxiety of a public trial, and also to protect the state from useless and expensive trials.
(Trocio v. Manta, 118 SCRA 241; citing Hashimn v. Boncan, 71 Phil. 216). The right to a preliminary
investigation is a statutory grant, and to withhold it would be to transgress constitutional due process.
(See People v. Oandasa, 25 SCRA 277) However, in order to satisfy the due process clause it is not
enough that the preliminary investigation is conducted in the sense of making sure that a transgressor
shall not escape with impunity. A preliminary investigation serves not only the purposes of the State. More
important, it is a part of the guarantees of freedom and fair play which are birthrights of all who live in our
country. It is, therefore, imperative upon the fiscal or the judge as the case may be, to relieve the accused
from the pain of going through a trial once it is ascertained that the evidence is insufficient to sustain a
prima facie case or that no probable cause exists to form a sufficient belief as to the guilt of the accused.
Although there is no general formula or fixed rule for the determination of probable cause since the same
must be decided in the light of the conditions obtaining in given situations and its existence depends to a
large degree upon the finding or opinion of the judge conducting the examination, such a finding should
not disregard the facts before the judge nor run counter to the clear dictates of reason (See La Chemise
Lacoste, S.A. v. Fernandez, 129 SCRA 391). The judge or fiscal, therefore, should not go on with the
prosecution in the hope that some credible evidence might later turn up during trial for this would be a
flagrant violation of a basic right which the courts are created to uphold. It bears repeating that the
judiciary lives up to its mission by vitalizing and not denigrating constitutional rights. So it has been
before. It should continue to be so. (id., pp. 461- 462)
Because of the foregoing, I take exception to that part of the ponencia which will read the informations as charging simple
rebellion. This case did not arise from innocent error. If an information charges murder but its contents show only the ingredients
of homicide, the Judge may rightly read it as charging homicide. In these cases, however, there is a deliberate attempt to charge
the petitioners for an offense which this Court has ruled as non-existent. The prosecution wanted Hernandez to be reversed.
Since the prosecution has filed informations for a crime which, under our rulings, does not exist, those informations should be
treated as null and void. New informations charging the correct offense should be filed. And in G.R. No. 92164, an extra effort
should be made to see whether or not the Principle in Salonga v. Cruz Patio, et al. (supra) has been violated.
The Court is not, in any way, preventing the Government from using more effective weapons to suppress rebellion. If the
Government feels that the current situation calls for the imposition of more severe penalties like death or the creation of new
crimes like rebellion complexed with murder, the remedy is with Congress, not the courts.
I, therefore, vote to GRANT the petitions and to ORDER the respondent court to DISMISS the void informations for a non-
existent crime.
FELICIANO, J ., concurring:
I concur in the result reached by the majority of the Court.
I believe that there are certain aspects of the Hernandez doctrine that, as an abstract question of law, could stand reexamination
or clarification. I have in mind in particular matters such as the correct or appropriate relationship between Article 134 and Article
135 of the Revised Penal Code. This is a matter which relates to the legal concept of rebellion in our legal system. If one
examines the actual terms of Article 134 (entitled: "Rebellion or Insurrection-How Committed"), it would appear that this Article
specifies both the overt acts and the criminal purpose which, when put together, would constitute the offense of rebellion. Thus,
Article 134 states that "the crime of rebellion is committed by rising publicly and taking arms against the Government "(i.e., the
overt acts comprising rebellion), "for the purpose of (i.e., the specific criminal intent or political objective) removing from the
allegiance to said government or its laws the territory of the Republic of the Philippines or any part thereof, or any body of land,
naval or other armed forces, or depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of their powers or
prerogatives." At the same time, Article 135 (entitled: "Penalty for Rebellion or Insurrection.") sets out a listing of acts or particular
measures which appear to fall under the rubric of rebellion or insurrection: "engaging in war against the forces of the
Government, destroying property or committing serious violence, exacting contributions or diverting public funds from the lawful
purpose for which they have been appropriated." Are these modalities of rebellion generally? Or are they particular modes by
which those "who promote [ ], maintain [ ] or head [ ] a rebellion or insurrection" commit rebellion, or particular modes of
participation in a rebellion by public officers or employees? Clearly, the scope of the legal concept of rebellion relates to the
distinction between, on the one hand, the indispensable acts or ingredients of the crime of rebellion under the Revised Penal
Code and, on the other hand, differing optional modes of seeking to carry out the political or social objective of the rebellion or
insurrection.
The difficulty that is at once raised by any effort to examine once more even the above threshold questions is that the results of
such re-examination may well be that acts which under the Hernandez doctrine are absorbed into rebellion, may be
characterized as separate or discrete offenses which, as a matter of law, can either be prosecuted separately from rebellion or
prosecuted under the provisions of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, which (both Clause 1 and Clause 2 thereof) clearly
envisage the existence of at least two (2) distinct offenses. To reach such a conclusion in the case at bar, would, as far as I can
see, result in colliding with the fundamental non-retroactivity principle (Article 4, Civil Code; Article 22, Revised Penal Code; both
in relation to Article 8, Civil Code).
The non-retroactivity rule applies to statutes principally. But, statutes do not exist in the abstract but rather bear upon the lives of
people with the specific form given them by judicial decisions interpreting their norms. Judicial decisions construing statutory
norms give specific shape and content to such norms. In time, the statutory norms become encrusted with the glosses placed
upon them by the courts and the glosses become integral with the norms (Cf Caltex v. Palomar, 18 SCRA 247 [1966]). Thus,
while in legal theory, judicial interpretation of a statute becomes part of the law as of the date that the law was originally enacted,
I believe this theory is not to be applied rigorously where a new judicial doctrine is announced, in particular one overruling a
previous existing doctrine of long standing (here, 36 years) and most specially not where the statute construed is criminal in
nature and the new doctrine is more onerous for the accused than the pre-existing one (People v. Jabinal, 55 SCRA 607 [1974];
People v. Licera, 65 SCRA 270 [1975]; Gumabon v. Director of Prisons, 37 SCRA 420 [1971]). Moreover, the non-retroactivity
rule whether in respect of legislative acts or judicial decisions has constitutional implications. The prevailing rule in the United
States is that a judicial decision that retroactively renders an act criminal or enhances the severity of the penalty prescribed for an
offense, is vulnerable to constitutional challenge based upon the rule against ex post facto laws and the due process clause
(Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 US 347,12 L. Ed. 2d 894 [1964]; Marks v. U.S., 43 US 188, 51 L. Ed. 2d 260 [1977]; Devine v.
New Mexico Department of Corrections, 866 F. 2d 339 [1989]).
It is urged by the Solicitor General that the non-retroactivity principle does not present any real problem for the reason that the
Hernandez doctrine was based upon Article 48, second clause, of the Revised Penal Code and not upon the first clause thereof,
while it is precisely the first clause of Article 48 that the Government here invokes. It is, however, open to serious doubt whether
Hernandez can reasonably be so simply and sharply characterized. And assuming the Hernandez could be so characterized,
subsequent cases refer to the Hernandez doctrine in terms which do not distinguish clearly between the first clause and the
second clause of Article 48 (e.g., People v. Geronimo, 100 Phil. 90 [1956]; People v. Rodriguez, 107 Phil. 659 [1960]). Thus, it
appears to me that the critical question would be whether a man of ordinary intelligence would have necessarily read or
understood the Hernandez doctrine as referring exclusively to Article 48, second clause. Put in slightly different terms, the
important question would be whether the new doctrine here proposed by the Government could fairly have been derived by a
man of average intelligence (or counsel of average competence in the law) from an examination of Articles 134 and 135 of the
Revised Penal Code as interpreted by the Court in the Hernandez and subsequent cases. To formulate the question ill these
terms would almost be to compel a negative answer, especially in view of the conclusions reached by the Court and its several
Members today.
Finally, there appears to be no question that the new doctrine that the Government would have us discover for the first time since
the promulgation of the Revised Penal Code in 1932, would be more onerous for the respondent accused than the simple
application of the Hernandez doctrine that murders which have been committed on the occasion of and in furtherance of the
crime of rebellion must be deemed absorbed in the offense of simple rebellion.
I agree therefore that the information in this case must be viewed as charging only the crime of simple rebellion.
FERNAN, C.J ., concurring and dissenting:
I am constrained to write this separate opinion on what seems to be a rigid adherence to the 1956 ruling of the Court. The
numerous challenges to the doctrine enunciated in the case of People vs. Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515 (1956) should at once
demonstrate the need to redefine the applicability of said doctrine so as to make it conformable with accepted and well-settled
principles of criminal law and jurisprudence.
To my mind, the Hernandez doctrine should not be interpreted as an all-embracing authority for the rule that all common crimes
committed on the occasion, or in furtherance of, or in connection with, rebellion are absorbed by the latter. To that extent, I
cannot go along with the view of the majority in the instant case that 'Hernandez remains binding doctrine operating to prohibit
the complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed on the occasion thereof, either as a means necessary to its
commission or as an unintended effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion" (p. 9, Decision).
The Hernandez doctrine has served the purpose for which it was appealed by the Court in 1956 during the communist-inspired
rebellion of the Huks. The changes in our society in the span of 34 years since then have far-reaching effects on the all-
embracing applicability of the doctrine considering the emergence of alternative modes of seizing the powers of the duly
constituted Government not contemplated in Articles 134 and 135 of the Revised Penal Code and their consequent effects on the
lives of our people. The doctrine was good law then, but I believe that there is a certain aspect of the Hernandez doctrine that
needs clarification.
With all due respect to the views of my brethren in the Court, I believe that the Court, in the instant case, should have further
considered that distinction between acts or offenses which are indispensable in the commission of rebellion, on the one hand,
and those acts or offenses that are merely necessary but not indispensable in the commission of rebellion, on the other. The
majority of the Court is correct in adopting, albeit impliedly, the view in Hernandez case that when an offense perpetrated as a
necessary means of committing another, which is an element of the latter, the resulting interlocking crimes should be considered
as only one simple offense and must be deemed outside the operation of the complex crime provision (Article 48) of the Revised
Penal Code. As in the case of Hernandez, the Court, however, failed in the instant case to distinguish what is indispensable from
what is merely necessary in the commission of an offense, resulting thus in the rule that common crimes like murder, arson,
robbery, etc. committed in the course or on the occasion of rebellion are absorbed or included in the latter as elements thereof.
The relevance of the distinction is significant, more particularly, if applied to contemporaneous events happening in our country
today. Theoretically, a crime which is indispensable in the commission of another must necessarily be an element of the latter;
but a crime that is merely necessary but not indispensable in the commission of another is not an element of the latter, and if and
when actually committed, brings the interlocking crime within the operation of the complex crime provision (Art. 48) of the
Revised Penal Code. With that distinction, common crimes committed against Government forces and property in the course of
rebellion are properly considered indispensable overt acts of rebellion and are logically absorbed in it as virtual ingredients or
elements thereof, but common crimes committed against the civilian population in the course or on the occasion of rebellion and
in furtherance thereof, may be necessary but not indispensable in committing the latter, and may, therefore, not be considered as
elements of the said crime of rebellion. To illustrate, the deaths occurring during armed confrontation or clashes between
government forces and the rebels are absorbed in the rebellion, and would be those resulting from the bombing of military camps
and installations, as these acts are indispensable in carrying out the rebellion. But deliberately shooting down an unarmed
innocent civilian to instill fear or create chaos among the people, although done in the furtherance of the rebellion, should not be
absorbed in the crime of rebellion as the felonious act is merely necessary, but not indispensable. In the latter case, Article 48 of
the Revised Penal Code should apply.
The occurrence of a coup d' etat in our country as a mode of seizing the powers of the duly-constituted government by staging
surprise attacks or occupying centers of powers, of which this Court should take judicial notice, has introduced a new dimension
to the interpretation of the provisions on rebellion and insurrection in the Revised Penal Code. Generally, as a mode of seizing
the powers of the duly constituted government, it falls within the contemplation of rebellion under the Revised Penal Code, but,
strictly construed, a coup d'etat per se is a class by itself. The manner of its execution and the extent and magnitude of its effects
on the lives of the people distinguish a coup d'etat from the traditional definition and modes of commission attached by the
Revised Penal Code to the crime of rebellion as applied by the Court to the communist-inspired rebellion of the 1950's. A coup
d'etat may be executed successfully without its perpetrators resorting to the commission of other serious crimes such as murder,
arson, kidnapping, robbery, etc. because of the element of surprise and the precise timing of its execution. In extreme cases
where murder, arson, robbery, and other common crimes are committed on the occasion of a coup d' etat, the distinction referred
to above on what is necessary and what is indispensable in the commission of the coup d'etat should be painstakingly
considered as the Court should have done in the case of herein petitioners.
I concur in the result insofar as the other issues are resolved by the Court but I take exception to the vote of the majority on the
broad application of the Hernandez doctrine.
BIDIN, J ., concurring and dissenting:
I concur with the majority opinion except as regards the dispositive portion thereof which orders the remand of the case to the
respondent judge for further proceedings to fix the amount of bail to be posted by the petitioner.
I submit that the proceedings need not be remanded to the respondent judge for the purpose of fixing bail since we have
construed the indictment herein as charging simple rebellion, an offense which is bailable. Consequently, habeas corpus is the
proper remedy available to petitioner as an accused who had been charged with simple rebellion, a bailable offense but who had
been denied his right to bail by the respondent judge in violation of petitioner's constitutional right to bail. In view thereof, the
responsibility of fixing the amount of bail and approval thereof when filed, devolves upon us, if complete relief is to be accorded
to petitioner in the instant proceedings.
It is indubitable that before conviction, admission to bail is a matter of right to the defendant, accused before the Regional Trial
Court of an offense less than capital (Section 13 Article III, Constitution and Section 3, Rule 114). Petitioner is, before Us, on a
petition for habeas corpus praying, among others, for his provisional release on bail. Since the offense charged (construed as
simple rebellion) admits of bail, it is incumbent upon us m the exercise of our jurisdiction over the petition for habeas corpus
(Section 5 (1), Article VIII, Constitution; Section 2, Rule 102), to grant petitioner his right to bail and having admitted him to bail, to
fix the amount thereof in such sums as the court deems reasonable. Thereafter, the rules require that "the proceedings together
with the bond" shall forthwith be certified to the respondent trial court (Section 14, Rule 102).
Accordingly, the cash bond in the amount of P 100,000.00 posted by petitioner for his provisional release pursuant to our
resolution dated March 6, 1990 should now be deemed and admitted as his bail bond for his provisional release in the case
(simple rebellion) pending before the respondent judge, without necessity of a remand for further proceedings, conditioned for his
(petitioner's) appearance before the trial court to abide its order or judgment in the said case.
SARMIENTO, J ., concurring and dissenting:
I agree that People v. Hernandez
1
should abide. More than three decades after which it was penned, it has firmly settled in the
tomes of our jurisprudence as correct doctrine.
As Hernandez put it, rebellion means "engaging m war against the forces of the government,"
2
which implies "resort to arms,
requisition of property and services, collection of taxes and contributions, restraint of liberty, damage to property, physical injuries
and loss of life, and the hunger, illness and unhappiness that war leaves in its wake. ..."
3
whether committed in furtherance, of as
a necessary means for the commission, or in the course, of rebellion. To say that rebellion may be complexed with any other
offense, in this case murder, is to play into a contradiction in terms because exactly, rebellion includes murder, among other
possible crimes.
I also agree that the information may stand as an accusation for simple rebellion. Since the acts complained of as constituting
rebellion have been embodied in the information, mention therein of murder as a complexing offense is a surplusage, because in
any case, the crime of rebellion is left fully described.
4

