15 cases DAY 2, Torts (June 24, 2014)

General Rule: Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable
1 BARREDO v GARCIA and ALMARIO .
At about 1:30am on May 3, 1936, Fontanillas taxi collided with a kalesa thereby killing the 16 year old
Faustino Garcia. Faustinos parents filed a criminal suit against Fontanilla and reserved their right to file
a separate civil suit. Fontanilla was eventually convicted. After the criminal suit, Garcia filed a civil suit
against Barredo the owner of the taxi (employer of Fontanilla). The suit was based on Article 1903 of
the civil code (negligence of employers in the selection of their employees). Barredo assailed the suit
arguing that his liability is only subsidiary and that the separate civil suit should have been filed against
Fontanilla primarily and not him.

ISSUE: Whether or not Barredo is just subsidiarily liable.

HELD: No. He is primarily liable under Article 1903 which is a separate civil action against negligent
employers. Garcia is well within his rights in suing Barredo. He reserved his right to file a separate civil
action and this is more expeditious because by the time of the SC judgment Fontanilla is already serving
his sentence and has no property. It was also proven that Barredo is negligent in hiring his employees
because it was shown that Fontanilla had had multiple traffic infractions already before he hired him
something he failed to overcome during hearing. Had Garcia not reserved his right to file a separate civil
action, Barredo would have only been subsidiarily liable. Further, Barredo is not being sued for damages
arising from a criminal act (his drivers negligence) but rather for his own negligence in selecting his
employee (Article 1903).

2 ELCANO v HILL .
Reginald Hill, a minor, caused the death of Agapito (son of Elcano). Elcano filed a criminal case against
Reginald but Reginald was acquitted for lack of intent coupled with mistake. Elcano then filed a civil
action against Reginald and his dad (Marvin Hill) for damages based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Hill
argued that the civil action is barred by his sons acquittal in the criminal case; and that if ever, his civil
liability as a parent has been extinguished by the fact that his son is already an emancipated minor by
reason of his marriage.

ISSUE: Whether or not Marvin Hill may be held civilly liable under Article 2180.

HELD: Yes. The acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case does not bar the filing of a separate civil action.
A separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally
prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if accused is
actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such
eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In
other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively
to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same
act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the
criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the
accused. Briefly stated, culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable
by law.
While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child (Article 327, Civil
Code), and under Article 397, emancipation takes place by the marriage of the minor child, it is,
however, also clear that pursuant to Article 399, emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really full
or absolute. Thus Emancipation by marriage or by voluntary concession shall terminate parental
authority over the childs person. It shall enable the minor to administer his property as though he were
of age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate or encumber real property without the consent of his
father or mother, or guardian. He can sue and be sued in court only with the assistance of his father,
mother or guardian. Therefore, Article 2180 is applicable to Marvin Hill the SC however ruled since at
the time of the decision, Reginald is already of age, Marvins liability should be subsidiary only as a
matter of equity.

3 VORATA v OCHOA .
In September 1975, Borilla was driving a jeep when he hit Arsenio Virata thereby causing the latters
death. The heirs of Virata sued Borilla through an action for homicide through reckless imprudence in
the CFI of Rizal. Viratas lawyer reserved their right to file a separate civil action the he later withdrew
said motion. But in June 1976, pending the criminal case, the Viratas again reserved their right to file a
separate civil action. Borilla was eventually acquitted as it was ruled that what happened was a mere
accident. The heirs of Virata then sued Borilla and Ochoa (the owner of the jeep and employer of Borilla)
for damages based on quasi delict. Ochoa assailed the civil suit alleging that Borilla was already
acquitted and that the Viratas were merely trying to recover damages twice. The lower court agreed
with Ochoa and dismissed the civil suit.

ISSUE: Whether or not the heirs of Virata may file a separate civil suit.

HELD: Yes. It is settled that in negligence cases the aggrieved parties may choose between an action
under the Revised Penal Code or of quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
What is prohibited by Article 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines is to recover twice for the same
negligent act. Therefore, under the proposed Article 2177, acquittal from an accusation of criminal
negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action, not for
civil liability arising from criminal negligence, but for damages due to a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana.
But said article forestalls a double recovery.

