REPORTOFTHE DEPARTMENTOF THEARMY REVIEW

OF THE
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATIONS INTOTHEMY LA1 INCIDENT(U)
VOLUME III
EXHI BI TS
BOOK I - DIRECTIVES
B OOKS 1 & 2 C O N T A I N A L L
D I R E C T I V E S E N T E R E D
I N T O T H E I N Q U I R Y R E C OR D I N C L U D I N G T H O S E
DESI GNATED AS MI S CELLANEOUS EXHI BI TS.
14 MARCH 1970
PREFACE
VolumeI11 comprisesthesupportingdocumentsen-
teredintotheInquiryRecordasExhibits. Cate-
goriesaredesignatedas:
D- Directives
R- Reports
M- Miscellaneousdocuments
Map- Maps
0- Overlays,sketches,drawings
S- Statements
P- Photographs
Administrativeexhibitsarenum-
beredwithoutadesignation.
Thismaterialisarrangedbycategoryintosep-
aratebooksasfollows:
Book1 Directives
Book2 Directives(continued)
Book3 Reports
Book4 Miscellaneousdocuments
Book5 Miscellaneousdocuments
(continued), Overlays,
StatementsandAdministrat-
ive
Book6 Photographs
Book7 AerialPhotographsand
Maps
AlldirectivesarecompiledinBooks1and2
includingthosedesignatedasmiscellaneous
exhibits. Likewise,allreportsareinBook 3.
Volume111,Book1
CONTENTS
ORGANI ZATI ON
Book1 (Pages1through470)
Title
DEPARTMENTOFTHEARMY
AR15-6,ProcedureforInvestigatingOf-
ficersandBoardsofOfficersConduct-
ingInvestigations ........................
UNITEDSTATESMILITARYASSISTANCECOMMANDVIET-
NAM (USMACV)
Directive9-67,MACVPlanningGuidancefor
SeniorCommandersforthePeriod1Nov-
ember1967- 30April1968(U) ............
Directive20-4,18May1968,withChange1..
Directive20-5,InspectionsandInvestiga-
tions,PrisonersofWar- Determination
ofEligibility,15March1968.............
Directive95-4,Aviation,USAirOperations
inRVN (U),26August1967 ................
Directive190-3,MilitaryPolice- Enemy
PrisonersofWar(PW),12February1968...
Directive335-1,ReportsofSeriousCrimes
orIncidents,22November1967
............
~irective 335-12,SpotReports,29Novem-
ber1967...................................
Directive381-46,MilitaryIntelligence,
CombinedScreeningofDetainees
...........
Directive525-3,CombatOperations,14
October1966.
.............................
Directive525-9,CombatOperations,Control,
Disposition,andSafeguardingofVietnamese
Property,CapturedMaterielandFoodSup-
plies(U),23July1967..
..................
Exhibit
No. Page
D-2
D-53
D-1
D-42
D-4
D-43
D-8
D-9
D-39
D-6
D-40
Exhibit
Title
No. Page
Directive525-18,CombatOperations-
ConductofArtillery/MortarandNaval
Gunfire(U) ,21January1968.............. D-3 135 '.
Directive612-1,PersonnelProcessing-
ProcessingofNewArrivals,16March
1968...................................... D-41 139
MACVCombinedCampaignPlan(Extract) ....... D-44 141
MACVGuideforCommandersinRVN(Extract).. D-45 201
DFMACV,13March1967,GuideLettersto
FWMAFCommanders.......................... D-46 239
SummaryofRemarksbyCOMUSMACV,28
August1966............................... D-47 251
Message, istreatmentofDetaineesand
PW(U), 2February1968.. ..... ............ M-48 255
Message,GuidanceforCommandersinRVN,
2December1967........................... M-91 257
IndividualReplacementPacket(Extract) ..... M-94 259
UNITEDSTATESARMYVIETNAM (USARV)
Regulation335-6,SeriousIncidentReports,
24June1967.............................. D-10
Regulation350-1,10November1967
(Extract)............................... D-17
Regulation525-7,CombatOperations,5Jan-
uary1968................................. D-11
Regulation612-1,PersonnelProcessing,8
January1968.............................. D-18
Regulation870-2,HistoricalActivities,11
March1968................................ D-19
USARVMessage- GenevaConventions,3Nov-
ember1967................................ D-48
GenevaandHagueConventionsTraining,USARV
Message,22June1968..................... D-49
------- - -
Title No. Page
Message, Reorganization of America1
Division................................. M-97 319
111 MARINE AMPHIBIOUS F.ORCE (I11 MAF)
Coordinator Instruction 5370.1AI Respect
for the Law, Property, Institutions, Tradi-
tions and Customs of the RVN, 13 February
1966, with Change 1.. .................... D-27
Coordinator Instruction 5830.1Af Spot/
Serious Incident Reports, 2 March 1967 ... D-12
I ~orps/III MAF Combined Campaign Plan
1-68 for 1968 (Extracts). ................ D-52
Book 2 (Pages 471 through 914)
Force Order 1560.1A, Command Information
and Indoctrination Program, 11 Septem-
ber 1967 (Extract). ...................... D-20
Force Order 3040.3, Minimizing Noncombatant
Battle Casualties, 13 December 1966 ...... D-21
Force 0rder.PO 3121.5, SOP for Ground and
Air Operations, 10 November 1967 ......... D-22
Force Order 03330.1, Conduct of Artillery/
Mortar and Naval Gunfire, 3 February
1967..................................... D-23
Force Order 3460.3, Treatment of Captured
Personnel, 8 September 1966 ............. D-24
Force Order 3461.2AI Processing, Exploit-
ing, Evacuating, and Accounting for
Prisoners of War, 8 July 1967, with
Change 1, ................................ D-25
Force Order 5080.5, Property Damage and
Death or Personal Injury to Vietnamese
Civilians, 3 October 1966 ................ D-26
Force Order 5820.1, War Crimes Investiga-
tion, 3 June 1967......... ............... M-8
Spot/Serious Incident Reports, Letter, 2
March 1967. .............................. D-28
Exhibit
Title
No. Page
MessagefromCG,I11MAFtoAllCommands,
0100542,January1968,Subj: NewYear
Resolutions.............................. D-29
TASKFORCE(TF)OREGON
Regulation335-6,ReportsofSerious
CrimesorIncidents,21March1967....... D-30
MessagefromCG,TFOregontoCG,I11
MAF,Subj: OperationalControl(U),
Cite522,2216002April1967............. D-50
OrientationandTraininginArtillery
Techniques,MessageAVDF-AT,1483,
May1967 ................................. M-73
ReportingandInvestigationofErratic
ArtilleryRounds,Message,AVDF-AT2859,
July1967.... . .. . . ..... . . . . . . . .... . . . . . . . . M-71
FieldSOP,21March1967(Extracts) ........ M-105
InvestigationofArtilleryIncidents,7
May1967................................. M-70
AMERICALDIVISION
Regulation335-8,CombatActionReports,
28January1968.......................... D-31
Regulation525-4,CombatOperations,Rules
ofEngagement,16March1968 ............. D-5
OperationsOrder2-68,23January1968,
withFragmentedOrders1and2(Extract). D-33
OperationsOrder20-67,December1967,with
FragmentedOrders1,2,and3(Extract) .. D-32
ArtilleryItemsforCommandEmphasis,12
October1967(Letter) . . . . . . . ...... . . . . . .. M-68
InvestigationsofArtilleryIncidents,15
January1968(Letter) .................... D-14
TheSafeguardingofNoncombatants,24March
1968(Letter) ............................ M-9
Exhibit
Title No. Page
GunneryChecklist,5February1968
(Letter)................................. M-67
PhasedScheduleofllthInfantryBrigade
(U),7December1967(Letter) ............ M-54
InformationOfficeSOP,7April1968
(Letter'). . . .... . ............ . ....L.. .... . M-112
CombatSOP,15April1968(Extracts) ....... M-106
ArtilleryFieldSOP,1December1967
(Extracts)... . ............,. . ......;.. ... . ...
M-66
FraqmentedOrder24-68,DisbandinqTFBarker,
April1968(Message) ..... . . . .......... -. . D-34
Reporting,2December1967(Message) ....... M-69
DoubleCheckProcedureforArtilleryUnits
(U),July1967(Message) ................. M-72
llTHINFANTRYBRIGADE
Regulation1-3,Administration- Reporting
ofSeriousIncidents,31March1967...... D-13
Regulation525-1,CombatOperations- Rules
TrainingMemorandum350-2,Educationand
ofEngagement(U),9February1968....... D-7
Training................................. M-55
FragmentedOrder3-68,January1968........ D-15
FragmentedOrder8-68,24March1968,llth
Brigade.................................. D-51
AdministrationOrder1-68,February1968... D-16
OperationsOrder1-68,February1968....... D-35
OperationPlan7-68,March1968............ D-36
PreparationforOverseas~ovement (POM),
1November1967(Letter) ................. M-53
TacticalSOPforCounterinsurgencyOpera-
tions(Extracts) .. . . . ....... . . . . . . ........
M-56
T i t l e
Comba t SOP, 1 8 November 1 9 6 7 ( E x t r a c t s ) ....
E x h i b i t
No.
M-74
P a g e
8 9 5
MISCELLANEOUS DIRECTIVES
A c t i v i t y G u i d e l i n e s f o r C o r p s T a c t i c a l
Zo n e s w i t h D i r e c t i v e from GEN V i e n
. . . . .. . . : . . . . . 1 9 6 8 ) . February 1 5 ( L e t t e r , D- 54 9 0 9
CONTENTS
EXHlBI T NUMBER
Exhibit
No. Title Page
D-1 MACVRegulation20-4,InspectionsandInvest-
igations- WarCrimes........................ 23
D-2 ArmyRegulation15-6,ProceduresforInvest-
igatingOfficersandBoardsofOfficers
ConductingInvestigations .................... 1
D-3 MACVDirective525-18,21January1968,Com-
batOperations- ConductofArtillery/
MortarandNavalGunfire..................... 135
D-4 MACVDirective95-4,includingChange1and
Change2,Aviation- USAirOperationsin
RVN.......................................... 57
D-5 Directive525-4,16March1968,CombatOpera-
tions- America1Directive"RulesofEn-
gagement".................................... "587
D-6 MACVDirective525-3,14October1966,Combat
Operations- MinimizingNoncombatantsBattle
Casualties................................... 119
D-7 11thInfBdeRegulation525-1,including
Change1,CombatOperations- RulesofEn-
gagement............................... .,..... *757
D-8 MACVDirective335-1,22November1967,Re-
portsofSeriousCrimesorIncidents ......... 93
D-9 MACVDirective335-12,29November1967,Spot
Reports...................................... 99
D-10 USARVRegulation335-6,24June1967,Serious
IncidentReports............................. 269
D-11 USARVRegulation525-7,5January1968,Corn-
batOperations- ReportingandInvestigation
Exhibit
No. Title Page
of Accidents Involving Misdirected Ar-
tillery/Mortar Fire, Naval Gunfire,
or Air-Directed Ordnance.....................
I11 MAF Instruction 5830.1A, 2 March 1967,
Spot/Serious Incident Reports ................
llth Infantry Brigade Regulation 1-3, 31 March
1967, Administration - Reporting of Serious
Incidents..
..................................
America1 Division Artillery, ~nvestigation of
Artillery Incidents ..........................
FRAGORD: 3-68, llth Infantry Brigade, Duc
Pho (BS814385) RVN 221700 January 1968 .......
ADMINO 1-68, llth Infantry Brigade LZ Bronco,
BS812383, 261600 February 1968 ...............
USARV Regulation 350-1, 10 November 1967
(Extract)
....................................
USARV ~egulation 612-1, 8. January 1968 .........
USARV Regulation 870-2, 11 March 1968 ..........
I11 MAF, Force Order 1560.1AI 11 September
1967 (Extract) ...............................
111 MAF, For~e~Order 3040.3, 13 December
1966.........................................
I11 MAF, Force Order PO 3121.5, 10 November
1967, SOP for Ground and Air Operations ......
I11 MAF, Force Order 03330.1, Conduct of Ar-
tillery/Mortar and Naval Gunfire. ............
I11 MAF, Force Order 3460.3, Treatment of
Captured Personnel....... ....................
I11 MAF, Force Order 3461.24, Processing,
Exploiting, Evacuating and Accounting
for Prisoners of War.........................
--
111 MAF, Force Order 5080.5, Property Dam-
age and Death or Personal Injury to Viet-
namese Civilians .............................
Exhibit
No.
.
Title Page
I11 MAF, ICCI 5370.1AI Respect for the
Law, Property, Institutions, Traditions
and Customs of the Republic of Vietnam .......
111 MAF, Spot/Serious Incident Reports Letter..
Message from CG to all Commanding Officers
Jan 68, Subj: New Year Resolutions ..........
TF Oregon, Regulation 335-6, 21 March 1967,
Report of Serious Crimes or Incidents ........
Americal Regulation 335-8, 28 January 1968,
Combat ~ction Reports ........................
Americal ~ivision Operations Order 20-67,
December 1967 ................................
Arnerical Division Operations Order 2-68, 23
January 1968, with Frag Orders 1 and 2
(Extract)....................................
Message from CG, Arnerical Division to CO, llth
Bde, Subj: Frag Order 24-68, Disbanding TF
Barker 0705102, April 1968 ...................
llth Brigade Operations Order 1-68, 0412001
February 1968 ................................
llth Infantry Brigade, Operation Plan 7-68,
March 1968........... ........................
MACV Directive 20-4, 18 May 1968, with Change
1, 7 October 1967..
..........................
MACV Directive 27-5, 2 November 1967, Legal
Services, War Crimes and Other Prohibited
Acts.........................................
MACV Directive 381-46, 27 December 1967, Mili-
tary Intelligence, Combined Screening of De-
tainees......................................
MACV Directive 525-9, 10 April 1967.,, with
Change 1.. ...................................
MACV Directive 612-1, 16 March 1968, Personnel
Processing, Processing of New Arrivals.......
x i i i
Exhibit
No. Title Page
MACVDirective20-5,15March1968,Inspections
andInvestigations,PrisonersofWar- Deter-
minationofEligibility......................
MACVDirective190-3,MilitaryPolice- Enemy
PrisonersofWar(PW's) ......................
MACVCombinedCampaignPlan(Extract) ......,...
MACVGuideforCommandersinRVN (Extract) .....
MACVDF,13March1967,GuideLetterstoFWMAF
Commanders...................................
SummaryofRemarksbyCOMUSMACV,28August
1966.........................................
USARVMessage- GenevaConventions,3Novem-
ber1967...... ...............................
USARVMessage- GenevaandHagueConventions
Training,22June1968.......................
MessagefromCGTFOregontoCGI11MAF,Subj:
OperationalControl(U),Cite522,2216002
April1967...................................
FragOrder8-68,24March1968,11thBrigade...
ICorps/IIIMAF CombinedCampaignPlan1-68for
1968(Extracts)..............................
MACVPlanningDirectiveNumber9-67,Planning
GuidanceforSeniorCommandersforthePer-
iod1November1967- 30April1968 (U)dated
29October1967,pages1-8(Extracts)........
ActivityGuidelinesforCorpsTacticalZones
withDirectivefromGENVien (letter15Feb
I11MAFForceOrder5820.1,"WarCrimesInvest-
igation";....................................
America1Letter,24March1968,Subj: "Safe-
guardingofNoncombatants" ...................
COMUSMACVMessage,2115312February1968to
'VMAC,Subj: MistreatmentofDetaineesand
PW(U) .......................................
xiv
Exhibit
No.
Title Page
HQ, llth Inf Bde, XIOP, 1 November 1967,
Subj: Preparation for Overseas Move-
ment (POM) (Letter). .........................
HQ, Americal Division, AVDF-GC, 7 December
1967, Subj: Phased Schedule of llth
......................... Inf Bde (u) (Letter)
Training Memorandum 350-2, HQ, llth Inf
Bde (Record Copy, Undated) (Training of
llth Bde in RVN on arrival) ..................
llth Inf Bde Tactical SOP (Extracts)
...........
Americal Division Artillery Field SOP, 1 Dec-
ember 1967 (Extract) .........................
Gunnery Checklist, Americal Division, 5 Feb-
ruary 1968. ..................................
Artillery Items for Command Emphasis, Ameri-
cal Division Artillery, 12 October 1967.
.....
America1 Division Message, AVDF-GC 6660, 2
.............. December 1967, Subj: Reporting
Investigation of Artillery Incidents, TF
Oregon, 7 May 1967 ...........................
TF Oregon Message, AVDF-AT2859, July 1967,
Subj:. Reporting and Investigation of Er-
ratic Artillery Rounds .......................
Back Channel Message, Knowles to Matheson,
Linnell, Wear and Young, July 1967, Subj:
Double-Check Procedure for Artillery Units
( U) .........................+................
TF Oregon Message AVDF-AT1483, May 1967, Subj:
Orientation and Training in Artillery Tech-
niques.......................................
6th Bn, llth Arty Combat SOP, 18 November
1967 (Extracts) ..............................
Message from COMUSMACV, Subj: Guidance for
Commanders in Vietnam, December 1967.... .....
MACV Individual Replacement Packet, with MFR,
20 January 1970 (Extract) ....................
Exhibit
No. Title Page
M-97 MessagefromCG,LSARVtoCG,America1Divi-
., sion,Subj: Reorganization,9September
1968............ .............................. 319
M-105 TFOregonFieldSOP,21March1967(Extracts) ... *559
M-106 AmericalDivisionCombatSOP,15April1968
(Extracts).................................... *641
M-112 America1DivisionInformationOfficeSOP,
7April1968 (Extract)
........................
*631
ARMYRE~ULATION
HEADQUARTERS
DEPARTMENTOFTHEARMY
No. 15-6
WASHIN~TON, D.C., fd AUf,W8t 1966
BOARDS, COMMISSIONS, AND COMMITTEES
PROCEDURE FOR INVESTIGATING OFFICERS AND BOARDS OF OFFICERS
CONDUCTINGINVESTIGATIONS
Bmcmo~I. GENERAL I'aragrapll Page
Appointment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3
Swearing of an investigating officer or member of board of
of f i cers - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Challenge of aninvestigating officer or member of boards of
officers;membershipof board-. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Duties and functions of investigating officer or recorder or
junior memberof board-. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Reporter;clericalassistance--- - - ---------- - -------------
Individualentitled t ohavewunscl-- - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
11. CONDUCTOFINVESTIGATION
Genernl - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - . . - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Rulesof evidence- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Individualunderinvqtigationwillbepresenta t opensessions-
Witnesses,t obesworn. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Testimonyof witnesses---------------------------------
Prejudicial allegations-- - - - - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - - - - - -
Pecuninry responsibility---- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --- - - - - - - - - -
Informalevidence-- ---------- -------- - ------- - -------- -
Writtenbri ef------------------------------------------
Suggestedprocedure-------------------. . ---. . ------------
111. FINDINGS
General - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - : - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Evi denti arybasi s--------------------------------------
For m- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
General -----------------------------------------------
Minorityreport- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
V. REPORTOFPROCEEDINGS
General - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Copiesof report s---------------------------------------
APPENDIX.SUGGESTED PROCEDURE FOR INVESTIGATING
OFFICERSAND BOARDSOFOFFICERS ------------
SectionI. GENERAL
1. Scope. Investigating officers and boards of toinvestigateacomplaintunderUCMJ,Art.138).
officers(whichmayconsistof onlyoneofficer)are I ncase of conflictbetween thisregulation and n
appointed by superior authority, usunlly under pertinent specific regulation, however, the latter
an Army regulation pertaining specificallyto the will govern. Thisregulation isnot applicable to
the matter requiring investigation. Generally, investigation of court-martial charges. See Uni-
this regulation is supplemental to such specific form Code of Military Justice, h t d c 32, and
re,gulations and,inaddition,willgovernin thein- Man& for Courts-Martial, United States, 1.352,
vestigation of matters not covered in specific chapterMI. Thepromulgationof thisregulation
regulations (e.g., whenever anofficeris appointed shallnotinvalidateanyinvestigationorproceeding
*Thisregulation supersedesAR 15-6. 3November 1960, includingC 1.27 October 1961.
1:
EXHI BI T D-2
init,intedprior tothereceipt of thisregulation and
conducted in conformity with the existing
re.gulntion.
2. Function. The primary purpose of any
investigation,whetherconductedbyaninvestigat-
ingofficerorbyaboard of officers,istoascertain
facts and to report them to the appointing au-
thority as the basis for some appropriate action
byhim. I t isthedutyof anyinvestigating officer
or board to make a complete andimpartialpres-
entation of the evidence on both sides, and to
makesuchfindingsandrecommendationsasmay
be appropriate and warranted by the facts. No
person shall attempt to coerce, or by unlawful
means influence, the actions of an investigating
officer or board of officers in anymatterwhatso-
everortheactionof anysuperiorauthorityacting
upon the matter. Theappointing authoritywill
take whatever action he deems necessary to cor-
rect errors or irregularities in the proceedings of
aninvestigatingofficerorboardof officers. How-
ever,errorsorirregularitieswhichdonotadversely
affect the substantial rights of the individual(s)
concernedorof theGovernmentwillnotbedeemed
torenderinvalidtheproceedings,oranyaction of
theappointing authority,based thereon.
3. Appointment. a. Orders. Orders appoint-
ing an investigating officer or a board of officers
will specify clearly the matter tobeinvestigated
andthescopeof thefindingsrequired. If theap-
pointment is madeunder a specificArmy reeds-
tion, theregulationshouldbe cited. If madefor
apurpose notcovered specificallybyregulations,
thepurposeshouldbestatedinsufficientdetailto
apprisetheinvestigatingofficerorboardof officers
thereof. When circumstancas warrant, the in-
vestigation maybeordered orally to enablei t to
be commenced without delay. Such oral orden
willbeconfirmedinwriting.
b. Investigating oficers. Onlycommissionedof-
ficers will be appointed as investigating officers,
unless the specific statute or regulation under
which theappointment is made authorizes other-
wise. An investigating officer appointed to in-
vestigate the conduct, status, efficiency, fitness,
character,pecuniaryliability, orrightsof another
willbeseniorinranktotheperson underinvesti-
gation,exceptwheresuchisimpracticablebecause
of military exigencies (but not because of mere
inconvenience). If an investigating officer dis-
covers duringthecourse of aninvestigation that
the completion thereof requires investigating the
conduct, status, efficiency, fitness, character,
pecuniaryliability,orrightsof anofficersenior to
him, he will report this fact to the appointing
authority, who will replace him with an officer
seniortotheofficerunderinvestigation,orappoint
another officer,senior totheofficerunder investi-
gation, toconduct aseparateinvestigation of the
matterspertaining tothatofficer.
c. Boards of ojkers.
(1) Boards will consist of commissioned
officers unless otherwise prescribed by
specific statutes or regulations. The
voting members of a board shall be
senior in rank to all persons under in-
vestigation exceptwhere suchis irnprac-
ticable because of military exigencies
(butnotbecauseof mereinconvenience).
Appointing authorities may request as-
sistance from higher headquarters to
securesufficientpersonnel seniorin rank
to all persons under investigation to
carry out the intent of the previous
sentence. Unless otherwise designated
in theappointing order, theseniormern-
ber present is president of the board.
A commissioned or warrant officer may
be designated as recorder by the orders
appointing theboard, andshallbewith-
outvote. Wherearecorderisnotdesig-
nated in the appointing orders, the
junior member of the board shall act as
recorder, andshallhaveavote.
(2) A majority of the appointed members of
a board will constitute a quorum and
mustbepresentat allitssessions. How-
ever, where a statute or regulation
specifies the number (or a minimum
number) of members of which a board
will be comprised, the required number
(or minimum number) will be present
at all sessions. A large number of of-
ficers will not be appointed to a board
of officers with the intention .of using
such of them (but less than a majority
of such number) asare available at the
time of theboard's meeting. This does
not preclude designation in theappoinb
ing order of one or more "alternata
members," provided theappointingorder
specifies that an alternate member may
serveon theboard onlyin theabsenceor
unavailability of an appointed member,
and the order in which alternate mem-
bers are to be called for service by the
president of the board. I n any board
proceedings,amemberwhohasnotbeen
presept at a prior aeaaion of the board
(such as an absent or newly appointed
member, or an alternatemember called
to serve as a member) may participate
thereafter if that member has read or
had read to him the record of the pro-
ceedingsheld duringhisabsenceorprior
tohisparticipation.
(3) When a board of officers is convened to
investigate amember of a Reservecom-
ponentnotonactivedutyorexamineam
applicant for appointment in a Reserve
component, one member of the board
will be a Regular Army officer and the
remainder willbe Reserve officersof the
Army in an active reserve status or on
active duty. When the appointing au-
thoritydetermines thata Regular Army
officer is not available, an officer of a
Reservecomponent,onactiveduty,may
be substituted for the Regular Army
officer.
(4) When a board is convened to consider
technical or professional qualifications
of a member, or for appointment in a
Reserve component, the active duty
member of the board will be of the
branch concerned if practicable. A
Reserve component officernot on active
duty, of the branch concerned, may be
substitutedwhen i t hasbeendetermined
that an officer on active duty is not
available. When practicable, thismem-
berwill possessthe qualificationssought
in the individual to be examined. For
example, when an optometrist of the
Medical Service Corps appears before
the board, the Medical Service Corps
member thereof should, if reasonably
available,be an optometrist. When the
branch cannot be determined prior to
appearance of the applicant before the
board, an officer with qualifications
comparable to those in which the in-
dividual is to be examined, regardless
of branch, may be detailed to theboard
and appropriate explanation included
aspart of the board proceedings.
(5) A member of the board serving only in
an advisory capacity may be junior
to any person being considered by the
board.
4. Swearing of an investigating ol3cer or
member of board of officers. Unless the in-
vestigating officer or the board of officers is
required to be sworn by the specific statute or
regulation under which appointed,i t isnotneces-
saryfortheinvestigatingofficerorthemembersof
theboard of officers tobe sworn.
5. Challenge of an investigating officer or
member of boards of officers; membership of
board. Investigating officers nand members of
boards of officers are not subject to peremptory
challenge. The privilege of challenge for cause
runsthroughtheentireadministrativeandpunitive
system of the Army; where i t appears clearly
t hat achallengedinvestigatingofficeroramember
of a board of officers cannot impartially partici-
pateintheinvestigation,actionwillbetakenonthe
challengebytheappointingauthorityorthepresi-
dent,asappropriate. Thepresidentortheseniorun-
challenged member will rule on challengesmade
whiletheboardisinsession. If thechallengeof a
member of a board of officers is sustained, the
remaining members will constitute the board,
except that whenever, through such challenge,
the number of members is reduced below the
minimum required, additional members will be
detailed by the appointing authority.
6. Duties andfunctionsof investigating officer
orrecorderorjunior memberofboard. a.Prior t o
hearing.
(1) I n every case in which the conduct,
status,efficiency,character,fitness,pecu-
niaryliability,orrightsof anyindividual
is to be investigated, such person will
be afforded a hearing, and the investi-
gating officer or the recorder or junior
member of the board of officers if no
recorder is designated (acting under the
supervision of the president) will, a t a
reasonabletimeinadvanceof thehearing,
deliver or dispatch by messenger or
mail to the individual concerned, a
written communication stating-
(a) Thedate,hour, andesactplaceof con-
vening.
(b) Thespecificmatter to be investigated.
(c) The names of witnesses whose testi-
monyisexpectedto beused.
(d) That the investigating officer, or the
recorder, or the junior member of the
boardwill endeavor toarrangefor the
presence of any available witnesses
desired by the individual concerned
upon timely written request therefor.
A copy of this communication, bearing
thecertificate of theinvestigatingofficer
or therecorder or the junior member of
theboard thati t isntruecopy andthat
theoriginalwasdelivered ordispatched,
will be read in evidence and the record
will nfirmatively showthis'action.
(2) Hewillgivetimelyoralorwrittennotice
to allconcerned (including,when appro-
priate,membersof theboard)of thedate,
hour, andexactplace of convening.
(3) Hewillnotifyandarrangetohavepresent
at the hearing witnesses who are to
testify in person (including witnesses
desiredbytheindividualconcerned)and
a reporter and interpreter if required.
(4) He will obtain a suibble room for the
hearing; see that i t is in order; procure
requisite stationery and other supplies;
and takesuch otheraction aa will make
possible a prompt, full, and systematic
presentation of thecase.
(5) Hewill insurethat allrecords and docu-
ments referred with the cnse are fur-
nished,whenappropriate,tothemembers
of the board and, subject to security
requirements, to anynamed respondent
or his counsel.
6 . Duringhearing.
(1)The recorder or junior mcmber of the
boardwillexecuteallordersof theboard.
Theinvestigating officer or the recorder
orjunior member of theboard willkeep
orsuperintendthekeepingof therequired
record of proceedings (sec Vj.
(2) At the initial session, the investigating
officeror therecorder orjunior member
of the board will read the appointing
order. At thebeginningof eachsession,
the investigating officer or the recorder
or junior member of the board will
notefortherecordthepresenceorabsence
of members of theboard, theindividual
concerned, and his counsel, if any.
(3) The investigating officer, or when ap-
propriate therecorder orjunior member
of the board, under the direction and
. supervision of the president, will so
conduct the presentation of evidence
and examination of witnesses (including
those of the individual concerned if he
is not represented by counsel at the
investigation) as to make as complete
and impartial a presentation of the
evidence on both sides as is possible.
c. After haring. The investigating officer or
recorder or junior member of the board will
prepare or superintend the preparation o f the
report of theproceedingsasprescribed in section
v.
7. Reporter; clerical assistance. Theappoint-
ing authority will make available the necessary
clerical assistance for investigating officers and
boards of officers. An investigating officer is
not authorized to employ a civilian contract
reporter. A board of officers may only employ
a civilian contract reporter if such a reporter is
authorized under' the regulations pursuant to
which the board is convened. I n no event will
a civilian contract reporter be employed if an
enlisted or Government civilian employee r e
porterisavailable.
8. Individual entitled to have counsel. An in-
dividual under investigation is entitled to have
counsel, either military or civilian, and any mili-
tary person requested by the individual under
investigation will be appointed as counsel if
reasonably available. A decision by the appoint-
ing authority as to availability is final. If the
requested military counsel is unavailable, other
military counsel will be provided, if requested.
Unless the specific statute or regulation under
which theinvestigating officeror board of officers
is appointed so provides, an individual under
investigation is not entitled as a matter of right
to appointed counsel who is legally qualified.
Government civilian employees may voluntarily
act as counsel for another civilian employee or
military member, if such services are,rendered
gratuitously, while on leave, or subsequent to
normal hours of employment,anddo not conflict sonnel under investip.;tion will, to the extent
withregular duties. See18U.S.C. 205. Civilian permitted by security classification,be permitted
counsel will not be provided a t Government to have their civilian counsel present at all open
expense in any case. Civilian or military per- sessions.
Section 11. CONDUCT OF INVESTIGATION
9. General. a. Obtaining evidence.
(1) The investigation will be conducted so
thatwhenever possiblethehighest qual-
ity of evidence obtainable and available
will beconsidered,e.g.-
(a) Stipulations.
(b) Viewsandinspections.
(c) Sworn testimony by witnesses appear-
ing before the investigating officer or
theboard.
(d) Depositions taken upon due notice to
and, if feasible, in the presence of all
parties.
(e) =davits.
(j)Original or properly identified copies
of records anddocuments.
(g) Otherwritings and exhibits.
(2) Usually, an investigation resolves itself
into an inquiry concerning but a few
essential facts. These facts should be
established by substantial evidence and
.
notbyrumor (para20).
(3) Unless stipulated to by all parties, no
evidence concerning the results, taking,
orrefusalof polygraph(liedetector)tests
will bereceivedinevidenceorconsidered
by an investigating officer or board of
officers.
b. Dates,places, persons,and events. Bywhat-
ever method evidence is obtained, investigating
officers and boards are required to fix dates,
places, persons, and events definitely and accu-
rately to the best of their ability. The investi-
gating officer or board should develop complete
answerstothequestions: Whatoccurred? When
did i t occur? Wheredid i t occur? How did i t
occur? Who were involved (and the extent of
their involvement)? If property is involved, an
exactdescription thereof anditsvalue, should be
included in the record. Diagrams and photos
should be used when necessary. Exact descrip-
tionsof whatoccurred,includingboth themethod
and the reason for the occurrence, should be
included. Reading of the Report of Proceedings
by Investigating Officer (Board of Officers) (DA
Form 1574) by the investignting officer or the
board before commencing tho investigntion or
hearingwillservetoeliminateerrors.
10. Rules of evidence. Asproceedingsutilizing
thisregulation areadministrativeandnotjudicial
in nature, an investigating officer or board of
officersisnotbound by therulesof evidence pre-
scribed for trials b y courts-martial or for court
proceedings generally. Accordingly, subjcct to
the provisions of paragraph 9, there will be ad-
mitted in evidence, without regard to technical
rules of admissibility, any oral or written matter
(includinghearsay) whichin theminds of renson-
able men is relevant and material. All evidence
shallbeaccordedsuchweightns iswarrantedunder
thecircumstances. All questionsof admissibility
willberuleduponinopensessionbythepresident,
subjecttoobjection by anymember of theboard,
inwhichcasethodeterminationwillbebymajority
vote of the members present. Seeparagraph 20
astoevidentiarybasis forfindings.
11. Individual under investigation will be pres-
ent at open sessions. An individual whose con-
duct, efficiency, fitness, or pecuniary liability is
under investigation and who has been notified
pursuant to paragraph 6 will, except for good
causeshown,bepermittedtobepresentat allopen
sessions and to cross-examine adverse witnesses.
However, whether or not he is present at all
sessions,before thohearing isconcluded theindi-
vidualconcernedshouldbegivenfull opportunity
by some appropriate method to rebut adverse
allegations. The individual concerned, if sus-
pected of an offense punishable by court-martial,
shallnotbeinterrogatedorrequested tomakeany
statement without first being informed of the
nature of the offense of which ho is suspected,
that he does not have to make any statement
regardingtheoffenseof whichheissuspected,and
thatanystatementmadebyhim maybe used as
evidence against him in a trial by court-martial.
SeeUniform ebde of Military Justice, Artkle91(b) .
12. Witnesses to be sworn. Investigating offi-
cers and the president or the recorder of boaxds
of officershave power to administer oaths (see
UCIMJ, Art. 136).
Any person appearing before
an investigating officer or a board as a witness
should be sworn. I n the absence of any law or
regulation prescribing the form of oath to be
taken by a witness, the following oath will be
administered :
170u swear (or asrm) that the evidence you shaU
give i n Ihe case now in hearing shad be the truth,
the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. ' So
help you God.
13. Testimony of witnesses. a. Rights of wit-
nesses. No witness shall be compelled to incrimi-
nnte himself or to answer any question the answer
to which might tend to incriminate him, or to
make a statement or produce evidence if the s t at e
ment or evidence is not material to the issue and
might tend to degrade him (see UCMJ, Art. 31),
or, in the case of witnesses not subject to the
UCMJ, which would deprive him of his rights
under the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution
of the United States. However, the witness must
state specifically that refusal to answer a question
is based upon the immunity afforded by the
Uniform Code of Military Justice, Article 31, or
the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the
United States. It is the proper province of the
investigating officer or board, in each case, to
decide whether the stated reason is well taken.
Whenever i t appears appropriate and advisable
to do so, the rights of a witness wiU be explained
to him. The procedure prescribed by the Manual
for Courts-Martial, United States, 1951, paragraph
150, may be utilized in such cases.
b. Personal appearance of witnesses. Personal
appearance of a witness should always be obtained
whenever possible in preference to use of his depo-
sition, affidavit, or written statements. However,
in the event a material witness resides or is on
duty at a substantial distance from the installation
at which the hearing is conducted, his evidence
may be obtained by deposition, affidavit, or
written statement. DA Form 19-24 (statement)
should, if available, be used for written statements
of witnesses. The commander having jurisdiction
over the locality in which such a witness is residing
or is found may be requested to have a deposition
or asdavi t taken. Where personal appearance is
otherwise not feasible, evidence should be obtained
by deposition or &davit. If it is impracticable
to obtain evidence by either method, it may be
secured by compondence between the investi-
gating officer or board and the witncss. If evi-
dence is secured by affidavits or written statements
(including correspondence), the individual con-
cerned should be given reasonable notice thereof
and afforded an opportunity to meet adverse al l e
gations. If depositions are taken, see hianadfor
Courts-Martial, United States, 1951, paragraph 117,
and appendix 18, for guidance. The use of oral
or written stipulations in appropriate cases is also
permissible. If stipulations are used, see M a n d
for Courts-Martial, United States, 1961, paragraph
154b, for guidance.
14. Prejudicial allegations. When matters prej -
udicial to the conduct, status, efficiency, fitness,
character, or rights of an individual arise and
become an issue during the course of the investi-
gation, the investigating officer or board s h ~ l l
make the individual concerned a party, and make
hown to him in writing, the precise n a k e of
the prejudicial allegations. Additionally, he will
be entitled to counsel as provided in paragraph I;,
permitted to examine such allegations or evidence,
and afforded an opportunity to answer such
allegations by the testimony of any witness or
witnesses he may desire heard in his own behalf,
and by written statements, sworn to i f practicable,
of himself and others he may desire to submit.
Failure to afford any of the above rights will be
fully explained in the record of proceedings.
If the person concerned is unavailable for good
cause, such as absence from the command, the
above requirements may be met by furnishing
him a copy of the record of preceedings together
with advice as to his right to present evidence.
Subject to the rights of a witness as set forth in
paragraph 13, the individual concerned may be
called by the investigating officer or board and
required to testify under oath upon any point
involved concerning which he might be a material
witness.
15. Pecuniary responsibility. The requirements
in paragraph 14 also will be observed before
arriving at a finding which h e s pecuniary respon-
sibility on any individual who has not been fully
apprised of the matter and afforded an opportunity
to present his side of the case. Every report of
proceedings which recommends that any individual
be held pecuniarily responsible for loss of funds or
lost, damaged, or destroyed property will contain
a positive statement, immediately following the
&dings, that each individual found pecuniarily
responsible hns been afforded an opportunity to
examine all evidence considered by the investi-
gating officer or board and to present evidence,
including affidavits of other parties, in his own
behalf. If i t is impossible or impracticable to
afford this opportunity to individuals held pe-
cuniarily responsible, the report of proceedings
will contain a full explanation as to why' i t is
impossible or impracticable to do so.
16. Informal evidence. During hearings, the
investigating officer or board should refrain from
unnecessary informal conversations or comment
upon subjects under investigation, and witnesses
should not be allowed to make statements "off
the record." It should be understood that the
primary mission of the investigating officer or
board is to present in the written record all
pertinent facts and circumstances supported by
the recorded evidence. Findings and recommen-
dations must be supported by the facts contained
in the record and not based upon personal
knowledge not of record in the report of
-
proceedings.
17. Written brief. The individual concerned
or his counsel may submit a mitten brief covering
the whole or any portion or phase of the case
under investigation and, except for good cause
shown, a reasonable time will be afforded him in
which to submit it. To assist in preparation of
this brief, the individual concerned or his counsel
will, upon request and subject to security require-
ments, be allowed to examine the report of proceed-
ings prior to nction by the convening authority.
18. Suggested procedure. The appendix con-
tains a suggested procedure for investigating
officers and boards of officers in cases in which tho
conduct, status, efficiency, fitness, character,
rights, or pecuniary liability of persons is being
investigated and in which a hearing is considered
appropriate, if specific procedure is not prescribed
by other regulations. So much of this procedure
as is applicable may be used in cases where there
appears to be no individual under investigation
in the foregoing respects or where no hearing is
held. Use of, the suggested procedure is not
mandatory. However, i t may be used as a guide
in the presentation of evidence by investigating
officers and boards of officers in accordance with
this regulation.
Section In. FINDINGS
19. General. A finding, in the sense that i t is
used in proceedings under this regulation, is cr
clear and concise statement of a fact evidenced
in the record, or is a conclusion of the investigating
officer or board which can be readily deduced from
the evidence in the record.
20. Evidentiary basis. Each finding must be
supported by substantial evidence, which is
defined as such evidence as a reasonable mind can
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
21. Form. Where the regulation under which
an investigating officer or board of officers functions
specifically provide the form of findings, such
form will be followed. I n the absence of specific
provisions, the findings will be stated in such
form as to give a coherent and clenr recitnl of the
facts as established by the evidence and the con-
clusions thereon of the investigating officer or
board. If several findings are required, coherence
and clarity will best be achieved by presenting
separately the complete facts as to each item.
If but one finding is required, the best exposition
of facts ordinarily will be obtained by arranging
their presentation in chronological order.
Section IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
22. General. a. I n nppropriate cases, whether
or not prescribed by the regulation under which
an investigating officer or board is functioning,
recommendations should be made, even if of a
negative nature, as a statement that no
further action is considered necessary.
Recorn-
mendations must be appropriate to and warranted
by the findings and, in general, should cover the
pecuniary, disciplinary, and corrective phnses of
the matter under investigation.
b. Investigating officers or boards must make
their recommendations according to the best of
their understanding of the rules and regulations
for the government of the Army, of Army ~olicies,
and of the customs of the service, guided by their
concept of justice both to the Government and to report may be submitted, either as to the findings
the individunl concerned. or to the recomniendations, or to both. The
23. Minority report. I n case of a disagreement reasons for the minority report must be stated
between members of a board of officers, a minority clearly.
Section V. REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS
24. General. The report of the proceedings of
investigating officer or a board of officers will
be
as prescribed in the regulation under
which appointed. When the regulation does not
provide the form or character of the report, the
report will be prepared on DA Form 1574 (Report
of Proceedings by Investigating Officer (Board of
Officers)). Also, the following instructions are
generally applicable:
a. The record will be clenr and legible.
6 . Erasures, interlineations, and other changes
will be initialed by the investigating officer or by
the recorder or another member of the board of
officers.
c. Additional pages will be numbered at the
bottom, and margins of 2% inches will be left at
the top, and 1 inch at the bottom and left side of
each page.
d. Where testimony is not recorded verbatim,
i t should be summarized on DA Form 19-24
(statement) and signed by the witness. If the
witness is unavailable or refuses to sign, such
should be noted over the signature of the investi-
gating officer, recorder, or junior board member.
Unless the specific regulation governing the
proceedings provides otherwise, .the report of
proceedings of an investigating officer will be
authenticated by his signature, and board reports
will be authenticated by the signature of all the
members of the board present at its deliberations
and that of the recorder. If any one of the fore-
going persons is unable to authenticate because
of death, disability, or absence, the reason will be
stated in the report.
e. Unless otherwise specified, the proceedings
will be submitted in triplicate; the duplicate and
triplicate copies, as well as the original, having
appended thereto complete copies of all testimony
and other exhibits.
25. Copies of reports. Except as prescribed in
paragraphs 14, 15, and 17, an investigating officer
or board of officers is not authorized to furnish
reports of investigation or copies thereof to anyone
other than the appointing authority or his duly
designated representative. After deletion of classi-
fied portions, one copy shall be furnished to each
individual concerned. The appointing authority
may furnish reports of investigation or copies
thereof to others whose official duties entitle them
to such; otherwise, the furnishing of copies is
governed by the provisions of AR 345-20 and
other pertinent regulations.
APPENDIX
SUGGESTED PROCEDURE FOR INVESTIGATING OFFICERS AND BOARDS OF OFFICERS
Nok. Thefollowingabbreviationsareusedinthissuggestedprocedure:
PRES: Presidentorseniormemberof aboardof officers.
10: Investigatingofficer.
RCDR: Recorderorjuniormemberof aboardof officersif norecorder
isdesignated..
RESP: Respondent, i.e., individual concerned, against whom preju-
dicialmattersaxeallegedorariseandbecomeanissue.
Note. Prior to the opening hearing, the RCDIt (10)will perform the dut i a and
functioollprovidedinparagraph6a.
PRES (IO): Thishearingwillcometoorder. (RESP),thisisa boardof officers
(Investigationis)calledtodetermine- - - -,,,,,- - ,,- - - - - - - - - --.
PRES (10): (RESP),you may, if you desire,employc j q a n co~psel at your
own expensefor thishenxing. Doyou haveapchcounsel? Yau
may request military counsel of your own choice, who MU be
furnished if reasonably available, or you pmy request that the
appointingauthoritydesignatemilitrygcopnselforyou.
RESP: Yes (No).
Noh. If RESP answers "yes," t4e bearing should be adjourned and theappointing
authorityshouldberequestedt aappointcounselforRESP,preferablyoneof hisownchoos-
ing. If RESPanswers"no," theboard (10) maystillfeelobligedtoreportabsenceof counsel
to theappointingauthorityiftaeiesueaaregraveenough. If counselissupplied, aproper
entry of identification should appear here and a shqwing of any adjournments incident
thereto.
Note. During the heatlng, the RCDR (10)will comply e t b the requirements of
paragraph 6b.
Note. A commissioned or warrant officer appointed aa recorder may not serve M
recorder andat theeametimesitasavotingmemberof a board of o5cera.
Note. A reporterandaninterpreter, if wed, willbesworn.
RCDR (10): Thereporterwill besworn.
RCDR (10): Youswear(or&inn) thatyouwillfaithfullyperforni theduties
of reporter tothisboard. Sohelpyou God.
REPORTER: Ido.
RCDR (IO): Theinterpreterwill besworn.
RCDR 00) : Youswear (or&rm) thatyouwill faithfullyperform theduties
of interpreter in thecasenowin hearing. Sohelp you God.
INTERPRETER: Ido.
RCDR (10): The board is appointed (This investigation is directed) by
paragraph ----, Special OrdersYo. - - - - - - --,Headquarters,
..-------------------dated ---------, 19--. (The order is
thenread aloudbytheRCDR (IO).)
RCDR: Thefollowingmembersof theboard mepresent:
PRESENT: --------------,-----
ABSENT: -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - -
No&. A majorityof themembers of a boardof o5ceraconstituteaquorumandmust
be present a t all sessions, except that a member who was pmvioualy absent, or whohad
been newly appointed to a board, may participate in the proceedinga if thenew member
orabsentmemberhasread orhadread to him suoh record of the proeeedinga held during
hisabsenceorprior tohisparticipation.
Note. Reasons or authority for absenceshould be stated if known. All personnelof
. ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
theboard, includingtherecorder and counsel, if any,shouldbe accounted foraspresent or
absent a t each session.
RCDR: Request theappointingordertobeattachedtotheseproceedings
and marked "Exhibit A."
PRES(10): The appointing order will be attached totheboard proceedings
and marked a s requested.
.
RCDR (10):Thegeneral natureof thehearingis asfollows:
_____-_____-_______-------------------------------------------------------------.
Note. RCDR (10) advises the RESP (and t he board members) of t henatureof t he
hearing underconsideration.
PRES(10): Does the respondent desire to challenge any member
of the board (theinvestigating officer)for cause?
RESP(COUNSEL): No. (The respondent challenges - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - for
cause on the ground
Note. If challenge for cause is made by RESP, theboard or appointingauthority, as
appropriate, will consider t he challenge. If a challenge is sustained and t he remaining
membersof theboard areless thant heminimum required bylaworregulations, theboard
should recess until addition4 members are detailed.
Note. Recorder swearsboard, if required. Presidentthenswearsrecorder, if required.
RCDR: Theboardwillbesworn.
Note. All persons int heroomstandupwhile theoathisadministeredt ot heboardand
to the reco der. Each board member raises his right hand as his name is called by the
recorder in administering t he following oath:
RCDR: You,Colonel--------_----, etc. LieutenantColonel-------------,
No&. When the recorder haa called all the members of the board by name, he
c o n t i n u e
RCDR: Do swear that you will faithfully perform all the duties incumbent
upon you as amember of this board; thatyou wiU faithfully and
impartially examine and inquire, according to the evidence, your
conscience, and the laws and regulations provided, into the matter
now before you without partiality, favor, affection, prejudice, or
hope of reward; that you will find such facts as are supported by
substantial evidence of record; that. in determination of those facts
which are in disputeor are dif3icult'of proof, you will use your pro-
fessionalknowledgeandbestjudgment andcommonsenseinweighing
the evidence, considering the probability or improbability thereof,
andwith thisinmindwillregard asestablishedfactsthosewhich are
supported by evidence deemed most worthy of belief; and that you
wiUmake such findingsandrecommendations as a h appropriate to,
warranted by, and consistent with your findings, according to the
best of your understanding of the rules andregulations for the gov-
ernment of the Amy, Department of the Army policies, and the
customsof theservice,guidedbyyourconcept of justice, bothtothe
Governmentandtoindividualsconcerned. Sohelpyou God.
EACH MEMBER OF THE BOARD: Ido.
Note. The board members lower their hands but remain standing while the oath ia
administered byt hepresidentt otherecorder.
PRES: You, ------------, do swear that you will faithfully perform the
dutiesand functions of recorder (juniormember) of this board. So
helpyouGod.
RCDR: Ido.
Nob. All personncl now resumetheir seats.
RCDR: Does any member of the board desire to be advised as to the law,
regulations, orordersconcernedin thishearing?
PRES: Noreadings aredesiredat thistime (orstatementof whatisdesired).
RCDR (10): Therecorder (investigating officer) and respondent have agreed
tostipulate - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -----.
Note. Prior t oacceptanceof t hestipulation of t hePRES(10),byquestions, should
determinet hat RESPjoins i n t he stipulation. Manualfor Courb-Martial, United States,
1961,paragraph 154b,willbeobservedsofaraspracticable.
PRES(10): Thestipulationis(not)accepted,andwillbemarked"Exhibits - -."
RCDR (10): (RESP),you were notified of this hearing on - - - - - - - - - - 19--.
Note. RCDR(10)readsa copyof theletterof notification certifiedasa truecopyand
t hat t heoriginalwasdelivered ordispatched t oRESP (para6a(l)). At thistime, RCDR
offere in evidence a copy of t he letter of notification and requests i t be attached t o the
proceedings andmarket"Exhibit --."
PRES (10): Thecopyof letterof notification willbeattached totheproceed-
ingsandmarked asrequested.
PRES (10): (RESP),youhavetherighttocross-examineallwitnessesbrought
before thishearing. I t isourdesiretoascertain thetruth of all
matters, andweshallbeglad tohelpyouquestionanywitnesses
whensuchquestioningmightshedatruelightonthefactsof the
case. Doyouunderstand yourrightof cross-examination?
RESP: Ido.
PRES (10): (Recorder), you will (Iwill) now read all the documentary
evidence to be consideredin this matter, and thestatementsof
anywitnesseswhoareunable to appearin person.
Note. Withreference touseand form of depositions, see Uniform Code of Military
Justice, Article 49, and Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 1951, appendix 18;for
principles governing t he introduction of documentary evidence, see Manual for Courb-
Martial, United Slates, 1961, paragraphs 143and 144. If i t is impracticnble toproduce a
witnesstoidentifyanunofficialpaperordocument, t heboard (10)isauthorizedt odispense
withformal proof of itsauthenticity, provided theboard (10) issatisfied t hat thepaper or
documentiswhati t purports tobe.
Note. TheRCDR(LO)presentst heevidenceandexaminesthewitnessessoast omake
ascompleteandimpartialpresentation of t heevidence onbothsidesasispossible.
RCDR (10): Thefirstwitness tobe called is-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - -.
Note. TheRCDR, underthedirectionandsupervision of t hepresident (10). presents
witnessescalledbyhimintheorderdesired. Heconductsdirectexaminationof eachwitness.
RESPorhiscounselcross-examines eachwitnessaftercompletionof thedirectexamination.
Membersof t heboard question witnesseslast, after direct andcross-examination.
Note. A witness, if in the military service, salutesthe president (10) when he enters
t heroom,thenraiseshisrighthandandthereaftert heRCDR(10)administerstheoath. A
civilian witnessenterstheroom uncovered,raiseshis right hand, andt hent heRCDR(10)
administerst heoath. SeeManualfor Courk-Martial, United States, 1961,paragraph 112.
No&. Wheneveri t appearsappropriateandadvisabletodoso, t herightsof awitnesa
undert heUniformCodeof MilitaryJustice,Article31,ort he5thAmendmentoftheConsti-
tutionof t heUnitedStates,maybeexplainedt ohim. Seealso Manwl for Courk-Marl&l,
United States, 1961,paragraph 150.
RCDR (10): You swear (or affirm) that the evidenceyou shall give in the
case now in hearing shall be the truth, the whole truth, and
nothingbutthetruth. Sohelpyou God.
WITNESS: Ido.
AR E-6
Noh. Thewitneasnowtakeshisseatinthewitnesschair.
Thefirsttwoquestionsmked
everywitneesareaskedbytheRCDR(10)whetherthewitnessbecalledbyhim(theboard)
orbytheRESP.
RCDR (10): Stateyourfullnameand (rank (grade),servicenumber,branch
of service,organizationandstation)or(occupationandresidence).
RCDR (10): Doyouknow therespondent? If so,whatishisname?
Noh.
If the witness statcs that he knows the RESP, normally he will be asked to
pointtotheRESPif heseeshimintheroom.
Note. Questionsshould be propounded todevelopthe matter under coneideration.
RCDR (10): Therecorder (investigatingofficer)hasno furtherquatiom.
RESP (COUNSEL):Therespondenthasno (further)questions.
Nols. If the REBP orow-examfnos the witness, the RCDR may conduct
redirect
examination.
RCDR: Are thereanyquestionsby theboard?
Note. Any board memberwbhing toquestion thewitnessh t securesthepermbion
of thepresident.
No&. .I f eithertherecorderortheRESPwishestoaskfurtherquestionsof thewitnese
afterhia emmination hasbeenturned overtotheboard, permimionof theboardshouldbe
secured. Suchrequestshould,ingeneral,begranted,unleaatheinterrogation iss u p f l ~ ~ ~ s
inscope.
Noh, Whenquestionsareconcluded,thePRES(10)announces-
PRES (IO): Thewitnessisexcused.
Note. Theproceeding3shouldindicatethatwitnesses, otherthan RESP, withdrew.
Nde. Unless expreesly exoueed from further attendance during the hearing, dlwit-
nesseswillremainsubjecttocallorrecalluntiltheproceedingshavebeenconcluded. When
awitnessisrecalled,theRCDR(M)remindesuchwitness,afterhehaaappeared-
RCDR (10): You areremindedthatyouarestillunderoath.
Note. Theprocedurein the,case of a wi t nwcalled by the board ia thesameas out-
linedabove.
RCDR (10): There is nothing further to offer relating to the matter under
consideration.
RESP(COUNSEL): Therespondenthasno (has) openingstatement.
Note. The RESP introduces his stipulations, witneasea, and documentary evidence,
followingtheprocedureindicated aboveforthe RCDR (10);the RCDR (10) adminiatem
theoathto allwitnessesanda s h thefirsttwoformalqueationa.
No&. Whenever it appears appropriate and advisable to do eo, the RESP may be
advised of hisrights under the Uniform Codeof Military Justice, Article31.
Note. Should the RESP be called to the stand as a witnese, the RCDR (10) will
adminietertheoathandaak thefollowingpreliminary quwtions, afterwhich theprocedure
followathatof otherwitneasea.
RCDR (IO): Stateyourname,rank (grade),servicenumber,branchof serv-
ice, organization,andstation.
RESP: --------------------------------------------------------.
RCDR (10): Areyou therespondentinthiscase?
RESP: Yes.
Note. Whenthe RESPhasconcludedhiscaaeheannounce%--
RESP(COUNSEL): Therespondentresta.
RCDR: Thereisnofurtherevidencetoofferinthishearing. Doestheboard
wish tohaveanywitnessescalledorrecalled?
PRES: Itdoes (not).
RCDR: Openingargumentiswaived.
Noh. The RCDRhas theright tomake theopeningargument, and, if anyargument
is madeonbehalf of theRESP, theclwingargument. Argumentsarenotrequired. If no
oralargumentsaremade, RESPand RCDRcontinue-
RESP(COUNSEL): Therespondentsubmitsthecasewithoutcomment.
RCDR: Therecordersubmitsthecasewithoutcomment.
PRES: Hastherecorderanythingfurthertooffer?
RESP (COUNSEL): Ihave (not).
Nolc. Mattersdevelopedduringtheproceedingswhichareprejudicial topersonsother
thanthe RESP, if not within theecopeof theinvestigation, will be reported promptly to
theappointingauthorityforsuch.actionae he maydeemappropriate. If suchmattersare
withinthescopeof theorder directingtheinvestigation, likeproceedingswill be hadae to
suchpersona.
Nob. When matters prejudicial to the character, mtanding, or emoisncy or matters
Involving pecuniary liability of the RESP are originally alleged, or arise and become an
ieaueduringthecourseof theinv-tigation, theboard (10) willmakehown tothe RESP
theprecise nature of theprejudicial allegations,andIt practicable permit him toexamine
suchallegationaorevidence,andaffordhimanopportunitytopresent hisaideof thecase.
PRES:Thehearingis adjourned.
Nok. Theconclusionof thehearingdoesnotendthedutiesof theboard (10). Itmust
then enter intoclosed-ion. (It in thenthedutyof theboard (10) toarrivea t findinge
based upon the evidence heard, and make teammendations justified by that evidence.
Thereafter,theRCDR (10)is reaponaibleforcornplhgthe report of proceedings (para24)
andsubmittingproperlyauthenticatedoopiea thereof totheappointingauthority(para 64.)
[JAG1
By Order of the Seoretary of the Army:
HAROLD K. JOHNSON,
General, Um'ted Stah% Amy,
OfEcia1: Ohief of Staff.
KENNETH G. WICKHAM,
Major General, United States Army,
Thd Adjutant General.
Dietxibution:
TobedistributedinaccordancewithDAForm 12-9 requirementsforAdministration:
- . Ad* A m : A. NQ:A. USAR: A.
~ , Q U ~ , E R S
WHITED STAIES HILITARY ASSISTBIYCE COMMAND, YIETMH
IPO Sari ~ 6 n c i 8 c o96222
PWRJXNG D m T I V B E X T R A C T S 29 October1967 -
NLMEER 9-67 ( KACCOC~ ~ )
PUNNI NG GUIDANCE FOR SENIOR COfWiN
THE PERIOD 1 NOV 67 - 30 APR 68
1. (1) -3. To prorl de planning guidance f o r t he period
1 November 1967 - 30 Apri l 1968, a period general l y oorseeponding t o
the Northealit kmeoon Saaaon. Th i s aeaaon overlap8 t he end of t he period
aorsred i n t he )ucv/~PIUF Combined Campaign Pl an f o r 1967 - 0142 and
tho beginning of the period t o be covered i n the Combined Campsign Plan
f o r 1968 - AB 145.
a. Previous.offenri ves have creat ed a ai t uat i on =h i s
conduoire t b i n i t i a t i n g an al l -out offensi ve on dl f r ont s -- pol i t i c e l ,
milituy, aooaaaio, and pryahologioal. RvR/US/FV forcres have ret ai ned
the i nf t l a t i ve , apolled enalpr at t empt s to LeWBh- '-affenaios~, t h r o w
the DM& and in t he wa t s r n highlands, f nr s t r at ed enemj-%fforte t o di sr upt
pmi f i oat i on and el eot i on a c t i vi t i e s , expanded t he er eas of secure popula-
t i on, and mule inroad8 yt ai nr t -my i nf r as t r uct ur e in aereral. key areera.
Tho est abl i shaent of a rtrow point obvt scl e system south of tho DKt m a
i ni t i at md and i r prognrring.
b. Pacification t hroughout RVN i a expsnding. Revolutionary Devel op
ment Cadre groupa and m i l i t a r g and wramilitary f or c e s i n di ract support a m
-dually, but persistently, becoming more effective.
om The war ha8 passed t he poi nt a t which losema i nf l i c t e d on
t he enemy exseed hie ourrent r epl acr mnt i nput . fir i n t e r d i c t i ~ n of t h e
enemy KCsin 8VB aad i n the extended ba t t l e f i e l d of b r t h Vietaa~land
Lwr a m harapering en- meupply effort e. Suucessive offensi ves i nt o
enemy b e an- u o rsduofw his unit mffectivenoss and morale. The
VLet Cow oapabi l i t y t o foregr, t o obt ai n r e c nr i t r and support in-country
i s dmnaming. Except d o n 8 t he Urn where t he war has developed a oon-
r s nt l onal charaat er, tho enemy i s r esor t i ng i ncmaai ngl y t o terrori rt
~ ~ t i v i t y , and hi t md- run at t acks.
. (8) 98TrCTIVE4. The RVN/US/RI operat i onal obj aot i r es fqr the
period r r m r
SPECIAL HANDLING FZEQt J ~ ' ! WTm S m m TO GROLJs'-l+
FOREIGN IJATIONAIS EXCEPT lJomBNTR mE A S A B ~ DOWXADIiD AT 3 YEAR DlTERVAIS;
AS ~ I C A ~
DECIdSSIFZED AF3m 12 YEARS
IN PARAGRAT% 6 ONLY BY AUlNORI'l'Y
OF CCHUWl CV DAI%
29 OCT 67.
COPT OF U8 COP= PAGE 1 OF U PAGE
A m Contml No. 001380
planning di recti m supe;~qsApaHACV F'lann* Directive 5-67 (s),3 May
e bEXHIBIT D-53 ,
d i p a g e s 1- Bm? TT' TTE- r a de d)
1
-
'i
-
Re g r a d e d C ONF I DE NT I A~ , , 7 Mar 7 0
L e t t e r , Office I G , HQ USMACV '
-
T-\
- --a
YACV Planniw Dlr 9-67
-.
=-\-
a. Incmare pol i t i cnl , military, economic, and psycholau5cal
pressures on t he enemy i n RVI and, t o t he ext ent authorized, i n contigqous
count ri es and waters.
b. Sxpcind and ~ c c e l e r a t e ' t i ~ e paci fi cat i on pro4pua with emphsi s
on i m; roved t e r r i t or i nl secur i t y, increased n i l i t ~ r y dperatios agal nst
enemy uni t s o r bnees t hreat eni ng pacification pr i or i t y areas, ~nt e ns i f i e d
act i on @.inst eneuy i nf r ar t r uct ur e , tmd more sel ect i ve md eff ect l ve
population and resources control.
c. Increme employmect and improve effect i veness of HVB forceo
vi t k empnasie on W and PP elementa.
d. Invade enemy base are-, devtroy or capture emmy mat eri al s
and f a c i l i t i e s , and defeat enemy organized uni t e.
e. I nt er di ct enemy l i nee of comr.~unicatior, both i n end l e a di w
i nt o HVN.
f . Open, aecure , and use addi t i onal lmd EU, ~water l i nes of
comr~unication i n hVN. %'he Combined Zempaic;n Plnn 1966,,0'143, w i l l
contain comulete listing of a l l the pr i or i t y IL)C f or thc: u~t i reyear;
tr.ose l i s t e d herein a r e i n coneonance with t hat listing but include only
those t h a t ehauld recei ve pr i or i t y at t ent i on within tk&i time frame of
t hi s plan. Those not included herei n w i l l receive at t ent i on during t he
remainder of 1968..
a. As t he conteinment forces prevent major in&ursiona of t he
enemy from out-of-country eanct uari es t he pr i or i t y f or offensi ve operations
w i l l s hi f t , with the weather pat t ern chan(see, t o the eouthern portion8 of
11 Cl'L, all of 111.CTZ, and IV CLZ. a s er i es of uffensivee w i t 1 be con-
aucted i n sel ect ed mesa. The pr i or i t y f or t he CVN p a c i f i c a t i ~n ' Frogrun
behind 'the prot ect i ve shield of the US/FW/ARW forces w i l l be 111 CTZ/
IV CTZ, 11. CTZ anJ I C'IZ i n t ha t or der . Economy of forces and mh*,
f l e xi bi l i t y i n f o e s al1.ocation between find vi t ki n ccrpo t hct i ci i l zonee,
coupled with i m i t ~ t e ~ c s a balanced responsive logistics supDort sgetem, of
i s required.
. .
. -
b. Yhe over al l st r at egy w i l l conttiin t hsee brtsic fecet e: (1)
of feneives t o keep t he entny of f-balance; (2) per si st ent neut ral i dat i on
of enemy base areas with mthodicfll capture/deetnrction of his suppl i es
and f a c i l i t i e s ; and (j) improved and expanded t e r r i t or i a l security and
ot her paci f i cat i on prosame. nppl i cnt i on of al l t hree a s pwt e thro-vut
Wir w i l l be concurrent, a l t h o w. apportionin,; the weight of e f f or t anon@
them wi ' l l vary from area t o area. A comon r equi r ewnt i e findityr a d
fixiw t he enew. ilence, t a c t i c s w i l l s t r eee long m e pat r ol l i l r ~;i n
MACV Planning Dir 9-67
and around TAOR'8 and i n t e ~ r a t e d operst i ono hj. rrilit ar y, parami i i t a r y ,
and Nstioruil Pol i ce Forces i n populated we n s .
c. The key t o the over el l c o ~ c e ~ t is sustained t e r r i t o r i n l
s ecur i t y f o r the pncificcltion program. l'he concerted e f f o r t s of tile:
e nt i r e mi l i t ary-ci vi l . t ecun a r e requi red t o a c f ~e l e r a t e improved secur i t y
condi t i ons. A major e f f or t w i l l be &de t o implement rneaeures t o i nt egr at e
a l l aspect s of the ant i - i nf r as t r uct ur e ct~mpai~cn. Si mi l ar l y, bet t er uore
specificall,^ t ar get ed population and rce:lurces cont r oi ml i st be developed
nnd enforced. Planning, ae a mat t er of pr i or i t y, w i l l provide f or t h e
opening and securi ng of land and water LOC t o er-hr~ncei nt er-cornuni t y
cont act e, i ncrease f r i endl y presence i n the count ryei de, an3 permi t
uni nt errupt ed flow of civil/comrnercial t r a f f i c .
d. Pmeeure w i l l be n!)plied on a l l segments of t he enemy's ext er nal
and i n t e r n ~ l eupport aystem t o reduce t he combat effect l veneaa of his
or gmi zed forcea and t o keep h b on the move and away from populated areas.
Iltulti-brigade offensi ve8 w i l l be .launchedagai nst major beae are.88 not
previ ousl y invaded. Close-in enemy b ~ s ersreae will be neut r al i zed between
mador offensives v i t h pr i or i t y agai nst thoee base ar eae most eeri ousl y
af f ect i ng paci f i cat i on p r i o r i t y areas. Previously at t acked bane areRs
wi l l be reent ered t o i ns ur e continued neut r al i zat i on. However, US/FW/RVN
uni ts m a t be prepared f o r the enew t o r eact with i ncreased uee of gue r r i l l a
and t e r r o r i e t a c t i vi t i e s .
e. Improvement i n t he over al l effect l venese of Vietnameee m i t i t ar y ,--
par ami l i t ar y, and National Pol i ce Forcee (NPF) w i l l be at reeeed. ' ~' he
planned RVNAF r e or ga ni z ~t i on program is designed t o provide t he f m v o r k
f or enhanced effect i veness. Under t h i s program ARVN end w/P? uni t s w i l l
continue t o exert primtlry e f f or t on t e r r i t o r i a l s ecur i t y aepeote of
paci f i cat i on development. Concurrently, t he tempo of offenai ve operat i ons
by AWN, combined US/RVN and W/ RV~- f o r c e s w i l l increase. I)ur obj ect i ve,
by t he end of t he peri od, i e t o t ur n over t he i nt er nal s ecur i t y of eel ect ed
areas to PF, NPFF, and to am9 extent haml et sel f-defense forcea.
US, FW,
and RVN uni t s w i l l pmpi de out er s ecur i t y by offensives against enslqy min
f or ce u n i t s and i n t o enemy baae areae. It i sv i t a l t ha t during t he kVNaF
reorgnni zat i on the tewpo of ARVN operat i one not be allowed t o decel er at e
and t ha t improved i nt egr at i on be achieved r at her than i nereaeed compart-
ment al i zat i on.
a. Pl anni ng w i l l provide f o r the f o l l o w i ~t aeke c m o n t o two
o r more oorpe tactical zoneer
ACS 3 OF 11 PACES
t&
rn
MACVPlanning Mr 9-67
( 1
l nt enei f y endnc(. elernta r t ct i vl t i es deei(;?led t o ixnprove
iiVNI1E' uni t effect i veness emphanizlr:.~: i d ' ~ n r fPP' ~ i r l i t!,. Pr l mnr - con~i der et i on
w i l l begiven t o i nt egr at ed t r ai r i i m ;adoporr-tlons.
(2)
Neut ral i ze till e1ren.y bnee ar eas i n ~ y l o x i ~ l t y t o kej
population srldeconomic cent er s ani t2 vi t a l cor-unu:rication arterl es.
( 3)
3eet roy VL'/%VA ma i n force uni t s with ekipnasio on wgfesoi ve
and rapi d plxsuit.
( 4)
St r ees i nt er-headquart ers arrangements f o r operat i one
. andpursui t across t : i ct i cal boundaries.
(5)
Open, secure, r e he bi l i t a t e / u~i nt wn, ctnd ~ a k ecurium
vse of surface IAC. Pr i or i t y willt e givent o N~t l ona lKoute 1framTay
' :;lnh t o I j on~ h, Route 20 from iilghvay 1t o ~I nl a t , houte 4 from Saipon
t o k c Lieu,anr! waterways.from r i ce p r o d u c i ~ ar eas of the lrekow Uelta
t o Se i ~o n .
( 6 )
Employ long rangereconnaieaance a nd ccmbat pat r ol e day
and. n l ~ h ti n ever i n c r e a s i n ~i nt ens i t y t o l ocat e l ucr at i ve enemy formtitions
and f a c i l i t i e s , reducing t he conduct of nonproductive l erge scal e searoh
and dest roy operations.
( 7)
I nt ensi f y ef f or t s t o di s r2pt nnd reduce enerq i n f i l t r a t i o n
i nt o m d through SYNand t o prevent Onecy withdrawal i nt o out -of-count q
8mct uar i es i n ane f f or t t o void f r i endl y offensi ves.
(8)
Give i ncreased pr i or i t y t o pr ovi di ng cokt at support
resource8 fo: epeci al operat i ons.
( 9 )
Focus mexpandedARC LICi l T proerrfull on deat mct i on of
enelq baee areae with i ncreeeed emphsi s or1 wgreesive ground follow-up
of EL52et r i kes . .
(10)
h v e l o p m d implemnt act i ons tiptinst i ncreased enemy
t errori sm, at t ack8 on paci f i cat i on ~ c t i v i t i e s , ai d emall-uci t *err1 Lla
act i ons vhich probably v i l l be i nt ens i f i ed as t he main Porze wtsr t ur ns
increaein&ly i n favor of f r i endl y forces.
(11)
Asai st tmd/or rei nforce HVNnF cu:d o t h e r f or ces e ~ a g e d
i n operat i ons designed t o el i mi nat e t he YCi nf r as t r uct ur e.
(12)
Pr ot ect f r i endl y i ns t al l at i ons and haees from enecly
at t acks by f i r e , by strengtheningpaasive defenee measures, andby an '
aggressivle, of f ensi vel y orienteddefense, t o includeday andni ght ambushes
andpatrols outtoand berond rocket ranfie f r o m f ri endl y bases.
MACV Planning Mr 9-67
(13)
hphaai ze t he continuirifl t r ai n: r:c; of i ndi vi duel e and
uni t s duri ng t hose periode vhen they are not act i vel y engaged or ar e
waiting commi.tment.
b. CG, USARV, in coor di mt i on with ot her compcnert a d senior
t a c t i c a l comanders w i l l :
(1)
I n coordi nat i on with ARVK, mplement ?lam t o const ni ct ,
r ehabi l i t at e, and mai nt ai n roads i n 11, 111, and I V Cns;w i t h pr i or i t y ts
8, 13, 15, 19, 20, and 26 providing f unds , , National Routes 1 4, SA, are
avai l abl e.
(2)
Be prepared t o suppr t ' employment of '1stCav Div (MI)as a
country-kcl.de expl oi t at i on force.
( 3 )
Expand l ogi et i cal support i n IV QZ as addi t i onal
f or ces ar e dep1o::ed t o t he area.
(4)
I n t e ~ r a t e base development p l mn i n ~ with echeduled ar r i val
of new uni t e and wi t h planned redeployment of in-country forcee.
( 5 )
Support, where poeui bl e, CVN pa c i f i c a t i o~l et' forts.
(1)
I n coordi nat i on with Comnander VHN, i n t e n s i f j I L ! Y
'i'lUoperat i ons t o i nt e r di c t enemy eeaborne i n f i l t r a t i o n and supply act i vi t y
and t o i ncreaae t he coverage of southern I CTB, nort hern I1 CT", arld 1V
CTL coaet al areaa.
(2) I n coordi nat i on with Commander, VNN; SA, X J Corps; CC,
I1FFOHUV; and C%, 111 W,i nt ens i f y and expand G d . 2 dh3 l ; N operatiorrs
t o improve cont r ol of i nl and waterways, with e~~phAs i s oper' atione. on ni &t
( 3 )
I n coordi nat i on with. CG, XI1 k k Y, implement plms t o
c ona t r wt , r e ha bi l i t a t e , and maintain roada , i nI LTZ with pr i or i t y t o
Nvtioriel Houte 1from I1 LTBboundary to 1)ong Ha and t o iioute 9 froin
Dong !la t o Cam Lo.
(4)
I n coordi nat i on wlth CC, 111 l.CLI\F, continue supbort of
t he const ruct i on of t he s t r o wpoi nt obst acl e eyatrrm.
( 5 )
In coordi nat i on with Commander, V?l?4 and CG; ,111HAP
establish a C o a s t a l Defense Group base a t Sa Huynh in earl$ CY 68.
MACV PlannirqDir 9-07
!
( b )
I n coordi nat i on with Commanuer, Vl l N nnd CG,11FMCm,
conduct operat i ons i n RSSZ, ris nS*cesoar.y,t c secure mains h i p ~ i n gchannel.
(7) I n coordi nat i on vfth ':iwsnander, V W ; CG,11k'IQRMV; .
CG, 111Corps;Sn, 1VIrYl.ZiOrmdCG, IVCorps; conu1:ct fvzr i ns operat i ons
i n 111end I V Cl'Z with pr i or i t y t o 1.4 C'LZ,
( 8 )
support , wherc possi bl e, CVNpaci f i cat i on ef f or t s .
d.
Camnander, 7t h Air Force, i n c ~or di na t i onwith Commander,,
WAF wi l l :
(1)
Conduct i nt er di ct i on operat i ons and provide closea i r
support crf groundopemt i ons i n consonance vltht he tsskrand p r i o r i t i e s
del i neat ed herein.
(2)
I nt enai f y air operat i one agai nst enany IA;'C and infiltra-
t i on rout ee t o HVN, with pr i or i t y t o t hose support i ng eneiiry operat i ons i n
t he SML and i n the western highlands..
.. .
( 3
Execute out-of-country air-eupported barrier pl m.
. .
(4)
Provide t a c t i c a l a i r l i f t i n support of operat i ons,
i n c l u d i n ~ ai rborne o p e r ~ t i o n s , am required. .
( 5 )
Prepare t o expand iiiuY(=H lteik operat i ons.
e. .CG, IlIHAF, ln coordi nat i on wi t h CG, ICorps w i l l :
(1)
Consolidate, provi de f o r i r l i t i al mnnnir.g, endprepare
f or strengthenin^ and expangion of a t r o n ~poi'nt obet ecl e s y s t e ~southof
t he 3'2.
. ( 2) Continue screening, sur vei l l ance, and scoil i n ~operat i ons
i n t h 2 a r e a of tile UH'.