At any rate, the government need only amend the information by a clerical correction, since an amendment will not alter its
substance.
I dissent, however, insofar as the majority orders the remand of the matter of bail to the lower court. I take it that when we, in our
Resolution of March 6, 1990, granted the petitioner "provisional liberty" upon the filing of a bond of P100,000.00, we granted him
bail. The fact that we gave him "provisional liberty" is in my view, of no moment, because bail means provisional liberty. It will
serve no useful purpose to have the trial court hear the incident again when we ourselves have been satisfied that the petitioner
is entitled to temporary freedom.
PADILLA, J ., dissenting:
I concur in the majority opinion insofar as it holds that the ruling in People vs. Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515 "remains binding doctrine
operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed on the occasion thereof, either as a means
necessary to its commission or as an unintended effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion."
I dissent, however, from the majority opinion insofar as it holds that the information in question, while charging the complex crime
of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder, "is to be read as charging simple rebellion."
The present cases are to be distinguished from the Hernandez case in at least one (1) material respect. In the Hernandez case,
this Court was confronted with an appealed case, i.e., Hernandez had been convicted by the trial court of the complex crime of
rebellion with murder, arson and robbery, and his plea to be released on bail before the Supreme Court, pending appeal, gave
birth to the now celebrated Hernandez doctrine that the crime of rebellion complexed with murder, arson and robbery does not
exist. In the present cases, on the other hand, the Court is confronted with an original case, i.e., where an information has been
recently filed in the trial court and the petitioners have not even pleaded thereto.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court, in the Hernandez case, was "ground-breaking" on the issue of whether rebellion can be
complexed with murder, arson, robbery, etc. In the present cases, on the other hand, the prosecution and the lower court, not
only had the Hernandez doctrine (as case law), but Executive Order No. 187 of President Corazon C. Aquino dated 5 June 1987
(as statutory law) to bind them to the legal proposition that the crime of rebellion complexed with murder, and multiple frustrated
murder does not exist.
And yet, notwithstanding these unmistakable and controlling beacon lights-absent when this Court laid down the Hernandez
doctrine-the prosecution has insisted in filing, and the lower court has persisted in hearing, an information charging the
petitioners with rebellion complexed with murder an multiple frustrated murder. That information is clearly a nullity and plainly
void ab initio. Its head should not be allowed to surface. As a nullity in substantive law, it charges nothing; it has given rise to
nothing. The warrants of arrest issued pursuant thereto are as null and void as the information on which they are anchored. And,
since the entire question of the information's validity is before the Court in these habeas corpus cases, I venture to say that the
information is fatally defective, even under procedural law, because it charges more than one (1) offense (Sec. 13, Rule 110,
Rules of Court).
I submit then that it is not for this Court to energize a dead and, at best, fatally decrepit information by labelling or "baptizing" it
differently from what it announces itself to be. The prosecution must file an entirely new and proper information, for this entire
exercise to merit the serious consideration of the courts.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to GRANT the petitions, QUASH the warrants of arrest, and ORDER the information for rebellion
complexed with murder and multiple frustrated murder in Criminal Case Nos. 90-10941, RTC of Quezon City, DISMISSED.
Consequently, the petitioners should be ordered permanently released and their bails cancelled.
Paras, J., concurs.
Footnotes
1 99 Phil. 515 (1956).
2 People vs. Lava, 28 SCRA 72 (1956); People vs. Geronimo, 100 Phil. 90 (1956); People vs. Romagosa,
103 Phil. 20 (1958); and People vs. Rodriguez, 107 Phil. 659 (1960).
3 Rollo, G.R. No. 92163, pp. 32-34.
4 Rollo, G.R. No. 92163, pp. 34 et seq.
5 Rollo, G.R. No. 92163, p. 26.
6 Rollo, G.R. No. 92163, pp. 305-359.
7 Originally a petition for certiorari and prohibition which the Court, upon motion of the petitioners,
resolved to treat as a petition for habeas corpus; Rollo, G.R. No. 92164, pp. 128-129.
8 Rollo, G.R. No. 92163, pp. 407-411.
9 Fernan, C.J., and Narvasa, Cortes and Grino-Aquino, JJ.
10 Fernan, C.J. and Narvasa, J.
10-A Two Members a on leave.
11 Executive Order No. 187 issued June 5, 1987.
12 People vs. Hernandez, supra at 541-543.
13 Id., at 551.
14 Rollo, G.R. No. 92163, pp. 78-79 and 73-76.
14 Supra, footnote 4.
15 Soliven vs. Makasiar, 167 SCRA 394.
17 Rollo, G.R. No. 92163, pp. 46-47.
18 Sec. 2, Rule 117, Rules of Court.
19 Ocampo vs. Bernabe, 77 Phil. 55.
20 Rollo, G.R. No. 92164, pp. 124-125.
Melencio-Herrera, J., Opinion
1 "ART. 142-A-Cases where other offenses are committed.-When by reason or on the occasion of any of
the crimes penalized in this Chapter, acts which constitute offenses upon which graver penalties are
imposed by law are committed, the penalty for the most serious offense in its maximum period shall be
imposed upon the offender."
Sarmiento, J., Concurring
1 99 Phil. 515 (1956).
2 Supra, 520.
3 Supra, 521.
4 US v. Santiago, 41 Phil. 793 (1917).