4 BANAL v TADEO .
Petitioner herein is one of the complainants in the criminal cases filed against Rosario Claudio. Claudio is
charged with 15 separate information for violation of BP22. Claudio pleaded not guilty, thus trial
ensued. Petitioner moved to intervene through private prosecutor but it was rejected by respondent
judge on the ground that the charge is for the violation of BP 22 which does not provide for any civil
liability or indemnity and hence, it is not a crime against property but public order. Petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration but was denied by the respondent judge. Hence this appeal.

Issue: Whether or not a private prosecutor may intervene in the prosecution for violation of BP
22 which does not provide for civil liability.
YES. Under Art. 100 of the RPC, every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. Thus a
person committing a felony offends namely (1) the society in which he lives in or the political entity
called the State whose law he had violated; and (2) the individual member of that society whose person,
right, honor, chastity or property was actually or directly injured or damaged by the same punishable
actor or omission. While an act or omission is felonious because it is punishable by law, it gives rise to
civil liability not so much because it is a crime but because it caused damage to another. Viewing things
pragmatically, we can readily see that what gives rise to the civil liability is really the obligation and the
moral duty of everyone to repair or make whole the damage caused to another by reason of his own act
or omission, done intentionally or negligently, whether or not the same be punishable by law. In other
words, criminal liability will give rise to civil liability only if the same
feloniousact or omission results in damage or injury to another and is the direct andproximate cause
thereof. Damage or injury to another is evidently the foundation of the civil action. Such is not the case
in criminal actions for, to be criminally liable,
itis enough that the act or omission complained of is punishable, regardless of whether or not it
also causes material damage to another. Article 20 of the New Civil Code provides: Every person who,
contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the
same.Regardless, therefore, of whether or not a special law so provides,indemnification of the
offended party may be had on account of the damage, loss or injury directly suffered as a consequence
of the wrongful act of another.
5 OCCENA v HON. ICAMINA
Petitioner Occena filed a criminal complaint for Grave Oral Defamation against private respondent
Cristina Vegrafia for allegedly openly, publicly and maliciously uttering the following insulting words and
statements: "Gago ikaw nga Barangay Captain, montisco, traidor, malugus, Hudas." Private respondent
as accused therein entered a plea of not guilty. After trial, private respondent was convicted of the
offense of Slight Oral Defamation and was sentenced to pay a fine of Fifty Pesos (P50.00) with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs. No damages were awarded to petitioner.

WON pet. is entitled to damages from (lowercrt-declared) defamatory remarks by private respondent