( 3)
Conduct continuous a i r and peri odi c ~r0undoperat i ons '
"
i nt o t h e A Shau Valley t o prevent enemy use t hereof.
( 4)
i k i n t s i n eecuri t y i n t he couat al ar eas of I GTi, and
provide f o r i ncreaei ng and cont r ol of the populace and resources.
(5) Continue and e x p ~n d operat i ons i n riumg Ngai, 1CTZ
padi f i cet i on pr i or i t y area,t o include es t abl i s hi nga Cn) G camp at Sa
ffugnh.duri ng CY 67. .
(6)
Prepare t o posi t i on a r t i l l e r y i n I iT1; s o as t o provide
1
MACV Planning Mr 9- 67
a r t i i l e r y f i r e i nt o Laou wi t h pr i or i t y t c support cf 'BV 33.
(7)
I n aaordincltion with CC\JN.r;VE\,r(V ,tmple.me:~t p h s t o
conat mct , r ehabi l i t at e and maintain roade arid IX)C i n I CTL.
(8) Coordinate a i t h CG, I k'F(iHCEV on Operation Y O U . '
f.
CC, I FFCI!CCV, in coordin?.tion with JC, I1 Corps will:
(1) ile prepared t~ conduct Operation PHOGBXX ar d, i n
coordinntion with 111 IUF, Operation' Y OU,
' ( 2)
Li s mpt enemy i nf i l t r a t i on and prevent incurslona by
oaj or ensmy forces i n t he weetern Hi&lande. .
( 3 )
Expand securi t y i n t he paci f i cat i on pr i or i t y amas cf
t he coaet al provinces of II 01s ( ~ i n hUinh, Phu Yen, !%axdl IIoa, Kinh
Thuan and Pinh Thuan).
-- 1
(4)
Coordinate with and aupport i ncreased offensi ve opera-
t i ons by ROK forcea agai nst enemy main force and l ocal force uni t e i n
coast al ar ea of XI CTL with empbaeia on PhuaYen and southern Binh Dinh.
( 5 )
I n coordination with II Pl WnCi V, conduct operat i ons
t o secure Hi gf . wny 20 i n I1 WZ.
(b)
Coordinate with GC, U5MV t o eecure ana t mi nt ai n
pr i or i t y II)(:i n cone.
g. , CG, II FF@RCEV, i n c o o r d h t i o n with CG, I11 Corpe; SA N
CTZ; and CG, IV Corps, as appropri at e wiU:
- (1) Prepare t o recei ve adai t i onal f or ces t o- i nt ensi f y
of feneive operations.
(2)
Conduct Operation SALWA 5% t o deatroy enemy baees and
forcea, improve t he secur i t y, and provide prot ect i on t o t he produce of
t he men.
( 3)
Conduct Operat i on W)SK;g CITY, accompanied'by e x t e ~s i v e
f or eet cieariw e f f or t , t o deetroy enemy forcea and bnees and deny further
w e of the area by t he enmy.,
(4)
Corrduct operation.SAN ANGEfl) concurrent w i t h DODCE C A T ,
MACVPlanningDir9-67 '
( 5 ) Conduct Operation Y:.LLO~S'I'C/N?;.
(
Phme Ua -force6 out of operat i on F' n L i SA by,end of 67,
but provide f o r pericdlc follow-on opert i t i o: , ~by iJS force? i n G:a 31nh.
Insure developuent nnd nsi nt enance of t e r r i t o r i a l sc:+curl ty capahj l i t y of
r e e i dua1. .iVliAF :'orcss.
(7)
1,. coordj nat i on w j t h . COMN:lVF%ItV, conduct ' mound and
r i ver i ne operat i ons i n t he HsSZ, as requi red, tr; eeovrre main ehipping
c a a n n e ~t o ablson.
-
( )
I n cuordinntion w l t h %, I FFUl:CiV, conduct operat i ons
t o secure lii~hwxvz2"i n 111 C',i;.
( 4 )
Upn Hi&way 23 fron Xuyen Moc t o rLamTm, j A from
Saigon t o I11 - I?: CT2 boundary, and r out e 13 from Gia ijinh t o An h c .
(10)
Coordinate wlth S4, IV CTL t o i n c r e ~ s efrequency and
scope of combined MVN EW operat i ons i n N CTL with pr i or i t y of
ef f or t t o Dinh T-tone, Go Corn:, &en Iioe, Vinh b n g , end Vinh ' ~ i n h ,
(11)
hcoordi net i on with COMNAVIUiiV, expand r i ver i ne operet i one
i n t o and peripheral t o t he pr i or i t y ar eas of N CTZ with emphesis' on
i ncr eas i n~ CVN cont r ol ove,r t he nat i onal resources.
(12)
Goor di n~t e wi t h. V.C, I FFOdGIJ t~ provide mutual support
t o Operation r'HUSNU.
f aci l i t a te and enk.hnce conmerce, v l t h ~ r i o r i t y t o those r out es connect i ne
( 13)
ibI: i n zone.
(Joordinate with CC, USMt7 t c secure and mair.tsln p r i o ~ i t y
(14)
Upen mri secure water IUC within I j l EL . which will
111 rcnd I V C X .
(15)
Conduct operations t o f ur t her t he p ~ c i f i c a t i o n e f f o r t s
i n Cie L)ir?h, Phuoc ' . i i , HAU lighia, Birh ilaulg, A I O ~ ; ~An, Bien iioa, t he
southern t vo di st r. i ct a of Ta y Ninh, and Xuan ' lac dl s t ri ct of Long Khanb
and 91nh 7luy provinces.
- E - ONLF
MACVDir20-4
HFA OQUARTERS
UNITEDSTATESMILITARYASSISTANCECOMMAND,VIETNAM
APOSanFrancisco 96222
DIRECTIVE 27April1967
NUMBER20-4* (MACJA1
INSPECTIONSANDINVESTIGATIONS
WARCRIMES
1. PURPOSE. Toprovideuniformproceduresforthecollection
andperpetuationofevidencerelativetowarcrimesincidentsandtodesig-
. .
natetheagenciesresponsiblefortheconductofinvestigationsforalleged
orapparentviolationsoftheGenevaConventionsof12August1949,Forthe
ProtectionofWarVictims.
2. SCOPE. Thisdirectiveisapplicabletoallallegedorapparent
warcrimesviolationsofthesubjectGenevaConventions,inlict-s-
tileforcesuponUSmilitaryorcivilianpersonnelassignedinVietnam,or
byUSmilitarypersonneluponhostilemilitaryorcivilianpersonnel'.
3. DEFINITION.
/
J
a. WarCrimes. Warcrimesareviolationsofthelawofwar
(seeDAFieldManual27-10,TheLawofLandWarfare,July1956).
/
b. A"gravebreach"oftheGenevaConventionsconstitutesa
warcrime. Someexamplesof"gravebreachestt areasfollows(whencom-
mittedagainstpersonstakingnoactivepartinthehostilities,including
membersofarmedforceswhohavelaiddowntheirarmsandthoseplaced
horsdecombat bysickness,wounds,detention,oranycause): Willful
killing,tortureorinhumantreatment,willfullycausinggreatsufferingor
seriousinjurytobodyorhealth.
c. Otherwarcrimesareasfollows: Makinguseofpoisoned
orotherwiseforbiddenarmsorammunition,treacherousrequestforquar-
ter,maltreatmentofdeadbodies,firingonlocalitieswhichareundefended
andwithoutmilitarysignificance,abuseoforfiringontheflagoftruce,
misuseoftheRedCrossemblem,useofcivilianclothingbytroopstocon-
cealtheirmilitarycharacterduringbattle,poisoningofwellsorstreams,
pillageorpurposelessdestruction,improperuseofprivilegedbuildingsfor
-his directivesupersedesMACVDirective20-4(01,25March1966
n n rv
t U ~ L I
EXHI BI T D-l
23
MACVDir20-4
27April1967
militarypurposes,compellingprisonersofwartoperformprohibitedlabor,
killingspiesorother,personswhohavecommittedhostileactswithouttrial,
compellingcivilianstoperformprohibitedlabor,andviolationsofsurren-
derterms.
4. COORDINATION. Investigationsofallegedorapparentwar
crimeswillbecoordinatedwiththeStaffJudgeAdvocate,USMACV.
5. RESPONSIBILITIES.
a. Itistheresponsibilityofallmilitarypersonnelhavingknow-
ledgeorreceivingareportofanincidentorofanactthoughttobeawar
crimetomakesuchincidentknowntohiscommandingofficerassoonas
practicable. Personnelperforminginvestigative,intelligence,police,-pho-
tographic,graveregistration,ormedicalfunctions,aswellasthoseincon-
tactwiththeenemy,will,inthenormalcourseoftheirduty,makeevery
efforttodetectthecommissionofwarcrimesandwillreporttheessential
factstotheircommandingofficer. Personsdiscoveringwarcrimeswill
takeallreasonableactionunderthecircumstancestopreservephysical
evidence,tonoteidentityofwitnessespresent,andtorecord(byphoto-
graph,sketch,ordescriptivenotes)thecircumstancesandsurroundings.
b. CommandersandMACVstaffsectionsreceivingreportsof
probablewarcrimeswill,inadditiontoanyotherrequiredreports,report
thefactsassoonaspracticabletotheStaffJudgeAdvocate,USMACV,and
willmakepertinentcollateralinformationavailabletotheappointingauthor-
ityandinvestigatingofficers.
c. TheStaffJudgeAdvocate,USMACV,will:
(1)Immediatelynotifytheappropriateappointingauthority
(seeparagraph5d,below)ofthereceiptofareportofanallegedorapparent
warcrime.
(2)Assistandadvisetheappointedinvestigatingofficer,
incoordinationwiththeStaffJudgeAdvocateorLegalOfficeroftheap-
pointingauthority.
(3)Receiveandreviewcompletedandapprovedinvestigations
fromtheappointingauthority.
(4)Maintainafileonallallegedorapparentwarcrimes.
FnR f i F F
MACVDir20-4
27April1967
(5) MakeappropriaterecommendationstoCOMUSMACV
concerninguseoftheevidenceobtainedanddispositionofthereportofin-
vestigation.
d. AppointingAuthority:
(1)Willappointaninvestigatingofficerand,ifappropriate,
designateaqualifiedcriminalinvestigatororCICagentastechnicalas-
sistant. Uponreceiptofnotificationofanallegedorapparentwarcrime
concerningamemberofhiscommand,oneofthefollowingappointingau-
thoritieswill,withalldispatch,appointaninvestigatingofficertoprepare
andtransmittohimareportofinvestigation.
(a)Army. OfficerswhoexerciseGeneralCourt-martial
jurisdiction(ortheirdesignees)areappointingauthoritiesforcasesinvolving
personnelundertheirGeneralCourt-martialjurisdiction. TheCG,HqDet,
USArmyElement,USMACV(orhisdesignee)istheappointingauthorityfor
casesinvolvingUSArmypersonnelassignedtoUSMACVandanyotherper-
sonbelievedtobeaUSservicemanbutnotsufficientlyidentifiedorother-
wiseprovidedforbyanotherappointingauthority. Commandersofbrigades
(ortheirdesignees),whohaveaJudgeAdvocateassignedtotheirstaff,are
appointingauthoritiesforcasesinvolvingpersonneloftheirbrigades.
(b) AirForce. TheCommander,~econd'~ir Division,
(orhisdesignee)istheappointingauthorityincasesinvolvingUSAirForce
personnel.
(c)Navy. Commander,USPavalForces,Vietnam,
(orhisdesignee)istheappointingauthorityincasesinvolvingUSNavalor
MarineCorpspersonnel,exceptnavalormarinepersonnelattachedtoMa-
rineCorpscommands.
(dlMarineCorps. TheCG,111 MarineAmphibiousForce
(orhisdesignee)istheappointingauthorityincasesinvolvingUSMarineCorps
personnelandnavalpersonnelattachedtoMarineCorpscommands.
(elCoastGuard. Commander,CoastGuardSquadron
#1 (orhisdesignee)istheappointingauthorityincasesinvolvingUSCoast
Guardpersonnel.
(2)Iftwoormoreappointingauthoritiesareconcernedwith
thesameincident,theywillagreeupontheappointmentofoneinvestigating
officer,withsuchadditionalassistantsasmaybenecessary,tomakeinquiry
onbehalfofallconcerned.
MACVDit20-4
27April1967
( 3) WhenthecompletedReportofInvestigation(ROI)has
beensubmittedtotheappointingauthoritybytheInvestigatingofficer,the
appointingauthoritywillreceive,review,andapprovethereport. Two
copiesoftheROIandphysicalevidencewillbetransmittedtoCOMUSMACV,
ATTN: SJA.
e. Theinvestigatingofficer,withtechnicalassistancefurnished
byqualifiedcriminalinvestigatorsorCICagents,will:
(1) Promptlymakeinquirytodeterminethefactsandcir-
cumstancessurroundingtheallegedorapparentwarcrime,toincludethe
following:
(a) Identity,organization,andstatusofvictim.
(b) Natureofviolationcommitted.
(c)Causeofinjuryordeathandmannerinwhichinjury
ordeathoccurred.
(d)Timeandplaceofcommission.
(e)Identityofindividualsororganizationssuspectedof
commissionoftheact.
(f)Names,identification,addresses(orunits)ofwit-
nessesorsuspectedwitnesses.
( 2) Collectallnecessaryevidence,statements,andexhi-
bits,toinclude:
(a)Medicalorautopsyreports.
(b)Photographicevidence,preferablytakenatthescene
ofdiscovery,andproperlyidentifiedastotime,place,subject,witnesses,
andphotographer.
(c)Statementsofwitnessesofanyofthecircumstances
surroundingtheincidentandthediscoveryofevidenceregardingtheinci-
dent. Wheneverpracticable,statementsshouldbeunderoath.
(dlMilitaryreports,includingafter-actionreportsand
thosefromintelligencesources,toidentifysuspectedindividualsandunits.
MACVMr20-4 .
27April 1967
(e)
Physicalevidence, suchasweapons, clothing, bul-
lets, shellcasings, rope, etc,, pertinenttothe case.
(3) Without delay, prepare andsubmithisrecommendations
astothe dispositionof the inveetigationreporttothe appointingauthority.
FORTIIE COMMANDER:
JOHN N. EWBANK -
Major General,USAF
Chief aStaff
F. G*MILLER
Colonel, USA
Adjutant General
%)I$TRIBUTION:
B
PIUS 25- JA
200 -.AG-AOP
10- AG-A0
----
* MC V Di r 20-4
HEADQUARTERS
UNI TEDSTATESMI1,T'TAR Y ASSIST$.NCE (3-OMMAND, VIETNAM
/
APOSan Fr anci sco 96222
1968
NUMBER 20- 4
(MACJA)
DIRECTNE
18~ a f
INSPEC'I'IONSAPJDINVESTICATIONS
WAR CRIMES .
1. PURPOSE. Toprovide uniform procedures forthe collection and
perpetuation of evidence relative t owar cr i mes incidents andt odesi g-
nate the agencies responsible for the conduct of investigations f or alleged
o r possible violations of the Geneva Conventioris of 12August 1949For
the Pr o t e ~t i o n of War Victims.
2. APPLICABILITY. hisdi rect i ve isapplicable t oallalleged o r
possible war c r i me s violations of th&subjectGeneva Conventions, in-
flictedbyhostile f or cesupon US mi l i t ar yo r civilianpersonnel assigned
in Vietnam, o r by US mi l i t ar y personrlel upon hostile mi l i t ar yo r civil-
ian personnel.
3. DEFINITIONS.
a. Wa r Cri me. violation of the.lawof war isawar cr i me.
(Chapter8, DA Fi el d Manual 27-10, The Lawof Land War f ar e, July 1956.)
b. Grbve~ r r a c h . /A gravebr each of the Geneva Conventions isthe
most ser i oustype of war cr i me. Exaxnples of gr avebr eaches ar e: willful
killing, t or t ur e o r inhumant r eat ment , including biological experirnents,
willfullycausinggr eat sufferingo r ser i ousi nj uryt obodyo r health, taking
of hostages, compellinga pr i soner of war t o s er veinthe f or cesof t he
hostile power.
c. Other War Cr i mes. Examples a r e : makingus e of poisoned o r
otherwise forbiddena r ms o r ammunition, t r eacher ous request f or quar t er ,
mal t reat ment of deadbodies, firing onl ocal i t i eswhicha r e undefended and
without ~i l i l i t ar y significhnce, abuse of o r fi ri ngonthe flagof t r uce, mi suse
of the Red Cr os s embl em, use of civilianclothingbyt r oopst oconceal
t hei r mi l i t ar y char act er duringbattle, poisoning of ~wel l s o r et r eams, pill-
age o r purposel ess dest ruct i on, i mpr oper use of privilegedbuildings for
* T h i ~di rect i ve~ype r s e c i e s MACV Directive 20-4 (0). 27Apr i l 1967
MACV Dir 20-4
mi l i t arypurposes, compelling prisoners of war to performprohibited
labor, killing spies or other persons whohave committedhostile act s
without t ri al , compelling ci vi l i ans to perform prohibited labor, and vio-
lations of surrenderterms.
4. COORDINATION. Iqve stigations of alleged or possible war cri mes
willbe coordinatedwith the Staff Judge Advocate,
MACV.
5. RESPONSIBILITLES.
a.
It i sthe responsibilityof allmi l i t aryp e r s o ~ e l having know-
ledgeor' receivinga report of anincident or of anactthought tobe a war
cri metomake suchincident known tohis commanding officer a s soon a s
practicable. Personnel perfornling investigative, intelligence, police,
photographic, grave registration, or medical functions, a s wella s those
in contact with the enemy, will, i nthe normal course of t hei r duty, make
everyeffortt odetectthe commissionof war cr i mesandwill report the
essentialfactst ot hei r commandingofficer; Persons discoveringwar
cri meswilltake allreasonable actionunderthe circumstances to pre-
eervephysical evidence, tonote identityof witnesses present, andt o .
record (byphotograph, sketch, or descriptive notes)the circumstances
and sur rounding8.
b. Commandersand MACV staff sections receiving report s of prob-
ablewar cri meswill, inadditiont oanyother required report s, report
the fact sa s Boon a s practicable t othe Staff JudgeAdvocate, MACV, and
willmake pertinent collateralinformation available tothe appointing
authorityandinvestigating officers.
c. The Staff JudgeAdvocate, MACV will:
( 1 )
Immediately notify the appropriateappointingauthority (see
paragraph 5d, below)of the receipt of a report of analleged or possible
war crime.
(2) Assist and advise the appointed investigating officer, in coor-
dinationwith the Staff Judge Advocate or Legal Officer of the appointing
authority.
( 3)
Receive and review completed and approved investigations from
the appointing authority.
MACV Dir 20-4
(4)
Maintain a file on all war crime investigations.
..
( 5 )
Make appropriate recommendations to COMUSMACV concerning
use of the evidence obtained'and disposition of the .report of investigation.
I . .
d. Appointing Authority:
\
(1)
Appoint an investigating officer and, if appropriate, designate
a qualified criminal investigator as technical assistant. Upon receipt
of notification of an alleged or possible war crime concerning a member
of his command, one of the following appointing authorities will; with all
dispatch, appoint an investigating officer to prepare and transmit to him
a report of investigation.
(a) Army. Officers who exercise General Court-martial jurisdic-
tion (or their designees) ar e appointing authorities for cases involving
personnel under their General Court-martial jurisdiction. The CG, US
Army Element, USMACV (or his designee) is the appoinfing authority for
cases involving US Army personnel assigned to USMACV and any other
person believed to be a US serviceman but not sufficiently identified or
otherwise provided for by another appointing authority. Commanders
of brigades (or their designees), who have a Judge Advocate assigned
to their staff, ar e appointing authorities for cases involving personnel
of their brigades.
(b) Air Force. The Commander, 7th Air Force, (or his designee)
is the appointing authority in cases involving US Air Force personnel.
(c
) Navy. Commander, US Naval Forces, Vietnam, (or his de-
signee) is the appointing authority in cases involving US Naval or Marine
Corps personnel, except naval or marine personnel attached to Marine
Corps c ornmands .
(d) Marine Corps. The CG, LU Marine Amphibious Force (or his
designee) is the appointing authority in cases involving US Marine Corps
personnel and naval personnel attached f o Marine Corps commands.
(e) Coast Guard. Commander, Coast Guard Squadron #1 (or his
designee) i s the appointing authority in cases involving US Coast Guard
personnel.
MACV Dir 20-4
( 2 )
If two or more appointing authorities ar e concerned with the '
same incident, they will agree upon the appointment of one investigating
officer,
with such additional assi st ant s a s may be necessary, to make
inquiry on behalf of all concerned.
(3)
When the completed Report of Investigation (ROI) has been sub-
mitted to the appointing authority by the investigating officer, the appoint-
ing authority will receive, ' review, and, i f appropriate, approve the r e-
port.
Three copies of the ROI will be transmitted t o COMUSMACV,
ATTN: MACJA.
e. The investigating officer, with technical assi st ance furnished
by qualified criminal investigators will:
. ,
(1)
Promptly make inquiry t o determine the facts and circumst-ances
surrounding the alleged or apparent war cri me, to include the following:
(a) Identity, organization, and status of victim.
(b) Nature of violation committed.
(c)
Cause of injury or death and manner in which injury or death
occurred.
(d)
Time and place of comrnisaion.
(e)
Identity of individuals or organizations suspected of commission
of the act.
( f ) Names, identification, addresses (or units) of witnesses or sus-
pected witnesses.
(2) Collect all necessary evidence, statements, and exhibits, t o
include:
(a) Medical or autopsy reports.
(5)
Photographic evidence, preferably taken at the scene of di s-
covery, and properly identified a s t o time, place, subject, witnesses,
and photog raphe r.
MACVDir 20-4
(c)
Statements of witnesses of any of the circumstances surrounding
the incident and the discovery of evidence regarding the incident. When-
ever practicable, statements should be under oath.
(d)
Military reports, includingafter-action .reports and those from
intelligence sources, ' to identify suspected individuals and units.
(e)
Physical evidence, such as weapons, clothing, bullets, shell
casings, rope, etc., pertinent to the case.
( 3)
Without delay, prepare and submit his recommendations as to
the disposition of the investigation report to the appointing authority.
FOR THE COMMANDER:
WALTER T. KERWIN,JR.
Major General, USA
Chief of Staff
SIDNEY GRITZ
Colonel, USA
Adjutant General
DISTRIBUTION:
B
Plus :
300-AG-AOP
25- JA
5-AG-A0
- - - -
C1, MACV Di r 20-4
HEADQUARTERS
IJNi TED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
APO San Francisco 96222
CHANGE 1
DIRECTIVE
NUMBER 20-4
7 October 1969
(MACJA)
INSFECTIONS AND INVESTIGATIONS
WAR CRIMES
Direc.tive Number 20-4, this headquartere. 18 May 1968, i e changed asfollows:
1. Paragraph 6 is supersededae followe:
REPORTS.
reports control symbolMACJA-I2 (RCS: MACJA-12).
2. This transmittal eheet ist obe filedin front of the publication for reference
purposes.
FOR THE COMMANDER:
OFFICIAL
ELIAS C. TOWNSEND
Major General, USA
Chief of Staff
L.OC!lS J. PROST
Cc~l oacl ,USA
Adjut;*tjtGeneral
I')I.';'I'HlRUTION:
I3
Plil s:
300'- MACAG-AP
25 - MACJA
6 . Reports requiredby paragraph 5d(3), above, areassigned
I hSPECTl ONS .LND INYEST.I'CLATIOKS
------l.~l.lly---.-lp..-l.--.~-
PHISON'ERS 07 WAX -.DF:'T'EXMi:iUTION OF ELIGIBZTA'r:TY
__^_______l___l_I__._- ".-- _ . . ._ - - - -
PTJR'PCSE. To pr ancr i hc po!,Scieo ancl procedures f or det cr i mi ni ~g
1 -.-.-,.-,--...
t;rl!.-thcr personnel i n the cnotocly of tb.5 Uni t ed Statea -:?!lohave cozrim.ittccl
bel l i gerent act a ar e ei ~t i t l ed?G y r i a o n e ~of w . r . . CL:.~LIZ.
a.
Article 5 of the Gc.nova Co'nvention Relative to the Tr eat ment
of Pzinoner~of Jai'irr ( GPS~) req,uisee that the yrotectionrp of Cle Co?~vei~"Lion
be extznclzcl to a Fzroon viiro ha.3 corn~x?f.?.ed a belligerent act and w:ior;e eil-
t i t l e r n~ntto Priric;:le~. of W2 r ( p V i ) ctatu,- i 3 i l l d&ht unt i l ouch time a a hi13
~tatri shag he e n . det zr xi r l zd by s cornFzt er_t t r i bunal .
b.
Thic di rect i ve p:co~+.'lder: a.uthosity a n d establishes procedures
f or :
c, Scree>i.ng, cla.fi;7ificz.tisna.ncI.d~.r;pocj.tion of de".-inee~ ill he
i n acco$dazce wi t h h!i~Cy TJirective ".1-46.
d. Evac-.~a-kisn,p ~ ~ c ~ ~ ~ i i l s azd ~ . ~ ~ ~ i ~ ~ t a b j . l i t ~ of P W \-:iI'l 58 ill
zccordznce wit]: IMACY Directive 190-3.
3. --- APPLTCX3II. , l TY. -.---.--- .----
This <i.rective ~ p p l i e nto prisonera o: war, non-
priaor?::r.-, of wa r ~ n c i c ? o ~ ~ b i - f ~ l cases who a r e cr . . pt ~~: . ed h)- or ar e i n the cust ody
0.4 Uni t ed Sta:ea f or cco.
rY(
a. he d::fir,itioris and c r i t e ~ i ai n r clasoifir:ation nf 6ot:~.ia@cs will
be i n accor dance kit> ~ n a > z ~ S I AC Vn r c c t i y c 38 1- 46.
b. Doubt f ul casen; Per aonswl - l ohavc commi t t edabe! . l i gc~ent act
a nd whonc entitiemcni: t:> .qtatl:i: a s a P W i e i11 douSt .
$---his
direci-is-? s::,er.sedca MA C V Direct'Lve 23- 5, 2 1 Se;>terr?be.r 1456 i nc l udi ng
Ci l z n ~ c1, 1.6 Ll ecct ~i be?: 196s
3 5 EXHIBIT D-42
, MACV Dir 20-5
c. Convening Authorities. of those maj or subordi- ~ o m m a n d ~ r e
.nate units which may reasonably be expected to take pr i soner s and who a r e
authorized to c0nven.e general court e-mart i al under Art i cl e 22 of the Uniform
Code of Military J11.atice.
BACKGROUND.
a. The United States is a par t y to the Geneva Conventiona of 12
August 1949.
Ther e a r e four oeparate Conventions. Number I i e f or the
amelioration of the condition of the wounded and si ck of armed' f or ces i n
the field (GWS). Number IIis f or the amelioration of the condition of the
wounded, sick, and ship\vrecked member s of ar med forcee a t s ea (GWS Sea).
Number 111provides for t r eat ment of prieonere of war (GPW). Number IV
provideo for the protection of civilian$ (GC).
Each convention is reproduced
in full in DA Pamphlet 27-1, AF Pamphlet 110-1-3 (Treat i ea Governing
hi nd Warfare) and NWIP 10-2 (Law of Naval War'fare).
b. The United State8 c o n ~ i d e r ~ l the ar med conflict present l y
e xi ~t i ngi n Vietnam to be international i n charact er. - Accordingly, al l ar t i -
---
___- ---- -.--A
clee of all. four Geneva Conventions a r e applicable.
c. Art i cl e 5, GPW, provides f or the convening of tribunal8 by a
_
detaining power. The sole purpose of a tribunal ie to determine i n doubtful
caees, whether a detained person who has committed a belligerent a c t i s en-
titled to statusa s a pri aoner of war.
d.
The reoponai'bility f or determining the st at us of persons
captured by US forcee r est o with the United st at es. Before any detainee i s
rel eased or t r ansf er r ed f r om ~n i t e d . ~' t a t c s custody, hi s st at us an priaoner
of war ar non-prisoner of war must be determined.
e. Some perrsono obvioual-:v are pri aoners of war'; e. g. , NVA or
Viet Cong r egul ar s taken into custody on the battlefield while they a r e en-
gaged i n open combat. Ot hers obviougly a r e not pr i soner s of war ; e. g.,
civilian8 who z r e detained ars ~us yect 8, found to be friendly, and r el eased;
OF ret urnees who recei ved favored t r eat qent under the Chieu Hoi program.
In other caaeo entitlement to P W statup. may be doubtful. In doubtful cases
the necessity f or a determination of st at us by a tribunal may ar i se.
f. A detainee wi l l be r ef er r ed to an Art i cl e 5 tribunal only when:
(1)
He has committed a belligerent act, and
(2)
Ei t her of the folloping conditions exist:
MACVDir 20-5
(a)
-Therei s cloubt dr; to whether the detainee i s entitled
{:o P W~1;ab-l~.
(b)
determinztionhas bzen riiade thzt theatatuo of the
dctzinee ia that of anon-pri3oner of war and t he detainee o r someoneinhi8
bchalf claim.^ f i a t he i s cntitledt oP W statue.
6 . RESPONSIBILITIES.
a.
All United Statea mi l i t ar yand DODcivilian personnelwhotake
or have custodyof a det ai neevrill:
(1)
Complywiththe proviaiona of the Geneva Couventionrs.
Vi ol ~t i on of the humane provioiona of fieConventiorns i s anofPense under
the Uniform Code of Militazy Juctice. Pereon.cjwho commi t violations of
the Gencva Conirenticna maybe subjject t o' t r i al by court-mart-f.al.
(2)
Afford to each d2&bineaintheir cuntody treztrnent conaiat-
ect with thnt c j f a pricoo.zr of \:Jar, ~ ~ n P e c o or until'ithas bean det ermi nedby
competent c..uthorityinxccorciancev ~i t l lthin diractive thatthe detainee i o not
a prisonerof war.
b.
~omr&nti-r2cfsuboxdinate comma,nde (definedin pr agr aph
2 of MACV Directivr 310-2) ts~ill:
(1)
Insure timi: ~sr.oor.sc?Zof their comm?,.ndsc~in.~>!y vrit.5 Farz-
~ji*~:;,h 6~~ a'ocvc.
(2)
Pn3-iu:i.e thztb ~ f ~ r e anyd2tainee i n r el eaacdfromUS cuatody
h-is 6 i a h ~he s been det er mi ned' bycompatent authority.
( 3)
I n ~ u r ethatal l pri soners of w z ~ andnon- p~i zoner c:of war,
inthe custodyof t hei r forcca, a:ce evac~l at ed, yr ocesoed, andrccountzdf or
in accor dat ~cewith MACV Directiva 190-3.
(4)
I n ~ u r eCxat a l l de&.ined pesnonsi nt he cuotody of US
forces,whoare aicl: or vmunded, ar eprovided rnediczl t r czt ment arrc!c a r e
required by theirn b t e of health.
(5)
Incure that p.2zsons deterrnliied to b.-,non-pl-isonc:f:,n of
WL ~ Taresegr egat edfronl $ i ' i 8 0 l i 4 ~ ~ ofwar prio: 'ic, ~ e i r t r ans f er to Vietnar:lese
au'thoritieo.
c. Navy, Ai r For ce, and Cc4aa.t Guar duliits may t r ansf er doubtful
canes to the m-oct convenientUSArrny OTM-zrine GCMzuthoritycompet ent to
cocvctie tribunalG md e r the proviaionr?of this directive.
, 37
3
d. The Int errogat i ng Officel: will:
( I )
Deterrnin-ewhether the s.tatusof a detained per son is
that of a prinoner of war , nor,-prieoner of war , o r doubtful case.
Thi s d e t e r -
minationwillbe reco~dedon the Detainee Repor t For m ( seezl s oMACV Di r ec-
tive 381- 11) .
(2)
Refer the following cas es to the appr opr i at eStaff Judge
Advocate o r Staff h g a l Officer:
( a) Doubtfulcasca.
(b)
Casee in whichhe has made ani ni t i al det ermi nat i on
that the o tatua of the detainee i~that of a civil defendant.
( 3)
In doubtful caseeo r i nthose c a s e s i nwhich he ha s made
a n initial det ermi nat i onthat the st at us of a detained pereon ist hat of a civil
defendant, f or war dthe Detainee Report Fo r mand a nummar y of the rel evant
factoupon which hi s dzciaionwas bzaed ( or a copyof the pr el i mi nar yi nt er -
rogation r epor t ) to the appr opr i at eStaffJudgeAdvocate or S+affLegal Officer
f or review.
(4)
Tur na l l prirjonern of war andnon-pri soner8 of war over
to the propcr authoritien i naccordance with MnCV Directive 381-46.
e. Tribumal. ~will:
(1) Consi st of t hr ee or mor e officers. Where practicable,
the member s shouldbejudge advocate0 or other mi l i t ar yl awyera familiar
with the Geneva Conventions. In anyevent, a t l eaot ' one member ,of the t r i -
bunalwi l l be a judge advocate or other mi l i t ar y lawyer f ami l i ar with the
Geneva Convention. The eeni or member shal l act a s president of fie tri-
bunal.
(2)
Follow the pr ocedcr ee s e t f or t ha t AnnexA of this d i r e c -
tive and maymake suchadditional rules of procedure consi st ent with the
Geneva Conventions-a8 a r e deemedneces s ar ytoinsrirea f ul l andf ai l i nqui ry
intomat t er s beforc them.
( 3) Apply the provi si ons of Ar t i cl e 4, GPW, andMACV Di r ec-
.tive381-46, in making a det ermi nat i on of ent i t l ement or nonentitlement to
pr i soner of war st at ua.
(4)
Indicate i t e decision ona f or mat si mi l ar to the.rnoclel
shown a t Annex B.
f . Convcrling aut hori t i eovril!:
MACV Di r 20- 5
(1)
Convene Ar t i cl e 5 t ri bunal 8 when r equi r ed by t hi s
di rect i ve. Annex C provi ck s a sample f or ma t f o r conveni ng t r i bunal s.
Offi-
c e r s f r o m ot her ' commando o r ot her ~ e r v i c c ema y be as s i gned t o tribunal^
as me mb e r s o r counael wi t h t he concuyr ence of t he ot her commander
concer ned.
( 2)
I n~ursthat tribuzlzlo are conduct ed pr ompt l y and t hat t he
pr ocedur es s e t f or t h a t Annex A ar e follovred.
( 3)
Inoure t hat each tribv. nal deci oi on i s r e c or de d aer i al l y
and f or war ded t o COMUSMACV, ATTM: SJA. Annc-: D pr ovi des a f o r ma t
for the f or war di ng inbor aemeni .
(4)
I naur e t hat t her e we r e no i r r e gul a r i t i e s i n t he t r i bunal
proceedi ngs,
(5)
Indi cat e in the f or war di ng i ndor s ement t he di sposi t i on of
the det ai nee subeequent t o t he hs ar i ng.
( 6 )
Have all Fercotia who a r e det er mi ned t o be ci vi l defend-
ant s t ur ned over t o t he pro-,srr Vi ct namene autho1.itie.s f or possi bl e t r i z l and
puni shment under the law3 of the Governmerl t of Vietnqrn. Aa civil. defend-
dant s s uch person:: a r e ezt i t l ed t o LIEpr ot ect i ons of common Ar t i cl e 3 of
t he Geneva Conventiono.
g.
The MACV Staff Judga Advocat e wi l l :
(1)
Revier:! a l l dzci okno of US t:sibunals appoi nt ed urider t hi s
' di rect i ve to i n ~ u r e t hat t h ~ p ewere PO i r ~ e g u l a r i t i e s i n t he pr oceedi ngs.
A
det er mi nat i on by a t r i bunxl tI1~-6L the det ai nee i s ent i t l ed to P W s t at us i a final.
I n c a s e s i n whi ch P W ~ t ~ l ? ~ s f or good and ham been deni ed, COIMUSMACV,
nuffi ci ent r eas oc, ma y o r d e r a r ehear i ng o r ma y admi ni s t r at i vel y gr ant P W
s t a t us .
(2)
Forward a l l tri.buna1 decision^ t o the USARV Pr o v o s t
Mar shal .
(3)
~ r o v i d clogal. gui dance t o s ubor di nat e comi nander 8 con-
cer ni ng the conduct of Ar t i cl c 5 ti-ibunalo.
h,
The USAIIV Pr ovoat Mar s hal wi l l :
( I )
Ma i nki n a p ~ r ~ n a n ~ n t fi l e of a11 t r i bunal deci si ons.
( 2 )
Uai nt ai n a perrnaaent f i l e of Det ai nee Repor t Fo r ms .
33
5
--
lm.CV Dir 20-5
i.
The Staff Judge Advoca.teor Staff Legal Offi cer-(SLO)of unite
taking priooncrtl will:
(1)
Pr ovi de l egdl guidance to i nt errogat i ng of f i cer s concerni1;g
the det ermi nat i on of pr i s oner of wzi. otatua.
( 2 )
Review a l l c a me inwhich t he i nt er r ogat i ngoffi cerhas
made a ni ni t i al det ermi nat i on t hat the st at us of a. det ai nee ist hat of a ci vi l
defendant.
(a)
If thz SJA or SLOconcurs i nthe i nt er r ogat i ng officer' rs
iiiitial det ermi nat i on, he wi l l i ndi cat ehi a concur r ence on t he l 3et ai nee. Keport
Foi-rna ndwi l l at t acha summaryof t he rel evnnt fact nuponvrhich thz deci si on
v.rau based t o. t he Detainee Repor t Form.
(b)
If t he SJA o r SLOdi s agr ees with t he i nt er r ogat i ng
ofi i cer' c i ni t i al det ermi nat i on t hat t he atatuo of t he det ai nee io t hat of a ci vi l
defendant, or the det ai nee 01. somconc i nhi s behalf cl ai ms t hat he i s ent i t l ed
toPJY st at xo, the SJA or SLO maya c c or dthe det ai nee P W s t at us or refer
the c2s.e to a t ri bunzl , indicating hio act i onont he Detainee Repor t For m.
( 3) Review a11 doubtfulc a s e s .
(a)
If t he SJ'A or SJdO concur s i nt he i nt er r ogat i ng offi cex' e
deterrninc?tiont hat the detainee lo n t a t u o i e doubtful, he r e f e r t he c a s e to
a t ri bunal .
(b)
If t he SJA o r S. 50 det er mi nes t hat t he det ai nee shoul d
be given pr i s oner of wa r s t at us he rnay accor dP W st at us, i ndi cat i ng hi s action
on the Detaillee Re por t Form.
j.
The bMCV P WRescreeri i ng Te a mwi l l s e r ve f or t he pur ps s es ,
be corllponeda s , and follow t he pr ocedur es, s e t f or t ha t Annex E of t hi s
dii-ective.
7. REFERENCES.
b. DA Pamphl et 20- 151.
d. NWI P 10-2.
MACV Di r 20- 5
f . The Geneva.Conventions of 12 Aug 49.
g.
The Uni f or r i ~ Code of Mi l i t ar yJust i ce.
h. Comment ar yon t he Geneva Conveiltion Rel at i ve to the Tr eat -
ment of P r i c o n e r ~ oiW a r of 12Aug 49 by J e a nS. Pi ct et .
i. MACV Directive 190-3.
j. MACV Di rect i ve 381-11.
k. MACV Di rect i ve 331-46.
FORTHE COMMANDER:
WALTERT. KERWIN, JR.
Maj or Gener al , USA
Chief of Staff
NEI LN. SNYDER, JR.
Colonel, USA
Adjutant Ganer al
An~i exe a
A. Tr i bunal Pr ocedur ea
B. Repor t of Tr i bunal Deci si on
C. Appointment of Tr i bunal
D. Action by ConveningAut hori t y
E. MACV PW Rescr eeni ng T e a m
F. P WRescr eeni ngRepor t
GXSTRIBUTION:
I,11, 111,IV- A
VI- I3
PIUS 100-JA
1 -ARC
1 -DODSPECWEP
1-AMEMB
1 -CINCPAC
1-JUShfP,GTHM
1-USMACTWLI
1 -Military Ar?aictzr,ceInstitute
300-AG-AOP
5-AG-A0
MACV Dir 20-5
TRIBUNAL PROCEDURES
1. JURISDICTION. Military tr-ibunaleconvened purouant to MACV
Directive 20-5 shallbe limited intheir deliberationsto the determination of
whether detainedpersone ordered t6a p p a r beforei t arcentitledto pri soner
of war status.
2. APPLICABLE LAW. In making i t s determination of entitlement
or nonentitlement to prieoner of war statue the tribunal should apply the
following:
a. The Geneva Converitione of 12 August 1949, with special.atten-
tion giventoArticle.4 of the'Geneva Convention Relative to the Treat ment of
Pr i soner s of War (GPW).
b. The definitionof P Wcur i ent l yapplicableinVietnam coiztained
i nMACV Directive 381-46.
c.
The Law of Land Warfare, FM27110, Paragsapha 60-83.
d. The Law of War a s recognizedby international law.
3. _MEMBERSHIP. The tribunal ohall conoiet of not l es s than 3 -.-
officers. When practicable, the members trhould bejudge a dvoc a t e ~ or other
mi i i t ar yl awyer ~. f ami l i ar with the Geneva Conventiona. In anyevent, atleast
one member of the tribuniilwillbe e j ~l dgcadvocate or other mi l i t ar ylzwyer
fannilieswith the Geneva Coriventiono. The senior membcr ohallact a s pren-
idantof thetribunal.
4. COUNSELFOR TFIE TRIBUNAL. A judge advocate or other rnil-
i t ar ylawyer ~ h a l l be deaignatadss couneelf or the tribunal, Counsel i a not
amember of the tribunalandhao no vote. He i s rengonaible for the cl er i cal
and prel i mi naryworkof the hearing including advieing the detainee of hia
rights. He ari-angesfor the attendance of wi t ~ i e ~ a s a andansembl esthe docu-
ment s foruaebythe tribunal. At t he hearinghe pr esent s al l evidence r el e-
vanttothe i a oue arid i s responsiblefor prepari ngthe r epor t of the hearing.
QUORUM. The prenence of three member s appointed tothe t r i -
5* --
burial, one of whom munt bz ajudge advocate or other mi l i t zry lawyer f ami l i ar
with the Geneva Conventionn, ahallbe neccaaary to constitute a quorum.
6 . VOTING. All decisions of the tzibunal uhall be by maj ori t yvote.
I nthe event.the votes a r e evenly divided, the dzciaion shal l be infavor of P W
st at us.
Annex A
--
~~ - -
MAC'V Dir 20-5
7.
RIGHTS OF THE DETAINEE. The detainee shal l be advised of and
accorded the following fundamental rights conoidered to be eeseritial to a f ai r
hearing:
a. No person may be ddprived of hio stal;uo as a pr i soner of war
without having had an opportunity to present hi s case with the a e s i ~t a n c eof
a qualified advocate o r counsel.
b.
The detainee shal l be entitled to the ser vi ces of a competent:
i nt erpret er.
c.
The detaisiee ohall have the right t o be present with hio coun-
eel at al l open eessi o~l s of the tribunal.
8. COUNSEL FOR THE DETAINEE, Each detainee shal l have the
right to be represent ed by counsel. He may sel ect anyone reasonabl y avail-
able, including a fellciw detainee. If the detainee does not wish t o make a
selection or i f the counael request ed is not reabqnably availzble, the con-
vening authority ohall appoint a judge advocate, or other rnilitary lawyer
fami l i ar with the Geneva Conventions a s counsel f a r the detainee.
9. RIGHTS OF COUNSEL FOR THE DETAINEE.
a. Counsel shal l have a period of a t l east one week before the
hearing in or der to pr e7ar e hi s case. Thia right may be waived by counsel.
b.
Counsel shzl l be informed of the procedure to be followed by
the tribunal at the hearing.
c.
Counsel shal l be afforded f r ee acceos t o vioit the detainee and
interview hi m i n private.
d.
Counsel shal l be afforded a reasonab1.e opportunity to confer
privately with eoeential witneo s e a, including pr i soner s of war.
e. Couneel shal l have the ri ght to cal l witncoses, to examine and
cr os s -examine witnesses, and to preaent evidznce i n behalf of the detainee
alrbject to such reasonable reotrictions a e the tribunal may impoee.
f . Counsel may addi-cos the tribunal during the proceedings, make
a fi nal argument, and make a st at ement i n behalf of the detainee.
10. RIGHT TO TESTIFY. The detainee rnay testify in hi s own behalf
or r emai n silent a t hin option.
Page 2 of Annex A
-- 11. EVIDENCE.
a.
The triburlal shal l not bc bound by the r ul es of evidence pr e-
scr i bedf or t ri al o by court -mart i al .
It should consi.deranymat t er present ed
which i o rel evant t othe i ssuewhetherwri t t en o r or al , swor no r uneworn.
b.
The tribunalmayrefuae to conaider anyor a l or wri t t en mat -
t e r prccent edif i t i s i rrel evznt , i nl mat eri al , o r unnecessar i l y repetitive o r
cumulative.
12. I NTERPRETER. -
a.
Eachdetaineehaa the r i gkt to the ser vi cea of a qualified
i nt er pr et er t hr &tghoutthe proceedings 2nd inhia dealings with hi s counsel.
b.
Theat t orney-cl i ent privilege alno shal l applyto the i nt er -
pr et er .
13. POWERS OF THE TRI BUNAL. - The tribunal shal l have the power
to:
a. Order US mi l i t ar ywi t ne ~a e eto appear andto r equest the
appezritnce of civilianmi t ne aoe a.
b. Questiona,ll witncsseo i n c l u d i ~ ~ ehouldhe choose the detainee,
tot est i fya t the hearing.
c. Require the proclr?ctionof document^ andr e a l evidence.
d. Require of eachwitneas an oath, affirmation, or suchdecl ar -
ationa a i o cust omar yi nthe country of the witness.
e. Appoint offi cer8f or car r yi ngoutanyt ask designatedby the
tribunal, including the taking of evidence oncomnlission.
f . Todet ermi ne thc ment al and physical capaci t yof the detainee
to ~ a r t l c i p l t e i nthe hearing.
a. The preoidentu p n calling the t ~i b u n a l to or dcr shouldf i r s t
r eadthe or der appoitlting the tribunal.
b. Counsel for the tribunal will causea r ecor dto be made cf the
time, date, and place of the hcari ng, and the identity andqualifications of all
participants.
43
Page 3 of Annex A
h4AC.V Di r 20-5
c. Thepr es i dent shoul d t hen expl ai n t o the det ai nee h i s r i ght s ,
the pur pos e of the hear i ng, andthe posoi bl e conoequencoB of t he deciwi.on.
d. Counsel f or t'he t r i bunal wi l l r e a d t he r e por t of t he i nt e r r o-
gat i ng of f i cer s ummar i zi ng the fact'rs upon whi ch the i nt er r ogat i ng of f i cer ' a
deci si on was baeed.
e. Wi t nes s es expect i ng t o t e cal l edwi l l be excl udedf r o mt he
hear i ngexcept whi l e teutifying. An oat h o r af f i r mat i onwi l l be admi ni at er ed
bycouns el f or the t r i bunal .
f. C o u n ~ e l f o r t he cletzinee maymake o r wai ve a n openi ng ot at c-
ment .
g.
Couneel f o r t he t r i bunal shoul dt hen pr es ent a1.l r el evant
evi dence tcwhi chhe ha s acceeo t hr ought he t es t i monyofwi t nes s es , docu-
ri~en.ttj,or r e a l evi dence wi t hout r e g a r d t owhet her the evi dence i ef avor abl e
or unfavorabl e t o t he det ai nee.
h. Counsel f o r the det ai nee andcouns el f o r the t r i bunal rnay
cr oes - exami ne wi t nces cs o r devel opnew ma t t e r s a s l ong a s t hey ar er el evant
t o t he iafiuea bef or e t he t r i bunal .
i. Counncl f or t he dct ai nec maypr e s e nt wi t nc as e s , docurnent n,
af f i davi t s, r e a l evi dence, and owo-n o r uns wor n s t at ement s i n behal f of t he
det ai nee.
j.
Ei t her counsel ma y cal l v~i t ne s a e o i n' r ebut t al o r surrebut t c?l .
k. At t he concl uoi on of t he p r c ~ e n t a t i o n of evi dencebybot h C O ~ K ~ S ~ !
the t r i bunal may r e c a l l wi t neos cs o r c a l l addi t i onal wi t necs ea.
1. Af t er a l l evi dence i s i nandafter cl osi ng o r a l e r gume nt har; been
m a d e bybot h counsel , the he a r i ngwi l l be cl osed.
m. The t r i bunal wi l l del i ber at ei n cl os ed ~ c a s i o n . Only vot i ng
me mb r r n wi l l be pr es ent .
11. In c l o ~ e c l ceaoi ont he t r i bunal will make i t s
det crmi l wt i ozl of
otatus. Its deci si onwi l l be r e c or de d1~r; i ngthe f or r nat z t Anne x. 5of MACV
Di r ect i vz 20 -5 ZB E? gui de andwi l l be di gnedby a l l mcl-nbere.
o. In open seeoi on the pr es i dent wi l l announce t he deci s i onof t he
t ri bunal .
4 3
Pngc 4 of AnnexA
a. In c a s z c i n which the cl et ~i si ce ha s bee; ~det ermi i i ed to be en-
t i t l ed to P W otatu;, 2. - br i ef 1:esurn.z of the [acts 2nd c i r c u n ~ s ta.ncea upon which
the cl eci ~i onv..at; bas ed wi l i b2 aFr;;,?ndcd to t he deci oi on. A copy of t he o r d e r
appointing the t r i bunal wi l l b:: at t ached.
b. In cas cn i n 171hici.i the detainee h a s been det ermi ned. not t o be
ent i t l ed to P W s t ; a . k s , the ioliuwing i t erna v i l l be at t zchcd t o t he decision:
(11
A copy of the o r d e r appoi nt i ng ti-ii- tuib:znal.
(2)
A nt at ement of the t i rne ant: pl zce of the hear i ng, ycr-
oone p r e s e ~ t ,and t hci r qual i fi cat i ons.
( 3)
A 31~r nnl ~r y of t he t est i mony of all. wi t necoes hear d b y
the t ri bunal .
(4)
Cert i i i ecl copi ea of a l l oupport i ng docu.ments upon whi ch
t h i deci si on wno bascd.
(5) Di-avringa, photog~:ayho, Gr accur 2t e 6zscriytio:ln of i t cl ns
of real evi dence considered by the t ri bunal .
c. Counocl f or the t r i bui ~a l wi l l a a ~ i s t ir? the pr epar at i nr ~ of tile
r e c o r d of procec8ingrs.
d. Thz or i gi nzl 2nd 2 copier; of the t r i bunal ' s d-ci si ou a n d all.
suppar t i ng documcnt,q \;/ill bz fcrrv;ardzd by the pr es i dznt f.3 t hc c o~ve t l i ng
aut hor i t y ivithiil one week frorn. the dat e of the a n n o u n c e ~ ~ c n t of the deci oi on;
t he or i gi nzl will. be f o r v ~ m d dby tile conveni ng zut hor i t y- t o COMUSl,4ACV',
ATTN: SJA; one copy wi l l be retained by 'he conveni ng zut hor i t y; one co;>y
wi l l be ma de available t o the det ai nee or h i s counsel upon r eques t .
Page 5 of Annex A
---- -
- --
MACV Di r 20-5
REPORT OFTRIRIMfiL DECISICN
Ti?IBUmhQ.. CASE hQ.
--
(UNIT) DATE
InRe:
This tribunal, havingbeen directed t omke a detersllination as t o t he legal
s t at us of ,captured by
-
a t
--
on .,has examined a1.l availzble
informationend has determined t hat 'he (is) ( i s not) ent i t l ed t opri soner of
war st at us.
Additions1 i dent i f yi ng infomiation conee~ni ngt he prisoner i s as follows:
Dateof Bi rt h: hit,i f hovm:
Place of Birth: bb'Gherl s naTz:
-
IDM. , ifany: Father1s nam:
Rank, i f any:
Aliases, i?any:
Annex B
~
bkjo.; A. B. k?,05100822, JAGC
C;.,ptais.l R. C. S'na;.;, Oi;'il?.::53$, IXF
LUG R.S. Fcxz, 53.6924, U3ll?
1LT R. A. Base, 05474421, JI&C
Ape to: p i b 5 ~ 1 - j ~
E f f . Pate: w- c - >r . : nr r n
Pd: Indefiiiite
: <22ei.iR5.gej-3.1 c<T, : ; ~s f-,a.cp---- . < .... d r ;,d t o it ~:l:e.;her t ! ! a i ndi vi 6vsl s
bz-foyz f t p.1-2 ej-i.tiepd .to ~ ~ ~ ~ ; ~ ~ ; ~ j 25 P i ' i ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ of W ~ T~~, d; l y
t!lc G5 7 ~ 3 ~ 7 a &;l*;-;c-t iv....~ .
fi.~e,h: paLo.,;,.,:l . - - r 7 < : V - 3 7 - . 6 , F,yic\/ Di?;tcq;iye 29-5
sP Insw:
~r>.,~ .". A-..-". L i
2..:.;-.4 ,.:.A :' ill1 - - TDI..ZC.~Itl:?pr~cedr!z.es s et for'ih i n Armex A
rCO b.: p " 7: : *; - _A:
s-.bd 1;..i;.,.t.:.-::3 29-5 nl d v , i l l i n d i ~ q t ei t s daeision i n the
-fc;y,?atsix;.:;!? i n ;;:;;:;y 13 f,v.Cqi?Di i ~z c . ~i ~e 20-5 in case
thg-e 22 L,,..; ....% -, L.5i2:;y~.
Annex C
h?ACV Di- 20-5
T.. .
(Reziarks, if my, a ~ d s.mi%::.,hc1rZr3':;xtj~~;flos to thr? detaincers di c -
position folloxing thz hx~rnj ~i : ~ t-511Bc s k z a at this point.)
Annex D
------
M C V Di r 20- 5
1. PUL',:PC?ST. the c a r e s of ~ W E .
-..,---
To s . e v i c ~ ~ ~ captxred and cls.zsified
by US f or ccs \~~iiooe, cr:tltlcmcnt t o PJV 'statun i o quest i oned by the GVN.
2. ----. -.---- RACI<CRGUZ?D. F r o m t i me t o time, Wd!CV r ecei vec requccts
~ T O X Xt he GVN, t h r o u ~ hthe Joist Genzr al Stzff, t o review t he cs uee of c c r -
taln PIV, captxioed a nd clascified by US f or c e s and held in Vietnzn2eae PVJ
camp?, who may have baenn errozeousl y clenoir'i.ed as P W. The hCACV FYI
3. -.--- .----.-
?he hMCV Pi7 Rcncr ecni ng T e a m wi l l be. corn-
CO~L~L~C~SLTION.
yoaed of four of f i ce>: ~. They will. bc one each fro~-. MACJ1, P.ILACJ2,MACJA
arid the captxiring uuit.
a. MACY 1 rep;.cacut.rstiuc . wi l l have $mar y general o t a f f Eupor -
vision avcr the r es cr ecai uz act i vi t i es.
b. MACJ2 r epr cs ent at i vz will be r a n$on~i b%e for cl ac si fi cat i on
of Lhooe r e 3 c ~ e c ~ c Z .
C . MACJA rc?rsr; enAat i ve ill advise azld acrjiot in the cl aagi f i -
cc?,Monof e;~:;e re::ci ..~c,~-~d,
d. Ca;;D.~ring\ ~ ~ i i t wi l l provi de advi ce an.d a s s i ot - repze-oe~~ta'iive
aacc t o the rencrccnir:g teala. and ~ ~ r o v l d c all available capt uri ng uni t r zcor ds
2nd r zpor t : ~on tlic F W t o be r e ~c r a e t ; c d .
5. PROCEDURES.
a. Requeot s f r o m GVN for P741r es cr eeni ng wi l l be r ecei ved and
coordi nat ed by lVA.CJ1. In t l ~ eevent that a r oa t c r o i P W whoae s t at us i s being
que2tion.c.d does not acco-mpmy the request for r cocr ecoi ng, MACJl wi l l o h b i n
such r out er pr i or to the r e a ~ ~ e e n i n g . Upon receipt of the r os t e r , bfACJ 1 wi l l
furni sh two crjpieo ef i t t o MIiCJ2.
b.
Prior t o th.? vi s i t of the MACV PTvr Rescreening Team to tile PVI'
car-p, a combi ned i nt er r ogat i on t e ~ r n ,coordilzated by w9CJ2, wi l l a a sur e
tlmt c u f f i c i e ~~t r ecor d3 are nvsi l sbl e on each PI': who is to be r e3cr cci l r d t o
enable a deci ci on t o b=! n l ~ d ein hi3 case. The r e c or d on each P W t o be rc-
wcrcened m u ~ t contain the r e por t of an i nt er r ognt i on conduct ed by a US i s t e r -
rogat or. Fo r purpoze the i ni t i al . Pr el i mi nar y I nt er r ogat i on Repor t
( W C V For r n 370) wi l l auffi ct .
I A C V Dir 20- 5
d. Rebcrc.enirzg chaI.1.bc z~co??.::,:~19.346.SrePIV carr~p 2.t \-:here the
PW andtlleis recc;scla ere!.ocatcd. Perr.,ci:!,lelf r omthe c;l..ytu.ringuili'i-~7I1ibe
presentCIil~ii~g the rcocreei i i ug, in orcIeTthzt t;.l.e r es cr ecr i i ng teammi gh-t
havethe benefitof their acl~iicca:id z~;r;jstal;ce,~ ^ L Cvqel.1 2 s the recordi; and
repsstcl of theca.~iturii?.g1;iiit c..:ld i;rltj.al i nt el - r ogat o~s . Itis consj6zrcc-idcsir-
able that ~ p p RVI<l]F ~ ~r;-rzcr:i:_nel ~ i ~hi? p::cnerJt ~ ~duri l i g t5.e re;crecl.iing to ~ .
a&, ri : >- 2r:d 2w~:i:;t: p'i:J x~elr.:reel~.;.nc. Such pc~;oil. ilel l i ??. ~ C' Glc >gt.AiCy, Ter:nl,
a o s i a i i nt:+.e yescreeziyi:,
i1;1t i.2 ~z?.?i.:.L bz ~~n~: : hr ? , r : i ~: e ~ the c:e;;zr;ilii:~i:i~t1 :!?at
conc~.;r,irlgt!lr zt::.hls c;f aU S cc.>kii:ed znci cl.?sc;fied P'i'V ia a unilztei-a!.
decision 1-i13.d~by ' j S i:,z;.::orinel,
e. The r e ccrecnitlg tez.a.1wiJl utilize ~ 1 1 in document..i a.ve.ilaS!
the r eocr cei ~i ng of PRi . Such dccun.lcntc vfilI.i ncl ude, but notl>sl i mi t edt cf
the Preliwi;;ary Iniez:t.ozar;j.o;?Rey;:j:.ri: (I\,!-?.CV Foyril 370) ; otFiei. wr' lttzn ~ccor d: . :
of i-r,:err.o<::,tic;13; t.hCI >. ~~. : : ~i : . l ~~~(USi",A'v l ?c; ?i ~~3 6 5 ) ; fie D>taiileen e p ~ r t C.
or& (TJ:;fiI'\l' F'oz;>r236/1.);a;ld l_'yT cp,mp ~ e c ~ r d . 7 .
f. Vi %si l tile resci-eeilifiztearin -i,iil i nt er - conci cl zr r d nijCi.~;~;~~-j:.:)r,
vie.;? i:ldivi<v.al Pk"2r;d conchct ouch i n t c r i ~ o g ~ t i a ; ~ as i o decmedneccenzr y.
5.
Aft::;. cr;n:;;c?,~.;.ir;g 211. av.aj.labl3evi <znce?the rescy;.ee.ni?~g tezm
vjil].y:l:?.tie 2 dr.tzy;l.li~12tj.3il./ : : ~ t l i c ~ez.;lch PW vjIi3::2 csze beenz' i . ~di ed
chou!.cj bc co:i'ii.r,uecl int';lct ::.:PT.:-L:u or ;:ec].zoaified z s z civliian. Skb1t mili
. .
b.2 cil:in.jctl f r ci nPI T 32l y-;~rhent!~a evld2i:c.e c].c;.:.?l.;r. ir:dj.ck'ice thzt to be a.Y;>so-
pi-istt.
h. Eachc::sc wi l l bz ~.zr;i!:\::,-.dby the hFACJAre7rcsentrttiv.e. Re-
cl nosi f i ca. t i sa to no~: -P' Watatuswi l l not bz ac~or =?~l i s hcd' wi t hout hi s concur r epce.
Any case c.houtwhich the IVLACJA repzesenfx~tivehaa doubts wi l l be.refet : red t ~ ,
a n Art i cl e 5, GPW; tribcnz! i n rccorclznce wi t h t5.e provisions of t hi s di rect i ve.
i. The c ? . s ~of 2.ny detaizic.e who clairne P W s t a h s , butv/h:>the
roacrezniilg t;:arn f eel s shoul dbe 1.cclasuifiedasacivilian, will be r e f e r z e d
t oa nArt i cl e 5, GPW, tribuaa! i n>ccorc:.ance with tlhe pjroiri:;ion~ of this
di r c ctive.
6. -.--.-- REPSX' CS. Thz r e z c r e e n i i ~t e s a ~wi l l submit a r e ~ o r t of each
r cocr eeni ngutilizing the fo~rnlx. 2cr3r.tair~eda,th ~ l i l e ~ Fof this di r ect i ve, which
ohall i?lclude:!.B a ni ncl or ~ur ct?leretoa c c m~ ~ l e t e rosterof +he PI1! rescreetied
and f ne d2te;.mio>tioa rnacle i n e>.cl_lc2oc.
1.
Page 2 of Annex E !I 2
----
--
----
- - - - - - - - - -
i i
I. D~ r i n gt he pariod
------
t he 3%C!r F*V Resc~cmingTeain screened
i!
f
1 I
I
I
1
5 +-., 0: U.S. captl.~rcdand cl assi f i ed JW a t t he
j
cl,e L . ~ C : ~ Y C ~ RVNAF Ri cznp located
-
I 1
a 2, Or" t he E1!rescx<eilcd:
y;
b. : Recla,ssifi& as ci vi l i an.
J 6
: 3.
It is reca!~~~-znded as t hat (3%(JGS) be iniomied t hat those reclassified 1
Z
P
!. ci-rriJ.isrl i<Aybe trmsfer-red im t he cxiip for f ur t he r clisyosition i n zccoz-Lznce
3
;
1
i n eech case.
bUCJI 5 Rep.
i
Cop;, T~rrnisl~ed:
Cap'iuring Ifi~!.t Rep.
-
bMC.J.84
, yJ: - T?
t
]. i
1. Annex F
2 -
,;
-.,--.,."--..
- ~- , . . - - "- =~i - r- a. - -.c-..-m:. -?Ad.:IIII.Ln..U)- . = ,r..-m"" z,.s 4.--=--.--:-- r,: :7. ;.i..ZCI-2v. 3i..... iillm.:... .-.:Cc,.,:,....."i.;.*,.i-.V.~...u. *l . . CLi 0 ~ - . . , , . 1 1 .-.a. -.C ...-- .....
I,...
'
-
I T, m. - ; , . s, REPLACES OD F O n M C'6, EXI STI ?: G SU; ' P! . l ES DF Xi l l t H 7; I L. i Ot7
-.- - - - - .. -- -. . . . - . . - --- I . ! ' , :
MACVDir 27-5
HEADQUARTERS
UNITEDSTATESMILITARYASSISTANCE COMMAND, METNAM
APOSanFrancisco96222
DIRECTIVE 2 November 1967
NUMBER 27-5 (MACJA)
LEGAL SERVICES
WAR CRIMESANDOTHER PROHIBITEDACTS
1. PURPOSE. To reaffirmthe prohibitionagainstcommissionof
warcri mesandrelatedacts.
2. BACKGROUND. Overtheyears, therehaveevolvedcertainrul es
whichcivilizednations observei ntheconductof war. Theserul esa r e known
asthe law af war. Theyrepresentthe principle that, eveni nwartime, there
arerul esgoverningbehavior andprescribing the limitstowhich troopscan
go, collectively andindividually, i nprosecuting thewar.
3. DEFINITION. A war cri meisthe technicalexpressionfora
violationd the lawof warby anypersonorpersons, military orcivilian.
Everyviolationathe law of war isawar crime.
4. ILLUSTRATION. Thefollowinga r e examplesof warcri mesand
relatedimproperacts. Itisimportant to note thatthis listisnot intended
toincludeallsuchacts.
a. Maltreatment ormutilation ddeadbodies.
b. Maltreatment of prisoners of war ordetainees.
c. Use of forbiddena r ms andammunition.
d. Abuse af orfiringontheflagof truce.
e. Improperly takingpersonaleffectsormoneyfromprisoners
of war or detainees.
f.
Killingspiesor otherpersonswhohave committedhostile
act swithout trial.
g.
Tortureorinhumantreatment of aprisoner of war ordetainee.
h.
Depriving prisoners of war ordetainees of the rightdaf ai r
trial.
EXHI BI T D-38
i. Looting orpurposeless destruction.
53
MACVMr27-5 -
5. APPUCABIUTY. Thisdirectiveisapplicablet oallUSmililary
personnelandtoUS civilianpersonnelservingwlth or accompanyingthe
armedforcesinthefield.
6. ACTION. Commissionaanyactenumeratedinparagraph4,
above, or -ng awarcri meiaprohibited. Violation dthis directive
willbe punishable i naccordancewiththeprovirione dthe Uniform Code d
MilitaryJustice.
7. REPORTS. Thisdirectiverequiresnoreport.
8. REFERENCES.
a. Geneva Conventions of1949.
b. HagueConventions of 1907.
c.
Uniform Code of MilitaryJustice.
f . MACVDirective 190-3.
FOR THECOMMANDER:
WALTER T. KERWIN, JR.
Major Gelieral, USA
Chief ofStaff
NEIL N. SNYDER, JR.
Col or ~l , USA
Adjutant General
DISTRIBUTION:
B
Plua 5 - JA
10- NAVFORV
300 - AQ-AOP
10- USARV
10- mMAF
5- AO-AO
10- 7AF
s,
- L MACV Dir95-4
HEAWTJARTERS .
UNITED STATESMILITARYASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
A m SanFrancisco96243
DIRECTIVE 28June'.1966
~UWMBEF~ 95-4* (MACJ3)
AVLATION
US 0- AIR INRVN (U)
a, Toestablishtheproceduresandresponsibilitiesforcom-
mand, control, andcoordinationof UnitedStates(US) militaryai r opera-
tionsintheRepublicof Vietnam (RVN).
b. Topublish therulesof engagement andrestrictionsfor mil-
itaryai roperationsinRVN.
2, (U) DEFINITIONS,
a. SpecifiedStrike Zones. Thoseareasapprovedby aprovince
chief where strikesmaybe conductedwithout additionalpoliticalclearance.
Whenever possible, aFAC will supportthese strikes.
b. CloseAir Supprt. Airactionrequestedbythegroundcom-
mander againsthostiletargetsincloseproximitytofriendlyforcesand
which requiresintegrationof eachai rmissionwiththef i r eandmovement
of thegroundforces. Duetothewidespreadintermingling of friendlyforces
andpopulations with enemyforces, G W political andtacticalapprovalof
-
allstrikeswithinRVN isrequired, thereforeharasementandinterdiction
rnisdionswithincountry muetbeprocessedascloseah support missions.
c. JointAirGroundOperationsSystem(JAGOS). A composite
of integratedcommandandcontrolsystemswhich includes.theMACV Com-
mandandControlSystem, theArmyAi r Ground System(AAGS), andthe
AirForceTacticalAirControlSystem(TACS).
*ThisdirectivesupersedesMACV Directive95-2, 20December 1965, and
MACV Directive95-4, 6February 1966
DOWNGRADEDAT3YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIEDAFTER 12YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10
EXHIBIT D-4
MACV Mr 95-4
28 June .I966
3. (C) GENERAL.
a.
The mission of 'dlUS military aviation forces in the Republic
of Vietnam-iato assist and provide air support for the counterinsurgency
effort of the RVN Armed Forces (RVNAF) and the United Statesflree World
Military Assistance Forces (US/FWMAF).
b.
All services operate thmugh portions of the same air space and
are frequently employed on joint and combined operations. Each possesses
to some degree the capability to accomplirh miustone normally assigned to
another service. Therefore, cloue cooperation and coordin#ion ar e required
to assure that efforts are complementAry, integrated, and achieve the most
effective results.
c. En route Air Traffic Control is a function of the Director of
Civil Aviation. It is exercised through the Joht VN/US Air Coordination
Committee which coordinates the use acivil and milftarp communication
and navigation facilities and personnel. Terminal Air Traffic Control is a
function of the mpported force commander aa defined by MACV Directive
95-5, subject: Flight Facilities in the RVN, and MACV Mrective 95-9, sub-
ject: Joint ~irborne/AirmobfleAirmp ope ratio^. Aircraft performing
close air mpport are controlled as upecified in appropriate service Air/
Ground Operations dfrectives.
d.
Al l US military pilots providing air fire support will endeavor
to eliminate incidents involving friendly forces, non-combatants, and damage
to civilian propem by adherence to the Procedures, Re6t?i~ticmm, md Rules
of Engagement e h l i s h e d by RVNAF and this headquarters (8ee Annex D).
While these restraint6 and procedures ar e deeigned to minimice losses to
friendly forces and non-combatants, the objective dlretimine to obtain the
full productivity of US air capabilities without' appreciably inhibiting reapon-
- siveness or flexibility.
e.
In the event d a major emergency or dlmuter, COMUSMACV
may direct the Commander, 7th Ai r Force, to asmme operational control
over certain designated Zts air resourcee. The relrponeibllity for determlq
ing the eldstence of .such an emergency reat8 with COMUSMACV and wi l l not
be delegated. Upon termination of the emergency condition, operational con-
trol over US air resources will revert to normal as ltpecified in this direc-
tive.
4. (C) RESmNSIB-8.
- MACV Dir 95-4
a.
Commander, '7th AL. ~' or ce, in hi s capacity as MACV Ai r
Force Component Commander, acts a s coordinating authority for all US/
FWMAF air operations and Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) activities in the
MACV area of responsibility. For detailed responsibilities see paragraph
3, Annex A.
b.
Commanding General, 'm[Marine Amphibious Force (ITI MAF),
wi l l conduct offensive and defensive tactical ai r operations in accordance
with the established Rules of Engagement and will augment daily the US Air
Force effort with resources not required to support operations of prime con-
cern to IXI MAF. For detailed responsibilities see paragraph 3, Annex B.
c. Comaanding General, US Army Vietnam (USARV), will pro-
vide those US Army aviation resources necea~lrurg to mpport both US/FWMAF
and ARVN ground operations and will exercise all functions of command,
except those specifically withdrawn by COMUSMACV, of all US Army avia-
tion units not assigned to US Divisions. For detailed responsibilities, see
paragraph 3, A~mexC.
d. Commander-in-C hief, Pacific Fleet, will provide strike air-
craft as directed by CINCPAC to operate in coordination with the JAWS.
5. (C) 0PBHATIONAL PLANNING.
a. Joint operational planning for required aviation support will
be conducted on a continuing basis at all levels of command down to and
including battalion. Representatives of the ground commander (G2/3Ai r or
~ 2 / 3Air), Air Liaison Officer, and Army aviation representative will
participate in the tactical ground planning to assure efficient utilization of
all ai r support and proper integration into the ground scheme of maneuver.
USMC and 7th Fleet liaison officers will be provided to the J AWS when air-
craft of these services ar e participating in joint operations or providing
close ai r support.
b.
RVNAF advisors and US commanders of ground and Naval
units will assure that planners consider the use of air support for all opera-
tions. Plans for movement of convoys and trains, ground reconnaissance
patrols, security forces, and quick reaction forces will include provisions
for obtaining or using air support. During the execution phase of operations,
aerial fi re support is especially appropriate to support efforts to maintain
contact with the snerny. In the conduct of airmobile operations, air cover
of lift elements and prestrikes on all landing zones will be used as required
where there is a pesibility of opposition.
MACV Mr 95-4
28 June 1966
.c.
Requests for close air support will be proceseed- through the
Joint Air Ground Operation. Syatem (JAWS) (for III WF/ICorps/u~AF
relationship, see. Annex B). Utilieation of thilr .ayetern will insure that ap-
plication of close air support is in accord with the ground commander's
plan and will provide required respoxwivenese.
d. Army Aviation considerations: See Annex C, this directive.
e. Plvrnirrg coordination of air mpport requirements wi l l be.
achieved in the field through the Combat Support Coordination Center (see
paragraph 6n).
f.
Herbicide operatiom (Trail met ) must be elective in nature
and coordinated both politically and militarily. Requeete mulrt be initiated
at province level (see paragraph em).
g.
SKY S#)T should be utilized to maintain close air support or
interdiction-during times of reduced visibility or darkness (see Annex A,
this directive).
h. Troop Airlift: See paragraphe 6d, 6e, 6f, and 6%.
6. (U) REFERENCES.
a. JCS Publication 1, Dictionary of United States Military Terms
for Joint Usage (JD).
b.
JCS Publication 2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF).
c. Letter of Agreement between DCS, VNAF, and MACV,
MACJ311, HQ MACV, Serial 395, 5 February 1965, subject: Special ?rc?-
cedurea for Tactical Operations Flights.
d. MACV Directive 55-2 (C), subject: Movement of Units (U).
e. MACV Directive 55-4, subject: Movement System in RVN.
f.
MACV Directive 95-3 (C), subject: USA/USMC Aviation Sup-
port (U).'
g. MACV Directive 95-5, mbject: Flight Facilities in the Re-
publit uf Vietnam.
MACVDir95-4
28June 1966
:I. MACV Y,iibective 95.-${a;), subject: Joint andCombinedHeli-
copterOperations(U),
f. MACVDirective95- 11(C), eubject: JointAirGroundOpera-
tionsSystem(JAWS)(U).
j. MACV Directive95-9, subject: JointAirborne/Airmobile
Ai r StripOperation.
k.
MACV Directive 381-1 (C), subject:, VisualAerialSurveil-
lance (U).
1. MACV Directive 381- (C), subject: AirborneRadioDirec-
tiw Finding (ARDF)[tobepubl i shez
m. MACVDirective525-1 (C), mbject: HerbicideOperations(U).
n. MACV Directive525- 12, subject: CombatSupportCoordina-
tionCenter.
0.- MACV WI governingoperationsofm'MAFinRVN,6 May
1965,
FOR THECBMMANhjEK:
W.l3. rcOSSON
Major General; USA
Chief of Staff
E, D.BRYSON
Colonel, AGC
Adjutant General
4 Amexea
A. 7thAir ForceOperations
B. . HIMAFAirOperations
C. ArmyAviation
D.
Restrictionsand Rulesof Engagement, RVN
MACV Mr95-4
28 June1988
DI STFUBU~N:
1 - EaHQ MACVStaff
30 - CG, WARV
30 - CG, mMAF
30- CG, 1stInfMv
30- CG, IFFORCEV
30 - CG,I1FFORCEV
30- CG, 1stAi rCav Mv
150- Cdr, 7AF
20- Cdr, I C O F ~ ~ Adv Gp
20- Cdr, IfCorpeAdvGp
20- Cdr, III CorpsAdv Gp
50- Cdr, IVC o r p A& Gp
2 - SA, CMR
2 - SA, AbnBde
2 - SA,RF/PF
150 - COMSEVENTHFLT
20- FWMAO
1 - SA, RW Scty Adv Det
1 - CG, 5th Forcer
202 - MACAG-2'0
25 - MACJ3
W MACY Dh 95-4
28June 1#00
I. (U) PUR3PBSE. To e ~ t b l i d hreilponrribilitieaof W A F forcom-
mand, control, andcoordinationsf'miPitary airoperationeIn theRspbllc
of ~i et nam.