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Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-30642 April 30, 1985
PERFECTO S. FLORESCA, in his own behalf and on behalf of the minors ROMULO and NESTOR S. FLORESCA; and
ERLINDA FLORESCA-GABUYO, PEDRO S. FLORESCA, JR., CELSO S. FLORESCA, MELBA S. FLORESCA, JUDITH S.
FLORESCA and CARMEN S. FLORESCA;
LYDIA CARAMAT VDA. DE MARTINEZ in her own behalf and on behalf of her minor children LINDA, ROMEO, ANTONIO
JEAN and ELY, all surnamed Martinez; and DANIEL MARTINEZ and TOMAS MARTINEZ;
SALUSTIANA ASPIRAS VDA. DE OBRA, in her own behalf and on behalf of her minor children JOSE, ESTELA, JULITA
SALUD and DANILO, all surnamed OBRA;
LYDIA CULBENGAN VDA. DE VILLAR, in her own behalf and on behalf of her minor children EDNA, GEORGE and
LARRY III, all surnamed VILLAR;
DOLORES LOLITA ADER VDA. DE LANUZA, in her own behalf and on behalf of her minor children EDITHA, ELIZABETH,
DIVINA, RAYMUNDO, NESTOR and AURELIO, JR. all surnamed LANUZA;
EMERENCIANA JOSE VDA. DE ISLA, in her own behalf and on behalf of her minor children JOSE, LORENZO, JR.,
MARIA, VENUS and FELIX, all surnamed ISLA, petitioners,
vs.
PHILEX MINING CORPORATION and HON. JESUS P. MORFE, Presiding Judge of Branch XIII, Court of First Instance of
Manila, respondents.
Rodolfo C. Pacampara for petitioners.
Tito M. Villaluna for respondents.
MAKASIAR, J .:
This is a petition to review the order of the former Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XIII, dated December 16, 1968
dismissing petitioners' complaint for damages on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
Petitioners are the heirs of the deceased employees of Philex Mining Corporation (hereinafter referred to as Philex), who, while
working at its copper mines underground operations at Tuba, Benguet on June 28, 1967, died as a result of the cave-in that
buried them in the tunnels of the mine. Specifically, the complaint alleges that Philex, in violation of government rules and
regulations, negligently and deliberately failed to take the required precautions for the protection of the lives of its men working
underground. Portion of the complaint reads:
xxx xxx xxx
9. That for sometime prior and up to June 28,1967, the defendant PHILEX, with gross and reckless
negligence and imprudence and deliberate failure to take the required precautions for the due protection
of the lives of its men working underground at the time, and in utter violation of the laws and the rules and
regulations duly promulgated by the Government pursuant thereto, allowed great amount of water and
mud to accumulate in an open pit area at the mine above Block 43-S-1 which seeped through and
saturated the 600 ft. column of broken ore and rock below it, thereby exerting tremendous pressure on
the working spaces at its 4300 level, with the result that, on the said date, at about 4 o'clock in the
afternoon, with the collapse of all underground supports due to such enormous pressure, approximately
500,000 cubic feet of broken ores rocks, mud and water, accompanied by surface boulders, blasted
through the tunnels and flowed out and filled in, in a matter of approximately five (5) minutes, the
underground workings, ripped timber supports and carried off materials, machines and equipment which
blocked all avenues of exit, thereby trapping within its tunnels of all its men above referred to, including
those named in the next preceding paragraph, represented by the plaintiffs herein;
10. That out of the 48 mine workers who were then working at defendant PHILEX's mine on the said date,
five (5) were able to escape from the terrifying holocaust; 22 were rescued within the next 7 days; and the
rest, 21 in number, including those referred to in paragraph 7 hereinabove, were left mercilessly to their
fate, notwithstanding the fact that up to then, a great many of them were still alive, entombed in the
tunnels of the mine, but were not rescued due to defendant PHILEX's decision to abandon rescue
operations, in utter disregard of its bounden legal and moral duties in the premises;
xxx xxx xxx
13. That defendant PHILEX not only violated the law and the rules and regulations duly promulgated by
the duly constituted authorities as set out by the Special Committee above referred to, in their Report of
investigation, pages 7-13, Annex 'B' hereof, but also failed completely to provide its men working
underground the necessary security for the protection of their lives notwithstanding the fact that it had
vast financial resources, it having made, during the year 1966 alone, a total operating income of P
38,220,254.00, or net earnings, after taxes of P19,117,394.00, as per its llth Annual Report for the year
ended December 31, 1966, and with aggregate assets totalling P 45,794,103.00 as of December 31,
1966;
xxx xxx xxx
(pp. 42-44, rec.)
A motion to dismiss dated May 14, 1968 was filed by Philex alleging that the causes of action of petitioners based on an
industrial accident are covered by the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act (Act 3428, as amended by RA 772) and
that the former Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction over the case. Petitioners filed an opposition dated May 27, 1968 to the
said motion to dismiss claiming that the causes of action are not based on the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act
but on the provisions of the Civil Code allowing the award of actual, moral and exemplary damages, particularly:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre- existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
Art. 2178. The provisions of articles 1172 to 1174 are also applicable to a quasi-delict.
(b) Art. 1173The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that diligence which is
required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the
time and of the place. When negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of Articles 1171 and 2201,
paragraph 2 shall apply.
Art. 2201. x x x x x x x x x
In case of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude, the obligor shall be responsible for all damages
which may be reasonably attributed to the non-performance of the obligation.
Art. 2231. In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with gross
negligence.
After a reply and a rejoinder thereto were filed, respondent Judge issued an order dated June 27, 1968 dismissing the case on
the ground that it falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Workmen's Compensation Commission. On petitioners' motion for
reconsideration of the said order, respondent Judge, on September 23, 1968, reconsidered and set aside his order of June 27,
1968 and allowed Philex to file an answer to the complaint. Philex moved to reconsider the aforesaid order which was opposed
by petitioners.
On December 16, 1968, respondent Judge dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction and ruled that in accordance with the
established jurisprudence, the Workmen's Compensation Commission has exclusive original jurisdiction over damage or
compensation claims for work-connected deaths or injuries of workmen or employees, irrespective of whether or not the
employer was negligent, adding that if the employer's negligence results in work-connected deaths or injuries, the employer shall,
pursuant to Section 4-A of the Workmen's Compensation Act, pay additional compensation equal to 50% of the compensation
fixed in the Act.
Petitioners thus filed the present petition.
In their brief, petitioners raised the following assignment of errors:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PLAINTIFFS- PETITIONERS' COMPLAINT FOR
LACK OF JURISDICTION.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE CLEAR DISTINCTION BETWEEN
CLAIMS FOR DAMAGES UNDER THE CIVIL CODE AND CLAIMS FOR COMPENSATION UNDER THE
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT.
A
In the first assignment of error, petitioners argue that the lower court has jurisdiction over the cause of action since the complaint
is based on the provisions of the Civil Code on damages, particularly Articles 2176, 2178, 1173, 2201 and 2231, and not on the
provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act. They point out that the complaint alleges gross and brazen negligence on the
part of Philex in failing to take the necessary security for the protection of the lives of its employees working underground. They
also assert that since Philex opted to file a motion to dismiss in the court a quo, the allegations in their complaint including those
contained in the annexes are deemed admitted.
In the second assignment of error, petitioners asseverate that respondent Judge failed to see the distinction between the claims
for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act and the claims for damages based on gross negligence of Philex
under the Civil Code. They point out that workmen's compensation refers to liability for compensation for loss resulting from
injury, disability or death of the working man through industrial accident or disease, without regard to the fault or negligence of
the employer, while the claim for damages under the Civil Code which petitioners pursued in the regular court, refers to the
employer's liability for reckless and wanton negligence resulting in the death of the employees and for which the regular court
has jurisdiction to adjudicate the same.
On the other hand, Philex asserts that work-connected injuries are compensable exclusively under the provisions of Sections 5
and 46 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, which read:
SEC. 5. Exclusive right to compensation.The rights and remedies granted by this Act to an employee by
reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation shall exclude all other rights and remedies
accruing to the employee, his personal representatives, dependents or nearest of kin against the
employer under the Civil Code and other laws because of said injury ...
SEC. 46. Jurisdiction. The Workmen's Compensation Commissioner shall have exclusive jurisdiction to
hear and decide claims for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act, subject to appeal to
the Supreme Court, ...
Philex cites the case of Manalo vs. Foster Wheeler (98 Phil. 855 [1956]) where it was held that "all claims of workmen against
their employer for damages due to accident suffered in the course of employment shall be investigated and adjudicated by the
Workmen's Compensation Commission," subject to appeal to the Supreme Court.
Philex maintains that the fact that an employer was negligent, does not remove the case from the exclusive character of
recoveries under the Workmen's Compensation Act; because Section 4-A of the Act provides an additional compensation in case
the employer fails to comply with the requirements of safety as imposed by law to prevent accidents. In fact, it points out that
Philex voluntarily paid the compensation due the petitioners and all the payments have been accepted in behalf of the deceased
miners, except the heirs of Nazarito Floresca who insisted that they are entitled to a greater amount of damages under the Civil
Code.
In the hearing of this case, then Undersecretary of Labor Israel Bocobo, then Atty. Edgardo Angara, now President of the
University of the Philippines, Justice Manuel Lazaro, as corporate counsel and Assistant General Manager of the GSIS Legal
Affairs Department, and Commissioner on Elections, formerly UP Law Center Director Froilan Bacungan, appeared as amici
curiae and thereafter, submitted their respective memoranda.
The issue to be resolved as WE stated in the resolution of November 26, 1976, is:
Whether the action of an injured employee or worker or that of his heirs in case of his death under the
Workmen's Compensation Act is exclusive, selective or cumulative, that is to say, whether his or his heirs'
action is exclusively restricted to seeking the limited compensation provided under the Workmen's
Compensation Act or whether they have a right of selection or choice of action between availing of the
worker's right under the Workmen's Compensation Act and suing in the regular courts under the Civil
Code for higher damages (actual, moral and/or exemplary) from the employer by virtue of negligence (or
fault) of the employer or of his other employees or whether they may avail cumulatively of both actions,
i.e., collect the limited compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act and sue in addition for
damages in the regular courts.
There are divergent opinions in this case. Justice Lazaro is of the opinion that an injured employee or worker, or the heirs in case
of his death, may initiate a complaint to recover damages (not compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act) with the
regular court on the basis of negligence of an employer pursuant to the Civil Code provisions. Atty. Angara believes otherwise.
He submits that the remedy of an injured employee for work-connected injury or accident is exclusive in accordance with Section
5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, while Atty. Bacungan's position is that the action is selective. He opines that the heirs of
the employee in case of his death have a right of choice to avail themselves of the benefits provided under the Workmen's
Compensation Act or to sue in the regular court under the Civil Code for higher damages from the employer by virtue of
negligence of the latter. Atty. Bocobo's stand is the same as that of Atty. Bacungan and adds that once the heirs elect the
remedy provided for under the Act, they are no longer entitled to avail themselves of the remedy provided for under the Civil
Code by filing an action for higher damages in the regular court, and vice versa.
On August 3, 1978, petitioners-heirs of deceased employee Nazarito Floresca filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that they
have amicably settled their claim with respondent Philex. In the resolution of September 7, 1978, WE dismissed the petition only
insofar as the aforesaid petitioners are connected, it appearing that there are other petitioners in this case.
WE hold that the former Court of First Instance has jurisdiction to try the case,
It should be underscored that petitioners' complaint is not for compensation based on the Workmen's Compensation Act but a
complaint for damages (actual, exemplary and moral) in the total amount of eight hundred twenty-five thousand (P825,000.00)
pesos. Petitioners did not invoke the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act to entitle them to compensation thereunder.
In fact, no allegation appeared in the complaint that the employees died from accident arising out of and in the course of their
employments. The complaint instead alleges gross and reckless negligence and deliberate failure on the part of Philex to protect
the lives of its workers as a consequence of which a cave-in occurred resulting in the death of the employees working
underground. Settled is the rule that in ascertaining whether or not the cause of action is in the nature of workmen's
compensation claim or a claim for damages pursuant to the provisions of the Civil Code, the test is the averments or allegations
in the complaint (Belandres vs. Lopez Sugar Mill, Co., Inc., 97 Phil. 100).
In the present case, there exists between Philex and the deceased employees a contractual relationship. The alleged gross and
reckless negligence and deliberate failure that amount to bad faith on the part of Philex, constitute a breach of contract for which
it may be held liable for damages. The provisions of the Civil Code on cases of breach of contract when there is fraud or bad
faith, read:
Art. 2232. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the court may award exemplary damages if the defendant
acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner.
Art. 2201. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the damages for which the obligor who acted in good faith is
able shall be those that are the natural and probable consequences of the breach of the obligation, and
which the parties have foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen at the time the obligation was
constituted.
In cases of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude, the obligor shall be responsible for all damages
which may be reasonably attributed to the non-performance of the obligation.
Furthermore, Articles 2216 et seq., Civil Code, allow the payment of all kinds of damages, as assessed by the court.
The rationale in awarding compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act differs from that in giving damages under the
Civil Code. The compensation acts are based on a theory of compensation distinct from the existing theories of damages,
payments under the acts being made as compensation and not as damages (99 C.J.S. 53). Compensation is given to mitigate
the harshness and insecurity of industrial life for the workman and his family. Hence, an employer is liable whether negligence
exists or not since liability is created by law. Recovery under the Act is not based on any theory of actionable wrong on the part of
the employer (99 C.J.S. 36).
In other words, under the compensation acts, the employer is liable to pay compensation benefits for loss of income, as long as
the death, sickness or injury is work-connected or work-aggravated, even if the death or injury is not due to the fault of the
employer (Murillo vs. Mendoza, 66 Phil. 689). On the other hand, damages are awarded to one as a vindication of the wrongful
invasion of his rights. It is the indemnity recoverable by a person who has sustained injury either in his person, property or
relative rights, through the act or default of another (25 C.J.S. 452).
The claimant for damages under the Civil Code has the burden of proving the causal relation between the defendant's
negligence and the resulting injury as well as the damages suffered. While under the Workmen's Compensation Act, there is a
presumption in favor of the deceased or injured employee that the death or injury is work-connected or work-aggravated; and the
employer has the burden to prove otherwise (De los Angeles vs. GSIS, 94 SCRA 308; Carino vs. WCC, 93 SCRA 551; Maria
Cristina Fertilizer Corp. vs. WCC, 60 SCRA 228).
The claim of petitioners that the case is not cognizable by the Workmen's Compensation Commission then, now Employees
Compensation Commission, is strengthened by the fact that unlike in the Civil Code, the Workmen's Compensation Act did not
contain any provision for an award of actual, moral and exemplary damages. What the Act provided was merely the right of the
heirs to claim limited compensation for the death in the amount of six thousand (P6,000.00) pesos plus burial expenses of two
hundred (P200.00) pesos, and medical expenses when incurred (Sections 8, 12 and 13, Workmen's Compensation Act), and an
additional compensation of only 50% if the complaint alleges failure on the part of the employer to "install and maintain safety
appliances or to take other precautions for the prevention of accident or occupational disease" (Section 4-A, Ibid.). In the case at
bar, the amount sought to be recovered is over and above that which was provided under the Workmen's Compensation Act and
which cannot be granted by the Commission.
Moreover, under the Workmen's Compensation Act, compensation benefits should be paid to an employee who suffered an
accident not due to the facilities or lack of facilities in the industry of his employer but caused by factors outside the industrial
plant of his employer. Under the Civil Code, the liability of the employer, depends on breach of contract or tort. The Workmen's
Compensation Act was specifically enacted to afford protection to the employees or workmen. It is a social legislation designed to
give relief to the workman who has been the victim of an accident causing his death or ailment or injury in the pursuit of his
employment (Abong vs. WCC, 54 SCRA 379).
WE now come to the query as to whether or not the injured employee or his heirs in case of death have a right of selection or
choice of action between availing themselves of the worker's right under the Workmen's Compensation Act and suing in the
regular courts under the Civil Code for higher damages (actual, moral and exemplary) from the employers by virtue of that
negligence or fault of the employers or whether they may avail themselves cumulatively of both actions, i.e., collect the limited
compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act and sue in addition for damages in the regular courts.
In disposing of a similar issue, this Court in Pacana vs. Cebu Autobus Company, 32 SCRA 442, ruled that an injured worker has
a choice of either to recover from the employer the fixed amounts set by the Workmen's Compensation Act or to prosecute an
ordinary civil action against the tortfeasor for higher damages but he cannot pursue both courses of action simultaneously.
In Pacaa WE said:
In the analogous case of Esguerra vs. Munoz Palma, involving the application of Section 6 of the
Workmen's Compensation Act on the injured workers' right to sue third- party tortfeasors in the regular
courts, Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, again speaking for the Court, pointed out that the injured worker has the
choice of remedies but cannot pursue both courses of action simultaneously and thus balanced the
relative advantage of recourse under the Workmen's Compensation Act as against an ordinary action.
As applied to this case, petitioner Esguerra cannot maintain his action for damages against the
respondents (defendants below), because he has elected to seek compensation under the Workmen's
Compensation Law, and his claim (case No. 44549 of the Compensation Commission) was being
processed at the time he filed this action in the Court of First Instance. It is argued for petitioner that as
the damages recoverable under the Civil Code are much more extensive than the amounts that may be
awarded under the Workmen's Compensation Act, they should not be deemed incompatible. As already
indicated, the injured laborer was initially free to choose either to recover from the employer the fixed
amounts set by the Compensation Law or else, to prosecute an ordinary civil action against the tortfeasor
for higher damages. While perhaps not as profitable, the smaller indemnity obtainable by the first course
is balanced by the claimant's being relieved of the burden of proving the causal connection between the
defendant's negligence and the resulting injury, and of having to establish the extent of the damage
suffered; issues that are apt to be troublesome to establish satisfactorily. Having staked his fortunes on a
particular remedy, petitioner is precluded from pursuing the alternate course, at least until the prior claim
is rejected by the Compensation Commission. Anyway, under the proviso of Section 6 aforequoted, if the
employer Franklin Baker Company recovers, by derivative action against the alleged tortfeasors, a sum
greater than the compensation he may have paid the herein petitioner, the excess accrues to the latter.
Although the doctrine in the case of Esguerra vs. Munoz Palma (104 Phil. 582), applies to third-party tortfeasor, said rule should
likewise apply to the employer-tortfeasor.
Insofar as the heirs of Nazarito Floresca are concerned, as already stated, the petition has been dismissed in the resolution of
September 7, 1978 in view of the amicable settlement reached by Philex and the said heirs.
With regard to the other petitioners, it was alleged by Philex in its motion to dismiss dated May 14, 1968 before the court a quo,
that the heirs of the deceased employees, namely Emerito Obra, Larry Villar, Jr., Aurelio Lanuza, Lorenzo Isla and Saturnino
Martinez submitted notices and claims for compensation to the Regional Office No. 1 of the then Department of Labor and all of
them have been paid in full as of August 25, 1967, except Saturnino Martinez whose heirs decided that they be paid in
installments (pp. 106-107, rec.). Such allegation was admitted by herein petitioners in their opposition to the motion to dismiss
dated May 27, 1968 (pp. 121-122, rec.) in the lower court, but they set up the defense that the claims were filed under the
Workmen's Compensation Act before they learned of the official report of the committee created to investigate the accident which
established the criminal negligence and violation of law by Philex, and which report was forwarded by the Director of Mines to the
then Executive Secretary Rafael Salas in a letter dated October 19, 1967 only (p. 76, rec.).
WE hold that although the other petitioners had received the benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Act, such may not
preclude them from bringing an action before the regular court because they became cognizant of the fact that Philex has been
remiss in its contractual obligations with the deceased miners only after receiving compensation under the Act. Had petitioners
been aware of said violation of government rules and regulations by Philex, and of its negligence, they would not have sought
redress under the Workmen's Compensation Commission which awarded a lesser amount for compensation. The choice of the
first remedy was based on ignorance or a mistake of fact, which nullifies the choice as it was not an intelligent choice. The case
should therefore be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings. However, should the petitioners be successful in their
bid before the lower court, the payments made under the Workmen's Compensation Act should be deducted from the damages
that may be decreed in their favor.
B
Contrary to the perception of the dissenting opinion, the Court does not legislate in the instant case. The Court merely applies
and gives effect to the constitutional guarantees of social justice then secured by Section 5 of Article 11 and Section 6 of Article
XIV of the 1935 Constitution, and now by Sections 6, 7, and 9 of Article 11 of the DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE
POLICIES of the 1973 Constitution, as amended, and as implemented by Articles 2176, 2177, 2178, 1173, 2201, 2216, 2231 and
2232 of the New Civil Code of 1950.
To emphasize, the 1935 Constitution declares that:
Sec. 5. The promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people
should be the concern of the State (Art. II).
Sec. 6. The State shall afford protection to labor, especially to working women, and minors, and shall
regulate the relations between landowner and tenant, and between labor and capital in industry and in
agriculture. The State may provide for compulsory arbitration (Art. XIV).
The 1973 Constitution likewise commands the State to "promote social justice to insure the dignity, welfare, and security of all the
people "... regulate the use ... and disposition of private property and equitably diffuse property ownership and profits "establish,
maintain and ensure adequate social services in, the field of education, health, housing, employment, welfare and social security
to guarantee the enjoyment by the people of a decent standard of living" (Sections 6 and 7, Art. II, 1973 Constitution); "... afford
protection to labor, ... and regulate the relations between workers and employers ..., and assure the rights of workers to ... just
and humane conditions of work" (Sec. 9, Art. II, 1973 Constitution, emphasis supplied).
The foregoing constitutional guarantees in favor of labor institutionalized in Section 9 of Article 11 of the 1973 Constitution and
re-stated as a declaration of basic policy in Article 3 of the New Labor Code, thus:
Art. 3. Declaration of basic policy.The State shall afford protection to labor, promote full employment,
ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed, and regulate the relations between
workers and employers. The State shall assure the rights of workers to self-organization, collective
bargaining, security of tenure, and just and humane conditions of work. (emphasis supplied).
The aforestated constitutional principles as implemented by the aforementioned articles of the New Civil Code cannot be
impliedly repealed by the restrictive provisions of Article 173 of the New Labor Code. Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation
Act (before it was amended by R.A. No. 772 on June 20, 1952), predecessor of Article 173 of the New Labor Code, has been
superseded by the aforestated provisions of the New Civil Code, a subsequent law, which took effect on August 30, 1950, which
obey the constitutional mandates of social justice enhancing as they do the rights of the workers as against their employers.
Article 173 of the New Labor Code seems to diminish the rights of the workers and therefore collides with the social justice
guarantee of the Constitution and the liberal provisions of the New Civil Code.
The guarantees of social justice embodied in Sections 6, 7 and 9 of Article II of the 1973 Constitution are statements of legal
principles to be applied and enforced by the courts. Mr. Justice Robert Jackson in the case of West Virginia State Board of
Education vs. Barnette, with characteristic eloquence, enunciated:
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political
controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal
principles to be applied by the courts. One's right to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free press,
freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they
depend on the outcome of no elections (319 U.S. 625, 638, 87 L.ed. 1638, emphasis supplied).
In case of any doubt which may be engendered by Article 173 of the New Labor Code, both the New Labor Code and the Civil
Code direct that the doubts should be resolved in favor of the workers and employees.
Thus, Article 4 of the New Labor Code, otherwise known as Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, promulgated on May 1,
1974, but which took effect six months thereafter, provides that "all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the
provisions of this Code, including its implementing rules and regulations, shall be resolved in favor of labor" (Art. 2, Labor Code).
Article 10 of the New Civil Code states: "In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the law-
making body intended right and justice to prevail. "
More specifically, Article 1702 of the New Civil Code likewise directs that. "In case of doubt, all labor legislation and all labor
contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety and decent living of the laborer."
Before it was amended by Commonwealth Act No. 772 on June 20, 1952, Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act
provided:
Sec. 5. Exclusive right to compensation.- The rights and remedies granted by this Act to an employee by
reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation shall exclude all other rights and remedies
accruing to the employee, his personal representatives, dependents or nearest of kin against the
employer under the Civil Code and other laws, because of said injury (emphasis supplied).
Employers contracting laborecsrs in the Philippine Islands for work outside the same may stipulate with
such laborers that the remedies prescribed by this Act shall apply exclusively to injuries received outside
the Islands through accidents happening in and during the performance of the duties of the employment;
and all service contracts made in the manner prescribed in this section shall be presumed to include such
agreement.
Only the second paragraph of Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act No. 3428, was amended by Commonwealth Act
No. 772 on June 20, 1952, thus:
Sec. 5. Exclusive right to compensation.- The rights and remedies granted by this Act to an employee by
reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation shall exclude all other rights and remedies
accruing to the employee, his personal representatives, dependents or nearest of kin against the
employer under the Civil Code and other laws, because of said injury.
Employers contracting laborers in the Philippine Islands for work outside the same shall stipulate with
such laborers that the remedies prescribed by this Act shall apply to injuries received outside the Island
through accidents happening in and during the performance of the duties of the employment. Such
stipulation shall not prejudice the right of the laborers to the benefits of the Workmen's Compensation Law
of the place where the accident occurs, should such law be more favorable to them (As amended by
section 5 of Republic Act No. 772).
Article 173 of the New Labor Code does not repeal expressly nor impliedly the applicable provisions of the New Civil Code,
because said Article 173 provides:
Art. 173. Exclusiveness of liability.- Unless otherwise provided, the liability of the State Insurance Fund
under this Title shall be exclusive and in place of all other liabilities of the employer to the employee, his
dependents or anyone otherwise entitled to receive damages on behalf of the employee or his
dependents. The payment of compensation under this Title shall bar the recovery of benefits as provided
for in Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code, Republic Act Numbered Eleven hundred sixty-one,
as amended, Commonwealth Act Numbered One hundred eighty- six, as amended, Commonwealth Act
Numbered Six hundred ten, as amended, Republic Act Numbered Forty-eight hundred Sixty-four, as
amended, and other laws whose benefits are administered by the System during the period of such
payment for the same disability or death, and conversely (emphasis supplied).
As above-quoted, Article 173 of the New Labor Code expressly repealed only Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code,
R.A. No. 1161, as amended, C.A. No. 186, as amended, R.A. No. 610, as amended, R.A. No. 4864, as amended, and all other
laws whose benefits are administered by the System (referring to the GSIS or SSS).
Unlike Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act as aforequoted, Article 173 of the New Labor Code does not even
remotely, much less expressly, repeal the New Civil Code provisions heretofore quoted.
It is patent, therefore, that recovery under the New Civil Code for damages arising from negligence, is not barred by Article 173 of
the New Labor Code. And the damages recoverable under the New Civil Code are not administered by the System provided for
by the New Labor Code, which defines the "System" as referring to the Government Service Insurance System or the Social
Security System (Art. 167 [c], [d] and [e] of the New Labor Code).
Furthermore, under Article 8 of the New Civil Code, decisions of the Supreme Court form part of the law of the land.
Article 8 of the New Civil Code provides:
Art. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal
system of the Philippines.
The Court, through the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, in People vs. Licera ruled:
Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines decrees that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the
laws or the Constitution form part of this jurisdiction's legal system. These decisions, although in
themselves not laws, constitute evidence of what the laws mean. The application or interpretation placed
by the Court upon a law is part of the law as of the date of the enactment of the said law since the Court's
application or interpretation merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the construed
law purports to carry into effect" (65 SCRA 270, 272-273 [1975]).
WE ruled that judicial decisions of the Supreme Court assume the same authority as the statute itself (Caltex vs. Palomer, 18
SCRA 247; 124 Phil. 763).
The aforequoted provisions of Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, before and after it was amended by
Commonwealth Act No. 772 on June 20, 1952, limited the right of recovery in favor of the deceased, ailing or injured employee to
the compensation provided for therein. Said Section 5 was not accorded controlling application by the Supreme Court in the 1970
case of Pacana vs. Cebu Autobus Company (32 SCRA 442) when WE ruled that an injured worker has a choice of either to
recover from the employer the fixed amount set by the Workmen's Compensation Act or to prosecute an ordinary civil action
against the tortfeasor for greater damages; but he cannot pursue both courses of action simultaneously. Said Pacana case
penned by Mr. Justice Teehankee, applied Article 1711 of the Civil Code as against the Workmen's Compensation Act,
reiterating the 1969 ruling in the case of Valencia vs. Manila Yacht Club (28 SCRA 724, June 30,1969) and the 1958 case of
Esguerra vs. Munoz Palma (104 Phil. 582), both penned by Justice J.B.L. Reyes. Said Pacana case was concurred in by
Justices J.B.L. Reyes, Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando and Villamor.
Since the first sentence of Article 173 of the New Labor Code is merely a re-statement of the first paragraph of Section 5 of the
Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended, and does not even refer, neither expressly nor impliedly, to the Civil Code as
Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act did, with greater reason said Article 173 must be subject to the same
interpretation adopted in the cases of Pacana, Valencia and Esguerra aforementioned as the doctrine in the aforesaid three (3)
cases is faithful to and advances the social justice guarantees enshrined in both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions.
It should be stressed likewise that there is no similar provision on social justice in the American Federal Constitution, nor in the
various state constitutions of the American Union. Consequently, the restrictive nature of the American decisions on the
Workmen's Compensation Act cannot limit the range and compass of OUR interpretation of our own laws, especially Article 1711
of the New Civil Code, vis-a-vis Article 173 of the New Labor Code, in relation to Section 5 of Article II and Section 6 of Article
XIV of the 1935 Constitution then, and now Sections 6, 7 and 9 of the Declaration of Principles and State Policies of Article II of
the 1973 Constitution.
The dissent seems to subordinate the life of the laborer to the property rights of the employer. The right to life is guaranteed
specifically by the due process clause of the Constitution. To relieve the employer from liability for the death of his workers
arising from his gross or wanton fault or failure to provide safety devices for the protection of his employees or workers against
the dangers which are inherent in underground mining, is to deprive the deceased worker and his heirs of the right to recover
indemnity for the loss of the life of the worker and the consequent loss to his family without due process of law. The dissent in
effect condones and therefore encourages such gross or wanton neglect on the part of the employer to comply with his legal
obligation to provide safety measures for the protection of the life, limb and health of his worker. Even from the moral viewpoint
alone, such attitude is un-Christian.
It is therefore patent that giving effect to the social justice guarantees of the Constitution, as implemented by the provisions of the
New Civil Code, is not an exercise of the power of law-making, but is rendering obedience to the mandates of the fundamental
law and the implementing legislation aforementioned.
The Court, to repeat, is not legislating in the instant case.
It is axiomatic that no ordinary statute can override a constitutional provision.
The words of Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act and of Article 173 of the New Labor Code subvert the rights of the
petitioners as surviving heirs of the deceased mining employees. Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act and Article 173
of the New Labor Code are retrogressive; because they are a throwback to the obsolete laissez-faire doctrine of Adam Smith
enunciated in 1776 in his treatise Wealth of Nations (Collier's Encyclopedia, Vol. 21, p. 93, 1964), which has been discarded
soon after the close of the 18th century due to the Industrial Revolution that generated the machines and other mechanical
devices (beginning with Eli Whitney's cotton gin of 1793 and Robert Fulton's steamboat of 1807) for production and
transportation which are dangerous to life, limb and health. The old socio-political-economic philosophy of live-and-let-live is now
superdesed by the benign Christian shibboleth of live-and-help others to live. Those who profess to be Christians should not
adhere to Cain's selfish affirmation that he is not his brother's keeper. In this our civilization, each one of us is our brother's
keeper. No man is an island. To assert otherwise is to be as atavistic and ante-deluvian as the 1837 case of Prisley vs. Fowler (3
MN 1,150 reprint 1030) invoked by the dissent, The Prisley case was decided in 1837 during the era of economic royalists and
robber barons of America. Only ruthless, unfeeling capitalistics and egoistic reactionaries continue to pay obeisance to such un-
Christian doctrine. The Prisley rule humiliates man and debases him; because the decision derisively refers to the lowly worker
as "servant" and utilizes with aristocratic arrogance "master" for "employer." It robs man of his inherent dignity and dehumanizes
him. To stress this affront to human dignity, WE only have to restate the quotation from Prisley, thus: "The mere relation of the
master and the servant never can imply an obligation on the part of the master to take more care of the servant than he may
reasonably be expected to do himself." This is the very selfish doctrine that provoked the American Civil War which generated so
much hatred and drew so much precious blood on American plains and valleys from 1861 to 1864.
"Idolatrous reverence" for the letter of the law sacrifices the human being. The spirit of the law insures man's survival and
ennobles him. In the words of Shakespeare, "the letter of the law killeth; its spirit giveth life."
C
It is curious that the dissenting opinion clings to the myth that the courts cannot legislate.
That myth had been exploded by Article 9 of the New Civil Code, which provides that "No judge or court shall decline to render
judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the laws. "
Hence, even the legislator himself, through Article 9 of the New Civil Code, recognizes that in certain instances, the court, in the
language of Justice Holmes, "do and must legislate" to fill in the gaps in the law; because the mind of the legislator, like all
human beings, is finite and therefore cannot envisage all possible cases to which the law may apply Nor has the human mind the
infinite capacity to anticipate all situations.
But about two centuries before Article 9 of the New Civil Code, the founding fathers of the American Constitution foresaw and
recognized the eventuality that the courts may have to legislate to supply the omissions or to clarify the ambiguities in the
American Constitution and the statutes.
'Thus, Alexander Hamilton pragmatically admits that judicial legislation may be justified but denies that the power of the Judiciary
to nullify statutes may give rise to Judicial tyranny (The Federalist, Modern Library, pp. 503-511, 1937 ed.). Thomas Jefferson
went farther to concede that the court is even independent of the Nation itself (A.F.L. vs. American Sash Company, 1949 335 US
538).
Many of the great expounders of the American Constitution likewise share the same view. Chief Justice Marshall pronounced: "It
is emphatically the province and duty of the Judicial department to say what the law is (Marbury vs. Madison I Cranch 127 1803),
which was re-stated by Chief Justice Hughes when he said that "the Constitution is what the judge says it is (Address on May 3,
1907, quoted by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt on March 9, 1937). This was reiterated by Justice Cardozo who
pronounced that "No doubt the limits for the judge are narrower. He legislates only between gaps. He fills the open spaces in the
law. " (The Nature of the Judicial Process, p. 113). In the language of Chief Justice Harlan F. Stone, "The only limit to the judicial
legislation is the restraint of the judge" (U.S. vs. Butler 297 U.S. 1 Dissenting Opinion, p. 79), which view is also entertained by
Justice Frankfurter and Justice Robert Jackson. In the rhetoric of Justice Frankfurter, "the courts breathe life, feeble or strong,
into the inert pages of the Constitution and all statute books."
It should be stressed that the liability of the employer under Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act or Article 173 of the
New Labor Code is limited to death, ailment or injury caused by the nature of the work, without any fault on the part of the
employers. It is correctly termed no fault liability. Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended, or Article 173 of
the New Labor Code, does not cover the tortious liability of the employer occasioned by his fault or culpable negligence in failing
to provide the safety devices required by the law for the protection of the life, limb and health of the workers. Under either Section
5 or Article 173, the employer remains liable to pay compensation benefits to the employee whose death, ailment or injury is
work-connected, even if the employer has faithfully and diligently furnished all the safety measures and contrivances decreed by
the law to protect the employee.
The written word is no longer the "sovereign talisman." In the epigrammatic language of Mr. Justice Cardozo, "the law has
outgrown its primitive stage of formalism when the precise word was the sovereign talisman, and every slip was fatal" (Wood vs.
Duff Gordon 222 NW 88; Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 100). Justice Cardozo warned that: "Sometimes the
conservatism of judges has threatened for an interval to rob the legislation of its efficacy. ... Precedents established in those
items exert an unhappy influence even now" (citing Pound, Common Law and Legislation 21 Harvard Law Review 383, 387).
Finally, Justice Holmes delivered the coup de grace when he pragmatically admitted, although with a cautionary undertone: "that
judges do and must legislate, but they can do so only interstitially they are confined from molar to molecular motions" (Southern
Pacific Company vs. Jensen, 244 US 204 1917). And in the subsequent case of Springer vs. Government (277 US 188, 210-212,
72 L.ed. 845, 852- 853), Justice Holmes pronounced:
The great ordinances of the Constitution do not establish and divide fields of black and white. Even the
more specific of them are found to terminate in a penumbra shading gradually from one extreme to the
other. x x x. When we come to the fundamental distinctions it is still more obvious that they must be
received with a certain latitude or our government could not go on.
To make a rule of conduct applicable to an individual who but for such action would be free from it is to
legislate yet it is what the judges do whenever they determine which of two competing principles of policy
shall prevail.
xxx xxx xxx
It does not seem to need argument to show that however we may disguise it by veiling words we do not
and cannot carry out the distinction between legislative and executive action with mathematical precision
and divide the branches into waterlight compartments, were it ever so desirable to do so, which I am far
from believing that it is, or that the Constitution requires.
True, there are jurists and legal writers who affirm that judges should not legislate, but grudgingly concede that in certain cases
judges do legislate. They criticize the assumption by the courts of such law-making power as dangerous for it may degenerate
into Judicial tyranny. They include Blackstone, Jeremy Bentham, Justice Black, Justice Harlan, Justice Roberts, Justice David
Brewer, Ronald Dworkin, Rolf Sartorious, Macklin Fleming and Beryl Harold Levy. But said Justices, jurists or legal
commentators, who either deny the power of the courts to legislate in-between gaps of the law, or decry the exercise of such
power, have not pointed to examples of the exercise by the courts of such law-making authority in the interpretation and
application of the laws in specific cases that gave rise to judicial tyranny or oppression or that such judicial legislation has not