Ruling: PETITION GRANTED. The decision of the RTC is MODIFIED and private respondent is ordered to
pay petitioner the amount of P5,000.00 as moral damages and another P5,000.00 as exemplary
damages.
What gives rise to the civil liability is really the obligation of everyone to repair or to make whole the
damage caused to another by reason of his act or omission, whether done intentionally or negligently
and whether or not punishable by law. The offense of which private respondent was found guilty is not
one of those felonies where no civil liability results because either there is no offended party or no
damage was caused to a private person.
Article 2219, par. (7) of the Civil Code allows the recovery of moral damages in case of libel, slander or
any other form of defamation. This provision of law establishes the right of an offended party in a case
for oral defamation to recover from the guilty party damages for injury to his feelings and reputation.
The offended party is likewise allowed to recover punitive or exemplary damages.
6 SPOUSES PACIS v MORALES .
Petitioners are the parents of Alfred Pacis, a 17-year old student who died in a shooting incident inside
the Top Gun Firearms and Ammunitions Store in Baguio City. Morales is the owner of the gun store.
On the fateful day, Alfred was in the gun store, with Matibag and Herbolario as sales agents and
caretakers of the store while owner Morales was in Manila. The gun which killed Alfred is a gun owned
by a store customer which was left with Morales for repairs, which he placed inside a drawer. Since
Morales would be going to Manila, he left the keys to the store with the caretakers. It appears that the
caretakers took the gun from the drawer and placed it on top of a table. Attracted by the sight of the
gun, the young Alfred got hold of the same. Matibag asked Alfred to return the gun. The latter followed
and handed the gun to Matibag. It went off, the bullet hitting the young Alfred in the head.
A criminal case for homicide was filed against Matibag. Matibag, however, was acquitted of the charge
against him because of the exempting circumstance of accident under Art. 12, par. 4 of the RPC.
By agreement of the parties, the evidence adduced in the criminal case for homicide against Matibag
was reproduced and adopted by them as part of their evidence in the instant case.
The trial court rendered its decision in favor of petitioners, ordering the defendant to pay plaintiffs
indemnity for the death of Alfred, actual damages for the hospitalization and burial, expenses incurred
by the plaintiffs, compensatory damages, MD and AF.
Respondent appealed to the CA, which reversed the trial courts Decision and absolved respondent from
civil liability under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. MR denied, hence this petition.
ISSUE: Was Morales negligent?
HELD: YES Petition granted. The CA decision is set aside and the trial courts Decision reinstated.
This case for damages arose out of the accidental shooting of petitioners son. Under Article 1161 of the
Civil Code, petitioners may enforce their claim for damages based on the civil liability arising from the
crime under Article 100 of the RPC or they may opt to file an independent civil action for damages under
the Civil Code. In this case, instead of enforcing their claim for damages in the homicide case filed
against Matibag, petitioners opted to file an independent civil action for damages against respondent
whom they alleged was Matibags employer. Petitioners based their claim for damages under Articles
2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code.
**
Unlike the subsidiary liability of the employer under Article 103 of the RPC, the liability of the employer,
or any person for that matter, under Article 2176 of the Civil Code is primary and direct, based on a
persons own negligence. Article 2176 states:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
This case involves the accidental discharge of a firearm inside a gun store. Under PNP Circular No. 9,
entitled the Policy on Firearms and Ammunition Dealership/Repair, a person who is in the business of
purchasing and selling of firearms and ammunition must maintain basic security and safety
requirements of a gun dealer, otherwise his License to Operate Dealership will be suspended or
canceled.
Indeed, a higher degree of care is required of someone who has in his possession or under his control an
instrumentality extremely dangerous in character, such as dangerous weapons or substances. Such
person in possession or control of dangerous instrumentalities has the duty to take exceptional
precautions to prevent any injury being done thereby. Unlike the ordinary affairs of life or business
which involve little or no risk, a business dealing with dangerous weapons requires the exercise of a
higher degree of care.
As a gun store owner, respondent is presumed to be knowledgeable about firearms safety and should
have known never to keep a loaded weapon in his store to avoid unreasonable risk of harm or injury to
others. Respondent has the duty to ensure that all the guns in his store are not loaded. Firearms should
be stored unloaded and separate from ammunition when the firearms are not needed for ready-access
defensive use. With more reason, guns accepted by the store for repair should not be loaded precisely
because they are defective and may cause an accidental discharge such as what happened in this case.
Respondent was clearly negligent when he accepted the gun for repair and placed it inside the drawer
without ensuring first that it was not loaded. In the first place, the defective gun should have been
stored in a vault. Before accepting the defective gun for repair, respondent should have made sure that
it was not loaded to prevent any untoward accident. Indeed, respondent should never accept a firearm
from another person, until the cylinder or action is open and he has personally checked that the weapon
is completely unloaded. For failing to insure that the gun was not loaded, respondent himself was
negligent. Furthermore, it was not shown in this case whether respondent had a License to Repair which
authorizes him to repair defective firearms to restore its original composition or enhance or upgrade
firearms.
Clearly, respondent did not exercise the degree of care and diligence required of a good father of a
family, much less the degree of care required of someone dealing with dangerous weapons, as would
exempt him from liability in this case.


