7.

angara vs electoral commission 63 phils 139

FACTS: That in the elections of 1935, petitioner, Jose A.
Angara, and the respondents, Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo,
and Dionisio Mayor, were candidates voted for the
position of member o the National Assembly for the first
district of the Province of Tayabas.
Petitioner and took his oath of office. That on December
3, 1935, the National Assembly in session assembled
passed Resolution No. 8 , which in effect, fixed the last
date to file election protests.
On December 8, 1935, respondent Ynsua filed before the
Electoral Commission a Motion of Protest against Angara
and praying, among other things, that Ynsua be
named/declared elected Member of the National
Assembly or that the election of said position be nullified.
ON December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted
a resolution (No. 6) stating that the last day for filing of
protests is on December 9.
Angara contended that the Constitution confers exclusive
jurisdiction upon the Electoral Commission solely as
regards the merits of contested elections to the National
Assembly and the Supreme Court therefore has no
jurisdiction to hear the case.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction
to issue writ of prohibition on to the Electoral Commission
on matters subject to controversy?
RULING: The Supreme Court has jurisdiction.
The separation of powers is a fundamental principal of a
system of government. It obtains not through a single
provision but by actual division in our Constitution that
each department of the government has exclusive
cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is
supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from
that fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and
that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely
restrained and independent of each other. The
Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of
checks and balances to secure coordination in the
workings of various departments of the government.
8. us vs ang tang ho 43 phils 1
FACTS: On 30July 1919, the Philippine Legislature (during
special session) passed and approved Act No. 2868 entitled
An Act Penalizing the Monopoly and Hoarding of Rice,
Palay and Corn. The said act under extraordinary
circumstances authorizes the Governor General to issue
the necessary Rules and Regulations in regulating the
distribution of such products. Pursuant to this Act, On 01
August 1919, the GG issued EO 53 which was published on
20 August 1919. The said EO fixed the price at which rice
should be sold. On the other hand, Ang Tang Ho, a rice
dealer, voluntarily, criminally and illegally sold a ganta of
rice to Pedro Trinidad at the price of eighty centavos. The
said amount was way higher than that prescribed by the
EO. The sale was done on the 6th of August 1919. On 08
August 1919, he was charged in violation of the said EO. He
was found guilty as charged and was sentenced to 5
months imprisonment plus a P500.00 fine. He appealed
the sentence countering that there is an undue delegation
of power to the Governor General.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is undue delegation to the
Governor General.
HELD: Fist of, Ang Tang Hos conviction must be reversed
because he committed the act prior to the publication of
the EO. Hence, he cannot be ex post facto charged of the
crime. Further, one cannot be convicted of a violation of a
law or of an order issued pursuant to the law when both
the law and the order fail to set up an ascertainable
standard of guilt. The said Act, as to the judgment of the
SC, wholly fails to provide definitely and clearly what the
standard policy should contain, so that it could be put in
use as a uniform policy required to take the place of all
others without the determination of the insurance
commissioner in respect to matters involving the exercise
of a legislative discretion that could not be delegated,
and without which the act could not possibly be put in
use. The law must be complete in all its terms and
provisions when it leaves the legislative branch of the
government and nothing must be left to the judgment of
the electors or other appointee or delegate of the
legislature, so that, in form and substance, it is a law in all
its details in presenti, but which may be left to take
effect in future, if necessary, upon the ascertainment of
any prescribed fact or event.
9. people vs vera 65 phil 56
FACTS: The criminal case, People v. Cu Unjieng was filed in
the Court of First Instance (CFI) in Manila, with HSBC
intervening in the case as private prosecutor.
-The CFI rendered a judgment of conviction sentencing Cu
Unjieng. Upon appeal, it was modified to an indeterminate
penalty of from five years and six months of prison
correccional to seven years, six months and twenty-seven
days of prison mayor , but affirmed the judgments in all
other respects.
-Cu Unjieng filed a Motion for Reconsideration and four
successive motions for new trial which were all denied on
December 17, 1935. Final judgment was entered on Dec.
18, 1935. He filed for certiorari to the Supreme Court but
got denied on Nov 1936. The SC subsequently denied Cu
Unjiengs petition for leave to file a second alternative
motion for reconsideration or new trial,then remanded the
case to the court of origin for execution of judgment.