3. (U) GENXRAE. Comwmd and controlof USAF strikeaircraft
and thecoordinationof ~ C/ US N/ VNAFstrikeaircraftwill beaccornplinhed
throughthe TacticalAirControlSystem,
3. (C) RESP8NSIBILmS. Commander, 7th Ai r Force, nik.
a. Conductoffeprrrfve and defelarpivetacticalair operationsto
includemaintenanceof aireuptiority, closeairmpport, reconnaismace
as requestedbytheground. ~ ~ m r n ~ d e ~ orCsqmSeniorAdviaor, search
and rescue, airtramport, andother erupplernentalai r supportas required.
b. Ruvideerssentialtrainingof VNAF inoffensiveanddefendve
tacticalairoperations.
c. Provide hetical air mpport through SKY SPOTwhen d@nese
orinclementweathercreate mch sa requirement.
d.
Provide rnettssmjlogicd mpr4 forair operatione.
e. EotabUeh, irk c~n~rnction with other US and R W agencies,
an Ai r TrafficControlSyateun which lp~avfderrnor& processingandflight
following.
f. Prepare jcrht iiul a-uclrlons hi coujunctionwith CG, USARV,
CG, XI X MAF;and Commm&er;-, 4th Fleet, to assureintegratedandcoor-
dinatedairaperatisns.
4. (C) OPERA'FPOPJAEP E A mC .
a. Immediateand p~ieplamedrequestsforCloseAi r Support
willbeprocesmdthrough the JointAirGround OperationsSystem(JAGOS)
as outlinedinreference411, bmicdirective. 7thAi r Forcewill maintain
tacticalaircraftonground alertto fulfillimmediateairrequests.
b. Coordinationof airactidtierrwi l l takeplace atal l levelsof
JAGOStoeliminate.conflictbetween participating forcesandtoinsurere-
quiredsupport,
AnnexA
MACV Mr 95-4
28June 1966
c.
SKY SPOTControlmints(RadarDirectedBombing)will be
submittedfromfriendlyground'unitstoappropriateSKY SPOTunitto
insurecompletepreplanning forairsupport, 8peeia.l Forcescampsand
outpobtspf specialpolitical/strategic importancewi l l inuurethattheircon-
trolpointcoordinateshave'beencataloguedby nearedSKYS#)T unitso
thatpoints canbeverifiedby USAF phobreconnaissance.
d.
IntheeventCOMUSMACVdeclaresamajor emergency, '7th
AirForcewillassumeoperationalcontrolof certainairresourcestw de-
signatedbyCOMUS'MACV.
Page2of AnnexA
MACV Mr .95-4
28 June 1965
1. (U) PURKISE. To establish operating procedures and assign
responribilities for command, control, and coordinatron of US Marine Corps
aviation operations In the Republic of Vietnam.
2. (C) GENERAL.
a Marine Corpa aviation resources are organic to III MAF and
are commanded and directed in support of tactical operations as designated
by CQ, m MAF.
b,
The w i n e Corpe Tactical Ai r Control Syatern, a component
of Marine aviation, will exercise positive control over all USMC aircraft
in support of Marim Corpa operations and over other aircraft as may be
assigned in aupport of mch operations. The Marine Cor m Tactical Air Con-
trol Sjrretem includes a Tactical Air Mrection Center, Direct Air Support
Centerr, radar surveillance capability, and such terminal guidance facilltiee
re necessary to facilitate the orderly and expeditious handling of tactical
aircraft. This sy&em will coordinate with the TACS ~pe r a t e d by WAF/
USA& and will be prepared to suppiemeni: and integrate with the existing Air
Defense Control System.
9. (C) RESPONSIBmTES, C~mmandingGeneral, IIIMAF, will:
-
a. Exercise operational control over all USMC aviation resources
except as provided in paragraph 3e of the basic directive.
b. Conduct offensive and defensive tactical air operations, to
include close air support, irrterddisn, recomdasance, maintenance of
air superiority, air transport, aerpreh and rescue, and other supplemental
air support, as required.
c. Provide aircraft to support US 7th Fleet operations as directed
by COMUSMACV or higher authority.
d. Establish joint and combined planning coordination measures
required in connection with III MAF/USAF/RVNAF air operations in I Corps
and make provision for apprising 7 th Air Force (TACC) of future ground
operations and possible USAF reinforcement requirements by the following
meana:
Annex B
MACV Dir 95-4
28 June 1966
(1)
Prepare in conjunction with the Commander, 7th Air
Force, joint operating instructions to insure an integrated and coordinated
joint effort.
(2) Identify to the Commander, 7th Air Force, for coordina-
tion and control through the TACS, those resources in excess of current
requirement for support of III MAF operations so that such resources may
be allocated in support of other forces or missions.
(3)
Provide liaison with the Commander, 7th Air Force, to
faci,litate the coordination and control of USMC aviation asset s committed
i n support of 7th Air Force requirements and for purpose of keeping 7th Air
Fuxe abreast of III MAF ground operations.
(4)
Provide liaison with the I Corps Tactical Operations
Center and I Corps Direct Air Support Center. This liaison effort will
facilitate the tin-ialy passing of information on current and proposed military
operations in order that available aviation assets may be most effectively
utilized,
(5)
In hi s capacity a s I Corps Senior Advisor, insure that
the P.Corps Advisory Group establishes physical liaison with III MAF for
the purpose of informing III MAF of impending and current I Corps opera-
t i o n ~and required air support.
e.
In the event COMUSMACV declares a major emergency, be
prepared to transfer to Commander, 7th Air' Force, operational control of
air resources a s designated by COMUSMACV.
Page 2 of Annex F
i: .) !
--- -- - ----.
28 June 1966
1, (U) PURPOSE. and assign To eatablisrh operating pr acv~~wea
responeibilitie~for command, control, and coordination cl t US Army avla-
tion ope ratio^^^ inthe Republic ofVietnam (RVN).
a. US Army aviation resources not organic to combat unit8 will
normally be allocated to Senior Corps Advisors and US commanders for
employment in mrpport of ARVN/US/FWMAF oMratione.
Aviation resources
so ;rll'&ed wi l l be ~ai gaed,inwar a6 practicable, mireione of direct
.supportof ARVN dioisiom and UB/FWMAF,&vision#, brigade., and regiments.
Senior A&&ora wi l l eatablish an Army Aviation Element (ME)within each
ARVN C o w and Divhion Tactical Operations Center (TOC).
US divlaion or
higher c o m ~ r e wi l l eatablish an AAE at their TOCe.
b. Aviation asseta wi l l be 'allocated asdirected by COMUSMACV.
U8 Army rerourcer u s subject to reallocation, recaIl, or citieraion through
the &my A v U h Diman (MD), Combat Operation8 Center (COC), to
comply Vith priorities establiehed by this headquarters.
c,
US Army aviation rsesurces assigned in general bupport and
not aUecated to mpport a s pe dk UiVN Corps or US unit will remain under
operational control af COMWXACV. OV-1unita in this category are under
thg operati d control of MACV J2. This control is exercised through HQ,
USARV. Other resonrcea in UI~B~ategolywill be allocated by AAD, COC,
MACV, in accordance with priorities eetablierhed by this headquarters. When
committed to operation$ guch resource8 exclusive of OV-1's will be under
operational control or in support of the commander of the US unit, or the
Senior US Adviaor ofthe ARW.unit concerned until released by the US com-
mander or advisor, or recalled by MACV through the AAD.
d. uS/FWMAF units aslafgned to a CTZ or major US unit will
request US Army aviation support tlhrowgh the respective TOC.
3. '(C) RES~NSIBILITTIES.
a.
Commanding Generall, US Army Vietnam (USARV), rill:
(1) Provide US Army aviation resources to support ground
operatione including airmobile operations, aerial reconnaissance and
~urveillance, fire support, search and rescue, air transport, and ot her
applemental dir support, an required.
,"-
Annex C
MACV Dh 95-4
28 June1966'
(2) Exercirecomrmhd, leasoperationnlcontrol, of US
Army.Aviationr e~) ur cer and
combatadation.upport, udirected,
to w/FWMAF/ARVN forcerf6rthe conduct of combat, l@.tlcd, orother
c o u n t e r ~ e n c p operatiomthroughout'theRVN.
(3) Provideqydlfled aviationproomeltooperateArmy
AviationElementratc o w and dtririonTOC1r.
(4) ProvideUS Army aviationrupportforHeadquarters,
MlUtaryArrrirtanceCommand, Vietnam.
(6) B. MU. h ando p m an ArmyAi r Traffic Regulation .
andIdentificationSyrtsm, coordinrtedwith andrempmivetotheAi r Traffic
ControlSycrtem.
(6) R e m e inconjunctionwithCommander, 7thAir Force,
joint operatingin8tructlonrtommre intsgratedand coordinntedairopeza-
tions.
(1) Exerciseoperationalcontrol overallocatedUSArmy
aviationremurcee.
(1) Exe~pcirscommandoverorganicUS ArmyaviQtionre-
sourcee.
(1) Exercime operationalcontrolover allocatedUSArmy
aviationrerourcer.
(2) Withinallocatedreeourcer, provideerrentialaviation
supportforARVN military andparamilitary forcerinconeof responsibility,
includingunitsaf theGeneralReserve-andSpecialForce6when, committed.
Page2of AnnexC
.-.
MACV Dir 95-4
r-28 June 1966
RES~C: TIC+NB
..,. .. .--
AND $CirYXSOF EWGAGEM@lrJT, RVN
1. (U) PURRXE. To di ne upecific operationnl restrictions and
rules of engagement for 7% aircrah in RVN.
a. All targetrr #elected tor orn air etrike will be approved by
the Province Chief directly or throhgh higher ARVN authority.
b.
All pilots wi l l endeavor to minimize non-combatant caeualtiee
and civilian property damage. A strike will not be executed where identifica-
tion of friendly forcee ia i n doubt.
c.
All pilots will lrave a bml edge of the dieposition of friendly
forces and/or civilian8 prior to conducting a strike. This information may
come from ground or air briefing.
. d. For purpoBee of this directive, references to the Forward Ai r
Contr~ller(FAC)also encompass and apply to the Marine Tactical Ai r Coor-
dinator Airborne (TACA),
e.
USAF, -USMC, avkd USN &trikeaircraft will normally be con-
trolled by the follmirg in the order sf prdsrence as liated:
*(I)
US Air Foxe AM/ vAC or hbrine TACA.
*(2) VNAF F.Ac:PAO,
(3)
ITSAP M&-*/?( M Y BX43T)or USMC TPQ-10.
f. In an emergency, uhan ~ L . Pqualified meanrr of control is avail-
able, the following personnel may deslignate the target for strike aircraft:
(1) The commadurdelr of a ground unit or US advieor engaged
with the Viet Cong.
(2) US pilot of an airplane or helicopter supporting a ground
unit, who haa radio contact with the ground unit hvoived and/or can identify
friendly po8itione in. relation to enemy lpoeitions.
*Under VFR cocditionrr, when a USAR, USMC, or VNAP FAC lie not avail-
able, a qualified Army Target Identuying Pilot (TIP) may designate the
target to be &ruck and the flight leader of the strike aircraft will control
3t ICV Dir 95-4
28 June 1966
(3) US pilot of a? .irpkma or hellco$er requirsd to oprate
d & i n the vicinity of a hoolile pi l l ~zeor hamlet for the plrga~gOf COP L X~ XC~ -
~ n g a :?edical evacuation or oug*y docion, .andwhere enemy fire promnb
,imme,aateWeat to tho lives ofthe hellcagter or tramport crew.
g.
Close Air Support missions that 'involve otriketl 'onhgmleta
d l a g e a must always be controlled by a FAC. It the attack on a village
0, hamlet i s deernecl necsoaav am?die executed in colljunctisnwith sground
involving movement of ground forcea thrc~rghthe area, -the.~ttack
may be made without n a r ~ i ~ g ; ho37aver, appropriititc US-GVW-RVNAF
is required, except in fnemorgsniee. If the attiack on a v$lhge or
hamlet i s not in conjurrction nleh any frmI@datsground oparatisn, the
inh&itanta mgst be namedby ledlets md/or loudspeaker ey&em prior
to t he attack and must be given sufficient time to evacuate the area.
3. (C) SPSCIFIC lNSp'gEUCTEBNSFOR CLOSE AIR SUPPORT T8
DJCLUDE I $ ? ' P ~ : ~ ! ~ ~ ~ ~ O ~ Y ---OR Pira'GB'r).
a. A ~ / ~ P A C will:-
maneuver.
(I) Have thorough Bn~vledge of'the ground scheme of
in directing
(2)
an air
every effort to secure a WAF observer to aeeist
If a VNAF observer iar not available, an Am/ drike.
FAC i s authorized to direct the air strike.
(3)
Maintain reliable communications with &und unit arid
with strike drcralt.
(4) Make po~litive identffication and mark the target.
. .
(5) Imure that strike piiota are wa r e of friendly locations
in relation to target, characteriatic~of target area,md local weather
condltiorm.
(6)
Use 1:50,000 a c J e maps of target area, and photograph-
when available,
(1) Always be under the copltpol andl have direct radio c~ntact
for a strike with a Fornard Air ControlZcr or designated control agency
(drborne or ground).
Page 2 of Annex D
MACV Mr 95-4
28 June 1966
(2) Have visual csr -tact with target or target marker except
aa noted in paragraph (6), below.
(3) Always ascertain the prdtion of friendly troop (or
civilians, when applicable).
(4) Aecertain localconditions regarding weather, target
area, and surrounding terrain characteri6tice.
(5) Defend themaelves againd grodd fire providing:
(a) Source of fire can be visually identified.
(b) . The strike can be positively oriented against the
source.
(c) The fire is of such intensity that counter-action
is necessary.
(6) Strike at night .only with flares, unless under control
of TZQ-10 or MSQ-77.
.4. (C) BORDER RESTRICTIONS FOR AIRCRAFT CONDUC'SI[NG
ASSIGNED IN RVN.
a.
Aircraft will not cross the demilitarized tone or Cambodia-,
border d e n 8 8pecifically authorized by COMUSMACV.
b.
All FACs operating i n the vicinity of the border will have a
1:50,000 map of the target area. Maps, mosaics, and photos will be made
available to the pilots.
c. Joint operations-intelligence facilities ,will be establiehed
and complete prestrike briefings and poststrike debriefing8 wi l l be con-
ducted for strikes within 5000 meter8 of the border, when practical.
d.
Cambodian border restrictions which are additional to the
above:
(1) Strike aircraft wi t h 5080 meters of the Cambodian
border will be under positive control of a Forward Ai r Controller or MSC
77/ ~~Q-10.The authority to waive this requirement is restricted to
COMUSMACV or his designated representative.
Page 3 of Annex
MACV Mr 95-4
28 June 1966
(2) All .organitation-, responsible for plrnning or 6-0
tion of mfseione rim5 km of the border will have pa&d in op~t i on8
a 1:250,000 or larger scale map on which the Cambodian border i8 dim-
tinctly marked, on the RVN side, to the depth of 5 km.
(3) Aircraft supporting border outposts (fire aupport,
reconnaissance, supply, and tranaportation) are allowed to operate aa
necessary i n the outpost area, but will neither cro88 nor fire rcro88
the border.
(4) Appropriate radar stations will flight follow aircraft
on missions within 5 km of the border withinequipment eoppbillty.'
5. (C) JE' l ' mN.
a. Munitions will be jettisoned only in designated jettiooq arOa8..
b.
During night or IF'R conditions, aircraft W be onQr -v_8
radar control while jefflsoning.
c: During day VFR, drops wi l l be monitored by ndPr vmnever
possible.
8. (C) US ARMBD HELICOP'IXRS.
a.
US Army and US Marine armed helicopters wi l l be marked
"US Army" or llUSMarine, Tt as appropriate, and m y be m d with dl-Us
crews at the unit commanders discretion.
b.
If the target involves non-combatants, such as'in a W e t or
village, whenever possible an RVNAF observer wit1 be aboard the hacopter
and US-GVN-RVNAF approval to fire must be obtained unleea the adbation
clearly presents an immediate threat to the lives of the crew.
7. (C) USAF C-123 AIRCRAFT. (RANCH BAND). Ranch Hand air-
craft flying Trail Dust missions in RVN for the purpose of crop destruction
will be flown under "Farmgate" rules which require Viehamem markings
on the aircraft and a Vietnamese observer aboard.
8. (C) AIR RECONNAISSANCE AM) AERIAL SURVEILLAWE '
MISSIONS.
a. Operational restrictions placed upon reconnaisranee aircraft
near the ~VN/Cambodian border, for the purpose oi immring that inadvertsnt
Page 4 of Annex D
MACV Mr 95-4
28June 1966
overflightsdonot occur, preclude midreconnaissanceoverlargear ea
within RVN where significantenemyactivityisknowlr tobetakingplace.
Inordert oeliminatetheimmunityof suchareastoobservationandphotog-
raphy, Weeerestrictions may bewaivedonacase-by-case basis.
b.
Reconnaieeancerequeetsforcoverageinareaswhichpresent
a danger of an overflightor borderviolationwill beforwardedthrough
nor ma1 reconnaissance requerrt channel8to the TASE. Upon determination
that awaiver isjustified, therequest wi l l beexecuted. Intheevent.of
particularly seneitivecomplications, C0MUSMAC.Vwillbethefinaldeter-
mining authority.
c. USArmyOV-1 aircraftmaybearmedwith target marking
ordnance whileonsurveillancemiesions.
9. (U) AIR TO AIR RESTFUCmNS. Commander, 7thAir Force,
pescri besRulesof Engagement and Restrictionsforairtoaircombatin
RVN. TheaearE publishedbythathepdquartersinTacticalAirControl
Center(TACC)Op e r a wInatructiw (01) No 55-33, 30 March 1966.
Page 5of Annex D
Ch 2, MACV Mr 95-4
26 August 19 67
HEADQUARTERS
UNITE D STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
APO San Francisco 96222
CHANGE. 2
26 August 1967
DIRECTIVE
(MAC J3)
NUMBER 95-4
AVIATION
US AIR OPERATIONS'IN RVN (U)
-
Directive Number 95-4, this headquarters, dated 28 June 1966, is
changed as follows:
Annex B
3. - (C) JIESPONSIBILIITZES; Commanding General, III MAF, will:
d.
(Superseded) Establish joint and combined planning coordi-
nation measures required in connection with III MAF/USAF/RVNAF air op-
erations in I Corps and i n the DMZ south of a line running from the coast
line west along the northern boundary of the DMZ to NS grid line XD 90; then
south along the NS grid line XD 90 to the PMDL; then west along the PMDL
to the Laotian border and make provision for 'apprising 7th Air Force (TACC)
of future ground operations and possible USAF reinforcement requirements
by the following means:
GROUP-4
DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
Ch 2, MACVDir 95-4
26 August 1967
FORTHE COMMANDER:
NEILN. SNYDER, JR.
Colonel, USA
Adjutant General
DISTRIBUTION:
1 - Ea HQ MACVStaff
30 - CG, USARV
30 - CG, 111MAF
30 - CG, 1st I dDiv
30 - CG, 1 FFQRCEV
30 - CG, I1 FFORCEV
30 - CG, 1stAir CavDiv
150- Cdr, 7AF
20 - Cdr, ICorpsAdv Gp
20 - Cdr, IJ Cor psAdv Gp
20 - Cdr, III CorpsAdv Gp
WALTER T, KERWIN, JR,
Major General, USA
Chief of Staff
50 - Cdr, IVCorpsAdv Gp
2 - SA, CMD
2 - SA, AbnBde
2 - SA,' RF/PF
150 - COMSEVENTHFLT
20 - FWMAO
1 - SA, RW SctyAdv Det
1 - CG, 5th SpFor ces
25 - 53
100 - AG-AOP
5 - AG-A0
CORRECTEDCOPY
Ch 1, MACV Mr 95-4
HEADQUARTERS
UNITEDSTATESMILITARYASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
APOSanFrancisco96222
CHANGE 1
14February 1967
DIRECTIVE (MACJ3)
NUMBER 95-4
AVIATION
US AIR OPE- INRVN (U)
Directive Number 95-4, thisheadquarters, dated28June 1966, is
changeda s follows:
AnnexD
2. (C) GENERAL.
g.
(Superseded) CloseAir SupportmissionrrrthatfIlmolverrtrikerr
onhamletsorvillagesmustalwaysbecontrolledbyaFAC.
(1) If theattackonavillage orhamletisdeemednecessary
andisexecutedinconjunctionwithagroundoperationinvolvingmwement
of groundforcesthroughthearea, theattack may bemadewithoutwarning;
however, appropriateUS/GVN/RVNAF approvalisrequiredexceptinemer-
gencies.
(2) If theattackonavillageorhamletisnotinconjunction.
withanyimmediategroundoperation, the inhabitantsmustbewarnedby
leafletsand/or loudspeakersystempriortotheattackandmuatbegiven
sufficient timetoevacuatethearea. Oncetheinhabitantsof apreplamed
targetareahavebeenadequatelywarnedthattheareahasbeenselected.as
atargetandgivensufficienttimetoevacuate, thehamlet/village may then-
bestruckwithoutfurtherwarning.
DOWNGRADEDAT3YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFTEDAFTER 12YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10
CORRECTEDCOPY
Ch 1, MACVDir95-4
14February 1967
(3) Commandersinitiatingarequestf or attackafahamlet/
villageareresponsiblef or ensuringthatUS/GVN/RVNAF approvalisob-
tainedand, inthecaseof preplannedattack, thatrequiredwarningisgiven
pri ort oexecution dtheattack.
FOR THE COMBUNDER:
W. B. ROBSON
Major General, USA
Chiefd Staff
F. G. MILLER
Colonel, USA
AqjutantGeneral
DISTRIBUTION:
1- Ea HQMACVStaff
50- Cdr, IV CorpsAdv Gp
.
30- CG, USARV
2 - SA, CMD
30 - CG, mMAF
2 - SA, AbnBde
30- CG, 1st Id MV
2 - SA, RF/PF
30- CG, IFFORCEV
150- COMSEVENTHFLT
30 - CG, 11FFORCEV
20- FWMAO
30- CG, 1st Air CavDiv
1- SA, RW Scty Achr Det
150- C&, 7AF
1- CG, 5thSpForces
20- Cdr, ICorppAdv Gp
25- 53
20- Cdr, IICorpsAdv Gp
200- AG-AOP
20 - c&, mCorpsACIVGP
10- AG-A0
*MACV Dir 190- 3
HEADQIJARTERS
UNITED STATES MI LI ~ARYASSISTANCE COMMAND. VIETNAM
APO San Francisco 96222
DIRECTIVE
NUMBER 190-3
12 February 1968
(MACJY 5 )
MILITARY POLJCE
----. ----.---,-.
EIGM'Y F'RISOX?;'.I;RS OF JVkR (PW')
-..--- --.-------- ---.----- -----
(RCS: b,L!.CJ.l-21, 33, 51)
- - . . - A m - - - . ----.----
PtP,POS?X. To c:.tc?bliclh policinc, reeponaibilitiee and pr ac s hr e s
1 -.---
~ O Fthe hmslEing of Pri ranera of Vjar (PT??)c~piurecf. by Uilited St at cs Military
Forcoa or delivered to United St at es Mi l i t ary Foacc3 by Free Wor l d Afilitary
Asaimtance Forces (Fi~T~UX;') in the Republic of Vietnam.
a. All yEyann.n.ej, detrlnerj, by US f o r ~ < ~ ye?.!bc extended t2l.c fuil
protactinn ofthe Gr cevn CcyLvc:~i'Lcin; of 1.2 August 1949.
b. US c..sc:~:.rcd :;.ill be ~etainei!i n US channels ui ~t i lrelcased
:5cxn ARVM P-71cz,~qp,t&:z C13z:;bi~i.cdMi l i t ar y Interrogation Center (CMIC), o r
2 CQ~;;?.:, . ~ ~ t ~ ~ r ~ c ~ ~ t j . ? ~ ~ ~ i71rit3?r(CIC).
3. Q ~ ~ ' ~ ; ' , ? Z - { zI-C;."S. DoSr,'_":- - Y C
..-.--- -.,..--.-- <em.-
,..:-,-,, a.pplic:-.hie t o F.W' oparat i ons a r e c et
.$,;7 ,--.- ...
f9r.t:: ill -~.T.E.-::~A,-.,.., L, Y !L)i>-eeel-y::3 8 ( - . c. : $.
EXHIBIT D-43
MACV Dir 190-3
a,
This h?a$.quzirtara ia responsible for eertablishing joint policy
for the Pri soner of YJar Program in Vietnam.
Specific responsibilities
include the fallowing:
( I ) ACofS for Personnel, J - l (J15). Coordinate6 the US
Pri soner of War Progzam to include integration with those of RVNAF and
FWMAF to ineure tr unified program. Maintain8 records and etatistics on
al l P W interned in Vietnam. Advises RVNAF DCSPER (J1/JGS and PM/ JGS).
through appro?ri,sta edviaory channela, concerning t 5e totz.1 RVNAF PW
Program.
(2) ACofS for Intelligence, J- 2. Coordinates and supervise?
US interrogation, ex-9loftstic~and clazeification of detained pernonnel. Advises
RVMF JZ/JGS regarzing the exploitrtti~nof detained peraonnel.
Coordinates
integration of RVN, US and FTt'dAL\F exploitation effort.
(3) ACcfZ for Gparatirsac, J- 3. Cosrdinatec force develop-
ment ~ n d ~c~u~TBxE?~: : : ;i 3~rUS raililary unit8 ernployed in P W operatioos.
Advises RVZl.L\F J3/,72'G5csncerai-ng J3 FYI Program respon~i bi l i t i cs.
Coordinate3 iskg::;.;:t3anoi US, RVFLW and F WMAF force development and
requiramentrr for rni.li-tc.~yanit3 err~ylqyedin PIq! operations.
(4) ACjbf3 i s;. Logistics,. 5-4. Coordinater; and cupervisea
logiztical ancl t~:unrcriati::n 3crecas for the Pi1program.
(5) C.s-;l:;t;r~~ctlonDirectorztc, M~LCDC. Advine:: RVNAF
DCSLffi/JGS cxl PC l >sae Jz-fo?opinu,n'i r a z ys n~i bi l i t i e ~ t o include programming
aP FW cfmp cc~~:;t:~acti~~ ~ 3 - dacqzl;:i:ion of real ezht e.
@
JJup Advocate, ,?d&,C_JA-.-.- prdvide s legal guidance
___,.-.--.-
concerning the cokEucfGC-G13-~US-fo-~cea PJ1l Program.
-
(7) '~ur~eonr, MAChD. Coordinates medical aervice support
for PW i n US P'i? er:,e~'"ciorzc%lmzmelo. Advi ae ~R V WF Surgeon General
regardin6 mdi cal service alpport for RVN4F PW; Coordinates integretion
of RVN; US and r"sT:',SQPrc2dicnl nupport for P't?.
I
b. CG, 1 ?TO:?.C:EV ?ad 1: FFORCEV a r e reaponaible foTthe
procecoing, k , ~ c 3 i a : y L7 ,mid e~ncua: i oncrP all gernone detained by units under
their ty:jeratios~Jcon.Srd. ~r2:il re1:3:;sf(d t o one of the following:
( a ) CG, USJLW.
(2) Com.bir..::2. Mi l i t z ~ ~ y Center.
MACV Dir 190- 3
( 3) . CorpsIptc:rrogrt:ion Center.
(-5) ARVN YVJ C~srnp.
c. CG, U%RV i o re:;ponaible for:
(1)
Adrdnbotrntive oupcrvioion of the US forces PMT Prograrn
toinclude the folle~ri.ng:
,
(a)
h$::1nbinirlg recordr: of al l PW capturedby or
releasedto USauthorities.
(b) I v b . ~ ~ ? e i n ~ ~ civildefendznis records on zll returneec,
andthooe i moccnt civilizxs czpturedby US forcea andprocessedatbri gade/
divieion or higherlevel. Syctarn -;dlestablish recordn accountability for
returneer?, civildefendantsrild innocent civilianc f r omthe time of capture
or detainmentby USfarces u t i i released toGVNcontrol.
( 2 )
O p ~ r s t i ~ n ~ l US forceoPWprogrami n ovpcrvioion of t$n,
Vietnamtoinclude ev?,cq~2tlon fromUS divizion/ceparzte brigade P W collect-
ing~) abi l t ~ inthc I FFCXGZV cndIS.FFORCEV and IV Corpa TacticalZone of
al l US dcti~inaecor Pi'?relcnoedtoGVN control.
d. CG El1GJ.Fi a rccponaible for the processing, hsndling and
evacu--.tion of allyzrsr, ns detainod atcollecting pointa or by unita under 111
MAF q x r a t i o x ~ l c n ~ t r o l w~tiireleasedtoone of thefollowing:
(1) Conxbinod Xi l i t sryInterrogation Center.
(2) Corps L~tarrogzition Center.
(3) A2VP.IPCd Camp.
e. CQ3AJQLVFOXV and CG. 7thAF are recrponsible for evacu.tion
ofPT?teo the nszraat U&lRV collectingpoint and forestablishing,componenta
orvviceproca2urcts toizlcludcj ths n.,intemnce ofPWrecords. The CG, 7th
AFi~ rospansliblc forprcrr9dh.g ai rl i ft forenacuationof P Wasrequired.
f. WithinRVKYF, pri soner of war reaponsibilitiea have been
aocigncela&fol l ox~o:
(1) DCSPER/JGG. Ch r g e d with joint supervigionof the
RVNAF PiYProgrexntoiccluda themaintenance of accountabilityfor PJ5r in
GVNcuotody.
MACV Dir 1933-3
( 2) J1/JGS. Reeponvible toDCSPER foraccountability of
allPWin- country illGVN'cuetody.
( 3) F r o v o ~ t Mar~hzl/RVNAl?. -Under ~upervi ei on of ACofS.
J- 1, rerrponr:ib!a foredminictl-otionand operational rruys?.viaionof RVNAF'
P WProgramii~cluding Wcampaperationo.
Maintains a central repository
foral l recordn of P Wdetained inARVN Corps fiCamps.
*
g. FTTI:]:/I.F, byagreement, a r e reoponaible forprocessing and
delivering P Wtoth-. GVN. US force^ csxmnandera areauthorized, hov~ever,
toa c c e ~ t cc:itc?y o! 1;' YjP/il~Fczytured PW t ~Ae n in combined US/FVI,'vfAF
opzratiunps. US L3;-cer; commcandern a r e a180 suthoriuedtoa s o i a t i nthe
evacmtionaf F,"T?,IAF captured P WtoP Wcampa without forrr~zlly a c c e pt i ~g
r e c p ~ n s i b i l ~ y for t h i r cunhdy\mdcrthe GmV.
5. PROCEDURES.
--. . . --
( 1 )
XII M V N ICTZ, P l V\.ill be evacuated tothe ARVX I
Corps P Wcrx-:lp.
(2)
i;? A~ XVNII CTZ, PW wi l l be evacuated to one of the
ARVN LY CC-T:; PTI camp.
( 3)
SiARVN U CTZ, P Wwillbe evacuatedtothe P,.IIVN
111 Corpo PV c-:.;..y,!.
(4:
12 AZVN TV CTZ, P W-will be evacuated tot he ARVP?
1v corpa PJ 7 c;?.::?;?.
(5)
T'louaded and ceriourlyillP I Y &illbe evacuated through
US force*m-cdb;::..l c:L.r;?:melsuntil suchtime as their medical conditioilwill
permit trr?n,..:fertr,ARVN PIT carip. The medicalbr i g~de , ao designzted
by CG. USI?IS:V%.-,.ill 'coordiin.2tethe t ranaferof theee PJV with hnlkCJ15 for
t ransfer tot3.eF'i7 c;>>ixy dasignztedto receivemounded or seriouslyi l l P W
at leafit 24 hour:! ii=,-.dvL:nceof the rnove toinsurethat the campis pr opzr l y
notified.
(6j
I ?or : ; ~n: ~l efiectr:ofP Y i ;Till be hanclled and accou~ltcd
for a3outlinzd in rJ1-~1-,:.~r2, Scction1, AR 633-50. Proccdurrr;\-/ill be
ectxblichedt o in::-?ireih...t retained and impounded pr oper t yi o not l o o t or
micappropri-.tcd.
b. RYI\YLFIT? evacuationf l oa parallel3the RVNhFiahlli:once
ayetern.
MACY Di r 190- 3
c. FWMJL;?v~illt ag each P Wpr i or t ot r ans f er to US custody.
Norlx;,1Xy US f.:)rc.sn ~ . - r i Z SAcc..;..t only per cons whohave been deoignnted a e
FSY bythe c.?.ph:ril=~<force. FWMAF will cornplete andt ur nover t oUS f or ces
the PY? i9rocer;ning cl:.ocun~.eato on all P W accepted. Those det ai nees ivho by
ncccaaity arc tli:.ncd ovey to US f or cespr i or t o the det emi na- t i onof t hei r
P W nta'iuc r+-illbe procerioec?through US challnele i naccordance with extabli,ched
pr scedur ca.
d. The 3.42iCV Mi l i t aryPol i ce PW campa.dvin0x-yt ezm :ocated,at
each ARVN PYI C C ~ ?::All obtain-two copies of ARVN Fo r mQCalOl Cor each
PVq capt uredby US forceu o r FYJMAF wllich US forcea have evacua. edt othe
camp. Ofic co13y of the AXVN Fo r mQCa109.wi l l be forwarded to h~i ACJ15,
ATTN: Br a~l Ji ~ . n 8anz c02y villhe maintained i nthe fi l es of the US Pi.'?
Advisory for P Weccourmtability purpogea. If a P W ir; t r anci er r edto
anct her camp, t hcI ~gi i l g PWsdvi aor yt eamwill forwardt hei r copy of the
QCa109 t ot hc recci vi natcnm.
e. US militarypolice encor t pe rsoml el willprovide a USARV
Form 364 (DetninocR c p r t Form)t oa member of the PUTcampadvi sory
o h f f f or es chP77 &~l i ~rari ?l d US advico' rawill ent er the P W t othe tarn-p.
interment o s r i d m:xAcr i ni t a m15 sndwill f or war dthe USARV Form 364
by r e ~ i c t e r c d ZI ~: ! ~~Et~ 1vrY~CJ115,ATTN: PT? Branch. Aft er pertinent i nfor-
=tie-n IXLCb!?e;le;:kractod, EAACJ15 %ill fort-;'iard the f or mto the USARV
Provsrt hl:c?ri;b-1,ATTN: AVHPM-PJT7.
f. Vi oi t a t oIxjJ c s ~ r q sby ot har than per sonnel assi gncd. a di r ect
zdv-iacs-ly ole r;rz pzaoliibitedudzst:~ r i o r cl ear as ceDa u becn obteined f r o m
thz JcintGcn~i-?,IS",,lf, RVFGLF. Rer,uer;ta forpermirigion tovi si t anARVN
PETc2np\-rillb2 au'u:dtt.-d i nwriting t othia Headquai-ters, ATTN:
TVLACJlS
not later t : h?~t anckyf:;>rial:tothe requested dat e of the vizit. Re q u e ~ t rrill.
contain 'he purpci s of thz vi si t , the composition of the par t y- andthe e x ~ e c t e d
a r r i va l ar-d d e ~ z r t x r eti-mea.
g.
Repolat;7or obcervationa madeby US vi si t or e during vieito t o
aRVN PT'J 'i~1np3which~y a r r a n t c o m. 3 n d attention o r correc,tive nction wi:l
not he ct ~bmt t t adtotheAXVN P Wcaln? co-ndcr o r t oany nl ember of the
US P Wcamp advi zar ytearn, butni l 1bB f or war dedt ot hi s Headquar t er s,
ATTN: h4AC.715,for evaluationandtrancnriittal t othe JointGener zl Staff,
,
ARVN.
h. When i nt er r agat i onof US czp'iurer!P Wi c conducted at the C34IC
o r a CIC, the f o l l o ~ i n gpr ocedur esvJill be ut i l i zed to i nsur e accur at e Pi\'
accountnbility.
( 1 )
U ~ o nr ccsi pt of is US capt ur edPW, aGVN r e p~e s e nt a t i ve
will signP a r t V s f the USARV For m 364t oi ndi cat ethat the P Whasbeen
released f r omUS culto2y.
5
-
---
--
MaCV Di r 190- 3
( 2 )
The USARV Forrn 364 will be retained i n the poeaeeni on
of US personnel in the CMIC or CIC nntil the P W l o evacuated to a PW camp.
( 3 )
W1-len the P W is evacuated to a PVJ. camp a US member o I
the CMIC or CIC will enter the nnm&of t hecamp i n Par t V of the USARV
Form 364 and forward the form to l-vf.tXC,J15.
(4)
lMACJl5 will entzr the i nt ernrne~i : in itern. scriai n u ~ ~ i h e r
15 and forward the form ta t'nr UYAKV Provost Maruhal , ATTN: AVi-IPM- PW.
6. REPORTS.
a. Prinoi-,er of %VnrRepcrt (RCS: MACJ'I-21(R- I ) . CG, USkRV
will furnish a monthly r e p~ r t t o MACJ I , ATTN: U C J 1 5 to include the
number of:
b. Pr f ~ai i arof ;7cr. Ir,cld:-.r;t:Report ( RCS: MACJ1- 33( R- 3. )).
Inci dant J -,5-r'cafnii?;?g 1- - tc thr2 Lt'YT a0 G ~ I J ~ ~ U P B ~ reriouz i nj ur y, r i ot ?, G U C ~ cka'ih,
..-
f,.t'
r.::,n;.>l;ei?d
..
an:: ~ u c b+ _._ r = S C a p a , zot r ei : ~r t edt o this hcadpuxr' ;crs ur:dsI. ; -..-,rzsful
. .
Fra.c:lr::lrJr_;a OE >:!A':I.CV DDi-;ocPI-i3 335- 3_ bz r el i o~t ed ~;-~i3.3. a3 outlines hereill zn
zZ~:.,;.?-.7, bs made thrczagt:. 2.pqi-opria.t.e :7 , - i , , . I : . .. -,%; - J..A19,.
cfi:.ni~<?,:~ 1;). a y ~ , ~ ~ l . i c ~ j r 7:.-:~ J : f;;:;irl_g ; kno-\;:icdzc
tifi7..-Vi1)7 nf ;?rU
3ricident Rc~. , ort;: .~,4!.
32 ~ ~
the i.;.c:d::ili. kii~, t . i ~ - ~ t -
-.* ....--..-
bs t i - an~pi t t cdby elc?ctric:.,: i:-:.-;.:r:s
t o thl-3 Hc?L.,cl:;u:~-r.t-rr::, AXTN: MACJ15. h l inforiixition copy of 2.11 17r;Incidell;
Re~oi -t r:.:yj.:;ichj.nl;;?.;; I"?,? *;r!u,h: zs c ~ , ~ > ~ ~ ~ ~ ; > . ~f3r.::iarded by MACJ'15 ;
t]?.;.
UShXV F'r3<;02f 2v',.;::,ri;h7bl, ATII-'GPM-P'g. Ay'f>::
* n 7 . 7
c. E:?cre>,i,r;eIni-dcazr1ypcpul:ttioniRCS: MACJ1- 51) . P' W
tra. ~rsfsr:. ~, be reported by the US P W ad. , -hory ralrara,?s crrrr~.Lur:;,l. deat h ~:?:r!ll
i kz:;.7. i o h:.BCJS 5 i :"?.~>:>d$z"L!cX;?~:,i;!lii;i:li; the n o s t cxpeiiitiouc rneang of col-A-
r--.w.q.-, - - - ri~tl:,<:,,~.icfn, ,;
.
r
.
.- ;, L<. T: . . - +=, . -..-..; .; c ~ Yc Y: ~ - ~ s ~ ? . x c ~ ~ : the ch?.nge arid the total number
-~L, . vci vsr j .
A. -.;~~~-<~ +;E.>;a-u2 r : : ~<- , yt;yiilbil ::::bi-?.li,tcz$ctz:::;-,i;li2i( t.hl fo?.ln;.:ir,c:
. .- . .
I i-, j. .-..- . .. -,-* LL:SZ~ :i :; a mirLi.T:~.:~xx: , -,
cc
(4) Rennon for 103~.
( 5)
In the czaz ofaP Wdeathduetounnatural o r nat ural
one copy of the Vietnamese. Deat h ~cr t i f i cat ewillbe forwardedto
anexpcditiout;lys c pot~sible.
. Lcetci- t o CCJ, U5A.E.V; CC?vZXAVFORV; CC;,IT1T;/I.A.F; a i ~dCrJ,
7tl; JW fro:mCOFIILX3LAC\T, 3 Eapte~n%ar ] 956, subj : Hzndling andP,ccoi~n?ing
~ O P Pri:;~ync~; of-';..'i~r.
WALTER T. KERWLY. J R.
Maj or C-er>er21, USA
Chief or'Staif
- - .,-., .. ..
;-.;L. ;.;, Pi. SI\:YDEK, JR.
C~! s : >~l ,US A
A.<'ljl.i?antC-sr:e;.al
AUCV Dir 190-3
Annex
A. InformationRequiredfor Prikoner of War Incident Report.
DISTRIBUTION:
B. L
PIUS 25-J15
300-AG-BOP
5-AG-A0
5 0 - MCVF
MACVDi r 190- 3
TNFOR?>4A.TIONREQUIRED-FORPRISONER OFWAR INCIDENT REPORT
--- .----- ----.-----.-.--- -----.-.
1. Typeofincident.
2. Time sn&date GPincident.
' . 3. L~cat i cnof incidcr~t(a.g.,'napecific P WCollecting Psi.nt,P W Cam'p,
.
or m.apgrid coordint?,te8) .
4. Name, grade and argsniaationof individual rendering report.
5 . N;:me sf yrcrssn(u)invalved, toinclude vi ct i na, raubjecti.:and
witncssea, including information astotheir:
a. Grndo or title.
f. Jf arefr:vofvcd, indicate their ot at uo, i.e . , DA.C, et c. , c i ~ i l j z ~ n ~
'
inplace ofservicen mh r t r .
6. .
r--
eec r-r--.-.'..
aurnmLrryof f . act u~~1
A caxi-,;iI
I,:b,~~el.vs informaticnconcc:rni:ig
the incidcrtt. Wh->ni~.;!icntedbed--?-useof the rz.ture of tlzc ii~ciG.e~;t,the exter?.'.
ofi nj cr i ss"iper.?onj?.cl andori t I l i z. at ~~d vz.lua ofd.?..miageoorl osswillbe
includa?d.
7. St:?,ha and :oe::.tian cfpei.aomlcl involved.
8. D~.sigrct5-.,ion ofthe org3.niz:stioeor agency, militeyand civilian,
csndu. ct l ri 2~ the: invo:jC.igstion.
9. St.tcxienS e:.ito sc?~.al.?r alaticlpsted rcac.!-io-. ....,by the ci vi l populsce,
t o the i : i ~i i l e~~t asd z@:<:a ftexna rziztiy-e the ilicident.
20. Include 2- r.ta'i.::~:~~en.t th2t the localGIorP-dl-jutant('Ix.s) (hasno:)
beeni-lotii'icd s f thin incid+~nt.
------
CORRECTED COPY
C1, MACVDi r 190-3
HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATESMILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND,VIETNAM
APO San ~r k n c i s c o96222 -
CHANGE 1 23 July 1968
DIRECTIVE (MACJ3.5)
NUIASSP. 190-3
MILITARY PO.LTCE
ENEMY PXISONERS --. OFWAR -( PW)
Di r ect i ve Nu111bzr 190- 3, thiS headqua' rters, 12 Februa.ry 1168,is C ~ . L ? ; ~ ~ C I ( _ !
as fol l ows:
5. PRCCEDURES.
e. (Supereeded.)USn-il.i?arypolice escort perscjnnel will provize
aUSA.R'V Form 364 (Ce.Sai;.iec Repor t FOP&) t o a~xerrx'berofthe PW A*<-
vi.xnry staff for eachP7Y delivered t othe camp. USadvisors; will. cnt er
.I-& PYb .hternmelzt fi eri d z ~ mb e r initem 15andwi3.1 forward the USAK'V
F'or-m 30.4 byregbrjtered arlail to Corm~3-.~zding General , US.ARV, A'TTN:
AVHF?A.,-PW, AYO 96375.
C1, MACV Di r 190-3 -
FOR THE COMMANDER:
WALTER T. KERWJN, JR.
Majox' ~enera1,USA.
Chief of Sisff
SI DNEY GRITZ
Colonel, USA
Adjuta:lt General
DZSTRLEZUTZON:
B
Plus:
300 - AG-A'OP .
25 - J15
5 - AG-A0
, C2, MACV Di r 190-3
HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSIST~LNC E COMMAND, VIETNAM
APO SanFranci sco 96222
CHANGE 2
DIRECTIVE
NUhf EEK 190-3
MILITARY' POLICE
ENEMY PRISONERS OFWAR( P W ~
(RCS:htACJ1-21, 33, 51)
Directive Number 190-3, t hi s headquarte'ro, 12 February 1968, is
'changedasfollows :
* * t *
2. POLICY.
!Y
e. (Superseded) ~ r t i c l e )2: GPW, provides that pri soners of war
will be protected againstpablic curiosity. Article 14 requi res that pr i -
soners a r e entitledt o respect for t hei r peroonsand t5eirhonor. Sh.ow-
ing the condition8 in whichpri s ~neralive is permissible when it is. in-
te~srledby such photographa t o reaffirm the rights of the pri soner a s an
individual and t o chow hi s t reat ment in accordance with the Geneva Co1-i-
ventions. Thet a n individcal .mTmay be identifiable as a resul t of such
pbotograi~hu doee n~t ,iri itself,preclude the taking or publishing of i3lc
photograph. Thefollowing areaxamp?es of types of permi ssi bl e photo-
grzp5s :
(1j Healthful livingquar t er s (Art. 25, 29).
(2) Cleanmessesand adequateirations (-Art. 26).
( 3)
P W clothing suitable t o theclimate, clean andi n good repai r
(Art. 27).
(4) Csmp canteens where F W may procure foodstuffs,soap, tobacco
andordinary ar t i cl es of daily use(Art. 28).
C2, U C V Di r 190-3
(5) Medical facilitieo and meqical car e arCforded P W (Art . 30, 31).
( 6 ) Freedom of rel.igious observance for PW (Art. 34).
(7)
P l V engaged in intellectual, educational and recreational (includ-
ing sports) pursuits (Art. 36).
(8)
P W g a h f ~ d l y eniplsyecl i n suitable working environments at
work of the approved kind - that having no mi l i t ary character sr purpose
(Ad. 50, 51). a ,
(9) PW receiving pay for work performed (Art. 54, 62).
(10) When applicable, P'tod writing their farnilice and receiving mail
and p r e e l a from Atbeinfandies or fromthe Red Cross (A:*. 70, 71, 72).
f. (Added) Autllorizntion for any photographs to be taken at a P W
caxr~p.r~luet Ideztirficatiun photographs foi- first he cierxrnd wi t h WAC31.
prisoner s f . records conotitute an exception to the f or egohg.
CEL4RLES A. CORCOWiN
Major General, USA
Chief of Staff
SLDNXP GRITZ
Cnl ~nc l , . USA
Acijutnnt General
DISTRBU'I'ION:
3
Flue :
300 - LLAGLLG-AOP
25 - MAC315
5 - IAXCAG-A0
*MACVDir 335-1
HEADQUARTERS
,. - UMTEDSTATES MILITARYASSISTANCE COMMAND, VlETNAM
APO SanFrancisco96222
DIRECTIVE 22 November 1967
NUMBER 335-1
(MAC J15)
REPORTS
PORTSOFSERIOUSCRIMESORINCIDENTS(SIR)
(RCS: MACJ1-22)
1. PURPOSE. Toestablishuniformr e p o r k g procedures onall
seriouscri mesori nc i de nt s ~oc c ur r i ~~ within RVNinvolving US forces
personnel,,ov pf o~er t S. ~ . ( dQ~~~~~ f7a+ure
2. DEFIMTIONS.
- .
a. USForcesPersonnel. ;CfS military personnel onactiveduty
in~i e t n a m with the US Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, Coast
Guard, FWMAF; orGVNforces; US civiliansemployedbyathe US forces,
US civilianemployeesof contractorsengagedinUS military contractsin
Vietnam; dependentsof suchpersonnel;andVNandother nationalemploy-
eesof the US forcesinVietnam when onduty status.
(1) Deathsexcludingcombatdeathsanddeathsresulting
fromnaturalcauses. Combatdeathsaredefinedasindividualskilledas
aresul t of hostileoeker)l 05friendlyaction.
(2) Voluntary orinvoluntary manslaughter or assaultwith
intenttocommitmanslaughter.
(3) Rape oranassaultwiththe intentt ocommitrape or
otherserioussexoffenses.
@ro & a~ / r ~ t r ~ a f ~ ~ ~
(4) Burglary, robbery, arson;and 9
fraudor extortiond major significance.
EXHIBIT D-8
*mi8directivesupersedesMACVDirective 335-1, 4 October 1966
-
MACVDir335- 1
5 j N ; 6;b " Y
(5)A blackmarketirg, smuggling, andeurrenc y manipula-
tions.
.
(6) Riotor mutiny.
(7)
Involvementswith military or civilianpersonnel of a
foreignpoweri nacriminalincidentofimmediateor potentially seri ous
significance fromapolitical, military, or public relationsstandpoint.
(8)
Terrori st act i vi t i esinvolving US personnelan.d/or US
Governmentproperty.
(9)
Otheract sin+olvinginoraltl(rpitude consideredof
sufficientimportance towarrant the attention ofCOMUSMACV.
(10)
Seriousincidentsinyolvi'ng detaineesandpri soners of
warf or which the US hasresponsibilityunder the Geneva Conventions,
including death, maltreatment, seri ousinjury, ri ot sandsuccessful
escapes(seepr a gr a ph6b, MACVDirective 190-3).
ingcriminalact sor willful negli-
ablepublicity or adversereaction
n w y connectedwith
i
a.
Any agency orpersonhavingknowledge of aseri ousincident
'asdefinedi nparagraph2b, above, isresponsibleforr e ~o r t i n g thefact t o
the nearest US forcesheadquarters or ProvostMarshal.
J b. When US ArmedFor cescriminalinvestigative agencies
(OSI, MSO, CID)a r e requestedt oinvestigateacasereportable i naccor- .
dancewith this directive, theywilldetermineimmediately ifa n Serious
IncidentReport(SIR)hasbeenmade. If a nSIRhasnotbeen made, the
factwillbebroughtt otheattentionof the commander requestingthe
investigation.
c. m e CommandingGeneral, US Army, Vietnam, isresponsible
f or reportingallseri ousincidents involving US Army personneli nVietnam.
d.
The Commander, Naval Forces, Vietnam, isresponsiblef or
reportingallseri ousincidentsinvolvingUS Navy, MarineCorpsandCoast
, Guardpersonnelunder his' administrativecontrol.
. .
MACV' Dir 335- 1
e.
The Commander, Seventh Ai r Force, is responsible f or
reporting all seri ous incidents involving US Air Force personnel i n Vietnam.
f . The Commanding General, III Marine ~mphi bi ous Force, is
responsible for reporting all seri ous incidents involving US Navy and Marine
Corps personnel i n Vietnam under his administrative control.
g.
Area .Coordinators are ' responsible f or reporting al l seri ous
incidents involving persons not included in component commanders report.
4. PORTING PROCEDURES.
t. s sas-
5. SE CURITY CLASSIFICATION. Reports submitted under the
provisions of this directive will be classified according t o content as pres-
cribed by .the current coqponent servi ce directives; however, as a minimum,
they will be marked "FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.l1
6. REFERENCES.
c. AFR 55-30.
pert-
MACV Dir 335- 1
FOR THE COMMANDER:
' WALTER T. KERWIN, JR.
Major General, USA
Chief of Staff
NEIL N. SNYDER, JR.
Colonel, USA
Adjutant General
DISTRIBU+ION:
B
Plus 25 - 515
300 - AG-AOP
5 - AG-A0
INFORMATIONREQUIREDFOR
RIOUSINCIDENT Rl3PORT(SIR)/
MACV
/
Di 335-1
\ Type of incident;
i
2. \Time.anddate of incident..
/
using identifiable
gridcoordi-
4. Name, gv, andorgadzati
9X
of individualrenderingreport.
5. Name of per on(s)involve ,.toincludevictims, subjectsand
witnesses, includingid
k
mationas
F'
oheir:
a..Gradeortitl\
/
b. Fi r st name, dle initial, lastname.
c. Service nufer.
%
\
e. Sexa ddate of birth.
% \
f. If vilian, indicatetheir s i. e.,DAC, dependent,
etc., inplace
d
servicenumber.
summaryof concerning
indicatedbecause of the theextent
andestimateddollar
~ &t u s andlocationof personnel involved.
\
8. Designationof the organizationor offices,
the investigation.
9. Statementastoactualoranticipatedreaction, by
L c e , tothe incidentandnews itemsrelativetothe incident.
Anne* A
Micv Dir 335-<
10. Include1teme/ a thatthe localG-2 orIntelligence Officer
(has)(haasnot) beenno
of thisincident.
applicable.
Page2 of Annex A
*MACVDir 335- 12
HEADQUARWRS
UNITEDSTATESMILTTARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
APO SanFrancisco96222
DIRECTIVE
29 November 1967
NUMBER 335-12
(MACCOC3)
REPORTS
SPOTREPORTS (RCS: MACJ3-21)
1. PURPOSE. Toprescri i ~epo1i cyand~: roceduresforexpedi t i ous
reporting of significantinformation tothe MACVComn~and Center.
GENERAL.
a. Thisheadquartersrequires timelv informationonsignificant
events. Suchinformationcan-beprovidedbestby spotreport swhich follow
aprescribedformatanda r e submittedwithout delay. Incomplete informa-
tion, with detailedinformationt ofollow, willsufficeforthe initialspot
report.
b. Significanteventsinclude, buta r e not limitedt othefollowing
examples.
(1)
Enemy orfriendly initiatedcontacts, actionsorattacks
onforces, lines of communications orfacilities, including ambushes,
attacksby f i r eandassaul t s~ i c h resul t insignificantdamaget oinstallations
or property, or resul t i na total of five or more killed, wounded, or missing.
All USMLA willbe reported. US WIA, when reported, willbe reporteda s
WLA (minor)orWIA (evacuated).
(2)
Allatrocities, t er r or i st attacks, or act sof sabotage
directedagainstfriendlypersonnelor installations.
OP kaCCyi~y
(3)
The capturdlof sQnier enemy officers(VC, NVA, .irregular,
orinfrastructure); the detectionof enemy infiltrationoperations; the sighting
or discovery of significantar ms, supply orsupportcaches; or evidence the
enemy isusing new ar ms, equipmentor tactics.
(4)
The destructionof, majordamage to, o r l ossof cri t i cal
equipment (dredges, AVLP, etc.) or major endi t ems(aircraft, ar mor ed
personnelcarriers, tanks, bulldozersandotherheavy engineer equipment),
including downedor missingaircraft.
?This directive supersedesMACV Directive 335- 12,
;'
%ACV Dir 335-12
e
acpWsyuv/ hce &oLL/rdar,es
.
ahdhr L b p s [rd~hdat / e~
(5)
~eloeationvbf maj or friendly combat/combat support
trniCs (battalion size or larger), t hei r ar r i val in-country, depart ure f r om
ccluiltrp, initial participation i n a bathlion size or l ar ger operation, a
i:hz;ige d their OPCON, the termination of t hei r participation i n an opera-
tion, and the initiation or termination of a battalion si zed or l ar ger
?peration.
(6)
All incidents, accidental or deliberate, including
..!isxskrs resulting i n major property destruction or l oss t o friendly per-
strljnel, or the killing, wounding or mistreating of friendly personnel by
US, RVN, o r Free World Forces.
(7)
Incidents which could be detrimental t o US/'GVN r el a-
tiollship. Such incidents include, but a r e not limited t o the f o l l q i n g when
caused by Americans:
(a)
Injury, death, or mistreating of noncombahnts or
sl pni i cant damage to Vietnamese property in the cour se of tactical opera-
ti ons.
(b)
Riots or di sor der s and involvement i n cr i mi nal
incidents of a ser i ous nature.
(c)
Incidents, which because of t hei r nature or the
personnel involved, reasorably may be expected t o ar ouse public i nt erest ,
or which are of sufficient importance t o' recei ve widespread publicity.
(8)
The violation d national borders, t er r i t or i al wat ers, %
or al r space by friendly or hostile i orces, including physical violation,
violation by overflights, and viohtioti by f i r e, naval or air attacks.
(9)
Overt intervention by Soviet or Chinese Communist
f or ces, or nuclear detonations (see MACV Directive 335- 11(C), f or
for mat).
(10)
Incidents likely t o r esul t i n immediate widespread
coverage by news media. Examples a r e attempted coups, nat ural
di sast ers, political prot est demonstrations, and at t acks on US personnel.
3. PROCEDURES.
a. Spot r epor t s will be rendered by comn:a nders l i st ed i n para-
graph 4, below, using secur e or nonsecure voice equipment, a s appropriate,
to the MACV Command Center. If voice ci r cui t s are not available, Iracsnlit
i
MACVDir 335-12 :
e s ys t emusi ngaprecedence of IMMEDIATE
COCdecticrited teletype system. is notavailxble,
. Repor t swi l l fol l o, ~formatspecifiedill A~lilex.4
andwi l l be submi t t edwi t hout dehyafI.er a n il~cident/evctltoccur sor
hlr.cirn-lesknown. It isnot ncccssilry Cl atabso:utz proof
/
oieac-l~iten: c,:'
it<-)r.?natioii5e obtainedpriortor epdr t i i g, . Keweve~,fhose i t ems not
rct:$scrlal;!jr assuredor coi r f l r m~d I.;? si~i~~ilcl:i:lnotatcd i nthe respec:tive
pf . ' : ' l j o~~ o.C fhf?repbi-tas "i~ep!jrted'' or "utlcc!nlir::!ed" (seeRnr!cx A for
: ' i ? ; . i n ; ~ t a f i ~ i ( - ~ q l ~ P ] ~ ~ ) . i t o f ; + ~ t -C * - . t f -). - - ) . , I n. . ! ).; 4 , 1 l r r 1 r ' r a : . ; ~ F , . : , ~ , ; : ~ ~ J
7 .
,.. !.<;I. :A.::\L.., (:.: +.;b\ni ,\; - , . l . \ :. :Jc + fi 6 I .L
i . .Xlajor.c o m~ i ~ a ~ i d s . antit ht ~ ~ ~ i t a i ccirpssd\.isc:ry;;roups,
?<LJ: i ? ~ry ~)isi.ribtl'i;cted.in wi l l fc,rw;lrcl t ~ d ....parac:.i;ipll4. Ijeloiv, kb:,ic~,,i
tN:ir c isri-entsigna 1operaiiO~lsit?strilc t i ol i i to COMVS ~ ' ~ CAT?'N: V,
MACC'OC3. SupersedingSOT wi l l be:ioi. ~&-dedsoa s t oreach MACCOCS
3 t k?;ist48hoc::.s prior- totheir effective &t e. apprgp~.iateKAC or
sl:xi!ar voice roc76 \ui11becspd?r.i;el~transi-,,i:l.i,I!; i'lassl'ied &hby
jwecure v~i cc:circ:uits.
b. Spotreport s h-ansmi t t edby telephone tothe MACVConimand
Center canbe pas:x?c!onthefollowin~rcircuits:
-(-I-)- . - Co~. ~r no! ~ MACV 31191, -20%; rwrr- iines (2) tltr-ough-(7) -
-.orSaigon LongDistance-37.
.(2)-- . T e ~ nChief - COC B o p 1, Ssigoil Long Distance.-1.
-(3) Operations Sergeant- COCD r ~ p .2.
-+3-)--W-TZ Desk- --COC-Dr@,.- -
4. RESPONSIBILITIES. The commandersandseni oradvi sors
lisied below areresponsiblef orproviding spotreportstotkie MACV Com-
mand Center:
a. CG, mMAF.
b. CG, IFFORClEV.
c. CG, I1 FFORCEV.
d. SA, IVCorps.
e. DCG, USARV.
f . COMNAVFORV.
g. CG, 7thAi r Force.
h. %-t& GNAC
i.
CO, 5th SpecialForces Group.
5. REFORTS. isassigned ~ l s - ~ n t r o l ~ m b ~ C J 3 . - 2 1
EX.Scupr- uh)ozR ' F#i j=, <!. dfiI~li;~*r,F p)aro-'jfwcl 85. 0
-%is report. -
- 2 Jj* 32s-)<
I- FOR THE COMMANDER:
WALTER T. KERWIN, JR.
Major General, USA
Chief of Staff
NEIL N. SNYDER, JR.
Colonel, USA
AdjutantGeneral
MACV Dir 335- 12
9 Annexes
A. 'Spot Report Format.
3. Becurri ng Requirements, I J Lc i i r 1;.
-----
- - - -- - -
MACVDir3335 - 12
SPOTIPEFORTFOKMAT
Reportswi l l lollow the sequence listedbelow. Eachquestionwi l l be
, i f > ~ - ~ r i r ~ d a\-aihbie. assufficientirlforrvlaliorl beco~r~cs
(Brgalliz; ~t i on),(ra~lk!~radt: -- trIRLGI;Y:l ?'OR OF REPORT: ------ andname). -
Lv.Tik:FiE:i:D INClDENT OCCGR'? in Province( 6-digitgrid
oT=-aT*---
km(direction1aC fiirejor
-. -- ..-.-, --- ----
city or base).
,',.-
TT- 3 *I riEW DIDITOCCUR? ! w~l(IT) date-time-group.
Dcsci-ibewhat occuredasobser7;ed
or rsporkd.
Explainthe cause of, or development
of, whatoccurred. If notavailablefor
iaitialreport, report asacquired.
RESbLTSOFINCIDENT? List casualtiesandequipment lostor
captured, etc.
(UFDATEOF RESULTS) (Updateasinformati.onbecomesavailable. )
SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS
1. The "HOW" may notbeavailable initially. k n o t wait. - -.- Report
asinformationbecomes available - donotwaitforf i nal data. Follow-UD
.. -- - . - - - .
with interim andfimlreports.
2. Reportthe terminationtimea s wellasthe time of initialcontact
onactions. Reporttime of dispatchandtime of arri val of reactionforce
whenutilized.
3. Reportfriendlyequipmentandweapons lostby type aswellas
enemyequipmentandweapons (asspecificequipment, individual orcrew
servedweapons, etc.)captured.
4. Onreport safincoming:artilleryandmortarrounds, state whether
ornotcountermartarradarwasused, whether or notcounterbatterywas
AnnexA
fired; include the time Ir ienoly ai:., art i l l ery, or mor t ar s cornme mad
support, and results if kno.;,;/r?.
Report i.l~comil?g rounds by qulirrtiQ, calibc~. ,
rtnd type (if kntrwi!, On all miring incidents include wheiher or not co~nmand
det.~rxitedif known,
5. Report ?i;xage as: 'Destrojre(a, nna.jcr, 01% rliinor. 'WIIEAreport -i q
ih!::aged or cks trdyed bridges, give inf ormstiul: 02 lypass, E TR (estimated
rllne :A' repzir), wheiher or at bridging icy re'i'p:ir is available locally, and
follow-up -,with a final. report whe~l normal i ~ai f i cis restored.
a.
>
1 .
it~sigpf.:!.
Date- time -group of acc idents/incidents.
T y p of a i r c r d t (e. g.', UH-ID, OH-13Y), and unit to which
. blission of aircraft.
e. Cause of incident.
f . E-xtent of damage - use "minor damage ", '!major damage'',
"destroyed1'.
g.
Whether ar ea is secure or not.
h. Whether ai r cover is present or not, and type of air cover.
SPOT REPORT EXAMPIX
Tiger TOC - this is Major Jones. Spot Report - prepare t o copy. In
Binh Dinh Province (BR801532), 8 km' , NW of Phu Cat, at 211832H the 1st
Co, 1/41 Inf (ARVN) contacted a n estimated company of NVA. Gunships
and art y a r e supporting f r d unit. Contact continues. Interim results:
Friendly (ARVN - 2 KIA, 5 WIA, 2 indiv wpns lost; Enemy - 2 1KIA, 2
detainees, 5 indiv wpns and 1 crew served wpn cptrd.
Page 2 ofAnnex A
MACV Dir 335- 12
I%, r?isv.t.'MF and ARVN operations will be report ed no la.tcr than 04i)OIi
&iii:r ;o tllc 3i ACV Command Center.
This r epor t wi l l i ncl ude:
I . Operations with the equivalent of cine or mor e battalions part i ci -
p l l i ~ ~ wt ;ih arc in pr ogr ess during the report i ng day givi~lg:
(1) Name of operation.
(2) Units participatin:.
(3) Starting Time.
(4) Expected duration.
(5) Type of operation.
(6) Operational cent er of mass.
b. Final results and termination time of operations-which ended
during the previous 24 hour period.
c. Period r esul t s of'continuing operations.
Annex B
.'C-,i, i h?CV Dir 335- 12
"It i s reported, but unconfirmed, *.hat.the enemy used CS gas against Yrd
unit. "
3. Remove old pages 3 and 4, and iasert new pages 3 znd 4.
4. This t:ansmittal sheet should be f i l ed in the front of the publication for rc. . f c. l . -
ence pl i r poses.
CiIAF.LES A. CORCORAN
Mai cr Grr:cral , LISA
Chief of Staif
Sl i ) KE Y WIT%
<.r-;l*>i~el, ZSA
Adj ct an: General
!3ISTKiBC'TION:
13
Pius :
3 0 0 ' - MACAG- AOP
~5 - MA1253
F, - ;MACFAG-A0
$c I , ~ 4 c - d Di i ~ 3 s . - 1 2
IMMEDIATE or hi gher , asa p p r o p ~ i a t e . J.: aci:ens t-othc MACV Corrirnand Center
dedi cat ed t el et ype' s ys t emis notavailable. fastest means zvai l abl e. t?eriorts
wi l l follow format speci fi ed a: A:lnt.x -4 and wi!l bc.: submi t t ed ~.vitho-.it del ayai'ter
ani nci dent / event o' ccurs o r becu.rrlns :inow,.. i t i s ~i o?. necessavy tha5 p?:~.!.[ r:,f
each i t e mof i nf or mat i onbe obt ai ned pr l oi - f -o r e p ~ r t i n g . T'nc>s+: iit:il-!s- 1, ; ; :LC.: -,r;..,1 L k
o r conf i r med shoul dhe annotated i r : t hc r a p l c i i v e pt.brtion of tl-,c. r : . . ; ~c ~r t a;:
"reporled1' o r "unconfirmctd, " ( ae e .4;..nex 11 for .! orm::l 176 s : t:ea:.r~,pl:.:!. L ~ - : ~ c ~ ~ , - : , ~ j i
t o obtain prooi o r c.onfir~ni?ti:,n t i s i l l nut be L ( : , 7 1 ~; , t del;l; ~ ; l b i l ; . ; ~ t i ~ : f i f ~i i - I:; i i - L ~ N ; ~ .
repo1.l.
b. Spot r epor t s t r ans mi t t ed b:.; tcsiephone t o the MACV Cornl:lar!d <;el:!-er,
can be pas s ed o r , the following circuits:
(bj
9per at i ons Sgt - MACV (923)2092/38' 31 o r F A G 72' ).
(c)
1 CTZDesk Of f i ccr - LMACV ( 923) 2C92: ' 3891 or EXC 311.
(d)
XI CTZ Desk Qffi ccr - MACV (923)2092/ 3891 or Eki; 31'2.
(c)
111CTZ Desk Offi cer - MACV (923)2092!3891 or E:AC 313.
(f;
i VCTZ Desk Offi cer - MACV (923)2092/389: o r EAC 314.
(gj,
Ai r /Navy Desk Offi cer - MACV (923)2878 or EAC 330 or TSN (924)4378.
( 11)
CMAC D e s k Offi cer - MACV (923)2878 or EAC 330 or TSN (924)437'8.
(i)
52Desk Offi cer - MACV (923)2971 o r EAC 322.
(j)
J 4/ TMA Desk Offi cer - MACV ( 9 2 3 ) 3173 or EAC 344.
(k) J6Desk Offi cer - MACV (923)2076 o r EAC 336. '
(2) . 1900 - 0600 MACV CommandCent er (Bunker)* - AU. TOSEVOCO~;~3112.
(a')
Oper at i ons Chief - MACV(923) 2988.
*The IdACY Command Cent er Bunker wi l l be occupied dur i ngper i ods of i ncr eas ed
a l e r t i n t he Sai gona r e a ; the TOC1s/COC1. sof commander s and s eni or advi s or s
l i s t edi npar agr aph4, below, wi l l be notified when \ t hi so c ~ urs.
C1, MACV Dir 3 3 5 - 1 2
(b)
Operations Sgt - MACV ( 923) 2988.
( c )
I ZTZ Desk Offi cer - MACV (923)2303'or EAC311.
(t i ) Ij CTZ Desk Offi cer - L I A CV ( 923) 253- or E-qC 3l 2.
( e : 1, ' C. T. Z Dr s kOf f i c t l - MACV( 9 2 3 ) 2 3 C\ t o r F-AC 3 1 3 .
f i'/ CTI : Tksk Oi fi cer - MACV ( 923) 71384O L EAC 314.
I gf
A:
- ,
;y
a vyDesk Offi cer - MACV (923j 2974 or IlAC 330.
( h) C;hlAi-; Desk OfEicer - MACV ( 923) 297.k :,r E.'AZ 330.
( i )
.i2 Desk Ofr' icer - MACV ( 9 2 3 ) 2242 o r L A G' 9 2 .
( j \
J-*!'TMA Desk Offi cer - MACV (923) 2-469 or EAC 344.
jk)
.Ti-; Desk Offi cer - MACV ( 923j 2470 or EAC 3 3 6 .
?. Ri' SFJONSIBILITiES. The comrmandcrs and s eni or advi s or s l i s t ed bel ow
arc. rccpor?sible f or provi di ng s pot r epor t s t o the .MACV Command Ce nt e r :
. CG, I F F ORCEV
c . C G, I I F F OR C E V
d. SA, I VCor ps
e. DCC, USARV
g. Cdr , 7thAi r For ce
h. CG, CMAC
i. CO, 5t hSpecial Forces Group
HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATESMILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
APOSan Franci sco 96222
DIREC TIVE
27 December 1967
NUMBER 381-46
(MACJ26)
MILITARY'INTELLIGENCE
COMBINEDSCREENINGOFDETAINEES
1. PURPOSE.
Thisdirectiveprovidespolicy guidance f or the com-
bined screening.of detainees, andfor theactivation, asrequi red, of Com-
bined Tactical ScreeningCent ers(CTSC).
2. GENERAL.
a. Thef or cesthat captureor detain suspectpersonnelarere-
sponsible fortheprompt screeningand classificationof detainees.
b. Cri t eri afor determinationof st at usandclassificationof de-
taineesiscontained inparagraphs 3and4 of AnnexA-.
c. Dispositionof detainedpersonnelwhohavebeen classifiedwill
be made i naccordancewith paragraph 5 of AnnexA.
d. Close.coordinationbetween the capturingforces, civilaut hor-
ities, andmilitarypoliceunitsisessent i al toaccomplishthe screening,
classification, anddispositionof the detainedpersonnel.
3. . APPLICABILITY.
a. Thisdirectiveappliest oallUS f or cesandFWMAFassigned,
attached, orunder operational control of MACV.
b. .CTSCa r e tobeactivatedona n "asneeded" basi sincon-
junction with combined operations, tooptimize the screeni ngof detainedper -
sons. Deactivationwill occur assoonasthetactical situationdictatesand
therequirementfor the center nolonger exists.
4. DISCUSSION. Classification of per sons detainedisthe sol er e -
sponsibility of the detaining US or FWMAF. All detaineesmust be cl assi -
fiedintoone of thefollowilig categories:
a. Pr i soner sof War.
EXH IB ITD-39
b. Non-Prisoners of War.
(1) Civil Defendants.
(2) Returnees.
(3) Innocent Civilians.
5. CONCEPT.
a.
The success of the combined screening is dependent upon
close coordination and integrated planning among all participating and inter-
ested organizations. Maximum cooperation and the availability of essent i al
data will ai d in the immediate rel ease of innocent civilians and proper treat-
ment of returnees.
b. Combined screening of detainees will be conducted a t the low-
es t echelon of command practical; normally, a t the brigade or division
Prisoner of War (PW) collecting points.
Screening cent ers should be lo-
cated near sector/sub-sector headquarters for ease of access to both mil-
itary and civilian files.
c. The mission of the CTSC is to optimize the screeni ng and
classification of a large number of detained personnel to permi t effective ex-
ploitation of knowledgeable sources for immediate tactical information and
to expedite the proper disposition of PW's and Non-Prisoners of War.
6. RE SPONSIBILITIE S,
a. GCof S, 5-2, will develop joint policy and guidance for the
classification of detainees.
b. ACofSfor CORDSwill insure that its fi el dact i vi t i es coordi-
nate with the operation of the CTSC.
c. CG, I FFORCEV, 11FFORCEV, and III MAF will i nsure that
units under their operational control have made adequate provisions for com-
bined tactical screening of detainees pri or t o the start of operations.
d. Province and district chiefs wi l l usually have the funds t o
provide for feeding of Non- Pri soners of War detainees. If local funds a r e
not available, foodstuffs can be obtained through the local CORDS r epr e-
sentative on an emergency basis.
7. ORGANIZATION OF THE COMBINED TACTICAL SCREENING
CENTER (CTSC).
MACV Dir 381-46
a.
The CTSC will have joint representation @pm participating
military units and civil authorities. Ideally, the deputy province chief and
a representative from the operational unit should function as co- chairmen.
As established in paragraphs 2a and 8b, final responsibility for determin-
ing the status',of persons detained by US forces, rests with a representative
of the US Armed Forces.
In addition t o participation by various staff ele-
ments of the operational unit, representatives at the CTSC should include
the following: The National Police, ~rovi nci al / ~i st r i ct Police, including
the wecia1 Branch, National Police Branch, Military Security Service
(MSS) and Sector/Sub-Sector S1.
Each element functioning in the CTSC will
provide its own .transportation, equipment, and supplies.
b. Exploitation of human sources, documents, materiel, and
other intelligence requirements incident. to the effective screening and
classification of detainees will normally be accomplished by intelligence per-
sonnel of the participating elements.
c. Liaison with the Province/District office is necessary t o
gain advice on t erri t ori al mat t ers which may be affected as a resul t of acti-
vation of a screening center.
8. SCREENING PROCEDURE S.
a.
The detaining unit will insure that the proper documentation
is initiated and maintained on every individual detained. It is imperative
that data reflect circumstances of capture and whether documents of weapons
were found on the detainee.
b.
Maximum use must be made of~i nt errogat ors and i nt erpret ers
to conduct initial screening and segregation a t the lowest possible level.
