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Merida Water District et al. vs. Bacano et al.

G.R. No. 165993, September 30, 2008

FACTS: On Oct. 10, 2001, Merida Water District (MWD) conducted a public hearing for the purpose of increasing the
water rate. The Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA) confirmed MWDs proposed water rate and attached
to the approved letter was a Rate Schedule of Approved Rates containing progressive increase of water rates
over a certain period. On Sept. 3, 2002, MWD approved Resolution No. 006-2 increasing to 90 water
consumption for the first 10 cubic meters. Thereafter, petitioner issued notices of disconnection to those wo
refused to pay the water rate increase and did not render service to those who opted to pay the increased rate on
an instalment basis. On Feb. 3, 2003, respondents filed with RTC a petition for Injunction against MWD alleging
the latter violated LOI 700 by implementing a rate increase greater than 60% of current rate and failing to conduct
public hearing for the imposed rate of 90.

Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss for not EAR under PD 198 as amended. On Feb. 26, 2003 one of the
respondents questioned the legality of the water rate increase before the National Water Resources Board
(NWRB). RTC denied petitioners Motion to Dismiss. On appeal, CA affirmed the RTC.


ISSUE: (1) Did RTC have jurisdiction over the subject matter?
(2) Did respondents recourse to trial courts constitute a proper act despite failure to EAR?

RULING: (1) Yes, DEAR applies where a claim is cognizable in the first instance by an administrative agency alone;
judicial intervention is withheld until the administrative process has run its course. Abe-abe vs. Manta does not
apply here as the issue involved water rights for irrigation. Petitioners contention that the RTC has no jurisdiction
because the NWRB has original and exclusive jurisdiction over a dispute concerning the increase of water rate is
clearly without merit. Respondents failure to exhaust administrative remedies does not affect jurisdiction of the
RTC. Non-EAR renders an action premature and not yet ripe for judicial determination.

(2) No, since cases were observance of the DEAR has been disregarded require a strong showing of the
inadequacy of the prescribed procedure and of impending harm. Respondents cited (1) patent illegality and (2)
denial of due process as reasons for failing to EAR but the former was not shown and the latter did not exist being
that MWD as admitted by respondents did in fact conduct a hearing.


National Irrigation Administration vs. Enciso
G.R. No. 142571, May 5, 2006

FACTS: In 1984, NIA commenced widening of the Binahaan river in Brgy. Cansamada, Dagami, Leyte. The project was
divided into small sections costing 50,000 each to escape public bidding. Pre-bidding was done by NIA to
determine the lowest bid, which would serve as the cost of the project. Contractors were assigned sections to
work without formal contracts. When a contractors works is complete the NIA will check it and if satisfied, the
latter will prepare contracts so that the collector can collect payment. Enciso worked as one of the contractors
under the name LCE Construction. His first billing was paid by NIA. However, his second and final billing of
259,154.01 was denied on ground that work done on the right side of the river was not accomplished. Enciso filed
for collection of sum of money with damages and attorneys fees with the RTC of Makati City. Petitioner and co-
defendants motion to dismiss on grounds of non-exhaustion of administrative agencies and lack of cause of
action was denied by the court a quo. RTC ruled in favour of herein respondent and ordered NIA to pay the
demand sum plus 12% interest per annum until fully paid.

Both parties appealed to the CA, petitioner averring RTC erred in denying its Motion to Dismiss. Respondent
claimed RTC erred in failing to hold petitioners co-defendants liable for damages and NIA solely liable based on
work done in 1985. CA found no reversible errors and affirmed said rulings.

ISSUE: (1) Did CA err in dismissing Motion to Dismiss for non-exhaustion of administrative remedies?
(2) Is the NIA liable to Enciso for the latters work on the formers project?

RULING:
(1) Yes, CA should have focused solely on respondents failure to EAR by not appealing to the COA. NIA, being
a govt. entity disbursing public funds is subject to jurisdiction of COA for any claim for collection of sum of
money, especially where no written contract is done. PD 1445, Sec. 26 vests said power to the COA. Indeed,
COA may not be compelled to release funds to respondent without a written contract. However, DEAR is
disregarded were: (1) violations of due process will be committed; (2) issues involved are purely legal
questions; (3) the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdicti on; (4)
estoppel on part of administrative agency; (5) irreparable injury; (6) respondent is a department secretary; (7)
unreasonable; (8) amounts to nullification of a claim; (9) subject matter is private land in land proceedings;
(10) rules does not provide plain, speedy and adequate remedy; (11) circumstances indicating injury of
judicial intervention.
(2) Petitioners payment to respondents claim may be addressed in a proper case before the COA.

Petition granted.