protected public interest or individual welfare, particularly the lowly workers or the underprivileged.
On the other hand, there are numerous decisions interpreting the Bill of Rights and statutory enactments expanding the scope of
such provisions to protect human rights. Foremost among them is the doctrine in the cases of Miranda vs. Arizona (384 US 436
1964), Gideon vs. Wainright (372 US 335), Escubedo vs. Illinois (378 US 478), which guaranteed the accused under custodial
investigation his rights to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed of such rights as even as it protects him against the
use of force or intimidation to extort confession from him. These rights are not found in the American Bill of Rights. These rights
are now institutionalized in Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution. Only the peace-and-order adherents were critical of
the activism of the American Supreme Court led by Chief Justice Earl Warren.
Even the definition of Identical offenses for purposes of the double jeopardy provision was developed by American judicial
decisions, not by amendment to the Bill of Rights on double jeopardy (see Justice Laurel in People vs. Tarok, 73 Phil. 260, 261-
268). And these judicial decisions have been re-stated in Section 7 of Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as well
as in Section 9 of Rule 117 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court. In both provisions, the second offense is the same as the first
offense if the second offense is an attempt to commit the first or frustration thereof or necessarily includes or is necessarily
included in the first offense.
The requisites of double jeopardy are not spelled out in the Bill of Rights. They were also developed by judicial decisions in the
United States and in the Philippines even before people vs. Ylagan (58 Phil. 851-853).
Again, the equal protection clause was interpreted in the case of Plessy vs. Ferguson (163 US 537) as securing to the Negroes
equal but separate facilities, which doctrine was revoked in the case of Brown vs. Maryland Board of Education (349 US 294),
holding that the equal protection clause means that the Negroes are entitled to attend the same schools attended by the whites-
equal facilities in the same school-which was extended to public parks and public buses.
De-segregation, not segregation, is now the governing principle.
Among other examples, the due process clause was interpreted in the case of People vs. Pomar (46 Phil. 440) by a
conservative, capitalistic court to invalidate a law granting maternity leave to working women-according primacy to property rights
over human rights. The case of People vs. Pomar is no longer the rule.
As early as 1904, in the case of Lochner vs. New York (198 US 45, 76, 49 L. ed. 937, 949), Justice Holmes had been railing
against the conservatism of Judges perverting the guarantee of due process to protect property rights as against human rights or
social justice for the working man. The law fixing maximum hours of labor was invalidated. Justice Holmes was vindicated finally
in 1936 in the case of West Coast Hotel vs. Parish (300 US 377-79; 81 L. ed. 703) where the American Supreme Court upheld
the rights of workers to social justice in the form of guaranteed minimum wage for women and minors, working hours not
exceeding eight (8) daily, and maternity leave for women employees.
The power of judicial review and the principle of separation of powers as well as the rule on political questions have been
evolved and grafted into the American Constitution by judicial decisions (Marbury vs. Madison, supra Coleman vs. Miller, 307 US
433, 83 L. ed. 1385; Springer vs. Government, 277 US 210-212, 72 L. ed. 852, 853).
It is noteworthy that Justice Black, who seems to be against judicial legislation, penned a separate concurring opinion in the case
of Coleman vs. Miller, supra, affirming the doctrine of political question as beyond the ambit of judicial review. There is nothing in
both the American and Philippine Constitutions expressly providing that the power of the courts is limited by the principle of
separation of powers and the doctrine on political questions. There are numerous cases in Philippine jurisprudence applying the
doctrines of separation of powers and political questions and invoking American precedents.
Unlike the American Constitution, both the 1935 and 1973 Philippine Constitutions expressly vest in the Supreme Court the
power to review the validity or constitutionality of any legislative enactment or executive act.
WHEREFORE, THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER OF DISMISSAL IS HEREBY REVERSED AND SET ASIDE AND THE CASE IS
REMANDED TO IT FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS. SHOULD A GREATER AMOUNT OF DAMAGES BE DECREED IN
FAVOR OF HEREIN PETITIONERS, THE PAYMENTS ALREADY MADE TO THEM PURSUANT TO THE WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION ACT SHALL BE DEDUCTED. NO COSTS.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Plana, Escolin, De la Fuente, Cuevas and Alampay JJ., concur.
Concepcion, Jr., J., is on leave.
Abad Santos and Relova, JJ., took no part.
Separate Opinions
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J ., dissenting:
A
This case involves a complaint for damages for the death of five employees of PHILEX Mining Corporation under the general
provisions of the Civil Code. The Civil Code itself, however, provides for its non-applicability to the complaint. It is specifically
provided in Article 2196 of the Code, found in Title XVIII-Damages that:
COMPENSATION FOR WORKMEN AND OTHER EMPLOYEES IN CASE OF DEATH, INJURY OR
ILLNESS IS REGULATED BY SPECIAL LAWS.
Compensation and damages are synonymous. In Esguerra vs. Muoz Palma, etc., et al., 104 Phil. 582, 586, Justice J.B.L.
Reyes had said:
Petitioner also avers that compensation is not damages. This argument is but a play on words. The term
compensation' is used in the law (Act 3812 and Republic Act 772) in the sense of indemnity for damages
suffered, being awarded for a personal injury caused or aggravated by or in the course of employment. ...
By the very provisions of the Civil Code, it is a "special law", not the Code itself, which has to apply to the complaint involved in
the instant case. That "special law", in reference to the complaint, can be no other than the Workmen's Compensation
Even assuming, without conceding, that an employee is entitled to an election of remedies, as the majority rules, both options
cannot be exercised simultaneously, and the exercise of one will preclude the exercise of the other. The petitioners had already
exercised their option to come under the Workmen's Compensation Act, and they have already received compensation payable
to them under that Act. Stated differently, the remedy under the Workmen's Compensation Act had already become a "finished
transaction".
There are two considerations why it is believed petitioners should no longer be allowed to exercise the option to sue under the
Civil Code. In the first place, the proceedings under the Workmen's Compensation Act have already become the law in regards
to" the "election of remedies", because those proceedings had become a "finished transaction".
In the second place, it should be plainly equitable that, if a person entitled to an "election of remedies" makes a first election and
accepts the benefits thereof, he should no longer be allowed to avail himself of the second option. At the very least, if he wants to
make a second election, in disregard of the first election he has made, when he makes the second election he should surrender
the benefits he had obtained under the first election, This was not done in the case before the Court.
B.
'There is full concurrence on my part with the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Gutierrez upholding "the exclusory provision of the
Workmen's Compensation Act." I may further add:
1. The Workmen's Compensation Act (Act No. 3428) was approved on December 10, 1927 and took effect on June 10, 1928. It
was patterned from Minnesota and Hawaii statutes.
Act No. 3428 was adopted by the Philippine legislature, in Spanish and some sections of the law were
taken from the statutes of Minnesota and Hawaii, (Chapter 209 of the Revised Laws of Hawaii, 1925).
[Morabe & Inton, Workmen's Compensation Act, p. 2]
Under the Workmen's Compensation Act of Hawaii, when the Act is applicable, the remedy under the Act is exclusive The
following is stated in 1 Schneider Workmen's Compensation Text, pp. 266, 267.
Sec. 112. Hawaii
Statutory Synopsis. The act is compulsory as to employees in 'all industrial employment' and employees
of the territory and its political subdivisions. (Sections 7480-7481, S.S., Vol. 1, p. 713.)
Compensation is not payable when injury is due to employee's willful intention to injure himself or another
or to his intoxication. (Sec. 7482, S.S., p. 713.)
When the act is applicable the remedy thereunder is exclusive (Sec. 7483, S.S., p. 714.)
2. In providing for exclusiveness of the remedy under our Workmen's Compensation Act, the Philippine Legislature worded the
first paragraph of Section 5 of the Act as follows:
SEC. 5. Exclusive right to compensation.-The rights and remedies granted by this Act to an employee
by reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation
shall exclude all other rights and remedies accruing to the employee, his personal representatives,
dependents or nearest of kin against the employer
under the Civil Code and other laws, because of said injury (Paragraphing and emphasis supplied)
In regards to the intent of the Legislature under the foregoing provision:
A cardinal rule in the interpretation of statutes is that the meaning and intention of the law-making body
must be sought, first of all in the words of the statute itself, read and considered in their natural, ordinary,
commonly-accepted and most obvious significations, according to good and approved usage and without
resorting to forced or subtle construction Courts, therefore, as a rule, cannot presume that the law-making
body does not know the meaning of words and the rules of grammar. Consequently, the grammatical
reading of a statute must be presumed to yield its correct sense. (Espino vs. Cleofe 52 SCRA 92, 98)
[Italics supplied]
3. The original second paragraph of Section 5 provided:
Employers contracting laborers in the Philippine Islands for work outside the same shall stipulate with
such laborers that the remedies prescribed by this Act shall apply exclusively to injuries received outside
the Islands through accidents happening in and during the performance of the duties of the employment.
(Italics supplied)
The use of the word "exclusively is a further confirmation of the exclusory provision of the Act, subject only to exceptions which
may be provided in the Act itself.
4. It might be mentioned that, within the Act itself, provision is made for remedies other than within the Act itself. Thus, Section 6,
in part, provides:
SEC. 6. Liability of third parties.-In case an employee suffers an injury for which compensation is due
under this Act by any other person besides his employer, it shall be optional with such injured employee
either to claim compensation from his employer, under this Act, or sue such other person for damages, in
accordance with law; ... (Emphasis supplied)
If the legislative intent under the first paragraph of Section 5 were to allow the injured employee to sue his employer under the
Civil Code, the legislator could very easily have formulated the said first paragraph of Section 5 according to the pattern of
Section 6. That that was not done shows the legislative intent not to allow any option to an employee to sue the employer under
the Civil Code for injuries compensable under the Act.
5. There should be no question but that the original first paragraph of Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, formulated
in 1927, provided that an injured worker or employee, or his heirs, if entitled to compensation under the Act, cannot have
independent recourse neither to the Civil Code nor to any other law relative to the liability of the employer. After 1927, there were
occasions when the legislator had the opportunity to amend the first paragraph of Section 5 such that the remedies under the Act
would not be exclusive; yet, the legislator refrained from doing so. That shows the legislatives continuing intent to maintain the
exclusory provision of the first paragraph of Section 5 unless otherwise provided in the Act itself.
(a) The original second paragraph of Section 5 provided:
Employers contracting laborers in the Philippine Islands for work outside the same shall stipulate with
such laborers that the remedies prescribed by this Act shall apply (exclusively) to injuries received outside
the Islands through accidents happening in and during the performance of the duties of the employment
(and all service contracts made in the manner prescribed in this section be presumed to include such
agreement).
On June 20, 1952, through RA 772, the foregoing second paragraph was amended with the elimination of the underlined words
in parentheses, and the addition of this sentence at the end of the paragraph:
Such stipulation shall not prejudice the right of the laborers to the benefits of the Workmen's
Compensation Law of the place where the accident occurs, should such law be more favorable to them.
(Emphasis supplied)
It will be seen that, within the Act itself, the exclusory character of the Act was amended. At that time, if he had so desired, the
legislator could have amended the first paragraph of Section 5 so that the employee would have the option to sue the employer
under the Act, or under the Civil Code, should the latter be more favorable to him.
(b) The Workmen's Compensation Act, which took effect in 1927, grants compensation to an injured employee without regard to
the presence or absence of negligence on the part of the employer. The compensation is deemed an expense chargeable to the
industry (Murillo vs. Mendoza, 66 Phil. 689 [1938]).
In time, it must have been thought that it was inequitable to have the amount of compensation, caused by negligence on the part
of the employer, to be the same amount payable when the employer was not negligent. Based on that thinking, Section 4-A
1
was
included into the Act, on June 20, 1952, through RA 772. Said Section 4-A increased the compensation payable by 50% in case
there was negligence on the part of the employer. That additional section evidenced the intent of the legislator not to give an
option to an employee, injured with negligence on the part of the employer, to sue the latter under the provisions of the Civil
Code.
On June 20, 1964, Section 4-A was amended (insubstantially) by RA 4119. The legislator was again given the opportunity to
provide, but he did not, the option to an employee to sue under the Act or under the Civil Code.
When a Court gives effect to a statute not in accordance with the intent of the law-maker, the Court is unjustifiably legislating.
It is in view of the foregoing that I vote for affirmation of the trial Court's dismissal of the Complaint.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J ., dissenting:
To grant the petition and allow the victims of industrial accidents to file damages suits based on torts would be a radical
innovation not only contrary to the express provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act but a departure from the principles
evolved in the long history of workmen's compensation. At the very least, it should be the legislature and not this Court which
should remove the exclusory provision of the Workmen's Compensation Act, a provision reiterated in the present Labor Code on
employees' compensation.
Workmen's compensation evolved to remedy the evils associated with the situation in the early years of the industrial revolution
when injured workingmen had to rely on damage suits to get recompense.
Before workmen's compensation, an injured worker seeking damages would have to prove in a tort suit that his employer was
either negligent or in bad faith, that his injury was caused by the employer and not a fellow worker, and that he was not guilty of
contributory negligence. The employer could employ not only his wealth in defeating the claim for damages but a host of common
law defenses available to him as well. The worker was supposed to know what he entered into when he accepted employment.
As stated in the leading case of Priestley u. Fowler (3 M. & W. 1, 150 Reprint 1030) decided in 1837 "the mere relation of the
master and the servant never can imply an obligation on the part of the master to take more care of the servant than he may
reasonably be expected to do of himself." By entering into a contract of employment, the worker was deemed to accept the risks
of employment that he should discover and guard against himself.
The problems associated with the application of the fellow servant rule, the assumption of risk doctrine, the principle of
contributory negligence, and the many other defenses so easily raised in protracted damage suits illustrated the need for a
system whereby workers had only to prove the fact of covered employment and the fact of injury arising from employment in
order to be compensated.
The need for a compensation scheme where liability is created solely by statute and made compulsory and where the element of
fault-either the fault of the employer or the fault of the employee-disregarded became obvious. Another objective was to have
simplified, expeditious, inexpensive, and non-litigious procedures so that victims of industrial accidents could more readily, if not
automatically, receive compensation for work-related injuries.
Inspite of common law defenses to defeat a claim being recognized, employers' liability acts were a major step in the desired
direction. However, employers liability legislation proved inadequate. Legislative reform led to the workmen's compensation.
I cite the above familiar background because workmen's compensation represents a compromise. In return for the near certainty
of receiving a sum of money fixed by law, the injured worker gives up the right to subject the employer to a tort suit for huge
amounts of damages. Thus, liability not only disregards the element of fault but it is also a pre- determined amount based on the
wages of the injured worker and in certain cases, the actual cost of rehabilitation. The worker does not receive the total damages
for his pain and suffering which he could otherwise claim in a civil suit. The employer is required to act swiftly on compensation
claims. An administrative agency supervises the program. And because the overwhelming mass of workingmen are benefited by
the compensation system, individual workers who may want to sue for big amounts of damages must yield to the interests of their
entire working class.
The nature of the compensation principle is explained as follows:
An appreciation of the nature of the compensation principle is essential to an understanding of the acts
and the cases interpreting them.
By the turn of the century it was apparent that the toll of industrial accidents of both the avoidable and
unavoidable variety had become enormous, and government was faced with the problem of who was to
pay for the human wreckage wrought by the dangers of modern industry. If the accident was avoidable
and could be attributed to the carelessness of the employer, existing tort principles offered some measure
of redress. Even here, however, the woeful inadequacy of the fault principle was manifest. The
uncertainty of the outcome of torts litigation in court placed the employee at a substantial disadvantage.
So long as liability depended on fault there could be no recovery until the finger of blame had been
pointed officially at the employer or his agents. In most cases both the facts and the law were uncertain.
The witnesses, who were usually fellow workers of the victim, were torn between friendship or loyalty to
their class, on the one hand, and fear of reprisal by the employer, on the other. The expense and delay of
litigation often prompted the injured employee to accept a compromise settlement for a fraction of the full
value of his claim. Even if suit were successfully prosecuted, a large share of the proceeds of the
judgment were exacted as contingent fees by counsel. Thus the employer against whom judgment was
cast often paid a substantial damage bill, while only a part of this enured to the benefit of the injured
employee or his dependents. The employee's judgment was nearly always too little and too late.
xxx xxx xxx
Workmen's Compensation rests upon the economic principle that those persons who enjoy the product of
a business- whether it be in the form of goods or services- should ultimately bear the cost of the injuries or
deaths that are incident to the manufacture, preparation and distribution of the product. ...
xxx xxx xxx
Under this approach the element of personal fault either disappears entirely or is subordinated to broader
economic considerations. The employer absorbs the cost of accident loss only initially; it is expected that
this cost will eventually pass down the stream of commerce in the form of increase price until it is spread
in dilution among the ultimate consumers. So long as each competing unit in a given industry is uniformly
affected, no producer can gain any substantial competitive advantage or suffer any appreciable loss by
reason of the general adoption of the compensation principle.
In order that the compensation principle may operate properly and with fairness to all parties it is essential
that the anticipated accident cost be predictable and that it be fixed at a figure that will not disrupt too
violently the traffic in the product of the industry affected. Thus predictability and moderateness of cost
are necessary from the broad economic viewpoint. ....
Compensation, then, differs from the conventional damage suit in two important respects: Fault on the
part of either employer or employee is eliminated; and compensation payable according to a definitely
limited schedule is substituted for damages. All compensation acts alike work these two major changes,
irrespective of how they may differ in other particulars.
Compensation, when regarded from the viewpoint of employer and employee represents a compromise in
which each party surrenders certain advantages in order to gain others which are of more importance
both to him and to society. The employer gives up the immunity he otherwise would enjoy in cases where
he is not at fault, and the employee surrenders his former right to full damages and accepts instead a
more modest claim for bare essentials, represented by compensation.
The importance of the compromise character of compensation cannot be overemphasized. The statutes
vary a great deal with reference to the proper point of balance. The amount of weekly compensation
payments and the length of the period during which compensation is to be paid are matters concerning
which the acts differ considerably. The interpretation of any compensation statute will be influenced
greatly by the court's reaction to the basic point of compromise established in the Act. If the court feels
that the basic compromise unduly favors the employer, it will be tempted to restore what it regards as a
proper balance by adopting an interpretation that favors the worker. In this way, a compensation act
drawn in a spirit of extreme conservatism may be transformed by a sympathetic court into a fairly liberal
instrument; and conversely, an act that greatly favors the laborer may be so interpreted by the courts that
employers can have little reason to complain. Much of the unevenness and apparent conflict in
compensation decisions throughout the various jurisdictions must be attributed to this." (Malone & Plant,
Workmen's Compensation American Casebook Series, pp. 63-65).
The schedule of compensation, the rates of payments, the compensable injuries and diseases, the premiums paid by employers
to the present system, the actuarial stability of the trust fund and many other interrelated parts have all been carefully studied
before the integrated scheme was enacted in to law. We have a system whose parts must mesh harmonious with one another if
it is to succeed. The basic theory has to be followed.
If this Court disregards this totality of the scheme and in a spirit of generosity recasts some parts of the system without touching
the related others, the entire structure is endangered. For instance, I am personally against stretching the law and allowing
payment of compensation for contingencies never envisioned to be compensable when the law was formulated. Certainly, only
harmful results to the principle of workmen's compensation can arise if workmen, whom the law allows to receive employment
compensation, can still elect to file damage suits for industrial accidents. It was precisely for this reason that Section 5 of the
Workmen's Compensation Act, which reads:
SEC. 5. Exclusive right to compensation.-The rights and remedies granted by this Act to an employee by
reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation shall exclude all other rights and remedies
accruing to the employee, his personal representatives, dependents or nearest of kin against the
employer under the Civil Code and other laws because of said injury. ...
Article 173 of the labor Code also provides:
ART. 173. Exclusivenesss of liability.Unless otherwise provided, the liability of the State Insurance Fund
under this Title shall be exclusive and in place of all other liabilities of the employer to the employee his
dependents or anyone otherwise entitled to receive damages on behalf of the employee or his
dependents.
I am against the Court assuming the role of legislator in a matter calling for actuarial studies and public hearings. If employers
already required to contribute to the State Insurance Fund will still have to bear the cost of damage suits or get insurance for that
purpose, a major study will be necessary. The issue before us is more far reaching than the interests of the poor victims and their
families. All workers covered by workmen's compensation and all employers who employ covered employees are affected. Even
as I have deepest sympathies for the victims, I regret that I am constrained to dissent from the majority opinion.
Separate Opinions
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J ., dissenting:
A
This case involves a complaint for damages for the death of five employees of PHILEX Mining Corporation under the general
provisions of the Civil Code. The Civil Code itself, however, provides for its non-applicability to the complaint. It is specifically
provided in Article 2196 of the Code, found in Title XVIII-Damages that:
COMPENSATION FOR WORKMEN AND OTHER EMPLOYEES IN CASE OF DEATH, INJURY OR
ILLNESS IS REGULATED BY SPECIAL LAWS.
Compensation and damages are synonymous. In Esguerra vs. Muoz Palma, etc., et al., 104 Phil. 582, 586, Justice J.B.L.
Reyes had said:
Petitioner also avers that compensation is not damages. This argument is but a play on words. The term
compensation' is used in the law (Act 3812 and Republic Act 772) in the sense of indemnity for damages
suffered, being awarded for a personal injury caused or aggravated by or in the course of employment. ...
By the very provisions of the Civil Code, it is a "special law", not the Code itself, which has to apply to the complaint involved in
the instant case. That "special law", in reference to the complaint, can be no other than the Workmen's Compensation
Even assuming, without conceding, that an employee is entitled to an election of remedies, as the majority rules, both options
cannot be exercised simultaneously, and the exercise of one will preclude the exercise of the other. The petitioners had already
exercised their option to come under the Workmen's Compensation Act, and they have already received compensation payable
to them under that Act. Stated differently, the remedy under the Workmen's Compensation Act had already become a "finished
transaction".
There are two considerations why it is believed petitioners should no longer be allowed to exercise the option to sue under the
Civil Code. In the first place, the proceedings under the Workmen's Compensation Act have already become the law in regards
to" the "election of remedies", because those proceedings had become a "finished transaction".
In the second place, it should be plainly equitable that, if a person entitled to an "election of remedies" makes a first election and
accepts the benefits thereof, he should no longer be allowed to avail himself of the second option. At the very least, if he wants to
make a second election, in disregard of the first election he has made, when he makes the second election he should surrender
the benefits he had obtained under the first election, This was not done in the case before the Court.
B.
'There is full concurrence on my part with the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Gutierrez upholding "the exclusory provision of the
Workmen's Compensation Act." I may further add:
1. The Workmen's Compensation Act (Act No. 3428) was approved on December 10, 1927 and took effect on June 10, 1928. It
was patterned from Minnesota and Hawaii statutes.
Act No. 3428 was adopted by the Philippine legislature, in Spanish and some sections of the law were
taken from the statutes of Minnesota and Hawaii, (Chapter 209 of the Revised Laws of Hawaii, 1925).
[Morabe & Inton, Workmen's Compensation Act, p. 2]
Under the Workmen's Compensation Act of Hawaii, when the Act is applicable, the remedy under the Act is exclusive The
following is stated in 1 Schneider Workmen's Compensation Text, pp. 266, 267.
Sec. 112. Hawaii
Statutory Synopsis. The act is compulsory as to employees in 'all industrial employment' and employees
of the territory and its political subdivisions. (Sections 7480-7481, S.S., Vol. 1, p. 713.)
Compensation is not payable when injury is due to employee's willful intention to injure himself or another
or to his intoxication. (Sec. 7482, S.S., p. 713.)
When the act is applicable the remedy thereunder is exclusive (Sec. 7483, S.S., p. 714.)
2. In providing for exclusiveness of the remedy under our Workmen's Compensation Act, the Philippine Legislature worded the
first paragraph of Section 5 of the Act as follows:
SEC. 5. Exclusive right to compensation.-The rights and remedies granted by this Act to an employee
by reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation
shall exclude all other rights and remedies accruing to the employee, his personal representatives,
dependents or nearest of kin against the employer
under the Civil Code and other laws, because of said injury (Paragraphing and emphasis supplied)
In regards to the intent of the Legislature under the foregoing provision:
A cardinal rule in the interpretation of statutes is that the meaning and intention of the law-making body
must be sought, first of all in the words of the statute itself, read and considered in their natural, ordinary,
commonly-accepted and most obvious significations, according to good and approved usage and without
resorting to forced or subtle construction Courts, therefore, as a rule, cannot presume that the law-making
body does not know the meaning of words and the rules of grammar. Consequently, the grammatical
reading of a statute must be presumed to yield its correct sense. (Espino vs. Cleofe 52 SCRA 92, 98)
[Italics supplied]
3. The original second paragraph of Section 5 provided:
Employers contracting laborers in the Philippine Islands for work outside the same shall stipulate with
such laborers that the remedies prescribed by this Act shall apply exclusively to injuries received outside
the Islands through accidents happening in and during the performance of the duties of the employment.
(Italics supplied)
The use of the word "exclusively is a further confirmation of the exclusory provision of the Act, subject only to exceptions which
may be provided in the Act itself.
4. It might be mentioned that, within the Act itself, provision is made for remedies other than within the Act itself. Thus, Section 6,
in part, provides:
SEC. 6. Liability of third parties.-In case an employee suffers an injury for which compensation is due
under this Act by any other person besides his employer, it shall be optional with such injured employee
either to claim compensation from his employer, under this Act, or sue such other person for damages, in
accordance with law; ... (Emphasis supplied)
If the legislative intent under the first paragraph of Section 5 were to allow the injured employee to sue his employer under the
Civil Code, the legislator could very easily have formulated the said first paragraph of Section 5 according to the pattern of
Section 6. That that was not done shows the legislative intent not to allow any option to an employee to sue the employer under
the Civil Code for injuries compensable under the Act.
5. There should be no question but that the original first paragraph of Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, formulated
in 1927, provided that an injured worker or employee, or his heirs, if entitled to compensation under the Act, cannot have
independent recourse neither to the Civil Code nor to any other law relative to the liability of the employer. After 1927, there were
occasions when the legislator had the opportunity to amend the first paragraph of Section 5 such that the remedies under the Act
would not be exclusive; yet, the legislator refrained from doing so. That shows the legislatives continuing intent to maintain the
exclusory provision of the first paragraph of Section 5 unless otherwise provided in the Act itself.
(a) The original second paragraph of Section 5 provided:
Employers contracting laborers in the Philippine Islands for work outside the same shall stipulate with
such laborers that the remedies prescribed by this Act shall apply (exclusively) to injuries received outside
the Islands through accidents happening in and during the performance of the duties of the employment
(and all service contracts made in the manner prescribed in this section be presumed to include such
agreement).
On June 20, 1952, through RA 772, the foregoing second paragraph was amended with the elimination of the underlined words
in parentheses, and the addition of this sentence at the end of the paragraph:
Such stipulation shall not prejudice the right of the laborers to the benefits of the Workmen's
Compensation Law of the place where the accident occurs, should such law be more favorable to them.
(Emphasis supplied)
It will be seen that, within the Act itself, the exclusory character of the Act was amended. At that time, if he had so desired, the
legislator could have amended the first paragraph of Section 5 so that the employee would have the option to sue the employer
under the Act, or under the Civil Code, should the latter be more favorable to him.
(b) The Workmen's Compensation Act, which took effect in 1927, grants compensation to an injured employee without regard to
the presence or absence of negligence on the part of the employer. The compensation is deemed an expense chargeable to the
industry (Murillo vs. Mendoza, 66 Phil. 689 [1938]).
In time, it must have been thought that it was inequitable to have the amount of compensation, caused by negligence on the part
of the employer, to be the same amount payable when the employer was not negligent. Based on that thinking, Section 4-A
1
was
included into the Act, on June 20, 1952, through RA 772. Said Section 4-A increased the compensation payable by 50% in case
there was negligence on the part of the employer. That additional section evidenced the intent of the legislator not to give an
option to an employee, injured with negligence on the part of the employer, to sue the latter under the provisions of the Civil
Code.
On June 20, 1964, Section 4-A was amended (insubstantially) by RA 4119. The legislator was again given the opportunity to
provide, but he did not, the option to an employee to sue under the Act or under the Civil Code.
When a Court gives effect to a statute not in accordance with the intent of the law-maker, the Court is unjustifiably legislating.
It is in view of the foregoing that I vote for affirmation of the trial Court's dismissal of the Complaint.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J ., dissenting:
To grant the petition and allow the victims of industrial accidents to file damages suits based on torts would be a radical
innovation not only contrary to the express provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act but a departure from the principles
evolved in the long history of workmen's compensation. At the very least, it should be the legislature and not this Court which
should remove the exclusory provision of the Workmen's Compensation Act, a provision reiterated in the present Labor Code on
employees' compensation.
Workmen's compensation evolved to remedy the evils associated with the situation in the early years of the industrial revolution
when injured workingmen had to rely on damage suits to get recompense.
Before workmen's compensation, an injured worker seeking damages would have to prove in a tort suit that his employer was
either negligent or in bad faith, that his injury was caused by the employer and not a fellow worker, and that he was not guilty of
contributory negligence. The employer could employ not only his wealth in defeating the claim for damages but a host of common
law defenses available to him as well. The worker was supposed to know what he entered into when he accepted employment.
As stated in the leading case of Priestley u. Fowler (3 M. & W. 1, 150 Reprint 1030) decided in 1837 "the mere relation of the
master and the servant never can imply an obligation on the part of the master to take more care of the servant than he may
reasonably be expected to do of himself." By entering into a contract of employment, the worker was deemed to accept the risks
of employment that he should discover and guard against himself.
The problems associated with the application of the fellow servant rule, the assumption of risk doctrine, the principle of
contributory negligence, and the many other defenses so easily raised in protracted damage suits illustrated the need for a
system whereby workers had only to prove the fact of covered employment and the fact of injury arising from employment in
order to be compensated.
The need for a compensation scheme where liability is created solely by statute and made compulsory and where the element of
fault-either the fault of the employer or the fault of the employee-disregarded became obvious. Another objective was to have
simplified, expeditious, inexpensive, and non-litigious procedures so that victims of industrial accidents could more readily, if not
automatically, receive compensation for work-related injuries.
Inspite of common law defenses to defeat a claim being recognized, employers' liability acts were a major step in the desired
direction. However, employers liability legislation proved inadequate. Legislative reform led to the workmen's compensation.
I cite the above familiar background because workmen's compensation represents a compromise. In return for the near certainty
of receiving a sum of money fixed by law, the injured worker gives up the right to subject the employer to a tort suit for huge
amounts of damages. Thus, liability not only disregards the element of fault but it is also a pre- determined amount based on the
wages of the injured worker and in certain cases, the actual cost of rehabilitation. The worker does not receive the total damages
for his pain and suffering which he could otherwise claim in a civil suit. The employer is required to act swiftly on compensation
claims. An administrative agency supervises the program. And because the overwhelming mass of workingmen are benefited by
the compensation system, individual workers who may want to sue for big amounts of damages must yield to the interests of their
entire working class.
The nature of the compensation principle is explained as follows:
An appreciation of the nature of the compensation principle is essential to an understanding of the acts
and the cases interpreting them.
By the turn of the century it was apparent that the toll of industrial accidents of both the avoidable and
unavoidable variety had become enormous, and government was faced with the problem of who was to
pay for the human wreckage wrought by the dangers of modern industry. If the accident was avoidable
and could be attributed to the carelessness of the employer, existing tort principles offered some measure
of redress. Even here, however, the woeful inadequacy of the fault principle was manifest. The
uncertainty of the outcome of torts litigation in court placed the employee at a substantial disadvantage.
So long as liability depended on fault there could be no recovery until the finger of blame had been
pointed officially at the employer or his agents. In most cases both the facts and the law were uncertain.
The witnesses, who were usually fellow workers of the victim, were torn between friendship or loyalty to
their class, on the one hand, and fear of reprisal by the employer, on the other. The expense and delay of
litigation often prompted the injured employee to accept a compromise settlement for a fraction of the full
value of his claim. Even if suit were successfully prosecuted, a large share of the proceeds of the
judgment were exacted as contingent fees by counsel. Thus the employer against whom judgment was
cast often paid a substantial damage bill, while only a part of this enured to the benefit of the injured
employee or his dependents. The employee's judgment was nearly always too little and too late.
xxx xxx xxx
Workmen's Compensation rests upon the economic principle that those persons who enjoy the product of
a business- whether it be in the form of goods or services- should ultimately bear the cost of the injuries or
deaths that are incident to the manufacture, preparation and distribution of the product. ...
xxx xxx xxx
Under this approach the element of personal fault either disappears entirely or is subordinated to broader
economic considerations. The employer absorbs the cost of accident loss only initially; it is expected that
this cost will eventually pass down the stream of commerce in the form of increase price until it is spread
in dilution among the ultimate consumers. So long as each competing unit in a given industry is uniformly
affected, no producer can gain any substantial competitive advantage or suffer any appreciable loss by
reason of the general adoption of the compensation principle.
In order that the compensation principle may operate properly and with fairness to all parties it is essential
that the anticipated accident cost be predictable and that it be fixed at a figure that will not disrupt too
violently the traffic in the product of the industry affected. Thus predictability and moderateness of cost
are necessary from the broad economic viewpoint. ....
Compensation, then, differs from the conventional damage suit in two important respects: Fault on the
part of either employer or employee is eliminated; and compensation payable according to a definitely
limited schedule is substituted for damages. All compensation acts alike work these two major changes,
irrespective of how they may differ in other particulars.
Compensation, when regarded from the viewpoint of employer and employee represents a compromise in
which each party surrenders certain advantages in order to gain others which are of more importance
both to him and to society. The employer gives up the immunity he otherwise would enjoy in cases where
he is not at fault, and the employee surrenders his former right to full damages and accepts instead a
more modest claim for bare essentials, represented by compensation.
The importance of the compromise character of compensation cannot be overemphasized. The statutes
vary a great deal with reference to the proper point of balance. The amount of weekly compensation
payments and the length of the period during which compensation is to be paid are matters concerning
which the acts differ considerably. The interpretation of any compensation statute will be influenced
greatly by the court's reaction to the basic point of compromise established in the Act. If the court feels
that the basic compromise unduly favors the employer, it will be tempted to restore what it regards as a
proper balance by adopting an interpretation that favors the worker. In this way, a compensation act
drawn in a spirit of extreme conservatism may be transformed by a sympathetic court into a fairly liberal
instrument; and conversely, an act that greatly favors the laborer may be so interpreted by the courts that
employers can have little reason to complain. Much of the unevenness and apparent conflict in
compensation decisions throughout the various jurisdictions must be attributed to this." (Malone & Plant,
Workmen's Compensation American Casebook Series, pp. 63-65).
The schedule of compensation, the rates of payments, the compensable injuries and diseases, the premiums paid by employers
to the present system, the actuarial stability of the trust fund and many other interrelated parts have all been carefully studied
before the integrated scheme was enacted in to law. We have a system whose parts must mesh harmonious with one another if
it is to succeed. The basic theory has to be followed.
If this Court disregards this totality of the scheme and in a spirit of generosity recasts some parts of the system without touching
the related others, the entire structure is endangered. For instance, I am personally against stretching the law and allowing
payment of compensation for contingencies never envisioned to be compensable when the law was formulated. Certainly, only
harmful results to the principle of workmen's compensation can arise if workmen, whom the law allows to receive employment
compensation, can still elect to file damage suits for industrial accidents. It was precisely for this reason that Section 5 of the
Workmen's Compensation Act, which reads:
SEC. 5. Exclusive right to compensation.-The rights and remedies granted by this Act to an employee by
reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation shall exclude all other rights and remedies
accruing to the employee, his personal representatives, dependents or nearest of kin against the
employer under the Civil Code and other laws because of said injury. ...
Article 173 of the labor Code also provides:
ART. 173. Exclusivenesss of liability.Unless otherwise provided, the liability of the State Insurance Fund
under this Title shall be exclusive and in place of all other liabilities of the employer to the employee his
dependents or anyone otherwise entitled to receive damages on behalf of the employee or his
dependents.
I am against the Court assuming the role of legislator in a matter calling for actuarial studies and public hearings. If employers
already required to contribute to the State Insurance Fund will still have to bear the cost of damage suits or get insurance for that
purpose, a major study will be necessary. The issue before us is more far reaching than the interests of the poor victims and their
families. All workers covered by workmen's compensation and all employers who employ covered employees are affected. Even
as I have deepest sympathies for the victims, I regret that I am constrained to dissent from the majority opinion.
Footnotes
1 SEC. 4-A. Right to additional compensation.- In case of the employee's death, injury or sickness due to
the failure of the to comply with any law, or with any order, rule or regulation of the Workmen's
Compensation Commission or the Bureau of Labor Standards or should the employer violate the
provisions of Republic Act Numbered Six hundred seventy-nine and its amendments or fail to install and
maintain safety appliances, or take other precautions for the prevention of accidents or occupational
disease, he shall be liable to pay an additional compensation equal to fifty per centum of the
compensation fixed in this Act.