-Cu Unjieng filed an application for probation before the
trial court, under the provisions of Act4221 of the defunct
Philippine Legislature. He states he is innocent of the
crime; he has no criminal record; and that he would
observe good conduct in the future.
-CFI Manila Judge Jose Vera set the petition for hearing
for probation on April 5, 1937.
-HSBC questioned the authority of Vera to hold such
hearings and assailed the constitutionality of the Probation
Act since it violates the equal protection of laws and gives
unlawful and improper delegation to provincial boards.
Section 11 of Art 4221 states that the act shall only be
applied in those provinces wherein the probationary
officer is granted salary not lower than provincial fiscals by
respective provincial boards.
-The City Fiscal of Manila files a supplementary petition
affirming issues raised by HSBC, arguingthat probation is a
form of reprieve, hence Act 4221 bypasses this exclusive
power of the Chief Executive.
-Hence this petition in the Supreme Court.
ISSUES:
1. If in the affirmative, whether or not Act 4221 is
unconstitutional based on these three grounds:
a. It encroaches upon the pardoning power of the
executive
b. It constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power
c. It denies the equal protection of the laws
RULINGS:
a. No. There exists a distinction between pardon and
probation. Pardoning power is solely within the power of
the Executive. Probation has an effect of temporary
suspension, and the probationer is still not exempt from
the entire punishment which the law inflicts upon him as
he remains to be in legal custody for the time being.
b. Yes. The Probation Act does not lay down any definite
standards by which the administrative boards may be
guided in the exercise of discretionary powers, hence
they have the power to determine for themselves,
whether or not to apply the law or not. This therefore
becomes a surrender of legislative power to the
provincial boards. It is unconstitutional.
c. Yes. Due to the unwarranted delegation of legislative
power, some provinces may choose to adopt the law or
not, thus denying the equal protection of laws. It is
unconstitutional.
10. eastern shipping lines inc vs poea 166 scra 533
FACTS: Vitaliano Saco was Chief Officer of the M/V Eastern
Polaris when he was killed in an accident in Tokyo, Japan
on March 15, 1985. His widow sued for damages under
Executive Order No. 797 and Memorandum Circular No. 2
of the POEA. The petitioner, as owner of the vessel,
argued that the complaint was cognizable not by the POEA
but by the Social Security System and should have been
filed against the State Fund Insurance. The POEA
nevertheless assumed jurisdiction and after considering
the position papers of the parties ruled in favor of the
complainant. The petition is DISMISSED, with costs against
the petitioner. The temporary restraining order dated
December 10, 1986 is hereby LIFTED. It is so ordered.
ISSUE: Whether or not the validity of Memorandum
Circular No. 2 itself as violative of the principle of non-
delegation of legislative power.
HELD: No. Memorandum Circular No. 2 is an administrative
regulation. The model contract prescribed thereby has
been applied in a significant number of the cases without
challenge by the employer. The power of the POEA (and
before it the National Seamen Board) in requiring the
model contract is not unlimited as there is a sufficient
standard guiding the delegate in the exercise of the said
authority. That standard is discoverable in the executive
order itself which, in creating the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration, mandated it to protect the
rights of overseas Filipino workers to "fair and equitable
employment practices."
GENERAL RULE: Non-delegation of powers; exception
It is true that legislative discretion as to the substantive
contents of the law cannot be delegated. What can be
delegated is the discretion to determine how the law may
be enforced, not what the law shall be. The ascertainment
of the latter subject is a prerogative of the legislature. This
prerogative cannot be abdicated or surrendered by the
legislature to the delegate.
Two Tests of Valid Delegation of Legislative Power
There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not
there is a valid delegation of legislative power, viz, the
completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under
the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and
conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it
reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is to
enforce it. Under the sufficient standard test, there must be
adequate guidelines or stations in the law to map out the
boundaries of the delegates authority and prevent the
delegation from running riot.
Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of
legislative authority to the delegate, who is not allowed to
step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power
essentially legislative. The delegation of legislative power
has become the rule and its non-delegation the exception.
Rationale for Delegation of Legislative Power
The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of
government and the growing inability of the legislature to
cope directly with the myriad problems demanding its
attention. The growth of society has ramified its activities
and created peculiar and sophisticated problems that the
legislature cannot be expected to reasonably
comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has
become necessary. Too many of the problems attendant
upon present-day undertakings, the legislature may not
have the competence to provide the required direct and
efficacious, not to say, specific solutions. These solutions
may, however, be expected from its delegates, who are
supposed to be experts in the particular fields.