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Laguna CATV Network Inc. vs. Maraan et al.
G.R. No. 139492, November 19, 2002

FACTS: On March 3, 1998 private respondent Ignacio et al. filed with the DOLE Region IV separate complaints for
underpayment of wages and non-payment of other benefits against their employer Laguna CATV. Pursuant to Art.
128 of PD 442 as amended by RA 7730 DOLE Reg. IV on April 1, 1998 conducted on-site inspection of
petitioners workplace and found the latter violated laws on payment of wages and other benefits. DOLE IV
requested petitioner to correct such irregularities but was ignored. DOLE RED Maraan set a case for summary
investigation which led to Laguna CATV being directed to pay concerned employees 261,009.19 representing
unpaid claims within 10 days from notice with proof of payment. Laguna CATV filed a motion for reconsideration.
DOLE Reg. IV then issued a writ of execution, ordering Sheriff Sagmit to collect and cash from Laguna CATV or
attach its goods and chattels. Sheriff Sagmit subsequently levied the owners L300 van and garnished his bank
deposits.

On March 2, 1999, petitioner filed a motion to quash the writ of execution, notice of levy and garnishment of bank
deposits since the Motion for Reconsideration has not yet been resolved. RED Maraan on April 21, 1999 denied
the Motion for Reconsideration for failure of Laguna CATV to perfect its appeal by not posting the appeal bond of
262,009.19 that the writ of execution should be considered as an overt denial of Laguna CATVs MR.

Laguna CATV appealed with the CA INSTEAD OF THE Secretary of Labor. CA denied the same. Appeal by
petitioner was denied too.


ISSUE: Did the CA err in denying petitioners motion for extension of time to file a petition for review?

RULING: No, the CA was correct in the sense that there was failure to EAR by petitioner. This is in consonance with Art.
128 of PD 442 as amended. Exemptions may be allowed in the following cases: (1) violation of due process; (2)
issue is purely legal question; (3) administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction; (4) estopppel on part of administrative agency; (5) irreparable injury; (6) respondent is a department
secretary; (7) unreasonable; (8) amounts to nullification of a claim; (9) subject matter is private land; (10) rule is
not plain, speedy, adequate remedy; (11) urgency of judicial action; (12) no administrative review provided by law;
(13) rule of qualified political agency applies; (14) when non-EAR is rendered moot.

Petition is denied.


Universal Robina Corp. (corn division) vs. Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA)
G.R. No. 191427, May 30, 2011

FACTS: URC produces animal feeds at its plant in Bagong Ilog, Pasig City. LLDA on March 14, 2000 conducted an
analysis of petitioners corn oil refinery plants wastewater and found it failed to comply with government
standards provided by DAO Nos. 34 and 35, s. 1990. LLDA issued an ex parte order requiring petitioner to
explain why no order should be issued for cessation of its operations due to discharge of pollutants into the Pasig
River. LLDA later received a phone-in complaint which prompted the latter to conduct another lab analysis of
petitioners wastewater. Results showed URC failed to comply with the order set before. In 2003, URC notified
LLDA of its plan to upgrade its wastewater treatment facility which was completed only in 2007.

URC requested a reduction of penalties on Aug. 24, 2007 to show penalties should only cover 560 days. After
conducting hearings LLDA reckoned fines should cover 1,247 days and ordered it to pay 1,247,000. URC
moved to reconsider for a fine of 560,000 on grounds LLDA thought URC was operating on a daily basis. LLDA
denied the same.

URC filed a petition for certiorari with the CA which was denied.


ISSUE: (1) Did the CA err in denying URCs petition?
(2) Was computation of dates by URC valid?

RULING:
(1) No, URC should have appealed with the DENR Secretary or the OP. Petitioners contention of deprivation of
due process and lack of plain, speedy and adequate remedy as grounds for exemption from EAR fails.
(2) No, since the same was unverified and therefore may be rejected by the LLDA.
Petition denied.












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Samar II Electric Cooperative Inc. (SAMELCO II) et al. vs. Ananias Seludo Jr.
G.R. No. 173840, April 25, 2012

FACTS: Respondent Seludo is a member of SAMELCO IIs BOD. A board resolution was issued disallowing respondent
from attending meetings of the BOD effective February 2005 until the end of his term as directed and disqualified
him for one term to run as candidate for director in the upcoming district elections. Respondent then filed an
Urgent Petition for Prohibition against SAMELCO II with the RTC in Calbiga, Samar. RTC granted a TRO in
favour of Seludo effective for 72 hours and later extended for another 17 days. Petitioners then raised an
affirmative defense of lack of lack of jurisdiction of RTC over subject matter, the same being with the National
Electrification Administration (NEA). RTC sustained its jurisdiction over the matter, motion for reconsideration was
denied. CA affirmed the RTC.
.