Reservation of right to institute a separate civil action for damages (Rule 111
ROC)
Plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for same act or omission committed by
defendant (Art. 2177, CC)
7 PEOPLE v AMISTAD .
In CFI Baguio and Benguet, action (INFORMATION) was filed against ITONG AMISTAD
ESTAFA. He allegedly sold by deed of sale on Oct 11, 1962 Ben Palispis an unsegregated portion of
42,000 sqm of land in Baguio
KNOWING FULL WELL that he had already previously entered into an agreement with JAVELLANA last
Feb 10, 1962 of 10,000 sqm of that exact described parcel
xx RTC = acquitted him, guilty not proven beyond reasonable doubt. Case is Civil in nature
xx CA = dismissed appeal
ISSUE whether an appeal by the complainant for estafa, may be allowed from a decision
acquitting the accused of the crime charged, only insofar as the latter's civil liability is concerned.
We find no ground to reverse the Resolution of the Court of Appeals on the purely legal question of
whether the petitioner, as complainant in Criminal Case No. 4025 of the Court of First Instance of Baguio
and Benguet, for estafa, can appeal from the judgment acquitting the accused, because the trial court
failed to declare the latter's civil liability to the complainant, which was allegedly proven by the
evidence.
The provision of Article 29 of the Civil Code relied upon by the petitioner clearly requires the institution
of a separate action by the filing of the proper complaint. To such complaint, the accused as the
defendant therein, may file the appropriate responsive pleading, which may be an answer or a motion
to dismiss. In a criminal action, notwithstanding that the action for the recovery of civil liability is
impliedly instituted therewith, if not reserved or waived, the accused is not afforded the same remedy.
Neither is the mandatory pre-trial held as is required of all civil actions. The obvious reason is that the
civil liability recoverable in the criminal action is one solely dependent upon conviction, because said
liability arises from the offense, with respect to which pre-trial is never held to obtain admission as to
the commission thereof, except on the occasion of arraignment. This is the kind of civil liability involved
in the civil action deemed filed simultaneously with the filing of criminal action, unless it is reserved or
waived, as so expressly provided in Section 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court and as held in People vs.
Herrera, 74 Phil. 21.
If the civil liability arises from other sources than the commission of the offense, such as from law or
contract or quasi-delict, its enforcement has to be by an ordinary civil action, which, as expressly
provided in Article 29 of the Civil Code may be disposed of as a mere preponderance of evidence would
warrant. Then, all the defenses available, such as prescription, lack of jurisdiction, set-off, and the other
grounds for a motion to dismiss may be availed of, as may be proper under the peculiar facts and
circumstances of the case, complete with pre-trial after issues have been joined. Upon these
considerations, it becomes clear that the argument of petitioner invoking the rule against multiplicity of
action may not forcefully or convincingly be put forth.
xxx
Brought out in bold relief in the aforequoted ruling is that what is impliedly brought simultaneously with
the criminal action is the civil action to recover civil liability arising from the offense. Hence, the two
actions may rise or fall together. However, if the civil action is reserved, or if the ground of acquittal is
reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused, a separate civil action may be filed, the complainant
alleging a cause of action independent of, and not based on, the commission of an offense. Only
preponderance of evidence would then be required.
8 JARANTILLA v CA .
Private respondent Jose Kuan Sing was "side-swiped by a Volkswagon Beetle driven by Edgar
Jarantilla in the evening of July 7, 1971 in lznart Street, Iloilo City" towards the direction of the
provicional capitol resulting to serious physical injuries thru reckless inprudence.
Sing did not reserve his right to institute a separate civil action. Jarantilla was eventually
acquitted because of reasonable doubt.
On October 30, 1974, Sing filed a complaint (civil case) against the Jarantilla in the former Court
of First Instance of Iloilo, Branch IV, in which civil action involved the same subject matter and
act complained of in the dismissed criminal case. RTC wanted to enrich our jurisprudence. So
RTC denies motion to dismiss, grants damages to Sing, proposed that the case be elevated to
the SC by certiorari. CA affirmed.

ISSUE: Whether Sing, who was the complainant in the dismissed criminal action (grounded on
reasonable dobut) for physical injuries and who participated in the prosecution without reserving
the civil action can file a separate action for civil liability arising from the same act or omission.

HELD: YES, because the civil action here is not based on DELICT, but on QUASI-DELICT.