Participation in the initial screening by al l agencies represent ed in the
CTSC is encouraged. However, the sole responsibility for determining the
status of per sons detained by US forces r e s t s with the representatives of
the United States Armed Forces.
c. Detainees will be classified in accordance with the cri t eri a
established in Annex A. Every possible arrangement will be made t o i nsure
that it is a joint effort by the participants of the CTSC, that all possible in-
formation and fact s have been gained from interrogation, and that all perti-
nent files and records have been checked.
d. To preclude rejection by the PW camp commanders of PW's
of questionable status, evidence gathered to substantiate the determination
that the detainee is entitled to PW status must be forwarded with the prisoner.
Improperly documented PW's will not be evacuated to PW camps.
MACV Dir 381-46
9. REPORTS. This directive r equi r es no report .
10. REFERENCES.
a. The Geneva Convention, Relative to the Treat ment of Pr i s oner s
of War, of 12 August 1'9 49.
b. MACV Directive 20-5.
c. MACV Directive 190-3.
d. MACV Directive 381- 11.
e. UMRV Regulation 190-2.
FOR THE COMMANDER:
WILLIAM E. BRYAN, JR.
Brigadier General, USAF
Acting Chief of Staff
NEIL N. SNYDER, JR.
Colonel, USA
Adjutant General
1Annex
Classification and Disposition of Detainees
DISTRIBUTION:
B
PIUS 25 - 526
300 - AG-AOP
5 - AG-A0
MACVDir 381-4b
CRITERIA FOR CLASSIFICATIONANDDISPOSITIONOFDETAINEES
1. PURPOSE. Toestablish criteriafor the classificationof de-
taineeswhichwillfacilitaterapid, precise screening, andproper disposition
of detainees.
2. DEFINITIONS.
a. Detainees. Personswhohave been detainedbut whosefinal
statushasnotyetbeen determined.
Such personsa r e entitledtohumane
treatmentinaccor hncewith theprovisionsof the Geneva Conventions.
b. Classification. The systematicassignmentof a detaineei n
either the PW or Non-.Prisoner of War category.
c. Pri sonersof War. All detaineeswhoqualify inaccordance
with paragraph 4a, below.
d. Non-Prisonersof War. All detaineeswhoqualify inaccord-
ancewith paragraph 4b, below.
3. CATEGORIESOFFORCES.
a.- 'Ji'et Cong(VC)Main Force (MF). Those VC militaryunits
whicha r e directly subordinateto CentralOffice for South Vietnam (COSVN),
a Front, Viet Congmilitaryregion, or sub-region. Many of the VC units
contain NVA personnel.
b. Viet Cong(VC) Local Force(LF). Those VC militaryunits
which a r e directly subordinate toaprovincial or districtparty committeeand
which normally operateonlywithinaspecifiedVC province or district.
c. North VietnameseArmy (NVA)Unit. A. unit formed, t rai ned
anddesignatedby North Vietnam asanNVA unit, andcomposedcompletely
orprimarily of North Vietnamese.
d. Irregulars. Organizedforcescomposed of guerrilla, self-
defense, andsecret self-defense elements subordinatet ovillageandhamlet
level VC organizations.
Theseforcesperformawide variety of missions
insupportof VC activities, andprovideatrainingandmobilizationbasefor
maneuverandcombat supportforces.
(1) Guerrillas. Full-time forcesorganizedintosquadsand
platoonswhich donot necessarily remai nintheirhomevillage orhamlet.
Typical missionsfor guerrillasincludepropaganda, protectionbf village
party committees, t errori st , andsabotageactivities.
AnnexA
(2) Self-Defense Force. A VC paramilitary st ruct ure r e-
sponsible for the defense of hamlet and village in VC controlled areas.
These
forces do not leave their home area, and they perform their duties on a part -
time basis. Duties consist of constructing fortifications, serving as hamlet
guards, and defending home areas.
(3) Secret Self-Defense Force. A clandestine VC organiza-
tion which performs the same general function in Government of Vietnam
(GVN) controlled areas. Their operations involve intelligence collection, as
*well a s sabotage and propaganda activities.
4. CLASSIFICATION OF DETAINEES.
a. Detainees will be classified PW's when determined to be
qualified under one of the following categories:
(1)
A member of one of the units listed in paragraph 3a, b,
or C, above.
(2)
A member of one of the units listed in paragraph 3d,
above, who i s captured while actually engaging in combat or a belligerent
act under arms, other than an act of t errori sm, sabotage, or spying.
(3)
A member of one of the units listed in paragraph 3d,
above who admits or for whom there is proof of his having participated or
engaged in combat or a belligerent act under a r ms other than an act of t er r or -
ism, sabotage, or spying.
b. Detainees will be classified a s Non-Prisoners of War when
determined to be one of the following categories:
(1) Civil Defendants.
(a) A detainee who is not entitled to PW st at us but is
subject to t ri al by GVN for offenses against GVN law.
(b)
A detainee who is a member of one of the units listed
in paragraph 3d, above, and who was detained while not engaged in actual
combat or a belligerent act under ar ms, and there is no proof that the de-
tainee ever participated in actual combat or belligerent act under ar ms.
(c) A detainee who is suspected of being a spy, saboteur,
or t errori st .
Page 2 of Annex A
(2) Returnees (Hoi Chanh). Al l persons regardless of past
membership in any of the units listed in paragraph 3, above, who voluntarily
submit to GVN control.
(3) Innocent Civilians. Persons not members of any units
listed in paragraph 3, above, and not suspected of being civil defendants.
by FWMAF will be retained in US Military channels until transferred to the
5.
DISPOSITION OF C LASSIFIE D DETAINEES.
a. Detainees who have been classified will be processed as
follows:
(1)
US captured PW1s and those PW1s turned over to the US
ARVN PW .Camp.
(2) on-Prisoners of War who a r e suspected as civil defen-
dants will be released to the appropriate GVN civil authorities.
(3)
Non-Prisoners of War who qualify as returnees will be
transferred to the appropriate Chieu Hoi Center.
(4)
Non- Prisoners of War determined to be innocent civil-
ians will be released and returned to the place of capture.
b. Responsibilities and procedures for evacuation and accounting
for PW1s ar e prescribed in MACV Directive 190-3 and USARV Regulation
190-2.
Page 3 of Annex A
/'C;Y
n~~rrr. rnr)rACrMACVD i h L 9
HEADQUARTERS \
UNITEDSTATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
AFO San Francisco 96243
DIRECTIVE
14 October 1966
NUMBER 525-3"
(MACCOCl a) .
COMBAT'OPERATIONS
MINIMIZMG NONCOMlBATANT BATTLE CASUALTBS
1.- PURPOSE. This directive prescribes policy designed40 minimize
noncombatant battle casualties and the impact of those which may occur.
2. GENERAL.
a.
The Government of Vietnam (GvN) is engaged in a fight for its
survival against the communist Viet Cong (VC) supported and reinforced by
the forces of the Democratic Republic Vietnam (DRV), It is the objective of
the VC to s 3 z e control of the hamlets, villages and towns by, a,combination
of military action, t errori sm, political 'action and subversion. It is*the ob-
jective of the GVN to yesist this process and where it has occurred, to reverse
it. This means that the battle for Vietnam flows backward and forward across
the homes and fields of the hapless ri ce farmer and the smal l town inhabitant.
Whether, at any one time, he lives in a VC or a GVN controled hamlet depends
to a l u g e extent upon factors and forces beyond his control. Eventually, of
course, the GVN plans to regain control over all of the hamlets and all of the
people.
b.
The use of unnecessary force leading to noncombatant bxttle
casualties in ar eas temporarily controlled by the VC will embitter the popula-
tion, drive them into the arms of the VC, and make the Xong range goal of
pacification more difficult and more costly.
c. The circumstances described above call for the exercise of re-
straint not normally required of soldiers on the battlefield. Commanders at
all echelons must st ri ke a balance between the force necessary. to accomplish
their missions with due regard to the safety of their commands, and the high
importance of reducing to a minimum the casualties inflicted onjthe noncom-
batant populace.
d.
The% exploit fully incidents of noncombatant casualties and
destruction of property by RVNAF, US combat forces; and other Fr ee World
military forces. Their objectives a r e to fost er resentment against GVN and
the United States, and to effect the permanent-aliepation of the people from the
government.
*This directive supersedes MACV Directive 525-3 (0);7 September 1965 -
including Change 1, 25 October 1965.
- -
USE U O N L F ~
MACV gir 525-3
14 October 1966
3. APPLICATION.
a.
US Foqces. Commanders at every echelon ar e directed to @an
and con,&ct operations in accordance with the following~guidelines:
(1)
Commanders will consider both the military and psycho-
logical objective,of each operation. hes t r i kes in populated areas, recomais-.
sance by fire into hamlets, and poorlv selected harassing and interdiction
fi res ar e examples of military rneasures'wnich wi l l be counterproductive i n
the long zun.
(2)
Commanders will maintain and-conduct a thorough and con-
tinuing program to emphasize both the short and long range importance of
minimizing noncombatant casualties. Troop indoctrination briefings will be
held before each operation. They will include the location of noncombatants
and other friendly forces, measures to prevent mutual :interference, safety
precautions for fi re control support, rules of engagement, identification and
recognition signals, emergency procedures and other appropriate matters.
(3)
The proper selection of landing zones, the careful planning
and execution .of ai r strikes, and the proper employment of artillery and armed
helicopters will prevent unnecessary damage to lives and property of noncom-
batants.
(4)
Forward ai r controllers and armed helicopter commanders
will be briefed on areas to be avoided because of the presence of friendly or
potentially friendly population. Such information must be sought f r om VSadvi-
sor s and local officials at province and district level.
(5) With due regard to security and success of the mission,
whenever possible the people will be warned by leaflets'and broadcasts of
impending air strikes or operations. Blame for military action'in the area
would be shifted to the VC.
(6) A civic action plan should be developed to support each
operation even if the ar ea has been controlled by the VC.
(7)
Specified strike zones should befconfigured to exclude
populated areasexcept those in acce'pted VC bases.
(8) Operations should be planned in'coordination with province
anq district chiefs with dueregard to security of plans.. A liaison officer from
US combat forces conducting operations in a padi&&i.r.province should be
positioned at the sector, headquarters f or coordination. The sector advisors.
must perform this function in the absence of other liaison.
--
1 OFFICIAL ONL c t
MACV Dir 525-3
14 October 1966
(9) Assignment to US combat forces of qudified RVNAF liaison
officers from appropriate RVNAF commanders is egsential and should be
arranged between US commanders and advisors .for each significant operation.
These liaison officers through their knowledge of the area of operation and the
population can assist in identification of friend from foe and can help to insure
close ioordination with all Vietnamese forces. In this 'connection, the partici-
patioa'of ~ i e t n a ' d s e .forces in operations should be encouraged so that the war
does not:appear. to be a US action against theVietnamese people. . Regional and
Popular Force participation should be sought at US battalion or even company
level so that they- may assi st in:the search of private dwellings,' obtain infor-
mation, and contribute to the desired effect of the cooperative war effort.
(10) Established 'rules of good military conduct and discipline ,
must be enforced.
(11)
It is absolutely essential that US forces establish the reputa-
tion of being able to move at will throughout SVN and to defeat any VC force en-
countered. Thi'sreputation for invincibility will produce i n~m~er abl e psycho-
logical benefits and hasten the end of the war. On the other hand, these same
forces must demonstrate constantly their concern for the safety of noncombat-
ants -- their compassion for the injured -- their willingness to aid and assist
the sick, the hungry and the dispossessed.
b.
US Advisors. US advisors wi l l make every effort to convince
Vietnamese counterparts of the necessity for preservation of the lives and pro-
perty of noncombatants. Counterparts must be encouraged to promulgate and
implement parallel instruction.
4. NPLEMENTATION. Implementing instructions and SOPS concern-
ing this directive, fi re control support and safety precautions will be issued
by major commanders and senior advisors. commanders will insure distribu-
tion to the lowest echelons and to other services as required. Alinex A pro-
vides additional guidance for incorporation in the instructions,
5, R23FERENCES.
a. MACV Directive 95-4 (C), subject: Air Operations inJtVN (u),
b. ~et t e%, COMUSMACV, subject: Minimizing Non-Combatant
Casualties, to SA and US Commanders, dated 7 July 1965,
c, Letter, COMUSMACV, subject: ,Conduct 01Artillery and Nava
Gunfire (U), dated .7 November 1965,
amT
1LlALLTS
MACVDir 525-3
14October 1966
FOR THE COMMANDER:
W.B.ROSSON
Major General, USA
Chiefof Staff
E.D.BRYSON
Colonel,AGC
AdjutantGeneral
1Annex
Utilizationof ~ s y ~ a r / ~ i v i l WairkResources
DISLSTRIBUTION:
B
Plus 25- COC12
MACV~ i r ' 525-3
14October,1966
UTILIZATIONOFPSYWAR/CML AFFAIRS;RESOURCES
1 CommanderswillutilizeG5/S5 and Psywar staff officersto:
a. AssGrethat, wherefeasible, eachoperationalplan containsa
~ s y wa r / ~ A Annexandthatallconcernedarefamiliarwith i t sprovisions.
FragmentaryordersshouldincludereferencetoSOPS on minimizationof non-
combatantbattle casualties.
b.
Whenever possible, utilize appropriatele*dlets',airborneloud-
speakers, groundloudspeakersand/or .face-to-facet eamstoseparatenon-
combatantsfromtheViet Cong (VC).
c.; Utilizing appropriatepsywar techniques, explaintothepeople
thattheGVNandthe US understandthatinmany casesvillagesandhamlets
areunfortunately,undertemporary VC domination; thatthisconditionwillnot
prevailforlong;andthatindue coursetheGVNwillrest orelawandorder;
Inthe meantime, thepopulace should shunthe VCandprotectthemselves
againstbattledamage.
d. Wherefeasible, follow eachoperationwith a ~sywar / CA team
toexplaintothepopulationwhathappenedandhow toavoidfuturenoncombatant
casualties.
e. Following eachoperationwherein noncombatant casudties.aria/
or property damagehave occurred, coordinatewith theprovince chief concerne
onprompt indemnificationof those affected. Considerationalsoshouldbe
givenat thistimetoappropriatecivicactionmeasures.
2. CivicAction: Asthe situationdictates, operationplanswillprovide
forutilization of allavailableassets, toinclude aprogramfordispensingof
medical supplies; transportationanddistributionof emergencysgtions; medical
evacuationof injuredor sickregardlessof suspectedor knownpoliticalMil-
iation; andlightenginee,ringworkwithin thecapabilitiesof tacticalunite.
MACV Dir 525-9
HEADQUARTERS
UMTEDSTATESMILITARYASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
APOSanFrancisco 96222
DIRECTIVE 10April 1967
NUMBER 525-9* (MACJ46)
COMBATOPERATIONS
CONTROL, DISPOSITION, ANDSAFEGUARDING
OFVIETNAMESE PROPERTY, CAPTUREDMATE- L
AND FOODSUPPLIES(U)
1. (C) PURPOSE. Toeetablishpoliciesandproceduresfor:
a. Control, dispositionandsafeguardingof private propertyand
foodsuppliesduringcombatoperations.
b.
Controlanddispositionof capturedmaterielandsupplies.
2. (C) GENERAL.
a. Public andprivate propertyandfoodsupplies.
(1)
Whenperforming combat operationsinVC controlled
areas, USandotherFreeWorldMilitaryAssistanceForces(FWMAF)will
takeallpracticable measurestominimize thedestructionof public andpri-
vateproperty. Theseforcesalsomust provideforcontrol, disposition, and
safeguardingof suchproperty. Peoplewhohave livedunder VC controlar e
notnecessarilyhostile, andmight nothavechosentobeunder VC control.
Totreatthem indiscriminatelyasthe enemy, todestroy their propertyor
todenythem essentialresourcesisincompatiblewith long-term Government
of Vietnam (GVN), US, andFWMAF objectivestoextendGVNinfluence
throughout SouthVietnam.
(2)
Continuingcommandemphasiswillbe directedtothepro-
tectionof privatepropertyandsupplies, especiallyfoodstocks, toensure
thatthe population isnot deprivedof itspropertyandmeansof livelihood.
DOWNGRADEDAT 3YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIEDAFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10
*Thisdirective supersedesMACV Directive 525-9 (C), 4October 1966
1 2 5
MACV Mr 52 5-9
10 April 1967
Unnecessary destruction of property will embitter the population by creating
additional hardships, give credence to VC propaganda directed against GVN/
US/FWMAF and make the attainment af long range goals more difficult and
costly.
b. Captured materiel and supplies.
(1) Captured materiel and supplies will be handled in a man-
ner which will preclude their further use by the enemy. Actions will be
taken to permit advantageous use af such materiel-and supplies in support
of the overall war effort. Captured enemy medical stores or material will
not be destroyed intentionally. MACV Directive 381-2 4 contains procedures
for the exploitation of enemy materiel captured by US forces. Enemy ma-
teriel captured by FWMAF will be processed in accordance with their cur-
rent working arrangements.
(2) Rice is a basic and vital commodity in the economy of
Vietnam. It is essential that rice uncovered during combat operations not
be abandoned or destroyed except as a last resort. Every effort will be
made to move the ri ce to a secure area.
3. (C) FtESPONSIBILITIES. Major US subordinate commanders,
Fr ee World Military Assistance Force commanders and corps senior advi-
s or s will initiate action to implement these instructions.
a. Private property and supplies. US/FWMAF commanders
and US military advisors with RVNAF will make every effort to minimize
the destruction of private property and will develop appropriate procedures
to ensure that the population is not deprived of its property and means of
livelihood.
b. Captured materiel and supplies. US/FWMAF commanders
and US military advisors will ensure that appropriate action is taken to se-
cure captured materiel and supplies to preclude their further use by the
enemy. Where possible,, the materiel and supplies will be exploited for
intelligence purposes and/or used to support GVN/US/FWMAF efforts and
objectives. Component logistics advisors and MACV sector advisors ar e
responsible for providing liaison between US/FWMAF tactical units and ap-
propriate GVN officials in the control and disposition of captured supplies.
4. (C) POLICY. The following policy is established for US/FWMAF:
- -
ACV Dir 525-9
10 April 1967
a. Private property and supplies.
(1) Disposition of private property and supplies is the re-
sponsibility d GVN officials.
(2) Civilian dwellings or private property , including live -
stock, will not be destroyed except as an unavoided consequence of combat
actions.
(3)
The destruction of dwellings and livestock of noncom-
batants as a denial measure is to be left to GVN authorities or RVNAF units.
Requests by Vietnamese authorities for employment of US forces in the de-
liberate destruction of noncombatants property or supplies as,a denial mea-
sure will be referred to this headquarters for the personal decision of
COMUSMAC V or, in his absence, DEPCOMUSMACV.
(4)
US advisors at all levels will encourage their counter -
parts to avoid unnecessary destruction of private property. Appropriate
psychological operations and civic action projects will be plamied to demon-
strate GVN/US/FWMAF, concern for the people's welfare.
b. Captured materiel and supplies.
1 Captured materiel and supplies are to be considered a
valuable asset that will be extracted whenever possible', Evacuation will be
effected through logistic channels utilizing retrograde transportation to the
maximum extent. Such materiel and supplies will be destroyed as a last
resort only.
(2)
Tactical commanders will include in operations plans
provisions for security and immediate release to RVNAF of all captured
food supplies. me r e feasible, these provisions wi l l be coordinated with
the appropriate RVNAF CTZ/DTA Commander. When a food cache is cap-
tured, the US tactical commander will report it to the responsible RVNAF
Commander. Reports will include information pertaining to type, quantity,
location, and tactical considerations to include security requirements.
Captured food caches will be extracted by RVNAF whenever possible and
redistributed using RVNAF resources and transportation to the maximum
extent practicable. Major US tactical commanders will make the final de-
cision to destroy significant food caches only after determining that ex-
traction is not feasible.
@) Captured rice should be disposed of by RVNAF in the
following sequence of priority:
MACV Dir 525-9
10April 1967
(a)
To meet RVNAF ration requirements where their
supplies ar e clef icient.
(b)
To meet emergency needs i n the province/sector
or district/subsector area t o help meet critical needs of war victims and
refugees.
(c)
To appropriate GVN officials, who will provide a
receipt for the rice and dispose of it i n accordance with current GVN di-
rectives.
(d) Extracted and transported to the nearest secure
storage area for determination of ultimate disposition.
(4) In accordance with the Geneva Convention for the Ame-
lioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick i n the Armed Forces in
the Field (GWS), captured or abandoned enemy medical st ores or material
shall not be destroyed intentionally. This prohibition includes medical
items which ar e determined or suspected to be contaminated, outdated or
unidentified. Specific procedures pertinent to captured medical supplies
a r e contained in paragraph 5b, below.
5. (C) PROCEDURES.
a. Captured materiel and supplies will be handled by the most
secure and economical means available. In the event extraction of captured
supplies is determined to be feasible but requires resources beyond those
available 'in the area, the tactical commander will forward a request for
assistance through command channels. Requests for assistance to move
materiel and supplies will contain the following items of required information:
(1)
Type and amount d supplies.
traction.
(3)
Transportation and manpower requirements for sx-
(4)
Tactical situation, to include security forces required
for an extraction operation.
(5)
Other factors which might affect the operation, i. e. ,
attitude of local populace and GVN officials.
--?
YJ
MACV Dir 52 5-9
10 April 1967
b. Captured medical supplies ar e subject to the following:
(1) Limitation on Use. Captured enemy medical supplies
have great potential for harm due to unknown enemy standards of quality
and doubtful enemy capability for adequate quality control of items in field
medical stores. They may be used for the care and treatment of wounded
or sick enemy personnel, but only when such use is under the supervision
of enemy medical @rsonnel. They shall not be used by US medical per-
sonnel except in an emergency due to nonavailability of US medical item(s)
of the type required. Similarly, release of captured medical supplies to
local GVN officials or other relief agencies in the field is expressly pro-
hibited except in cases of urgent humanitarian need. Such release may be
made only when US supplies of the Qpe and quantity required ar e not avail-.
able. Release will be limited to types and quantitites d items required to
meet the existing medical emergency as determined by the US military sur-
geon in the incident area. Such release will be reported in the next SITREP
to include types and quantities of items, date of release, name and location
of recipients and intended purpose for which released.
I
(2) Disposition. If not required for treatment of enemy
personnel pursuant to paragraph 5b(l), above, all captured medical sup-
plies shall be extracted by capturing units through component command
established channels to the Combined Materiel Exploitation Center (CMEC),
Building 614, Tan Son Nhut Air Base, These supplies, when excess to
CMEC requirements, will be turned into collection centers established by
USARV. If all available means have been exhausted and extraction remains
impractical, captured medical supplies shall be left intact and in place as
required by the Geneva Convention (GWS). Date, location and best estimate
of quantities left i n place will be reported in the next SITRE P.
c.
USJFWMAF commanders, with the assistance of US advisors,
will coordinate with appropriate GVN officials to establish procedures f o r
(1)
Informing GVN officials of captured supplies and
achieving appropriate coordinated action.
(2) Handling, transportation and disposition of captured
supplies.
(3)
An accounting or other receipt system to be followed
when private ownership d captured supplies is claimed.
(4) Establishing required security in support of extraction
operations.
MACV Dir 525-9
10April 1967
6. (u) REPORTS.
1
a. Whenafoodcacheiscaptured, the US tacticalcommander
willreportittothe responsible RVNAF Commander. Reportswillinclude
informationpertaining totype, quantity, location, andtacticalconsidera-
tionstoinclude securityrequirements. Thisreportisexemptunder para-
graph39af, AR 335-15.
I
b. Releaseof capturedmedicalsuppliestolocalGVN officials
I
I
or otherrelief agenciesinthefieldwillbereportedinthe nextSITREP to
includetypesandquantities of items, dateof release, nameandlocation
af recipientsandintendedpurposeforwhich released. Thisas-required
I
reportcontrolsymbol(RCS: MACCOC-03) isapplicabletoreportssub-
mittedunder thisdirective.
I
c. If allavailablemeanshavebeenexhaustedandextractionof
allcapturedmedical suppliesr e mainsimpractical, capturedmedical sup-
pliesshallbeleftintactandinplace as requiredby the GenevaConvention
(GWS). Date, locationandbestestimateof quantitiesleftinplacewillbe
reportedinthe nextSITREP. Thisas-required reportscontrolsymbol
(RCS: MACCOC-03) isapplicabletoreportssubmittedunder thisdirective.
7. (U) mFERENCES.
a. JointDirective2-65 (S), subject: USAgencyFieldRela-
tionships (U)(beingrevisedforpublicationas ajoint O C O / ~ C V Directive).
b. MACV Directive 525-7 (C), subject: EconomicWarfare (u).
c. MACVDirective 525-17, subject: CivilAffairs.
d. MACV Directive 515-2, subject: Military CivicAction.
e. MACVDirective 381-24, subject: Exploitationof Captured
Materiel.
f .
Republicof Vietnam Decree Law 20/64, 15August 1964, sub-
ject: TheArmedForces: The PowertoRequisition.
MACVDir 525-
10April 1967
FOR THE COMMANDER:
W. B. ROSSON
Major General, USA
Chief of Staff
F. G. MILLER
Colonel, USA
Adjutant General
DISTRIBUTION:
I, rn, VI, vn - A
I1 - B
Plus 40- OCO
40 - JUSPAO
50- RDS
10- PD
5- COC
5 - PACFLT
5 - 7th FLT
5 - TG 76. 5
5 - TG 79. 5
200- AG-AOP
10 - AG-A0
Ck 1, MACV Wr 525-9
HEADQUARTERS
UNITEDSTATESMILITARYASSISTANCE COMMAND, METNAM
APOSanFrancisco 96222
CHANGE 1 23July 1967
IXRECTIVE (MACJ46)
NUMBER 525-9
COMBATOPERATIONS
CONTROL, DISPOSITION, ANDSAFEG U ~ D I N G
OFVIETNAMESE PROPERTY, CAPTUREDMATEFURL
ANDFOODSUPPLIES(U)
DirectiveNumber 525-9, thisheaciquarters, dated10April 1967, is
changedasfollows:
5. (C) PrnCEDURE:S*
(2) (Superseded) Disposition. If notrequiredfortreatment
of enemypersonnelpursuanttoparagraph 5b(l), above, allcapturedmedical
suppliesshallbeextractedby capturingunits throughcomponent command
establishedchannelstothe CombinedMaterielExploitationCenter (CMEC),
Building 614, TanSonNhut Air Base. These supplies, wheni nexcessto
CMECrequirements, will be turnedintocollectioncentersestablishedby
USARV. If allavailable means havebeenexhaustedandextraction remains
Pmpractical, capturedmedicalsuppliesshallbe leftintactandi nplace asre-
quiredby the Geneva Convention(GWS). Date, locationandbestestimated
quantities lefti nplacewillbepeportedi nthe nextSITREP. USARV collection
centerswill disposeof capturedenemy medicalmaterialasfollows:
(a) Drugs, biologicals, officialreagents, andsurgical
sutures: AllstandardandnonstandardFSC Class6505typeitemsand6515
surgicalsutureswillbe destroyedasunserviceable inaccordancewith para-
graphB40, ChapterXV or DGAM 4160; 1(AR755-20), Defense MsposalMan-
ual.
DOWNGRADEDAT3YEAR INTERVALS,
DECLASSIFIEDAFTER l2 YEARS
Ch 1, MACVDir 525-9
23 July 1967
(b) Other CapturedMedicalMaterial: Other itemsof
capturedmedicalmaterialwillbeclassifiedast oconditionanddisposition
madeunder the samecriteriaasMedforcomparable US medicalmaterial
withthefollowing exceptions:
1. Dispositiond servicableitemswillbebyissue
through the RWAFPrzvostMarshalGeneraltoARWPWcampsforuseby
enemymedicalpersonnel inthecareandtreatmentd enemysickandwounded.
USARVwillcoordinateprodedureswith the ProvostMarshalGeneral, RVNAF,
i nordertoeffectissuesof serviceablemedicalitemstothe PW camps.
Capturedmedicalitemswillnotbe introducedinthe RWAFsupplysystems.
2. Al l steriletype medicalitemssuchassterile
surgicaldressings, whxch areot h~r wi seconsideredserviceablewillbe is-
suedtoPW campsasnonsterileitems.
FOR THE COMMANDER:
WALTER T. KERWIN, JR.
Major General, USA
Chief of Staff
NEIL N. SNYDER, JR.
Colonel, USA
Adjutant General
DISTRIBUTION:
I, m,M,vn - A
I I - B
Plus 40 - OCO 5- 7th FLT
40 - JUSPAO 5- TG76.5
50- RD6
5- TG 79.5
10- PD
200 - AG-AOP
5- COC
10- AG-A0
5- PACFLT
-CONFTDENTIA
HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATESMILITARYASSISTANCE COMMA
APO9bn Francisco9 a 2 2
DIRECTIVE
NUMBER 525 - 18
COMBAT OPERATIONS
CONDUCTOFARTILLERY/MORTAR ANDNAVAL GUNFIRE (u)
1 (U) PURPOSE. Toprovide guidance concerningthe controlof
artilleryandq v a l gunfire supportprovidedby US/FWMA Forces. The
termsartilleryandartilleryfirea s used inthisdirective include
andmortar fire.
2. (u)GENERAL. RETBINFOB
a. The nature of operationsandof thebat W S T Q R ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ! ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
andthefrequentconductofcombinedoperations involvingUS, FW,and -
RVN forcesrequirethat specialemphasisbe placed onproceduresforthe
controlof artilleryandnaval gunfire.
b. .Restrictivecontrolsshouldbe heldtothe minimum necessary
toinsure that:
, (1) Friendly forcesanel civilfansarenot' enc~ngered.
(2) Property of friendlyforces, RVNandfrlendly civilians
isnot destroyedordamaged.
(3) Natiomlandoperationalboundariesa r e notviolated.
c. Careandattention must be exercisedcontinuously inthe
applicationof allartillerygunnery techniques. Thefullrange of artillery
gunnery techniqueswhich ineureaccuracy shouldbeappliedtothe maximum
extentpermittedby the situation. Theapplication of thesetechniquesand
theexerciseof soundjudgement on thepartofallpersonnel involved in
solvingtheartilleryproblem providethebestassuranceagainstendangering
friendlyforcesandciviliansor destroyingor damagingRVN, friendlyforces
andfriendlycivilians' praperty.
GROUP-4
DOWNGRADEDAT3YEARINTERVALS;
DECLASSIFlEDAFTER 12 YEARS
EXHIBIT. tD-3
, *Thiedirectivesupersedes
includingChanges 1and2
d. This directive will serve a s a basis for the preparation by
senior tactical commanders and Senior Advisor, IV Corps of standard
operating procedures for the conduct of artillery and naval gunfire:
3. (U) RESPONSIBILITY.
Corps:
a. Senior US tactical commanders and Senior Advieor, IV
(I)Incoordination with appropriate senior RVNAFcom-
manders, develop procedures for the effective control and coordination of
artillery and naval gunfire support based upon established artillery and
naval gunfire procedures a s modified by guidance contained herein.
(2) In coordination with appropriate senior RVNAFcom-
manders, develop positive target clearance procedures to include a system
of double checks to preclude error or misunderstandng.
4. (C)CONDUCTOFFIRE.
a.
*hocedures applicable to the control of mval gunfire ar e
contained in Wr at l on Order 320A-67 (GUN12), Commander ?'a& Group
70.8, dated2 June1967. This document has the force of a USMACV Direc-
tive. Adcbltional cogiea of thie document may be obtained fromHeadquarters,
MACV,ATTN: MACCOC12.
b. &ecified strike zones.
(1) Wcified strike zones muat be approved by GVN/RVNAF
as appropriate.
(2) Unobserved fire may be directed a-imt all targets and
target ar'easlocated within specified e t r t e zones.
c. Uninhabited areas outside speclfied strfke zonerr.
(1)
Fire may be directed against vC/NVA forcer in conduct
in accordnce withnormal artillery procedures.
(2) Unobserved fires may be directed at targets and target
areas,other than vC/NVA forces i n contact, only after Province Chief,
District Chief, &ctmCommander, or absect
r apprqval as
appropriab.
TWNFTDENTIAL
MACV Wr 585-18
(3) Observed fire may be directed against targets of -or-
tunity which ar e clearly identified a s hostile without obtaining .Province
Chief, District Chief, Sector Commander, or SClbsector Commander appro-
val.
(4) Appropriate Province Chief, Metr ict Chief, Sector Com-
mander, or Subsector Commander approval is required before directing fire
on targets of opportunity not clearly identified as hostile.
d. Villages and Hamlets.
(1)
Fire missions directed against knwn or suspected VC/
NVA targets in villages and hamlets occupied by noncombatants will be con-
ducted as follows:
(a) All such fire miesions will be controlled by an
observer and wffl be executed only after Province Chief or District Chief
approval as appropriate.
(b) Villages and hamlets not associated with maneuver of
ground forces will not be fired upon without prior warning by leaflets and/or
speaker syetems or by other appropriate means, even though fire is received
from them.
(c) Villages and hamlets may be attacked without prior
warning if the attack is in conjunction with a ground operation involving
maneuver of ground forces through the area, and if in the judgement of the
ground commander, his mission would be jeopardized by such warning.
(d) The use of increndiary type ammunition will be avoided
unless absolutely necessary in the accomplishment of the commanderts
mission.
e. R V N / C ~ ~ bodian Border area.
(1)
Fire missions within 2000 meters of the ~VN/ ~a mbo&n
border will be observed except under circumstances where f i r es ar e in
defenee of friendy forces and observation of such fi res is not possible
Them requirements are in addition to applicable control procedures stated
elsewhere in this directive.
(2) Fire missions with intended target ar eas more than 2000
metere from the ~ ~ l V / ~ a m ~ o d k n border may be unobserved, subject to
applicable control procedures stated elsewhere in thi6 directive.
(3)
Firemirsionsrillnot be conductedwheredl8perdon
couldresultinfi rebeingplacedonorover the~VN/Cambodlan border.
(4)
Commanderswillreviewandcomplywith thepr ovi ~i on of
MACVRulesof Engagementwhenplanningforoperationsnear the Cambodian/
RVNborder.
FOR THE.COMMANDER:
WALTER T. KERWIN, JR.
Major General, USA,
Chief of Staff
NEIL N. SNYDER,JR.
Colonel, USA
AautantGeneral
DISTRIBUTION:
4 m,v, vn- A
II-B
VI-C
Plus 10-53
50-m MAF
50-7AF
25-1FFORCEV
25-IIFFORCEV
150-AG-AOP
5-AG-A0
JJMACV Dir 612-1
KEACQUARTZRS
UNITEDSTATESMILITARY ASSISTANCE COMiMAND, VIETNAM
APOSdnFr anci s co 96222
DIRECTIVE
16 Mar ch 1968
NUMBER 612-1 (WACAG)
PEXS3NNEL PRGCESSING
PROCESSIXG OFNEW ARRIVALS
1. PURPOSE. To est abl i sh i npr ocessi ngr equi r ement s f o r a l l mi l i t ar y
andci vi l i an personnel ar r i vi ngin Vi et nam.
2. GENERAL. Al l new.arriva1-s wi l l r ecei ve i ai t i al pr oces s i ngaria
bri efi ngs. Thep r i ma r y obj ect i ve of the bri efi ng i s t o i ns ur et hat al l per sonnel
underst and whyt heya r e i nVi et nam, t he i mpor t ance of each i ndi vi dual ' s cont r i -
bution to the defeat of the enemyandt he si gni fi cance of e ve r yAmer i can' s pe r -
sonal conduct i nt he Zepubl i c of Vi et nam.
a. Offi cers i nt he gr adeG: 0 7 and above will pay an office cal l on
COMUSiMACV, mi s s i onconsi derat i ons permi t t i ng. The s?onsoriilg agency
will ar r anget he office cal l wi t ht t e Pr ot ocol Br anchof SJS.
b. Oi f i cer s i ngr ade 0 6 andabove and ci vi l i acsi nt he gr ade of
GS-15 a r d above wili be invited t o at t enda Mi ssi on Council Seni or Bri efi ng.
Thi stwo daypr ogr a mi s hel d approxi mat el y once ever ytwo mont hs.
c . Per s onnel below g r ~ c e 0 6 o r GS-15 will at t endpr ogr a ms
pr es cr i bed by component o r uni s er vi ce commands of one t ot hr ee day
durat i on, exci usi ve of joh ori ent at i on.
a. The ACofS, J - I , MACV wi i l exer ci s e staff super vi si onover
t he i npr ocessi ngpr ogr ams .
b.
Cornpor,en"Land s epar at e us i s er vi ce commander s wi l l devel op
pr ocedur es t o 7r oc e s s a l l new a r r i va l s as s i gnedt o ' heir or gani zat i onsf r o m
within t hei r own r es our ces . Copi es of i m2l ement i ng pl ans and/ or di r ect i ves
andchanges wi l l be f ur ni shedt hi s Keadquar t er s, ATTN:
lMACJ1.
c.
CG, USARV wi l l provi de t h d ioilowing s u p ~ o r t t o a s s i s t i n
pr oces s i ngper s onnel assi gned to &is h e a d q ~ a r t e r sandt he advi s or yeffort :
j 1) Tr ar s por t at l on f or movei-aent oz 2ersoi l nel to .&e L$Lr < : @
P e r sunriel Pr oc e e siilg Cente:. ZjiL,C,
EXHI BI T D-41
"U' $6
*This di r ect i ve super seLes h4ACV Zi r ect l ve 612-1, 9August 1966
b 4
., ' -
J. 3 .:j
U C V Dir 612-1
( 2 )
Tr ans i ent bi l l et s f o r a l l i ncomi ng per sonnel whent he
capaci t y of the MACV Per s onnel Pr oces s i ng Cent er (Koel per Hot el ) i s ex-
" ceeded.
( 3) Te . por ar yo r per manent qua r t e r s f or a l l per s onnel
assi gnedwithin the Sac,. ~n/ Cl i ol on/ Tan Son Nhut a r e a i ma e di a t e l yupnn t he
compl et i on of pr ocessi ng.
4. BXIEFINGS.
a. Bri efi ngs shoul dbe compr ehensi ve.andaudi ence or i ent ed. Use
of demonst rat i ons, pr act i cal exer ci s es anddi scussi onswher e appr opr i at e is
encouraged.
b. Handouts wi l l be us edto I nsur e ret ent i on of i mpor t ant i nf or ma-
t i on including, but notl i mi t edto:
( 1) Nine Rul es.
(2)
TheEnemyi n Your Mands.
( 3) Sbndi ngOr der s , Zoger s Ranger s.
-7
(4) St andar dsof Conduct. I
(5)
St ays & St r i pes Semi annual . Ori ent at i on Edi t i on.
(6)
Gui dancef or Commander s i nVi et nam ( of f i cer sonly).
FOX THE COMMANEEK:
WALTER T. KEXWIN, .JR.
Maj or Gener al , USA
Chief of Staff
NEI LN. SNYDER, J R,
Colonel, USA
Adj ut ant Gener al
DISTRIBUTION:
I, 11, IV, V, VI, VII-A
XI-B
I ,....-.... .
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7 6 2 5 5
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ANNEXES
I NTELLI GENCE
TINH-BAO
MILITARY SUPPORT FOR PACI FI CATI ON
YEM- TRO QUAN-SU XDNT
REFUGEESUPPORT
TY NAN CONG-SAN
AREAS REQUIRING SPECI ALSECURITY
CAC KHU-VUC CAN DAC BI ET BAOVE
RESTORATION AND PROTECTI ON O F RAIL, ROAD, AND WATER LOC' S
TAI THI ET VABAO-VE CAC TRUCGIAO-THONG THUY BOVATHI ET LO
RESOURCESDENI AL
BAO- VE TAI-NGUYEN
CIVILIANDETAI NEES
NHUNG NGUOI TAMGIU
PSYCHOLOGI CALOPERATI ONS
CHIEN-TRANH CHINH-TRI
CHI EU HOI
CHIEU-HOI
ATTACK ON VC I NFRASTRUCTURE
TI EU DI ET HA TANG CO-SO VC
XU-DUNG DSCD
NEUTRALI ZATI ON O F VC/NVA BASE AREAS
TE- LI ET HOA CAN CU VCMN/VCMB
PROCEDURES FOR COORDINATION O F RVNAFAND US/ FWMAF
OPERATI ONS
PHUONG THUCPHOI HOP HANH QUAN GIUAQLVNCHVAHOA-KY/
QVTGTD
LOGISTICS
TI EP- VAN
COMMUNICATIONS - ELECTRONI CS
TRUYEN- TI N - DI EN- TU
\\-'
C,
PUBLIC AFFAI RS++b-pMi*
THONG-TI N (ph8bi gn sau) . .
P ., ,
QUARTERLY REVI EW (Tw-be-published)---- -'
DUYET XET (ph8b i b s a u )
DEFINITIONS
DINH-NGH' IA ,.\
; f,
INSPECTOI; GENERAL-@+^^^^^-&&^- -/
THANH-TRA (phibi gn sau)
DISTRIBUTION
PHO- BI EN
-
5. Thi s Combi ned Campai gn Pl a n i s for
pl anni ng on r ecei pt and f or execut i on on 1 J anuar y 1968. Recom-
mended changes to t hi s pl an wi l l be submi t t ed t hr ough RVNAF
channel s to JGS and t hrough USIFWMAF channel s to MACV.
-
6. RVNAF and US Component Commands ,
ARVN Co r p s and US Fo r c e Commands wi l l devzl op s emi - annual
combi ned campai gn pl ans to suppor t t hi s Combi ned Campai gn
Pl an. The s e pl ans wi l l be desi gned to accompTi sh t he obj ect i ves,
t a s ks and goal s, s t at ed i n t hi s campai gn pl an and t o s uppor t
achi evement of t he goal s i n est abl i shed pr ovi nci al paci fi cat i on
pl ans. Speci fi c goal s to be accompl i shed dur i ng each qua r t e r wi l l
b e s i a f i d i n t he support i ng campai gn pl ans. RVNAF Component s,
and ARVN Cor ps wi l l submi t support i ng s emi - annual pl ans to
RVNAF, JGS f or combi ned r evi ew by 15 December 1967 and 15
J une 1968. US Component s, 111MAF. I FFORCEV and II FFORCEV, and
Seni or Advi sor IV CTZ wi l l submi t support i ng semi - annual pl ans to
MACV f o r combi ned r evi ew by 15 December 1967 and 15 June 1968.
-
7. Concur r ent l y wi t h devel opment of mi l i t a r y
campai gn pl ans, RVN Cor ps and Pr ovi nc e echel ons wi l l devel op
paci fi cat i on pl ans i n accor dance with t hi s Combi ned c a mpa i gn
P l a n and di r ect i ves i s s ued by t he Mi ni s t r y of Revol ut i onary
Devel opment . See Annex B ( Mi l i t ar y Suppor t of Paci fi cat i on).
-
8. RVNAF and US Component s, ARVN Cor ps ,
I11 MAF, I Fl -ORCEV, I1 FFORCEV and S k , IV Cor ps wi l l submi t
qua r t e r l y s u mma r i e s cover i ng t he s t at us of i mpl ement at i on o f t hi s
pl an, p r o g r e s s ma de , pr obl ems encount er ed and r ecommendat i ons
f o r i mpr ovement . Su mma r i e s a r e t o be r ender ed a s of 31 Ma r c h,
30 J une, 30 Sept ember and 31 De c e mbe r and submi t t ed s o a s t o
a r r i v e RVNAF, JGSIMACV not l a t e r t han t he f i f t eent h day
fol l owi ng t he a s of dat e.
5. (U) LOGISTICS: Annex N (Logi st i cs).
6. ( U) COMMAND AND SIGNAL:
a. Command.
(1) Command of a l l mi l i t a r y f o r c e s r e ma i n s vest ed i n t he
c o mma n d e r desi gnat ed by t he gover nment maki ng t he cont ri but i ons.
(2) Oper at i onal cont r ol of USI FWMAF is as mut ual l y
I
a g r e e d upon by t he r epr es ent at i ves of t he gover nment s i nvol ved. .
b. Si gnal . Annex 0 ( Communi cat i ons - El ect r oni cs ) .
CAO VAN VIEN
' W. 6. WESTMORELAND
Ge ne r a l , ARVN
Gener al , USA
Chi ef , JGS, RVNAF COMUSMACV
Incl osures: 1--Map, RVN - Ar eaf or Pr i or i t y of Military
Offensive Operations
2--Map, RVN - 1968Pacification Pr i or i t yPr ovi nces
3--Map, RVN - RVN and VC Provincial. CTZand
Mi l i t aryRegion Boundaries
Annexes: A--Intelligence
B--Military Supportf or Pacification
C--Refugee Support
D- - Ar eas RequiringSpeci al Security
E--Rest orat i on andProt ect i on of Rail, Road, and
Water LOC' s
F- - Resour ces Denial
G--Civilian Detainees
H--Psychological Operations
I - - Chi eu Hoi
J--Attack on VC I nf r ast r uct ur e
'
K--Employment of CivilianI r r egul ar Defense Group
L--Neutralization of VC/NVA BaseAr eas
M- - Pr ocedur es f or Coordinationof RVNAFand
US/FWMAF Operations
O- ~Cor nmuni cat i ons- El ect r oni cs
Q--Quart erl y Revieww
,
v
/.Y - z
Appendix 2 (Concept on Use of Forces)to Annex B (Military Sup-
port for Pacification) to Combined Campaign Plan, 1968, AB 143
1. (U) PURPOSE: This appendix outlines the concept on
the use of forces in pacification to include ARVN regular forces,
US/FWMAF, and certain GVN provincial military forces and
civilian elements. This appendix is intended a s a guide for RVNAF
and U S I F W~ F commanders to determine specific pacification
t asks for their subordinate echelons. Terms a r e defined in
Annex R, Definitions.
2. (C) ARVN REGULAR FORCES: Tasks in support of
pacification activities to provide t erri t ori al security
a. In support of RD:
(1) Conduct clearing operations.
(2) Conduct security operations.
(3) Conduct PSYOP with emphasis upon RD and
Chieu Hoi themes.
(4) Conduct military civic action in accordance with
the coordinated provincial civic action program to help with the
support of the people to the government with emphasis on the
proper behavior and discipline of the troops.
(5) Assist sector commanders in the recruiting and
training of RF and PF.
(6) Provide elements for reserve/ react i on forces in
support of military forces in ar eas undergoing RD.
b.
By conducting security operations for previously
pacified areas, LOC, national resources, and government centers.
c. Assi st GVN intelligence elements in t hei r operations
agai nst the VC i nfrast ruct ure.
3. (C) REGIONAL FORCES. Tasks in support of pacifica-
tion act i vi t i es t o provide t er r i t or i al security.
a. In support of RD:
(1) Conduct clearing operations, within capabilities,
in conjunction with ARVN r egul ar f or ces and/ or US/FWMAF.
(2) Conduct securi t y operations.
(3) Provi de local secur i t y f or population and GVN
civil el ement s in hamlet and village a r e a s where PF a r e
inadequate f or t hi s task.
(4) Assi st GVN Cadre el ement s t o per f or m economic
and soci al development projects.
(5) Assi st in the recrui t i ng and training of PF.
(6) Provi de elements f or r eser vel r eact i on forces.
(7) As s i s t ot her GVN el ement s conducting PSYOP
with emphasi s on RD and Chieu Hoi themes.
b. By securi ng LOC f or military, economic and political
efforts.
c.
Assi st ot her GVN intelligence agenci es in t hei r
operations against the VC i nfrast ruct ure.
d. Assi st the National Pol i ce i n population control,
r es our ces denial, and/ or t o maintain l aw and order.
e.
Assi st GVN civil cadre el ement s to organize and
t r ai n people' s self-defence forces.
4. (C) POPULAR FORCES. Tasks in support of pacifica-
tion activities to provide t erri t ori al security.
a. In support of RD:
(1) Provide local security for the population and GVN
civil cadre elements in hamlet areas.
(2) Assist RF to provide local security.
(3) Assist GVN civil cadre-elements to perform
economic and social development projects.
(4) Conduct security operations.
(5) Assist other GVN elements conducting PSYOP
with emphasis on RD and Chieu Hoi themes.
b. By securing LOC for military, economis and
political efforts.
c.
Assist the National Police in population control,
resource denial and/or to maintain law and order.
d. Assist GVN civil cadre elements to organize and
t rai n people's self-defense forces.
e. provide local security until relieved by NP o r other
authorized police force.
5. (C) REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT CADRE GROUPS
AND OTHER ORGANIZED TEAMS. Tasks to establish political,
economic and sociological programs:
a. Supply intelligence on the VC infrastructure and
other local VC forces to military and .police forces.
b. Establish initial hamlet government administration
by election, if possible, or appointment, a s required.
Similarly,
and where possible, establish initial village government admini-
*
stration.
c. Organize and train an effective hamlet self-defense
force.
d. Organize an effective plan for hamlet defense and
establish an al arm system to warn the hamlet populace of VC
attack.
e. Assist military forces t o establish signal communica-
tions between hamletlvillage and district.
f. Survey, classify, and complete a census of the hamlet
population. Determine and record the grievances and aspirations
of the hamlet populace.
g. Conduct PSYOP with emphasis on ~ ~ / ~ h i e u Hoi
themes.
h. Initiate and, where possible, complete economic and
social development projects to satisfy a s much as possible the more
critical grievances and involve the people in the projects. Empha-
si ze self-help by the hamletlvillage populace.
i. Initiate and maintain a program to eliminate the
presence of corrupt officials and other tyrants. Emphasize the
need for the people to forget their personal conflicts and work
together in harmony to achieve community development goals.
j. Assist the hamletlvillage populace to establish
through a democratic elective process a permanent hamletlvillage
government system.
k. Continue Tksk h above in con>mction with GVN
technical cadre with priority to more permanent programs that
will conform to the aspirations of the people and;
(1) Eliminate illiteracy and rai se educational a c h i e ~ -
ment.
(2) Provide satisfactory sanitary conditions and
eliminate disease.
(3) Accomplish land reform as directed by GVN.
(4) Create agricultural associations to assi st local
peasant farmers harvest and market crops.
(5) Provide an adequate road network.
6. (C) NATIONAL POLICE FORCES. Tasks in support of
pacification activities to provide internal security:
a.
Develop and maintain informant nets and other
intelligence nets.
b. Supply intelligence to military forces.
c. participate with military forces in operations to
destroy VC guerrillas and infrastructure.
d. Assume custody of and interrogate VC suspects.
e. Prevent VC infrastructure reorganization.
f. Initiate and maintain population and resources control.
g. Maintain law and order.
h.
Assist, by virtue of their police activities, military
forces to provide t erri t ori al security.
i.
Conduct operations, in coordination with military
forces, to destroy VC guerrillas and infrastructure.
j.
Prevent and control riots and sabotage of public
security.
k. Relieve military forces, when capable, by providing
security for the population and GVN cadre elements.
1. Conduct coordinated PSYOP with emphasis on RD and
Chieu Hoi themes.
7. (C) US/FWMAF Tasks in direct support of Pacification
Activities:
a. Conduct combined and unilateral operations to clear
VC/NVA main forces from provincial priority areas and other
critical areas in accordance with established provincial pacifica-
tion plans.
b. Conduct combined operations in conjunction with ARVN
and/or provincial military forces and police elements to destroy
-
VC guerrillas and infrastructure in specified hamlet or village
ar eas in accordance with established provincial plans.
c. Conduct population control and resources denial
operations on the ri vers and coastal ar eas to prevent infiltration
of military contraband from out.side RVN, to prevent smuggling,
to interdict and destroy the enemy's internal water LOC.
d. Conduct military civic action in accordance with the
coordinated provincial civic action program to help win support of
the people to GVN with emphasis on proper behavior and disci-
pline of troops.
e. Assist sector commanders in the training of RF and
PF.
f. Conduct PSYOPS with emphasis on RD and Chieu Hoi
themes. '
. .
g.
Related task is to conduct combined and unilateral
offensive search and destroy operations against VC/NVA main
forces to prevent their incursion into areas undergoing pacifica-
tion.
A M ~ XC (Refugee Support) to Combined Campaign Plan, 1968,
AB 143
1. (U) SITUATION:
a. General. This annex describes the concept of the refugee
program and defines the functions of RVNAF and US/FWMAF
Commanders in supporting the program.
b. Enemy Forces. Annex A (Intelligence).
c. Assumptions. Paragraph 1, basic plan.
2. (U)MISSION:
To-furnish advisory and operational support for GVN refugee
relief programs which provide for reception, screening and
initial care of the refugee, psychological and political reorienta-
tion; and return to normal life a s rapidly a s possible.
3. (u) EXECUTION:'
a. Concept of Operation.
(1) The GVN Special Commissariat for .Refugees (SCR),
assi st ed by US advisors, has overall responsibility for the refu-
gee program. In each province, the province chief i s respon-
sible to plan, coordinate and implement the refugee program
providing hospitable and fair treatment of refugees regardless
of their political or religious affiliations a r ethnic background.
When cared for properly, refugees can become supporters of the
GVN, causing the VC to lose a source of manpo,wer, supplies,
intelligence and funds.
(2) The refugee program has four basic aspects:
(a) Reception, care and screening of refugees at
temporary refugee centers.
(b) Psychological and political orientation,
U N C L A S S I F I E E
156
U N C L A S S I F I E D
par t i cul ar l y i n t he t e mpor a r y c e nt e r s , and cont i nui ng i n t he r e -
s et t l ement phase. A s t r ong ef f or t wi l l be ma de to win t he r ef u-
ge e s ' suppor t f or t he GVN and t o expl oi t t hei r cont act s i n enemy
domi nat ed a r e a s t o pr omot e addi t i onal o r cont i nui ng def ect i ons
under t he Chi eu Hoi pr ogr a m and t o provi de i nt el l i gence on VC
i nf r a s t r uc t ur e and act i vi t i es.
( c) Pr ovi s i on of vocat i onal t r ai ni ng f or r ef ugees and
encour agement in formi ng cooper at i ves and cot t age i ndus t r y,
par t i cul ar l y i n r es et t l ement s i t e s .
(d) Reest abl i shment of r ef ugees t hrough r e t u r n t o
t he i r vi l l ages o r t hrough r es et t l ement i n new l ocat i ons.
(3) GVN pol i cy pr ovi des for emer gency c a r e f or 30 days,
whi ch ma y be ext ended a n addi t i on 30 days i f r equi r ed. P r i o r
t o t he end of t hi s t i me , t he r ef ugee shoul d have been abl e t o r e -
t ur n t o hi s or i gi nal home, o r if mi l i t a r y oper at i ons o r ot her
f act or s pr ecl ude r e t ur n t o hi s or i gi nal home, he shoul d have
been r e s e t t l e d i n anot her haml et o r a r e a whi ch i s s ecl . r e and
af f or ds a n opport uni t y for hi m t o become sel f - suppor t i ng. If
t hi s is not possi bl e, t he per i od of emer gency r el i ef c a n be
ext ended by t he SCR f or one y e a r , dependi ng upon t he l ocal
si t uat i on.
(4) Some r ef ugees l eave VC domi nat ed a r e a s vol unt Zri l y;
ot he r s a r e gener at ed by mi l i t a r y oper at i ons. P e r s o n s i n VC
domi nat ed a r e a s shoul d not be encour aged t o come t o GVN con-
t r ol l ed a r e a s a s r ef ugees except in conj vnct i on with ongoing
mi l i t a r y o r paci fi cat i on oper at i ons and when t he GVN i s capabl e
of c a r i ng f or s c c h r e f ~l ge e s when t hey a r r i v e in t he GVN con-
t r ol l ed a r e a .
C- 2
U N C L A S S I F I E D
1 4 3
U N C L A S S I F I E D
b. Pr i nci pl es :
(1) The r ol e of t he mi l i t a r y i n suppor t of the refugee pr o-
g r a m cons i s t s of t he following funct i ons:
(a) Incl udi ng i n mi l i t a r y pl ans speci fi cat i ons for the
c a r e , cont r ol , and di sposi t i on of probabl e r ef vgees who ma y
r e s c l t f r om, o r affect , mi l i t ar y oper at i ons. Within s ecur i t y
r e s t r i c t i on appr opr i at e GVN and US-MACVJCORDS offi ci al s
shoul d be i nf or med of t hese pl ans pr i or to t he oper at i on i n o r d e r
t o pr ovi de f or t he pre-posi t i oni ng of r el i ef suppl i es and t o ma ke
pr epar at i ons to i nst i t ut e t he ne c e s s a r y refugee r el i ef pr ogr a ms .
(b) At t achi ng mi l i t ar y per sonnel f r om US Ci vi l Af f ai r s
compani es t c t act i cal uni t s o r assi gni ng t hem t o provi nce s eni or
a dvi s or s i n pr ovi nces wher e t he r ef ugee pr obl em is subst ant i al .
Such per s onnel , unde; t he oper at i onal cont r ol of t he pr ovi nce
s eni or advi s or , wi l l be empl oyed a s uni t s to suppor t ongoing
GVN r ef ugee pr ogr a ms . The US t act i cal commander , o r p r o -
vi nce s eni or advi s or , a s appr opr i at e, wi l l provi de f or e me r ge nc y
a s s i s t a n c e t o r ef ugees duri ng t he e a r l y s t ages of evacuat i on pr o-
j ect s, usi ng Ci vi l Af f ai r s per sonnel . RVNAF Ci vi l Af f ai r s per -
sonnel support i ng t he refugee pr ogr a m wi l l be operat i onal l y con-
t r ol l ed by t he r esponsi bl e ARVN t act i cal commander o r t he pr o-
vi nce chi ef, a s appr opr i at e.
( c) Pr ovi di ng s ecur i t y t o refugee c e nt e r s and haml et s
(d) Pl anni ng and i mpl ement i ng psychol ogi cal oper -
at i ons desi gned to wi n t he s uppor t of r ef ugee for t he GVN and t o
gai n r ef ugee a s s i s t a nc e i n t he Chi eu Hoi pr ogr am. Comi ng mai n-
l y f r o m VC cont est ed o r cont r ol l ed a r e a s , and r et ai ni ng s t r ong
U N C L A S S I F I E D
154
U N C L A S S I F I E D
t i es with t hei r f or mer haml et s, refugees can be i nst r ument al
i n causing defections through the Chieu Hoi pr ogr am and i n f ur -
nishing intelligence. Military operat i on plans that affect refu-
gees wi l l have a psychological operations annex. The PSYOPS
annex wi l l be i n consonance with the National Psychological
Operations Pl an ( see Appendix 2 (National PSYOP Pl an) to qnnex
H (Psychological Operations)) and will cover at l east the follow-
ing points : psychological objectives, t ar get audiences, t hemes
(including t hemes to be emphasized and t hemes to be avoided),
and PSYOPS t asks i n support of the refugee pr ogr am for al l
organizations covered by the basic plan.
(el Scheduling civic action proj ect s ai med a t i m-
proving refugee facilities, medi cal car e, and engaging i n ot her
act i vi t i es designed to i mprove the environment of the refugees.
(f) Assisting the National Pol i ce i n gathering
intelligence through the syst emat i c screeni ng and i nt errogat i on
of refugees.
(g) Assi st i ng i n the training of refugees to cont ri -
bute to l ocal defense i n refugee cent er s and hamlets.
(h) Providing emergency logistic support, part i -
cul arl y during the ear l y st ages of refugee movement.
4. (U) TASKS:
a. CG I, 11, LII, and I V Cor ps and CTZ, within t hei r r e-
spective t act i cal zones, i n coordination with GVN and US refugee
officials, will:
(1) Emphasi ze to al l subordinate commands the value
of the refugee to the CVN pacification pr ogr am and the necessi t y
for f ai r , timely handling and support of refugees r egar dl ess of
U N C L A S S I F I E D
155
U N C L A S S I F I E D
t hei r pol i t i cal o r rel i gi ous affiliations or ethnic background.
(2) Make provisions i n operation plans and di rect i ves
at a l l echelons f or t he handling of refugees s o that they a r e car ed
for pr oper l y and do not i nt er f er e with mi l i t ar y operations, and
'
for t hei r ear l y t urnover to GVN ci vi l refugee officials. Pl ans
should provide f or emergency backup support i n t ransport at i on,
food, shel t er , medi cal car e, and safety a s well a s supporting
psychological operations.
(3) Provi de assi st ance to province and di st r i ct
officials, if requested, t o expedite the establishment and de-
velopment of t empor ar y refugee cent er s and reset t l ement si t es
in s ecur e ar eas . Thi s assi st ance will include, but i t i s not
limited to:
(a) Employing appropri at e mi l i t ar y units to as s i s t
in si t e preparat i on, construction of facilities, and the t r anspor t
of supplies, commodities and personnel.
(b) Detailing mi l i t ar y f or ces to maintain secur i t y
i n a r e a s of refugee concentration, and training refugees t o
as s i s t i n prov'ding camp security.
(c) Assigning t rai ned i nt er r ogat or s to as s i s t the
National Pol i ce i n screeni ng refugees f or intelligence purposes.
(4) Employ psywar units to augment civil effort s i n
presenting a st rong pr ogr am of psychological and political
orientation designed to persuade the refugee to support the CVN
and t o cooperat e in the Chieu Hoi program.
, (5) Encourage civic action pr ogr ams by appropri at e
mi l i t ary units to as s i s t i n the construction of cl assr ooms,
mar ket places, roads and ot her proj ect s designed to i mprove
C-5
U N C L A S S I F I E D
15;
existing faci l i t i es and to improve the refugees' environment.
Such civic action mus t be coordinated a t the province l evel to
i nsur e that proj ect s undertaken support the over al l pacification
pr ogr am i n the province. See Appendix 3 (Civic Action) to
Annex H (Psychological Operations).
(6) Support and encourage vocational training for
refugees where possible. Fur ni sh technical support and advice,
where feasible, to expedite the formation of cooperatives and
cottage i ndust ri es, part i cul arl y i n reset t l ement cent ers. En-
courage l ocal employment of refugees s o that refugee ski l l s and
training may be fully utilized.
b. CG III MAF, I FFORCEV, and I1 FFORCEV and SA IV
Corps, within t hei r respect i ve t act i cal zones, i n coordination
with GVN ci vi l refugee officials, and a s mutually agreed between
each US/FWMAF Commander and hi s count erpart ARVN Cor ps
Commander, will:
(1) Emphasi ze to al l subordinate commands the value
of the refugee t o the GVN pacification pr ogr am and the necessi t y
f or f ai r , t i mel y handling .and support of refugees r egar dl es s of
t hei r political o r religious affiliations o r ethnic background.
(2) Make provision i n operation plans and di rect i ves
a t all echelons f or the hand!iqg of refugees s o that they a r e
car ed f or properl y and do not i nt er f er e with mi l i t ar y operations,
and f or t hei r ear l y t urnover to GVN ci vi l refugee officials.
Pl ans should provide f or emergency backup support i n t r ans -
portation, food, shel t er, medi cal car e, and safety, a s we l l a s
supporting psychological operations.
(3) Provi de assi st ance to province and di st r i ct
U N C L A S S I F I E D
157
U N C L A S S I F I E D
offi ci al s, if r equest ed, t o expedi t e t he est abl i shment and de-
vel opment of t e mpor a r y r ef ugee c e nt e r s and r es et t l ement s i t e s
i n s e c u r e a r e a s . Thi s a s s i s t a nc e wi l l i ncl ude, but is not l i mi t ed
( a) Empl oyi ng appr opr i at e mi l i t a r y uni t s t o a s s i s t
i n s i t e pr epar at i on, const r uct i on of f aci l i t i es, and t he t r a ns por t
of suppl i es, commodi t i es and per sonnel .
r ( b) Det ai l i ng mi l i t a r y uni t s t o mai nt ai n s e c ur i t y
i n a r e a s of r ef ugee concent r at i on, and t r ai ni ng r ef ugees t o a s s i s t
i n provi di ng s ecur i t y i n t hes e a r e a s .
(4) Encour age ci vi c act i on pr ogr a ms by appr opr i at e
mi l i t a r y uni t s t o a s s i s t i n t he const r uct i on of c l a s s r ooms ,
ma r k e t pl aces, r oads , and ot her pr oj ect s desi gned t o i mpr ove
e ~ i s t i n gf aci l i t i es and t o i mpr ove t he envi r onment of r ef ugees.
Such ci vi c- act i on mu s t be coor di nat ed a t t he pr ovi nce l evel t o
e ns ur e t hat pr oj ect s undert aken s uppor t t he ove r a l l paci fi cat i on
p r o g r a m i n t he provi nce. See Appendi x 3 (Ci vi c Act i on) t o
Annex H ( Psychol ogi cal Oper at i ons) .
(5) Suppor t and encour age vocat i onal t r ai ni ng f or
r ef ugees wher e possi bl e. Fur ni s h t echni cal suppor t and advi ce
wher e f easi bl e t o expedi t e t he f or mat i on of cooper at i ve and
cot t age i ndus t r i es , par t i cul ar l y i n r es et t l ement si t es. Encour -
a ge l ocal empl oyment of r ef ugees s o t hat r ef ugee s ki l l s and
t r ai ni ng ma y be ful l y ut i l i zed.
5. ( U) LOGISTICS:
a. The GVN Speci al Co mmi s s a r i a t f or Refugees, ha s
p r i ma r y r esponsi bi l i t y f or provi di ng l ogi st i c suppor t to t he
r ef ugee pr ogr am. St ocks of commodi t i es and equi pment a r e
U N C L A S S I F I E D
maintained a t GVN supply points throughout the RVN t o expedite
i s s ues t o refugees.
b. US advi sor s, i n coordination with the SCR, as s i s t i n
the procurement , st orage and distribution of supplies and equip-
ment t o i ns ur e the availability of sufficient quantities to meet
on-going and anticipated refugee pr ogr am requi rement s.
c. Maj or GVN/US/FWMAF commander s will provide
l ogi st i cal support when ci vi l r es our ces a r e not adequate. This
support will include, but not be limited to, providing: rapid
and saf e evacuation of civilian refugees by any means of t r ans -
portation available, food, shel t er , and medi cal attention. See
Annex N (Logistics).
6. (U) COMMAND AND COORDINATION:
a. The ARVN Cor ps Commander, assi st ed by US advi sor s,
is responsi bl e to provide advi sory and operational support f or
the GVN refugee rel i ef program. The GVN/US/FWMAF t act i cal
commander whose f or ces gener at e refugees, will provide
secur i t y and c a r e for such refugees until such t i me a s GVN
ci vi l officials can take charge.
- b. The GVN Special Commi ssar i at f or Refugees has over-
all responsi bi l i t y for the refugee pr ogr am, and coordinates with
and seeks support f r om the Cor ps and Division Commanders and
Pr ovi nce Chiefs, a s requi red, to ensur e adequate car e f or al l
refugees.
c. US advi sor s will as s i s t t hei r count erpart s i n ensuring
accompl i shment of the objectives of each phase of the refugee
pr ogr am f r om reception to reset t l ement .
U N C L A S S I F I E D
153
Annex F (Resources Denial) to Combined Campaign Plan 1968,
AB 143
1. (U) SITUATION:
a. Enemy Forces. Annex A (Intelligence).
b. Friendly Forces. Basic plan.
c. Background.
(1) During recent years the VC have organized an
effective logistic system to supply t hd r forces by infiltrating
essential supplies into the RVN and by obtaining a greater part
of t hei r critical logistical requirements from the RVN economy.
A positive means to defeat the enemy, in addition to search and
destroy operations, is to neutralize his logistical organization.
(2) In 1967, resources denial measures achieved few
significant results. Many authorities did not know how to apply
selective denial measures so as to assi st economic development
in the countryside and rai se the living standards of the people.
Checkpoints were operated only on relatively secure national
roads and waterways. We must improve the resources denial
program in 1968, adopting the principle of refining the program
to the point where it does not hurt the RVN economy more than
it hurt s the enemy.
2. (U) MISSION: To protect the manpower and material
resources of the RVN and to deny vital resources to the enemy.
3. (C) EXECUTION:
a. Concept.
(1) Resources denial i s an element of economic war-
fare undertaken to deny enemy access to and exploitation of
manpower and material resources of the RVN by providing the
necessary security measures to protect and control the population
and to control the production, storage, movement and use of
resources considered vital to the war effort. The principal
resources denial activities ar e a s follows:
(a) Preventing the VC from stealing and exploiting
farmersf crops in order to carry on the war.
@) Controlling the movement of military use sup-
plies, medicines, foodstuffs, etc., to the VC from government
cantrolled areas.
(c) Destroying VC finance and economy organiza-
tions and other VC economic organizations and ventures which
a r e self -sufficient.
(d) Creating a status of continuous insecurity
along enemy LOC.
(2) The scope of this program is limited to those mea-
sures undertaken within the boundaries of the RVN including i t s
inland and coastal waters. Resources denial operations will be
concentrated on: population control; weapons, ammunitions and
other military equipment; medicines, drugs and chemical com-
ponents for explosives. However, denial of foodstuffs will be
confined to and intensified in the areas of tactical military oper-
ations, along borders and boundaries, around enemy base areas
and those areas where enemy units a r e known to be located; but
not in secure areas. Measures undertaken to interdict enemy
LOC's and neutralize or destroy enemy base areas inside of the
RVN a r e covered elsewhere in this plan. See Annex L (Neutral-
ization of vC/NVA Base Areas).
(3) Intelligence efforts should be directed to collecting
and exploiting information which identifies items critical to the
enemy war effort, strong and weak points of the enemy financial
and logistic st ruct ures and enemy plans and operations designed
to disrupt the RVN economy.
b. Planning and Execution.
(1) Planning Phase. Before planning resources denial
measures, province and district chiefs must carefully research
enemy operations and capabilities and assess friendly economic
resources and capabilities in each village and district. Province
and district authorities must per sonal l y develop and execute the
plan to exploit their knowledge of the local situation.
(2) Execution Phase. Province and district chiefs must
continually evaluate their local s r eas to determine boundaries of
secure and insecure areas so a s to implement selective denial
measures in their areas.
(a) Secure Areas. In secure areas, control measures
will not be imposed on bulk foodstuffs. Emphasis should be rat her
on protection of ri ce movement to town and cities. A minimum
number of checkpoints (mostly mobile) will be operated to check
cargo on vehicles enroute to insecure areas. Stringent measures
should continue to be applied to population control, military use
supplies, medical and chemical supplies.
(b) Insecure Areas. Within i nsecure a r e a s the sale,
purchase and movement of mi l i t ary use supplies and foodstuffs
will be controlled. Pl ans should be made to prot ect commodities
against VC capture during shipment. Positive population control
meas ur es will be conducted. In r egar d to VC base ar eas , civil
and mi l i t ar y authorities in the province will determine the off-
l i mi t per i met er s of each base ar ea and ensure that the local pop-
ulation is well informed of these.
c. Tasks. ARVN'Corps Commanders, in coordination with
US/F WMAF commanders and appropri at e GVN civil authorities,
within t hei r a r e a s of r esponsi bi l i t y, ~~i l l employ f or ces a t t hei r
disposal to accomplish the following general t asks:
(1) Pl ans will be developed and executed by Corps, Divi-
si ons and Sectors, h coordination with t he VNN and appropri at e
GVN civil agencies, to provide for:
(a) Operation of r esour ces control checkpoints.
See Appendix 1 (Checkpoints).
@) Protection of ri ce. See Appendix 2 (Rice Pr o-
tection).
(c) Control of waterways. See Appendix 4 (Control
of Waterways). US/FWMAF and US civil agencies will as s i s t in
the development, evaluation, and execution of t hese plans a s
required.
(2) In planning and conducting r es our ces denial activities,
psychol ogi c~l operations which encourage popular support f or and
involvement of the people will be given a high priority. Ever y
mi l i t ary plan f or r es our ces denial will include a supporting psy-
chological operations annex which will adhere to guidance s et
-
forth in the National Psychological Operations Plan. See Appen-
dices 2 (National PSYOP Plan) and 7 (PSYOP in Support of Popu-
lation and Resources Control) to Annex H (Psychological Operations).
(3) Carry out resources denial measures in contested
areas, assisted by the National Police, and assi st the National
Police in carrying out si mi l ar measures in secure areas.
(4) Conduct checkpoint operations, assisted by the
National Police, in contested areas, and assi st the National
Police in conducting checkpoint operations in secure areas.
(5) Conduct operations t o seize and/or destroy enemy
storage logistics and ar ms manufacturing locations. See Annex
L (Neutralization of VC/NVA Base Areas). Extract and/or des-
troy captured supplies and equipment in accordance with proce-
dures detailed in Appendix 5 (Control, Disposition and Safeguard-
ing of Vietnamese Property, Captured Material and Food Supplies).
(6) Interdict VC/NVA LOC1s through ai r, sea, riverine,
ground and art i l l ery operations. Pri ori t i es for interdiction of
VC/NVA LOC1s will be established based on Annex A (Intelligence).
(7) Conduct herbicide operations to destroy enemy crops
and to uncover enemy LOC1s and storage sites.
(8) Conduct operations to eliminate VC tax collection
points.
4. (U) COMIVIAND AND COORDINATION:
a. At the national level, the Interministerial Resources
Control Council will guide the development, coordination, imple-
mentation and review of GVN economic warfare policy.
b. The Corps commander will task subordinate division and
sect or commanders to prepare appropriate resources denial plans
and wi l l monitor and evaluate development and execution of these
plans to ensure adequacy, consistency and coordination.
c. MACV advisors will assi st their counterparts in preparing
appropriate resources denial plans and in monitoring and evaluating
the effectiveness of the execution of these plans.
d. In accordance with GVN decree number 844-TTP/VP/M,
26 October 1964, the Corps commander will ensure that a Resources
Control Committee, comprised of representatives of the appropriate
GVN/US military and civil agencies, is operating effectively at the
Corps level and in each province to coordinate resources control
activities.
e. National Police, when available, will be responsible for
the conduct of search and seizure of personnel and property.
f. Coordination procedures a r e contained in Annex M (Pro-
cedures for Coordination of RVNAF and US/FWN~AF Operations).
Appendices: 1- -Checkpoints
2--Rice Protection
3--Use of Herbicides
4--Control of Waterways
5--Control, Disposition and Safeguarding of Viet-
namese Property, Captvred Material and Food
Supplies
UNCLAS S I FI ED
165
Appendi x 5 (Cont rol , Di sposi t i on and Safeguardi ng of Vi et namese
Pr ope r t y, Capt ur ed Ma t e r i a l and Food Suppl i es) t o Annex F (Re-
s our c e s Deni al ) to Combi ned Campai gn Pl an, 1968, AB 143
1. (U) PURPOSE: Thi s appendi x out l i nes pol i cy and pr oc e dur e s
f or :
a. Cont r ol , di sposi t i on, and safeguardi ng of pr i vat e pr oper t y
and food suppl i es dur i ng qombat oper at i ons.
b. Cont r ol and di sposi t i on of capt ur ed ma t e r i a l and suppl i es.
2. (U) REFERENCES:
a. JGS Me mo Number o ~ ~ ~ / T T M/ I T HQ/ HQ, 7 Fe b r u a r y
1967, subj ect : Ut i l i zat i on of Food Suppl i es Sei zed Duri ng
Oper at i ons.
b. MACV Di r ect i ve 525-9 (C), subj ect : Combat Oper at i ons
Cont r ol , Di sposi t i on, and Safeguardi ng of Vi et namese Pr ope r t y,
Capt ur ed Ma t e r i a l and Food Suppl i es.
3. (C) GENERAL:
a. In VC cont r ol l ed a r e a s , RVNAF , US and ot her FWMAF
mu s t t ake a l l pr act i cabl e me a s u r e s t o mi ni mi ze t he dest r uct i on
of bot h publ i c and pr i vat e pr oper t y.
11) Di sposi t i on of pr i vat e pr oper t y and suppl i es is t he
r esponsi bi l i t y of GVN offi ci al s.