Power of Subordinate Legislation
The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative
powers in general are particularly applicable to
administrative bodies. With the proliferation of specialized
activities and their attendant peculiar problems, the
national legislature has found it more and more necessary
to entrust to administrative agencies the authority to issue
rules to carry out the general provisions of the statute. This
is called the power of subordinate legislation.
With this power, administrative bodies may implement
the broad policies laid down in statute by filling in the
details which the Congress may not have the opportunity
or competence to provide. Memorandum Circular No. 2 is
one such administrative regulation.
Administrative agencies are vested with two basic powers,
the quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial. The first enables
them to promulgate implementing rules and regulations,
and the second enables them to interpret and apply such
regulations.
11. bayan vs ermita 488 scra 226
FACTS: Batas Pambansa 880 was passed, which provides
boundaries on the free expression of persons. Such in the
case of three petitioner groups, first of Bayan, secondly of
26 individual petitioners, Jess del Prado, et al and third of
Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), all of whom are recognized as
taxpayers and official residents who allege themselves to
be staging a peaceful mass assembly when police forces
under the rule of BP 880 forcibly and violently dispersed
them much to their dismay, which incurred their members
injuries and arrest. These groups of concerned citizens are
attesting that such manner of dispersal of abiding by no
permit, no rally policy, and that delegation of powers in
the local government (specifically by the Mayor Lito
Atienza)in the said dispersal were unconstitutional, as well
as the implementation of BP 880itself. They seek to stop
such policies of ruthless dispersals, as it violates their basic
right to freedom of expression, redress of grievances and
most of all their right to peaceably assemble.
ISSUE: Whether Batas Pambansa 880 is constitutional or
not.
HELD As it is to be observed in the BP itself, BP 880 has
provisions which define the requisites of a peaceful
assembly, maximum tolerance of the police forces and
permit to rally (see definition of terms and Declaration of
policy). On the matter regarding the claim of illegality of
power delegation without clear standards, the mayor
being the local government head concerned, has the right
to issue or not the permits. As stated in Section 6 of BP
880: (a) It shall be the duty of the mayor or any official
acting in his behalf to issue or grant a permit unless there
is clear and convincing evidence that the public assembly
will create a clear and present danger to public order,
public safety, public convenience, public morals or public
health. The preceding and succeeding sections provide for
the requisites of the peaceful assembly stated in the Article
4 of the Bill of rights. As to the matter regarding ruthless
dispersals, police assistance as observed in Section 10 to
11 of the same law is observed for the interest of those
exercising their right to assemble peacefully. BP 880 gives
that no assembly shall be dispersed, unless there is
impending violence which could lead to property
destruction, harm to others and the likes.
The right to freedom of speech, and to peacefully
assemble and petition the government for redress of
grievances, are fundamental personal rights of the people
recognized and guaranteed by the constitutions of
democratic countries. But it is a settled principle growing
out of the nature of well-ordered civil societies that the
exercise of those rights is not absolute for it may be so
regulated that it shall not be injurious to the
equal enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor
injurious to the rights of the community or society.
If one is to read fully the contents or provisions of the BP
880, it is not a law indicating total ban of assemblies; but
rather it exists to regulate the time, place, and manner
of conducting the assembly. B.P. No. 880 cannot be
condemned as unconstitutional; it does not hold back or
unduly confine freedoms; it merely controls the use of
public places as to the time, place and manner of
assemblies. Much of the population has the notion that
maximum tolerance is a sinister move, but "maximum
tolerance" is for the benefit of rallyists, not the
government. The delegation to the mayors of the power to
issue rally "permits" is valid because it is subject to the
constitutionally-sound "clear and present danger" standard
as stated in Section 10.Therefore: As the court finally
decides that the Secretary of the Interior and Local
Governments, are DIRECTED to take all necessary steps for
the immediate compliance with Section15 of Batas
Pambansa No. 880 through the establishment or
designation of at least one suitable freedom park or plaza
in every city and municipality of the country to avoid
misunderstandings of permit-related issues.
All in all, the petitions are DISMISSED in all other respects,
and the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa No. 880 is
SUSTAINED.