RATIO/DOCTRINES:
Well settled is the rule that the same act or omission can create two kinds of liability on the part
of the offender, that is, civil liability ex delicto and civil liability ex quasi delicto. Since the same
negligence can give rise either to a delict or crime or to a quasi-delict or tort, either of these two
types of civil liability may be enforced against the culprit, subject to Article 2177 of the Civil
Code that the offended party cannot recover damages under both types of liability.
Where the offended party elected to claim damages arising from the offense charged in the
criminal case through her intervention as a private prosecutor, the final judgment rendered
therein constituted a bar to the subsequent civil action based upon the same cause.
The well-settled doctrine is that a person, while not criminally liable may still be
civilly liable. 'The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the civil liability of the
accused only when it includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil
liability might arise did not exist'
Another consideration in favor of Sing is the doctrine that the failure of the court to make any
pronouncement, favorable or unfavorable, as to the civil liability of the accused amounts to a
reservation of the right to have the civil liability litigated and determined in a separate action.
The rules nowhere provide that if the court fails to determine the civil liability it becomes no
longer enforceable.
Furthermore, in the present case the civil liability sought to be recovered through the application
of Article 29 is no longer that based on or arising from the criminal offense. There is persuasive
logic in the view that, under such circumstances, the acquittal of the accused foreclosed the civil
liability based on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code which presupposes the existence of
criminal liability or requires a conviction of the offense charged. Divested of its penal element by
such acquittal, the causative act or omission becomes in effect a quasi-delict, hence only a civil
action based thereon may be instituted or prosecuted thereafter, which action can be proved by
mere preponderance of evidence. 28 Complementary to such considerations, Article 29
enunciates the rule, as already stated, that a civil action for damages is not precluded by an
acquittal on reasonable doubt for the same criminal act or omission.
Since this action is based on a quasi-delict, the failure of the respondent to reserve his right to
file a separate civil case and his intervention in the criminal case did not bar him from filing such
separate civil action for damages. 30 The Court has also heretofore ruled in Elcano vs.
Hill 31 that
The extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (c) of Sec. 3 Rule 111, refers
exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code;
whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and
not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that
the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the
accused . . .
9 HUN HYUNG PARK v EUNG WON CHOI .
Eung Won Choi, was charged for violation of BP 22,otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law, for
issuing PNB Check No. 0077133 postdated August28, 1999 in the amount of P1,875,000 which was
dishonored for having been drawn against insufficient funds. He pleaded not guilty.- After the
prosecution rested its case, respondent filed a Motion for Leave of Court to File Demurrer to Evidence to
which he attached his Demurrer, asserting that the prosecution failed to prove that he received the
notice of dishonor, hence, the presumption of the element of knowledge of insufficiency of funds did
not arise.- (2/27/03) The MeTC of Makati, Branch 65 granted the demurrer and dismissed the case. The
prosecutions motion for reconsideration was denied.- Park appealed the civil aspect of the case to the
RTC of Makati, contending that the dismissal of thecriminal case should not include its civil aspect. The
RTC held that while the evidence presented was insufficient to prove Chois criminal liability, it did not
altogether extinguish his civil liability. It accordingly granted Parks appeal and ordered Choi to pay
himP1,875,000 with legal interest.- Upon Chois motion for reconsideration, however,the RTC set aside
its decision and ordered the remand of the case to the MeTC for further proceedings, so that Choi may
adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case. Parks motion for reconsideration of the remand of the
case having been denied, he elevated the case to the CA which dismissed his petition.
Issue: Whether the respondent has a right to present evidence on the civil aspect of the case in view of
his demurer.
Held: Yes. n case of a demurrer to evidence filed with leave of court, the accused may adduce
countervailing evidence if the court denies the demurrer. Such denial bears no distinction as to the two
aspects of the case because there is a disparity of evidentiary value between the quanta of evidence in
suchaspects of the case. In other words, a court may not deny the demurrer as to the criminal aspect
and at the same time grant the demurrer as to the civil aspect, for if the evidence so far presented is not
insufficient to prove the crime beyond reasonable doubt, then the same evidence is likewise not
insufficient to establish civil liability by mere preponderance of evidence.- On the other hand, if the
evidence so far presented is insufficient as proof beyond reasonable doubt, it does not follow that the
same evidence is insufficient to establish a preponderance of evidence. For if the court grants the
demurrer, proceedings on the civil aspect of the case generally proceed. The only recognized instance
when an acquittal on demurrer carries with it the dismissal of the civil aspect is when there is a finding
that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist. Absent such determination,
trial as to the civil aspect of the case must perforce continue.- In the instant case, the MeTC granted the
demurrer and dismissed the case without any finding that the act or omission from which the civil
liability may arise did not exist. Choi did not assail the RTC order of remand. He thereby recognized that
there is basis for a remand. Park posits that Choi waived his right to present evidence on the civil aspect
of the case (1) when the grant of the demurrer was reversed on appeal, citing Section 1 of Rule 33, and
(2) when respondent orally opposed petitioners motion for reconsideration pleading that proceedings
with respect to the civil aspect of the case continue. Petitioners citation of Section 1 of Rule 33 is
incorrect. Where a court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the person of the accused,
and the crime was committed within its territorial jurisdiction, the court necessarily exercises
jurisdiction over all issues that the law requires it to resolve. One of the issues in a criminal case being
the civil liability of the accused arising from the crime, the governing law is the Rules of Criminal
Procedure, not the Rules of Civil Procedure which pertains to a civil action arising from the initiatory
pleading that gives rise to the suit.- As for petitioners attribution of waiver to respondent, it cannot be
determined with certainty from the records the nature of Chois alleged oral objections to Parks motion
for reconsideration of the grant of the demurrer to evidence. Any waiver of the 10 right to present
evidence must be positively demonstrated. Any ambiguity in the voluntariness of the waiver is frowned
upon; hence, courts must indulge every reasonable presumption against it. Dispositive Petition is
DENIED.