(2) The dest r uct i on of dwel l i ngs and l i vest ock a s a
deni al me a s u r e i s t he r esponsi bi l i t y of GVN aut hor i t i es o r
RVNAF uni t s. Request s by Vi et namese aut hor i t i es for empl oy-
me nt of US f or c e s i n t he del i ber at e dest r uct i on of non-combat ant ' s
pr oper t y a s a deni al me a s u r e wi l l be r e f e r r e d to Headquar t er s
MACV f o r t he per s onal deci si on of COMUSMACV.
b. Capt ur ed ma t e r i a l and suppl i es a r e to be cons i der ed a
val uabl e a s s e t t hat wi l l be ext r act ed if a t a l l possi bl e.
Newly
i nt r oduced i t e ms with unusual modi fi cat i ons will be evacuat ed
t hrough i nt el l i gence channel s. US t act i cal commander s will
i ncl ude i n oper at i ons pl ans pr ovi si ons f or s ecur i t y and i mmedi at e
r e l e a s e t o RVNAF of all capt ur ed food suppl i es. RVNAF wi l l
pr eposi t i on r i c e bags i n a l l CTZs to be used i n ext r act i ng bulk
s t o r e s of capt ur ed r i ce. RVNAF will use capt ur ed r i c e t o
suppl ement t hei r food r at i ons, if r equi r ed, and di st r i but e t he
e xc e s s t o needy people to pr omot e t hei r suppor t f or RVNAF and
t he GVN. Among needy people, r ef ugees and war vi ct i ms mu s t
be gi ven f i r s t pr i or i t y i n r ecei vi ng capt ur ed r i c e i n accor dance
wi t h RNNAF, JGS Di r ect i ves. Capt ur ed food caches wi l l be
ext r act ed and di st r i but ed using RVNAF r e s o u r c e s and t r a ns -
por t at i on t o t he ma xi mum ext ent pr act i cabl e. Maj or US t act i cal
c omma nde r s wi l l makk t he f i nal deci si on to des t r oy si gni fi cant
food c a c he s capt ur ed by US f or c e s only a f t e r det er mi ni ng t hat
ext r act i on i s not feasi bl e.
c. Capt ur ed medi cal suppl i es ma y not be dest r oyed o r used
by US me d i c a l per sonnel except i n a n emer gency due t o non-
avai l abi l i t y of US me di c a l i t e ms of the type r equi r ed. Rel eas e
of capt ur ed me di c a l suppl i es t o l ocal GVN offi ci al s o r ot her
r el i ef agenci es i n t he f i el d i s expr es s l y prohi bi t ed except i n c a s e s
of ur gent humani t ar i an need. If not r equi r ed f or t r eat ment of
e ne my per sonnel , all capt ur ed medi cal suppl i es wi l l be ext r act ed
by capt ur i ng units t hrough component command est abl i shed
channel s o r l ef t i nt act and in pl ace.
4. ( C) TASKS:
a. CG. I, 11, 111, and IV Cor ps and CTZ, within t he i r
r es pect i ve a r e a s of r esponsi bi l i t y will:
(1) I ns ur e t hat RVNAF units mi ni mi ze dest r uct i on of
pr oper t y.
(2) Devel op pr ocedur es, i n coordi nat i on with US/
FWMAF commander s , f or t he ext r act i on of capt ur ed suppl i es
t o pr ecl ude t hei r f ur t her use by t he enemy.
(3) Es t abl i s h pr ocedur es f or di st ri but i ng capt ur ed r i c e
t o r ef ugees, wa r vi ct i ms and ot her needy people.
(4) I ns ur e t hat oper at i ons a r e . planned and conducted
with pr ope r r e ga r d f or psychol ogi cal consi der at i ons. See Annex
H ( Psychol ogi cal Operat i ons).
b.
CG, I FFORCEV, I1 FFORCEV, and I11MAF, and SA,
IV Co r p s and CTZ, i n coordi nat i on with ot her FWMAF com-
ma nde r s, will:
(1) I ns ur e t hat US/ FWMAF units mi ni mi ze dest r uct i on
of pr oper t y.
(2) Ext r a c t and di spose of capt ur ed suppl i es i n accor d-
ance wi t h par agr aph 3b and c above.
(3) I ns ur e t hat oper at i ons a r e planned and conduct ed
with p r o p e r r e ga r d f or psychol ogi cal consi derat i ons. See Annex
H ( Psychol ogi cal Operat i ons).
-
CCONFIDENTIAL 3
Annex G (Ci vi l i an Det ai nees) to Combi ned Campai gn Pl an, 1968,
AB 143
1. (C) SITUATION:
a . Ene my Si t uat i on. Annex A (Int el l i gence).
b. La r g e numbe r s of ci vi l i ans suspect ed of ai di ng o r abet -
t i ng t he enemy a r e pi cked .up i n mi l i t ar y and combi ned mi l i t ar y/
ci vi l oper at i ons. Some a r e me mb e r s of thz VC i nf r as t r uct ur e.
Pr o c e s s i n g and account i ng f or t hes e det ai nees is a growi ng burden
on RVNAF, USIFWMAF, GVN and US ci vi l i an aut hor i t i es. As
t he wa r h a s i nt ensi fi ed, t he number of det ai nees ha s i nc r e a s e d
a t a r api d r at e. Thi s i nc r e a s e ha s caus ed s e r i ous over cr owdi ng
a t col l ect i on poi nt s, t e mpor a r y det ent i on camps , and GVN pol i ce
compounds. Scr eeni ng and cl assi f i cat i on of det ai nees is sl ow;
and oft en, due t o over cr owded condi t i ons, per s onnel a r e r e l e a s e d
wi t hout appr opr i at e i dent i fi cat i on o r det er mi nat i on of s t at us .
2. (U) MISSION: To provi de pr ompt , t horough, and effect i ve
s cr eeni ng, segr egat i on, and di sposi t i on of suspect ed enemy ci vi -
l i a n per s onnel capt ur ed o r det ai ned by RVNAF and USIFWMAF.
3. (U) EXECUTION:
a. Concept . Scr eeni ng of capt ur ed o r det ai ned suspect ed en-
e m y ci vi l i an per sonnel wi l l be accompl i shed t o gai n maxi mum i n-
t el l i gence and t o mi ni mi ze t he det ent i on of i nnocent ci vi l i ans.
Scr eeni ng pr ocedur es mu s t be t horough and effect i ve t o pr ecl ude
r e s c r e e ni ng once det ai nees a r e conf i r med as P W and i nt er ned i n
a P W camp. Det ai nees a r e per s ons who have been det ai ned but
whose f i nal s t at us a s t o PW, r e t ur ne e (Hoi Chanh), ci vi l defen-
dant o r i nnocent , ha s not been det er mi ned. Pr o c e d u r e s f or
handl i ng r ef ugees a r e cont ai ned i n Annex C (Refugee Support ) and
US and GVN di r ect i ves previ ousl y i s s ued; pr ocedur es f or handl i ng
r et ur nees a r e contained i n Annex I (Chieu Hai) and US and GVN
di r ect i ves previously i ssued; and i nst ruct i ons on processi ng PW
a r e contained i n detailed MACV and JGS di rect i ves previously
issued. I t i s i mport ant that enemy combat effectives, r et ur nees,
and refugees a r e processed i n accordance with appropri at e pro-
cedur es; that ci vi l defendants a r e r ef er r ed to proper judicial
agenci es f or t r i al ; and that doubtful cas es a r e turned over t o the
Provi nci al Securi t y Commi t t ee (which i s headed by the Pr ovi nce
Chief) f or appropri at e disposition. Screening procedures should
be designed to:
(1) Cl assi fy personnel rapidly s o that i nt errogat i on of
selected individuals can commence a s soon af t er capt ure o r de-
tention a s possible.
(2) Provi de means f or t act i cal units rapidly t o ext r act
exploitable information f r om detainees.
(3) Pr ecl ude the introduction of innocent people into the
al r eady sat urat ed judicial and penal syst em of RVN.
(4) I nsur e that only those detainees who a r e eligible f or
P W st at us a r e interned in PW camps.
(5) Conduct screeni ng of captured personnel and de-
t ai nees a t the lowest echelon of command practicable.
(6) Locate screeni ng points, where practicable, near
sect or o r subsect or headquart ers t o take maxi mum advantage of
.National Police, MSS, and other intelligence files a t those head-
, quart ers.
(7) Make maxi mum use of the Combined USIFWMAF
Interrogation System.
b. CG I, 11, 111, and IV ARVN Corps, i n coordination with
the National Pol i ce and l ocal GVN securi t y officials, wi l l i nsur e
that:
(1) Tact i cal screening cent er s a r e established whenever
t her e is an operation conducted by RVNAF units. Combined
t act i cal screeni ng cent er s will be established whenever t her e is
an operation conducted by US/FWM,AF units or by RVNAF/US/
F W F units. Est abl i shment of t act i cal o r combined t act i cal
screeni ng cent er s will be included i n advance operational plan-
ning. The mi ssi on of the t act i cal or combined t act i cal screeni ng
cent er i s to provide integration of RVNAF and/ or US/FWMAF
and appropri at e GVN ci vi l securi t y personnel f or screeni ng of
al l persons detained by RVNAF/US/FWMAF. A t act i cal or com-
bined t act i cal screeni ng cent er will have joint r epr e sentation
f r om participating units and civil authorities. Ideally the Deputy
Provi nce Chief for Security and a represent at i ve f r om the oper-
ational unit will function a s co-chairmen. In addition to part i ci -
pation by vari ous staff el ement s of t he operational units, the
MSS, Provi nci al / Di st ri ct National Police, including the Special
Branch, and t he Sect or/ Subsect or S2, will have represent at i on
i n the cent er.
(2) Military intelligence i nt er r ogat or s s cr een al l
civilians apprehended by mi l i t ary units. Detailed screening
procedures a r e contained i n Appendix 1 (Detailed Screening
Pr ocedur es) . Joint ci vi l fmi l i t ary interrogation t eams, includ-
ing Pol i ce Special Branch personnel, will be established where
feasible.
(3) Mi l i t ary intelligence i nt er r ogat or s at t ach high
pri ori t y t o identification and r el ease of innocent civilians soon
aft er capt ure. Thi s will be accomplished aft er information of
i mmedi at e operat i onal intelligence value has been obtained and
i mmedi at e appropri at e action taken thereon. Innocent civilians
will be r et ur ned to t hei r villages o r t r ansf er r ed to refugee
camps, a s appropriate. Where feasible, innocent civilians wi l l
be positively identified, photographed, and fingerprinted by the
National Pol i ce pr i or to r el ease to facilitate identification and
processi ng if they a r e agai n detained.
(4) Adequate t empor ar y faci l i t i es a r e constructed t o
effect compl et e segregation of PWs, innocent civilians, and
civilian detainees a s soon a s t hei r st at us i s determined.
(5) Al l doubtful cases, suspected member s of t he VC
i nf r ast r uct ur e, o r ot her civilians suspected of aiding the enemy,
but who do not qualify a s pr i soner s of war, a r e t r ans f er r ed to
civilian aut hori t i es for ultimate determination of st at us and
f ur t her processing.
( 6 ) All mi l i t ar y units effect t he physical t r ans f er of
civilian det ai nees t o civilian detention facilities a t the province
and di st r i ct according to specific i nst ruct i ons provided by t he
GVN Pr ovi nce or Di st ri ct Chief. The province and di st r i ct
chiefs will provide transportation, within t hei r capabilities, f or
civilian det ai nees to detention cent ers. Transportation, r equi r ed
beyond provi nce/ di st ri ct capability will be provided by RVNAF/
US/FWMAF.
(7) Mi l i t ary intelligence i nt er r ogat or s t r ansf er t o the
Pol i ce Special Br anch al l information appropri at e or pertinent
to the cas e of each detainee t r ans f er r ed to civilian authority.
(8) The GVN Provi nce Chief provides adequate
detention faci l i t i es for civilian detainees, securi t y of t hese fac-
i l i t i es, f ur t her screening, and ultimate determination of st at us,
including l egal proceedings.
(9) Unit commanders i n the field provide additional
support upon request of the Pr ovi nce Chief, within individual
unit capabilities. Such support will include commodities a s well
a s t empor ar y deployment of joint ci vi l f mi l i t ar y i nt errogat i on
t eams t o s cr een and det ermi ne st at us of suspect s.
c. CG I FFORCEV, 11FFORCEV, 111MAF and SA IV
Cor ps i n cooTdination with RVNAF Commanders, and pr oper
civilian aut hori t i es, where appropri at e, will i nsur e that those
t as ks outlined i n paragraph b. above a r e accomplished and/ or
supported t o the maxi mum extent possible. US units will
utilize t he combined t act i cal screeni ng of detainees concept
outlined i n t hi s Annex and appropri at e MACV di rect i ves.
4. (U) LOGISTICS:
a. Ca r e and feeding of det ai nees while i n custody of mi l -
i t ar y f or ces i s the responsibility of such mi l i t ar y forces.
b. Logistic support of det ai nees while i n mi l i t ar y custody
will be provided i n accordance with Annex N (Logistics).
c. Ca r e and feeding of det ai nees i n custody of ci vi l auth-
or i t y i s the responsibility of that authority, normal l y t he pro-
vince o r di st r i ct chief., In an emergency, US provinck o r di s-
t r i ct advi sor s may be able to provide assi st ance i n the f or m of
foodstuffs to the province o r di st ri ct .
Appendixes: 1--Detailed Screening Pr ocedur es.
Appendi x 1 (Det ai l ed Scr eeni ng Pr oc e dur e s ) t o Annex G (Civilian
Det ai nees ) t o Combi ned Campai gn Pl an, 1968, AB 143
1. At t he t i me of capt ur e, each det ai nee wi l l be tagged, and a
Det ai nee Ca r d (USARV F o r m 365 f or US uni t s) fi l l ed out a s
compl et el y a s possi bl e. Of ext r eme i mpor t ance i s dat a r e -
fl ect i ng ci r cums t ance of capt ur e, and i nformat i on a s to whet her
document s o r weapons a r e found on t he detainee.
2. A Det ai nee Repor t F o r m (USARV 364 f or US uni t s) wi l l be
compl et ed t o r ef l ect f act s concerni ng t he act i vi t i es per f or med by
t he det ai nee. Thi s i s i mpor t ant because a ma j or f act or f or
det er mi nat i on of s t at us i s t he a c t being per f or med by t he det ai nee
a t t he t i me of capt ur e.
3. A bl ackl i st f ur ni shed by count er-i nt el l i gence el ement s,
DOICC, PI C, PSB, e k . , suppl ement ed by t he pr ovi nci al and
di s t r i c t police knowledge of t he a r e a and i t s i nhabi t ant s, i s
e s s e nt i a l f or confi rmi ng t he i dent i t y of individuals, and f or
det er mi ni ng t he ver aci t y of s our ce st at ement s. The na me of t he
det ai nee wi l l be checked agai nst the bl ackl i st . If i t appear s on
t he l i s t , a notation t o t hat effect wi l l be ent er ed on the Det ai nee
Repor t F o r m (It em 15, Re ma r ks , USARV F o r m 364 f or US
units). The f act t hat a suspect was picked up i n a VC-cont rol l ed
a r e a does not i n i t sel f justify t he cl assi f i cat i on of a det ai nee a s
a PW. Ther ef or e, e ve r y bit of i nformat i on t hat t ends t o sub-
stantis.te the c o r r e c t st at us of the det ai nee mus t be ent er ed on
t he f o r ms .
4. Tr a c e me t a l det ect or ki t s should be used a s appr opr i at e.
Pos i t i ve r eadi ngs wi l l be r ecor ded on t he Det ai nee Repor t For m.
5. Ret ur nees and i nf or mant s wi l l be used t o identify det ai nees.
6.
Mi l i t ar y Int el l i gence (MI) i nt er r ogat or s will be a l e r t a t al l
t i me s t o det ect det ai nees who pos s es s i mmedi at el y exploitable info
concerni ng enemy pl ans, posi t i ons and supply caches. It i s
vi t al t hat such i nf or mat i on be obtained a s a ma t t e r of pr i or i t y
a s soon a s possi bl e af t er capt ur e.
7. Upon compl et i on of.MI i nt errogat i on, the nor ma l pr oc e s s e s
of population cont r ol a r e i ni t i at ed. Biographic dat a i s r ecor ded,
and f i nger pr i nt s a r e taken and compar ed with t h o s e o n t he
i ndi vi dual ' s ID car d. The det ai nee i s t hen photographed. A
copy of t he phot ograph should be pl aced on fi l e i n t he PSB, and
i n t he PI C and DOICC, when pr esent . If t he r e i s no r e a s on t o
s us pect t he det ai nee a s a VC, he i s i nt ervi ewed by t he Nat i onal
Pol i ce Speci al Branch. Using t he bl ackl i st and t he r e s ul t s of
t he MI i nt er r ogat i on, i nf or mat i on i s sol i ci t ed pert ai ni ng t o t he
det ai nee' s knowledge of VC act i vi t i es and per sonal i t i es i n hi s
vi l l age o r haml et . Thi s endeavor mu s t be conducted i n such a
ma nne r a s t o gai n the confidence and good wi l l of t he individual;
t hus h e o r she mu s t be t r eat ed with pol i t eness and dignity.
8. If t he det ai nee i s s t i l l suspect ed af t er t he compl et i on of t he
above, Nat i onal Pol i ce i nt er r ogat or s continue at t empt s ei t her t o
obt ai n addi t i onal i ncr i mi nat i ng evi dence o r conclude t hat t he r e i s
i nsuffi ci ent caus e t o hold t he det ai nee f ur t her . An i ndi vi dual
dos s i e r wi l l be pr epar ed f or ever yone who i s i nt er r ogat ed a s
suspect . When t i mef di s t ance f act or s per mi t , di s t r i c t pol i ce
f i l es wi l l he checked t o det er mi ne any pr evi ous r e c or d of
apprehensi on. The dos s i er s , o r a t l e a s t a copy of all i nfor-
mat i on contained t her ei n, wi l l be t r a ns f e r r e d t o t he di s t r i ct
police when the scr eeni ng cent er i s rel ocat ed. In the c a s e of a
det ai nee cl assi f i ed a s PW, a copy of t he Pr e l i mi na r y Interrog?tion
Report (PIR) will be sent with the PW t o the Cor ps PW Camp
where he is t o be interned.
9. Segregation of detainees i s ani mpor t ant aspect of the oper-
ation. Detainees a r e to be grouped i n holding a r e a s a s follows:
a. Apparent PWs.
b. Known VC identified by blacklists.
c. Suspected civil defendants.
d. Innocents.
10. Di spersi on of t hese holding a r e a s should be sufficient t o
precl ude nor mal voice communication between ar eas . The hold-
ing a r e a s should be scr eened by canvas o r matting t o deny vi sual
observat i on of one a r e a f r om another.
11. To f or est al l rej ect i on by PW camp commanders of P W of
questionable st at us, ever y attempt will be made t o substantiate
any evidence leading to the judgment by the i nt errogat or that the
detainee is entitled t o P W status. Fact or s to be consi dered ar e:
member shi p i n Viet Cong o r North Vietnamese Armed For ces ;
capt ur e while performi ng an over t hostile act i n combat; capt ur e
while car r yi ng weapons, documents o r individual paper s that
provide cl ues a s t o the P W st at us of t he individual; wearing of
uniforms and distinctive insignia; admi ssi on by the detainee him-
self, confi rmat ory st at ement s by wi t nesses and colleagues of t he
detainee; and positive readi ngs through the use of met al det ect or
kits, o r ot her scientific devices.
12. Compassion will be shown t o the aged, women and young.
Ever y at t empt will be made ear l y i n t he screeni ng pr ocess to
segr egat e the obviously innocent individuals and to r el eas e t hem
locally a s soon a s practicable.
13. Consideration will be given to detainees who have cooperated
i n providing information concerning the enemy so that they may
be, accorded ret urnee status.
14. Intermediate commands will consistently review and monitor
the classification procedures of subordinate units and take timely
action to minimize ar bi t r ar y classifications or mi scar r i ages of
justice.
15. Improperl y documented PW will= be evacuated to PW
camps. Ever y effort will be made to resolve conflicting views
between US and RVN i nt errogat ors pr i or to the t ransfer to and
i nt ernment of PW in the Corps PW camp.
Annex H ( Psychol ogi cal Oper at i ons) t o Combi ned Campai gn Pl an,
1968, AB 143
1. (C) SITUATION:
a. Gener al . Gui dance cont ai ned her ei n i s appl i cabl e t o a l l
psychol ogi cal oper at i ons (t o i ncl ude ci vi c act i on) i n suppor t of
RVNAF/ US/ FWMAF and appr opr i at e GVN/ US/ FW agenci es di -
r e c t l y o r i ndi r ect l y engaged i n combat i ng enemy f or c e s i n t he
Republ i c of Vi et nam. Thi s i ncl udes psychol ogi cal oper at i ons
conduct ed i n conj unct i on wi t h ot her pol i t i cal and mi l i t a r y GVN/
US agenci es and FWMAF i n suppor t of p r o g r a ms cover ed i n t he
appendi xes t o t hi s annex.
b. En e my For c e s . Annex A (Int el l i gence).
c. Fr i e ndl y For c e s .
(1) GVN/US Di pl omat i c Mi ssi on. Pr ovi de s pol i cy
gui dance concer ni ng nat i onal a i ms and pol i ci es. Ps ychol ogi cal
oper at i ons uni t s wi l l be r esponsi ve t o r e que s t s f r o m GVN/ US
Mi s s i on f or support .
(2j US 7t h Psychol ogi cal Oper at i ons Group. As di r ect ed
by CINCUSARPAC, pr ovi des back-up psychol ogi cal oper at i ons
suppor t r eques t ed t hr ough COMUSMACV by GVN/ US/ FWMAF
agenci es.
(3) Republ i c of Kor ea, Aust r al i an, New Zeal and, Thai and
Phi l i ppi ne f o r c e s . Conduct psychol ogi cal oper at i ons, t o i ncl ude
ci vi c act i on pr ogr a ms , i n coordi nat i on wi t h GVN and US f o r c e s .
d. Assumpt i ons. See basi c plan.
2. (C) MISSION: RVNAF and US/ FWMAF conduct psychol ogi cal
wa r f a r e oper at i ons agai ns t NVN and VC /NVA per s onnel and
ci vi l i ans under t he i nfl uence of t he Vi et Cong. RVNAF and US/
FWMAF conduct psychol ogi cal oper at i ons, i ncl udi ng mi l i t ar y
FI- 1
ci vi c act i on, i n conj unct i on with mi l i t a r y offensi ve and i n suppor t
of paci f i cat i on and nat i on-bui l di ng obj ect i ves.
3. (C) EXECUTION:
a. Concept of Oper at i ons.
(1) Psychol ogi cal oper at i ons wi l l be conduct ed i n accor d-
ance wi t h t he Nat i onal Psychol ogi cal Oper at i ons Pl a n a t Appendi x
2. Ci vi c act i on obj ect i ves a r e s t at ed i n Appendi x 3 (Ci vi c Act i on).
(2) St r at egi c and t act i cal psychol ogi cal oper at i ons wi l l
be conduct ed i n suppor t of RVNAF/ US/ FWMAF.
( a) St r at egi c psychol ogi cal oper at i ons wi l l be pl anned
by JGS/ MACV and execut ed by t he c omma nds and agenci es desi g-
nat ed.
(b)
Tact i cal psychol ogi cal oper at i ons a r e conducte' d
by RVNAF/ US/ FWMAF Comma nde r s ut i l i zi ng or gani c, at t ached
and suppor t i ng psychol ogi cal a s s e t s , oper at i ng wi t hi n t he f r a me -
wor k of t he obj ect i ves cont ai ned i n Appendi x 2 (Nat i onal PSYOP
Pl a n ) and t hat addi t i onal gui dance i s s ue d by MACV Psychol ogi cal
Oper at i ons Di r ect or at e/ RVNAF, Ge ne r a l Pol i t i cal War f ar e De-
par t ment . Empha s i s wi l l be gi ven t o t i mel y r es pons e t o t act i cal
si t uat i ons and i dent i fi cat i on and expl oi t at i on of psychol ogi cal
oppor t uni t i es.
(c) Ps ychol ogi cal oper at i ons a r e conduct ed by
RVNAF/ US/ FWMAF Comma nde r s t o s uppor t paci fi cat i on i n
a c c or da nc e wi t h Annex B ( Mi l i t ar y Suppor t f or ~ a c i f ~ c a t i o n ) .
(3) Ci vi c act i on, a s pa r t of ove r a l l psychol ogi cal
oper at i ons , wi l l be emphas i zed i n i t s compl ement ar y r ol e with
paci fi cat i on. Thr ough ci vi c act i on p r o g r a ms RVNAF/ US/ FWMAF
gai n t he s uppor t and i nvol vement of t he peopl e i n t he ef f or t s of
the Government of Vietnam t o cont rol the country and build a
nation.
b. RVNAFIUS For ce Commanders.
(1) Conduct t act i cal psychological operations i n support
of RVNAFIUS combat operations i n Vietnam with mi l i t ar y psy-
chological operations f or ces available.
(2) Assi st FWMAF Commanders i n conducting psycho-
logical operat i ons by attaching psychological operations t eams
when requested.
(3) Provi de for utilization of al l available as s et s f or
mi l i t ar y civic action commensurat e with the t act i cal situation.
As a mi ni mum, t hi s will consi st of emergency assi st ance, such
a s medi cal t r eat ment of noncombatant casual t i es during combat
operat i ons, and a planned, coordinated civic action pr ogr am to
consolidate existing secur e ar eas . coordi nat i on with appropri at e
l ocal officials will be effected to as s ur e that such activities sup-
port pacification and nation building objectives.
c. Commanders, U.S. 7th AFIVNAF. Conduct mi l i t ary
civic act i on and ai r bor ne psychological operations throughout
Vietnam and provide propaganda del i very means a s directed.
Coordinate psychological operations ai r cr af t support for each
CTZ through operation of a joint 7th USAFIVNAF Tact i cal ~ i r
Coordination Cent er and DASCSs.
d. COMNAVFORV/VN Navy. Conduct r i ver and coast al
wat erborne psychological operations, including civic action,
throughout Vietnam and provide propaganda delivery means a s
directed. Coordination with appropri at e l ocal officials wi l l be
effected t o as s ur e that such activities support RD and nation
building objectives.
e. Coordinating Instructions.
(1) Psychological operations support will be rendered i n
the following priority:
(a) St rat egi c ps ych~l ogi cal war i ar e, including
Chieu Hoi.
(b) Psychological war f ar e i n support of t act i cal
operations.
(c) Other psychological operations in support of
pr ovi ncef sect or requi rement s.
( 2 )
To obtain psychological operations support, beyond
the capsbility of psychological operations r es our ces under t hei r
OPCON, commanders will pr ocess request s through the CTZ
Propaganda Support Cent er s (PSC) to the PSYWAR Coordination
Cent er (PCC) of the RVNAF General Pol i t i cal Warfare Department.
(3) . Psychol ogi cal operations will be coordinated with
the province psychological operations commi t t ees (whenever
feasi bl e) i n or der t o achieve common goals. Planning f or psy-
chological operations support at al l pri ori t y levels wi1.l take into
account t he needs of pacification and nation building.
(4) Integration of civic action and pacification will be
accomplished i n coordination with the provincial comlnittees.
This provides a means for USfFWMAF to collaborate with RVNAF
and the province chiefs i n joint proj ect s ~ l l i c h as s i s t i n extending
GVN cont rol throughout the Republic of Vietnam.
(5) Psychological operations and civic action plans
(including MEDCAP) within each sect or, subsect or or autonomous
city, except i n unusual ci rcumst ances, will be coordinated with
a ppr opr i a t e GVN/ US/ FWMAF Comma nde r s and agenci es.
(6) Al l c omma nde r s wi l l i ncl ude PSYOP annexes i n
oper at i onal pl ans whi ch i nvol ve cont act with the enemy f or c e s and
ci vi l i an popul at i on.
4. ( U) ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS:
a. Logi s t i cs .
(1) ARVN/ US psychol ogi cal oper at i ons bat t al i ons a r e
r es pons i bl e f or suppor t of subor di nat e uni t s for mi s s i on - t ype
eq' ui pment and expendabl e suppl i es.
-
(2) Suppl i es t o s uppor t t he mi l i t a r y ci vi c act i on pr ogr a m
a r e avai l abl e f r o m I nt er nat i onal Vol unt ary Agenci es, pr i vat e
donat i ons and, i n e me r ge nc i e s , f r om mi l i t a r y st ocks.
b. Pe r s onne l .
(1)
Loc a l nat i onal s wi l l be empl oyed a s r equi r ed to pr o-
vide o r s uppl ement l i ngui st i c capabi l i t i es and soci ol ogi cal know-
l edge.
(2) Hoi Chanhs (Chi eu Hoi r et ur nee) wi l l be used i n
psychol ogi cal oper at i ons a s r e qui r e d t o expl oi t t hei r knowl edge
of t he si t uat i on o r s peci al apt i t udes.
5. (U) COMMAND AND SIGNAL:
a. Command r el at i ons r e ma i n a s cur r ent l y est abl i shed.
b. The ove r a l l coordi nat i ng aut hor i t y for t he di r ect i on of
mi l i t a r y psychol ogi cal oper at i ons is r et ai ned by CPWDI MACPD,
who i s s ue oper at i onal i nst r uct i on in conformance with GVN
pol i cy, and U.S. Mi s s i on PSYOP pol i cy pr omul gat ed by JUSPAO
a s r equi r ed.
c. Si gnal . Se e Annex 0 ( Communi cat i ons and El e c t r oni c s ) .
-- UNCLASSIFIED
Appendi xes: 1- - Tr oop Moral e.
2--Nat i onal PSYOP Pl an.
3--Ci vi c Act i on.
4 - - ~ n t i - c o mmu n i s t Refugee.
5--Chi eu Hoi, Open Ar ms .
6- - Mi l i t ar y PSYOP Support of Paci fi cat i on.
7--PSYOP i n Support of Popul at i on and Re s our c e s
Cont r ol .
- , H-6
UNCLASSIFIED
3 8Lj
*Appendix 1( Tr oop Mor al e Act i on) t o Annex H ( Psychol ogi cal
Oper at i ons) t o Combi ned Campai gn Pl an. 1968, AB 143
1. (C) GENERAL:
a. The act i vi t i es of t r oop mor a l e act i on i ncl ude: t r oop
i nf or mat i on and educat i on, provi di ng f or t he wel l -bei ng of t he
t r oops and f ost er i ng t hose act i vi t i es whi ch cont ri but e t o i mpr ovi ng
t he mo r a l e of enl i st ed men. If t r oop mo r a l e act i ons a r e execut ed
pr eci s el y, t he enl i st ed r a nks shoul d exhi bi t good di sci pl i ne and
conduct , a f r i endl y at t i t ude t owar ds t he ci vi l i an popul at i on and
t he wi l l t o wi n i n combat . Thes e shoul d r e s ul t i n winning t he
?uppor t and r e s pe c t of t he peopl e and i ns t i l l f e a r among t he r anks
of t he Vi et Cong.
b. Si nce t hi s is a wa r wi t hout a defi ned f r ont l i ne, i t becomes
mo r e i mpor t ant t hat we mi ngl e wi t h t he peopl e anywher e and a t
any t i me. Our capabi l i t i es, a s i n t he f i el ds of t r ans por t at i on and
t echnol ogy, me e t onl y a s ma l l por t i on of t he PSYWAR r e qui r e me nt s
in t he t ot al effort . The si gni fi cant way t o achi eve t he ul t i mat e goal
is t o have our s ol di er s r ef l ect const ant l y t he hi ghest l evel s of good
di sci pl i ne and conduct , exhi bi t a genui ne i nt e r e s t i n t he wel f ar e of
t he peopl e and be suffi ci ent l y i nf or med t o expl ai n c l e a r l y t he
pol i ci es of t he Gbver nment of Vi et nam.
c. I n s umma r y, t he mo s t i mpor t ant as pect s of PSYWAR a r e
t he mi l i t a r y behavi or, di sci pl i ne and at t i t ude of t he i ndi vi dual
enl i st ed man. Ther ef or e, t he act i vi t i es of t he Tr oop Ma r a l e
P r o g r a m become a deci si ve f act or wi t hi n t he broad scop of POLWAR.
2. ( U) MISSIONS:
*Appendix 1 h a s been pr e pa r e d by RVNAF speci fi cal l y f or
RVNAF, but ha s ge ne r a l appl i cat i on t o USIFWMAF under appr o-
pr i at e di r ect i ves.
a. Inform and educate the enlisted ranks, provide f or t hei r
well-being and f ost er mor al e building activities to at t ai n a high
level of response in rel at i on t o behavior, discipline, i nt er est i n
the people and a wi l l to win i n combat.
b. Educate the enlisted man s o that he , may e x ~ l a i n cl ear l y
and si mpl y the policies of the Government of Vietnam.
3. (C) EXECUTION:
a. Concept.
(1) Al l commanders must actively concern t hemsel ves
with the aspi rat i ons' and probl ems of enlisted men subordinate
t o them. They must carefully provide f or the welfare of enlisted
men and t hei r fami l i es t o i nst i l l confidence i n the command st r uc-
t ur e and the POLWAR cadr e who provide information and education.
(2) Al l comm' anders should encourage enlisted men t o
actively contribute constructive i deas to enhance the unit's accom-
plishment of the mi ssi on s o that the enlisted ranks gain confidence
i n t hei r own capabilities and a t the s ame t i me acqui re a spi r i t of
joint responsibility with t hei r comr ades- i n- ar ms and t hei r com-
manders.
(3) Commanders must use t hei r powers of promotion
and appointment judiciously and wisely.
(4) Commanders should enthusiastically use the medi a of
l eadershi p activities i n the t ask of ideological development to
consolidate and develop high st andards among enlisted men in
r espect t o t hei r c ~ n d u c t and behavior.
b. Objectives of information and education and i mpr ove me ~~t
of enlisted mor al e.
(1) Enlisted men should believe they a r e fighting f or
t hei r own f ut ur e a s wel l a s t hat of t hei r chi l dr en and t hei r fel l ow
count rymen.
( 2) Enl i st ed me n should f os t er a hatre-d f or t he Vi et
Cong, r eal i zi ng t he enemy i s cr uel , war l i ke and i s bet rayi ng t he
Fat her l and a s wel l a s t he people.
( 3) Enl i st ed me n should underst and t hat t he i r mi l i t a r y
and pol i t i cal
act i vi t i es a r e now winning, and wi l l ul t i mat el y
defeat t he a ggr e s s i ve s cheme of t he Viet Cong.
(4) Enl i st ed me n should underst and t hat the Paci f i cat i on
P r o g r a m is t he mo s t effective me a ns of winning over t he Vi et
Cong and wi l l l ead event ual l y t o agr i cul t ur al pr osper i t y.
(5) Enl i st ed men should r eal i ze t hey have a dual
responsi bi l i t y. They a r e both f i ght er s and pol i t i cal r epr es ent at i ves
of t he i r government . The i r devotion t o bot h of t hese r ol e s wi l l
win ove r t he Viet Cong i n both wa r and peace with the r e s ul t t hey
and t he i r chi l dr en wi l l enjoy peace i n f r eedom and pr osper i t y.
(6) Enl i st ed me n should exhibit a fri endl y at t i t ude
t owar ds al l i ed f or ces .
(7) Enl i st ed me n should develop a compet i t i ve s pi r i t by
cont i nual l y i mprovi ng t hei r unit, r ecor di ng t hei r f eat s a t a r ms
and par t i ci pat i ng i n pacification.
c. Vi t al Act i vi t i es.
(1) Develop and provi de moment um t o guidance and
command act i vi t i es l aunched i n combat units and staff and l ogi s-
t i cal agenci es.
(2) Announce and sust ai n the "f ai r play" policy on r i ght s,
pr omot i ons, appoi nt ment s and individual opinion.
( 3 ) Cl osel y coordi nat e a l l POLWAR ef f or t s with t hose
of t he Adj ut ant Ge ne r a l and di r e c t or s of Logi s t i cs and Tr ai ni ng
s o a s t o obt ai n ma xi mum r e s ul t s i n st r engt heni ng t he me nt a l and
phys i cal pr e pa r e dne s s of enl i st ed men.
(4) P r e p a r e , publ i sh and di s t r i but e pocket books whi ch
f e a t ur e s i mpl e and c l e a r quest i ons and a n s we r s on s ubj ect s
r el at i ve t o TI&Eobj ect i ves. Concur r ent l y, ma ke ma xi mum use
of communi cat i ons me di a a s news paper s , t el evi si on, r adi o and
Ar my mot i on pi c t ur e s t o communi cat e i nf or mat i on r el at i ve t o
t he s e obj ect i ves.
(i)
Or gani ze cont es t s a t t he unit l evel pr omot i ng f e a t s
a t a r ms , uni t pr e pa r e dne s s and par t i ci pat i on i n paci fi cat i on
p r o g r a ms wi t h sui t abl e r ecogni t i on and r e wa r d f or t hos e who
achi eve out st andi ng r e s ul t s .
Annex J (Attack on VC Infrastructure) to Combined Campaign
Plan, 1968, AB 143
1. (C) SITUATION: Despite progress in pacification programs
and in the mi l i t ary effort, the VC infrastructure remai ns largely
intact throughout Vietnam. Although many agencies a r e engaged
in the effort, a mor e effective, sustained attack on the infra-
st r uct ur e can be waged. This can be accomplished by specific
delineation of responsibility, improved coordination, and mor e
concentrated employment of existing US and GVN programs and
r esour ces for collection, collation and timely exploitation of
intelligence on the VC infrastructure.
Techniques, procedures and functions a s related to
screening, processing and handling VC civilian detainees, a s
well a s the controls and guidelines designed t o i nsure timely
dissemination and exploitation of intelligence and operational
information, need to be systematically standardized and im-
proved. In addition, it i s essential that centralized reporting
systems, keyed to support intelligence collection, operational
planning, management and evaluation, be developed.
2. (C) MTSSION: Identify, locate, harass, disrupt, neutra-
l i ze and eliminate the VC infrastructure.
3. (C) EXECUTION:
a. Concept. Attack on the VC infrastructure must be a
fully integrated and coordinated effort involving:
(1)- Collection, collation and dissemination of intelli-
gence information concerning key VC infrastructure personal-
ities, organizations, functions and modus operandi.
(2) Prompt exploitation of intelligence for furt her
intelligence collection or for positive action against the
J-1
infrastructure.
(3) Prompt and controlled screening, interrogation,
judicial processing, detention, or other appropriate disposition
of detainees. See Annex G (Civilian Detainees).
(4) Integratioh of anti-infrastructure operations with
pacification and military operations, a s appropriate, and
optimum utilization of propaganda and psychological operations
resources and techniques.
b. RVNAF ~ ~ ~ u S I F WMA F .
(1) Units will participate in operations in direct support
of provincial RD activities, and operations against the VC in-
frastructure a s defined in Annex R (Definitions). Operations
will be of a combined nature coordinated where practicable with
those GVN units, such a s Police Special Branch (PSB), Province
Reconnaissance Units (PRU), and National Police Field Force
(NPFF), who a r e assigned the specific mission of eliminating
the VC infrastructure. Coordination will take place a t thepro-
vinceldistrict level. Military units will, for example, secure
and cordon a target area and provide protection to PSB, Military
Security Service (MSS), or NPFF screening and search teams.
Operations of this nature will be supported to the maximum
extent by collated intelligence on the VC infrastructure pre-
viously acquired by al l agencies.
(2) Information and intelligence pertaining to the VC
infrastructure collected by intelligence agencies or acquired
through action or reaction operations will be immediately dis-
seminated to interested agencies and will be forwarded without
delay to District Operations and Intelligence Coordinating
Cent ers for information and possible further action, and/ or to
the Province Intelligence Coordinating Committee (PICC), or
the permanent office of the PICC, and to the Provincial Inter-
rogation Center (PIC).
(3) Provincial Reconnaissance Units will conduct
special operations to collect or exploit intelligence against the
VC infrastructure and, where appropriate, will participate in
o r support coordinated operations of other forces against the
infrastructure.
c. RVN National Police.
(1) The Police Special Branch, supported by the Pro-
vince Interrogation Center (PIC), is responsible for collecting,
collating, and evaluating intelligence pertaining to the VC infra-
structure.
(2) The NPFF, acting a s the action a r m of the National
Police is responsible for elimination of the VC infrastructure
in districts, villages and h-rnlets through overt police oper-
ations. NPFF will participate in operations mounted by RVNAF
and US/FWMAF units and operations generated by province and
district coordinating centers. Once this main task has been
discharged, the NPFF has the pri mary responsibility of pre-
venting VC resurgence and the ultimate mission of safeguarding
the extension of other NP presence into the r ur al area.
d. Hoi Chanh capabilities will be used to the maximum
extent in support of the attack on infrastructure, both to induce
VC to return to the GVN side and to support intelligence and
reaction activities. Personnel of military intelligence, national
police and other agencies who a r e concerned with the exploitation
of Hoi Chanh, a r e cautioned that such actions will not be pro-
secuted in such a manner a s to compromise the spirit or intent
of the National (GVN) Open Arms Program. The status of Hoi
Chanh a s a distinct and separate category, unlike PW, will be
carefully upheld. Selected Hoi Chanh will be used a s inter-
rogators, guides and in other suitable roles for which they a r e
individually qualified, such a s interrogation of refugees from
their own general area to obtain information on the VC infra-
st ruct ure in that area.
e. All units, agencies and activities engaged in the attack
on the VC infrastructure will, a s appropriate and inaccordance
with prescribed procedures, insure rapid and effective screen-
ing of detainees, identification of VC suspects, and early re-
lease of innocent persons. See Annex G (Civilian Detainees).
VC suspects will be transported promptly to the appropriate
interrogation activity for timely intelligence exploitation and
further processing and/or detention. Before release, civilians
will be fingerprinted and photographed by the National Police, o r
supporting elements, in order to provide positive identification
of individuals and to establish their presence at a known time
and location.
4. (C) ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS:
a. Logistics. The PSB, NPFF and PRU forces will be
furnished required logistical support (to include transportation
which i s beyond their own capa.bility) by RVNAF/US/FWMAF
when operating with such forces.
b. Personnel.
(1) In addition to employing al l available resources,
special emphasis will be placed on interrogation of PW, civil
detainees, and Hoi Chanh for the acquisition of intelligence on
the VC infrastructure and the identification of VC infrastmcture
personnel.
(2) Intelligence coordination centers will develop
techniques and procedures to categorize information on al l PW,
civil detainees, and Hoi Chanh.
5. (C) COMMAND AND SIGNAL:
a'. Military command relations remain a s currently
established.
b. Command of police forces will remain in the police
chain of command.
c. Overall coordinating authority within USMACV for the
direction of the infrastructure attack is retained by Deputy to
COMUSMACV for CORDS.
d. Signal. See .Annex 0 (Communications and Electronics).
Annex L (Neutralization of VC/NVA Base Ar eas ) to Combined
Campaign Pl an 1968, AB 143
1. (U) SITUATION:
a. General. This annex contains guidance for the syst em-
at i c neutralization of VC/NVA base ar eas.
b. Enemy For ces : Annex A (Intelligence).
c. Fri endl y For ces: See basic plan.
d. Assumptions: See basic plan.
2. (C) MISSION: RVNAF and USIFWMAF develop plans f or 2nd
conduct operations to locate and syst emat i cal l y neutralize VC /
NVA base ar eas.
/-
3. (C) EXECUTION:
a. Concept.
(1) The syst emat i c nestralization of VC/NVA base
a r e a s will di rect l y support th:: objectives of the campaign plan.
pr i mar i l y, the destruction of ;he enemy' s command, control,
and l ogi st i cs facilities will contrigute to hi s sventual defeat.
The neutralization of t hese bases al so will raqui re the enemy t o
place gr eat er demands on the people of RVN f oi financial, logie-
t i c a 1, and manpower support. As t hese demands i ncr ease, the
people will become increasingly disillusioned zr ~dmor e suscep-
tible t o friendly psychologichl operations. Tl-is wi l l stipnort the
objective of assi st i ng GVN to extend cont rol thl .>ughout RVN.
(2) Pr i or i t y of effort will be di rect ed tc. the neutraliza-
tion of t hose bases which di rect l y affect the sele~.-:eZ pri ori t y
ar eas , key population and economic cent er s, n?d vital commu-
nication ar t er i es .
(3) Maximum use will be n-.sde of B-52 Somber st r i kes
and ot her Ai r For ce and Naval fi repower, with rapid follow-up
I
by ground f or c e s t o compl et e t he neut ral i zat i on. F o r t hose
bas es wher e compl et e neut r al i zat i on and per manent deni al t o t he
enemy i s not possi bl e, r epeat ed a i r s t r i ke s with r andom pat t er n
ground oper at i ons wi l l be conduct ed to c r e a t e i nsecur i t y, di s r upt
command channel s, and det er st at i oni ng and movement of VC/
NVA f or c e s i n t hes e bases.
(4) Ba s e a r e a s det er mi ned t o be habi t ual safe havens
f or t he enemy wi l l be sel ect ed f o r t ot al dest r uct i on when war -
rant ed. Jungl e gr owt h whi ch pr ovi des t he cover and conceal ment
ne c e s s a r y f or t hes e a r e a s to be of val ue t o t he enemy wi l l be
des t r oyed when f easi bl e by cut t i ng, cl ear i ng o r ot her appropria&-
me a s u r e s .
(5) Se ve r a l bas e a r e a s ma y be cl us t er ed i n t he s a me
ge ne r a l a r e a ; even thought one ma y be consi der ed mo r e i mpor t ant
t han t he ot her s , i t i s des i r abl e t o neut r al i ze t he ent i r e cl us t er .
Ot her wi se, t he enemy can shi ft oper at i ons to ot her near by bas es
and cont i nue oper at i ng wi t hi n t he s a me ge ne r a l geogr aphi cal a r e a .
(6) At Appendi x 1is a l i s t of t he i dent i fi ed base a r e a s i n
r el at i ve o r d e r of pr i or i t y based on t he es t i mat ed val ue of t he bas e
t o t he enemy.
(7) At Appendi x 2 is a s chemat i c ma p i ndi cat i ng t he
appr oxi mat e l ocat i ons of bas e a r e a s
(8)
The pr i or i t y f or neut r al i zat i on o r dest r uct i on of base
a r e a s wi t hi n each c or ps t act i cal zone is det er mi ned by t he 111MAF
Comma nde r , 1 FFORCEV Commander , o r II FFORCEV Commander
i n coor di nat i on wi t h t he r espect i ve ARVN Cor ps Commander , and
t he ARVN 4t h Co r p s Commander i n coordi nat i on with t he Seni or
Advi s or IV Co r p s and i s subj ect t o per i odi c r evi si on dur i ng t he
campai gn. The pr i or i t y f or neut r al i zat i on i s based on t he e s t i -
ma t e d ef f ect t he cont i nued use of t he base would have on f r i endl y
oper at i ons and t he es t i mat ed val ue of t he base t o t he enemy.
(9) Ba s e a r e a goal s f or CY68 a r e 80% of t he i dent i fi ed
ba s e a r e a s i n RVN neut r al i zed on a cont i nui ng bas i s by t he end
of t he ye a r . P l a n s devel oped by component s, Co r p s headquar t er s ,
LII MAF and FFORCEV headquar t s r s f or bas e a r e a neut r al i zat i on
o r des t r uct i on wi l l es t abl i s h qua r t e r l y goal s. P r o g r e s s of accom-
pl i shment wi l l be r epor t ed dur i ng qua r t e r l y r evi ews.
b. CG, III MAF, CG, I FFORCEV, CG, I1 FFORCEV and
CG, IV ARVN Co r p s i n coordi nat i on with appr opr i at e count er par t
and adj acent c omma nde r s when appr opr i at e, will:
(1) Conduct sust ai ned gr ound and a i r oper at i ons t o
neut r al i ze ba s e a r e a s hatring hi ghest pr i or i t y f or neut r al i zat i on.
( 2 ) Conduct r epeat ed a i r at t acks i n ot her ba s e a r e a s
wi t h coor di nat ed ground oper at i ons a s f easi bl e.
( 3) As s i s t adj acent c omma nde r s i n t he neut r al i zat i on
of bas e a r e a s adj acent t o t he CTZ boundary.
c. CG, I ARVN Cor ps , CG, II ARVN Co r p s , and CG, 111
ARVN Co r p s wi l l a s s i s t appr opr i at e count er par t s i n t he neut r al -
i zat i on of bas e a r e a s affect i ng sel ect ed pr i or i t y a r e a s f or
paci fi cat i on.
d. Seni or Advi sor , IV Co r p s wi l l pr ovi de s uppor t t o IV
ARVN Co r p s a s avai l abl e.
e. Comma nde r VNN and COMNAVFORV wi l l s uppor t base
a r e a neut r al i zat i on oper at i ons a s appr ppr i at e.
f . Comma nde r , VNAF i n coordi nat i on wi t h CG, 7th Ai r
F o r c e wi l l provi de cl os e a i r s uppor t t o ground and amphi bi ous
operat i onsf or base a r e a neutralization.
g. CG. 7thAi r For ce, i ncoordination with Commander,
VNAF will:
(1) Provi de cl osea i r Support to base ar eaneutralization
operations.
(2) Provi de t act i cal ai rl i ft support to base a r e a neut ral -
izationoperat i onsa s required.
(3) Conductcontinoous, harassing and dest ruct i vea i r
offensive operations agai nst enemybase ar eas .
h. Coordinatinginstructions. Commanders will:
.----
' (1) Recommendnewly di scoveredbase ar eas , a s det er -
mined by har dintelligence, be added toAppendix1( Pr i or i t y
,
Listing of BaseAreas).
(2) Recommendadj ust ment of pr i or i t i esassi gned exist-
ing base ar eas.
(3) Coordinate with other ser vi ces, a s appropri at e,
plans f or base a r e a operations with the objective of applying
maxi mum combatpower f or neutralization of enemybase ar eas .
4. ( U) LOGISTICS: Annex N (Logistics).
5. ( U) COMMANDSIGNAL:
a. Command. See basic plan.
b. Signal. Annex 0(Communications and El ect roni cs).
Appendixes: 1--Pri ori t y Listing of BaseAr eas
2--Map - Location of BaseAr eas
co~-nl-naildcr of Lhe f or c e as s i gned t he TAOl i .
d. Tact i cal Ar e a s of I nt c r c s t (TAOI). An a r e a i ncl udi ng,
but not ne c e s s a r i l y l i mi t ed to, t he Tact i cal Ar e a s of Respon-
sibi.lity (TAOR ) i n whi ch t he desi gnat ed USI FWMAF c omma nde r
i s knowl edgeabl e of the' l ocat i on, act i vi t i es and oper at i ons of
al l GVN f or c e s alld i ust al l at i ol l s, CIDG c a mp s and RD a r e a s i n
or de r t o achi eve, t hrough mut ual cooper at i on and coordi nat i on,
t he ma x i mu m effect: of t he combi ned f r i endl y f o r c e s and fi're
power. The TAOI diffe' rs f r o m t he TAOR i n t hat , US/ FJ I MAF
a '
comnl ander s a r e not char ged wi t h p r i ma r y t act i cal r esponsi bi l i t y
\
nor a r e t hey expect ed t o conduct t act i cal oper at i ons on a cout i n-
uing b a s i s i n t he TAOI.
e. Combi ned Oper at i on. An oper at i on conducfed by el ement s
of t wo o r mo r e nat i ons oper at i ng t oget her o r i n c l os e coordi nat i on.
f . Cl ear i ng Oper at i ons. An oper at i on t o c l e a r a n a r e a
per manent l y of or gani zed VC/ NVA ma i n f or c e s , i ncl udi ng t he
pr ovi nci al bat t al i ons, i n o r d e r t o el i mi nat e t he i mmedi at e t h r e a t
of ove r t el l emy i nt er f er ence with r evol ut i onar y devel opment
act i vi t i es t hat a r e t o follow.
g. Se a r c h and Des t r oy Operat i on. An offensi ve oper at i on
conduct ed f or t he pur pose of seeki ng out and dest r oyi ng enemy
f or ces , i nst al l at i ons, r e s o u r c e s and ba s e a r e a s . Th e s e ope r -
1.
at i ons a r e oriented on t he enemy i ns i de o r out si de a TAOR.
h. Secur i t y Opcrat i on. Oper at i ons whose pur pos e is t o 2:)
Prot ect f r i endl y pol i t i cal , economi c, and mi l i t a r y r e s o u r c e s and
~s t a l l a t i ons , s uch a s di s t r i c t capi t al s o r popul at ed a r c a s , t o
5. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS:
a. Re por t s of ma j o r i nci dent s i n v o l v i ~ g two o r mo r e
count r i es wi l l be t r ans mi t t ed i mmedi at el y to MACV I ns pect or
Gener al .
6. Tr ans por t at i on. The I nspect or Gener al Advi sor a t each
echel on wi l l suppor t hi s count er par t by coordi nat i ng a i r t r a ns -
por t at i on, wher e ne c e s s a r y; and t h e count er par t will s uppor t
t he i ns pect or ge ne r a l advi s or by coordi nat i ng ground t r ans por -
t at i on, wher e ne c e s s a r y.
1
2
3
4
5
PHO BIEN
,
Vung 1Chi&-Thu$t
Khu 11chi $n- ~hu$t
Khu 12 Chicn-Thu$t
Bi.$t Khu Qlu;ng -Da
Vung 2 Chi&-Thu$t
Khu 22 Chi j n-Thust
Khu 23 Chi&-Thust
Bi,Gt Khu 24
Vung 3ChiZn-Thu$t
Khu 31 Chitn-Thu$t
Khu 32 Chi,$n-Thust
Khu 33 Chi&-Thust
Bi.Gt Khu T$-DB
Vung 4 Chi&-Thu$t
Khu 41 Chi&-Thust
Khu 42 FhiGn-Thu$t.
Khu Chicn-Thu$t Ti snGiang ,
BTLi(h6n.g Qugn
Kh6ng-do?n 23
Kh8ng-do?n 33
Khdng-do?n 41
Khcng-bo?n 62
KhBng- doan74
BTLHZi Qugn
Vyng 1DuyEn-hgi
Vyng 2 Duy^en-~gi
Vyng 3Duy^en-ha'i
Vyng 4 Duy$n-+Zi
Vyng 3 SSng ng?i
Vung 4 SSng ngoi
BTL/$$C -Ld$ng D5c-Bi$t
Sd-doa,n ~ h d y du
~ 2 - d o a n ThdyQugn Lyc- ch6n
BCH/ B~$; -D$?~-QU~?~
BCH Thj' et-giap
BCH Phao-Binh
UBDH/QVTGTD
Nha TSng ThanhTr a Qubn L$c
~ g n ~ CycQ%$n-Hhn
T$ng-cyc Ti^ep-v$n
Cyc Cdng;binh
Cyc Truysn-Ti n
BCH Ti t p-v$n
BCH Ti2p-v$n
BCH Ti,$p-v$n
BCH Ti t p- &
BCH Tisp-v$n
T;?~ cyc C.T.C.T.
ph?ngl / TTM
Phqng ~ / T T M
Phcng ~ / T T M
Phong ~ / T T M
SO BAN
5
3
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1
5
3
3
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2
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BAN SO
PHO BIEN SO BAN BAN SO
ph;ng TQT/TTM
TTFQ/TTM
Ph?ng 3 /TTM (BD)
Phpng ~ / T T M(HQ)
Phpng ~ / T T M( TG)
Phong ~/ TTM( ( TY)
V. P~ h d TgPg Th8ng ,
V. P~ h d PhoTGFg Th8ng
V. Pqh; Th; Tddng
BG Qu8c-phong
BijXPy ddng
Ba Chi&-h8i
~ h 3 Ds c fly TUTB
V. P/DT/TTMT
V. P/TT/TTMP
v.P/ TT/ T~T/ LCZ
V. P/ PhYTa HQ
Ldu - H8 sd
REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ORDER SEC ARMY BY TAG PER
7 6 2 5 5
- - -
- ,
- 'GUIDANCE FOR COMMANDERS'IN VIETNAM
.
. ' E W J *
lhia ~ ~ ~ ~ . c o m m k ~ d I policy book has deen'asnernbled to in-
- ,:
.
'
. ,.
.
.
I '
forrqsenlo? cornmapdsr~ mdkey s ~ &i c &d my k b mx b a n d . - . a + :
.*
.
. .-. .
. .f*,.. - . .
. intended
-...;,.,- abessea. . .:, to be al l incliwiY&",.>
policy. It 18 not...:',- . .
.- . : ..:
. .I I ' .U;:b; ,!
..A r r .
.% - * % . con-'
.-w.
.".
. - - . . y ..
i
rhai I consi deri - t ~; : ~~- d - ----: the 'most impor&ben. . d
' .
-.,..__
..
cern in our: conduct .-. '*.the . . 'etrug
- '*. ..=.
as~ociationswithadf&ces a
-7.. '
.- <*.:f.,;;.&' ,: ' .
the &p&uc of.V i m. ' - - : ....,+-,: - -
. - - - . *-:-,..:
- . '*'., =
It is expeced that actions un
..
...
will accord with the policy set forth he*ei&!.&fhrt
.'..: *,
modificatiq . .
. ,
....
d this policy wi l l be recommended- when neid the*- arises.
. . . ,
- *
.
I .
.'
-
.
. . I '
, . .
W. c.'WESTMORELAND
General, united States Army
Commanding
. ? &vF-5- 0 0 3 ~ PAGE . I OF 133 PAGES:
-..r.! ,...... &e. . r * y' a* -.-- - ....iC2 0 1 ,..*..-.,.. -..-.... .
. . .;... . . E;I ...
. .
INDEX
TAB PAGE
SECTIONI
3-7
Pocket GuidanceReferences
SECTION11
General Policy Guidance
Intelligence
Strategy
CommarldandControl
Psychological
Force Development
Personnel
Training
Logistics
Comptroller
Summar ies of Policy Guidance
SECTIONm
Staff Office Guidance
J1
52
53
- PAGE 2 OF 123 PAG1;S
SECTIONI
POCKET GUIDANCE REFERENCES
a
PAGE 5 OF 123 PAGES,
NINE R-ULES
FOR PERSONNEL OF US MILITARY
ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
The V i e t n a m have paid a heavy price i n
suffering f.>r their long fight against the commu-
nis!s. Wemililarymen are i nVietnam now because
their government has asked us t o help its soldiers
andpeoplei nwinning !heir struggle. TheVietCong
will attempt to turn the Vietnamese people again- . .
st you. You can &feat them at every turn by the
strength, understanding, and generosity you dis-
play with the people. Here are nine simple rules:
DlSTRfBUTlON-- 1.t oeach memberof the
UnitedStates Armed Forces i nVietnam
NINE RULES
1
Remember we are guests here:We make no
demands and seek no specialtreatment.
. ,
Join withthepeopleI Understandtheir life,^
'2.phrases from their langua~e and honor thtir
customs and laws.
Treat women with politeness and respect.
Makepersonalfriends among the soldiersand
common people.
Always give the Vietnamesethe rightofway.
Be alert to security and ready to react with
your military skill.
Don't attract attentionby loud, rude or unu-'
sual behavior.
I
Avoid separating yourself from.the people by
a display of wealth or privilege.
Abbeall else youare members of the US
MilitaryForcesonadiflicult mission, rqwmsi.
ble for.all your official and personal actiom.
Reflect honor upon yourself and the United
States of America.
201+ PAGE 4 OF 123 PAGES
I
6
GUIDANCEFOR COMMANDERSINVIETNAM
BY
GENERALW. C. WESTMORELAM), COMUSMACV
medical care.
7.
Useyour firepower with care and dlscrlmina-
tion, particularlyinpopulated are-. 8. Capitalize on psyrrropprtdti es.
9. Assist in*'revolutionary development" with em
phDBi8 on priority are- andon c i dc actlon
wherever feasible.
Encourageand help Vietnamese militarymd
paramflltarpunits;involve them i n your opmi-
tiomat wery opportanity.
Be smarter and more skillful than the enemy;
etimulate prdessionallem, alertnees and t a c t i s
calhgenuity; eetze every opportunityto enban
c e M n g of men and units.
Keepyour df i cer e and men well informed,
aware cdthe nine rul es forpersonael ofMAC7
andmindful of the techniquee d communist
insurgency and the role af free world farce8
in Vietnam.
Maintainan alert "open door" policy on com-
plafnteand a eenaitfvity to detection and cor-
rection d malpractices.
Recagnize bravery and outstanding work.
h p c t frequently unitetwo echelom below
your level toinsure compliance wi th the
foregoing.
W 1rn:66
CODE OF
CONDUCT
FOR MEMBERS OFTHE ARMED
FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES
GTA 21-50 Jum 1958'
DISTRlBUTlON-ACTIVE ARMY, NG6 USAR:
1 prr.och officer. wonant o(Fker, andd i s h d
CODE OF CONDUCT
for Members of the k me d forcer of the Uni tedStatel
1 am on Amdean hyhtiny man. I m e i nthe forces
pocedto y i wmy Iihi nthew dofen-.
2
Iwi l l neverw n e d a d myownheewill. Hi ncommandI
wi l l m a HrnendamymenA i l e h e y stillhavethe reon,
t orsi r).
3
IIIam coptwedIwi l l continuet omi s t byallmeamavail-
able. Iwi l l ateke every &&to=ape andai do h m
to CICQP.. I wi l l 0ccep1 neither pardo n a rpscml faron
hontheM y .
4
I f Ik w a piwrd w, Iwi l l keepkithwith my
f e l l wpti ronm. Iwi l l yive no inlornation a&e par)
i nany odiol which might be h l u l to my c o d . IfI
aa senla, Iwi l l takecomnond. I f not Irillobeythe lawful
ordendhow appointed over wandwi l l back hemupi n
my*ov.
Wh qdonod, Aoul d Ibecome o p i ~ e r drw,I
5r Cr * to only -.,anl t, m i c e nu&,, a d
date dM.Iwi II&omweriny I v r t k c qudi ocuto h e
utmost of my obility. Iwi l l d e no oral awri mn state-
me& ddoyal to mycoucl*yanditsallies wkarnful to hei r
cause.
6
Iwi l l wmf a p r that Iom an American fighting men,
mspom&l e f81myoctiom, ond d d l c a h d to he principles
which mod. mycountry bee. 1willtrud i nmy God and i n .
he UnitedSatadAmerica.
PAGE 6 OF 123 PAGES
C O Y U T NHOAUeuTAl S FOR ADVISORS
In tk paw' - d rh u.*noin k,re c d d
l o q p h (I.l i l di *. d 10 .I4dnn Ih.3 &r e nuu b
L.ud a ul dlort.r. &o . d d m Ird."""!S 0,a.R
L.u(.dp..At t r hr l c u n h r w n lhd r lo It* r
vmnr.. rhc)l me c m a m d J lor d d r rd vu Ik .Ha-
d -Aim r l l ut . .t b hd.a ~ m o i h l o 11.. d c l m d
eom)ll hdm*ldl. LmlcQ.. p., esefk-. rd C-non mu.
1. b kr d n hmhq his d a lhr t a l k b
*, -, nin U h olle+- m a un i s and
~ - h o l - r ~ ~ r i p n d mmm%h h f i d
2. b 'lkcomudr k*.plrp conloct ud pumsuhg . ai m .I
mrm-klwulr,r, -. r t h . hkne ar dor i b o .
ba b q l . 4 . i ! H raru, il b. k m r r el l nt nuh b
B . . r Ih+ ~kur d rril d m , dmld W&
4RpYb d.ymdl&. ai ar
A Ind. lai ol IkVC h t k . & l Br vu dlhrdnC
IhYC rd l ool l ut t h i -J h k m r r n I..- 4-
l k u s h up* md <crr.r*,Mndher 4m c bcabn Rrqnaig k
IrlirJ w r i l r ma-. n l s n b r l #ki ng d b n r JrJ(
&om rcmd N W I 10 MIU.S.W in Vd-
lL&fvndrmr*.lr lo Ah;- . ha r I% pbL
rdmr r .at& in y-d lo d&rr walisu--LdIkr 1hd4
be raltmh .rddto w a r , had or &rw K Cp
U,..I&d VC l r l c r l o *IdI hadd or nrl0.l r
.hm,!l*n mh.L D h. , al e &h g o r r m m l vr nl or cnr ds
w I&to r Z n r or I&<. k hml a or vrvl wu. krrr
rrt. l c d wu l n p a d a@ 4 mud I& ah. DI- u w c v
m n w r r n a r o u d m n * l b d b q d a n t k r d , uRr.pn*bl.
6. d d * . haH- kt r o or mar r o u l e s md n d l h .
nnl obon nl d u d far*
O r d k r w r ~ h r r ; p w o 5 . . u k l o b r l n , r h m n
to r omh. *n L.m+da, hrduum. t o 1-94, lb.t k &
Id-d lk mhnhnu* b c a o k t t r d RVNW lour-
r&w - h m e c- npalvl vr t k a d .lla t h n
th rdd dm a d .
&drs.lrmhJr, - - ml J iron. r n j l d
*.Ir . p l i n a rd w r=-kunrc - - mzl. & I 4 lire usa
ILo. - u r r r a r i v M br ( u l l n r ud vnJ rmr) .p*U
LWv m+h rur - uu r r a - uhi,urure IunYplr-
I& -+dm . 1 p 4 d ,win - u u m a d e rar- - b
Q.u.arckl.dbmMdm.illwin- Luv.i.plrnil
t a . - - w r . n d - r i l h p r a r d p U d . o p r
r.14 L. k m a d l l d s d k min b o d y to d;- &A *.I
U a h . ~ b D b r . ~ h r & W - h C p a d - h . ~ o I -
~ * I h . ~ " d . a i l I k - ~ b W
- a -
l.hmnpa&knru..h+1.Ln t o p t w r d I p r k . k
Ik M .rd WaLmmx. ud ~ar nl or i r cl l q. a* - ,
lonh. p.lds .*a W' s , inlor- I r m lidr
n d h r u k ?
~ L k m . l k & o . r p . ~ b r I k ~ 6 u l r * l . ~ ~
l o - o r m ~ k u r * L t . r u i , ~ 4 i l . . m h n h l
S h l h o a r r r d r - I h d b b a n l s . h i . k c o n V
dmsla *rm I
I ~ o . . t h c mn n r d n k ~ ~ n d . d p . d ~ ~ c i k r n n d h i o d
l,k,C..hIlr.r..?
6 k l h o m u J I k r ~ ' l ~ ~ l ~ ~ &
a k --s? H.Llmbm,-m Jnr r s r h d o m
i.ba bm'
207
PAGE 7 OF 123 PAGES
d
SECTIONII
GENERALPOLICY GUIDANCE
PAGE 8 OF123 PAGES
4 Y
205
..
PSYCHOLOGICAL
Recognize the basically political character of the warand the
resulting necessity of winniq the people.
CapitaXize on the ++Nine Rules" of'behavior in relationships with
the Vietnamese people.
Pursue a vigorous, imaginative and responsive psychological
operations campaign in which each commander is hisown psycho-
logical operatiom afficer .
Conctuct a comprehensive program of civic action entailing
maximumutilization ofMACV unitsand advisory resources.
Minimfie non-combatant battle ca@ties through diecreet,
controlled applicationoffirepower.
Stimulate within the RVNAF an offensive spirit and a close
knee of identity with the people of Vietnam.
Exploit the unit association (Buddy) systemto improve ARVN
morale and tactical praficienc y.
PAGE13 OF13.3 PAGES
FORCE DEVELOPME NT
chi eve and sustain an optimum b&nce between combat,
combat support and combat service support forces.within and be-
tween MACV components.
Promote development of suitably balanced RVNAF within
realilstic consbaints imposed by manpower availability.
Exploit to the maximum practicable degree the use d materiel
to conserve lives.
PERSONNEL
Insure thorough and t i hel y command indoctiination of a11in-
coming personnel,
Sustain the initiative on proper treatment ofpri soners of war
i n accordance with the Geneva Convention.
Relocate military persorlnel from populated areas as a means
of improving US-Vietnamese relations, contributing t o cont rol of
inflation and enhancing miesion effectiveness.
Exploit al l means, to enforce good order and military discipline.
Maintain a high state of morale through timely recognition of
valorous act s and by establishment of a responsive recreational
program.
Support vigorous and sustained efforts to improve leadership
at all levels within the RVNAF.
Sustain optimum personnel quality at al l echelons by working
through component commands to achieve fully responsive repJace-
ment programs.
Promote maximum continuity in keycommand and staff assign-
ments through a carefully supervised program of tour extensions.
Strive for attainment of viable, in-being capabilities for recovery
of personnel f r om enemv controlled territory.
211
n ~ c w15 OF123 PAGES
SUMMARTESOF POLICYGUIDANCE
Containedhereinare discussionsrelatingtomattersof mutual
andcontinuinginteresttocommandersbothamongandwithin thevarious
Free WorldForces. They maybeconsideredas policy guidancetoward
anincreasedatmosphere of concertedandcooperative effort.
PAGE 19 OF 123 PAGES
IMPACT UPON VIETNAMESE SOCIETY
Concernovertheimpactof thepresenceofFree WorldMilitary'
Assistance Forcesupon thepeople, econo~llic and~oci al systemsand
theultimateeffectuponourmissionhas increasedwith the prospecte
of militaryvictory. Understandingandsolutionstoproblemsarisihg
fromthieimpactmustbederivedfromknowing andbelievingthatthe
fightforthenational survivalafVietnamrequiresmorefromourcom-
. b b df wcesthanjust militaryeffectiveneesand, succese,
Our responsibilitiesinclude, therefore, tTnati~n buildingtt, touse
apoprlar phrase, as anintegralpartathefightf o r Vietnamese
national survival. Thisbecomea morereadilyapparentwhenonereal-
izeethatneither military successnor ttnation building'l inacounter-
ineurgencgenvironmenthas anyme d n g a.g separateconcepts. If suc-
cessis@ beattained, theterminationobactualfighting mustfinda
nationwith awellintegratedsociety, reliableecono&ic systemanda
etabhandreasonablypopularandeffectivegovernment. Apparent or
actualdominancebyFreeWorldMilitary Assistance'Forcesinevents
leadingtovictorycanundermine thenationalprideaad stabilityof
governmentwearetryingtofoster. Ulthmte andfiretlng successisa
morereasonableexpectationtf theimpact of thiepresenc'ehasbeen
sufficientlysubduedtolendcredibilitytotheFreeWorld Forces' role
obwUbgassistantsinanee~entialls Vietnameseventure.
Convincedthatactivitiesandsacrificesdirectedtuwardminimizing
thetotalimpactofFreeWorldMilitary AssistanceForces1presenceupon
the Vietnamese cannotbe viewedseprat el yfromthoserelating moredi-
lrsctly tocombatoperatione, allconcernedar eremindedatheheavysnd
dlencompaesingresponsibilitiesinthis matter. Any aspectofFree
WorldForcestpresencewhichblatantlyaffectsorovemhelmeVietnameee
nctivities, economy, impressianeorattitudesmudbeconeidreda s a
aeriuw problemmeritingimmediate attention.
D I S C I m , LAW AwORDER
She mnl nt emeaf high standards af discipline, lawandorderin
everycommunityi nVietnamisessentialtothe successaourcombining
8ofssic& ThisLs difficult evenundsr the mostidealconditions. The
- problem ie compoundedinVietnam bythenature of theconflictwith i t s
interrelatedineurgent,,terroristandCriminalactivitiesandthelarge
26 5
PAGE. 20'OF 123.PAGES '
- -- -- --
- --
influx of refugees and multi-national n.ilitary and civilian forces, each
witli their distinct native habits and cu~. foms. The presence d our
forces i n this environment focuses on the need for coordinated law en-
forcement programs integrating the efforts of the military forces with
those of the Vietnamese authorities.
It is recognized that the basic responsibility for internal securi-
ty, law and order is that of the Government of Vietnam. The discipline
of the military forces is that of military 'commanders. When incidents
occur which involve members of our forcev and the Vietnamese people,
i t becomes a matter of utmost importance to resolve them quickly if the
favorable national image which has been deve1oped.i~ to be maintained.
This is best accomplished by joint cooperative efforts in the enforcement
of law and order.
The Director General of National Police and the members of the
police agencies he represent s are working closely with our forces t o
improve the enforcement efforts wherever they are stationed. This has
resulted i n the development of joint military-civil police mobile and foot
patrols i n many ar eas of Vietnam. Criminal Investigations conducted
jointly involving members of our forces facilitate the exchange of cri mi -
naJ Mormation, development 6f evidence and identification of suspects
and witnesses. Prompt disciplinary action againat offenders contributes
to an appreciation of the seriousness with which delinquency or bad be-
havior by the troops is regarded, Experience shows that integrated,
coordinated police practices and procedures insure the full cooperation
and support of Vietnamese authorities, This in turn can serve as a
training and educational mechanism to develop mutual respect and under-
standing among those responsible for the enforcement of laws. It can
build confidence and professionalism in the police organization and con-
tribute t o the strengthening of the internal security posture. From a
military viewpoint, it facilitates the establishment of Iocal mutually
acceptable arrangements for the temporary detention of military per-
sonnel where distance or other factors ~r e c l ude the immediate delivery
t o the offencer' s forces. It i nsures the maintenance of cl ear lines of
jurisdiction over the personnel of our forces, thus preserving national
integrity i n support af our mutual objectives i n Vietnam.
The discipline, conduct and behavior of the multi-national forces
in Vietnam are under the constant, close sdrutiny of the eyes of the world.
The ability of the commanders d our forces to exercise control and main-
tain a high state csf discipline wi l l influence the degree d success of our
UNCLASSIFIED
PAGE 2 1 OF 123 PAGES
21 ~t
- - . .. ... . . -
combinedmfseionhere. m e achievementof u highstateof disciplineis
amatferof indtvidual, unitandnationalpridewhichhistoricallyhasbeen
' andcontinuestobeoneof theprimarygoalsadeverymilitarycomman-
der. A claeelyknit, integratedprogramforeffective lawenforcement in
fullsupportof Vietnapleseauthoritiesisahighlp'desirable objectivefor
each oftheforcessupportingtheGovernmentof Vietnam initsquestfor
peaceanddevelopmentasafreenation.
PRISONERSOFWAR
Thecontinuedsuccessuf ourmilitary oper adns canbeexpected
t oincreasethenumber acapturedenemypersonnel. Thehandlingand
treatmentgfsuchpersonnelbecomes moreimportantandtakesongreater
significanceint ermsof our roleand..miesioninVietnam.Thepresence
uif suchinternationalorganizationsa8the ICRC, theICC andothersdic-
tates the needtoinsurethatourforcesar ecomplyingwiththe intentof our
r espht i vegovernmentsi nadheringtotheprovisions of the GenevaCon-
vention(GPW)relativetothetreatmentof detaineesandprisonersof
Wk r (PW).
TheGovernmentaf Vietnamhasconstructed PWCampswhichar e
operatedmostefficientlyi nf ul l compliancewiththeGPW.Additional
carnapsarealsobeing prepared. Thefavorablereportsof theICRCfol-
lowingtheirvisitstosuchcampstestifiestothe successofthese opera-
tions.
Under existingagreements, eachof ourforcesisresponsiblefor
hetraderof captureddetaineesandPW's toG W custody. Although
the GVNassumescustodyof suchpersonnel, wr forces, ascapturing
powera, retainultimate responsibility fortheirtreatmentandctisposi-
tion(Art a),Under theseconditions, the needforeffective systemsof
controlandaccountabilitybecomesparamount.