12. rubi vs provincial board of mindoro 39 phil 660
FACTS: Since time immemorial (Spanish regime), there
has been a segregation of non-Christian Tribes in the
Philippines. The rationale is to facilitate the transformation
of these societies into civility.
The same segregation was espoused under the American
Administration. There was a Bureau of non-Christian Tribes
under the Organic Law, and even under statute,
particularly the Administrative Code of 1917 allowed
provincial boards to determine, by virtue of the interest of
law and order, segregation of uncivilised/non-Christian
Tribes to be approved by the Secretary of Interior.
By virtue of such laws, the Provincial Board of Mindoro
adopted resolution No. 25 which designated 800 hectares
of the sitio of Tigbao as the permanent settlement of the
Mangyanes in Mindoro. This was approved by the
Secretary of Interior.
The resolution was with a penal clause that refusal of
compliance will entail imprisonment not more than 60-
days in accordance with section 2759 of the revised
Administrative Code
Rubi, et al. applied for a writ of habeas corpus for being
illegally deprived of their liberty by provincial officials as
they are being held on the reservation in Tigbao against
their will. (one of them even escaped from the reservation
and is being held in custody by the provincial sheriff)
It is important to understand that the Manguianes are
semi-nomadic in nature, and are one of the tribes that
practice caigin.
The Spanish, Americans consider their lifestyle as
uncivilised and barbaric, and actually has nothing to do
with religious affiliation (since by their classification,
members of other faiths who live like they do are not part
of these non-Christians)
ISSUE: Was there undue delegation of legislative power to
the provincial authorities in the creation of these
reservations?
RULING: No, there is no unlawful delegation of legislative
power by the Philippine Legislature to provincial officials
and a department head.
The two-fold distinction is this: (1) is it delegation to make
the law, which includes the discretion on what it shall be;
or is it (2) conferring an authority or discretion as to its
execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the
law?
Malcolm felt that the authority given to provincial boards
falls under the second, which is allowable under the rule
on non-delegation of powers.
Another exception to the general rule, is that the central
legislative body is allowed, since time immemorial, to
delegate legislative powers to local authorities. The
provincial governor and the provincial board, as official
representatives of the province are better qualified to
judge when such a course is deemed necessary in the
interest of law and order. This is under the presumption
that they know their territory and their constituents the
best.
13. tatad vs secretary of energy 281 scra 330
Facts: The petitions challenge the constitutionality of RA
No. 8180 entitled An Act Deregulating the Downstream
Oil Industry and For Other Purposes. The deregulation
process has two phases: (a) the transition phase (Aug. 12,
1996) and the (b) full deregulation phase (Feb. 8, 1997
through EO No. 372).
Sec. 15 of RA No. 8180 constitutes an undue delegation of
legislative power to the President and the Sec. of Energy
because it does not provide a determinate or determinable
standard to guide the Executive Branch in determining
when to implement the full deregulation of the
downstream oil industry, and the law does not provide any
specific standard to determine when the prices of crude oil
in the world market are considered to be declining nor
when the exchange rate of the peso to the US dollar is
considered stable.
Issue: w/n the provisions of RA No. 8180 and EO No. 372 is
unconstitutional.
sub-issue: (a) w/n sec. 15 violates the constitutional
prohibition on undue delegation of power, and (b) w/n the
Executive misapplied RA No. 8180 when it considered the
depletion of the OPSF fund as factor in fully deregulating
the downstream oil industry in Feb. 1997.
HELD/RULING: (a) NO. Sec. 15 can hurdle both the
completeness test and the sufficient standard test. RA No.
8180 provided that the full deregulation will start at the
end of March 1997 regardless of the occurrence of any
event. Thus, the law is complete on the question of the
final date of full deregulation.
Sec. 15 lays down the standard to guide the judgment of
the Presidenthe is to time it as far as practicable when
the prices of crude oil and petroleum in the world market
are declining and when the exchange rate of the peso to
the US dollar is considered stable.
Webster defines practicable as meaning possible to
practice or perform, decline as meaning to take a
downward direction, and stable as meaning firmly
established.
