Ludwig Wittgenstein: Analysis of Language

The direction of analytic philosophy in the twentieth century was altered not once but
twice by the enigmatic Austrian-British philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein. By his own
philosophical work and through his influence on several generations of other thinkers,
Wittgenstein transformed the nature of philosophical activity in the English-speaking
world. rom two distinct approaches, he sought to show that traditional philosophical
problems can be avoided entirely by application of an appropriate methodology, one that
focuses on analysis of language.
The !early! Wittgenstein worked closely with Russell and shared his conviction that
the use of mathematical logic held great promise for an understanding of the world. "n the
tightly-structured declarationss of the Logische-Philosophische Abhandlung #Tractatus
Logico-Philosophicus$ #%&''$, Wittgenstein tried to spell out precisely what a logically
constructed language can #and cannot$ be used to say. "ts seven basic propositions simply
state that language, thought, and reality share a common structure, fully e(pressible in
logical terms.
)n Wittgenstein*s view, the world consists entirely of facts. #Tractatus %.%$ +uman
beings are aware of the facts by virtue of our mental representations or thoughts, which
are most fruitfully understood as picturing the way things are. #Tractatus '.%$ These
thoughts are, in turn, e(pressed in propostitions, whose form indicates the position of
these facts within the nature of reality as a whole and whose content presents the truth-
conditions under which they correspond to that reality. #Tractatus ,$ Everything that is
true-that is, all the facts that constitute the world-can in principle be e(pressed by
atomic sentences. "magine a comprehensive list of all the true sentences. They would
picture all of the facts there are, and this would be an ade.uate representation of the
world as a whole.
The tautological e(pressions of logic occupy a special role in this language-scheme.
Because they are true under all conditions whatsoever, tautologies are literally nonsense/
Wittgenstein
0ife and Works
. . 1icture Theory
. . act and 2alue
. . 3ew 4ethods
. . 0anguage 5ames
. . 1rivate 0anguage
Bibliography
"nternet 6ources
they convey no information about what the facts truly are. But since they are true under
all conditions whatsoever, tautologies reveal the underlying structure of all language,
thought, and reality. #Tractatus 7.%$ Thus, on Wittgenstein*s view, the most significant
logical features of the world are not themselves additional facts about it.
What Cannot be Said
This is the ma8or theme of the Tractatus as a whole/ since propositions merely e(press
facts about the world, propositions in themselves are entirely devoid of value. The facts
are 8ust the facts. Everything else, everything about which we care, everything that might
render the world meaningful, must reside elsewhere. #Tractatus 7.,$ A properly logical
language, Wittgenstein held, deals only with what is true. Aesthetic 8udgments about
what is beautiful and ethical 8udgments about what is good cannot even be e(pressed
within the logical language, since they transcend what can be pictured in thought. They
aren*t facts. The achievement of a wholly satisfactory description of the way things are
would leave unanswered #but also unaskable$ all of the most significant .uestions with
which traditional philosophy was concerned. #Tractatus 7.9$
Thus, even the philosophical achievements of the Tractatus itself are nothing more
than useful nonsense: once appreciated, they are themselves to be discarded. The book
concludes with the lone statement/
"Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent."
#Tractatus ;$ This is a stark message indeed, for it renders literally unspeakable so much
of human life. As Wittgenstein*s friend and colleague rank <amsey put it,
"What we can't say we can't say, and we can't whistle it either."
"t was this carefully-delineated sense of what a logical language can properly e(press that
influenced members of the 2ienna =ircle in their formulation of the principles of logical
positivism. Wittgenstein himself supposed that there was nothing left for philosophers to
do. True to this conviction, he abandoned the discipline for nearly a decade.
New Directions
By the time Wittgenstein returned to =ambridge in %&'>, however, he had begun to
.uestion the truth of his earlier pronouncements. The problem with logical analysis is that
it demands too much precision, both in the definition of words and in the representation
of logical structure. "n ordinary language, applications of a word often bear only a
!family resemblance! to each other, and a variety of grammatical forms may be used to
e(press the same basic thought. But under these conditions, Wittgenstein now reali?ed,
the hope of developing an ideal formal language that accurately pictures the world is not
only impossibly difficult but also wrong-headed.