Theeyeternshow ineffectwhile'workingefficiently, requirecon-
atantsaper vl ~i oaandcommandattention. Theseprovideforthehumane
treatmentat.thepoint of captureandprompt evacuationof detaineesand
PW'e frobthe combat.areas.' The needforknedicalcareandattention
is'&re&d. 'Theyprovideforewdi t i ousprocessingandproper classi-
ficationintosuchcategor$es' at3 imoceilt' civilians, returnees, civil
WTqCm~38EIEI)
PAGE 22 OF123 PAGES
defendants and PW'e. They insure accurate accountability by our forcea
throughout the processing channel to delivery to GVN custody. Refugee
problems are avoided or reduced by releasing innocent civilians near
their villages and hamlets or close to the point of capture. The delivery
of PW1sdirectly to the PW Camps located in each CTZ precludes diver-
sion of such personnel into hut hor i zed channels and assures m.r corn-
mandere of their proper disposition on the basis of current agreemenb.
The key to success of the PW program reeta in the need for our
forcea to classify all detainees into eetablished categories before they
are turned over to GVN custody. Without such classification, the beet
efforts d aur forces and those of the GVN in developing an effective FW
program would not succeed.
The handling and humane treatment of prisoners uf war by our forces
under the procedures established is the finest testimony of our will and
intent to comply with internatiollal law. Continued emphasis on the proper
handling uf PW'e will serve to encourage e m m y defections and eurrenders
weaken his forces in the field and contribute materially to the success of
our military operations in Vietnam,
COORDINATIONANb CONTROL OFFIREPOWER
Guidance, procedures, and responeibilltiem for the coordi@lon urd
control of fi re support operations ar e cadained in two MACV dWctiver.
MACVDirective 525-18 provides gui-e concerning control of artillery/
mortar awl navalgunfirewrtprovided by FWMAforcee. WC V I)i-
rective96-4 eatabIlrrhee~procedure8and respomibilitiesfor the com-
mand, control, and coordht i on uf FFKlldA farce afr operatioh. In ad&-
tlon to providingeffective command and control for fire support meane,
these &ectlves insure that (1)friendly forces and civilian6 are not en-
-red, (2) property of friendly forces, RVN, and friendly civilians
icr not destroyed or damaged, and (3) national and operational bmt hr i e e
are not violated. Significant among the measuresprescribed for the con-,
trolaffire suppart operations are (1)the general requirement to o b a n
cl ear ance/ appr d from appropriate GVN csfficialu (~rovl nce/ Dbbi ct
Chief & Sector/~ubsector Commander) prior to the athckoft argeb and
(2) the requirement to warn inhabitantr d hamletaand village8 not asso-
ciated with maneuver of ground forces by leaflets, speaker systems or
other appropriate meane prior to attack. met c a mp b c e with the pro-
vision d these directive6 is esmrentlalat all levels d command to inmxre
that noncombatant battLe c a d t i e e axe held to a minimum.
COORDINATXONANDCONTROL OFTACTICAL O~RATTONS
Command relationship8 among the various FW and RVN forces are
founded on the principles of cooperation, coordination, and close partner-
ship at all echelons. The key to rmccesa of combined operations rests
in preliminary planning, mutual trust, and reciprocal support by the
forcee involved. When a FW or RVNcommander desires assistance
from another national force, it &odd be requested from counterput
headquarters. When forces of different natfollalltiea ar e conducting
closely interrelated operations, orae force should be placed in either
direct or general support, under terms mutuallyagreeable to b ~ t h eides.
The forces involved in reciprocal support are orgardzationally indspend-
ent; and their efforts are coordinated throughjoint planning, cloee con-
tact, and mutual agreement between the commanders concerned.
FWf orceu may b~ placed i n direct or general support d RVNforces
or the reverse may be true, dependingon the situation existing at a
PAGE 24 OF 123 PAGES
particular time. A FW force commander does not assume operational
control of an RVN unit.nor does an RVN commander assume operational
control of a FW unit. Commanders and staffs are requested tq asgist
i n promoting cl ear cut, effective, and readily underatcmd relationships
among FW and GVN forces by adopting and using with precision fhe term
Wirect support" and "general support!' in connection with plartning and
assignment of missions for !combined operations. When a force ie
assigned the mission a supporting another force for a cornbiped opera-
tion, the commander af the supported force will exercise general direc-
tion of the supporting force within the limits permitted by accepted tac-
tical practices of the national service of the support force. Such direcd
tion includes designation of targets or objectives, timing, duration, and
other fnetructione necelsrsary for coordination and for efficiency. The
commander of the supporting force will Beter mine the requirements.d
the supported force and take necessary action to fulfill them within hi s
capabilities.
(C) PRINCIPLES OF A TAOR
-
A TAOR is a prescribed area which has been assigned specifically
to a Free World commander by the ARVN corps commander. Any changes
in the TAOR boundaries require the decision of the ARVN corps comman-
der aft er coordination with the Free World comnlander(8) concerned. The
primary purpose a the TAOR is to defineate an area in which a comman-
der is to focus the necessary effort to deny the area to the enemy. In the
TAOR, the specified commander is responsible for, and has the authority
to act on, the development and maintenance of installations and the con-
duct of tactical operations with troops under his control. Since there
frequently ar e ARVN and W/PF operations as well as Free World opera-
tions i n a TAOR, commanders must work closely with local ARVN and
RF/PF commanders to insure that Free World operations complement
and supplement GVN efforts, It is emphasized that the ar ea within a TAOR
still belongs to GVN. The civil administration and GVN control ar e not
rekqui shed. The ar ea is i n no sense under the martial law of the force
commander and normal police functions continue to be exercieed by the
GVN.
FWMAF-TAOR COMMANDERS' RELATIONS
WITH GVN OFFICIATS AND POPULATION
The tacticalobjective cd the FWMAF TAOR commander is the neu-
Wh a t i o n of enemy influence in his area. This short-term objective
must be coneidered i n the perspective provided by the long range objective
of the Free World allies in Vietnam, viz, the establishment of a free via-
ble nation, representativeof and responsive to its people.
Tactical operations conducted within TAOR must take cognizance of
the fact that the FWMAF is functioning i n a sovereign state whose people
are the nucleus around which this new nation is being built. The Vietnamese
populace must be presumed to be friendly until it demonatrates otherwise.
Relatiops with the people must be conducted through the legitimately con-
stituted provincial and district governmend.
TAOR boandmrries will not conform necessarily to Vietnamese politl-
cal boundaries. To aeeure coordination af effort in tactical operations,
213
PAGE 26 OF 123 PAGES
UNCLASSIFlED
liaison must be established with all local officials exercising jurisdiction
over any portion of the TAOR. Should the TAOR extend through more than
one province, inter-provincial liaison is essential: Both province and
district chiefs have a .dual civil-military responsibility. In many cases
they have military forces at their disposal. In all cases, they ar e re-
sponsible for security i n their areas. Liaison with these officials must
be effected through the MACV advisor, ahd where assigned, the FWMAF
Liaison Wi cer .
TAOR commanders wf f l have occasion to come into contact with
local revolutionary development activities. Revolutionary development
is a Vietnamese process which cannot be accomplisht?d by Free World
personnel. To be effective, revolutionary development activities re-
quire the participation of the individual Vfetnamese. Free World units
may support revolutionary development by providing the military securi-
ty required for it t o takeplace. Fr ee World unita also may be able to
assist the local revolutionary development program through military civic
action. Any support affered to revolutiorra~y development must be chan-
neled through local GVN officials.
Population control within TAOR muat be effected through the appro-
priate GVN official. In tactical situations, the attachment of Vietnamese
@Wary or civilian ufficials to units wi U facilitate this control. Coordi-
nation with the GVN must be effected i n planning operations s o that pop-
lation returned to government control caa be transferred to GVN civilian
control at the earliest possible time. In non-tactical situations, FWMAF
commandkrs have no jurisdiction we r Vietnamese personnel. IQ this
circumstance, population control is the prerogative d the GVN. To usurp
or weaken this control by effecting unilateral FWMAF control measures is
c-r-productive to our long-range objective in Vietnam.
Troop discipline and courtesy must receive command attention at
all echelone. The recent history af Vietnam is replete with examplee of
mistreatment ab the civilian populace by soldiers af many armies. The
good will and sincere friendship af the Free World allies is best demon-
otrated t o the individual Vietnamese by the courteous, disciplined conduct
afaru troops. Individual courteey must extend to the operation of motor
vehicle8 and other equipment. Consideratioi must be given the Vietname8e
oa raadsand highway8 and on urba streete. Conduct both on and uf dutg
h a y 8 must show respect and conaideration for Vietnamese cuetoms and
sonspdiutiea.
UNCLASSIFIED
Becauseof the-relativepermanence of theirassociationwiththe
populationof their area, TAOR commandershave anexcellentoppor-
tunity toassistboththe individual Vietnameseand localabficials. Every
opportunityshouldbetakento improve theprestige of the GW. Assis-
tanceprovidedwithinaTAOR shouldbe done seastoreflectmaximum
crediton the GVN ratherthanthe FreeWorldunitpresent.
PAGE 28 OF 123 PAGES
UNCLASSIFIED
MACJl
SUBJECT: Handlingand kccounting for Prbaners dWar
TO: CommandLng Geneml, United States Army,Vietnam, A m 9 6 M
Commander, NavalFarces, Vietnam, AP9 96243
Commancttng General,IDMarineAmpMbiourr Force, A#) 86601
Commander, Seventh Ai r Force, APO 96301
1. Interest continue8 to mount at hlgheet Levels wifhdn the United
States Government over the treatment afcaptives taken by the Free World
andARVN military force8 in Vietnam. QI particular concern iethat treat-
ment accorded captives taken by US Forces does not create an international
problem which could embarrass or complicate our effort8 to obtain prop&
treatment far captured US personnel in North Vietnam.
2. One ofthe initial actions which must be taken is to establish a
f u l l accounting for those Prisoners ofWarturned over to the Vietnamese
by the US Armed Forces to include the best reconstruction afpast actione
in this area that can be made.A related and equally important action,
already initiated by this Headquarters, but requiring active command sup
port, is the reclassification and transfer ofthose Prisoners obWarnuw
held i n Vietnamese civilian jails to Prisoner d Warcampis as rapidly as
space becomes available.
3.
In order to develop unified policies and procedures for Prisoners
of Waras outlined in JCS PubNo 3, dated 1September 1964, the following
responsibilities areestablkhed:
a. The CG USARV is responsible for the administration and
operational superviqion duse US Forces Prisoner ofWarprogram under
existing national policy, in Vietnam. Such responsibility includes evacuation
from DivisiolS/~epafate Brigade Collecting Points and custodial accountability
MAC31
SUBJECT: Handling and Accounting for Prisoners of War
for all US Force captured Prisoners aWar from point acapture to de-
livery or turn-aver to GVN control. Cozordinatfonwill be effected with
the US Component and IKI MBF Commanders in Vietnam in developing an
integrated Prisoner uf War program. Although Free World Forces, by
agreement, ar e responsible for delivering captives to the GVN, US Force
Commanders ar e authorized to accept custody uf Prisoners d War taken
in combined US - Free World Force operations when requeeted by the
commander af the capturing force.
b. The COMNAVFORV, CG III MAF,and Cm& 7th AF, are
responsible for evacuation of Prisonera af War to the nearest USARV
receiving or collection point and f or establishing component service pro-
cedures as outlined in MACV Directive number 190-3, Wed 24 May 1966.
The Commander, Seventh Ai r Force is further responsible f or providhg
airlift for evacuation d Prisonere of War as required.
4. Thi e' ~ea@uart ers will retain the reeponsibility for joint policy
d the Prilqoner of War program i n Vietnam. MACV directfvee wi l l be
revieed to delineate the responaibilitlee cited above.
5. CG W A R V wi l l take immediate action to implement the policies
a t b e d and advise this Headpuartere of the date necessary procedures
w,established
s/W. C. Westmoreland
t/w. C. WESTMORELAND
General, United States Army
Comm+cbg
PACE 48 OF 123 P A mS
UNCLASSIFIED
MACJl
St'BJECT: Standards od Conduct
TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION
1.
At a special meeting of the Miasion Councilon 5 Augaet, Am-
baseador m e expressed his growing concern over the standprdlsd
conduct of US personnel in the greater w o n area. I sharehi8concern,
2. Particularly disturbing are recent incidents involvingour per-
sonnel and members of the Vietnamese National Police. Commanders
must continually st ress the high standards af conduct expected d US milf-
tary personnel, with special emphasis on the necessity for maidahhg an
attitude of respect towards Vietnameae Police officials.
3.
The constant turnover ab personnel is one of the difficulties
confronting a commander in maintainingcontinuity d command 'policies
with regard to standardsof conduct. Commanders must insure that all
of their personnel are impressed with the seriousness cd this problem,
not only by written directives and messages, but also by frequent and re-
peated briefings. The Nine Rules set forth our guideIinee. Each fndivid-
ual must be made aware of theee precepts. n o s e who ignore or violate
them must be disciplined, promptly and appropriately.
4.
Commanders willbring this matter to the attention d their
personnel on a continuing basis. I expect positive results and wi l l accept
nothing less.
s,'W. C. Westmoreland
t/ W. C. WESTMORELAND
General, United States Army
Commanding
DISTRIBUTION
special
MACJl 8 January 1967
SUBJECT: US ~dvisor/VN CounterpartRelationship
TO: EachOfficerAdpieor, UnitedStatesUt a r y Assistance
Command, Vietnam
1.
Thisletterisdesignedtoemphasizethe importanceof US
advisor/^^counterpartrelationshipsandtohighlightyour rolea s the
USAdvisor andyour contributiontothetotalspectrumof US-Free World
Forcesteffortsinsupportof the Governmentaf Vietnam.
2.
Theunprecedentedbuild-up aUS-Free WorldForcesin
South VietnambeginninginAugust 1965, andthewidelydispersed, large-
scalecommitmentof theseforcesintheirintegrityagainsttheVietCong
andNorth VietnameseArmy, havehadtheeffectof takingthe spotIight
off ouradvisoryefforts. Itisabsolutelyessentialthatthisdevelopment
liotbeconstruedas aconstrictionof your missionorasalesseningof the
relativeimportanceof youreffort.
3.
You ar estillthe '!beart andsouittof our totalcommitmentin
South Vietnam. Theultimate successaf thatcommitmentdemands. an
effectualVietnamese militaryestablishment, notonlyforvictoryover
theinsurgentVietCongandtheinvading North VietnameseArmy, but
abo, andmoreimportant, forthe assuranceof apermanentpeace. The
armedforcesof theRepublicofVietnammustbepreparedtoassumethe
responsibilityforthe post-war 8ecurit.yof the Vietnamese peoplewith a
~mtnlmumOf externalassistance.
4.
Yourjob isamostdifficult andsometimesfrustratingtask.
Under circumstances, the relationshipof advisor-to-advised isa
testyanti~tenuous one, Here, thatrelationshipis compoundedby daily
decisioxis withlifeordeath consequences, andby c omm~c a t i ons prob-
lems cpmNcatedbylanguage difficultiesanddifferentnationalorigins.
223 PAGE 57 OF I23 PAGES
MACJl 8 January 1967
SURJECT: US ado is or/^^ Counterpart Relationship
5. The training of .the US military afficer is characterized by con-
ditioned hai t s of decisiveness and aggressiveness. The essence ofyour
relationehip with your counterpart is constituted by patience and restraint,
As a threshold to development of a meaningful affiliation with your coun-
terpart, you must succeed in the reconciliation of these contrasting qualities.
6, A natural tendency to be assertive in the rendering of advice and
guidance must be tempered with a degree of diffidence. You should provide
the ingredients necessary for your counterpart to make valid judgements,
and then encourage his decision-making prerogatives; these are essential
to his self-respect as wel l as hts leadership image, and must not be com-
promisect. Experience has proven that impartingthe knowledge required
for the decision is eminently more successful than attempting to provide
the decision. The net result frr a more qualified and confident counterpart
and the establishment of a stronger basis of mututaltrust and respect.
7, Once you have established a foundation of accord, it is to your
advantage to use all means at your disposal ta develop and maintain,an
attitude d comradeship with your counterpart, You will find him respon-
sive to a sincere desire on your part to learn about and accommodate his
language, customs, manner8 and religious beliefs. A working under-
standing of these essential8 will facilitate a more tractable and resilient
relationship,
8. Your challenge is indeed a great one. Your mandate charges
you with a degree of responsibility unparalleled in other areas of military
service, Your relationship with your counterpart is the key to the accom-
pllshment of our mission.
S/W. C. Westmoreland
t/ W. C. WESTMORELAND
General, United States Army
Commanding
PAGE 58 OF 123 PAGES
MACJ l 8January 1967
SUBJECT: USAMSO~/ VNCounterpartRelationships
DISTRIBUTION:
I - B
11- A
Plw 673 - ICorps
1052 - 11Corps
1090- mCorps
1362 - IVCorps
49 - SA, AbnBde Adv Det
157 - SA,SMD
97 - SA, RF/W
12 - SA,RW SCQ Adv Det
275 - School & TngAdv Det
133 - AreaLog ComdAdv Det
5000 - AG-AOP
m,w - c
227 PAGE59 OF 123 PAGES
MACJ54 29 July 1966
SUBJECT: USMACV Psychological Operations Posture (U)
TO: See Mstribution
1. (C) Our military progress has created condtions which ar e con-
sidered tobe conducive to the successful conduct of psychological warfare
operations. Specifically, our sustained military activities have created a
condition in which the tactical exploitation af Psywar efforts may readily
precipitate increased defections by the enemy. To capitalize on available
opportunities we must have constant an$ intensive command emphasis on
the military Psywar operation8 at all levels of command.
2.
(C) Commanders ar e expected to direct personally the Psywa~
effort within their commands. In implementing this program, commandera
??ill:
a.
Assign to the Psywar effort the necessary personnel to
advise and carry out the commanders' directions on this important'task,
b. Ascertain that personnel assigned to or supporting Psywar
.operations are properly motivated.
c. Decentralize the reproduction and delivery means supporting
Pspwar operations to the lowest practical level.
3.
(C) Research abackground materiel, analysis of program weak-
nesses and samples of successes will be developed and disseminated by the
MACV stAff to aid in the development and execution of these psychological
operations.
GE 90 OF 123 PAGES
228
MACJ54 29July 1966
SUBJECT: USMACV Psychological Operations Posture (U)
4. (U)The wholehearted and actiqe support of allcommanders is
essential to a dynamic, effective psychological warfare effort. It isex-
pected that with these efforts the US MACV Psyops programwillachieve
greater results.
s/W.C, Westmoreland
t/ W. C. WESTMORELAND
General,United States Army
Commanding
TIISTRIBUTXON:
CG USARV
CDR7th AirForce
COMNAYFORV
CG mMAF
CG I FFORCEV
CG I1FFORCEV
SA IVCORPS
CO 5th Special Forces Gp
CO 6th PSYOPS BN
Jrl
5-2
5-3
5-4
J-5
5-6
POLWAR
SOG
MAC-
22 DEC 1966
SUBJECT:. Mission d ARVN Advisors (U)
TO: Major Force Commanders
1. (C) The 1967 Combined Campaign Plan assigns ARVN the
primary mission to support Revolutionary Development (RD). Success
of the overall RD effort in 1967 will depend largely on how well ARVN
perf or ms this mission.
2. (C) The major tasks assigned ARVN in support of RD ar e to
clear selected areae of enemy forces, provide security for the population
and cadre elements i n these areas, assist police forces to identify wd
eliminate the VC infrastructure, open and secure lines cd communication
necessary for economic development and. conduct an active defense af
political and economic centers. In addition, ARVN search and destroy
operations ar e to be aimed at preventing the incursion of enemy main
force units into areas undergoing RD and destroying enemy forces i n
areas where RD activities are Named for the future. These are opera-
tiow tasks. ARVN commanders and key staff officers, especially the
G2'a &ndG3?s, must devote adequate attention to the planning and super-
vision of these t asks if ARVN is to accomplish i t s primary mission suc-
cessfully.
3. (U) Because support cif RD is ARVN's primary mission, ARVN
advisors ar e reminded that their primary mission is to provide advisory
assistance in aU matters pertaining to military support af RD. Accordingly,
all advisors will focus their personal efforts,' and those of their staffs,
toward this vital ar ea af responsibility. Revolutionary' Development cannot
be considered primarily a provincial matter with the responsibility for ad-
visory arssistance left to sector advisors. Instead, all ARVN advisors must
know and understand every aspect of RD support and use this knowledge i n
every possible way to assist their counterparts.
MACRDS
SUBJECT: Missionof ARVNAdvisors(U)
4. (C) SupportbyGVNandUS militaryforcesof Revolutionary
Development placesemphasisonthreematters:
dirty"anexcellentexamplewillbe set forthe Vietnamesetroopswhohave
leadership.
a. Smallunitoperations. This puts apremium onsmallunit
b.
guerrilla.
Night operations. We musttakethe nightawayfromthe
c.
mesepeople.
Troopcivicactionprojectsparticipatedinby the Vietna-
If US troopsar eavailabletopitchi nand"get theirhands
beeninclinedi nthepasttolook down onparticipationwith thepeople i n
manual labor. The.valueof troopcivicactionisperhaps morepsycho-
logicalthan material.
5.
(U) Iexpectyoutoensurethatal l advisorsunderstand, accept,
andexecutetheirresponsibilitieswith respecttosupportCSFtevolutionaq
Development. Increasesinpersonnelandequipmentauthorizationsare
notconsiderednecessarytoaccomplish, the mission. What isrequiredis
understanding, patience, persistence, organization, andcarefulsuper-
vision.
S/W. C. Westmoreland
t/W. C. WESTMORELAND
General, United States Army
Commanding
231
PA& 93 OF l23 PAGES
MACVJointMessageform
UNCLASSIFIED DTG:. 0312542Jul66
FROM: COMUSMACV
TO: . CG m MAF/SA ICORPS
CGIFFORCEV/SA II CORPS
SA fV CORPS
SA CMR (COURIER)
INFO: CG USARV (COURIER)
DSA.1CORPS, DANANG
I BA 11CORPS, PLEKKU
DSA m CORPS, BEN BOA
UNCLAS 22787 FROM GENERALWESTMORELAND
Subj: AircraftSupportforSectorandSubsectorAdvisory Teams.
1. The US effortinVietnamiaessentiallytwofold; onepartthe
tacticalefforttodestrog the NVA andMain ForceVC units, theotherto
as-t the GVN inthedevelopmentof aviablegovernmentdemonstratedby
itecapacity toexerciseeffectivecontrol&roughout thecountryside. Our
miUtary forcesare performingwellinthe tacticalrole. We must, however,
Drafter1
I
Releaser
JOELM. HOLLIS W. C. WESTMORELAND
Coldnel, G4: General, UnitedStatesArmy
Ch, ~volutiormryDev Mv Commanding
MACJ33 40796
23.2
PAGE 94 OF 123 PAGES
MACV Joint Messageform
Continuation Sheet
UNCLASSIFIED
exploit the success of our tactical military operations through greater
efforts towards the establishment of secbrity in the villages and hamlets
and extension uf GVN Mluence and control. I regard the MACV and
USASF sector and subsector advisory teams, working with GVN officials
at the province and district level, a s our primary resources in this effort.
These teams, often the only US presence in an area, are responsible for
providing advisory support to the G W in establishing adequate local
security and for the economic, political, psychologi~al, and social pro-
grams whi6h comprise revolutionary development.
2. The effectiveness of these teams in advising, influencing and
supporting the GVN authorities is a direct function aE their ability to work
with those authorities on a programmed recurring basis. As a matter of
policy, I desire that each sector advisor visit each district in hi s area of
resgbnsibility and each subsector advisor visit each village in hi s area at
least once each two weeks, local conditions permitting. Further, that
within the national priority areas these visits be conducted more frequently.
3. .Helicopters or fixed wing aircraft.wil1 be provided for this pur-
nose wherever the securitv situation or distances involved ~recl ude use of
,regulwground transport. Aircraft will be allocated to satisfy this requfre-
ment -on a special scheduled priority basis, not to be diverted to other
PAGE 95 OF 123 PAGES
MAC V Joint Messagef or m
Continuation Sheet
ppos e s including support d US tactical operations except in case of
ernergency.
4. I request that corps senior advisors place continuing emphasis
on support of the sector and subsector advisory program. I wish your
initial efforts directed to providing aircraft necessary for the advisor sup-
pr t effort noted above. Advise me within the next 15 days how you plan
to satisfy this requirement within your present resources.
c
MACV Joint Messageform
CONFIDZNTIAL NQFORN DTG: 18010'72 Nov 66
FROM: COBdUsb4ACV
TO: DEPCG, U-V RUMSVA
COM7AF RUBdSBJ
CG, ~ M A F RWNMF
COMNAVFORV RUlLdSBB
CG, I FFBRCEV RUMNVF
CG, IX FFORCEV RUBdSEF
SA, IV CORPS RIMSMT
CO, 5Ta SIFG RUMNAB
CONFDENTIAIJ NOFORN 49911 FIZlOBd: 3MACJ02
SUBJECT: Relationship Between US IMilitargl and Vietnamese (U)
References: a. MACV Msg 41772, DTG 1818132 &p 6.6.
b. Ltr, Hq USMACV, Sarbj: "Command Emphasis on
Revolutionary Development/Civic Action Programs", 22 Oct 66.
c. ' MACV Directive 525-3, Subj: ''Minimizing Non-combatant
Battle Casualties. ".
Drafter Releaser
W. Bc ROSSON W. B. ROSSON
Major General, USA Major General, USA
Chief af Staff Chief 0s Staff
40402
2 3 3
PAGE 102 OF 123 PAGE;
pdsiCV Joint L..essagef oz-m
Continuation Sheet
COrnDENTL4L XQFOrn
1. (C) In reference a CBMUSMACV stressed need for eyrnpthe&"sc
undsrstanding of the Vietnachese people if we are to achieve success in oess.
endeavor to assist and support W s embattled maon. Be went on Ls specify
elimination of actions on the part of US military personnel that womob
growth of diskimt and dsrespect between US Forces and the Vietnamese
people. Reference b furnished @dance &s&ned to inculcate i n U C V
ranks a solid appreciation of the role of RevoIutSonary Development and
Civic Action, enthusiasm for contributing to &ese vital mdsrbkhg~and
the importance of "tallcing up" o w efforts i n these fields.
2. (C) The foregoing notwithstanding, reports available to this
headquarters ~: zges t that an attitude of disaffection toward the Viet~amese
may be develosins among our personnel. P/Panifestations hcIlu8e reference
to excessive M3VN desertioam, lack of aggressiveness (z:~ the part crf RwIPU'
units, short duration of certain operations and absence of a sense of urgency.
Without overlooking the possibility that the reports may be exaggerated, or
that they reflect isolated cases, sufficient evidence is avzilable to require
f i r m and immediate command action through the medium of troop indoctri-
nation to arrcst the growth of a potentially dangerous development M n g
the incipient z:'age.
MACV Jaw Messagefarm
ContinuationSheet
CQNFZDErnL NWOM
3. (C)According1y, addressees wi l l institute without delay me&-
surea to impress upon all personnel the need for informed tmderseaa
af his Vietnamese comrade in arms. Emphasis ~ h d d be placed on &o
fact that after twenty years of sustained effwt, a &nee a!war =@m-imse
is inevitable. We, on the stkzr ha d, not only erday the ms t i mt i u . ~be@-
fits a~180ciatedi with the cne year tour, but pro&~cea "surge" effort daring
that period. In terms 0.f endmrince the average Vistamese semicennzlzn is
no match for hia American counterpart. As a yowg mdexgan- =tion,
the Republic Bf We b m Bs hard-pressed to provide leadership comparable
to that enjoyed by American forces. It bs recalled, in thda re,cy;ard,
that Commun4Lst QerrorP~m and military action have exacted a d#propm-
. .
tiomtely heavy toll of cas~. : t i esa mo e Webr ncse praannel in psitiom
of military and pslticzl Icaderrehip, particularly at the lower Ileveb.
AdditionalIy, it must be pl ated out that the Vietrzrnece mentality Mers
from Brat af the Americsn in Trarious respects, and that these differenrcea
must be reckoned with in as:sessisg the Vietmmeae attitude and outlo&.
3. Another poten.t!all)r-seriousQre-?dreflected in recent reparts
perhim to &[iaparagi-,-?cmments concernhg restraints on application of
firep0:ver. ~oxnrnerilsmch as "tile o d y good vilPzge is a burned vill.zige, IT
h&cltl;ve of the trend. d emphasis on
Y:&\;C ii hi nt .Messageform
~;;s;;'&y~~zJ~on gflec+k
troop indoctrination is necessary to insure that newly arrive personnel
in Fti cul m are tboroughly conversant with need for naPRS&hg non-
cornb=thtbaWe casualties, and understad the rationale behind current
f mhcf i om on this subject. Fkference c applies.
CP 4.
, (Al3 J(,O-t#)
SPICEbYMaoL Od FILEREFBRBNV
,
CONFIDENTIAL
'MACJ1 Guidance Letters toFWAF cmmmdero
0
SEEDISTRIBUTION ACofS, J-1 OFTe 13k67
CM7 1
LTCOverton/llf/60273
1. Inclosed I s acopyof correspondence which, i n the interest of cl oser
cooperation and unity of ef f ort among theFree WorldForcer, haa been addressed
recently t o each Free World Force corpmander. Itisfurnished here for yourinfor-
mation and guidance as appropriate.
2. As a matterof st af f i nt erest youare adv$eed that cogiw have been al s o
furnished toHq7AF,I11W,USARV, and USNAVFORV;BqFPORCEV I and11; and SA
I
I V Corpo.
-1 Incl
a8
DISTRfBUTIOEI:
C/S AG
SJS COMPT
HIST IG
32 W I
33 Pn
34 SJA
J5 * w,.,
56 Jl- 5 cye
JJJf . ,
EXHI BI T D-46
LJJ
REPLACES DDFORMM.EXISTINGSUPPLIESOFWHICHWILL BE
Q MAR 1967
Lieutenant General Chac, Myung Shin
Commander, Republic of Korea Forces, Vietnam
Saigon, Vietnam
Dear Genera'l Chae:
The Free World Forces in Vi et nam, individually and ;collectively,
have taken tremendous strides toward military vtctory over t he past
year. As a reeult we ar e now in a position'from which the picture of
ultimate military success may be viewed with increasingly greater
clarity. Accordingly, we may wish,to employ.this closer perspective in
reflecting upon our mutual concern for a purposeful and harmonious
approach to the victory we seek.
As the commander of your country's forces here in Vietnam, I am
certain that you have considered as I have the impact of our forces on
the poEttCca1, pyschological and economic aspecte of assistance t o t he
Vietnamese. I am equally certain that you found the matter full of
complextty, evpecjally when considered within t he framework of your
own military operations. However, regardlese of either complexity or
the inareasihg tempo of our own operations, it seems we ar e now enter-
trig a phase wherei n our presence and actiohs and their interface with
the V'tetnamese Government and people may be of even more lorig lasting
importance than the day to day victories over the aggressorat forces.
As we approach victory, then, the task of assisting the Vietnamese
41 their struggle tor freedom assuredly will become more demanding of
our interest and energies. In thiu context, t he requirement for a
prcacise and discrete unity or purpose and nffort am*$
.
dl the. Frt~o
World Forces dedicated to t l l , +l task Lecornps apparent. F~JP thi s reason
1 have prepared a suri~maryof :;c!r*c:chci policy statements that gp;ovcBrn
actions on the part of com~niindrrsof I.'ilitcd States force#.in the Republic
of Vietnam. As irlcloscd ncro\nrith,tht-sc policy guidtblines arc1intendcxl
for your-use in promoting attainmt-11tof the unity of purpose wid c>ffot-t
dtted above. One overall themc th~.t-:lriingthrough the slatenlcnts IS t h e
thought.that t he coming clcctiorls, Iht? formation of a democratic cunsli-
tution and the flickering flame of a true spirit of nat~onalismnow v i ~ i -
bte in Vietnamese endeavors, demand that we exert extreme care not to
overshadow or, for that matter, appear to overshadow the Victna~nr*sta
people in their efforts to hel p themselves. Nor can we afford t o act
in such fashion as to reflect disregard for their soverelgr~ty,trad~tic;iis
and customs.
As you can see, it is my deep conviction that all the Free World
Forces must wit to the fullest extent at this critical ti pe if we art?
t o insure accomplishment of our objectives. It is with this thought in
mind that 1-amwriting to each Free World Force commander.. I wou!ri
appreciate part tcularly your ideas and comments on t hi s subject, 3 s wc.11
as an opportunity to dtscuss them with you personally.
Sincerely,
1 Incl
a8
General. United states Army
commanding
SUMMARIES OF POLICY GUIDANCE
Contained herei n ar e di scussi ons r el at i ng t o mat t ers of mutual and
cont i nui ng I nt er est t o commanders both among and within t he vari ous Free
World Forces. They may be considered as pol i cy guldance toward an i n-
creased atmosphere of concerted and cooperati ve e f f o r t .
CONTENTS
SubJetct Page
Impact on Vietnamese Soci ety I
Dl scl pl l ne, Law and Order I
Pri soners o f War 3
Coordinat i oh end Control of Firepower
Caordl nati on and Control of Tact i cal Operattons
(C) Pr i nci pl es of a TAOR
FWMAF Cbmmanderst Rel at i on wi t h GVN Of f i c i a l s and
Popul ati on
1 MPACT UPON V I ETNAMESE SOC1 ETY
Concern over t he impact c f t he presence of Free World M i l i t ar y
Assi stance Forces upon t he people, economic and soci al systems and t he
ul t i mat e e f f e c t upon our mi ssi on has increased wi t h t he prospects of
mi l i t a r y vi ct or y. Understanding and sol ut i ons t o problems ar i si ng from
t h i s impact must be deri ved from knowing and believing t hat t he f i g h t
f or t he nat i onal sur vi val of Vietnam r equi r es more from our combined
f orces than j u s t mi l i t a r y ef f ect i veness and success.
Our r esponsi bi l Ji t i es i ncl ude, t heref ore, "nat i on bui l di ng", t o use
a popula$phrase, as an i nt egr al par t of t he f i g h t f o r Vietnamese
nat i onal sur vi val . Thi s becomes m'ore r eadi l y apparent when one r eal -
i zes t hat nei t her mi l i t a r y success nor "nat i on bui l di ng" i n a counter-
insurgency environment has any meaning as separate concepts. I f success
i s t o be at t ai ned, t he t ei ml nat i on of act ual f i ght i ng must f i r l d a
nat l on wi t h 3 wel l i nt egr at ed soci et y, r e l i a b l e economic system and a
st abl e- and reasonably popul ar and ef f ect i ve government. Apparent o r
act ual dominance by Free World Mi l i t a r y Assi stance Forces i n events
l eadi ng t o vi ct or y can undermine t he nat i onal pr i de and s t a b i l i t y of
government we ar e t r y i ng t o f ost er . Ul t i mat e and l ast i ng success i s a
more reasonable expect at i on i f t he Impact of t h i s presence has 3een
s uf f i c i ent l y subdued t o lend c r e d i b i l i t y t o t he Froe World Forces' r ol e
o f w i l l i ng assi st ant s i n an essent i al ly Vietnamese venture.
Convinced t hat a c t i v i t i e s and sacr l f l ces di r ect ed toward mi ni mi zi ng
t he t ot al impect o f Free Wor ld Mi l i t ar y Ass i-stance Forces1 pr'eserIi.2 u?Gi l
t he Vietnamese cannot be viewed separat el y from those r el at i ng more d i -
r e c t l y t o combat operati ons, a l l concerned ar e remlnded o f t he heaky ar~d
a l l encompassing r esponsi bi l i t i es i n t h i s mat t er . Any aspect of Fr ce
World Forcest presence which bl at ant l y af f ect s or ovorwholms Vietnames2
ac t i v i t i es , economy, imdressions o r gt t i t udes must be consi der6d as
seri ous-probl em mer i t i ng immediste at t ent i on.
-
DISCIPLINE, LAW AND ORDER
The maintenance of hi gh standards of di sci pl lne, law and,order i n
every .commun iti i n V ietnam i s essent ial t o t he success o f our combined
mi ssi on. Thi s i s d i f f i c u l t even under t he most i deal condi t i ons. The
problem i s compounded i n Vietnam by t he nat ure o f t he c o n f l i c t wi t h i t s
i nt er r el at ed i nsurgent, t e r r o r i s t and cr i mi nal a c t i v i t i e s and t he l arge
i nf l ux of refugees and mul t i - nat i onal mi l i t a r y and c i v i l i a n forces, each
wi t h t h e i r d l s t i n c t nat i ve habi t s and customs. The presence o f our
f orces I n t h i s environment focuses on t he need f o r coordi nated law en-
forcement programs i nt egr at i ng t he e f f o r t s of t he mi l i t a r y forces wi t h
those of t he Vietnamese aut hor i t i es.
It I s recognized t hat t he basi c r esponsi bi l i t y f o r i nt er nal securi -
t y, law and order i s t hat of t he Government of Vietnam. The di sci pl i ne of
t he mi l i t a r y f orces i s t hat of mi l i t a r y commanders. When I nci dent s occur
which i nvol ve members of our f orces and t he Vietnamese people, it becomes a
mat t er o f utmost importance t o resol ve them qui ckl y i f t he f avorabl e nat i onal
image which has been developed i s t o be maintained. Thi s i s best accom-
pl i shed by j o i n t cooperati ve e f f o r t s i n t he enforcement of law and order.
The Di r ect or General of Nati onal Pol i ce and t he members of t he pol i ce
agencies he represents ar e working cl osel y wi t h our f orces t o improve t he
enforcement e f f o r t s wherever they ar e st at i oned. Thi s has r esul t ed i n t he
development o f j o i n t mi l i t a r y - c i v i l pol i ce mobi l e and f oot pat r ol s i n many
areas o f Vietnam. Cri mi nal i nvest i gat i ons conducted j o i n t l y i nvol vi ng mem-
bers of our f orces f a c i l i t a t e t he exchange of cr i mi nal i nformati on, develop-
ment o f evidence and i dent i f i cat i on of suspects and witnesses. 'Prompt di s-
ci pl i nar y act i on agai nst of f enders cont r i but es t o an appr eci at i on of t he
seri ousness wi t h which delinquency o r bad behavior by t he t roops i s regard-
ed. Experience shows t hat i ntegrated, coordi nated pol i ce pr act i ces and pro-
cedures i nsure t he f u l l cooperati on and support of Vietnamese aut hor i t i es.
Thi s i n t ur n can serve as a t r ai ni ng and educati onal mechanism t o develop
mutual respect and understanding among those responsi bl e f o r t he enforce-
ment of laws, It can bui l d confi dence and prof essi onal i sm ir. t he pol i ce
or gani zat i on and cont r i but e t o t he strengtheni ng o f t he i nt er nal secur i t y
posture. From a mi l i t a r y vi ewpoi nt, it f a c i l i t a t e s t he establ i shment of
l ocal mut ual l y acceptabl e arrangements f o r t he temporary det ent i on of m i l i -
t ar y personnel where di st ance o r ot her f act or s precl ude t he immediate de-
l i v er y t o t he of f ender ' s forces. I t i nsures t he maintenance of cl ear
l i nes o f j ur i s di c t i on over t he personnel o f our forces, thus preservi ng
nati on81 I nt egr i t y i n support of our mutual obj ect i ves i n Vietnam.
The di sci pl i ne, conduct and behavi or of t he mul t i - - nat i onal f orces i n
Vietnam ar e under t he-const ant , cl ose scr ut i ny di t he eyes o f t he worl d.
The a b i l i t y of t he comnanders o f our f orces t o- exer ci se cont r ol and main-
t a i n a hi gh st at e o f di sci pl i ns w i l l i nf l uence t he degree of success of our
combined mi ssi on here. The achievement o f a hi gh st at e of di sci pl i ne i s
a mat t er o f i ndi vi dual , u n i t and nat i onal pr i de which hi s t or i c al l y has been
and conti nues t o be one of t he pri mary goal s o f every mi l i t a r y commander.
A cl osel y kni t , I nt egrat ed program f o r ef f ect i ve law enforcemen? i n f u l l
support of Vietnamese aut hor i t i es i s a hi ghl y desi r abl e obj ect i ve f o r each
of t he f orces supporti ng t he Government of Vietnam i n I t s quest f o r peace
and development as a f r ee nat i on.
PRl SONERS OF WAR
- . - . . - - - - -.-.- -. -..
The cont i nued success of our mi l i t a r y oper at i ons can bo expected t o
i ncrease t he number o f captured enemy personnel . The handl.ing and t r eat -
ment o f such personnel becomes more i mportant and t akes on gr eat er s i gni -
f i cance I n terms o f our r o l e and mi ssi on i n Vietnam. The presence.of such
i nt er nat i onal or gani zat i ons as t he ICRC, t he ICC and ot her s di ct at es t he
need t o i nsur e t h a t our f or ces ar e compl yi ng wi t h t he int,ent o f our respec-
t i v e governments i n adheri ng t o t he pr ovi si ons o f t he Geneva Conventi on
(GW)r e l a t i v e t o t he t reat ment o f det ai nees and pr i soner s o f war (PWI.
The Government of Vietnam has const r uct ed PW Camps which ar e operated
most e f f i c i e n t l y i n f u l l compliance wi t h t he GPW, Addi t i onal camps ar e
al so bei ng prepared. Toe f avor abl e r epor t s o f t he ICRC f ol l owi ng t h e i r
v i s i t s t o such camps t e s t i f i e s t o t he success o f t hese oper at i ons.
Under ex i s t i ng agreements each o f our f or ces i s r esponsi bl e f o r t he
t r ansf er of capt ured detai nees and PW's t o GVN custody. Al though t he GVN
assumes custody o f such personnel , our f orces, as capt ur i ng powers, r et ai n
ul t i mat e r es pons i bi l i t y f o r t h e i r t reat ment and di sposi t i on ( Ar t 12).
Under these condi t i ons, t he need f o r ef f ec t i v e systems o f cont r ol and
account abi l i t y becomes paramount
The systems now i n e f f e c t whi l e worki ng e f f i c i e n t l y r equi r e const ant
super vi si on and command at t ent i on. These pr ovi de f o r t he humane t reat ment
a t t he poi nt o f capt ur e and prompt evacuat i on o f detai nees and PW s f r on
t he combat areas. The need f o r medical car e and at t ent i on i s st ressed.
They pr ovi de f o r expedi t i ous processi ng and proper c l as s i f i c at i on i nt o such
cat egor i es as i nnocent c i v i l i ans , ret urnees! c i v i l defendants and PW s.
They i nsure accurat e account abi l i t y by our f or ces t hrouohcut i h c proccssi nq
channel t o del i ver y t o GVN custody Refugee problems ar e avoi ded o r rcduc-
ed by r el easi ng i nnocent c i v i l i a n s near t h e i r v i l l ages and haml efs o r cl ose
t o t he poi nt of capt ure. The del i ver y o f PW s d i r e c t l y t o t he Pk.1 Camps
l ocat ed i n each CTZ precl udes di ver si on o f such personnel i n t o unauthori zed
channel s and assures our commanders of t h e i r proper di sposi t i on on t he
basi s of cur r ent agreements.
Tho key t o success o f t he PW program r es t s i n t he need f o r our f or ces
t o c l a s s i f y a l l detai nees i nt o est abl i shed cat egor i es bef or e they ar e t urned
over t o GVN custody. Wi thout such c l as s i f i c at i on, t he best e f f o r t s 0 1 our
f or ces and those o f t he GVN i n devel opi ng an ef f ec t i v e PW program would not
succeed.
The handl i na and humane.treatment of pr i soner s o f war by our f or ces
under t he procedures est abl i shed i s t he f i nes t testi mony of our w i l l and i n-
t ent t o comply wi t h i nt er nat i onal law. Conti nued emphasis ori t he proper
handl i ng of PW's w i l l serve t o encourage enemy def ect i ons and surrenders
weaken h i s f or ces i n t he f i e l d and cont r i but e mat er i al l y t o t he success of
our mi l i t a r y oper at i ons i n Vietnam.
COORDINATION AND CONTROL OF FIREPOWER
Guidande, procedures, and r esponsi bi l i t i es f or t he coordi nati on and
cont rol of f i r e support operations are contained i n two MACV di rect i ves.
MACV Di r ect i ve 525-18 provides gu idance concern ing cont rol of a r t i i l ery/
mortar and naval gunf i r e support provide@ by FWMA forces. MACV Di r ect i ve
95-4 establ i shes procedures and responsibilities f or t he comnand, cont rol ,
and ' coordi nati on of W A f orce a i r operations. I n addi t i on t o provi di ng
effective comnsnd and cont rol f or f l r e support means, these di r ect i ves i n-
sure t hat ( 1 ) f r i endl y f o r ~ e s and c i v i l i ans are not endangered, ( 2) pro-
p e r ? ~of f r i endl y forces, RVN, and f r i endl y c i v i l i ans i s not destroyed or
damaged, and ( 3) nat i onal and operati onal boundaries are not vi ol at ed. Sig-
ni f i cant among t he measures prescribed f or t he cont rol of f i r e support
operat ions are ( I t he general requlrement t o obta in c learance/approva l
from appropriate-GVN o f f i c i a l s (Provi nce/ Di st rl ct Chief L Sector/Subsector
Comnander) pr i or t o t he at t ack of t arget s and ( 2) t he requirement t o h r n
Inhabi tants of hamlets and vi l l ages not associated wl t h maneuver of giaund
forces by l eaf l et s, speaker systems o r other appropriate means pr i or t o
attack. St r i c t compliance wi t h t he provi si on of these di r ect i ves i s
essenti al a t a l l l evel s of conunand t o insure t hat noncombatant bat t l e
casual t i es are hel d t o a minimum.
COORDINATION AND CONTROL OF TACTICAL OPERATIONS
Command r el at i onshi ps among t he vari ous FW and RVN forces ar e founded
on t he pr i nci pl es of cooperat ion, coord i nation, and cl ose a t a l l
echelons. The key t o success of combined operati ons r est s i n preJi mmary
planning, mutual t r ust , and reci procal support by t he forces involved. When
a FW or RVN commander desi res assi stance f rom~anot her nat i onal force, it
should be.requested from counterpart headquarters. When forces of . di f f er ent
nat i onal i t i es are conducting cl osel y i nt er r el at ed operations, one f or ce
should be placed I n ei t her di r ect or general support, under terms mutual l y
agreeable t o both sides. The f orces i nvol ved i n reci procal support are
or gani zat i onal l y independent; and t h e i r ef f or t s are coordi nated through
j o i n t planning, cl ose contact, and mutual agreement between t he commanders
concerned.
FW f orces may be placed i n di r ect or general support of RVN forces or
t he reverse may be t rue, depending on t he si t uat i on exi st i ng a t a par t i cu-
l ar time. A FW f or ce cmander does not assume operati onal cont r ol of an
RVN u n i t nor does an RVN commander assume operati onal cont r ol of a FW uni t .
Comnanders and s t a f f s are requested t o assi st i n promoting cl ear cut, ef f ec-
t i ve, and r eadi l y understood r el at i onshi ps among FW and GVN f orces by
adopti ng and usi ng wi t h pr eci si on the terms " di r ect support" and "'general
supper+" i n connecti on wi t h pl anni ng and assignment of mi ssi ons f or cob-
bined operati ons. When a f or ce i s assigned t he mi ssi on of supportl ng
another f orce f or a combined operati on, t he commander of t he supported
f orce w i l l exerci se general di r ect i on of t he supporti ng f or ce wi t hi n t he
l i mi t s permi t t ed by accepted t act i cal pr act i ces of t he nat i onal servi ce of
t he supportl ng force. Such di r ect i on i ncl udes desi gnati on of t ar get s or
obJectives,timing, durati on, and ot her i nst r uct i ons necessary f o r coordi -
nat i on and f or ef f i c iency. The c mander of t he supporti ng f or ce w i l !
determine t he requirements of t he supported f or ce and t ake necessary act i on
t o f u l f i l l them wi t hi n hi s capabi l ~t i es,
I
v i abi I it y i s dependent upon cl ef t ing gc)ods t o t he market p l a c e t he open i r - ~r l
and securi ng o f LOC s r eoui r cd f o r t he f r ee movement o f such goods can bn
accornp I ishs-d besl . by i ncr mscd use c f Iond ant: water LOC f o r rr,i l i t s r y
~per at i onr , . Whi l c hcl i coptot-s c:?n i-;sr; is.:- in c:.cnduct of mi I it z r y opera-!- i rr.ri5
I$
every oti)r!r means o f movernon.I. musl- b c cxL~mi nec: cont i nua l ly -to enab I e f o r c . : ~
t o conduct operations under al l circumstances and wi t hout overdepcndencc
upon any one means of movcmcnt. I n t h i s connecti on seni or commanders
shoul d f or ce t h e i r subordi nate uni t s t o make. i ncreased use o f l and and
water LOC!s by a pol i c y of del i ber at el y denyi ns hel i copt er asset s when t he
ni s s i c n can be accomplished by overl and movement.
( C) PRI I'ICI PLES
--.-.-.-.-
OF A TAOR
- --.----- .-
A TAOR i s a pr escr i bed area which has been assi qned s pec i f i c al l y t o s
Free World commander by t he ARVN corps commander, Any changes i n t he TAOR
boundari es r equi r e t he deci si on o f t he ARVN corps commander af t . er coordi -.
nat i on wi t h t he Free World commander(s) concerned The pri mary purpose of
t he TAOR i s t o del i neat e an area i n which a commander i s t o focus t he neces-
sary e f f o r t t o deny t he ' area t o t he enemy. I n t he TAOR, t he spec i f i c d
commander i s r esponsi bl e f o r , and has t he aut hor i t y t o ac t on t he develop-
ment and maintenance of i ns t al l at i ons and t he Conduct of t a c t i c a l opera-
t i ons wi t h t r oops under h i s cont r ol . Si nce t her e f r equent l y ar e ARVN and
RF/PF oper at i ons as wel l as Free World oper at i ons i n a TAOR, commandcrs
must work cl osel y wi t h l ocal ARVN and RF/PF commanders t o i nsur e t hat Free-
World oper at i ons complement and supplement GVN ef f or t s . I t i s emphasized
t h a t t he area wi t hi n a TAOR s t i l l bel ongs t o GVN. The c i v i l admi ni st r at i on
and GVN cont r ol ar e not r el i ngui shed The area i s i n no sense under t hc
mar t i al law of t he f or ce commander and normal p o l i c e f unct i ons cont i nue t o
be exerci sed by t he GVN.
FWMAF TAOR COMMANDERS' RELATIONS WITH GVN OFFICIALS 4NO PCPULATION
--- ---.-- --- --- - --------- - --.----- - - .-.-- -- .
The t a c t i c a l objective o f t he FWMAF TAOR commander i s t he neut r al i .
zat i on o f enemy i nf l uence i n h i s area. Thi s shor t - t er m obj ec t i v e must be
consi dered i n t he per spect i ve provi ded by t he l ong range obj ect i ve of t he
Free World a l l i e s i n Vietnam. v i z , t he est abl i shment o f a f r ee v i abl e
nat i on, r epr esent at i ve o f and responsi ve t o i t s peop 1 e.
Tact i cal oper at i ons conducted wi t hi n TAOR musf t ake cogni zance o f t he
f a c t t h a t t he FWMAF i s f unct i oni ng i n a soverel an s t at e whose peopl e ar e
t he nucl eus arouhd whi ch t h i s new nat i on i s bei ng b u i l t .
The Vietnamese
popul ace must be presumed t o be f r i e n d l y ' u n t i l it demonstlrates ot her wi se.
Rel at i ons wi t h t he p e ~ p l e must be conducted t hrough t he l egi t i mat el y con
s t i t u t e d pr ovi nci al and d l s t r i c t governments.
TAOli boundari es w i l l not conf orm necessar i l y t o Vietnamcsa p o l i t i c a l
boundari es. To assure coor di nat i on of e f f o r t i n t a c t i c a l oper at i cns, l i z i
son must be qst abl i shed : i t h a l l I Qcal o f f i c i a l s c x er c i s i nq j u r i s d i c t i o n
over any por t i cr n of t he TAOR. Should t he TAOP cxt end t hr ounh more t han one
pr ovi nce, i nt er - pr ov i nc i al l i a i s o n i s essent i al Bot h pr ovi ncc and d i s t r i c t
c h i e f s have a dual c i v i l - mi l i t a r y r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . I n many cascs t hey have
mi l i t a r y f or ces a t t h e i r di sposal . I n a l l cases t hey ar e r e s ~ o n s i b l e f o r
s ec ur i t y i n t h e i r areas. Li ai son wi t h t hese o f f i c i a l s must be ef f ec t ed
t hr ough t h e MACV advi sor . and whcre assi gned, t h e FWMAF Li ai son Of f i c e r
TAOR commanders w i l l have occasi on t o comc i n t o cont act wi t h l ocal
r evol ut i onar y development a c t i v i t i e s . Revol ut i onar y development i s a Vi et -
namese process whi ch cannot be accompl i shed hy Free Worl d personnel . To be
e f f e c t i v e r evol ut i onar y development a c t i , v i t i e s r equi r e t he p a r t i c i p a t i o n
o f t he i ndi vi dual Vietnamesc. Free V!orld u n i t s may suppor t r evol ut i onar y
development by pr ovi di ng t hc mi l i t a r y s ec ur i t y r equi r ed f o r i tt o t eke pl ace
- Fr ce Worl d u n i t s a l s o may bc abl e t o as. si st t h e l ocal r evol ut i onar y d s v ~ l o p
ment program t hr ough mi l i t a r y c i v i c ac t i on. Any suppor t of f er ed t o revo-
l ut i onar y devel opment must be channel ed t hr ouqh l ocal GVN o f f i c i a l s
Popul at i on c ont r ol wi t h i n TAOR must be ef f ec t ed t hr ough t he appr opr i at e
GVN o f f i c i a l . I n t a c t i c a l s i t u a t i o n s t h e at t achment o f Vietnamese mi l i t a r y
o r c i v i l i a n o f f i c i a l s t o u n i t s w i l l f a c i l i t a t e t h i s c ont r ol Coor di nat i c~n
wi t h t he GVN must be ef f ec t ed i n pl anni ng oper at i ons s9 t h a t popul at i on r e
t ur ned t o government cont r ol can be t r ans f er r ed t o C,Vl\Ic i v i l i a n c ont r ol a t
t h e ear l i e s t possibl e t i me In non-t a c t i caI s i t u a t i o n s . FWMAF commdriders
have no j u r i s d i c t i o n over Vi et nanese personnel I n t h i s ci r cumst ance,
popl i l at i on c ont r ol i s t he p r e r o ~ a t i v e o f t he GV;.J. To usur; o r weaken t h i s
c ont r ol by e f f e c t i n g u n i l a t e r a l FWMAT c ont r ol measures i s count er - pr oduct i ve
t o our l ong-range o b j e c t i v e i n Vi etnam.
Troop d i s c i p l i n e and c o u ~ t e s y must r ecei ve command a t t e n t i o n a t a l l
echel ons. The r ecent h i s t o r y o f Vi etnam i s r e p l e t e wi t h exarnplcs of mi s-
t r eat ment o f t he c i v i l i a n popul ace by s o l d i e r s o f many ar mi es. The good
w i l l and si ncer e f r i ends hi p o f t he Free Worl d a l l i e s i s best demonstrated
t o t h e i ndi v i dual Vietnamese by t he court eous, d i s c i p l i n e d conduct c f our
t r oops. I ndi vi dual cour t esy must ext end t o t he oper at i dn o f mot or vehi cl es
and ot her equi pment . Consi derat i on- must be gi ven t he Vietnamese on roads
and highways and on urban s t r eet s . Conduct bot h on and o f f dut y al ways ni ust
show r espect and consi der at i on f o r Vietnamese customs and s e n s i b i l i t i e s .
Because o f t he r e l a t i v e permanence o f t h e i r associ at i on wi t h t he popu-
l a t i o n o f t h e i r area, TAOR comnianders have an ex c el l ent oppor t uni t y t o
a s s i s t bot h t he i ndi v i dual Vietnamese and l ocal o f f i c i a l s Every oppor t uni t y
shoul d be t aken t o improve t he pr es t i qe o f t he GVM. Assi st ance pr ovi ded
wi t h i n a TAOR shoul d be done so as t o r e f l e c t maximum c r e d i t on t he GVN
r a t h e r t han t h e Fr ee Worl d u n i t pr esent .
SUlMMARY OF REMARKS BY COMUSMACV
RELATING TO NONCOMBATANT CASUALTIES
The following c o n me n t s wer e made by Gener al West mor el and at t he MACV
Commander s' Conf er ence hel d a t 5th Speci al ' h' orce s Headquar t er s, Nha
Tr ang, at 0900 hour s , 28 August 1966:
"I have fi ve poi nt s t o cover Sef or e we conclude. At your des ks
a r e r ul e s of engagement and pr ocedur es on cont r ol of f i r e s of al l t ypes.
It i s ext r emel y imporJant t hat we do al l we can t o use our f i r e s with
di scr i mi nat i on, and avoid noncombatant bat t l e casual t i es. Thi s i s a
ver y sensi t i ve subj ect , bot h l ocal l y and among our own p r e s s cor ps .
Unfortunately, we' ve had a r a s h of i nci dent s caused by everyt hi ng f r o m
mechani cal f ai l ur e t o human e r r o r . I would appr eci at e your reviewing
now, and your continued revi ew, of your safet y pr ecaut i ons and pr o-
cedur es on cont r ol of f i r es . Make s ur e your commander s a r e thoroughly
f ami l i ar with t he appr opr i at e document s. Henceforth my staff will
r epubl i sh t hese quar t er l y, t o count er l os s of f ami l i ar i t y t hrough t ur n-
over of per sonnel . The per cent age of i nci dent s ha s been mi nuscul e;
nonet hel ess, e ve r y ci vi l i an killed i s a cal ami t y, and we mus t cut the
per cent age t o t he mi ni mum possible. I '
The following commander s wer e pr es ent at t hi s meeting:
GEN Wi l l i am C. West mor el and COMUSMACV
Mr . Henr y L. T. Kor en As s t Deputy Ambassador
LTG J e a n E. Engl er DCG, USARV
LTG Wi l l i am W. Momyer Cdr , 7th AF
LTG John A. Hei nt ges DEPC OMUSIMACV
MG Stanley R. La r s e n CG, I FFORCEV
MG Jonat han 0. Seaman CG, I1 FFOXCEV
MG Fr e de r i c k C. Weyanc' CG, 25 t h Inf Div
MG Lewi s J.' Fi el ds CG, 111M-4F (Acting)
MG Lewi s B. Rober t shaw CG, 1st MAW
MG Urilliam J. Cr u mm Cdr , 3d AD
MG Wood B. Kyle CG, 3d Mar Di'v
MG Wi l l i am E. DePuy CG, 1st Inf Div
MG Char12 s W. Ei f l er CG, 1st Log Cmd
MG John Nort on CG, 1st Cav Di-J ( Ai r mobi l e)
MG Kenneth Mackay COMAFV
BG David 0. Byar s , Jr . CG, 4th Inf Div (Adv)
BG Wi l l i am K. J ones Di r , MACV COC
BG Wi i l ar t l Bear s on CG, 1st Rde, lOist Abn Div
BG Zoseph A. McChr i st i zn J 2, MACV
EXHIBIT D-47
RADM Norvel l G. Ward COMNAVFORV
BG Glenn A. ' Walker CG, 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div
BG William A. St i l es ADC, 1st Mar Div
BG George P. Seneff CG, 1st Avn Bde
BG Robe; f R. Ploge' r CG, 18th Engr Bde
BG Edward H. de Saussure CG, 196th Lt Inf Bde
BG Robert D. Te r r y CG, 1st Sig Bde
COL Lemuel E. Pope DSA, CMD
COL William R. De sobry SA, .IVCo.rps
COL Arndt L. Muel l er DSA, 111Cor ps
COL Ri chard M. Lee DSA, I1 Cor ps
COL Archel aus L. Hamblen, Jr. DSA, I Cor ps
COL Robert C. Shaw CG, 173d Abn Bde (Acting)
COL Fr anci s J. Kelly CG, 5th SF Gp
LTC John Hinton, Jr. Recor der
The following comment s wer e made by General West morel and at the MACV
Commanders1 Conference held at 5th Special For ces Headquart ers, Nha
Tr ang, at 0930 hours, 3 December 1967:
"General West morel and was concerned over the .high r at e of fi ri ng
and bombing acci dent s. Since US/FW f or ces have initiated operat i ons i n
Vietnam, the r at e of acci dent s has i ncreased. In 1966 we had 103 acci dent s.
In the f i r s t 10 months of 1967, we experienced 567, a mor e t han five fold
i ncr eas e; a.n i ncr eas e which cannot be accounted for by a correspondi ng
i ncr eas e i n combat as s et s . Thi s i s a mat t er of concern t o us al l . GEN
West morel and desi r ed commander s t o take a personal i nt er es t i n t hi s
mater t o r educe acci dent s t o a minimum. Upon the- occasi on of an
acci dent , the chai n of command should i ndorse the r epor t ' al l the' way
t o MACV level. Other means t o consi der include:
a. Appointment of safet y offi cers at sever al command l e ve l s with
t he s e offi cers t o check on t he st at e of gunnery t rai ni ng and ot her mea-
s u r e s designed t o bri ng down the accident level.
b- Special t rai ni ng f or repl acement s t o make t hem mor e proficient
and mo r e cognizant of t he hazar ds involved, safety procedures, ' and
hi s t or y of past ~c c i d e n t s .
c. St r es s on t hi s subj ect at Commanders1 meetings.
Gener al West morel and request ed 33 t o keep monthly st at i st i cs on acci -
dent s which could di r ect attention t o where acci dent s a r e occurri ng,
wher e t hei r . emphasi s on safety is strong, and where .it is iax. "
The following commander s w:=re pr esent at t hi s meeting:
Gener al We st mor el and
Gener al Abr ams
Ambassador Komer
LTG Chat:
LTG Cushman
LTG Rosson
MG Dar r ow
MG Eckhar dt
MG Mur r ay
MG P e e r s
MG Tol son
MG Mear ns
MG Hay
MG Worl ey
MG Ander son
MG Pe a r s on
MG Yose
MG Vincent
MG Chung
MG Bak
MG Kost er
BG Taber
BG Ki m
BG F'orhes
BG Met zger
BG Roseborough
BG Ras mus s en
BG Desobr y
BG Chai sson
BG Sidle
BG La Hue
COL Rober t s
COL P e t e r s
CP T Or me
COL Beeson
COL Ba r ne s
COL Ti t t er ud
COL Ladci
LTC Nel son
COMUSMACV
DEPCOMUSMACV
DEP t o COMUSlMACV f or CO
COMROKFV
CG, I11 MAF
CG, I FFORCEV
ACofS, J5, MACV
CG, I1 FFORCEV
DEP CG, I11 MAF
CG, 4th Inf Div
CG, 1st Cav Div (Airmobile)
CG, 25 t h Inf Div
CG, 1st Inf Div
Vice Cdr , 7th AF
CG, 1st MAW
ACofS, 53, MACV
COMRTFV
COMAFV
CG, ROK Capitol Div
CG, ROK 9th Div
CG, Amer i ca1 Div
Asst DCG, USARV
CG, 2d ROK Mar Bde
CG, 199th Lt Inf Bde
ADC, 3d Mar Div
ADC, 9t h Inf Div
ACofS, J4, MACV
SA, IV Cor ps
Di r ect or , COC, MACV
Chief, 01, MACV
ADC, 1st Mar Div
DEP ACofS, 52, MACV
DSA, I11 Cor ps
CI S, NAVFORV
DSA, I Cor ps
DSA, I1 Cor ps
Spec Asst , ACofS CORDS, M,
CO, 5t h SFG (Abn)
COC Recor der
(
Subj: Mistruatment of Detainees and RI(u)
( 1. ( c) menai ve praaa coverage ofrecent combatoperations
i n Vietnamhasafforded a fertilefieldfor aansational photegraphs
and w a r stories. Beporta and photsgraphs show flagrht dfsre&ard
forhuman l i f e, inhumme treatment andbrutality inhaadling of
detainees and PW. These press etoriea have 883pved to fecus davof -
able world attention ont he treatment of detainee&and prisonere of
war by bothARVN and M F .
2. (c) These rctioas wi l l net bscondoned.
insurethat all.p6rsonaelare familiar yfthaad0b8erve et r i ct v:
a. IWZI-lO,l a wofLosrdWarfare
b. UCMJ, Article93
c. OsRevfk Convantion relative t o treatmaat of W (Articles
112through 2% and121) EXHIBIT M-48
d. Gemova Ca~vsatien for Amelioration of condition of
TYPED NAUE TITLE' PHONE ANO R SIGNATURE
OFFICE SYMBOL E
A GIBSON
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COL, USA
T Y P E ~ N A ME P N D T I T L E ' -
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MACV JOI NT MESSAGEFORM
CONTI NUATI ON SHEET
I
DO NOT USE TP
wr wdd and sick armed forces i n t he f i el d, ~ r t i c l d l 7 and 50.
e. 7MCV DirectivesZO-4, 27-5 and 190d3
4. (c) In addition, US Advisors will thamselves adhere s t ~ ? t -
ly t o these pr odsi ens amd make every ef f or t t o influence t he i r
I I
counterparts t o sbaerve humane principles and t he Geneva Cmventione.
Advisors nmst not become involved with nap crimes oad at r oci t i es
land shall r dr l se t he i r cotmterpwta t hat they ar e rsqpired t o report
I
Ithose incidents t e higher haadquarters. Advisors dl1use a l l influ-
I
ence t o atop and prevent any maltreatment, war crimes or at r oci t i ee
and wi l l inform t he eelnior i n t he chain of comma~dof a l l det ai l s
s w~omdi ng such incidents a s qtrickly as possible.
5. ( C) A l l known, suepected or alleged war crimes or at reci -
t i e s committed by or against US personnel w i l l be investigated U W
YACV Directive 20-4.
I
SECVRl TY CLASSI FI CATI ON OFF I CE SYMBOL. PAGE NR. OF
NU. PAGES
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MCV JOIUT WESSI GEFO~M
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was preparedin 1966for Q*.tdm~ rtroop commhden. 1 r e d w thb
cardperiodically andftrdthe guidanceit expressesi o aspartbent w y a@
v;hcn it waa phlbhed.
Toasmare that all trctop leadere a a 1themuelver
c.cineistently of this @dance rufficient stock8,:-I the car& should bemain-
t'iined ineach majorc a x ma d and periodic chec:ke should be made to
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257
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I J I Ci ! hl R C l A 5 5 l F l i A T l 3 N
MACV JOI MT MESSAGEFORM
CONTI#UATIOY SHEET
-
I
ila;,.rrl~ine'he awareher8 od the indiddual concernedin Phis regard. The
:.\.?lid :ssue of t-he card will be nlsldia t c , ;,,:ch inc.on~ir?gc a d officer at
r e < . ~ p t i ~ n p,ir.ts, and distribut;.on~ i : l*. . . rl,l _ , A - , ~ ; ~bcheuded for
2 . Simiiarly, thc yclt!ished cars,., * L ! $ 1 '?':LIP Puies" contains
cssrr:t~.dguidance, and applies to al l mrtr.1, r c oi07ir arnwd forces
I : J i m . Thc princ~plrsof behavior cst-iblisfit-2i nthe ' ' Ni n~Ruler"
ir. uncl ~mgmgand practicable. They will berve the individual in good
4 t c d i p whatever status hc? or T~IP'T\IineRules" should ~ she enjoys.
:tkewise be emphasized and assuraxes nndc thatthe c q d is in the
: x~s session of each military member.
*
DO nor usr :w,f SPACE
I
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I
CS (PEERS I NQUI RY) 20 January 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD
SUBJECT: MACV Replacement Or i ent at i on Packet
1. Each i ndi vi dua l s ol di e r a t t e nds a n RVN o r i e n t a t i o n a t
t h e Replacement Ba t t a l i on upon h i s a r r i v a l i n RVN. ~ u r i n g
t h i s or i e nt a t i on, t h e s ol di e r i s i s s ued an i nf or mat i on
packet which cont ai ns s e ve r a l documents. I n t h i s packet
a r e t h e i t ems r e f e r r e d t o i n USARV Regul at i on 612-1.
2. I ncl osed are t he e x t r a c t s (10) of t h e pe r t i ne nt i t ems
and documents t h a t were obt ai ned from t he 1969 i nf or mat i on
packet i s s ued by MACV a t t h e Replacement Ba t t a l i a n. The
items i ncl os ed are i l l u s t r a t i v e of t he t ype of documents
each . s ol di er r ecei ved dur i ng 1969.
1 0 I n c l
a s Li eut enant Col onel , Armor
EXHIBIT M-94
1
SCGURE0,SIXTYROUNOS POWDER AN0BALL,ANO BE
READY TO MARCH AT A MINUTE'S WARNING.
:
3.WHENYOU'PE ONTHE MARCH,ACT THE WAYYOUWOULD
I FYGU WASSNEAKING UPON ADEER SEE THEENEMYFIRST.
W.THERE ISAN ARMY DEPENDINGON W FOR CORRECT
IWFORMATlON.YOU CAN LIEALLYOU PLEASE WHEN YOU
5 . OCN'T NEVER TAKE A CHANCLYOU DON'T HlWE TO.
FAR ENOUCHAPARTSO ONE SHOT CAN'T GOTHROUGH
7. I FWE STRIKESWAMPS,OR SOFTGROUN0,WE SPAEdO
OUTe i s r , s o IT'S HARDTOTRACKUS.
, 0 . WHEN WE MARCH,WE KEEPMOVINGTl LLOARK,SOAS TO
II.DON'T EVER M W H HOME THE SAMEWAY. TAKE A
DIFFERENT ROUTE SO YOU WON'T BE ABUSHED.
YARDS AHEAD,TWENTY YAROS ONEACH FL AWAND
TWENTY YARDS IN THE REAR, SOTHE BODY
CAN'T BESURPRISED AND WIPED PUT.
13. EVERY NIGHT YOU'LL BETOLO WHERE TO MEET IF
SURROUNDED BYA SUPERIOR FORCE.
16. DON'T CROSS A RIVERBY A REGULAR W O .
17. I F SOMEBODY'STRAILING YOU,YAKE A CIRCLE,COME
BACK ONTO YOUR OWN TRACKS,ANO AMBUSH THE
FOLKS THAT AIM TO AMBUSH YOU.
'
\ 19. LETTHE ENEMY COME Tl LL HE'S ALMOST CLOSE
ENOUGH TOTOUCH.THEN LET HI M HAVE I T AND
JUMP OUT AND FI NI SHHI MUPWITHYOUR HATCHET.
Inclosure1
NINE RULES
NINE 'RULES
FOR PERSONNEL OF US MILITARY
ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
The Vietnamese have paid a heavy price i n
suffering for their l ong fight against the commu-
nists. We military men are i nVietnam nowbecause
their government has asked us t o help its soldiers
and people i nwinning !heir struggle. TheVietCong
wi l l attempt t o turn the Vietnamese people again.
st you. You can defeat them at every turn by the
strength, understanding, and generosity you dis-
play with the people. Here are7ni nesimple rules:
DI STRI BUTI ON - It oeach member of the
Uni tedStates Armed Forces i n Vietnam
Remember we are guests here: We mal en o
demands and seek nospecial ireatment.
Join with the people! Understandtheir life,use
phrases from their language and honor their
customs and laws.
Treat women with politeness and respect.
Makepersonal friends among the soldiers and
common people.
Always give the Vietnamese the ri ghtof way.
Be alert t o security and ready t o react wi th
your military skill.
Don' t attrack attention by loud, rude or unu-
sual behavior.
Avoi d separating yourself from the people by
a display of weallh or ptivilege.
Above all else you are members of the US
M~l i t ar y Forcesona dilficult mission, responsi-
hle for all your ol fi ci al and personal actions.
Reflect honor upon yoursell and the Uni tad
States o l America.
Inclosure 2
CODE OF
CONDUCT
FOR MEMBERS OF THE ARMED
FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES
GTA 21-50 June 1958
DISTRIBUTION-ACTIVE ARMY, NG&USAR:
1 per each officer, warrant officer, andenlisted
person.
' CODEOF CONDUCT
For Membersof the Armed Forces o l the UnitedStater
an American lighting man. I sme i nthe Fmn
guardmycountry oadour way of life. Iam p.-
paredtogive my likintheir defense.
myownhe*will. 11IncommandI
menwhiletheyatillhavethe means
I1IamcaptundIwillcontinuetoresisibyallmean8mai l -
3 able Iwill makee n y elfor1t oncap. and aid0th-
to n c a k . I will occep( neithn parole nor rp.cial lavon
hamthe enemy.
4
If Ihcomea prisonerof war, Iwill keeploith wi th my
fellow prisonen. Iwill give no informationwlake Oorl
i nany action which might be hannlvlto m comradn. IfI
am~ n i ~ IF not Iwiliobeythe lawful Iwilllakecommand.
orden a1;how appoinhd e r n me andwill back them up i n
e w y way.
5
When quntioned, should Ibcomea pi wner01war, I
am boundto ireonly nome, mnk, sewlce numbr, and
date dbinh. I-81 evadeamwertnpfvrtherquestion,to the
umoat d my abllity. 1will makeno oml w dmnstak-
menhdi i oyal lamyc wn mandlkal l i nahannhl#atheir
c aw.
Iwi l l nevnfas.( that lMam Amnicanhghtiqglan
6-rib~e lormyacttow anddedtcat.d tothepinet&
whkh nod.lycounhy h...'Iwill h w ~i nmy GodandIn
thUmkd d A&.
Inclosure 3
KEY PHRASES.
ENGLISH VIETNAMESE
Hdt 0% bi
b y d m y a w gun bdngxu6ng
Put uppur hands
ha tay kn
THE ENEMYIN YOUR HANDS
Keepyour hmbon yourhaad Ovat ar l8ndl* -
I will search y8u T t i k b m Ong
Do,not talk Wng n6i chu*
Wal k there Lpi &ng Li
YOU CAN AND WILL
Turn Right X8y b n ph6i
DISARM YOUR PRISONER
Turn left U y bcnt r i i
Ihi MEOl ATELY SEARCH HIMTHOROUGHLY
REQUIRE HIMT O BE SILENT
SECRECATE HIM FROMOTHER PRISONERS
GUARD HIM CAREFULLY
TAKE HIM T O THE PLACE DESl CNAED BY
"The courage and skill olour men in hnttb
YOURCOMMANDER
wi l l bematchedbythsirnugmt i mi t ywhenthebattl e
YOU CANNOT ANDMUSTNOT
ads. And al l AmaiQn mi l i tary don inWetnun
MISTREAT YOUR PRISONER
willstopawxms,aggressionbyothersi sr t d" HUMILIATE OR DEGRADE HIM
TAKE ANY OF HI SPERSONAL EFFECTS WHl CN
DO NOT HAVE SIGNIFICANT MILITARYVALUE
REFLlSEHIMMEMCALTREATMENTIFREQUIRED
AND AVAILABLE
ALWAYSTREATYOUR PRISONERHUMANELY
THE ENEMY IN YOUR HANDS
1. HANDLE HI MFIRMLY, PROMTPLY, BUT HUMANELY.
The captive inyour hands must be di sarmed, searched, secu-
redand watched.But he must also be treated at all timesas a human being. He
must not be tortured, killed, mutilated, or degraded, even i f herefuses t o talk.
If the capt~ve isa woman, treat herw~t h all respectdue her sex.