(b) YES. Sec. 15 did not mention the depletion of the OPSF
fund as a factor to be given weight by the Executive before
ordering full deregulation. The Executive department failed
to follow faithfully the standards set by RA No. 8180 when
it co0nsidered the extraneous factor of depletion of the
OPSF fund. The Executive is bereft of any right to alter
either by subtraction or addition the standards set in RA
No. 8180 for it has no powers to make laws.
14. hardwood and venir company vs pangil federation of
labor 70 phil 642
FACTS: The case stems from an industrial dispute between
petitioner and its employees wherein demands were made
by the respondents to set the minimum daily wage to P1
from P.70, devise a proper schedule of wage rates for all
laborers and increase rate wages in mountain camps by
20% than those in the town areas. The CIR ruled in favor of
the respondents thus an appeal was filed by the petitioner
alleging that: (1) Court of Industrial Relations has no
authority to determine minimum wages for an individual
employer in connection with a particular and specific
industrial dispute under the provisions of section 4 of
Commonwealth Act No. 103; (2) that such authority would
constitute an undue delegation of legislative power to the
Court of Industrial Relations and would deny the petitioner
the equal protection of the laws, thus rendering said
section unconstitutional and void. This was also denied by
the CIR, en banc. Hence this motion for certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CIRs authority constitutes
undue delegation of legislative powers of Congress.
HELD: No.SEPARATION OF POWERS; DELEGATION OF
LEGISLATIVE POWERS; EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW.
Section 20 of Commonwealth Act No. 103 prescribes that
in the hearing, investigation and determination of any
question or controversy and in exercising any duties and
power under this Act, the court shall act according to
justice and equity and substantial merits of the case,
without regard to technicalities or legal forms. The
National Assembly has by this section furnished a sufficient
standard by which the court will be guided in exercising its
discretion in the determination of any question or
controversy before it, and we have already ruled that the
discretionary power thus conferred is judicial in character
and does not infringe upon the principle of separation of
powers, the prohibition against the delegation of
legislative function, and the equal protection clause of
the Constitution. The motion for certiorari is denied.
15. people vs jollife 105 phil 677
FACTS: William Ernest Joliffe is a Canadian, born in China,
permanently residing in Hongkong, the son of a former
Chancellor of the West China Union University and had
been Trade Commissioner for Canada in Shanghai &
Hongkong. He was from a reputable family & is quite well-
known. He made several trips to Manila, sometimes for
business trips, sometimes to meet his wife & children who
would be passing through.
One day he came to Manila to collect on a debt from
Woo. He did not know if he was going to be paid. He was
paid in gold which he hid under his shirt. When he was
going to his hotel room, he was accosted by a woman
secret service agent, Amanda Arimbay, and was brought to
a search room. He tried to prevent the gold from being
found but eventually, 4 pcs of gold bullion and a 100$
travellers check was found on him. He offered to settle
the case by bribing the agents.
He does not deny that he had no license to export the
gold.
O He was arrested for violating RA 265: An Act Establishing
The Central Bank Of The Philippines, Defining Its Powers In
The Administration Of The Monetary And Banking System,
Amending The Pertinent Provisions Of The Administrative
Code With Respect To The Currency And The Bureau Of
Banking, And For Other Purposes
O Sec 34 of said act states: Whenever anyone wilfully
violates this Act or any order, instruction, etc. legally
issued by the Monetary Board, he/she shall be punished by
a fine and by imprisonment.
O Note that when he was arrested, there was already CB
Circular 21: Any person desiring to export gold bullions
must obtain a license from the Central Bank.
CFI found him guilty.
Jolliffe questions validity of CB Circular 21 for being an
undue delegation of legislative power.
ISSUE: Is CB Circular 21 valid? YES.
RULING: Re: Delegation of Legislative Power
Under our system of govt, legislative power may not be
delegated except to local govts. HOWEVER, it is one thing
to delegate the power (1) to determine what the law shall
be; and another thing (2) to delegate the authority to fix
the details in the execution or enforcement of a policy set
out in the law itself.
The rule is that the delegated power fall under the 2nd
category, if the law authorizing the delegation furnishes a
reasonable standard which sufficiently marks the field
within which the Administrator is to act so that it may be
known whether he has kept within it in compliance with
the legislative will.
Re: Application to this case
In this case, Sec 74 of RA 265 conferred upon the
Monetary Board and the President the power:
O To subject to licensing all transactions in gold and
foreign exchange to protect the international reserve
of the Central Bank during an exchange crisis and to give
the Monetary Board and the Government time to take
constructive measures to combat such crisis.