Extinction or survival of civil liability arising from criminal offenses (Rule 120,
Sec 2 ROC)
10 PP v NAVOA .
Manuel Navoa and Bernardo Lim both found guilty of ARSON, both liable to the building and theater
owners N de la Merced 774k
With gasoline, set fire to the MANILA CINEMA BLDG at Recto. Totally destroyed and burned. Damage
valued at 6 million pesos. 14 people died.
He apparently repudiated the WAIVERS and CONFESSIONS. But, he claimed that the investigators
employed FORCE and INTIMIDATION as well as TORTURE to secure his confession
Records show that the EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSIONS formed the ONLY BASIS FOR JUDGMENT Taken
without counsel

11 PP v MANUEL BADEO .
Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code provides that criminal liability is totally extinguished "by the death
of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is
extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment." InPeople
vs. Alison, 23 the Court, upon the recommendation of the then Solicitor General who was required to
comment on the information that appellant Alison had died at the prison hospital, resolved that, there
being no final judgment as yet, "the criminal and civil liability (sic) of Alison was extinguished by his
death."
The Alison resolution was the basis of the resolution in People vs. Satorre 24 similarly dismissing the case
against the deceased appellant. In a separate opinion in the resolution, then Associate Justice Ramon C.
Aquino stated that as to the personal penalties, criminal liability therefor is extinguished only when the
death of the offender occurs before final judgment. According to Justice Aquino, the term " pecuniary
penalties" (las pecuniarias) in Article 89 refers to fine and costs as distinguished from " pecuniary
liability" (responsabilidades pecunarias) in Article 38 which include reparation and indemnity.
As every crime gives rise to a penal or criminal action for the punishment of the guilty party, and also to
a civil action for the restitution of the thing, repair of the damage and indemnification for the
losses 25 whether the particular act or omission is done intentionally or negligently or whether or not
punishable by law, 26 subsequent decisions of the Court held that while the criminal liability of an
appellant is extinguished by his death, his civil liability subsists. 27 In such case, the heirs of the
deceased appellant are substituted as parties in the criminal case and his estate shall answer for his civil
liability. 28
In the light of the foregoing, we reconsider the resolution August 21, 1991 insofar as it considers as
extinguished Esperidion Badeo's civil liability, in order to determine whether or not such liability
exist. 29
Well-settled is the rule that where the accused admits having authored the death of the victim and his
defense is anchored on self-defense, he must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the
weakness of that of the prosecution. 30 Otherwise his conviction is inescapable
12 CALANG v People .
Calang was the driver of a Philtranco bus whose left rear side hit an oncoming jeepney's front left side
(overtaking). Because of this, the driver of the jeep lost control of his vehicle and hit Jose Mabansag,
killing him. The jeep turned turtle thrice as well before coming to a halt, instantly killing two of its
passengers and causing serious physical injuries to the others. The prosecution charged Calang with
multiple homicide, multiple serious physical injuries, and reckless imprudence resulting to damage to
property before the Regional Trial Court. The RTC found Calang guilty for all three charges, and
sentenced him, aside from imprisonment, to pay indemnity to the victims or their heirs. Calalang and
Philtranco were ordered to pay, jointly and severally, Php 50,000.00 to the heirs of Armando, Php
90,083.90 to the private complainants, and Php 50,000.00 to the heirs of Mabansag.Calang and
Philtranco appealed to the CA but the CA affirmed the RTC's decision in toto.
Philtranco filed an MR, stating that they cannot be held jointly and severally liable with Calang as they
were not a party to the criminal case.
Issue Whether the CA was correct in holding Philtranco and Calang jointly and severally liable.
Held/Ratio There can be no doubt as to the culpability of Calang, however, the Court ruled that both the
RTC and the CA erred in holding Philtranco jointly and severally liable. Calang was charged criminally