2. TAKE THE CAPTIVE QUICKLY TO SECURITY
As soon as possible evacuate the captige to a place of salety and
interrogation designat& byyour commander. Military documents taken from the
captive are also sent to the interrogators,- butthe captive will keep his personal
equipment except ueapons.
3. MISTREATMENT OF ANY CAPTIVE IS A CRIMINAL OFFENSE.
EVERY SOLDIER IS PERSONALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ENEMY I N HIS
w.
I t is both dishonorable and foolish t o mistreat a wptive. It is also a
punishable offense. Not even a beaten enemy will surrender i f he knows his
captorswill torture or kill him. He will resist and make his capture more costly.
Fair treatment of captives encourages the enemy to surrender.
4. TREAT THESICK ANDWOUNDEDCAPTIVE AS BEST YOUCAN.
The captive saved maybe an intelligence source. In any case he is
a human being and must be treated like one. The soldier who ignores the sick
and wounded degrades his uniform.
5. ALL PEESONS I N YOUR I.IANDS, WHETHER SUSPECTS, CIVI-
LIANS, ORCOMBATCAPTIVES, MUSTBE PROTECTEDAGAINST VIOLENCE.
INSULTS, CURIOSITY, AND REPRISALS OF ANY KIND.
Leavepunishment t othecourts and ,udges. The soldier shows his strength
by his fairness, firmness, andhumanity to thepersons inhis hands.
Incl osure 4
I ncl os ur e 6
Army. Lukekwum. LucQudn.
Navy. Hi kwun. HgiQudn.
Ai r hvcc. Comekwun. KhbngQudn.
Marinecorps. Tooykwunlukechyen. Th:y QubnLucchi$".
( Br n, , ~hero/ rlreA, 111) ' )
1nl.lntry. Bobin. Bebinh.
Artillery. Fowbin. Phdobinh.
Encinccr. Comebin. Cbngbinh
hlcdic:~l. Kwunee. Quany.
(.ll,/,~ur) t i ni ~s)
2
Sqund. Tyewdoy. TiCudbi.
Ccmp:~ny. Diedoy. Doi d+i.
l3;bttalion. Tyewdwon. Tiaudodn.
Regiment. Troongdwon. Trungdoon
or
LiOndqi.
MACV PHRASE BOOK
PI:~tcron. Troongdoy. Trungd$i.
Gener al Conversat i on
Weapons
E~~gl i r h Pro,,,,,,' i',Ii0,, Vicfrro,rre.~cSpcllir,~
E~tglisir Pro~~ro~c, af i o~t Virr,ilr,,,crc Spcliir,~
Hello.zood-byc Chow. Chio.
Pistol. Shoomluke. 5Gnglyc.
Mr . Um. Ong.
or
Mrs. Boh. 80.
SGng sou:
Miss. KO. Cb.
Rifle. Shoomtrew-ong. SGngtruong.
You(child). Em. Em.
AutomnticRiflc. Troongleen-en. Trunglien.
Howarcyou? Ummonyoycome? Onglb6,cb,em)
C:~rbinc. Cock-bin. Cac.bin.
mpnhgi&ikhbng? Shoomcoy. Slingc6i
I'nlfinu. Toymonyoy. Tbimpnhgi6i. or
Thankyou. Comeonum. C6mon6ng. Moocch6. SGngkhbnggidl.
Plcncc<:I!. 11 nlnin. Sinumnoylie. Xin6-ng n6iloi.
Rcc.Riflc. Shoomcomeyoht.
E~ c u wIIIC. Idon't Sinloyum,toycome Xinbi bng.l bi
Gun.c:lnnon. Diebohc. Ooibdc.
uncI cr~t : ~~~d. hew. khbnghi!".
AAartillerygun. Diebohcl umcome. Ooibdcphongkhbng
DO)OU\~)c.~l. Er ~~l i sI i ? UmnoytyenAhncome? ongn6iti;ng Anh
or
khbng?
SGngcoo-xo.
Lct'sgo. Choongtodee. Chljngtodi. Howilzcr. Diebohcngohn O?ibdcngkn"ing.
nong.
Mi l i t ar y Ter mi nol ogy Ent erl nga Vi l l age
E,l ~l ,l Pr,>,,,#,,'-i',lio,r '5 t l pl i r l l Pro~i,r,~ciori~n Vierna,i~e.~e Spelling
A i ~ l \t:~tic>n. Tromcoothwong. Tramc;u thuo'ng. Thi < villageis Longni bebow L6ngnaybi boo
Dunhy tr:lp RPT. ByNo. BBYnb.
surrounded. voy. v6y.
Corp\nl:~n. EE-tan. Y.16.-
Brinpthcullopcchicl. Yonsotroo-ong. Ddnx B trG;' ng.
DIICI~~. Bocrhee. B6cSi.
Youwillnothch;trmcd. Umcomebebuckdie. b n g khbngbj bqcd6i.
E\pl<ni\.cs. Too-ocno. ~hubcn:.
HowmnnyV.C. arcthcrc? Cowbownyew C6boonhisu
First:lid. Coocup. C;L c 6 ~ .
VietCong? vie1Ceng?
Fl:~rc. Wocho. HA0c hu. Nyoongrhoongyo ~ h ~ i l ~ Whcrcnrcthcweapons sljnggibu
Grcn:~dc. Luudon. lu'u dan. hiddcn? uhdow? 8 ddu?
Ciucrrilln. Kwunyoukick. Qudndukich Whcrcarcthcrunnels? Nyoongbwonghum
Helicopter. Feecahtrooklong. Phicd tr<c thdng. uhdow?
Iccp. Soyyip. Xe dip. Whcrcarcthcbooby Nyoongby nouh
Jetpl:~nc. Feecofunluke. Phicdp\An llic. traps? dow?
NorthVictnnnicsc. NewybocViet. NgdhiBdc VI+I. Comcoutside. Rohnoy. Ronaoai.
Propullerplane. Feecacunquot. Phicdconhqupl. Enterfirst. v o wtroo-oc. ~a6i r u6c. ,
Trap.
BY.
6By.
Whcnwasthenuncli? Tuncungr ayrah Ti ncdngx6r o
Truck. Soycomnyong. Xecam-nhbng.
bowyuh? boogilr?
A \ . -
Pilot. Feecome. Phicbng.
Iam anAmerican. Toy lanewy mee. Toi lo npddi my.
PlntoonIcadcr. Trungdoitrew-ong. Trvng d$i ~ r u $ n ~ . Where is your uni t ? Done ver kwa um uh dow? W n vl cLo;ng ia&?
VictConp. VietCong. Vie1+ng.
Where isyour village? Lohn kwa um uh dow? G n g c: o i;ng 2di u?
Victnarncsc. NewyVielnom. Ngdu'iVi+tNom.
Where is your camp? Try kwo urn uh dow? Troic: o i;ng 2 adu?
Husband. Chum. chi ng.
Wife. Vyuh. Vd.
Wherearethe friendly 80 doy nwoc uh dow? B<a.'i n d c b?n
Chinese. ~ ~ u . b i
troops? d adu? Newyl rungwo. rung HOO.
Communist. Kongson. ~ p n g Isthie t rai l dangerous? m>? Ay
56".
Doonp mow nipht cow cot
Gow. Goo.
npooy he-em come? npuy hi i m kheng?
Watcrbuffalo. Controw. Contrbu.
How many V.C.were Bow nyew Viet Conp Boo nhiguvi ?t ~; ng
Enlistedmen. Binshee. Binhs;~
killed? be chet? bj ch&?
Sgt. Troongshee. Trungri.
How many villegers were Bow nyew n e v bong Boo n h i b ng&i lo&
OITiccrs. Sheekwun. sTqyon.
killed7 be chet? b! ch2i?
,R I'IV)
How manypeoplewere Cow bow nyew khonp? Cd boo nhi i ubj
wounded7 thddnp?
ChewLukekwun. c h i Luc Qudn.
Diofoongdwun. OjoPhlidngQudn.
Draw a picture. Sinvyeh hen. Xin v f hihh.
NyohKwun. N ~ ~ T o
Take me there. Sin chee doo-unp-den Xi n atld& d; n
Qudn.
chow dow. ~ h o ' ad.
I ncl osur e 7
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THE
CHET
Inclosure9
Inclosure10
263
-- --
-----
USARV Reg 335-6
VEADQIIJARTTLS
I N T E ? STATES AE!TI ''TlTVAK
A?? San francisc:, , 96307
2L June 19A7
;:r,PclPL7$-
3 e r i o ~ s i nci dent ':eports ( SI P) (i CS: 1TC;-22]?;?))
i. Y!.F3 5 Y: "7 e s t a bl i s 5 uniform report:.:^^ ;.rocedures on a:>. ser l s. i s crimes or i n-
ci dent s cc:jr>.ing v:'>?.in ?VX invo1vlr:g personnei and e q u i p e n t of t h i s ccman?. To i : i si ~re
that, t he i;L' and Li.;,t h i s headquart ers, arc?i nf omed i - ~e 2 i a t . e ; ~ ol' s!.:s er i ccs cr i mi nal
n?fenser c r inci-den:s i n which perscnnel of t h i s cornrand a-e ~o- r j c us ~ 3 i s c i ~ E n a r y i-..ro?ved.
2. ;!S?I??\'ITiC;;2: a . Fer s cr ~elof t h i s command: Yi l i t ar; , p s r s o ~ n e l or: act i ve dut y
with t he 1: ' >.my, Vi et nar~;'::. ci vi 1i a: t s whr? 67e assi&ned, attacher!, r.r ar e cn t onporary
or a v~bor dl na t e co~mand or uzit.: ' 1; ci-ri.lS3r ernpiqgues of dl!ty ki t h t h i s headqlra?+&
cor.'.ractors who a r e under cont,ract wi t 11 t he IS Ar my i n ?. ; l et n&~; .dependent.s of s::ch person&'
r ~ e l ; ~ n d l oc a l nat i onal employees of t hi s' i comand when on du..y st,at:~.s.
5. Seri ous i nci dent : Any i nci dent i nvol vi ng persr.r.ne1 of t h i s comand, p r o ~ l e r t ~ ~ ,
.>requj yet l t which may be r e a s ona bb expected t o arouse l oc a l publ i c ir.:ersst; cause coz-
t.ipued or widespread publ i ci t y; ent,arpnss t he 72 hver nnent or ~ i l i + , a y . commend'o r w?ich,
f cr ot her h . p r t a n t consi derat i ons, mywarrant the persorlal at t ent i or , of t h e !:C n r !X:S,
t!-,i3 hc?adquart,ers. Cr h e s , offenses, and i nci dent s t o be repcr!,:h i ncl ude, hilt a r e ~ : o tUn-
ited t o :
(1) Norlbattle deat he f r o m ot her tnan na t ur a l cauaes, t o Incl ude t hr rfegths cf
icreign nat i onal personnel when !73 r.er&onnelof eqi j pnent a r e in.~o!ved.
( 3)
i'ap.r wi t h t he l nt s nt 'c ?f- ~r ~ s s ~ ~ l l t cc,rrtrrit rape er c?,t.er ser: ol ~ssex
fenses.
!L! kgpravated a s s a c l t s , cnliwfl:: or u~a ut hor i z e d #dischargeof f!.raarris, 3r
!.lit. +nr! r::r: acci dent s r esul t i " i n scrims inj11x-yor i nvol vi ng circm,sL,ances :ike!.y t o cb::ee
lmfavorahle puyl i ci t y.
( 5 ) 'JurgLary, robbew, arson. anr! m i sa;.proyr?a!.io~, fras.i, -r e xt c r t i cn c,!'
val or sign! fjcance.
( A ) , Sl ach&-ket i ng, s~: rpi . i r: (: , currency n: a3i pi l at i cn, o s t a ! . ~l n ? ? t i o n s , 6qri
cf f enses Invo:vi cg nar cot i cs.
I ? ) i iot. a r rr~l t i ny.
!')
Inst ances i nvol vi ng apprehension or 11sc of ??me by ' ' S Army yerzorne!
&gainsA,'!:; c i vi l i a n p e r s o r ~ ~ e l , c r n i l i t a r y or c i vi l i a n yerson?ei -!'s forei gn ycwer, c.-
ct her inci-1~:nt.s of i n ~ e 4 i a t e or p t e n t i a l l g seri o, l s sj pni f j - znce Tror;~a rr,?i!.ica:, -.,i:jtary,
r.r p. ! ) l j c r el at i ons standpoir ~t , .
(0) Ter r cr i s t act ivl t i es involvinfi 3:; :r 1::; :k,veL-.~ e ~ t rrr: ert ; ~.
(!C-'I Alrcr.%rt. cras3es jlot i r r c . ' 3:e.i i n c r rec1:lt-inr:fro- t a c t i c a l nyra+.icr!rr.
( J i )
11rt.sinvn;-:ing rncra; t :!r; itir!e consi dereI r.f s z f f icicn*, i i y n r t a x e t,o
wa-rant, l:.e a+,;r?r,+l-.-, ,.-)ft he +!: l s headqoart.ers . :.I.'',
/ 3 ) Sea- GI!:; i nci dent s i ~ v o l v i n g ~ r l q o n e r s cf bra:.. -!e!;~innt:s c-ipt~!re.'. ur i!;
.- :3:9dy of'15 7rrce3, m: ot , hei ;:ersons f3rwkic!? t.ha h a s re-yonsj t -i l i tg 11,nde: Sanrvir 'I:;
. .
3- . . - P r
, . . .. 5.ior.. ::c ::;I! ..;dea:hz c- aer.l..-:s i r ~; i , r y, maitrcatc*:;-.t,Ti c' . . ,an-.: esc,y,e (incli;.li.,l;:
at,t.sx,rtu) .
''!!:is r e~. : Lat i z=s>~yer sr des::::A ' j r e p 335-'., 22 ;!ec 1.6. EXHI BI T D-I0
Reg Np 3? 54, EQ IlSARV, Am San Franci sco 96307, 24 J m e 1967, ( ~ o n t j
(u)
Sui ci des, at t empt ed s ui ci des , and s e l f - i r ~f l i c t e d gunshot wolvlds,
(15)
. 411F. urgl ari es, r obber i es, :mr! a g~r a va t e d a s s a ul t s , whCn c omi t t e d' a ga i ns \
a fgrei gn nat i onal . .
' . epart s, . occnrrences which !nag r esi r l t i n damaging publ l c
confide;lce %n t.ha Ar-rry and a r e s f s uf f i c i e nt i:?portunce t c ~be t)ral:ght t o t he immCdiate a+,-
t.ention of t h e M s t a f f . AdclltionaL puitianre i n dete.~ii:lir?g whether or not an i nci dent
should t~ report,eii a s - a "slue, ?e l l ' i s provided i.n :.'5;,511 Feu 1-55.
c. Sl ue Eel: S e r i o ~ ~ s
--- Any agency c r person h a v l n ~ kr,ow.Le?ge o? a seri01:s
i s r es r ?ns l bl e f s r r e ~ o r t i q g t h e f a c t t o t h e i me d i a t e csmand?r,g o f f i c e r o r near es t provost
marshal.
3. '.:'SPr'?'C:7;<l:JT;>S: - -.-- a. i nci dent
b. Yij;>r ~u b o r d i n a t e c o m d e r s a r e responsi bl e f o r r epor t i ng s e r i o ~ s cri mes o r
i nzi ri enfs t o t h i s headquart ers, ATTN: AVHP!, i n accordance wi t h t h i s r egul at i on.
. . .
c . The e o v o s t !Parr.\.al, headquar t er s, t ~ s is responsi1;ie f o r t he pr epr a?, i on and
sut.dnlusion of s er i ous i cci dent repoi-ts t o hi gher headquart ers.
L. zLP('FTINCI FP.XTDITFS : a. submi t t ed i n accordance with
.:SAT.I! ?eg 1-55. TnciCents report ed be, r epor t ed a s s e r i ous i nci -
dent s.
b. Seri ous i nci dent r epor t s w i l l t e spb~ai t t ed by t h e most expedi t i ous means ps -
s i bl e . "eport s w i l l not be del ayed pending t h e r a c e i pt of hddi t i onal i nfom. at i on snd i~?-
medi at e transm2ssion w i l l be 3t r essed i n all cases.
c.
Local provost marshal s w i l l submit s er i ous i nci dent r e p r t s t o t h e SI!? Sect i on,
1fkh YP Sri gade, t el ephone Long Xnh 3763/3769, which will be oper at i onal 24 hours a day,
seven days a week. I n addi t t on, r epor t s will be rendered to CC, I FOFCE\l, o r CC, 11
F"ORCR1, and ot her major subordi nat e conrmanders, as appr opr i at e, ATTN: r r ovos t P ~ r s h a l .
d. Rypenrljx 1 i s furni shed as a forrrrt and Ar,penrlix ?I a s a r . i 2 e il: reportinf!
ser i ous i nci dent s.
e. Three phases of t h e s er i ous i nci dent r epor t w i l l he submi t t ed: In5.tTa1, y u p
piemental, and Terminal.
(1) l n l t i a l r epor t s.
' I
( a )
I n i t i a l r e~mr t , s w i l l be submi t t ed by l o c a l provost marshal s i -medi -
a t e l y cn r ecel pt of i nformat i on t hat . an i nci dent t or a nat ur e descri bed i n p r a 2b, abo-JQ,
has occurred. Addi t i onal i nf oma t i oa .in c ~a r i f i c k t i c m c r s ubs t ant i at i on w i l l be forwarded
as it becomes avai l abl e.
( b)
I n t hose cases i n whjcri f m l pl ay i s nbt yro!,ahle, such a s bslicides
o r acci dent al deat hs, and i t 1 a l l cases w'en s uf f i c i e nt informatpion I s a va i l a bl e t o as cer t ai n
t h a t any cor r ect i ve act i on ir.dlcate;i has been accompiished, t he j n i t i a l and t er mi nal r epor t s
m y be combined. Jn such cases, t h e conbined r epor t wi l l cont ai n a st at ement t o t he e f f e c t
that no f ur t he r r epor t w i l l be submi t t ed on :hie i nci dent unl ess l a t e r i nves t i gat i on war&
r ant s .
(2) Supplementary r epor t s.
I ( a ) Supplementary r e wr t s , addrersed to t h i s headquart-ws, A T T : Afi!W,
ell be subr ut t ed neeh 30 days u n t i i f i n a l act i on has been accutri.lished and a t e mi n a l re-
por t i s submitted.
( b)
Supplementary ~ e p r t s w i l l r e f l e c t t h e c:rrrent st at i s of t he i nc i -
l?ent, personnel i nvol ved, and in appl i cabl e cases, changes 117 l oc a l p1bll.c r eact i on o r a t -
t i t udes .
( 3 ) Terminal rcp; +. s.
( a)
"er,;.ina.L r a r n r t s wi13 oe eut,m!tt.ed t ~ * e d i a t e l yupon c onpe t i on of t he
appr opr i at e act i on.
L'eg hr ?: , Jj 3 F!Q !iS>>v, Arc Snn T' ~. anci sc~963C7, 24 June 1967, ( ~ o n t )
(b). Tenni nal r e wr t s *il inf:!..>da an-: i l i ~c i o? i na ! - y a c i i on t aken a ga i ns t
~ < r s n ~ , . e l i nvol ve l and c or r e c t i ve arbcinio5r.-ct.i~..-- acLi sn t.a~er?t o pr;~cludea similar .inti-
d e l t . 411 inc?*lc?n+,a w i l l rma. l n o;.er, ca?es at, t h i s h~a dql ~a r : e r s1 1 ~t i . l a t,ermir;ai rel mrt i~
r ~c e i ve - d.
5 . ,!;CI,'FIITY R r ~ c r t . ~ nrev:'slon< of thisr s , q~l a t i on I!P"PT,ICA'T'TC\YR: sl:bvit t-ei? !mier. t.!;e
xi;: be cl assi fi er' accor+ing t o t h e na t ur e of t h e i : ~ c i d s n t ; -.o,evt;:., as a rcini~i:.:, irrit.terl
repor' ;w: 11be :-fi-kefl .'.'?: CYFTCI AL US F '! :?&7..?.
. - . , . , -
4. A:[.-- L. : a. IiS;.: PAC Peg 1-55.
s. !IJ.C;. jr 335-1.
L
c. ?5t:! 7 :rep 1-55.
FPANK 3. IrIL>EF
VaJor General , U, Xn r i y
Chief of St a f f
2 A ~ ~ e r d i c e s
T . :::;Ar.!; ?om 211,-l, 'ormat f or SR..
11.Instr1:ctions f o r Tonpleting IJSAY TOTTI 214-5.
1. St r i ke out SETTOUS INCiDEK;' c r B!L; fr;LTL., 0 3 aplrrog~-j.ate, and i dert , i fy ?ype of
i nci dent ; e. g. , f a + d t r a f f i c acci dent , ~rrirder, et r *.
i'r'_n!i:!rlo'fonses should be l i s t e d a s
c - hs s j f i e d i ~ Do not make numerical r.-ferer.tes t he :JCM.! r t he E M . :-. ar t , i cl e( s ) al l eged t o
hsve bee!? v i c k t e d .
2 .
I;,dj.co',e proper heport s Contro?. S p b o i ty crc.)ss!cg out i nappl i cabl e r ef er ence;
HCS ?S,XS-$2 f or "Elue Bel i " r epor t s ar.6 iCS Fix-22 (F2) f or Sericus Inci dent F e p r t s .
3.
Tr.rlicate t he degree of s ecur i t y c h s s i f i c a t i o , ~ a?>i.pr,ed t o ti-.e r epcr t .
As o mint-
mm, wr i t t en r epor t s w i l l be !narked "VT!OFTI CI AL [!SF, ONLY."
4. Show sequence number f or each r ep- ?. . Fxample: 9-2 (Second r epor t rece?,red i n Sep-
tember ) .
5.
Show t he day of t he month and t i me t h e i nformat t on was recei ved. Fmnpl e: 072930
Jur. 67.
6 . I ndi cat e whether t h i s i s an Tni t i el , I ni t i a l / ~e r mi na l , S:~yplemental, or Terminal
r e p - t .
7.
Show t he dat e and time a t which t he i nci deri t occu;,red i n t h e 3me manner a s para J.
8 . Peport t h e exact l ocat i on usi ng i del -i t i fl abl e landmarks, mi l es t o near est t o m. c i t y
o r vili-age.
9. Personnel involved. I ndi cat e par ent het i cal l y before each i de ot i f i c n5on whether
subj ect (s), vi ct i m (v),or wi t ness ( W) . Show deceased personnel wi t h a s t e r i s k (*) a f t e r
(2) or (' 1).
a. L i s t a i l mi l i t ar y personnel by rims, grade, SV, race, CC6 o r age, organt zat i on,
ar.d AW. Fxample: (S) JONES, John P., FCC, RA j 67e92i i Y Cau, 3'3 3 Yay LQ, 53Lth TC Co,
A N 96421.
5. For US c i vi l i a n personnel, i ndi cat e s t a t u s i n piace of gr e l e ; e. e. , DP.C, de?e:.-
dent , merchant seaman, et c. If female, i ndi cat e w i t h ( F) a f t e r s t a t us . Show s:wnsorls
i dent i f i cat i on f or a l l dependents. 'Fxample: (V) 'IFOWN, Louis > I . , DP.?, i'au, LYE! 2 J.ln 25,
1st Log Comd, A N 96307.
c . Foreiyp nat i onal c i vi l i a ns will be rkcorder! t o show nat i onal i t y, sex and ace,
and address. Ijcample: !C) Nguyen Tm Ptlan, ':"~/F/?L, 73 Yinh Thar. Cay, Bier: Hoa, Vietnam.
10. .4 synopsi s of f a c t ua l dat a avai l abl e a t t i ne of r e p r t i n ~ , t.o l ncl ude t he answer?
t o t he quest i ons of what., hcw, a ~ r l wny. ' h e r e appl i cabl e, i ncl ude t : ~e fcl l ordng:
8. . m e of vehi cl e involved ( i f i t,on t r uck, specin;, t ypo) .
b. Speed cf vehS c l e and aut hori zed speed.
c. Statement a b o - ~t whether or not. al cohol was i nvoked.
d . , Tndicate whether vehj c1.e use was ant hori zed or not .
e . For . rms and mu n i t i o n :
(1) Se r i a l r r l o t nunlbkrs.
( 2 ) Tyke of weapon.
( 3 ) Securi t y neas>:rea ir: effect . .
( 4)
Tn acci dent al shoct i ngs, i !, di cat e whether lictt pol i ci es were vi ol at e? a16
wb: we a p r , wa3 loaded.
1jSAP.V Fee No 335-6
. .
f .
&t ent of i nJ ur I es b r est i mat ed val ue of d m3 e s .
g. I e n t i f y medical f a c i i i t l e s used.
h.
Iln f a t a l l t i s s , i d e n t i a . t he do-+,or pronouncing death and t he time of deat h.
Cive d:sposit.ion of remal.ns.
i. Give di s pos i t i on of t he s ubj ect a1:d i f conftne!, t he l occt i an of c on~i ne ne nt .
j. Fcr incidgr,t,s j.nvolvinp, IYJ's? o r det ai n%s, reyort.:
( 1)
St,st,:!s (P.i,c i v i l defendant, r et ur nee, det ai nee, innocent c i v i i i a r ) .
( 2)
r)ete and F h c e of capt ure.
( 3) Capturing uni t .
(l,) Conditions ::rder which capt ured.
( 5) Fa c i l l t y t o wfiicb a: mi t t ed.
(5) Time hnd da t e admitted.
(7) Hospi t al r e gi s t r a t i on.
(8) Condition when' capt ured.
(9) Cause of death.
(10) Location ofr ma i ns . .
11. I de nt i f y agency o r cammander who i sconducting f ur t he r i nves t i gat i on o f . t h e i nc i -
dent an<!any d; sci pl l nary, admi ni st r at i ve, or cor r ect i ve a c t i on which nayhave been i n i t i a t -
ed o r i sa n t i c i p t e d . Show any ot her act i on t aken or contemplated which i si nt ended t o
reduce impact on U S ~ ~ I J r e l a t i ons .
12.
Tndi cat e i nt e l l i ge nc e agency which has been not i f j ef l sf t h e i nci dent when appro-
pr i a t e and &ow degree of a c c e s s ' t o c l a s s i f i e d i nf or nat i on by t hos e involved when r el evant
t o t he incident.
13.
Zndicate t he opi ni on of t he r ~ p o r t i n g agency a s t o whether puSl l cf t y of a ciemga-
t or y nat ur e is ex~ect ec!and whether it is t o be minor, normal, l oc a l , Kidespread, o r contin-
uing.
I,$.
Li s t t he dutyancl rrajor camand of t he r e wr t i n g agency. ?:onnally, t h i s shollld be
t he l o c a l provost marshal.
1 5 .
Li s t a n y . i n f o mt i o n cont fn; l ei fromt h e firs: p g e and i de nt i f yby shqwfne Item
number a?d t i t l e . "or t er mi nal or combined i ni t i a; / t ei mi nal r e por t s , a sentence vj l l be
i neIr. rl e~a s folluws: ?!o f nr t he r r e r or t wi l l be sliknitt,ed on t h i s i nci dent r ~nl e s s l a t e r
i n v e s t i ~ a t l o n war r a. ~t s . " '
16.
Tndicate each addressee who :-.as been fnrr.isherl a copy of t h e r e r o r t o r otherwise
informed of t he I t xi dent .
17. i.igt, name, rank, duty posi t i on, and orpanizat,io;. of person renderi ng t he r e ~ o r t .
l i st name, rank, rl11t.y posi t i on, and organi zat i or. ~f rorson recordi np t h e infor-a-
t i on.
1 ' .
WARV Reg No 350-1
HEAEQUARTWS
UNITEDSTATES ARMY VIETNAM
Am SmFnnciaco 96375
10November 1%7
EDUCATION AND TRAINING
SETIOR I m A L
PurPo-
Applicability
Mission
Training policies
I1 TRAINING GUIDANCE
b h d a t o ~training
--Spacial subjects
USARVTraining
PARAGRAPH
-
PAGE
1 2
2
2
3 2
4 2
5
6
Intelligence training
7
Medical training
8
Training in psychological operations (PSYOPS)
9
C i r i l a f f a i n t d n h g
10
Code of conduct training
11
Conwund i nf omt i on
12
safety
13
CBRmd nuelear traiIliq7
14
Couaterinmgencyand counterguerrilb, training l5
Character guidurca 16
Riot control
17
Amartation
18
Mine and boobyt rapwarfare
19
Co d c a t i o n a training
20
A i r mobile training 21
Physical socurity training 22
Reph-nt t r a h b g
23
R y o i d training
24
Smal l axma fami l i ari ~at i on f i r i ngp r o m
25
C a r e and c l a d n g of theMl6A1 Rifle
26
Out-oi-country training 27
Non-cdsuioned officer lendenship dovelopent 28
.-UtiUsation of Southeast Aaia A i r l i f t
29
Unit proficiency trainiry 30
FWand detainee handling 31
Supplytraining 32
~mpl&ting- instructions
mi ni ngand audio vim1aids
Addnlstration
Trainingrecords
IV REFWERCBS
Refm c e s
ulhia regulation ouparsedes USARVReg 350-1, 28 Jul 66; USARVTng C i r 3, 23 Nw 66;USARV
TngC i r 4,30h g 66; USARV TngC i r 5, 20Aov 66;WARV Tng C i r 350-6, 9 k y 67; BARV Tng
C i r 350-7, 1Jun67; and Trig C i r 350-8, 6 Jd67.
Reg uo 2 r 7 . ~ . P? USARV, APO an Francisco 96375, 1.0 NOT 67, (Cant)
SECTION I GENERAL '
1. PURPOSE: To prescri be policy and provide guidance f or a l l echelons of connnand i n
planning, conducting, and supervising t he mi l i t ar y t r ai ni ng of i ndi vi dual s and units as-
signed o r attached t o t h i s cammand.
2. APPLICABILITY: This regul at i on i s appl i cabl e t o a l l uni t s of t h i s connaand and
establ3.shes requirements f or t he conduct of oper at i onal readi ness t rai ni ng. Operational
requirements wi l l , a t times, limit t he avai l abl e t r ai ni ng time. A l l uni t s wi l l , a s a
mi*, schedule ori ent at i on and refresher t r ai ni ng f or a l l replacements and s t r i ve t o
achieve t he completion of DA nnndatory t r ai ni ng requirements.
3. MISSION: The t r ai ni ng mission of this catmnd is:
a. To a t t a i n and maintain a atate of operat i onal readi ness which will i nsure t he
ef f ect i ve performance of combat operations in a mid-intensity conf l i ct environment.
b. To maintain a s t a t e of operat i onal readiness which wi l l i nsure t he effect i ve
achievement of operat i onal and contingency missions in a high i nt ensi t y confl i ct .
4. TRAINING WLICIES: a. Training wi t hi n t he cosmsand w i l l be based on t he broad
pri nci pl es and pol i ci es out l i ned i n AR 350-1 and appropriate ATPfs, wlth mphasi s on lessone
learned i n Vietnam a s published by DA, Headquarters MACV, t h i s headquartera, and major
subordinate canrmnds .
,"
1
b. Indi vi dual replacemanta ar r i vi ng i n RVN\directly from CONUS 'willrecei ve
t r ans i t i on t r ai ni ng pr i or t o part i ci pat i on i n combat operations.
c. Hajor uni t commanders a r e afforded wide l at i t ude i n determining t he t rai ni ng
requirements which will r es ul t i n developing and maintaining a high s t a t e of uni t readiness
and operat i onal t rai ni ng.
d. Authority and r espomi bi l i t y f or planning, conducting, and supervising t rai n-
!l ng will be delegated t o t he 1-t element t ha t has t he a b i l i t y t o conduct ef f ect i ve
t rai ni ng.
e. Training program dspelopsd a t each l evel of c m d w i l l :
(1) Ehphasiae t he dwelopnent and maintenance of i ndi vi dual combat proficiency
of a l l personnel.
(2)
Recognize t he squad a s t he basi c combat uni t which must develop team-
work and f i r e and movament proficiency.
(3) St r es s combined arms concepts t o i nsure employment of a l l avai l abl e com-
bat power.
(4)
Allow t r ai ni ng time f or major subordinate commanders t o i ncl ude subj ect s
t hey consider essent i al .
(5) Provide wf f i c i e nt pi me mi l i t ar y man-hours f or t he performance and t r ai n-
i ng of preventive and correct i ve mintenance. Such performance and t r ai ni ng u i l l receive
maxhm colm~nd at t ent i on and supervision.
(6) St r es s on-the-job t r ai ni ng t o provide ret rai ni ng, updating, and convsr-
si on of i ndi vi dual sldlls when required, and t o develop i ndi ddua l proficiency and maintain
unit readiness.
(7) St r ess mat eri el readinesa during dl phases of t rai ni ng.
SECTION I1 TRAI NI NG GUIDANCE
5 . MANDATORY TRAINING: Mandatory and recurri ng t r ai ni ng subj ect s a r e l i s t e d i n A p
psndix I. Major uni t commanders a r e a ut hor i z d t o devi at e from t hese requirements eidy
when, i n t he i r judgement, t he operat i onal missions of t he i r uni t s necessi t at e w y
ouch deviation.
Reg No 350-1, HQ USARV, APO S.n F.rancisco 96375, 10 Nov 67, ( ~ o n t )
6. SPECIAL SUEUXTS: S p c i a l at t ent i on will be given t o:
a. Personnel, document, and information securi t y.
b. C' mi c a t i o n s securi t y.
c. Supply economy and conservation of materiel.
d: Maintenance of high standards of physical conditioning.
e. Personnl hygiene and f i el d sani t at i on.
- f . Safety, t o include weapons safet y. /
g. Training i n ni ght operations.
h. Small uni t t act i cs.
1. Weapons proficiency.
j. Sentry duty.
k. Host i l e i nt el l i gence expl oi t at i on of E Anny personnel.
1. Vietnam and r el at i ons with t he Vietnamese.
m. Mi l i t ary courtesy and di sci pl i ne.
7. INTELLIGENCE TRAI NI NG: a. Each i ndi vi dual sol di er must a t t a i n a high degree of
proficiency i n passive count eri nt el l i gence measures and report i ng of information. Train-
ing programs wi l l s t r e s s t he need f or high standards i n securi t y, l i ght and noi se di sci -
pl i ne; proper aut hent i cat i on procedures; accuracy and promptness in t he observation, col-
l ect i on and report i ng of information: and evasion and escape t rai ni ng.
b. The importance of i nt el l i gence and t he developnent of its appl i cat i on wi l l be
continuously st ressed through proper i nt egrat i on of i nt el l i gence i nt o ot her t r ai ni ng as
outlined i n Appendix 11. Additionally, speci al emphasis will be placed on those subject8
l i s t ed i n Appendix I by means of annual ori ent at i on.
8. lQ,DICAL TRAINING:g.Training i n personal hygiene and sani t at i on w i l l be st ressed
a t - a l l times. This t r ai ni ng should include:
a. Prevention of heat injury.
b. Field sani t at i on procedures t o prevent t he spread of disease.
c. Training i n sel f-ai d, f i r s t ai d t o ot hers, and treatment of ms s casual t i es
which wi l l s t r es s t he importance of i ndi vi dual measures t . a t can be taken t o minimize t he
ef f ect of enemy nucl ear, or CER weapons.
d. Preventive medicine aspect s of insect-borne di seases with speci al amphasis on
malaria.
e. Care of t he f eet .
f . Flabies hazards associated with pet s.
9. TRAINING I N PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS: The obj ect i ve of PSYOP t r ai ni ng is t o
develop an understanding of t he value of PSYOP t o t he Army and t he need f or i ndi vi dual s
and uni t s t o part i ci pat e effect i vel y i n support of t hese operations.
Emphasis w i l l be on
t he following:
a. The employment of l eaf l et s, loudspeakers, and radi os in t a c t i c a l FSYOP.
b. The anplayment of PSYOP techniques t o encourage enmy malingering, defection,
and surrender.
Reg No 350-1, HQ USARV, Am San Francisco 96375, 10 Nov 67, ( ~ o n t )
-
c. The plrpose of saf e conduct passes and act i on t o be taken by t he i ndi vi dual
sol di er with regard t o US o r U e d "surrender l aafl &s. "
-
d. Individual defense measures agai nst en- propaganda and ot her PSYOP act i vi -
t i es .
e.
The r ol e of PSYOP i n cont rol l i ng en- and fri endl y ci vi l i ans i n t he combat
area.
f . The ef f ect which mccessful BYOP can have on t he col l ect i on of i nt el l i gence.
10. CIVIL AFFAIRS TRAINING: Training wi l l be conducted on a recurri ng basis t o
fami l i ari ze a l l Xxqy personnel with c i v i l a f f a i r s matters. Inst ruct i on wl l l include t he
following subjects:
a. The defi ni t i on, plrpose, necessi t y, and scope of c i v i l a f f a i r s and revolution-
ar y developnent act i vi t i es .
b. The i ndi vi dual sol di er ' s r ol e in c i v i l a f f a i r s with emphasis on at abi l i t y
operations and community rel at i ons.
c. C i r i l a f f a i r s capabi l i t i es of non-civil a f f a i r s units.
d. Organization and functions of c i v i l af f ai r s s t a f f s and units.
e. Rules of land warfare and t he Geneva Cormantion, with em@msis on t he enfbrce-
ment of law; preservation of order; and t he prevention of wanton d-truction of ci vi l i an
property, c mn i c a t i o n s , records, and ot her item8 of value which a r e a par t of t he ci vi l -
i an economy or c i d l i a n i nst i t ut i ons.
11. CODE OF CONDUCT TRAINING: a. The primrry obj ect i ves of.Code of Conduct t rai ni ng
a r e t o i ncrease uni t f i ght i ng st rengt h and t h e i ndi vi dual l a will t o r e s i s t under varying
degrees of hos t i l e i nt errogat i on.
b. The pri nci pl es of t he Code of Conduct wi l l be i nt egrat ed t o t he max5mum axtent
possi bl e i nt o ot her subj ect matter and t r ai ni ng such a s mi l i t ar y j ust i ce, survi val , socaps
. and evasion, mi1itn.y di sci pl i ne, i nt el l i eence training, pat rol l i ng, and leadership. In
addi t i on, it wi l l be supported by and cl osel y coordinated with connuand information and
charact er guidance programs.
12. COMMAND INFORKATION: a. Cammnd information (CI) p r o w and a c t i vi t i e s wi l l be
cl osel y supervised a t a l l l evel s of camand.
b. A continuing program of ori ent at i on f or newly assigned personnel w i l l be con-
ducted t o improve t he i ndi vi dual sol di er ' s understanding of h i s presence i n t he area and
t he need f or reapact f or custams and t r adi t i ons of foreign nations. Objectives of t he C I
program wl l l be in consonance with p r a 3, USARV Reg 360-81.
13. SAFETY: a. Training i n defensive dri vi ng and public saf et y measures wi l l be con-
/ ducted concurrently with ot her t rai ni ng.
r /
b. Training in fire prevention and prot ect i on rillbe st ressed.
c. Frequent checko w i l l be made t o i nsure l ocal SOP1s a r e anforced with regard t o
carrying of weapons i n secure areas.
U. CrPl AWD NVCIEAR TRAINING: Continuing comwd mphasi s wi l l be given t o readi ness
of uni t s t o execute sustained operations wi t h mxiam i ndl vi dual and unit effect i veness
under conditions produced by fri endl y or en- employment of nuclear weapona. CBR/
nuclear t r ai ni ng wi l l be conducted i n accordance with Appendix 111.
15. AND COUNTERGUERRILLA TRAINING: Training i n
and count erguerri l l a opsrat i ons wi l l be conducted i n accordance v l t h Appendi x IV.
16. CHARACTER GUIDANCE: a. A l l mnbers of each c m d wi l l be instilled with an
understanding of t he obj ect i ver of t he charact er guidance program.
- -
bRV</
y!
L
y
/
1 ,
i %
W
Rwg No 350-1, HQ USARV, APO San Francisco 96375, 10Nov 67, ( ~ o n t )
b. A l l of f i cer s and'enl i s t & personnel wi l l receive t he scheduled charact er
guidance i nst r uct i onor ori ent at i on a s prescribed i n USARV Reg 6-30.
17. RIOT CONTROL: Ri ot cont rol t rai ni ng will be conducted i n accordance with FM 1$-15.
A l l combat and combat support units will undergo speci fi ed t r ai ni ng i n t h i s subj ect t o
assure m adequate conawd capabi l i t y.
18. A M AVIATION: Aviation proficiency wi l l be maintained i n accordance with avia-
t i on di rect i ves.
19. KINE AND BOOBY TIUP WARFARE: a. Training wi l l be conducted i n t he pri nci pl es,
methods, and technique8 of land mine and booby t r apwarfare, t o include functioning and
types of mines and minefield si t i ng, i nst al l at i on, marking, repart i ng, and breaching.
b. T7 i nsuret hat a l l personnel a r e adequately t rai ned i n t he anployment and
recognition of VC/NVA mines and .boobyt raps, major subordinate combat uni t commanders wi l l
est abl i shVC/NVA mine and booby t r a pconfidence coursesa t that l evel of cammond which is
best sui t ed t o t he const ruct i onand administration of t hese f a c i l i t i e s .
These courseswill
provide t he following:
( 1) An opportunity f or a l l personnel subjected t o VC/NVA mines and booby
t raps t o negot i at e t e r r a i q containing repl i cas of enemy devices.
(2) The requirement t hat a l l appropri at e personnel successfuU.y peas t h i s
course duri ne t he trainin$.
( 3)
Concurrent t r ai ni ng on recognition, marking, cl eari ng and report i ng of
VC/NVA mines aad booby t raps.
(4)
A s a minimum, confidence courses w i l l be ut i l i zed a s follows:
( a) For a l l r ephcment s a s a part of t he i r i ndi vi dual replacement
t r ai ni ng program. (seeAppendix VI . )
(b) Conducted i n conjunction with unit profi ci ency t rai ni ng. (See
Appendix X. )
20. COMMUNICATIONS TRAIN=: The obj ect i ve of conmi cat i ons trainine; ist o i nsure
t hat each uni t i sc a p b l e of installing, operating, and maintaining i t sorganic communico-
t i on equipnent under conditions experienced i n RVN. This t r ai ni ngmust be r e a l i s t i c and.
continuous t o i nsuret heuni t ' s a bi l l t yt o perform i t scameunications mission a t a l l times.
a. On-the-job t r ai ni ng (oJT) wlll a s s i s t i n preventing shortages of t rai ned com-
munication@personnel when known l osses sxceed known gains. This t r ai ni ngwi l l a l s o
f a mi l h r i t e newly assigned personnel with l ocal operating procedures and conditions.
b. Cross t r ai ni ng of personnel wi l l be conducted f or c r i t i c a l communications
positions.
c. Tni ni ngwi l l be conducted t o assuret hat a s uf f i ci ent number of CW radi o
operators i s. avai l abl e t o provide a capabi l i t y of continued operat i on of c r i t i c a l radi o
ci r cui t s by CW mode in t he event of del i berat e j&ng of radi o t e l e t ypwr i t e r c i r c ui t s o r
t hei r l os s by ot hermeans.
d. A vigorous and continuousuni t t r ai ni ng program i n proper preventive =in-
tenance of' sfgnal equipnent must be i n ef f ect a t a l l times.
--.-- - -- .-
Ulr.
e. Trainingwill be ucted on a continuous hsis sureand maintain secure
comuni cat i ons pr f i i &rad andung and use of codes, au-
t h m t i c a t ~ ~ p k e - d 7 T c % t ~ ~ p h o n e , procedures ut i U=ed
during n one. Lf l
f . When conditions pennit, consolidated uni t schoolswi l l be establSshsd f or t he
t r ai ni ng of sel ect ed communications speci al i st s, e.g., di vi si on schoolt r ai ni ng courses f or
switchboard operat ors from uni t s within t hedi vi si on.
Reg No 350-1, HQ USARV, APO San Francisco 96375, 10 Nov 67, ( ~ o n t )
21. AIRMOBILE OPERATIONS TRAINING: a. The trailiing of kviation and ground combat
units f or airmobile operations is t he responsi bi l i t y of cormnanders a t a l l echelons. The
objective i s t o fami l l ari se uni t s with a l l aspects of airmobile operations and enable them
t o develop a standing operating procedure which wi l l insure t hat efl ect i ve airmobile opera-
t i ons ar e conducted with maximum speed, f l exi bi l i t y, and timeliness.
b. Troop t rai ni ng should include familiarization with Amy ai r cr af t , f l i ght
saf et y procedures, preporation of equipaent f or i nt er nal and external transport, techniques
of assembly and reorganization, and conduct of airmobile operations.
c. Aviation uni t t rai ni ng must st r ess familiarization with operational planning,
low l evel mvigation, formation fl yi ng a t night and other periods of reduced vi si bi l i t y,
a i r t r a f f i c control, confined area operations, and maximum load handling.
22. PHYSICAL SECURITY TRAINING: a. Security i s a co~mnand responsi bi l i t y. Commanders
responsible f or oprat i onal managment . and control of i nst al l at i ons and act i vi t i es have a
di r ect responsi bi l i t y t o provide adequate securi t y t o insure the safeguarding of the i nst al -
l at i on or act i vi t y.
b. The t hr eat t o t he securi t y of US pr sonnel , i nst al l at i ons, and act i vi t i es i n
RVN is continuous. It mny be i n t he form of t er r or i st act i vi t i es and sabotage or mortar,
rocket or ground at t ack. This t hr eat can be reduced only through constant vigilance on
3 8 L d '
t he part of a l l concerned combined with proper t rai ni ng and adequate securi t y measures.
The increasing number of incidents of sabotage and t er r or i s t act i vi t y di ct at es t hat a l l
uni t s of t h i s c omnd be properly trained t o permit t he most effect i ve use of resources t o
safeguard personnel and property.
c. A l l commanders w i l l t ake' posi t i ve act i on t o insure t hat each individual assign-
ed securi t y dut i es is properly oriented on hi s responsi bi l i t i es within t he f i r s t ten dayo
of hi s assigrrment. As a part of t hi s orientation, t he t rai ni ng program i n Appendix V wi l l
be used as a basis f or t he presentation of a minimum of four hours of i nst ruct i on f or each
individual before he is assigned dut i es involving physical security. In addition, each
individual performing such dut i es wi l l be reoriented a t l east once each quarter.
23. REPLACEMENT TRAINING: Training f or replacements wi l l be conducted i n accordance
with Appendix VI .
24. PHYSICAL TRAINING: a. A s outlined i n Appendix I, Fhysical t rai ni ng i s a part
of t he mandatory t r ai ni ng program.' Local coinnanders ar e granted t he aut hori t y t o conduct
t h i s t rai ni ng t o t he extent they deem necessary.
i b. Major subordinate commanders wi l l submit a consoUdated report on t he physical
t rai ni ng program f or a l l units under the<operational control. This report wi l l be pre-
pared i n accordance with t he format i n Appendix V I I and will r ef l ect t he l a t e s t t e s t re-
s ul t s obtained during wch calendar year. -This report w i l l be prepared a s of 1January and
'
forwarded t o ar r i ve a t this headquarters, ATTN: AVHCC-DST, not l at er than 10 January.
Negative reports ar e required. Reports control symbol DD-M(A) 491.
,-
c. The requirement f or t hi s report wi l l not be construed a s a requirement f or
extensive physical t rai ni ng and t est i ng programs.
a. Units wi l l est abl i sh a t rai ni ng
unhls familiar with hi s assigned weawn.
'?hi; program wi l l s t r es s prellminery marksmanship i nst ruct i on prior t o t he conduct of l i be
f i r e -exekcisea. Range oGr at i ons All be conduited in accordance with t he procedures out-
lined i n Appendix VIII.
b. A l l uni t s will make necessary arrangements with l ocal ARVN aut hori t i es f or t he
use of sui t abl e ranges i n t hei r immediate area.
c. Familiarization will be conducted as required; however, a l l personnel w i l l
t ake f i r e f a m i l i a r i s a ~ A n n u a l o r m s qual i fi cat i on is
authorieed as a snbst i t ut e f or one semi-annual fami l i ari sat i on fi ri ng.
~ e g 350-1, HQ Em,AR, S.n Francisco 96375, 10 Nov 67, ( C O@I?$ b8
-
NO ~
.
- - - -- -
L
27. OUT-OF-COUNTRYTRAINIFIC: a. The t r ai ni ng of uni t s and i ndi vi dual s out-of-co
wi l l be considered only in cases where adequate t r ai ni ng cannot be conducted in RVN and
where t r ai ni ng is requlr* t o meet opr a t i ona l requircrments of t h i s command.
+\
b. Unit t r ai ni ng out-of-country wi l l be scheduled t o avoid i nt er f er ence with t he
operat i onal a c t i vi t i e s of t he uni t . Where pr act i cal , t h i s t r ai ni ng wi l l be W t e d t o
\
cadre t r ai ni ng of sel ect ed personnel who vill then provide addi t i onal t r ai ni ng in-country
t o uni t members.
. c . Indi vi dual t r ai ni ng out-of-country wi l l be conducted onl y i n cases required \
by oper at i onal necessi t y.
d. lQS producing or MIS p r e f ws u f f i x producing schools out-of-country wi l l be
a t t e n d 4 by psrsonnel of t h i s counmnd only when c r i t i c a l shortages e xi s t i n t hose MIS's
within t he command.
e. Personnel at t endi ng out-of-country i ndi vi dual t r Pi ni ng wi l l meet mlnlmm
standards est abl l shed by appropri at e di r ect i ves and wi l l have a minimum of six months re-
mining i n t he canmund upon completion of t he t r ai ni ng.
f . Requests by i ndi vi dual s f or out-of-country t r ai ni ng . wi l l be accepted by t h i s
headquarters only when scheduled courses o r s peci al al l ocat i ons have been announced by t h i s
headquarters.
Any 1-01 of conmvnd which has determined a need f or s paci al i ndi vi dual o r
g.
uni t out-of-country t r a Mn g rill forward a request through command channels t o t h i s head-
quart ers. As a minimum, t he request w i l l i ncl ude t he following:
( 1)
Type and scope of t r ai ni ng.
( 2)
Number of personnel t o be t r ai ned.
(3)
The reason(8) subj ect t r ai ni ng cannot be conducted in-country a t that
l e ve l of c o mn d .
(L)
Complete j us t i f i cat i on f or subj ect t r ai ni ng to i ncl ude t he ops r at i oml
requirement.
h. Preparat i on of orders and funding f or approved out-of-country t r ai ni ng rill be
accomplished a t t he lowest possi bl e l e ve l of caonmnd.
i. The ACofS, G3, t h i s headquarters, has s t a f f responsibility f or a l l out-of-
country uni t and i ndi vi dual ml l l h r y t r ai ni ng with t he exception of automatic d.tr process-
i ng t r ai ni ng over which t he Comptroller, t h i s headquarters, has s t a f f supervision.
28. NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICER LEADmSHIP DEVELOPHENT: a . The r ot at i on pol i ci es i n RVN
and t he subseauent l os s of exwri enced mmonnel i n key uosi t i ons r e f l e c t t he need f or a
continuing t r k r h g p r o ~ u n i br t he devilopuent of j uni or l eaders.
b. k j o r subordinate conmunders u e encouraged t o es t abl i s h f o m l and scheduled
NCO l eadershi p schools a t t he di vi si on, separat e brigade o r si mi l ar l e ve l of ccmmnurd.
c. Standards of t r ai ni ng.
( 1) Schools wi l l amphasize devel opant of leadership. Sel ect i on of subj ect
mt t e r i ncl udi ng t echni cal and t a c t i c a l subj ect s wi l l bu mde only as t eachi ng vehi cl es f o r
l eadershi p t r ai ni ng. A goal of i ncreasi ng i ndi vi dual t echni cal and t a c t i c a l proficiency
should be secondary t o developing l eadershi p traits. Units wi l l e s t . b Us h ~ o y - ' - ~ o f ,
i nst r uct i on which bes t f i t t he f i s s i on of. t he unitid-the o c c u p ~ i o ~ ~ l speci a tia of i _t he
personnel t o be trained..... .
. .
( 2)
Emphri s wi l l be placed on ni ght t rai n- and r wl i e t i c gr a c t i c a l work
pr&dlng f r q u e n t r ot at i on of 8t:tdents i n l eadershi p ~ o s i t f o n s .
~ e g NO 950-1, RQ USARV, AFO San Fnnci wo 96375, 10 Nov 67, ( ~o n t )
(3) lfaxbm emphasis will be -cad on Vietnam*lesron8 learned.
d. Although operation81 requirements will periodically l i mi t t he training time
available, commanders will give t hei r personsl attention t o the implementation and conduct
of this training. Special attention w i l l be given t o the selection of a well qualified
cadre and the development of a camprehenaive program of instruction between one and four
week8 in length.
e. Training should be dwigned for presentation t o junior noncolmnissioned of-
fi cers who have not received similar training or who have displayed a need for such train-
ing, and t o other enlirted personnel who have demonstrated unusual leadership potential.
29. UTILIZATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIA AIRLIFT: a. To insure t hat each unit subject t o
participation in combat operations perfects and rehearses loading p h s for a i r movement,
pro-pl.mhg and t rai ni ng of l a di ng and tiedawn toam will be stressed. Reduction of aSr-
craft ground time is the goal of t hi s training effort.
b.
The following are deficiencies which have been noted during past airlift move-
ments :
(1)
Lack of pro-plmnning, t o include determination and disseioination of load-
ing pri ori t i ee and preparation of loading plans.
.
(2) Ut Usat i on of untrained drivers and loading and tiedown team who were
not f md l h r with t hei r duti-.
(3) Lack of propep supervision.
30. UNIT PROFICIENCY TRAINING: a. To maintain adequate unit proficiency, c-ders
mu8t devise means t o overcome t he degradation of effectiveness occasioned by current rota-
tion policies and subsequent l oss of experienced personnel in key positions. Conmwrnders
a t a l l echelons wi l l give t hei r personal attention t o determining the st at us of proficiency
and implementing necwsal-p remedial training programs. These include, but me not limited
to, on-the-job training, cross training, unit and organizational schools and refresher
tnining.
\ b. Operatiolvl c d t me n t s penuitting, major subordinate comamnders will schedule
each mumaver battalion and reconnaisuance uni t t o receive one m k of refresher training
L) ,
4, every three months. In any spent, this traMng w i l l be accomplished a t l east every 8ix
months. Refresher training should be oriented to the needs of the individual unit. This
pd' , refresher training w i l l include, u a minimum, t he subjects outlined in.*pp)ndix X.
---d. Comaurdem sh4uld avoid postponing unit training unt i l t hei r scheduled periods
of refrerher training. &en during actended t act i cal operations, uni t s experience periods
of rel at i ve i nact i vi t y when training can be conducted coacurrmtly with t act i cal operations.
An alert commander wi l l use these periods t o conduct refresher training i n f i r e and
manewer, acquieition and reporting of en- information, commuclcations, troop leading
procedures and other amas i n which a training need has been dmonstrated.
31.
FW AND DETAINEE HANDLING: A l l personnel will be instructed i n the estrbllshed
procedu?ea for t he evacuation and procwsing of and custodial accounting for prisoners of
and detainees captured by or deI3ven-d t o US Militw Forces.
32. SUPPLY TRAINING: Appropriate t rri ni ng periods niU be devoted t o supply economy
and appl y discipline. Special emphasis will be placed i n on-the-job training i n the
proper msintenance of PU' s and ASL's for those personnel who are associated with these
amam.
Reg No 350-1, HQ USARV, APO San Francisco
96375, 10 Nov 67, ( ~ o n t )
SECTION 111 TRAINING ADMINISTRATION AND SUPR3RT
33.
TRAINING INSPECTIONS: Training i nspect i ons w i l l be conducted by subordinate com-
menders a s t hey deem appropri at e t o ascert ai n t he s t a t e of t r ai ni ng of t hei r comnds .
St af f visits by members of t h i s headquarters normally will be conducted i n accordance with
t he provisions of AR 1-200.
34. IMPLDBNTING INSTRUCTIONS: Two copies of a l l t rai ni ng di r ect i ves issued by
subordinate commanders w i l l be furnished t h i s headquarters,
35. TRAI NI NG AND AUDIO-VISUAL AIDS: a. Training ai ds support i s provided by t he
Training Aids Center, Fort Buckner, Oklniiwa.
b. Audio-visual support is provided by t he 69th Si gnal Bn, RVN.
c. A11 request s f or t r ai ni ng and audio-visual aids wi l l be submitted i n accord-
ance with i nst ruct i ons contained i n Appendix X I .
36. ADMINISTRATION: Additions or revi si ons t o t h i s regul at i on w i l l be effect ed by
t he issuance of s e p r a t e p g e changes f or t he basi c regul at i on and each appendix.
37. TRAINING RECORDS: Adequate t r ai ni ng records wi l l be maintained t o r ef l ect t he
campletion of mandatory and recurri ng t rai ni ng. It i s recaamnended t hat guidance contained
i n FM 21-5 "Mi l i t ary Training Management" be ut i l i zed t o ast abl i sh necesasry records.
38. REFERENCES: a. AR 11-8.
b. AR 11-u.
k. AR 350-30.
1. AR 350-212.
m. AR 350-216.
n. AFf 350425.
0. AFf 360-5.
P. AFf 360-45.
q. AR 360-81.
r. AR 380-5.
8. AR 380-200.
Reg No 350-1,HQ USARV, APOSanFrancisco 96375,10Nov 67,( ~ o n t )
t. AR 385-10.
u. AR385-55.
V. AR600-9.
w. AR 600-30.
X. AR 622-5.
y. AR 750-10.
z. DA C i r 380-1.
aa. DA Pam16-5through 16-12.
ob. DA Pam 21-81
ac. DA Pam350-9.
ad. FM5-20.
ae. FM5-22.
sf. FM16-100.
ag. FM 19-15.
ah. FM19-30.
a!.. FM19-40.
aj. FM21-20.
ak. FM21-40.
al . FM 21-41.
am. FM 21-48.
an. FM 30-5.
ao. FM31-12.
op. FM31-15.
aq. FM31-16.
ar. FM 31-40(C) .
as. FM 33-5.
at. FM 57-35.
au. TM21-200.
cv. TM38-750.
aw. USARV Reg 95-1.
ax. WARVReg 95-6.
ay. WARVReg105-3.
as. EARV Reg 108-2.
Reg No 350-1, HQ USARV, APO %n Francisco 96375, 10Nov 67, ( ~o n t )
ba. USARVReg 190-2.
bb. USARVReg 360-1.
bc. USARV Reg 360-81.
. bd. USARV Reg 381-5.
be. EARV Reg 3856.
bf. USARV Reg 600-30.
(AVHCC-DST)
ROBERT C. TABER
Brigadier General,- US A-
Chief of Staff
WI LLI AM R. JAMES
Colonel, AOC
Adjutant Csneral
ll Appendices
I.k d a t o r y Training
11. Intelligence Subjects f or Integration IntoOther Subjects
111. Chdc a l , Biological, Wo l o g i c a l ( ~ m ) end Nuclear Defense Mi ni ng.
IT.Counterinsurgency and Countarguerrilh Training
V. Physical SecurityTraining Program
VI.Rephcment Training
VII. Report on Physical ProgramF o mt
V I I I . Wenpons Familiarization Courses
IX.Preventive EIPintemce Indicator Check Li st (W16A1 ~ i f l e )
X. Unit Proficiency Training
XI . Training and VisualAido
DISTRIBUTION:
A /.-nu
50 G3 Ofc
3AVMGA
500 AVHAGAP
6 CmWARPAc
1USARPAC H i r t Unit
24?4cJ
gp#( 3t- 2 -:
Fr , " '
USARV Reg No 350-1
APPENDIX I
MANDATCRP TRAINING
1. CWWZAL: Training i nrequired etubjects l i st ed below wi l l be conducted i naccord-
ancewith t he frequency praacribed and authority and guidance contained inreferance8,-
indicated. m e p t where hours ar e prescribed by DA, achievement of training objectives
w i l l be t he governing factor i ndetermining t he amount of time devoted t o these subjects.
2. ONE-TIME RFQUIREMENTS: A l l individuals are required t o receivetraining i n the
follaring subjects. Make-up training w i l l be scheduled as required.
SUBJECT: REFEBXNCES RPWU(S
___C_
Hilltary Justice AR 350-212, ASubjScd 21-10, For a l l enlisted personnel
UCMJ A r t 137
PeychologicalWarfare FM 33-5 For Off and WO
Safety IRARV Reg 385-6 For a l l personnel
3. RECURRING REQ-: a. Training i n the following subjects isconsidered
wrsnti.1 and isrequired Anny-wlde by pertinent DA directives:
SUBJECT REFERENCB
.-
FmARlB
h e d Forcw Csnrorship AR 3-00, USARV Reg 380-200 For a l l military personnel.
Training nuy be i nconjunc-
t i onwith periodic security
indoctrination or incorpor-
ated i nt oregular training
progr-.
CBB Refresher AR 220-58, AR 6U-35,m 21-40 A s indicated i n A m d h
111.
CharacterGuidance AR 600-30, IEARV Rag 6-30, Monthly
DA Pan l6 aerier, DA TC 14-1, 164,
16-3, Prr 14-100
Ckndut i neS w d l h n c e AR 380-12, WARV Beg 380.42 A l l penonnel, in conjunc-
and Lirtaning Dwicw t i onwith other security
orientations.
Coda of Conduct AR 350-30 hmw
AR 350-25, DA C i r 525-1, DA Annually
27-1, FH 4l-5, FH 41-10, FM U-15,
MAW Mr 37-15, lIACV Mr 515-1,
HAW M r 525-17, USARV Reg 1-100,
USARV Reg 230-6, USdRv Reg 515-1,
WARV Reg 5154, WARV Reg 525-1,
IBARV h515-1
Def.nre Amr t Subversion AR 381-12, USARV Reg 381-12, DA Annually; t o be given in
and Espionage C i r 380-1 conjunotion ni t hother
80ClU'ity 0ri Onbt ~0na.
USARVReg NO 350-1
mica1Pitnerr Program
AR600-9, DAR m 21-1, DAPam21-2
FM21-20, FM3540, M 21-200
ASubjScd 21-37
SafeguudingDofenre Infor- AR380-5, U3ARPACReg 380-5,
Annully; m y bagiven with
mt i on mARVReg 3380-5 other securityorient.-
t i ons
Survival, Fmrion and ~~350-225,FM21-75,FW21-76,
Fn21-77, FM21-7'78
b. Other raqulramnts. The following rubjectr . r e comidered of sufficient im-
porknce t o baintegrated i nt oa l l appropriate phuer of training in accordance with t he
guidance contained inthe l i r t ed refemncer.
andCounter- IW31-15, FM31-21, AR 40-3 See Appmd5xsIV
, perrill. Mi n i n g
p i n t ~d md hergancy
AR 40-58, DAPam 39-3, DAPam
Ebdicil C a m 350-9, FM8-10, Fkl8-35, 8-9
FH21-10, Fn21-ll, FM21-13, FM
21-40, FW 2 1 4 , Flf 21-48, FNf 21-76
Pn31-30, FM31-72, 3-230,
8-285, Wed TB 81, EkdTB175, %d
TB234, h d TB246,ATP84000,
ASubjScd 6-12,ASubjScd 8-13
Field kni t a t i on
AR 4045, IBARV Reg 40-22, IBARV
Reg 40-33, USARVReg 40-29, F'l4
21-10, ASubjScd 21-3
IlrterielReadinerr ARIl-U, AR 750-10, M 38-79
Phpi cal Security
FM19-40, USARV Reg 190-2 Also ree AppsndixV
-tiedof H a t Injw
DA C i r 40-16, FH21-10, MedTI3 175
USARVReg 40-28
Supply &on- AR ll-8
SentrqDuty FH21-6
Vi st nr m, andReUtioM
USARV l b o p Topic No 4-66
Wth t he vi e t m- e
DA Pam 20-198, DAPam550-40
USARV Reg No 350-1
APPENDIX I1
INT?%LIGENCE SUaTECTS FOR INTEGRATION INTO OTHER TRAINING
The following i sa guide f or i nt egrat i ng i n t e u g e n c e subj ect swith various ot her
subj ect s i n i ndi vi dual and uni t t rai ni ng.
St at us of i ndi vi dual and uni t t rai ni ng wi l l
di ct at e t he amount of i nt egrat ed i nt el l i gence required.
The imagination of t he coiiunander
and hi s i nt el l i gence of f i cer w i l l determine t he success of this t rai ni ng.
Int el l i gence
aubjects t o be i nt egrat ed wi l l act ual l ybe wri t t en i nt o lesson plans.
PRINCIPAL SUEiJECT
SUEJECTS TO BE INTEWATED HOW TO INTEGRATE
Ant i guerri l l a and I nf i l t r a- 1. Counterintellieence 1. a. Require guards and
t i on Tr a i ni x
sent r i es i n forward and rear
2. Col l ect i ngand report i ng areas t o pract i ce camouflage and
i nf o mt i o n concealment a t a l l times.
3. Handling of W' a. b. Emphasiee increased
vi gi l ance t o obt ai n advantages
over guer r i l l as.
c. Use t he challenge and
password as a secur i t ymeasure.
d. Pract i ce sound and l i ght
di sci pl i ne f or added concealment.
2. a. Capture g u e r r i b s t o
pract i ce evacuation and i nt erro-
gat i on procedures.
b. Emphasize report i ne of
information about guer r i l l aac-
t i v i t i e s t o ~ o v i d e i nt el l i gence
f or couht erguerri l l a operations.
Bayonet and Unarmed Combat 1. Collecting information 1. Explain t hat t he bayonet and
a b i l i t y i n unarmed defense
2. Counterintelligence psychologically ai dby inducing
surrender, t hus as s i s t i ngt he
i nt el l i gence ef f or t from resul-
t ant i nt errogat i ons.
2. a. Dull t he surfaces of bay-
onets so l i ght doesn t r ef l ect .
b. Use proper camouflage
and concealment t o obt ai n sur-
pr i se essent i al f or unarmed at -
t acks .
Character Guidance
1. SAEDA 1. a. St r esst he personal con-
t r i but i on i ndi vi dual 8 can make t o
2. Personal behavior t he securi t y of t hemi l i t ar y
t r a i t s establishment.
b. St r ese obl i gat i on of re-
porting known or suspscted SAEDA
incidents.
2. a. Point out how personal
di f f i cul t i es can lead t o approach
by host i l e i nt el l i gence.
b. Explain basi c cause i n
defect i on cases not i deol ogi cal
USARV Reg No 350-1
PRINCIPAL SUaTEGT
SUBJECTS TO BE INTF,GRATEL
Commander's Time 1. Use t h i s time t o give
addi t i onal t rai ni ng t o
correct defi ci enci es i n
i nt el l i gencesubj ect s.
2. Use t h i s time f or make-up
i nt el l i gence t rai ni ng.
4. Personal behavior t r a i t s
affect i ng personnel securi t y
Concealment and C&ouflage 1. Counterintelligence
2. Pat rol l i ng
CrawServed Weapons
Range estimation and
Training di rect i on, compass and
gri d azimuths
Evasion and Es c a p 1. Collection and report i ng
information
2. Camouflage and conced-
ment
3. Scouting and pat r ol l i ng
4. Observation post s
5. Cross-count1.g movement
6. Securi t y
Ho'd TO INTEGRATE
but usual l y an attempt t o escape
from personal problems or indes-
cret i on.
c. Summarize contents of DA
C i r 380-1.
Same as above.'
1. a. Explain t hat good con-
cealment and camouflage l i mi t
t he a bi l i t yof an enemy t o ob-
t ai n mi l i t ar y information.
b. Include sound and l i ght
di sci pl i ne.
2. Require camouflage and con-
cealment essent i al f or success-
fulpat rol l i ng.
Ut i l i ze concurrent t r ai ni ng i n
i nt el l i gence subj ect s where prac-
t i cabl e. The st at i onmethod is
recommended where more than one
subj ect i sbeing taught concur-
rent l y.
1. St r ess t he value of mi l i t ar y
information t o i nt el l i gence and
t he need t o report it.
2. Pract i ce camouflage and con-
cealment techniques during eva-
si on f or success.
Use weather as cover.
St r ess t hat i ndi vi dual sol di er
isa primary source of i nt e l l i -
gence and scouting and pat rol -
l i ng operat i ons are conducted
pri mari l y t o col l ect infonnation,
3. Sel ect and est abl i shobserva-
t i on post s and require remember-
i ng of items seen and heard.
St r ess accurate and timely re-
port i ng and proper channels f or
i nt el l i gence reporting.
4.
Use t he rmn and stars as
substitutes f or maps t o keep
di rect i on.
USARV Reg No 350-1
PRINCIPAL SUBJECT
Fi r s t Aid
Field Sani t at i on
Grenades
Hasty Fort i fi cat i ons
Indi vi dual Day Training
SUBJECTS TO BE INTEGMTED
Pat rol l i ng
Counterintelligence
1. Ori ent at i on on enmy
equipnent
2. Deception measures
3. Count eri nt el l gence
li. The enamy
1. Observation
2. Counterintelligence
3. Surveillance radar
1. Observation
2. Counterintelligence
3. Evasion end escape
HOW TO TXTFGRATE
5.
St r ess importance of not di s-
cussing escape/evasion route
with anyone u n t i l properly de-
bri efed and aut hor i ~ed t o do so.
Use pat rol l i ng as a set t i ng f or
pr act i cal work i n f i r s t aid.
Police bivouac aFea8 and front
l i ne posi t i ons t o prevent enemy
from obtaining i nfomat i on.
St r ess t he importance of col l ect -
i ng enemy equi pent and evacuab-
ing it t o t echni cal i nt el l i gence
teams.
Deceiva t he enmy as t o your
exact posi t i on by using grenades
i nst ead of i ndi vi dual mapons.
1. a. Use a challenge and pass-
woml i n t he f i e l d as wel l 8s in
garrison.
b. Guard agai nst subversion,
i nf i l t r a t i on and guer r i l l a act i v-
i t i e s .
c. Require guards and sen-
t r i e s i n forward and ma r areas
t o pract i ce camouflage and con-
cealment a t a l l times.
2. Use aggressors t o add real-
ism t o damonstrations and pract i -
c a l exercises.
1. Sel ect a posi t i on t hat af-
fords good observation.
2. a. Pract i ce camouflage priu-
ciplos.
b. Pract i ce sound and l i ght
di sci pl i ne.
3. Plan use of ground sumrsil-
l ance radar in t he over al l s e c w
i t y plan.
1. Require continuous observa-
t i on.
2. a. Pract i ce camouflage and
conceahent .
b. Use cover when available.
3. Avoid capture by following
t he simple r ul es t aught i n s cout
ing and pat rol l i ng and use of
cover and concealment.
USARV Reg No 350-1
PRINCIPLE SUBJECT SUBJECTS TO BE INTFGRATED HOW TOINTEGRATE
Indi vi dual Night Tr ahi ng 1. Col ~nt eri nt el l i gance 1. Pract i ce sound l i ght discip-
l i ne.
2. Map and compass reading 2. Use compass and t he s t a r s t o
determine di rect i on.
3. Collecting and report- 3. Use night observation and
%a l i st eni ng techniques t o col l ect
information. Report allh f o r -
mation col l ect ed.
Individual Protective Measures 1. Collection of i nfor- 1. a. Watch f or enemy car r yhg
Against CB Attack r at i on prot ect i ve masks o r clothing.
2. Speed in reporting b. Report t he exact loca-
i nf omat i on t i on and t h e of at t ack.
c. Report col or, smell and
ot her char act er i st i csof CB
agents used by t he enemy.
2. Report information collected
by t hemost e qe di t i ous means t c
t he nearest uni t i nt el l i gence
of f i cer o r uni t commander.
Indi vi dual Proficiency Te s t hg Int el l i gence subj ect s and
subj ect s r el at ed t o i nt el -
Ugence should be adequate-
ly covered i n t he t est s.
Mines and Boob Traps Collecting and report- 1. Report l ocat i on h e d i a t e l y
i nfomat i on. of enmymines and booby t raps.
2. Teach pat r ol t o det ect and
by-pass mine and booby t r ap
areas.
Maintenance, Supply Economy, Counterintelligence Require clean bivouac areas t o
and Suppk Rocedums Observa- deny enemy i nfomat i on.
t i on Posts
1. Cover, concealment, and 1. Teach t hat cover, conceal-
camouflage ment, caouf l age are necessary
i n t he establishment of a good
2. Use of maps, a e r i a l observation post.
photos, compass and bino-
cul ars 2. Compare ground formation
wi t h a map or . aeri al photograph
3. Rage estimation t o i dent i f yobj ect s and person-
nel.
4. Area search
3. Require continuous pract i ce
5. Recognition of vehi- a t range est i mat i on. t o at t ai n
cl es, ai r cr af t , e n a y accuracy.
mi f oms , h a i g n i a md
rapkings. 4. Use a systematicmethod t o
cover a given area.
6. Reporting information
a. Use of brevi t y 5. Require observers t o recog-
codes and authentica- ni ze and i dent i f gobj ect s seea.
t o r s Include WHAT, WHERE, and WHEN.
USARV Reg No 350-1
PRINCIPLESUBJECT
SUBJECTS TO BE INTEGRATED
b. Message writing
7. Conduct and adjustment
of ar t i l l er yf i r e
8. Groumd surveillancede-
vices
m sof kind Warfare Exploitation of enemy
prisoners of war
Signal Conumications, 1. Collecting and report-
Elementaw ing
2. security
Squadamd Platoon Pa t mUng 1. Collecting aud report-
i ng infomation
2. Counterintelligence
3. Map, airphoto and
compass
4. The enmy
5. Exploitation of enemy
W's, documents and mate-
r i el .
6. hformation must be reported
inmediately and accurately by
the f ast est means available.
Brevity codes areameans of
speding up the reporting of in-
fomatior. Authenticators are
necessary t o idssltifg corwmica-
tors. Written messages must be
clear, concise, and complete.
7. Require obs e mr s t o c a l l
for and adjust ar t i l l er y f i r e,
8. Teach the capabilityof
ground surveillance radars.
Require correct t r eahent of
enemy FWb t o obtain infomation
through interrogation.
1. a. Write cl earmessages
which includeWHAT, WHERE,amd
m.
b. Dispatch messages t o
provide timely information.
c. Selectt henost ef f i -
ci sat means of communications.
2. a. Use authenticators and
codes correctly.
b. Avoid disclosure of
cl assi fi ed infomationwhen
transmittingmessages i nthe
clear.
1. a. Give every pat rol an in-
telligence mission, ei t her pri-
mat y or secondcll-~r, t o col l ect
enemy information.
b. Require pat rol members
t o detect enmy locations
through observations and l i st en-
ing.
c. Protect t he next pat rol
by reporting dlinformation
c o l ~ c t s d .
d. h i o r to departure,
brief pat rol on the cument
eamy si t uat i on, the t errai n,
and themat her.
e. St ress importance of
reportingeverything seen or
heard no matter how seemingly
insignificant.
2. ,a. Use camouflage and con-
cealment.
Practice moundand
l i ght diacipllne.
USARV Reg NO 350-1
PRINCIPLESUBJECT SUBJECTS TO BE INTEGRATED
Techniques of Fi r e 1. Counterintelligence
and Combat Fi ri ng
2. Miscellaneous
Troop Information 1. Ori ent at i on on forei gn
armies
program
2. Evasion and escape
1. Effect s of weather on
t er r ai n, equipnsnt, and
personnel
2. Maps and a e r i a l
photos.
3. Pat rol l i ng
4. Range cmtimation
5. Col l ect i ngand re-
port i ng
6. Evasion and escape
HOWTO INTEGRATE
C. Know t he correct usage of
t he challenge and password
d. Pract i ce comuni cat i ons
securi t y a t a l l times.