ISSUE: Does the NEA have primary jurisdiction over the question of the validity of the Board Resolution issued by
SAMELCO II?


RULING: Yes, pursuant to Subsection (a), Sec. 24, Chapter III of PD 269 as amended by Sec. 7, PD 1645 clearly shows
that, pursuant to its power of supervision and control, NEA is granted the authority to conduct investigations and
other similar actions as well as to issue orders, rules and regulations with respect to all matters affecting electric
cooperatives. In addition, while the RTC has jurisdiction over the petition for prohibition, the NEA, in its exercise of
its power of supervision and control, has primary jurisdiction to determine the issue of the validity of the subject
resolution.

Petition granted.


Addition Hills Mandaluyong Civic and Social Organization, Inc. vs. Megaworld Properties and Holdings, Inc. and
Wilfredo Imperial as Director of HLURB, DENR
G.R. No. 175039, April 18, 2012

FACTS: Megaworld is a registered owner of a parcel of land along Lee St., Brgy. Addition Hills, Mandaluyong City with an
area of 6,148 sq.m. In 1994 Megaworld decided to construct a residential condo complex in said lot. After
securing the necessary paper works, construction began but on June 30, 1995 AHMCSO filed a complaint before
the RTC-Br. 158 of Pasig City for the annulment of the required permits granted to Megaworld, to prohibit the
issuance to Megaworld of a Certificate of Registration and License to sell the condo units and to permanently
enjoin local and national building officials from issuing licenses and permits to Megaworld. Megaworld then filed a
Motion to Dismiss for lack of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction of RTC over the matter.

RTC denied Megaworlds Motion to Dismiss. Pre-trial and later trial commenced with the RTC rendering a
decision in favour of petitioner. CA reversed the RTC and a new one entered.

ISSUE: Is AHMCSO correct to go to the RTC in violation of the DEAR?

RULING: No, HLURB has jurisdiction under Secs. 4 and 6 of HLURB Resolution No. R-391, s. 1987 to annul any permit
issued by the HLURB may be filed before the Housing and Land Use Arbiter (HLA). The decision of the HLA may
be brought before the Board of Commissioners by petition for certiorari and its decision in turn appealable to the
OP.

Petition denied.
.

Euro-Med Laboratories Inc. vs. Province of Batangas
G.R. No. 148106, July 17, 2006

FACTS: A civil case for collection of sum of money by Euro-Med against the Province of Batangas in the amount of
487,662.80 of IVF incurred by respondent in behalf of various public hospitals. The same was not paid even
after demands were made.

At conclusion of petitioners presentation of evidence respondent filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the
ground that the primary jurisdiction over petitioners money claim is lodged with the COA.

RTC dismissed petitioners complaint without prejudice to the filing of a money claim with the COA.
.

ISSUE: Does the COA have primary jurisdiction over the case at hand?

RULING: Yes, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction holds that if a case is such that its determination requires the expertise,
specialized training and knowledge of an administrative agency, relief must first be obtained in an administrative
proceeding before resort to the courts is done.

Case at bar is enforcement of money claims against the government, which brought it under the COAs domain
under Sec. 26 of the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines. Second, the claim was founded on a series of
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purchases for medical supplies of respondents public hospitals, such being agreed by both parties to be
governed by the LGU on supply and property management as stated in Sec. 383 of said code.

Petition denied. RTC orders affirmed.



Nestle Philippines Inc. and Nestle Waters Philippines Inc. vs. Uniwide Sales, Inc. et al.
G.R. No. 174674, October 20, 2010

FACTS: Respondents filed with the SEC a petition for rehabilitation the same being approved. The newly appointed
Interim Receivership Committee filed a rehab plan in the SEC. An amended rehabilitation plan (ARP) was soon
filed with the SEC which included the planned entry of Casino Guichard Perrachon with an infusion of 3.5 billion
in fresh capital. The SEC approved the ARP. On Oct. 11, 2001, the Interim Receivership Committee filed a
Second Amended Rehab Plan (SARP) in view of Casino Guichards withdrawal. The same was approved by the
SEC.

Petitioners, as unsecured creditors of respondents, appealed with the SEC praying the SARP be set aside and a
new one be issued directing the Interim Receivership Committee to improve the terms and conditions of SARP in
consultation with all unsecured creditors.

SEC denied the appeal. CA affirmed the SEC.


ISSUE: Should the SARP be revoked and the rehabilitation proceedings terminated?

RULING: Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction and considering the supervening events that have substantially
changed the factual backdrop of this case, the SECs decision on the matter, herein pending, will have to be
anticipated since the same requires the technical expertise, knowledge and skills of the SEC.