@uring this fertile period, Wittgenstein published nothing, but worked through his new
notions in classroom lectures. 6tudents who witnessed these presentations tried to convey
both the style and the content in their shared notes, which were later published as The
Blue and Brown Books #%&9>$. G.E. oore also sat in on Wittgenstein*s lectures during
the early thirties and later published a summary of his own copious notes. What appears
in these partial records is the emergence of a new conception of philosophy.
The picture theory of meaning and logical atomism are untenable, Wittgenstein now
maintained, and there is no reason to hope that any better versions of these basic positions
will ever come along. =laims to have achieved a correct, final analysis of language are
invariably mistaken. 6ince philosophical problems arise from the intellectual
bewilderment induced by the misuse of language, the only way to resolve them is to use
e(amples from ordinary language to deflate the pretensions of traditional thought. The
only legitimate role for philosophy, then, is as a kind of therapy-a remedy for the
bewitchment of human thought by philosophical language. =areful attention to the actual
usage of ordinary language should help avoid the conceptual confusions that give rise to
traditional difficulties.
Language as Game
)n this conception of the philosophical enterprise, the vagueness of ordinary usage is
not a problem to be eliminated but rather the source of linguistic riches. "t is misleading
even to attempt to fi( the meaning of particular e(pressions by linking them referentially
to things in the world. The meaning of a word or phrase or proposition is nothing other
than the set of #informal$ rules governing the use of the e(pression in actual life.
0ike the rules of a game, Wittgenstein argued, these rules for the use of ordinary
language are neither right nor wrong, neither true nor false/ they are merely useful for the
particular applications in which we apply them. The members of any community-cost
accountants, college students, or rap musicians, for e(ample-develop ways of speaking
that serve their needs as a group, and these constitute the language-game #4oore*s notes
refer to the !system! of language$ they employ. +uman beings at large constitute a
greater community within which similar, though more widely-shared, language-games
get played. Although there is little to be said in general about language as a whole,
therefore, it may often be fruitful to consider in detail the ways in which particular
portions of the language are used.
Even the fundamental truths of arithmetic, Wittgenstein now supposed, are nothing
more than relatively stable ways of playing a particular language-game. This account
re8ects both logicist and intuitionist views of mathematics in favor of a normative
conception of its use. ! " # $ % is nothing other than a way we have collectively decided
to speak and write, a handy, shared language-game. The point once more is merely to
clarify the way we use ordinary language about numbers.
Pain and Priate Language
)ne application of the new analytic techni.ue that Wittgenstein himself worked out
appears in several connected sections of the posthumously-published Philosophical
Investigations #%&9A$. "n discussions of the concept of !understanding,! traditional
philosophers tended to suppose that the operation of the human mind involves the
continuous operation of an inner or mental process of pure thinking. But Wittgenstein
pointed out that if we did indeed have private inner e(periences, it would be possible to
represent them in a corresponding language. )n detailed e(amination, however, he
concluded that the very notion of such a private language is utterly nonsensical.
"f any of my e(periences were entirely private, then the pain that " feel would surely
be among them. Bet other people commonly are said to know when " am in pain. "ndeed,
Wittgenstein pointed out that " would never have learned the meaning of the word !pain!
without the aid of other people, none of whom have access to the supposed private
sensations of pain that " feel. or the word !pain! to have any meaning at all presupposes
some sort of e(ternal verification, a set of criteria for its correct application, and they
must be accessible to others as well as to myself. Thus, the traditional way of speaking
about pain needs to be abandoned altogether.
3otice that e(actly the same kind of argument will work with respect to every other
attempt to speak about our supposedly inner e(periences. There is no systematic way to
coordinate the use of words that e(press sensations of any kind with the actual sensations
that are supposed to occur within myself and other agents. Wittgenstein proposed that we
imagine that each human being carries a tiny bo( whose contents is observed only by its
owner/ even if we all agree to use the word !beetle! to refer to what is in the bo(, there is
no way to establish a non-linguistic similarity between the contents of my own bo( and
that of anyone else*s. Cust so, the use of language for pains or other sensations can only be
associated successfully with dispositions to behave in certain ways. 1ain is whatever
makes someone #including me$ writhe and groan.