before the RTC, therefore it cannot be said that Philtranco is a direct party to the case. Since the cause
of action against Calang was based on delict, both the RTC and the CA erred in holding Philtranco jointly
and severally liable with Calang, based on quasi-delict under Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code.
Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code pertain to the vicarious liability of an employer for quasi-delicts
that an employee has committed. Such provision of law does not apply to civil liability arising from
delict. If at all, Philtranco's liability may only be subsidiary. Article 102 of the Revised Penal Code sates
the subsidiary civil liabilities of innkeepers, tavernkeepers and proprietors of establishments, as
followsw library In default of the persons criminally liable, innkeepers, tavernkeepers, and any other
persons or corporations shall be civilly liable for crimes committed in their establishments, in all cases
where a violation of municipal ordinances or some general or special police regulations shall have been
committed by them or their employees.
The foregoing subsidiary liability applies to employers, according to Article 103 of the Revised Penal
Code, which reads: lThe subsidiary liability established in the next preceding article shall also apply to
employers, teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of industry for felonies committed
by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their duties.
Present motion is partly granted. CAs decision that affirmed in toto the RTC decision, finding Rolito
Calang guilty beyond reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide, multiple
serious physical injuries and damage to property, is AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that Philtranco's
liability should only be subsidiary
13 PP v AMISTOSO .
Amistoso found guilty of rape of a 12 year old girl in Masbate.
Aggravating circ = FATHER of the victim
His defense: his wife, his wifes lover and daughter FABRICATED a rape charge against him
with a certified true copy of Amistosos Death Certificate.
17
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Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

ART. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. Criminal liability is totally extinguished:cralawlibrary

1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefore
is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment[.]
In People v. Bayotas,
18
the Court laid down the rules in case the accused dies prior to final judgment:

1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil
liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, the death of the accused prior
to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based
solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore.

2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may also
be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these
other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission:cralawlibrary
a) Law

b) Contracts

c) Quasi-contracts

d) x x x

e) Quasi-delicts

3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor may be
pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules
on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either against the
executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the
same is based as explained above.

4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by
prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the
private-offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations
on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with
provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible
privation of right by prescription. (Citations omitted.)
Given the foregoing, it is clear that the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes
his criminal liability, as well as his civil liability ex delicto. Since the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch
as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused, the civil action instituted therein for recovery of
civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal case.
19
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Undeniably, Amistosos death on December 11, 2012 preceded the promulgation by the Court of its Decision
on January 9, 2013. When Amistoso died, his appeal before the Court was still pending and
unresolved. The Court ruled upon Amistosos appeal only because it was not immediately informed of his
death.