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Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 74917 January 20, 1988
BANCO DE ORO SAVINGS AND MORTGAGE BANK, petitioner,
vs.
EQUITABLE BANKING CORPORATION, PHILIPPINE CLEARING HOUSE CORPORATION, AND REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
OF QUEZON CITY, BRANCH XCII (92), respondents.
GANCAYCO, J .:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City promulgated on March 24, 1986
in Civil Case No. Q-46517 entitled Banco de Oro Savings and Mortgage Bank versus Equitable Banking Corporation and the
Philippine Clearing House Corporation after a review of the Decision of the Board of Directors of the Philippine Clearing House
Corporation (PCHC) in the case of Equitable Banking Corporation (EBC) vs. Banco de Oro Savings and Mortgage (BCO),
ARBICOM Case No. 84033.
The undisputed facts are as follows:
It appears that some time in March, April, May and August 1983, plaintiff through its Visa Card
Department, drew six crossed Manager's check (Exhibits "A" to "F", and herein referred to as Checks)
having an aggregate amount of Forty Five Thousand Nine Hundred and Eighty Two & 23/100
(P45,982.23) Pesos and payable to certain member establishments of Visa Card. Subsequently, the
Checks were deposited with the defendant to the credit of its depositor, a certain Aida Trencio.
Following normal procedures, and after stamping at the back of the Checks the usual endorsements. All
prior and/or lack of endorsement guaranteed the defendant sent the checks for clearing through the
Philippine Clearing House Corporation (PCHC). Accordingly, plaintiff paid the Checks; its clearing account
was debited for the value of the Checks and defendant's clearing account was credited for the same
amount,
Thereafter, plaintiff discovered that the endorsements appearing at the back of the Checks and purporting
to be that of the payees were forged and/or unauthorized or otherwise belong to persons other than the
payees.
Pursuant to the PCHC Clearing Rules and Regulations, plaintiff presented the Checks directly to the
defendant for the purpose of claiming reimbursement from the latter. However, defendant refused to
accept such direct presentation and to reimburse the plaintiff for the value of the Checks; hence, this
case.
In its Complaint, plaintiff prays for judgment to require the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of
P45,982.23 with interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of the complaint plus attorney's fees
in the amount of P10,000.00 as well as the cost of the suit.
In accordance with Section 38 of the Clearing House Rules and Regulations, the dispute was presented
for Arbitration; and Atty. Ceasar Querubin was designated as the Arbitrator.
After an exhaustive investigation and hearing the Arbiter rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiff and
against the defendant ordering the PCHC to debit the clearing account of the defendant, and to credit the
clearing account of the plaintiff of the amount of P45,982.23 with interest at the rate of 12% per annum
from date of the complaint and Attorney's fee in the amount of P5,000.00. No pronouncement as to cost
was made.
1