O The Board is also authorized to take such appropriate
remedial measures to protect the international stability of
the peso, whether the international reserve is falling, as a
result of payment or remittances abroad which, in the
opinion of the Monetary Board, are contrary to the
national welfare.
Note that these powers must be exercised in relation to
the objectives of the law creating the Central Bank, which
are(Sec 2 RA 265):
O To maintain monetary stability in the Philippines;
O To promote a rising level of production, employment
and real income in the Philippines.
These standards are sufficiently definite to vest in the
delegated authority the character of administrative
details in the enforcement of the law and to place the
grant of authority BEYOND the category of a delegation of
legislative powers. Appeal denied.
16. cebu institute of technology vs ople 156 scra 629
FACTS: Certain teachers of CIT filed a complaint for non
payment of Cost of Living Allowance (COLA), thirteenth
month pay differentials and service incentive leave. Thus,
by virtue of an Order issued by the then Deputy Minister of
Labor Carmelo C. Noriel, a labor-management committee
composed of one representatives from various ministries
of the government, the CIT and from the teachers was
created. Said committee was to ascertain compliance with
the legal requirements for the payment of COLA, thirteenth
(13th) month pay and service incentive leave.
The position taken by CIT during the conference held by
the labor management committee with regard to the
benefits were:
a. COLA was integrated in the teachers hourly rate/
b. 13th Month Pay was paid to employees
c. Service Incentive Leave Exempt as Teachers were
employed on contract basis
After the report and recommendation of the committee,
herein public respondent, then Minister of Labor and
Employment issued the assailed Order dated September
29, 1981 and held that the basic hourly rate designated in
the Teachers' Program is regarded as the basic hourly rate
of teachers exclusive of the COLA, and that COLA should
not be taken from the 60% incremental proceeds of the
approved increase in tuition fee. Petitioner assails the
aforesaid Order in this Special Civil Action of certiorari with
Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order. The Court
issued a Temporary Restraining Order on December 7,
1981 against the enforcement of the questioned Order of
the Minister of Labor and Employment.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CIT was denied of due process
when the minister of labor issued the order to conduct a
formal investigation and arbitration proceeding.
RULING: NO.CIT was not deprived of its right to be heard
when it appears on the record that it was permitted to
ventilate its side of the issues. There was sufficient
compliance with the requirements of due process. In the
face of the well- settled principle that administrative
agencies are not strictly bound by the technical rules of
procedure, this Court dismisses the petitioner's claim that
formal investigative and arbitration proceedings should be
conducted. "While a day in court is a matter of right in
judicial proceedings, in administrative proceedings it is
otherwise since they rest upon different principles." Thus,
the Minister of Labors order is sustained and the TRO
lifted and set aside.

17. bureau of customs employees association vs teves
661 scra 589
FACTS: Sometime in 2008, high-ranking officials of the
Bureau of Customs pursuant to the Mandate of RA 9335
(An act to Improve the Revenue Collection Performance of
the BIR and BOC through the creation of Rewards and
Incentive Funds of a Revenue Performance Evaluation
Board and) and its IRR, and in order to comply with the
stringent deadlines thereof, started to disseminate
Collection District Performance Contracts (Performance
Contracts) for the low ranking officials and rank-and-file
employees to sign.
BOCEA opined that the revenue target was impossible to
meet due to the governments own policies on reduced
tariff rates and tax breaks to big businesses the occurrence
of natural calamities and because of other economic
factors. BOCEA claimed that some BOC employees were
coerced and forced to sign the Performance Contract. The
majority of them, however did not sign. In particular,
officers of BOCEA were summoned and required to sign
the Performance Contract but they also refused. To ease
the tension, BOCEA claimed that its officers sent letters
and sought several dialogues with the BOC Officials but the
latter refused to heed them.
ISSUE: Whether of Not RA 9335 and the IRR are
unconstitutional as they constitute undue delegation of
legislative powers to the revenue performance evaluation
board in violation of the principle of separation of powers
enshrined in the constitution.