No independent action to recover civil liability arising from BP22
14 HEIRS OF SIMON CHAN V CA .
In 11 July 1997 the City Prosecutor of Manila filed a criminal case in the Metro politan Trial Court of
Manila charging Eduardo Simon of violating BP22. Sometime in December 1996, Simon issued to Elvin
Chan a Landbank check with a declared amount of P336,000. The accuse did not have sufficient fund in
his account to fund the check he issued, contrary to the information he had given to the respondent.
Despite notice insufficiency of his account ? s funds, the petitioner failed to pay the respondent the
value of the check within 5 days after receiving the notice.
Three years later on 3 August 2000, Elvin Chan commenced in the MTC in Pasay City a Civil Action for the
collection of the principal amount of P 336,000.00.On 17 August 2000, Simon filed an urgent Motion to
Dismiss with application to change plaintiff ? s attachmnent bond for damages on the ground of litis
pendentia asa consequence of the pendency of another action between parties for the same cause.
The plaintiff countered the argument of Simon by pointing out he did not make any allegation as to the
exact amount of his claim in the criminal case, consitituting an implied right to initiate civil action. The
Plaintiff also cited Rule 111 Section 2, exception to file separate civil action during the pendency of a
criminal case under Art. 31, 32, 33, 34, and 2177 of the CCP. The case falls underArt. 33 of the CCP. On
23 October 2000, the MCTC in Pasay City granted Simon ? s urgent Motion to Dismiss with application to
charge plaintiff ? s attachment bond for damages. On 31 July 2001, the RTC of Pasay City upheld MCTC ?
s dismissal of Chan ? s initiated Civil Case.
Chan appealed to the CA by petition for review with the following issue; Whether or not the RTC erred
in the dismissal of his case on the ground of litis pendetia.
The CA overturened the decision of the RTC with following legal basis; Though the CA recognized that
civil case cannot anymore initiated following the filling of a criminal case, the following case falls under
the exception under Rule 111 sec. 2. The case remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.
Simon appealed to the Supreme Court for petition for review.
Issue/Issues:
1. Whether or not Chan ? s Civil action to recover the amount of the bounced check a
s an independent civil action.
2. Whether or not new Supreme Court circular pertaining to BP22 can be applied r
etroactively.
Ruling:
The SC set aside the decision promulgated by the Court of Appeals on June 25, 2002. Furthermore, the
SC reinstate the decision rendered on October 23, 2000 by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 45, in
Pasay City. The SC applied new rule on BP22 specifically, The criminal action for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to necessarily include the corresponding civil action, and no
reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed or recognized. The aforequoted provisions
of the Rules of Court, even if not yet in effect when Chan commenced Civil Case No. 915-00 on August 3,
2000, are nonetheless applicable. It is axiomatic that the retroactive application of procedural laws does
not violate any right of a person who may feel adversely affected, nor is it constitutionally objectionable.
The reason is simply that, as a general rule, no vested right may attach to, or arise from, procedural
laws. Any new rules may validly be made to apply to cases pending at the time of their promulgation,
considering that no party to an action has a vested right in the rules of procedure, except that in criminal
cases, the changes do not retroactively apply if they permit or require a lesser quantum of evidence to
convict than what is required at the time of the commission of the offenses, because such retroactivity
would be unconstitutional for being ex post facto under the Constitution
Furthermore, for litis pendentia to be successfully invoked as a bar toan action, the concurrence of the
following requisites is necessary, namely: (a)there must be identity of parties or at least such as
represent the same interest in both actions; (b) there must be identity of rights asserted and reliefs
prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the same facts; and, (c) the identity inthe two cases should be
such that the judgment that may be rendered in one would, regardless of which party is successful,
amount to res judicata in respect ofthe other. Absent the first two requisites, the possibility of the
existence ofthe third becomes nil.
A perusal of Civil Case No. 01-0033 and Criminal Case No. 275381 ineluctably shows that all the
elements of litis pendentia are attendant. First of all, the parties in the civil action involved in Criminal
Case No. 275381 and in Civil CaseNo. 915-00, that is, Chan and Simon, are the same. Secondly, the
information inCriminal Case No. 275381 and the complaint in Civil Case No. 915-00 both allegedthat
Simon had issued Landbank Check No. 0007280 worth P336,000.00 payable to ? cash, ? thereby
indicating that the rights asserted and the reliefs prayed for, as well as the facts upon which the reliefs
sought were founded, were identical in all respects. And, thirdly, any judgment rendered in one case
would necessarily bar the other by res judicata; otherwise, Chan would be recovering twice upon
thesame claim.
It is clear, therefore, that the MeTC in Pasay City properly dismissed Civil Case No. 915-00 on the ground
of litis pendentia through its decision dated October23, 2000; and that the RTC in Pasay City did not err
in affirming the MeTC.

Extent of liability of principals as against employers
Franco v IAC