In a motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioner, the Board of Directors of the PCHC affirmed the decision of the said Arbiter
in this wise:
In view of all the foregoing, the decision of the Arbiter is confirmed; and the Philippine Clearing House
Corporation is hereby ordered to debit the clearing account of the defendant and credit the clearing
account of plaintiff the amount of Forty Five Thousand Nine Hundred Eighty Two & 23/100 (P45,982.23)
Pesos with interest at the rate of 12% per annum from date of the complaint, and the Attorney's fee in the
amount of Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos.
Thus, a petition for review was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch XCII, wherein in due course a decision
was rendered affirming in toto the decision of the PCHC.
Hence this petition.
The petition is focused on the following issues:
1. Did the PCHC have any jurisdiction to give due course to and adjudicate Arbicom Case No. 84033?
2. Were the subject checks non-negotiable and if not, does it fall under the ambit of the power of the PCHC?
3. Is the Negotiable Instrument Law, Act No. 2031 applicable in deciding controversies of this nature by the PCHC?
4. What law should govern in resolving controversies of this nature?
5. Was the petitioner bank negligent and thus responsible for any undue payment?
Petitioner maintains that the PCHC is not clothed with jurisdiction because the Clearing House Rules and Regulations of PCHC
cover and apply only to checks that are genuinely negotiable. Emphasis is laid on the primary purpose of the PCHC in the
Articles of Incorporation, which states:
To provide, maintain and render an effective, convenient, efficient, economical and relevant exchange
and facilitate service limited to check processing and sorting by way of assisting member banks, entities
in clearing checks and other clearing items as defined in existing and in future Central Bank of the
Philippines circulars, memoranda, circular letters, rules and regulations and policies in pursuance to the
provisions of Section 107 of R.A. 265. ...
and Section 107 of R.A. 265 which provides:
xxx xxx xxx
The deposit reserves maintained by the banks in the Central Bank, in accordance with the provisions of
Section 1000 shall serve as a basis for the clearing of checks, and the settlement of interbank balances ...
Petitioner argues that by law and common sense, the term check should be interpreted as one that fits the articles of
incorporation of the PCHC, the Central Bank and the Clearing House Rules stating that it is a negotiable instrument citing the
definition of a "check" as basically a "bill of exchange" under Section 185 of the NIL and that it should be payable to "order" or to
"bearer" under Section 126 of game law. Petitioner alleges that with the cancellation of the printed words "or bearer from the face
of the check, it becomes non-negotiable so the PCHC has no jurisdiction over the case.
The Regional Trial Court took exception to this stand and conclusion put forth by the herein petitioner as it held:
Petitioner's theory cannot be maintained. As will be noted, the PCHC makes no distinction as to the
character or nature of the checks subject of its jurisdiction. The pertinent provisions quoted in petitioners
memorandum simply refer to check(s). Where the law does not distinguish, we shall not distinguish.
In the case of Reyes vs. Chuanico (CA-G.R. No. 20813 R, Feb. 5, 1962) the Appellate Court categorically
stated that there are four kinds of checks in this jurisdiction; the regular check; the cashier's check; the
traveller's check; and the crossed check. The Court, further elucidated, that while the Negotiable
Instruments Law does not contain any provision on crossed checks, it is coon practice in commercial and
banking operations to issue checks of this character, obviously in accordance with Article 541 of the Code
of Commerce. Attention is likewise called to Section 185 of the Negotiable Instruments Law:
Sec. 185. Check defined. A check is a bill of exchange drawn on a bank payable on
demand. Except as herein otherwise provided, the provisions of this act applicable to a bill
of exchange payable on demand apply to a check
and the provisions of Section 61 (supra) that the drawer may insert in the instrument an express
stipulation negating or limiting his own liability to the holder. Consequently, it appears that the use of the
term "check" in the Articles of Incorporation of PCHC is to be perceived as not limited to negotiable
checks only, but to checks as is generally known in use in commercial or business transactions.
Anent Petitioner's liability on said instruments, this court is in full accord with the ruling of the PCHC Board
of Directors that:
In presenting the Checks for clearing and for payment, the defendant made an express
guarantee on the validity of "all prior endorsements." Thus, stamped at the back of the
checks are the defendant's clear warranty; ALL PRIOR ENDORSEMENTS AND/OR
LACK OF ENDORSEMENTS GUARANTEED. With. out such warranty, plaintiff would not
have paid on the checks.
No amount of legal jargon can reverse the clear meaning of defendant's warranty. As the
warranty has proven to be false and inaccurate, the defendant is liable for any damage
arising out of the falsity of its representation.
The principle of estoppel, effectively prevents the defendant from denying liability for any
damage sustained by the plaintiff which, relying upon an action or declaration of the
defendant, paid on the Checks. The same principle of estoppel effectively prevents the
defendant from denying the existence of the Checks. (Pp. 1011 Decision; pp. 4344, Rollo)
We agree.
As provided in the aforecited articles of incorporation of PCHC its operation extend to "clearing checks and other clearing items."
No doubt transactions on non-negotiable checks are within the ambit of its jurisdiction.
In a previous case, this Court had occasion to rule: "Ubi lex non distinguish nec nos distinguere debemos."
2
It was enunciated in
Loc Cham v. Ocampo, 77 Phil. 636 (1946):
The rule, founded on logic is a corollary of the principle that general words and phrases in a statute
should ordinarily be accorded their natural and general significance. In other words, there should be no
distinction in the application of a statute where none is indicated.
There should be no distinction in the application of a statute where none is indicated for courts are not authorized to distinguish
where the law makes no distinction. They should instead administer the law not as they think it ought to be but as they find it and
without regard to consequences.
3