RULING: NO. The Principle of Separation of Powers ordains
that each of the three great branches of government has
exclusive cognizance of and is supreme in matters falling
within its own constitutionality allocated sphere,
necessarily imbedded in this doctrine is the principle of
non-delegation of powers. However, this principle of non-
delegation or powers admits of numerous exceptions, one
of which is the delegation of legislative power to various
specialized administrative agencies like the board in this
case.
18. gerochi vs department of energy 527 scra 696
FACTS: RA 9136, otherwise known as the Electric Power
Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA), which sought to
impose a universal charge on all end-users of electricity
for the purpose of funding NAPOCORs projects, was
enacted and took effect in 2001.
Petitioners contest the constitutionality of the EPIRA,
stating that the power to tax is strictly a legislative function
and as such, the delegation of said power to any executive
or administrative agency like the ERC is unconstitutional,
giving the same unlimited authority and that the
imposition of the universal charge on all end-users is
oppressive and confiscatory and amounts to taxation
without representation for not giving the consumers a
chance to be heard and be represented. Respondents
contend that the charge is exacted by the State in the
exercise of its police power and it complies with the
requirements of due process, thus it is not oppressive and
confiscatory. They also contend that essentially, the
universal Charge does not possess the essential
characteristics of a tax
ISSUE: Whether or not there is undue delegation of
legislative power to tax on the part of the ERC.
NOTE: The Universal Charge is not a tax, but an exaction
in the exercise of the State's police power. Public welfare
is surely promoted
RULING: NO. There is no undue delegation of legislative
power to the ERC. The principle of separation of powers
ordains that each of the three branches of government has
exclusive cognizance of and is supreme in matters falling
within its own constitutionally allocated sphere. A logical
corollary to the doctrine of separation of powers is the
principle of non-delegation of powers, as expressed in the
Latin maxim potestas delegata non delegari potest(what
has been delegated cannot be delegated). This is based on
the ethical principle that such delegated power constitutes
not only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate
through the instrumentality of his own judgment and not
through the intervening mind of another.
In the face of the increasing complexity of modern life,
delegation of legislative power to various specialized
administrative agencies is allowed as an exception to this
principle. Given the volume and variety of interactions in
today's society, it is doubtful if the legislature can
promulgate laws that will deal adequately with and
respond promptly to the minutiae of everyday life. Hence,
the need to delegate to administrative bodies - the
principal agencies tasked to execute laws in their
specialized fields - the authority to promulgate rules and
regulations to implement a given statute and effectuate its
policies. All that is required for the valid exercise of this
power of subordinate legislation is that the regulation be
germane to the objects and purposes of the law and that
the regulation be not in contradiction to, but in
conformity with, the standards prescribed by the law.
These requirements are denominated as the completeness
test and the sufficient standard test.
Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its
terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such
that when it reaches the delegate, the only thing he will
have to do is to enforce it. The second test mandates
adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to determine
the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the
delegation from running riot. The Court finds that the
EPIRA, read and appreciated in its entirety, in relation to
Sec. 34 thereof, is complete in all its essential terms and
conditions, and that it contains sufficient standards.
1st test - Although Sec. 34 of the EPIRA merely provides
that within one (1) year from the effectivity thereof, a
Universal Charge to be determined, fixed and approved by
the ERC, shall be imposed on all electricity end-users, and
therefore, does not state the specific amount to be paid as
Universal Charge, the amount nevertheless is made
certain by the legislative parameters provided in the law
itself. Moreover, contrary to the petitioners contention,
the ERC does not enjoy a wide latitude of discretion in the
determination of the Universal Charge. Thus, the law is
complete and passes the first test for valid delegation of
legislative power.
2nd test - Provisions of the EPIRA such as, among others,
to ensure the total electrification of the country and the
quality, reliability, security and affordability of the supply
of electric power and watershed rehabilitation and
management meet the requirements for valid delegation,
as they provide the limitations on the ERCs power to
formulate the IRR. These are sufficient standards.
From the foregoing disquisitions, we therefore hold that
there is no undue delegation of legislative power to the
ERC. Petitioners failed to pursue in their Memorandum the
contention in the Complaint that the imposition of the
Universal Charge on all end-users is oppressive and
confiscatory, and amounts to taxation without
representation. Hence, such contention is deemed waived
or abandoned. Moreover, the determination of whether or
not a tax is excessive, oppressive or confiscatory is an issue
which essentially involves questions of fact, and thus, this
Court is precluded from reviewing the same.