The term check as used in the said Articles of Incorporation of PCHC can only connote checks in general use in commercial and
business activities. It cannot be conceived to be limited to negotiable checks only.
Checks are used between banks and bankers and their customers, and are designed to facilitate banking operations. It is of the
essence to be payable on demand, because the contract between the banker and the customer is that the money is needed on
demand.
4

The participation of the two banks, petitioner and private respondent, in the clearing operations of PCHC is a manifestation of
their submission to its jurisdiction. Sec. 3 and 36.6 of the PCHC-CHRR clearing rules and regulations provide:
SEC. 3. AGREEMENT TO THESE RULES. It is the general agreement and understanding that any
participant in the Philippine Clearing House Corporation, MICR clearing operations by the mere fact of
their participation, thereby manifests its agreement to these Rules and Regulations and its subsequent
amendments."
Sec 36.6. (ARBITRATION) The fact that a bank participates in the clearing operations of the PCHC
shall be deemed its written and subscribed consent to the binding effect of this arbitration agreement as if
it had done so in accordance with section 4 of the Republic Act No. 876, otherwise known as the
Arbitration Law.
Further Section 2 of the Arbitration Law mandates:
Two or more persons or parties may submit to the arbitration of one or more arbitrators any controversy
existing between them at the time of the submission and which may be the subject of an action, or the
parties of any contract may in such contract agree to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising
between them. Such submission or contract shall be valid and irrevocable, save upon grounds as exist at
law for the revocation of any contract.
Such submission or contract may include question arising out of valuations, appraisals or other
controversies which may be collateral, incidental, precedent or subsequent to any issue between the
parties. ...
Sec. 21 of the same rules, says:
Items which have been the subject of material alteration or items bearing forged endorsement when such
endorsement is necessary for negotiation shall be returned by direct presentation or demand to the
Presenting Bank and not through the regular clearing house facilities within the period prescribed by law
for the filing of a legal action by the returning bank/branch, institution or entity sending the same.
(Emphasis supplied)
Viewing these provisions the conclusion is clear that the PCHC Rules and Regulations should not be interpreted to be applicable
only to checks which are negotiable instruments but also to non-negotiable instruments and that the PCHC has jurisdiction over
this case even as the checks subject of this litigation are admittedly non-negotiable.
Moreover, petitioner is estopped from raising the defense of non-negotiability of the checks in question. It stamped its guarantee
on the back of the checks and subsequently presented these checks for clearing and it was on the basis of these endorsements
by the petitioner that the proceeds were credited in its clearing account.
The petitioner by its own acts and representation can not now deny liability because it assumed the liabilities of an endorser by
stamping its guarantee at the back of the checks.
The petitioner having stamped its guarantee of "all prior endorsements and/or lack of endorsements" (Exh. A-2 to F-2) is now
estopped from claiming that the checks under consideration are not negotiable instruments. The checks were accepted for
deposit by the petitioner stamping thereon its guarantee, in order that it can clear the said checks with the respondent bank. By
such deliberate and positive attitude of the petitioner it has for all legal intents and purposes treated the said cheeks as
negotiable instruments and accordingly assumed the warranty of the endorser when it stamped its guarantee of prior
endorsements at the back of the checks. It led the said respondent to believe that it was acting as endorser of the checks and on
the strength of this guarantee said respondent cleared the checks in question and credited the account of the petitioner.
Petitioner is now barred from taking an opposite posture by claiming that the disputed checks are not negotiable instrument.
This Court enunciated in Philippine National Bank vs. Court of Appeals
5
a point relevant to the issue when it stated the doctrine
of estoppel is based upon the grounds of public policy, fair dealing, good faith and justice and its purpose is to forbid one to
speak against his own act, representations or commitments to the injury of one to whom they were directed and who reasonably
relied thereon.
A commercial bank cannot escape the liability of an endorser of a check and which may turn out to be a forged endorsement.
Whenever any bank treats the signature at the back of the checks as endorsements and thus logically guarantees the same as
such there can be no doubt said bank has considered the checks as negotiable.
Apropos the matter of forgery in endorsements, this Court has succinctly emphasized that the collecting bank or last endorser
generally suffers the loss because it has the duty to ascertain the genuineness of all prior endorsements considering that the act
of presenting the check for payment to the drawee is an assertion that the party making the presentment has done its duty to
ascertain the genuineness of the endorsements. This is laid down in the case of PNB vs. National City Bank.
6
In another case,
this court held that if the drawee-bank discovers that the signature of the payee was forged after it has paid the amount of the
check to the holder thereof, it can recover the amount paid from the collecting bank.
7

A truism stated by this Court is that "The doctrine of estoppel precludes a party from repudiating an obligation voluntarily
assumed after having accepted benefits therefrom. To countenance such repudiation would be contrary to equity and put
premium on fraud or misrepresentation".
8

We made clear in Our decision in Philippine National Bank vs. The National City Bank of NY & Motor Service Co. that:
Where a check is accepted or certified by the bank on which it is drawn, the bank is estopped to deny the
genuineness of the drawers signature and his capacity to issue the instrument.
If a drawee bank pays a forged check which was previously accepted or certified by the said bank, it can
not recover from a holder who did not participate in the forgery and did not have actual notice thereof.
The payment of a check does not include or imply its acceptance in the sense that this word is used in
Section 62 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.
9

The point that comes uppermost is whether the drawee bank was negligent in failing to discover the alteration or the forgery.
Very akin to the case at bar is one which involves a suit filed by the drawer of checks against the collecting bank and this came
about in Farmers State Bank
10
where it was held:
A cause of action against the (collecting bank) in favor of the appellee (the drawer) accrued as a result of
the bank breaching its implied warranty of the genuineness of the indorsements of the name of the payee
by bringing about the presentation of the checks (to the drawee bank) and collecting the amounts thereof,
the right to enforce that cause of action was not destroyed by the circumstance that another cause of
action for the recovery of the amounts paid on the checks would have accrued in favor of the appellee
against another or to others than the bank if when the checks were paid they have been indorsed by the
payee. (United States vs. National Exchange Bank, 214 US, 302, 29 S CT665, 53 L. Ed 1006, 16 Am.
Cas. 11 84; Onondaga County Savings Bank vs. United States (E.C.A.) 64 F 703)
Section 66 of the Negotiable Instruments ordains that:
Every indorser who indorsee without qualification, warrants to all subsequent holders in due course' (a)
that the instrument is genuine and in all respects what it purports to be; (b) that he has good title to it; (c)
that all prior parties have capacity to contract; and (d) that the instrument is at the time of his indorsement
valid and subsisting.
11

It has been enunciated in an American case particularly in American Exchange National Bank vs. Yorkville Bank
12
that: "the
drawer owes no duty of diligence to the collecting bank (one who had accepted an altered check and had paid over the proceeds
to the depositor) except of seasonably discovering the alteration by a comparison of its returned checks and check stubs or other
equivalent record, and to inform the drawee thereof." In this case it was further held that:
The real and underlying reasons why negligence of the drawer constitutes no defense to the collecting
bank are that there is no privity between the drawer and the collecting bank (Corn Exchange Bank vs.
Nassau Bank, 204 N.Y.S. 80) and the drawer owe to that bank no duty of vigilance (New York Produce
Exchange Bank vs. Twelfth Ward Bank, 204 N.Y.S. 54) and no act of the collecting bank is induced by
any act or representation or admission of the drawer (Seaboard National Bank vs. Bank of America
(supra) and it follows that negligence on the part of the drawer cannot create any liability from it to the
collecting bank, and the drawer thus is neither a necessary nor a proper party to an action by the drawee
bank against such bank. It is quite true that depositors in banks are under the obligation of examining
their passbooks and returned vouchers as a protection against the payment by the depository bank
against forged checks, and negligence in the performance of that obligation may relieve that bank of
liability for the repayment of amounts paid out on forged checks, which but for such negligence it would
be bound to repay. A leading case on that subject is Morgan vs. United States Mortgage and Trust Col.
208 N.Y. 218, 101 N.E. 871 Amn. Cas. 1914D, 462, L.R.A. 1915D, 74.
Thus We hold that while the drawer generally owes no duty of diligence to the collecting bank, the law imposes a duty of
diligence on the collecting bank to scrutinize checks deposited with it for the purpose of determining their genuineness and
regularity. The collecting bank being primarily engaged in banking holds itself out to the public as the expert and the law holds it
to a high standard of conduct.
And although the subject checks are non-negotiable the responsibility of petitioner as indorser thereof remains.
To countenance a repudiation by the petitioner of its obligation would be contrary to equity and would deal a negative blow to the
whole banking system of this country.
The court reproduces with approval the following disquisition of the PCHC in its decision
II. Payments To Persons Other
Than The Payees Are Not Valid
And Give Rise To An Obligation
To Return Amounts Received
Nothing is more clear than that neither the defendant's depositor nor the defendant is entitled to receive
payment payable for the Checks. As the checks are not payable to defendant's depositor, payments to
persons other than payees named therein, their successor-in-interest or any person authorized to receive
payment are not valid. Article 1240, New Civil Code of the Philippines unequivocably provides that:
"Art. 1240. Payment shall be made to the person in whose favor the obligation has been
constituted, or his successo-in-interest, or any person authorized to receive it. "
Considering that neither the defendant's depositor nor the defendant is entitled to receive payments for
the Checks, payments to any of them give rise to an obligation to return the amounts received. Section
2154 of the New Civil Code mandates that:
Article 2154. If something is received when there is no right to demand it, and it was
unduly delivered through mistake, the obligation to return it arises.
It is contended that plaintiff should be held responsible for issuing the Checks notwithstanding that the
underlying transactions were fictitious This contention has no basis in our jurisprudence.
The nullity of the underlying transactions does not diminish, but in fact strengthens, plaintiffs right to
recover from the defendant. Such nullity clearly emphasizes the obligation of the payees to return the
proceeds of the Checks. If a failure of consideration is sufficient to warrant a finding that a payee is not
entitled to payment or must return payment already made, with more reason the defendant, who is neither
the payee nor the person authorized by the payee, should be compelled to surrender the proceeds of the
Checks received by it. Defendant does not have any title to the Checks; neither can it claim any derivative
title to them.
III. Having Violated Its Warranty
On Validity Of All Endorsements,
Collecting Bank Cannot Deny
liability To Those Who Relied
On Its Warranty
In presenting the Checks for clearing and for payment, the defendant made an express guarantee on the
validity of "all prior endorsements." Thus, stamped at the bank of the checks are the defendant's clear
warranty: ALL PRIOR ENDORSEMENTS AND/OR LACK OF ENDORSEMENTS GUARANTEED.
Without such warranty, plaintiff would not have paid on the checks.
No amount of legal jargon can reverse the clear meaning of defendant's warranty. As the warranty has
proven to be false and inaccurate, the defendant is liable for any damage arising out of the falsity of its
representation.
The principle of estoppel effectively prevents the defendant from denying liability for any damages
sustained by the plaintiff which, relying upon an action or declaration of the defendant, paid on the
Checks. The same principle of estoppel effectively prevents the defendant from denying the existence of
the Checks.
Whether the Checks have been issued for valuable considerations or not is of no serious moment to this
case. These Checks have been made the subject of contracts of endorsement wherein the defendant
made expressed warranties to induce payment by the drawer of the Checks; and the defendant cannot
now refuse liability for breach of warranty as a consequence of such forged endorsements. The defendant
has falsely warranted in favor of plaintiff the validity of all endorsements and the genuineness of the
cheeks in all respects what they purport to be.
The damage that will result if judgment is not rendered for the plaintiff is irreparable. The collecting bank
has privity with the depositor who is the principal culprit in this case. The defendant knows the depositor;
her address and her history, Depositor is defendant's client. It has taken a risk on its depositor when it
allowed her to collect on the crossed-checks.
Having accepted the crossed checks from persons other than the payees, the defendant is guilty of
negligence; the risk of wrongful payment has to be assumed by the defendant.
On the matter of the award of the interest and attorney's fees, the Board of Directors finds no reason to
reverse the decision of the Arbiter. The defendant's failure to reimburse the plaintiff has constrained the
plaintiff to regular the services of counsel in order to protect its interest notwithstanding that plaintiffs claim
is plainly valid just and demandable. In addition, defendant's clear obligation is to reimburse plaintiff upon
direct presentation of the checks; and it is undenied that up to this time the defendant has failed to make
such reimbursement.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit without pronouncement as to costs. The decision of the respondent
court of 24 March 1986 and its order of 3 June 1986 are hereby declared to be immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Narvasa, Cruz and Paras, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Decision, pp. 23, pp. 3536, Rollo. These are the findings of facts in the said decision of the Philippine
Clearing House Corporation (PCHC), board of directors in Arbitration Case No. 84033, which are final and
conclusive upon all parties in said arbitration dispute appealable only on question of law. (Section 13
PCHC-ARR, rules of procedure).
2 Phil. Veiriah Assurance Co. Inc. vs. The Honorable Intermediate Appellate Court, Sycwin Coating and
Wires Inc. and Aminador Cacpal Chief Deputy Sheriff of Manila D.R. 72005.
3 Loc Cham va. Ocampo, supra.
4 Harker v. Anderson, 21 Wend. (N.Y.), 2 Sto. 502, Fed. Case No. 1, 985; Merchants National Bank v.
Bank 10 Wall (U.S.) 647,19 L. Ed. 1008; Wood River Bank v. Bank 36 Neb. 744 N.W. 239,
5 94 SCRA 357.
6 63 Phil. 711.
7 Republic Bank va. Ebrada, 65 SCRA 680.
8 10 Saura Import & Export Co., 24 SCRA 974.
9 Supra.
10 Markel vs. United States, 62 F ed. 178.
11 Ang Tiong vs.Ting, L-16767, Feb. 28, 1968, 22 SCRA 713.
12 204 N.Y.S. 621 101 N.E. 87l Anm. Cas. 1914D, 462, L.RA. 191D, 74.

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Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 78687 January 31, 1989
ELENA SALENILLAS AND BERNARDINO SALENILLAS, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and HONORABLE RAYMUNDO SEVA, JUDGE OF BRANCH 38 OF THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF CAMARINES NORTE and WILLIAM GUERRA, respondents.
Jose L. Lapak for petitioners.
Jose T. Atienza for private respondent.
SARMIENTO, J .:
This petition for review on certiorari which seeks the reversal and setting aside of the decision
1
of the Court of Appeals
2

dismissing the petition for certiorari against Judge Raymundo Seva of the Regional Trial Court of Camarines Norte and the
private respondent, William Guerra, involves a pure question of law i.e., the coverage and application of Section 119 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, known otherwise as the Public Land Act.
The facts are undisputed.
The property subject matter of the case was formerly covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-1248, issued by virtue of Free
Patent Application No. 192765, in favor of the spouses, Florencia H. de Enciso and Miguel Enciso. The said original certificate of
title was inscribed in the Registration Book for the Province of Camarines Norte on December 10, 1961. On February 28, 1970,
the patentees, the Enciso spouses, by an Absolute Deed of Sale, sold the property in favor of the petitioners, the spouses Elena
Salenillas and Bernardino Salenillas for a consideration of P900.00. Petitioner Elena Salenillas is a daughter of the Encisos. As a
result of the aforementioned sale, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-8104 of the Register of Deeds of Camarines Norte was
issued in the name of the Salenillas, cancelling Original Certificate of Title No. P-1248. On June 30, 1971, the petitioners
mortgaged the property now covered by T.C.T. No. T-8104 with the Rural Bank of Daet, Inc. The mortgage was subsequently
released on November 22, 1973 after the petitioners paid the amount of P1,000.00. Later, or on December 4, 1975, the
petitioners again mortgaged the property, this time in favor of the Philippine National Bank Branch, Daet, Camarines Norte as
security for a loan of P2,500.00.
For failure of the petitioners to pay their loan, extrajudicial foreclosure proceeding, pursuant to Act No. 3135, was instituted by the
Philippine National Bank against the mortgage and the property was sold at a public auction held on February 27, 1981. The
private respondent, William Guerra, emerged as the highest bidder in the said public auction and as a result thereof a "Certificate
of Sale" was issued to him by the Ex Officio Provincial Sheriff of Camarines Norte. Ultimately, on July 12, 1983, a "Sheriff's Final
Deed" was executed in favor of the private respondent.
On August 17,1983, the Philippine National Bank filed with the Regional Trial Court of Camarines Norte at Daet, a motion for a
writ of possession. The public respondent, Judge Raymundo Seva of the trial court, acting on the motion, issued on September
22, 1983 an order for the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the private respondent. When the deputy sheriff of
Camarines Norte however, attempted on November 17, 1983, to place the property in the possession of the private respondent,
the petitioners refused to vacate and surrender the possession of the same and instead offered to repurchase it under Section
119 of the Public Land Act. On August 15, 1984, another motion, this time for the issuance of an alias writ of possession was
filed by the private respondent with the trial court. The petitioners, on August 31, 1984, opposed the private respondents' motion
and instead made a formal offer to repurchase the property. Notwithstanding the petitioners' opposition and formal offer, the trial
court judge on October 12, 1984 issued the alias writ of possession prayed for the private respondent. The petitioners moved for
a reconsideration of the order but their motion was denied.
Undeterred by their initial setback, the petitioners elevated the case to the respondent Court of Appeals by way of a petition for
certiorari claiming that the respondent trial court judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the order dated October 12,
1984 granting the writ of possession, and the order dated October 22, 1984, denying their motion for reconsider consideration.
In a resolution dated January 23, 1985, the respondent appellate court gave due course to the petition; required the parties to
submit simultaneous memoranda in support to their respective positions; and restrained the trial court and the private respondent
from executing, implementing or otherwise giving effect to the assailed writ of possession until further orders from the court.
3

However, in a decision promulgated on September 17, 1986, the respondent Court of Appeals dismissed the case for lack of
merit. According to the appellate court:
It must be noted that when the original owner, Florencia H. Enciso whose title, OCT No. P-1248, was
issued on August 9, 1961, executed a deed of absolute sale on February 28, 1970 of the property
covered by said title to spouses Elena Salenillas and Bernardino Salenillas, the five year period to
repurchase the property provided for in Section 119 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 as amended could
have already started. Prom this fact alone, the petition should have been dismissed. However, granting
that the transfer from parent to child for a nominal sum may not be the "conveyance" contemplated by the
law. We will rule on the issue raised by the petitioners.
4

xxx xxx xxx
Applying the case of Monge, et al. vs. Angeles, et al.,
5
the appellate court went on to hold that the five-year period of the
petitioners to repurchase under Section 119 of the Public Land Act had already prescribed. The point of reckoning, ruled the
respondent court in consonance with Monge is from the date the petitioners mortgaged the property on December 4, 1973. Thus,
when the petitioners made their formal offer to repurchase on August 31, 1984, the period had clearly expired.
In an effort to still overturn the decision, the petitioners moved for reconsideration. Their motion apparently went for naught
because on May 7, 1987, the respondent appellate court resolved to deny the same. Hence, this petition.
Before us, the petitioners maintain that contrary to the rulings of the courts below, their right to repurchase within five years under
Section 119 of the Public Land Act has not yet prescribed. To support their contention, the petitioners cite the cases of Paras vs.
Court of Appeals
6
and Manuel vs. Philippine National Bank, et al.
7

On the other side, the private respondent, in support of the appellate court's decision, states that the sale of the contested
property by the patentees to the petitioners disqualified the latter from being legal heirs vis-a-vis the said property. As such, they
(the petitioners) no longer enjoy the right granted to heirs under the provisions of Section 119 of the Public Land Act.
8

In fine, what need be determined and resolved here are: whether or not the petitioners have the right to repurchase the contested
property under Section 119 of the Public Land Act; and assuming the answer to the question is in the affirmative, whether or not
their right to repurchase had already prescribed.
We rule for the petitioners. They are granted by the law the right to repurchase their property and their right to do so subsists.
Section 119 of the Public Land Act, as amended, provides in full:
Sec. 119. Every conveyance of land acquired under the free patent or homestead provisions, when
proper, shall be subject to repurchase by the applicant, his widow, or legal heirs within a period of five
years from the date of the conveyance.
From the foregoing legal provision, it is explicit that only three classes of persons are bestowed the right to repurchase the
applicant-patentee, his widow, or other legal heirs. Consequently, the contention of the private respondent sustained by the
respondent appellate court that the petitioners do not belong to any of those classes of repurchasers because they acquired the
property not through inheritance but by sale, has no legal basis. The petitioners-spouses are the daughter and son-in-law of the
Encisos, patentees of the contested property. At the very least, petitioner Elena Salenillas, being a child of the Encisos, is a
"legal heir" of the latter. As such, and even on this score alone, she may therefore validly repurchase. This must be so because
Section 119 of the Public Land Act, in speaking of "legal heirs," makes no distinction. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere
debemos.
Moreover, to indorse the distinction made by the private respondent and the appellate court would be to contravene the very
purpose of Section 119 of the Public Land Act which is to give the homesteader or patentee every chance to preserve for himself
and his family the land that the State had gratuitously given him as a reward for his labor in clearing and cultivating it.
9

Considering that petitioner Salenillas is a daughter of the spouses Florencia H. Enciso and Miguel Enciso, there is no gainsaying
that allowing her (Elena) and her husband to repurchase the property would be more in keeping with the spirit of the law. We
have time and again said that between two statutory interpretations, that which better serves the purpose of the law should
prevail.
Guided by the same purpose of the law, and proceeding to the other issue here raised, we rule that the five-year period for the
petitioners to repurchase their property had not yet prescribed.
The case of Monge et al. vs. Angeles, et al.,
10
cited as authority by the respondent Court of Appeals is inapplicable to the
present controversy. The facts obtaining there are substantially different from those in this case. In Monge the conveyance
involved was a pacto de retro sale and not a foreclosure sale. More importantly, the question raised there was whether the five-
year period provided for in Section 119 "should be counted from the date of the sale even if the same is with an option to
repurchase or from the date the ownership of the land has become consolidated in favor of the purchaser because of the
homesteader's failure to redeem it.
11
It is therefore understandable why the Court ruled there as it did. A sale on pacto de retro
immediately vests title, ownership, and, generally possession over the property on the vendee a retro, subject only to the right of
the vendor a retro to repurchase within the stipulated period. It is an absolute sale with a resolutory condition.
The cases
12
pointed to by the petitioner in support of their position, on the other hand, present facts that are quite identical to
those in the case at bar. Both cases involved properties the titles over which were obtained either through homestead or free
patent. These properties were mortgaged to a bank as collateral for loans, and, upon failure of the owners to pay their
indebtedness, the mortgages were foreclosed. In both instances, the Court ruled that the five-year period to. repurchase a
homestead sold at public auction or foreclosure sale under Act 3135 begins on the day after the expiration of the period of
redemption when the deed of absolute sale is executed thereby formally transferring the property to the purchaser, and not
otherwise. Taking into account that the mortgage was foreclosed and the mortgaged property sold at a public auction to the
private respondent on February 27, 1981, with the "Sheriff's Final Deed" issued on July 12, 1983, the two offers of the petitioners
to repurchase the first on November 17, 1983, and the second, formally, on August 31, 1984 were both made within the
prescribed five-year period.
Now, as regards the redemption price, applying Sec. 30 of Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, the petitioners should
reimburse the private respondent the amount of the purchase price at the public auction plus interest at the rate of one per
centum per month up to November 17, 1983, together with the amounts of assessments and taxes on the property that the
private respondent might have paid after purchase and interest on the last named amount at the same rate as that on the
purchase price.
13

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated September 17, 1986, and the Resolution dated May 7, 1987 of the
Court of Appeals, and the Orders dated September 22, 1983, October 12, 1984, and October 22, 1984 of the Regional Trial
Court of Daet, Camarines Norte, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and another one ENTERED directing the private
respondent to reconvey the subject property and to execute the corresponding deed of reconveyance therefor in favor of the
petitioners upon the return to him by the latter of the purchase price and the amounts, if any, of assessments or taxes he paid
plus interest of one (1%) per centum per month on both amounts up to November 17, 1983.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson), Paras, Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Promulgated on September 17, 1986; Ejercito, B.C., J., ponente; Coquia, J.R. and Martinez, A.M., JJ.,
concurring.
2 CA-G.R. S.P. No. 04603, Elena Salenillas et al. vs. Hon. Raymundo Seva, etc., et al.
3 Rollo, 20.
4 Id., 16.
5 101 Phil. 563 (1957).
6 91 Phil. 389 (1952).
7 101 Phil. 968 (1957).
8 Rollo, Id., 44.
9 Santana vs. Marias, No. L-35537, December 27, 1979, 94 SCRA 853; Vargas vs. Court of Appeals,
No. L-35666, June 29, 1979, 91 SCRA 195; Simeon vs. Pea, No. L-29049, December 29, 1970, 36
SCRA 610.
10 Supra.
11 Id., 564.
12 Paras vs. Court of Appeals, et al., supra; and Manuel vs. Philippine National Bank, et al., supra.
13 PNB vs. Court of Appeals, et al., No. L-60208, December 5, 1985, 140 SCRA 360; Dulay vs. Carriage,
No. L-52831, July 29, 1983, 123 SCRA 794; DBP vs. Zaragosa, No. L-23493, August 23, 1978, 84 SCRA
668.

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[Syllabus]
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 123169. November 4, 1996]
DANILO E. PARAS, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
respondent.
R E S O L U T I O N
FRANCISCO, J .:
Petitioner Danilo E. Paras is the incumbent Punong Barangay of Pula, Cabanatuan
City who won during the last regular barangay election in 1994. A petition for his recall
as Punong Barangay was filed by the registered voters of the barangay. Acting on the
petition for recall, public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) resolved to
approve the petition, scheduled the petition signing on October 14, 1995, and set the
recall election on November 13, 1995.
i[1]
At least 29.30% of the registered voters signed
the petition, well above the 25% requirement provided by law. The COMELEC,
however, deferred the recall election in view of petitioners opposition. On December 6,
1995, the COMELEC set anew the recall election, this time on December 16, 1995. To
prevent the holding of the recall election, petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court
of Cabanatuan City a petition for injunction, docketed as SP Civil Action No. 2254-AF,
with the trial court issuing a temporary restraining order. After conducting a summary
hearing, the trial court lifted the restraining order, dismissed the petition and required
petitioner and his counsel to explain why they should not be cited for contempt for
misrepresenting that the barangay recall election was without COMELEC approval.
ii[2]

In a resolution dated January 5, 1996, the COMELEC, for the third time, re-
scheduled the recall election on January 13, 1996; hence, the instant petition for
certiorari with urgent prayer for injunction. On January 12, 1996, the Court issued a
temporary restraining order and required the Office of the Solicitor General, in behalf of
public respondent, to comment on the petition. In view of the Office of the Solicitor
Generals manifestation maintaining an opinion adverse to that of the COMELEC, the
latter through its law department filed the required comment. Petitioner thereafter filed a
reply.
iii[3]

Petitioners argument is simple and to the point. Citing Section 74 (b) of Republic
Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, which states that no
recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the officials assumption to
office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local election, petitioner insists
that the scheduled January 13, 1996 recall election is now barred as the Sangguniang
Kabataan (SK) election was set by Republic Act No. 7808 on the first Monday of May
1996, and every three years thereafter. In support thereof, petitioner cites Associated
Labor Union v. Letrondo-Montejo, 237 SCRA 621, where the Court considered the SK
election as a regular local election. Petitioner maintains that as the SK election is a
regular local election, hence no recall election can be had for barely four months
separate the SK election from the recall election. We do not agree.
The subject provision of the Local Government Code provides:
SEC. 74. Limitations on Recall. (a) Any elective local official may be the
subject of a recall election only once during his term of office for loss of confidence.
(b) No recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the officials
assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local
election.
[Emphasis added.]
It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be interpreted
with reference to the context, i.e., that every part of the statute must be considered
together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole
enactment.
iv[4]
The evident intent of Section 74 is to subject an elective local official to
recall election once during his term of office. Paragraph (b) construed together with
paragraph (a) merely designates the period when such elective local official may be
subject of a recall election, that is, during the second year of his term of office. Thus,
subscribing to petitioners interpretation of the phrase regular local election to include
the SK election will unduly circumscribe the novel provision of the Local Government
Code on recall, a mode of removal of public officers by initiation of the people before the
end of his term. And if the SK election which is set by R.A. No. 7808 to be held every
three years from May 1996 were to be deemed within the purview of the phrase regular
local election, as erroneously insisted by petitioner, then no recall election can be
conducted rendering inutile the recall provision of the Local Government Code.
In the interpretation of a statute, the Court should start with the assumption that the
legislature intended to enact an effective law, and the legislature is not presumed to
have done a vain thing in the enactment of a statute.
v[5]
An interpretation should, if
possible, be avoided under which a statute or provision being construed is defeated, or
as otherwise expressed, nullified, destroyed, emasculated, repealed, explained away, or
rendered insignificant, meaningless, inoperative or nugatory.
vi[6]

It is likewise a basic precept in statutory construction that a statute should be
interpreted in harmony with the Constitution.
vii[7]
Thus, the interpretation of Section 74 of
the Local Government Code, specifically paragraph (b) thereof, should not be in conflict
with the Constitutional mandate of Section 3 of Article X of the Constitution to enact a
local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local
government structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective
mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum x x x.
Moreover, petitioners too literal interpretation of the law leads to absurdity which we
cannot countenance. Thus, in a case, the Court made the following admonition:
We admonish against a too-literal reading of the law as this is apt to constrict
rather than fulfill its purpose and defeat the intention of its authors. That intention is
usually found not in the letter that killeth but in the spirit that vivifieth x x x
viii[8]

The spirit, rather than the letter of a law determines its construction; hence, a statute, as
in this case, must be read according to its spirit and intent.
Finally, recall election is potentially disruptive of the normal working of the local
government unit necessitating additional expenses, hence the prohibition against the
conduct of recall election one year immediately preceding the regular local election. The
proscription is due to the proximity of the next regular election for the office of the local
elective official concerned. The electorate could choose the officials replacement in the
said election who certainly has a longer tenure in office than a successor elected
through a recall election. It would, therefore, be more in keeping with the intent of the
recall provision of the Code to construe regular local election as one referring to an
election where the office held by the local elective official sought to be recalled will be
contested and be filled by the electorate.
Nevertheless, recall at this time is no longer possible because of the limitation
stated under Section 74 (b) of the Code considering that the next regular election
involving the barangay office concerned is barely seven (7) months away, the same
having been scheduled on May 1997.
ix[9]

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby dismissed for having become moot and
academic. The temporary restraining order issued by the Court on January 12, 1996,
enjoining the recall election should be as it is hereby made permanent.
SO ORDERED.
Romero, Melo, Puno, Kapunan, Hermosisima, Jr., Panganiban, and Torres, Jr., JJ.,
concur.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Bellosillo, Vitug, and Mendoza, JJ., concur in the
majority and separate concurring opinions.
Davide, Jr., Please see separate concurring opinion.





i[1]
COMELEC Resolution No. 95-3345, September 5, 1995
ii[2]
RTC, Cabanatuan City, Order dated December 20, 1995; Rollo, p. 28.
iii[3]
Rollo, pp. 64-66.
iv[4]
Aisporna v. Court of Appeals, 113 SCRA 464, 467.
v[5]
Asturias Sugar Central, Inc. v. Commissioner of Customs, 29 SCRA 617, 627.
vi[6]
Id. at p. 628.
vii[7]
PLDT v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 90 Phil. 674.
viii[8]
People v. Salas, 143 SCRA 163, 167.
ix[9]
Petition, p. 3; Rollo, p. 5; See: Evardorne v. COMELEC, 204 SCRA 464.