3 . Use a map, a i r photo, and com-
pass cor r ect l yt o l ocat e rout es, ob-
j ect i ves, and items t o report .
1*. Use aggressor t o add realism t o
problsms and st i mul at e i nt el l i gence
lay.
5. Have pat r ol capture documents
and items of enemy equipment and re-
t urn them t o t he i nt el l i gence of-
fi ce.
1. Use camouflage and concealment
during exerci ses.
2. a. Pract i ce estimation of di s-
tance.
b. Pract i ce area observation
t o l ocat e t ar get s.
1. Use information avai l abl e on
foreign armies. Treat a s a subj ect
i f possi bl e, otherwise, i nt egr at e
such informationa s i sappl i cabl e
t o t he pr i mav subj ect .
2. Develop t hewillt o f i ght and
t o evade capt ure a s a s ol di e r ' s
f i r s t responsi bi l i t y.
1. Vari at i ons i n weather produce
vari at i ons in t er r ai n, which may af-
f e c t operat i ons. Equi pent isaf-
fect ed by major changes i n tempera-
t ur eand climate. Personnel a r e ad-
versel y affect ed by axtreunes of
weather.
2. Extremes of weather may change
data a s represented on mapa, and
may limit a e r i a l photo coverage.
3.
Weather conditions must be taken
i nt o consi derat i onwhen planning
pat rol s.
4.
Weather af f ect s t he limitsof
vi s i bi l i t y.
5. General dat a concerningmat her
must be included in report s.
6 . Weather may be usedt o cover
evasion and escape. Weather may
00hinder a v a a i ~n and escape op-
erat i ons.
USARV Reg No 350-1
REPLACEMENT TRAINING
1. PURPOSE: To prescri be policy and provide guidance f or commanders i n est abl i shi ng
a t r ai ni ng prograa f or replacements.
2. OBJECTIVES: To i nsure t hat each i ndi vi dual replacement assigned t o a uni t of t hi s
command recei ves a~in-country ori ent at i on and i nst ruct i on on general subj ect s a t a replace-
r pnt battaUon/company, and proficiency t r ai ni ng a t his uni t of assignment. This t rai ni ng
i s designed t o develop increased understanding between US forces and t he people of RWJ and
members of ot her FWMAF, and t o develop profi ci ency by i ns t i l l i ng i ndi vi dual confidence and
expediting i nt egrat i on i nt o t he .unit.
qcq L " - 2
3. GENERAL: a. The +ef f or t i n RVN imposes many new r esponsi bi l i t i es
and unique rel at i onshi ps on t he i ndi vi dual sol di er. An essent i al i ngredi ent of our a bi l i t y
t o " Wi n i n Vietnm" i s t he devel opent of an understanding of t he Vietnamese people based
on mutual respect and t he appl i cat i on of hlgh standards of deportment by US personnel.
b. Indi vi dual replacements arri vi ng i n RVN di r ect l y from COLVS t r ai ni ng cent ers
am wel l t rai ned, but l ack unit experience. This shortcoming requi res t r ansi t i on t r ai ni ng
t o rmphasiae teamwork, comprehension of t he combined m s team concept,-and adjustment t o a
new environment.
c. The t rai ni ng program out l i ned in para 4, below, contains t he minimumt r ai ni ng
requirements f or repl acment s assigned t o uni t s of t hi s command. Each commander wi l l ana-
l p e t he i ndi vi dual requirements of his uni t based mission, operat i onal conditions, and
t asks assigned t o determine and provide necessarg addi t i onal t rai ni ng, e.g., r i o t cont rol
i nst ruct i on f or mi l i t ar y pol i ce uni t s.
4. RESPONSIBILITIES: a. Commanders of repl acment uni t s a t Long Binh, B&ku and
Cam Ranh Baywillprovide t he following ori ent at i on and t r ai ni ng f or a l l replacements pro-
cessing through t h e i r respect i ve l ocat i ons:
(1)
'hm-hour ori ent at i on basad on USARV Command Infonnation Troop Topic, Issue
No. 4-66, MACV"Nine Rules t o Raarber, andt he Chieu Hoa Program.
(2) Cammaad ori ent at i on film, "Unique War.''
(3) Mi l i t ary courtesy, dress and appearance ( t o include recognition of and
courtesy due noa-US members of FWMAF.)
(4) Personal hygiene and f i e l d sani t at i on.
(5) Tropical di seases.
(6) Fi r s t and self-aid.
(7)
Cumncy conversion and pi as t er control.
b. Camganders of medical f a c i l i t i e s furnishing primary medical caret o replace-
ment uni t s willprovide medical ori ent at i on f o r arri vi ng personnel i n conjunction wi t h other
t r ai ni ng mentioned i n 48, above. Medical ori ent at i on willeover heal t h hazards encountered
in RVN,measures t hat t he i ndi vi dual must t ake t o avoid haeards, f i r s t ai d and self-aid.
c. Major subordinate commanders of combat, combat support and combat s er r i ce s u p
uortuni t s willest abl i sh t rai nha Droarms f or replacements. The t r ai ni ng programs w i l l
-?rovide f or t r ai ni ng of repl aceme~t s Gt h i n seven days f t he i r as s i gnment - d- as a mini-
Am, willcover t he foIlowlng subj ect s:
(1) Feriliari sat i on f i r ~ ~ 4 4 k , ~ ' p ' p o , f ~ a p ~ n + h ~ ~ d d d ~ t , h , e ~ , F , F ~
appropriate,
USARV Reg No 350-1
(2) Weapons safety.
(3) Security and sentry duty.
(4) Hnes and booby traps. v
(5) Convoy procedures and driver safety.
(6) hmdi a t e action dr i l l .
(7)
Orientation on Viet Cong t act i cs and techniques.
(8) Gas chamber exercise. J
4 (9) PW and detainee handling.
request of ma j ~ r combat service support commanders, commanders of combat
provide assistmce in the form of instructional material and training of
instructional cadre.
e. In addition t o subjects l i st ed above, commanders of combat organizations w i l l
provide refrepher training in the follolring subjects t o enhance combat proficiency prior t o
participation in ccmbat operations:
(i)hall unit tactics. J
(2) Cm-eerved weapons.
(3) Ambuah and counter-dush.
(4) Lrmd navigation. v
(5) Patrol techniques and planning.
(6). Reporting of en- informlion.
(7) Battlefield police.
(8) A i r mobility. --
( 9)
Adjustaent of ar t i l l er y and mortar f i r e.
(ID)
Conduct of VC/NVA mine and booby t rap confidence course.
f. Durlng all training, mphaeis w i l l be placed on pract i cal work and trainlng
w i l l ba 0-nted to the l ocal mission, terrain, SOP1s and operational conditions of the in-
divldual d t r . Iassonr learned, t act i cal t i ps, dot e and don' t' s ,and need-to-know opr a-
t i o d data rillbe integrated into trainlng subjects as appropriate.
, ..>
I,L>,~' :)iJ>~i~~,[LS
u;;i.lt;;. s,l>,y:Ls ;G,$>;1- 11I,y?!,lA 7 7
r . I N .
Ai'3 San r"l.u:ciaco 36375
5. January i$,62
RETURN L?/ITHIN
.-.
74. i-fsgzs
C(>),'..i? (jI>!\?\ :.'?: , I . : . *
i,ol~,:.tbl;: jrlJ Accjdent3 Involving i*iiadj.'reeted ~ ~ t i l l ~ ~ ~ / k ~ ~ f , ~ ~ il,ve*tie-t,ir;~i of Fi r a,
;i&val C~ q f i r e or Air-Ijsliverea Ordnance
- I, ;'T,T' s' - .
To est abl i sh procedures t o be f ~ i l o ~ ~ e d f i r e ,
1. .--i:12-bz:.
when US or t i l i er y/ mor t ar
iiavai ~;unii;c;, or ai i -ci el i vered ordzance causes deat h, i nj ur y, or si gr i i f i caat propert y ilar-
age t o :rts::c;lp .r..llit;ary or c i v i Ea n personnel.
-
. L 2. :- . : - c?- The yovi sj . ona of t h i s 1,egulation w i l l be foLlowed when .death, i n j ury,
or ~l gni l l c a r . tproperty ca:~age occurs t o I r i endl y n i l i t a r y or c i vi l i a n peraormel. S e . 7 - 5 -
Inci dent Reports, ot her t han t hose i nvol vi ng mi sdi rect ed ordnance, w i l l cont i nue t.o be sub-
r,uttec! 1iiI;i ' ZSdlrV Zeg335-6,
3 . I:2,SPG~~jSI;ILI?Il!3: CC' s , 1and II ?F'ii CG, Aneri cal Di vi si on; and CC, 108th FA
Grou? ~ $ 1 1 :
s. Lm~edi at ei y s ~ k n i t an i n i t i a i spot r epor t of a l l kiiown f a c t s concerning an
acci dent t o t h i s heaci qua~t ers by e l e c t r i c a l means. Telephonic spot r epor t s w i n cont i nue
t o be rendered t o XI CV CLX as prescri bed i n 144CV D i r 335-12.
b.
Cause an iiznediate i nvest i gat i on t o be perforxed of a l l acci dent s occurri ng
.*Lbnln t k e i r ar ea of The i nvest i gat i on may be i nformal , o r way be f or aal -- I r o s p n s i b i l i t y .
JF .ZL15-6, dependent upon t he c i r c ~ ~ s t a n c e s surrounding tile, acci dent .
c. Sub::iit ;fi . nai r epor t t o tkiis headquart ers wi t hi n 15 days. I: t h i s suspense
cannot be net , subinit an i nt e r i x r epor t by e l e c t r i c a l means. Tb.e f i n a l r epor t w i i l j.rlclucie,
buL i s not &cited t o, t he Ioll.owing i d o ma t i o n pertai.!ling t o t h e acci dent ;
(1) iJete and t h e ,
(2) Coordinates. .
( 3) Ca s ~ a l t i e s and/or propert y dazage. I? US perso.mel were casual t i es, i n-
cl ude u ~ t desl gnat i on( s) .
( 4 ) uni t ( s ) involved.
( 5 ) 3 r i e i descr i pt i on or cause.
( ' 6)
Di sci pl i nary and/or corrective act i on t aken t o precl ude recurrence.
( 7 )
St at us of s o l a t i u ~ pay, ent s, i f ?i et nai l ese c i vi l i a ns were involved.
d. CG, I1 FFV, wi l l report
and h v e s t i g a t e acci dent s occuring I n ;?I CYZ an?
tinose ir.volving u n i t s under h i s cont r ol j n IV iTZ.
EXHIBIT D- l l
2123,F.;3L"pI@p:;
.i 2 2 s
3 .ivr:iG-A
2. SAVi;iG.-trP
j C 1 Oic .
5 52 GTc
20 23 GGfc
5 G4 Ofc
j XACY
6 CitiL2,3.U~P.iC
i 3hNtPAC Hist Unit
R;A":?[!A,':TEX
UFIITL?-I f,TArTEi A i i W VIZTb!A!4
LP': jar, Fri-ycisco '!05'75
Tssue and Possession .of 3f or ma t i on C a r d ~
.
1.pd g ~ ,
70es+, sblishpolicy ccncernl n~;tile issue and possession of infomn*lic!:
- .
:7-1.: ! - ymi\Lt:.r:r pe- so: ?~els s ~i gnedtot h i 3 ccr~.w,?d.
.
2 . 0 :
Thi: r e , ~ ~ l s t i o n is appl i zi hl o t@ a l l of f i c e r and eal i st ec! personfie1 nsnir'n-
edtothe Ui t e. ? St.itl-'s i:rxy, Vietnm.
3. 5 : : a. I!pcr. ar ?i val a t ei t her of t he replacement hattalior.^, a11incoming
of f ire. u:3 e n 3 sted personnel will recei ve t he f ol l mi nr : information cards:
(1)
"The Snemv i n Your Hands."
I
(2)
"Tips on VC Xines and Book7 Traps."
( 3 ) ')!ine Rules".
( h )
' Standing Orders, Ropers ?angers. I'
( 5 )
"Tips on t he M-16Ri f l e. I'
( 6j
"Code of Conduct."
(7) "Geneva Convention.:'
b. A l l conmissioned of f i cer s w i l l mcei ve a "Guidance f o r Canmanders ir.Vi et nm'
card i n addi t i on t o those l i s t e d i n para 3a,above.
I+. WSSESSION: These car ds cont ai n i nf omat i on us ef ul i n t he performance of t he
dut i e s assigned t o personnel of t h i s command. Therefore, each i ndi vi dual Ki l l keep t hese
cardsi n hi s possession a t alItimes.
5. RESUPPLY: a. The AC Publ i cat i ons Elranch, t h i s ' headquart ers, willbe r esponsi +l r
f or maintaining adequate st ocks of cards.
b. The cards maybe r equi si t i oned by submitting DA Form 17 t o t he AG Publ i cat i ons
Branch, t h i e headquarters.
FOR THE CO?r n?) r n:
ROBERT C. TALER
Elrigadier Ceneral, US Amy
Chief of St af f
EXHIBIT D-18
WILLIAM H. JAMES:
Colonel, AC:C
Adj ut ant General
*USARV Reg No 870-2
HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM
Am San Francisco 96375
11March 1968
HISTORICAL ACTIVITIES
Dai l y Journal Fi l es
1. PIIRPOSE: To pr escr i be r es pons i bi l i t i es and provide guidance pertainin^ t o t he
maintenance of d a i l y j our nal f i l e s .
2.
m:
This r egul at i on is appl i cabl e t o t h i s headquart ers and t o allUS Army
organi zat i ons, t o i ncl ude t h e i r subordi nat e elements, assi gned o r r epor t i ng t o t h i s head-
quar t er s.
3. DTINITIONS: a. Dai l y j ournal . An o f f i c i a l , permanent, chronol ogi cal record of
t he a c t i v i t i e s , and event s af f ect i ng an organi zat i on o r a s t a f f of f i c e duri ng a 24-hour
period.
b. Daily j ournal f i l e . A f i l e i n which da i l y j ournal s and t he mat er i al s c i t e d o r
paraphrased i n t h e d a i l y j ournal e nt r i e s ar e f i l e d. These mat er i al s ar e preserved a s
permanent records i n t h e d a i l y j ournal f i l e t oget her wi t h t he d a i l y j ournal s. They i ncl ude,
but a r e not . l i mi t ed t o , such i t ems a s messages, memoranda, br i ef i ng not es, s pe c i a l and
peri odi c r epor t s (i ncl udi ng SITREP1s, INTSUM1so r PERMTREP1s, personnel summaries, c i v i l
af f ai r s / ci vi c act i ons summaries and LOCSUM'S), a r t i l l e r y survey and f i r e di r e c t i on computer
records, annuni t i on expendi t ure records, annotated maps, sket ches and photographs. In
addi t i on, s i mi l ar i t ems t h a t a r e not preserved in anot her aut hori zed permanent f i l e main-
t ai ned by t he or i gi nat i ng organi zat i on o r s t a f f of f i c e wi l l be kept i n t h i s f i l e .
4. CE>!ZRAL: a. Properl y maintained d a i l y j ournal f i l e s preserve t he i nformat i on
necessary f o r comprehensive review and anal ysi s of event s and a c t i v i t i e s f o r both immediate
and f ut ur e use. These records ar e among t he most val uabl e management t ool s avai l abl e t o
commanders and chi ef s of s t a f f of f i ces , and a r e i nval uabl e sources of i nfonnat i on requi red
f o r per i odi c r epor t s, cur r ent operat i ons research, system anal ys i s , t r a i ni ng and developnent
of doct r i ne.
b. Professi onal hi s t or i ans consi der d a i l y j ournal s t o be o r i g i n a l source docu-
ments. In wi t i n g t h e o f f i c i a l hi s t or y of US Army operat i ons i n RVN, t he Offi ce of t he
Chief of Ki l i t ar y Hi st ory, DA, w i l l r el y heavi l y on da i l y j ournal s. Consequently, t he
adequacy of uni t and s t a f f da i l y j ournal s wi l l l ar gel ydetermine t h e ext ent t o which t he
report ed a c t i v i t i e s of a uni t o r s t a f f of f i c e can be confinned i n or i gi na l source documents
and covered in o f f i c i a l hi s t or i es .
5. RESPONSIBILITIES: a. Commandersw i l l i nsure t h a t d a i l y j our nal f i l e s a r e properl y
maintained i n accordance wi t h t he provi si ons o f t h i s regul at i on. Dai l y j ournal f i l e s w i l l
be maintained by:
(1)
Each s t a f f of f i ce of a l l group headquart ers and hi gher l e ve l organiza-
t i ons . Large s t a f f of f i c e s organized wi t h subsect i onswi l l mai nt ai n consol i dat ed da i l y
j our nal f i l e s as i ndi cat ed in para 6p, below.
(2)
Bat t al i ons and squadrons; separ at e companies ( uni t s , operat i ng independ-
ent l y, t h a t do not form a pa r t of a ba t t a l i on) ; separ at et r oops and separ at e ba t t e r i e s ;
Speci al Forces "B1'and "C" Detachments; and pr ovi si onal uni t s .
EXHI BI T D-19
<This r egul at i on supersedes USARV Reg 870-2, 25 Sep 67.
303
. . , . *
. . :.o - : . " - 2, :!.. i.:.:.::!;, A' . O San Francisco 96375, 11M a r 68, (Cont)
(j)
,Ill co;r.pany, t r oop and ba t t e r y l e ve l elements, of any t ype, when operat i ng
t:nrier c ~ x ~ a n d o r oper at i onal cont r ol of any headquart ers ot her t han t h e parent headquart ers
f or a peri od of more than 24 hours.
b. Bat t al i on-l evel uni t s may mai nt ai n consol i dat ed d a i l y j our nal f i l e s o r r equi r e
t h a t t he execut i ve o f f i c e r and each s t a f f sect i on mai nt ai n separ at e d a i l y j our nal f i l e s .
Comanders of bat t al i on- l evel uni t s mai nt ai ni ng consol i dat ed f i l e s w i l l i ns ur e t h a t d a i l y
i nput from a l l s t a f f s ect i ons and t h e execut i ve o f f i c e r i s i ncorporat ed.
C. Orpani zat i ons below company l e ve l are not requl md t o mai nt ai n dai l y j o u r n d
Yi l es, but should do so when i n t he opi ni on of t he comander a det ai l ed record of event s and
a c t i v i t i e s wi l l be of s i gni f i cant val ue t o t h e AT i n manning, equi ppi ng, t r ai ni ng, employink
eval uat i ng o r det ermi ni ng requirements f o r s i mi l ar organi zat i ons a t any t i me in t h e f ut um.
6. PREPARATION AND ~INTENANcE: a. Format. Daily j ournal s wi l l be prepared on DA
Form 1594 i n t he format i l l u s t r a t e d a t Appendix I. The j ournal s should be t yped but may be
handwritten when t ypi ng i s not f easi bl e. Handwritten j ournal s must be f u l l y l e gi bl e and
wr i t t en i n permanent bl ack o r blue-black ink. When f eas i bl e, documents pl aced in t he d a i l y
j ournal f i l e w i l l be o r i g i n a l copi es; i f t hese ar e not avai l abl e, fully l e gi bl e carbons o r
c e r t i f i e d t r ue copi es may be used. Thennofax o r ot her speci al -process copi es w i l l not be
placed i n t he da i l y j our nal f i l e due t o t h e i r r e l a t i ve l y r api d det er i or at i on.
To f a c i l i t a t e
f i l i n g and reference, support i ng documents w i l l be at t ached t o t h e appropri at e d a i l y jour-
nal .
h. Secur i t y cl as s i f i cat i on. When f eas i bl e, t he d a i l y j our nal should be kept
uncl assi f i ed t o f a c i l i t a t e gener al use. When support i ng c l a s s i f i e d documents o r ot her
c l a s s i f i e d mat er i al s a r e at t ached t o t he dai ky j ournal , each page and each e n t r y of t he
dai l y j ournal w i l l bear t he appropri at e s ecur i t y markings; t he c l a s s i f i c a t i ons wi l l be kept
as low as possi bl e and downgrading i ns t r uct i ons wi l l be i ncl uded on t h e f i r s t page of t he
dai l y j ournal . Top s e c r e t i nformat i on should not be i ncl uded i n t h e d a i l y j ourhdl f i l e .
3 e zournal ent r y r e f e r r i ng t o a t op s e c r e t document must i ncl ude a reference showing where
t he document i s f i l ed. The reference should i ncl ude l ocat i on of t he f i l e , t h e document
t i t l e and t h e i ssui ng headquart ers. I f t h e t i t l e i s c l a s s i f i e d t op s ecr et , it w i l l be
omitted and an uncl assi f i ed shor t t i t l e s ubs t i t ut ed wi t h not at i on a s t o t he t i t l e c l a s s i f i -
catior?.
c. Heading. The heading wi l l i ncl ude t he complete uni t / s t af f o f f i c e t i t l e , t h e
geographic l ocat i on, and t h e t i me period. The time peri od f o r d a i l y j ournal s w i l l be OW1
t o 2400 hours.
d. Item number. Each da i l y j our nal ent r y w i l l be numbered t o f a c i l i t a t e cr oss
referenci ng. Each support i ng document at t ached t o t he d a i l y j our nal w i n be gi ven t he same
item number a s t he d a i l y j our nal ent r y. I f a support i ng r ef er ence i t em c ons i s t s o f more
t,han one document, t he documents should be gi ven t he j our nal i t em number followed by A, B,
t ' , 01 8 % , a q ,,o,~..=.ao~l~,-,
a. 15nti.ieu. There i s no pr af ar r ed s t y l e f or da i l y j our nal e nt r i e s , but cr ypt i c
phrasi ne and meaningless st at ement s such a s "r out i ne a c t i v i t i e s " w i l l be avoided. Brevi t y
i s desi r abl e, but c l a r i t y and completeness a r e es s ent i al . The amount of d e t a i l requi red i n
a j ournal ent r y i s t h i t necessary t o expl ai n t o f ut ur e us er s t he WHO, WHAT, WHERE, WHEN,
HOW and WHY of t he a c t i v i t y o r event i ndi cat ed o r descri bed; and i ndi cat e by name, rank and
dut y assignment t he i ndi vi dual ( s ) provi di ng, recei vi ng o r act i ng on t h e i nformat i on ent ered
i n t he j ournal . I f a complete i de nt i f i c a t i on i s i ncl uded i n a previ ous ent r y, subsequent
i dent i f i cat i on on t he same day may be l i mi t ed t o t he name o r dut y t i t l e .
When a document
ci t ed i n a j ournal ent r y i s t o be presenred i n a permanent f i l e ot her t han t he d a i l y j our nal
f i l e (e-g. , an operat i on or der , operat i on pl an, contingency pl an o r a st udy), t h e ent r y
should i ncl ude t he uni t o r s t a f f o f f i c e f i l e number, t he document t i t l e and t h e i s s ui ng
headquart ers. A l l documents t h a t w i l l be requi red t o r econst r uct t h e a c t i v i t i e s o r event s
r e l a t i ng t o t he j ournal e nt r y w i l l be at t ached t o t h e d a i l y j our nal unl ess t hey are t o be
preserved i n anot her permanent f i l e .
St andard t echni ques f o r referenci ng a r e shown a t
Appendix I.
C
. . \ , ~, . '. . - " ' , i::!'. .\!V :::in R. . x~~ci aco $06375. ?l ?!ar 6s. (Cent,)
. : I . I f a l l t ho act i ons taken a r e i ndi cat ed i n t he body of an ent r y
, o r :lo act i or i s t aken, t he "aft i on taken" column i s l e f t blank. Use of t he l e t t e r "M" t o
i ndi cat e post i nc on a map i sacceptable. It i sredundant t o use "L" t o i ndi cat e t h a t t he
item has been logped. Items 2, 25 and 128 of Appendix I i l l u s t r a t e proper not at i ons. "F"
i snot adequate; t he s peci f i c f i l e must be i ndi cat ed.
g. I n i t i a l s . Since i n i t i a l s ar e usual l y meaningful t o l ocal . cur r ent user s of t he
j ournal , t he i n i t i a l s of t he i ndi vi dual who dr af t ed a j ournal ent r ymay be noted i n t he
i n i t i a l s colwnn, hut i ndi vi dual s providing, recei vi ng o r act i ng on t he information ir. an
ent r ymust be i dent i f i ed by name, rank and dut y assignment i n j our na1, ent r i es.
h. Abbreviations and sl ang. Abbreviations not found i n AR 320-50 o r a st andard
di ct i onar y w i l l not be used wi t hout explanation i n t he j ournal i t s e l f . Slang expressi ons
and code words of a l l t ypes wi l l be explained each day t hey ar e used.
i. Timeliness and accuracy. To minimize e r r or s in recordi ng times o r ot her mat-
t e r s of f a c t , da i l y j ournal e nt r i e s should be made a t t he time t he event s o r a c t i v i t i e s
occur. It i sespeci al l y . @port ant t h a t t he cont ent s of o r a l messages and orders be f ul l y
recorded a t t he time received o r given.
..
j.
Summary. The next-to-last ent r y in t he da i l y j ournal should be a s m a r y
wr i t t en by t he commander o r s t a f f of f i ce chi ef. Thi s summary wi l l descr i be t he ove r a l l
pat t er n of a c t i v i t i e s f or t he day and hc l ude comments necessary t o pl ace in perspect i ve
any important event s not f u l l y covered i n j ournal e nt r i e s o r i n t h e support i ng documents
at t ached. . If t he reasoning l eadi ng t o deci si ons, i ncl udi ng t he pr i nci pal consi derat i ons,
i s not provided elsewhere, itwould be given in t he summary. Plans f o r t he following day
wi l l be provided when iti sconsidered desi r abl e t o have them recorded f o r current o r f ut ur e
study.
k. Correct i ons. Once made, j ournal e nt r i e s wi l l not be al t er ed except t o cor r ect
t sypo~r aphi cal o r s i mi l ar er r or s. Correct i ons w i l l be i ni t i a l e d by t h e of f i c e r aut hent i cat -
ing t he j ournal . I f t he substance of an ent r y i si ncor r ect o r s i gni f i cant l y incomplete,
t he necessary correct i on o r addi t i on w i l l be made in a subsequent e n t l y referenci ng t he
or i gi nal ent r y. The source of information on which a s i gni f i cant cor r ect i on o r addi t i on i s
based should be ci t ed.
1. Authentication. The da i l y j ournal i san o f f i c i a l record 'and w i l l be aut hent i -
cat ed by t he si gnat ure of t he commander, chi ef of t h e s t a f f of f i ce, o r an appropri at e
aut hori zed represent at i ve.
m. Fi l e size,. Daily j ournal f i l e i t ems should be f i l e d i n st andard f ol der s as
prescri bed i n AR 345-200. Large documents should be fol ded t o t he s i z e of j ournal pages.
Small items should be secured t o blank sheet s o f l et t er - s i ze bond paper.
n. Fi l o numbers and t i t l e s . Units managing records under AR 345-210 wi l l f i l e
dai l , , j ournal s and supporting documents under f i l e number 206-07. Uni t s managing records
under AR 345-215 w i l l f i l e da i l y j ournal s and support i ng documents under f i l e number 2-06.
The f i l e t i t l e f o r f i l e numbers 206-07 and 2-06 wi l l be "Daily Journal Fi l es. "
o. Fi l e l abel s. Daily j ournal f i l e s w i l l be l abel ed a s shown a t Appendix 11.
p.
Consolidated da i l y j ournal f i l e s . Bat t al i on-l evel u n i t s usi ng a si ngl e j our nal
f i l e system, and l ar ge s t a f f of f i c e s wi t h sever al subsect i ons, wi l l consol i dat e d a i l y
j ournal f i l e s . Each s t a f f sect i on o r subsect i on should prepare complete dai l y j ournal f i l e s
and submit t he or i gi nal , aut hent i cat ed copi es t o t he of f i ce mai nt ai ni ng t h e uni t o r s t a f f
sect i on j ournal . The da i l y j ournal s wi l l be assembled i n a s e t sequence i n o;-~,.folderX---d
t he support i ng source documents w i l l be at t ached t o t he appropri at e d a i l y journal. In t i e
case of bulky j ournal s, separat e f ol der s f or each day o r week, o r a system of di vi der s may
be used t o f a c i l i t a t e prompt reference.
q.
Speci al requirements. Various t ypes of messages, wr i t t en records of o r a l or-
ders, memoranda on deci si ons o r conferences and s i mi l ar items may be properl y preserved i n
dail;y j ournal f i l e s of more than one uni t / st af f of f i ce. In t he case of such documents as
SITREP'S t h a t must be preserved i n da i l y j ournal f i l e s by t he or i gi nat i ng US Army uni t / st aff
- -
' 3-2. . .-, '!, AW San Fi-ancisco 96375, 11Mar 6 8 , (Cont)
o;. : c ~ ,i-ctcn-icr, hy cr. her t han t he or i gi nat or i snot requi red. However, s i gni f i cant docu-
-i:i..=:;, i n c l u d i n ~CI?7EP1s and F.E3INTREP0s,or i gi nat ed by non-US Army elements should be pre-
zcrved i n t he da i l y j ournal f i l e s of t he r ecei vi ng uni t o r s t a f f of f i ce.
7. DISPXTIONS: CoYmanders w i l l r equi r e frequent i nspect i ons t o i ns ur e t h e adequacy
of da i l y j ournal f i l e s maintained by s t a f f of f i c e s and subordi nat e uni t s . Records manage-
ment of f i c e r s , I G teams, uni t and s t a f f hi s t or i ans , and personnel of mi l i t a r y hi s t or y de-
tachments w i l l coordi nat e t o i nsur e comprehensive i nspect i on coverage and consi st ency i n
t echni cal guidance. The cont ent s of par a 4, above, should be consi dered i n eval uat i ng t h e
subst ance of j our nal f i l e s . Techni cal adequacy should be measured in t e r n s o f compliance
wi t h guidance provided in par a 6, above, and a t Appendices I and 11.
e. USARV Reg 345-200.
f . USARV Reg 870-1.
g. Message, m~c l a s s i f i e d, USARV AVH4G-AH 08760, subj ect : Pr ot ect i on of Records
wi t h Hi st or i cal Value, DTD X)0516Z Jan 67.
FOR THE COF?lfANDER:
ROBERT C. TABER
Bri gadi er General, US Army
Chief of St a f f
9. N. D A M
Colonel, AGC
Adj ut ant General
2 Appendices
I. Sample Dai l y Journal
11. Fi l e Ti t l e s
DISTRIBUTION:
A Pl us
50 AVHCS-MH
3 AVHAG-A
803 AVHAGAP
3 CINCUSARPAC
ATTN: GPOP-MH
6 CILrCUSARPAC
'1USMPAC Hist Unit
1MACV AG M&D Br, Am 96222
Appendix I
19 2 ~ l a s s i f i cat i on USARV Reg No 870-2
DAI LY STAFF JOURNAL OR DUTY OFFICER' SLOG
P A C E N O N O O F P AGE S
( AR 2 0 - 3 4 6 ) 1
1 6
OR GA N I Z A T I ON OR I N S T A L L A T I O N L OC A T I ON
.
.... P E R I OD C OV E R E D
FROM To
( S-3 Section AP VINH PHUOC
H OU R D A T E HOUR D A T E
j 1 s t Bde, 20th Inf Div XS 738781
0001 5 Jan 67 2400
5 Jan 67
I NCI DENTS. MESSAGES. ORDERS. ETC ACTI ON TAKEN
I NI -
NO
--- .
1 lo001 I I ( U) Journal opened.
1 I I I I
2 0015 (s) Tel msg f r MAJ Jackson, S-3 1-53 Inf,
3 ~ , copy t o S2 RLJ
r ec by CPT Jones, A s s t S-3:
a t 042230 Jan
squad ambush s e t by 3/~/1-53 Inf vi c
XS 77517550 engaged e s t 18en i n 3 sampans.
Results: FRD: 2 s l i ght l yWHA; EN: 2 KI A
(BC), 1sampan sunk; 1sampan, 1AK-47 w/two
20-rd map, 1MAS-36, 5 f r ag gren (US), 2
claymore (US), e s t 1l b documents and approx
100 l b r i ce cpt r. One m t r sampan w/est
7 en aboard escaped downstream. Cptr
sampan was recovered near N bank w/ l KI A
aboard. Other K I A found during search
along N bank-. Search term 0105 hrs.
Amush being r es et vi c XS 77997547.
3
0021 I 4 ( U) New l oc of squad ambush (Item 2) r ept DJT RLJ
by CPT Jones t o 3-63 Arty FDC (CPT Lewis,
ASST S-3).
4 0025 5 ( ~ ) CPT Jones rel ayed msg f r S3 1-53 Inf RLJ
(Item 2) by t e l t o MAJ Jordan, A s s t G3
a t DTOC.
25 0639 '(u) ARVN 11t h Regt Opn Summary f or 4 Jan DJF; copies DLG
r ec f r CPT Anh, 11t hRegt LNO, by OP SGT t o Sl+ and S5
(SSG reen).
I
P r ( E V I OU5 E D I T I O N O F T HI S F OR M15 OB S OL E T E .
DA f;ZtrMo21594
Cl a s s i f i c a t i o n USARVReg No 870-2
S-3 Sect i on AP VI NH PHLJOC
P RE V I OUS E D I T I O N O F T HI S F ORM I S OBSOLETE.
A1-2
/
3CI .3
Cl as s i f i cat i on USARV Reg No 870-2
- .- --:-- . , . ,, PAGE NO NO O F P A G E S a.
u.,,- LYAFFJOURNAL OR DUTYOFFICER'S LOG
( A H . ' 20- 33hJ
3 6
. . , . , ~ r . . . ' , . - i r i ~ h'. I I . L . - . L ( I ON IL O C A T I O N I 0 1 1 PERIODC OV E R E D
l
I I
.,-J ,LC t i on AP VINH PWOC
FROM To
HOUR DAT E HOUR DAT E
I l;t 3dc, 20th I nf Div XS 738781
f
0001 5 Jan 67 2400
5 Jan 67
TI I 4l
I
I NCI DENTS MESSAGES ORDERS E T C ACTI ON TAKEN
I NI -
' NO
I N
T I A L S
. 64 LC) SITREP f r 3-37th I nf r e c f r OP SGT M, S2 not i f i e d DLG
rp (ST ~ i l l i a ms ) by SSG Green: no changes
si nce 1100 hours.
4
1 65 1 ~2021
1 ::u: &~ 2 ~ i 1 f
M, DJF, oy to
$LG '
~ J . ' I ~ ; r ec fr LTB & ~ F S2
I I
66 1204
9 ( ~ ) SITREP fr 2-38 I nf dl vr by CPT Rakosi, M, cy t o S2 DLG 1,
I
I 1 1
Bn LNO. Rec by SSG Green.
I
i 67 1221 (U) Bde SITREF c a l l e d t o MSG Jansen (OP DJF DLG
SGT) DTOC, by SSG Green.
I_q-. - - , ( u) 1LT Reimer, Bn LNO, dl vr 3-37th I nf
To MAJ Smith DLG
Af t er Action Report on OP BEACHCOMBE3. Rec
by SSG Green.
( u ) Bde Aft er Action ileport on OP WESTFIELD S3 Fi l e S-12 TDS
si gned by LTC Fr ankl i n, Bde XO. cys t o msg cen
C - - -
f o r d i s t r
1
70
1315 1(U) Proposed MTOE 7-42G appr by COL 53 Fi l e 2-07,
TDS ;
Sant i ni f o r submission to Div HQ. 3 cys t o msg cen
I
'
I
f o r cour i er
i
del i ver y t o Div
I
HQ.
1 I
I . . - C L L
I
i 3 ~ e l mkg t e x t i not given; copy must be pl aced i n DJP.
p-..:
9
.L
i r i t t e n SITRlP not or i gi nat ed by bde; 2-38 I nf must pl ace copy i n DJF, but !
- . T- - -
I,,bde nOi required t o do so.
j LC) ~r g a n ~z a t i d n ~l
j
i planning docment ; f i l e d i n di f f e r e nt permdnent f i l e (2-07)
n pl an f i l e s (2-08).
I
).--
I
1 I I
I
Cl as s i f i cat i on
:T I P 1 L 1 h&Ut AND GRADE OF OF F I CER OR OF F I CI AL ON DUT Y SI GNATURE
t 1
PREVI OUSEDI T I ONO F Tn15 FORMI S OBSOLETE.
A 1-3
- - -
--
Cl es s i f i cat i on USARV Reg No 870-2
.. -- -
1P A G E NO
CAiL:' >-.'..,=.= , L"RSAL OR DUTYOFFICER' SLOG I N O OF I
( A/ < .20-346)
1 4 6
. , t . ~ , * ~ . , : : . ~ , r j r r~ l i * I N s T n L i n l l o h IL O C A T I O N I PERI OD COVERED
- -
. . FROM TO
3-3
-.-
,,<;c 7; 19ri -
AP VINH PHUOC
I HOUR
D A T E
HOUR D l T F
!
1," >cc, 23th Inf Div XS 738781
I 0001
i
/ 5 Jan 67 2400 5 Jan 67 j
; I T EM , TI ME I
I NCI DENTS. MESSKCES. ORDERS E T C
1 NO i
1 3 5 1 .
(C) COL Sa nt i ni hel d conference W/XO,
. S3, 10, 6-13 Arty CO and LNO t o bde, and
CPT Link, USAF ALO. Purpose was di scussi on
1 I '71 1320
--
52,
:-- A -
i:.
of changes i n SOP t o comply with new r u l e s
of engagement f o r a r t y and ai r - del i ver ed
- ..- . . - . -.-
f i r e s . MEi w i l l ser ve a s gui SGce u n t i l
formal SOP change i s publ i shed.
72 1405 1425 ( u ) Bde ORLL f o r per i od ending 31Oct si gned
I.
by COL Sant i ni .
1
I
.-
+-
DELAYED ENTRY - 4 Jan
( u ) CPT Mi l l er of USAWECOM Study Team ( s ee
It em 48, 3 Jan) dl vr 3 cy of team i nspect i on
i
l r e por t on v i s i t t o 2-38 I nf . Report r e c
approx 1820 h r s by CPT Jones.
r - I
1I
!
1
I
1 128 2204 2211 (C) CPT Mahan, Asst S3, 2-38 I nf r epor t ed
1
by t e l t o MAJ Smith t h a t a Hoi Chanh who
! came i n about 1910 h r s t oday s ai d two Main
I
Force bns w i l l a t k A&B/ ~-13 Arty a t mid-
Lnight t oni ght . Hoi Chanh had de t a i l e d
, i n f o ox at k pl ans.
ip,
j
1
1 -
1
,.- - - -.....
! I
I
''unit h i s t o r i c a l document f i l e .
I
! I
Cl a s s i f i c a t i on
i TI C' I D NAME AND GRADE O F OF F I CER OR OF F I CI AL ON DUT Y SI GNATURE
L I
ACTI ON T AKEN
T I A L S
I
MFR i n S3 Fi l e HRF
2-01; cy t o a l l
at t endees
,i
s 3 Fi l e 2-12 DLG
11s-1Fi l e 2-05,
cy t o msg cen
4
i
f o r d i s t r
I
I
1
i
I
i
j
1
DJF: cy t o S3 TDS i
and $&
I '
I
J
DJF 128A; MAJ
Smith n o t i f i e d I i
COL Sa nt i ni and
S2 and s ent an
a l e r t not i ce
t o 6-13th and
DTOC (DJF 1 2 8 ~ )
5
!
$
I
I
I
i
PREVI OUSEDI T I ONO F THI S FORMI S0 8 S OL E T E .
~ 1 - 4
-.
Classification USARV Reg No 870-2
DA: L Y S-iA,? J OURNAL OR DUTY OFFI CER' SLOG
i pA" ;" 1 1 ( A H 220- 3!6/ " O K F ' ^""
/ ..,
1
,. . L. . , : : , h, +. <>$<, ? < , , : A . L A T # < - , ~ . LOCATI ON PERI OD COVERED I
8 .
, ,,- j ~ i o r , :;-;I: AP VINH PKUOC FROM To I
1 / i;L d z u , 26th I n f Div XS '738781
HOUR D A T E HOUR DAT E
I
0001 5 Jan 67 2.400 5 Jan 67
!
I T [ M Tl rrE
I NCI DENTS. MESSAGES, O@DERS. ETC. ACTI ON T AKEN I NI - 1
T l A L S 1
r - - - r - - -- t--.-
., . -.. . .- . . ..-.-- -
acknowledgement of
)- OP NIGH
I
I --+ ?
i
b-
1
Cl assi fi cat i on
1 .
T Y P E D NAME AND GRADE O F OF F I CER OR OF F I CI AL OH DUT Y
1
I I Sl GN& I U R E
I I
PREVI OUS EDI T I ONO F THI S FORMI SOBSOLETE.
DA I::?La2 1594
A1-5
---
Cl a s s i f i c a t i on USARV Reg No 870-2
D A ~ L YS TAF F JOURNAL OR DIJTY OFFICER'S LOG
P AGE NO NO O F PACES
(..H . ) u - j ~ b ) 6 6
t I b ~ < , ~ ~ OH~ 0 1 , ~ I N . , ~ A L A T I O N LOCATI ON
P E R I O D C O V E R E D d ~
1
FROM T0
3-3 Ssct i on AP VI NH PHUOC
HOUR D A T E HOUR D A T E
1
1
i s r Bde, 20t n I nf Div XS 738781
0001 5 Jan 67 2400 5 Jan 67
\
l T t M
TI ME
I NI -
I NCI DENTS MESSAGES ORDERS. ETC ACTI ON TAKEN
TI ALS
N0
IN OUT
--.--- - -
142
(Cont)
2-38 I nf and A/2-13 Cav spent t h e day pr epar i ng f o r t h i s bper at i on.
~ / 2 0
Engr (-)
i s now w/2d Bde and w i l l j oi n t he ot her uni-;s a t 0630
tomorrow.
~ / 2 0 Engr cont i nued base const r uct i on and rotid r e p a i r s
L - ' % 5 Z - i b a s & ~ a m i i d d A ~ B i ~ h .
' I
143
2400
Jour nal cl osed.
-
1 '!'h!3>U\S1). SMITH, MAJ, I nf
I
PREVI OUS EDI T I ON O F THI S FORM I S 0 8 S OL E T E .
A1-6
CG S T SIG BD3 LU2.G BIftli
C% 91'1-111:F IIIW BSAX CAT
Is!cQ
11215 . .
i
i
1
i
I
35#9834
.
a lOlS'? AEX Bill3 CIiU LA1
CG X43D ADM F-92TU5: H0A
CG LT&TI<XtFDfjXCHU LfiI
CU i9SZB IIQ 373 CilU Id?
CCJ S'j9TIi friF BE2 L0i.M Ei'ii
co 5 2 5 ~ ~ ivnCP SGI'J
CG z ; f ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ . g ~ co:;~ ~,~~:.t,; uxi;jt
Co N4iECiL DIV GHU LA1
CG $! , JG"& S ~ F I a;5; C13!,,7)I.Cj:$G OSFpi .. P I
1
!
1 CLE/.J.~>TC,?
i D:SPtlTCtl
I ----.---I
:: .. . .
:1... ,. .
,.Iy2,qy<a. - ,
. -
&-'_.. .
.:
7 : . . . . ;
'
' : ; .:
.I.. I ' -..
., .
I
- . - ,. . .
i
EXHIBIT D-48'
..---
- . . .
i .I
/ it& coursas 02' i, isirucbion ior pc~sor+?elreport i ng into your
I1
t
1 wits ;IL t h e tifie t h a t they receive init.i.21 irrdoioc~lnat~ok aat~roes.
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REFS : A. USARV RE: 35%-1, DATED 1% NOV 6 7 , AS CHANGED.
B. USARV UNCLAS EFT0 MSG AVHJA 8 1 9 3 D DTG 9 3 1 2 5 5 2 NOV 67,
SUBJECT: GENEVA CONVENTIONS.
C. AR 35%- 216, DATED 2 8 SEP 6 7 .
1. I NSPECTI ON TEAMS CONDUCTING ANNUAL GENERAL I NSPECTI ONS, DURING
MAY AND JUNE 1 9 6 8 HAVE NOTED THAT OF THE RECORDS CHECKED, INDICA-
TIONS ARE, THAT APPROXIMATELY 5 0 PERCENT OF THE PERSONNEL HAD NOT
RECEIVED THE ANNUAL GENEVA AND HAGUE CONVENTION TRAI NI NG AS REQUIRED
2 . UNI TS ARE REMINDED THAT AR 35%- 216 REQUIRES THAT THI S INSTRUCT-
TION BE PRESENTED TO EACH MEMBER OF THE COMMAND ANNUALLY AND THAT
SUITABLE ENTRI ES BE MADE I N I NDI VI DUAL PERSONNEL RECORDS FORM
0908532 Sep 68
FM GG USARV LBN RVN
TO CG AMERICAL D N CHU LA1
0710312 SEP 68
FM CG 1ST LOG COMD LBN RVN
TO CG USARV LBN
INFO ZEN/CG USASUPCOM DNG RVN
C 0N F I D E N T I A L 09-045 FROM AVCA GP- P FOR AVHG-PO
SUBJECT: Reorganization of the Americal Division (U)
REFERENCE:
A. Conf MSG 68177 f r om A$&(GD-PO, DTG 5 Sep 68. (NQTA)
B. USARV G-3 DF, AVHGC-FDD, CONF, UNDTD, SUBJECT:
same a s above.
1.
(U)
Reference Alfa requests this headquarters forward plans to assume
logistical and administrative support of corps type units presently being supported
by the Americal Division. This headquarters was represented in the initial presentation
of the reorganization plan to the Americal Division on 21 July 1968. Planning f or
eventualities resulting f r om the reorganization has continued f r om that date and
involved personal coordination between staff sections of the Division, USASUPCOM
a NANG and t hi s HEADQUUWZO' MTTM KVR) CG, USASUPCOM, DA NANG HAS
coordinated directly with CG, America1 Division f or the purpose of adjusting
support agreements required by the division reorganization. Latest information
f r om CG, USASUPCOM Da Nang and absence of comments in reference BRAVQ
indicate that al l requirements will be satisfie. SpecFfically:
Ald ammunition: Capability provided by ODCO (AMMO) DS/GS and OD DET
EOD. Tr ~es eunits will provide support to al l divisional and non-divisiona.1 units.
B. MAINTENANCE: Capability provided by; Maint Co (DS) (DIV), ENGR
DET MAINT, and 6C DET RDR MAINT. These units a r e already providing
direct support maintenance f or al l non-divisional units and normal backup support
to the division.
EXHIBIT M-97
' I U
d k ;
C. POL: Capability provided by portion of QM CO POL SUP and trans-
portation asset s listed in E below. Retail distribution will be provided to
non- divisional and divisional units per mutual support agreement between the
Americal Division and 1ST LOG COMD.
D. Supply and service: Capability provided by; CS CO SUP;: $, class
I plat, fort & cost sup plat, laundry plat, and bakery plat. These units will
provide supply support to all non-divisional units and services to all units in
the area.
E. TRANSPORTATION: Capability provided by TC plat MED TRK (CARGO),
TC plat MED TRK, (POL), and TC plat t erm SVC. These units will provide
transport and airhead terminal service support to non-divisional units and back-up
support to the division permutual support agreement between the Americal Division I
and 1ST LOG COMD.
3.
(C) Administrative support to include personnel service and finance is
provided all non-divisional unit on an ar ea basis and will not be affected by this
,
reorganization.
i
4.
(U) Through personal liaison and daily DS contact, the require-Q
I
ENTF of the Americal Division and CORP type units will be supported to the
maximum extent
HFIAD&UARTERS
I11 Marine Amphibiow Force
MilitaryAesistance Canrmand, V i e w
FPO,SanFrancisco, California 96602
I CCI 5370.1A
17DAP/hrg
13 February 1966
I CORPSCOaRllIKATOR INSTRUCTION5370.18 w
I
C)\ )
From: AreaCoordinator -
To: Distribution Wst
Subj: Respect f or t he l aw, property, i nst i t ut i ons, t r adi t i ons and
custom of t heRepublic of Vietnam
Ref: (a) Uniform Code of Military Just i ce
(b) U. S. Navy Regulations, art.1214 and 1215
(c) FM 27-10, TheLawof Land Warfare (1956)
I
Encl: (1) Copy of NINE RULES f or llaCV ~er s' onnel
1
1.
-.
This I n ~t mc t i o n isdesignei! both toprevent and t o pscribe
cer t ai n conduct which is inimical t o t he accompllshrnent of t he laission
of t heU. 5. Forces i n Vietnam.
2. Cancellation. ICorps Coordinator Instruction 5370.1.
3. Discussion
a.
Enclosure ( l ) , a copy of t he MINE R U E S f or personnel of t he
I
U. S. MilitaryAssistance Co-nd, Vietnam, s t at es inconcise terms
t he standard of conduct required of al l U. S. personnel i n t heRepublic
of Vietnam.
References (a) through (c) contain addi t i onal info r ~a t i o n
pertain;ng t o basic standards of r&.uired conduct.
b.
It isincumbent on each member of t he Vdlitary Assistance
Conmand t o conduct hi-ilself i n a manner which r ef l ect s favorably on
himself and t he Un.ited St at es of America. I n furtherance of t hi s goal,
U. S. personnel must be familiar with, and avoid conduct'which infringes
upon,t he l ocal cwtoms, practices, i nst i t ut i ons and t r adi t i ons of t he
Vietnamese people.
c. The punitive provisions of t he Uniform CoZe of PAlit,ary Just i ce
a r e applicable i nVietnam and must be enforcec!t o protect t he i nt er est s
of both t he Government of t heRepublic of Vietnam and of theUnited
St at es i n order t o est abIi sh andmaintain l a w andorder i n t heRepublic
of Vietnam.
EXHI BI T D-27
ICCI 5370.1A
13-February 1966
d.
The pr oscr i pt i ons enumerated below a r e deri ved from t h e pr i nci pl es
of i nt er nat i onal l a w appl i cabl e t o t he conduct of h ~ s t i l i t i e ~ . The
l i s t i n g isnot exhaust i ve, and references (a) through ( c ) should be
consul t ed f o r f ur t her information. It is t h e pol i cy of t h e United St a t e s
government t h a t U. 2. personnel s h a l l adhere t o t hese pr i r ci pl es . Past
experience has demonstrated t he wisdom of t ha t policy. It is par t i cul ar l y
important f o r personnel t o conform t o t he proper stanAard of condlict as a
means of winning t he t r u s t and confidence of t h e populace which isa .
measure e s s e nt i a l t o t he acconplishnent of our mission i n Vietnaii.
4. Action
a , U. S. personnel wft hi n t he I Corps Area-
(1) Sha l l obey Vietnamese Law, t he orders of l o c a l and nat i onal
pol i ce, t r a f f i c r egul at i ons and shall. operat e vehi cl es i n a prudent and
defensi ve m n e r at a l l tines.
(2) Sh a l l r e s ~ e c t t he cilsto..;s, pr act i ces, i nst i t u. t i ons , t r a di t i ons
s t n ~ c t u r e s , synbols and propert y of t he nopulace of t h e Regublic of Vietnam,,
es?eci al l y, t hose devoted t o siich purposes a s r el i gi on, governnent,
medicine, car e of t he sj.c': and woundeil, art, sci ence, hi s t or y, refugee
ai d, orphanges, education, shr i nes, consecrated pl aces, and gr-lves, tonbs,
pl aces of burial or places-otherwise dedi cat ed t o t k e dead,
( 3) Shal l r espect t he hunan r i ght s , fami l y r i ght s , di gni t y, honor
J
a.ld propert y r i ght s of a l l persons, pa. t . i cul ar l yt hose accorded me c i a 1
consi derat i on mde r i nt er nat i onal l a w, i.e., civilians, nonco7lbatants,
pri soners, det ai nees, t he s i ck, wour.ded, aeed or infirm, cLi l dr envnder
15years of zge, or ~ha ns , women, e x ~e c t a n t mothers and mothers of young
chi l dren,
(4: Sha l l not use t hei r ' yosi t i on, parer or st at c. s, as a TT. 3.
2erson ir. t he Republic of Vjetnam, f o r any pr i vat e gai n and s h a l l not
engage i-n any pr i vat e c ome r c i a l t r ans act i onwithout approval of t h e i r
Bat t al i on, Squadron, conlpira".e o r super i or Conmand!-ng Cf f i cer or
Super-risor, even t'rough such a t r ansact i on otherwise i sa l e g i t i mt e
vcnt ~l r e, and
(5: ~&l l argunents or boi st erous conduct not engage i n dcbat es,
i n pl aces accessi bl e t o t?!e ~ b l i c ; llse dero;:atory, grovo!cing.,or reproachful
words or gest ures toward ot her persons; gi ve money t o beg-:ars or chi l dr en;
ext er ~ l v z t e 7ropert y except a t t he express i nvi t at i on or wi t h t he e x p e s s
>e r ~t . s s i o n of t ke owner or r esi dent ; ent er t he . enclcsed, screened or ot her
7r i vat e ar eas of bu.siness or co-rflercial est e. bl i shnent s (i11cludir.g caf es,
bar s an2 r est uar ant s) ; ent er an? ' J i et na~es e ar ea or bui l di ng except ,as
au.thorized or require(; i n t'?e performance of duty;' at t end
or r e mi n i n t he v i c i n i t y of eat herl ngs of l oc a l ci t i . zenswhich manS f e s t
!r di cat i ons of di sorder, t ensi on, t zrbul ence. or vi ol ence; tamper wi t h
r el i gi ous or nat i onal s p b o l s ; car r yweapons or "sw:tch blade" h i v e s
l C G I 537C. l A
13February 1966
( a s define:lby f eder al l a w) or iterc designed t o be used pr i nci pal l y as
weapons (shortl engt hs of pipe, blackjaclis,brass knlickles,et c) while
off-duty in public places (Danang, China Beach, et c. ) ;leave military
vehi cl es unattended except when @x e d i n a secure U. S . or Gm area.
(6) Personnel vi ol at i ng t hi s general order s ha l l be subj ect t o
puni s h~ent i n accordance wi t h t t e procedures and provisions of t he
Uniforrn Code of : , l i l i t ary Just i ce.
b. ConnandingQf f i cer s and supervi sorypersonnel a t a l l echelons
s ha l l ensure that--- .
(1) Personnel ar e i nst r uct ed on t he provisions of t h i s
order,t he custo78, pract i ces, t r adi t i ons and i ns t i t ut i ons of Vietnaz,
and t he standard of cond:ict required,
(2) Di sci pl i naryact i on istaken, according, t ot he f act s
and appl i cabl e law, i n each case in which an offense may have been
committed, and
( 3) versonnel whose conduct demonstrates a need f o r addi t i onal
j.nstruction ar e provided t ha t i ns t r cct i on durl.ng
.-
off-duty hours GI\
f or such geriod of tirne a s isnecessary t o a t t a i n proper conduct -
9
7.v-
L~xJTRIBUTION:
Case2
Case3
D. 3 , 3!3LTO?J
'~kijor USYC
Force Adj ut ant
ICCI 5370.1 A*. .
13 Febmmy 1966 '
FOR PERSONNEL OF US MI LI TA.
ASSISTANCE COI,FWD, VIETNAM
The Vietnamese have paid a heavy wi ce i n
suffering f or t hei r long fi ght against t he commu-
ni st s. We m i l i t a q r men are i n Vietnam now beeause
t hei r government has asked us t o help its soldiers
and people i n winning t hei r struggle. The V i e t Cong
w i l l attempt t o turn the Vietnamese people against
you.
You can defeat them a t every turn by t he
strength, understanding, and generosity you display
with the people. Here are nine eimple rules:
1. Remember we are guests here: We m&e no
demands and seek no special treatment.
2.
Join with t he people1 Understrind t hei r l i f e, use
phrases from t hei r language and honor. t hei r
custom and l aws .
3. Treat women with politeness and respect.
4.
Make personal friends among the soldiers and
common people.
5.
Always give the Vietnamese the right of way.
6. .Be al er t t o security and ready t o react with
your military skill.
7. Don't at t r act attention by laud, rude or unu-
sual behavior.
8. Avoid separating yourself from the people by
a display of wealth or privilege.
9.
Above all el se you a;'e members of the U. S.
Military Forces on a di ffi cul t miasion, responsi-
ble for a l l your of f i ci al and personal actions.
Reflect honor upon yourself and the United
St at es of America.
HEADQUARTERS
I11 Mari ne Amphibious For ce
Mi l i t a r y As s i s t a nc e Command, Vi et nam
FPO San Fr a nc i s c o 96602
I C C I 5370.1A Ch 1
17/ jnd
2 9 OCT 1969
I CORPS COORDINATOR INSTRUCTION 5370.1A Ch 1 ch 4%
From:
To:
Area Coor di nat or
Di s t r i b u t i o n L i s t
Subj : Respect
d i t i o n s
f o r t h e Law, Pr ope r t y, I n s t i
and Cust oms of t h e Republ i c
t u t i o n s , Tra-
of Vi et nam
1. Pur pose. To d i r e c t a pen change t o t h e b a s i c i n s t r u c t i o n
of 13 Febr uar y 1966.
2. Act i on
a. De l e t e t h e words " f o r l i b e r t y " i n l i n e 8 of
s ubpar agr aph 4 a ( 5 ) .
b. De l e t e t h e words " l i b e r t y o r v i n l i n e 2 of sub-
par agr aph 4b( 3) .
c . De l e t e t h e words "whi l e o n . l i b e r t y l ' i n l i n e s 3
and 4 of s ubpar agr aph 4b( 3) .
L . E . PO
DEPUTY C#MFOF STAFF
DISTRIBUTION:
Case 2
Case 3
From:
Tot
Area Coordinator
Di stri butl on L i s t
Subjr ~ ~ o t / ~ e r i o u s Incident Reports
Ref: ( a) U05740.2
(b) IiACV Directive 335-1
( c) WiCV Directive 335-12
( d) FhIFPac Order 57&Q,9
( 3) Force O r d e ~5700.18
Encl: (1) Format for Spot Incident Report
(2) Format for, Serious Incident Report (SIR)
1. ?urpose. To prescribe pol i cy and procedure for reporting of sig-
ni fi cant information t o the CG, I11 W/I Corps Coordinator.
2. Cancellation. I Corps Coordihator Instruction 5830.1 and Force
Order 3W. l A.
3, B a c k ~ u n d .' Reference6 ( a) , ( b) and ( c ) require immediate reports
t o higher headquarters of any i nci dent that results in death or serious
'
iP;;rUfy t o friendly forces or noncombatants; any i nci dent that my refiect
adversely up~f i ' U, S. Forces and their mission i n Vietnam; arid any
- .---
incident t hat may receive widespread adverse publ i ci ty, Tho req;rire~t%,~ta
t.0 r-rt a i l type& of$erious irlcidente sexvtc many porposssz : I ) it- - -
gemtit6 sound cornand ~uyerrrisiono f a l l related matters, sa that
appropriate ccrrectiv. meao:lres may be taker,. For example, the seure of
/
nfsdirected ordnance should always be de;ermined and co.xTZective act i on
.applied. (2) The appropriateness of existing procedures, oxders, ard
i nstructi ons $re tested by every incidenk, ( 3) Reports may i ndi cate
inadequate ef f0r. l;~t o assist innocent vf ct i ms of caperatianal, or sdrdnf s;
trative m:sbps in every way possible. 'i%eoiu ar' tksse prcjeedures %$ + t o
ensure timely and accurate remrthng t o higher a u t h wi t i e ~la ozcjer t hat .
they may meet ,*heir oblbgatio. 1~t o their super3.o~~ to pe~zce~3.l 9~ c o~x~~a~dor ;
a t a11 levels 'to. f ul f i i l the$r comniasld responslbilfties. The Cooxiand%ng
General, I11 &trine 'Anphibiauc'Force, has Been directed t o report a1i such
irrcidents occ'mrfng within units under hi s oprat i onal Yntrok. I ( :
I 327 EXHIBIT D-12
r
- - -
a s .T,c L ~ ~ U > & T . G ~ C ~ ~e.>c:h-b:, ;at i ; . rl ~L- . ~~ , v , . A L ~ ~ > 33 . . L L ~ : ~ c3LVi s; 31?,
1st Xari ne Aircraft k'ltlc;, Foi cc logrstic Z~l?i,,a:.j, Csrn:~;,;lrig \=fr';cer
,, Js, aria <oumiandsng
Corps Advisory Group/2eputy Seni or Advi sor , 1 Co--
Officers of uni t s under oper at l oaal cont r ol of Iii Xarine kmpnfbious
Force ar e r esponsi bl e f or t he r epor t i ng of a i i i nci dent s requi red t o be
report ed hereunder a r i s i ng out of operat i ons~concl uct edby t h e i r commands,
o r otherwise r el at ed t o personnel and uni t s under t h e i r oper at i onal con-
t r o l , and w i l l t ake such act i on a s is deemed necessary t o implement t hese
i nst r uct i ons. Such act i on will i ncl ude desi gnat i on of a s i ngl e poi nt
of cont act on t h e i r s t a f f s t o whom i nqui r i es can be addressed t o
determine t he s t a t u s of a par t i cul ar i nves t i gat i on o r t o secure such ot her
information as may be necessary.
,
>
b. Commanders of ot her U. S. Armed Forces Commands, I Corps should
provide t he Commanding ~ e n i r a l ,XI I Marine Amphibious Force a copy of t he
r epor t requi red by t he i r r es pect i ve s er vi ce i ns t r uct i ons . I n t h i s
connection a t i mel y wi re o r telephone r epor t t o 111 AAAF Combat Operations
Center (parchment COC) may be i n or der depending on t he seri ousness of the
s i t uat i on. The t el ephone c a l l should be Pollovred by submission of a copy
of the wr i t t en r epor t .
I
c. The Commanding Of f i cer , Headquarters and, Servfce Coopany, '111
Marine Amphibious Force is r esponsi bl e t o r epor t a l l i nci dent s , r equi r ec
t o be report ed hereunder a r i s i ng out of t he oper at i ons of , o r ot herwi se
r el at ed t o, personnel of his command.
5. Remr t abl e I nci dent s
. .
a. Operat i onal i nci dent s . t o be report ed u. t i l i zi ng t he Spot Report
Format (encl osure ( 1) ) i ncl ude, but a r e not l i mi t ed t o t he $allowing:
( 1) I ni t i a t i on and r e s ul t s - of US o r f r i endl y t a c t i c a l operations:+"
( 2) US cgs ual t i es , r egar dl es s of oause.
(3) Downed o r mi ssi ng f r i endl y a i r c r a f t .
( 4 ) ~e:ocation of major f ri endl y combal/combat support w i t s
( ~ t , ~ j a l i ~ or l &r c, or ; . '
..* ( 6) Ter r or i s t at t acks on f r i endl y' l oc a l i t i e s o r person,r)~l.
( 7 ) ; ~ i s c o v e r yof significant arms or supply caches and det ect i on
of i rrfi 1tr'aiion b?e;-azlons.
.
I
F-6
L
(10) Cs?tu-e of seni or anenyof f i cer s or VC cadre.
(11) Sparrowhawk: hunch, r et r i eve andr esul t s.
(12) Other react i on forces: 'Jnen Zzmched, why, r er al t s .
(13) Launch of si gni f i cant h e l i l i f t , completfon of l i ft .
(14) Si gni f i cant visualreconnaissance sightings.
(15)A i r to a i r contact, ground toairAll si ght i ngs.
(16) Motor vehicle convoys departing and.ar r i vi ng in TAORs;
delays.
(17) Change i n s t a t us of mafn LOC.
(18) Changei n a l e r t forces ( uni t s, t i nes) .
( I 9) Company or l ar ger troop lifts.
i
(20) Suspecded o~allegedbordervi ol at i ons pf KVX o r c j n j
tiguous nations.
' I I
i
I
4
(21) %rid8i nci dent s involving pr i soner sof t . , , f or which
i/
t5sif. L. has r esponsi bi l i t y under theGeneva Conventions, i ncl udi ng
death, seriousinjury, riotsand successfal escapes.
(22) Inj ury or deathof iloncornhatants during t a c t i c a l opera- f
t i ons due to U. 5. ordnance.
(23) Incidents, at t acks, c i v i l disturbances andnat ur al
di sast er s whichphysically or psychologically a f f e c t t he people of
Vietnam or the image of t he cent r al goverrment. Gfpr t i cul ar
i nt e r e s t arei nci dent s which 3ave 2 di rect irnpsct cn the~e vol u-
t i o n ~ - ~ :hc. ~ 3 i L i L - rof t;r-e ~ov?rli;-tr-t tc/
/
develo7-ent;p-og~arno r
C 8 - i - j O; l t t:iC -2- .. -'-+Pvy 2-
-
-- , . .
.: '.,..>?.>.-. ?-.-.:----
. . . .
-.3 :
. ; , ' ~ ; . ~ ; s ~ G : , , - - .,. ;;z~;T-~-~;~.i,Z>;"i;i;;-3brS - '-
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FGrCes.&-;c;
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w:-,i+.- -xc&.ase of. , - - - .-,.--.-
u4L e zr;:el- : ~z r ~e l
:'ix;,ed
.
5rAv~~\yer:,
J
.-
m y be reasonably e ~ e c t e 2;aarocze pGz:ic 5.nterss'L end c&:ue con-
ti nuous o r widespread adversepubl i ci t y, willje reported ut i l i zi zg
t he Serious Inciderti, 7 o m t [enclcs!,z;-e (2)j, Th?fcl;owifiz
i l l ust rb: i ~j eofrep-kl>ie '-,tide;-.-;-, -.. irLt:-'. < : A
c.2 -' . ,-.-----.. VL., : bb. .
" -..
(3) Fap? or an asxaillt w i t h i n b n t t o c~mni-Lrcpe or ot her
seri ous sex offenses.
(4) Si gni f i cant damage t o Vietnamese p r o y r t y brought about
by act i ons of Americans.
( 5 ) Burglary, robbery, arson, misappropriation, fraud o r
ext or t i on of major si gni fi cance .'
(6) Ri ot s or ot her di sorders r esul t i ng from an i nci dent
cause? ? ~ yAmericans.
(7) Blackmarketing, snuggling, and currency mnipu.h.tions.
(8) Involvement with rr,ilitary o r c i vi l i a n personnel of a,
forei gn power i n s cri mi nal i nci 6ent of inmediate or pot ent i al l y
serioi~ssi gni fi cance from a pol i t i c a l , m i l i t a r y o r public r el at i ons
standpoint.
. ,
(1) I n i t i a l Spot Reports w i l l be naZe imnediately by w i f e o r
telephone to t he I11 k i n e Amphibious Force Combct Operations Cent er.
(?archmen$, CCC) a t the e a r l i e s t time that the s i gni f i cant facts can
?xdetermined and b7 t he most expeditious means available, subj ect
to secur i t y requirements. Normally, ufi cl assi fi ed reports dl1 be
made telepk~oniczlly.
( 2) I n i t i a l Serious Incif!ent Reports r.my r eq: i r e more det ai l e?
i n f o mt - ion t o he meani ngfi l and t hi s information should be include?
even a t tne cost of some delay i n t he report, I n i t i a l r e2or t s should
be ,made not more t han twenty-four hours from t he tine thi: event was
known to Tnilitar:~aut hor i t i es. Such r e p r t s w i l l bo rnarje by wire
or telephone to tilc I11 Marine AmphibS.~usForce Combnt Operations
Center (parchment COC) .
( 3) Er~t kispot snd scTl ous $r.c.id.er:t i r, t er: l ~! foi:ow-.a-? report s
' A1
---- .r
wi;', '<&n&<e '5-~ J L ' T . ~ o;r ",e'_enh~ne r,o Lfie A-; T."Tl,;2s Lm.r-li'9iGus l-;'orce
C G m b t ~ r ~ i i ~ ~ S ce;2-kras .-ooi-, s s 2f i zo- ~, : +2 ,..,. j,ofi'rsc;xired is ~ ~ 2 i Z ~ h 1 6 ,
. .
but 'r.0 l a- 65~t b r ; 72 3 ~ ~ s ~ f - c e r -,rAe cfic-dent ~ 2 s hlosrr, -b 7Ali*g
"
aut hori t i es.
( 4 ) A t e mi c a l wri t Qn report, to the ComnCing General, 112
I"&irir,ekmphibious Force w i l l be su3mitted ( or i gi nal and two copies)
consol i dat i ng t he i n i t i a l and interim r e ~ r t stogether ~55th.my
addi t i onai i r f or r at i on obt ai md. The f i n+ ,,entry s k a L1 stcite "Xo
c-~:. ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 4 ; ,,%,L~ .: - -w si2bxJit-,eE ~ ~ 1 8 s ~ Lrr~~~:5g.A-~Ati;= 3:- ~ ~ y * e ; ~ ~ x . e ~ I ~
VarrmAZ. :f
L
( 5 ) Ififorras14;ion Service 3e-,:c.rtn.
A co2y o," -ii:3 vrl-twr. re$ort
submitted hereunder i s fomarde? t o the Cornkt Ybf o~s s t i on 'Siwea'c
obviating the necessity'of submitting wxitteq reports required by ,
paragraph 4007 of reference (e) ,unless specif i eal l y requested.
recornen-
5 on
d the
b V) asports of serious i n j q or death of i ndi vi dml Marinas
need not normal l y be reported as serious incidents, since t he d e t a i l s
are reported to higher authority i n the Casualty Report.
DISTRIBUTION:
Case 2
' Case 3; C & D
Case 4; A,G,X,L,?,S,T
&a Excliide Office I Corps (25)
'
I
H. M. ELWOOD
Chief of Staff
I CORPS COORDINATOR INSTRUCTION 5830.1A Ch 1
From: Area Coordinator
To: Di stri buti on Li s t
Subj: Spa&/Serious ~nc i de nt Report
1. P ~ DOS Q.
To di rect a pen change t o the basi c order.
2. Action. Delete present sub ragraph 5. c(6) i n itsent i ret y
and renumber subparagraph 5. c(7 ras 5. c(6).
R. B. NEVILLE
Daplty Chief of Staff
DISTRIBUTION:
Case 2 I
Case 35 A, CyD
,. 'Case 4; AyG,K,L,P,S,T ,
Ar e a Exchange Officer,\ I Corps (25) / I
d
I
Charl i e - Location by Coordinates
Delta - WiXAT, ( ~ 0 , WHEN, WHERE, XOW)
Echo - (RESULT: OR ACTION T ~ N )
~ o t e l - (FRIENDLYMIA)
India- ( E M KIA)( CONFI DED)
J ul i e t - (ENENY KI A) (PROBABLE)
.Kilo - (ENEMY CAPTURED)
Lima - (ENWSUSPECTS)
Mike- (WEAPONSc@TUIU$~)
I
&o~aber- ( EC~UI ~T/ DOCUMENTS)
r w . -
2.
L u ~ eand &ate of inci&e,~:t.
~.
- - . ,
I, -
3. Location of i nci dent . Report We exact locbiicn, usirig idadtifiabla
, landmarks, m i l e s ta the nearest town, city or viliage,
k p grid coor dh-
.stesw i l l be used onl ywhen other means of identifyingthe 3oca%ioaare
i mpract i cabl e, and then only when the mp is c oql e %e l y iqealtffied.
.: 4,. Name, grade, and or gani zat i on of i ndi vi dual rendering report.
,s
5.
b e of person(s) i nvol ved, to i ncl ude vi ct i ms, al l eged of f ender ( s )
and wi t nesses, i ncl udi ng i nformat i on as to their:
a. Grade o r t i t l e .
b. F i r s t came, middle initial, l a s t naoe.
c. Service n-m.ber.
e. Sex and dat e of bi r t h.
I il f
f.
Tf c i v i l i a c , i ndFcat e their s t a t u s , i.EtJ.,DKC, depende;fit, e w. ,
i n pi ace of s e r vi c e number.
'I
1 ,. /
6. A c c n ~ l e t e na r r a t i ve summary of f a c t u a l i nformat i on concerning the
i nci dent .
When i ndi cat ed bechuse of t he nat ur e of t he I nci dent , rt he
extent o f injuries t o personnel a n d e s t i - a t e 6 d o l l a r v ~ l u e of damages
o r l o s s will be i ncl uded.
I
7 .
Z t u t i l z and l ocat i on of p e r s ~ n n e li nvol ved.
. .
9.
Stai;emcnt 1-;t o nctfia], o r an i,-~c.: i:e.?,ec' r eact : on, b;! t he cj.~i:.p3pil-
.. .
l ace,
to ?,he i nci d; : ~: , hn< r,ewc i!,ci:,5 I.eiative t.o -,he il?cide;,.t.
REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ORDER SEC ARMY BYTAG PER
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by authorityofMessage
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COPY O F F CORES
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EXHl B IT D-52
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C o m b ~ dCarQoign Plan I 4
Basic Plan
Copy
,
.f\-,. .'
UL i,r. ..L :3
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rA?3;i>; FFi,Tx,f;;ib -; i-- .:-.:- L ;.;>z
WiiL,>! (3 Ll 2, ;< 1;
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Combined Cmpai gn Plan 1-65
Ref: (a) Maps: Indochi na =d Thai l ar ~d, ,
1:250,000 Sheet s iic2 &6&.,Its L + ~ C >Id2
I. ( S ) SI TUATI ON
b. Friendly Forces
(1) CI J CP AC suppor t s mi l i t - r y oper at i ons i n
4
ICTZ wi t h Navnl and A i r and ground force r es er ve as
requi red.
( 2 ) US Agency f(>rI nt e r na t i ona l Development
( Ij SAID) , J o i n t US public Affai r l s O f f i c e (J i u ~ P h Oj,and
O$fice of the Speci al As s i s t a nt ( OS A) provi de civil
a s s i s t a nc e t o 33JN c i y i l agenci es and t o L ~ / ~ 4 , * i i , , 3 - , .;:-:Y,..~<L~
t he COWS staff.
( 3) F:?ee dor l d i Gi l i t ar y Assistance >oraces
(FW?.&F'f conduct ml l - i t ar g, psycPiolo;.ic~1, %rid c i v i c a c t i m
ope r a Ci ~r ~s k.'J!iAP i ' cr ces o i n coor di nat i on w i t h =-id L S
( 4 ) Naval I i ' o~ces
(a) KAVFOHV, i n coor di nat i on wlth ' J NL , and
..
p r ~ v e n t i ~ ) n
waterbone i n f i l t r a t i o n of' t he RVii (I"arkec 'l'irne Gper at i cns )
GROUP-4
Downgraded at 3 year intervals:
Declassified af t er 12 years.
1 ARW Corps pr ovi des naval for1ces f o r i,f:E: of
andf o r -;he conduct o f r i ver / i r Jand h;aterways ?n*l.s,s
deny the enemy useof inland'waterL O C h a d a dj a c mz
shore ar eas (Gane Warden Oper at i ons) , and i n coorai r~at Lon
wi t h I11 hAFpr ovi des naval cons t r uct i on f or c e s f o r t he
cons t r uct i on, maintenance, and upgredi ng of major r oads ,
MI LCUN pr oj e c t s , anda i r f i e l d s a s r equi r ed,
( b ) 7t21 Fl e e t provi des shoref j r e bonbar-
~ h e nand naval gunf i r e suppo?",f ground f or c e s i n I CTZ
andmai nt ai ns an mphi bi ops f or c e prepared t o conduct
u n i l a t e r a l o r suppor t i ng oper at i ons ashore,
( 5) A i r Forces, 7 t n A F i n coor di nat i on wi t h
VNAF provi des a i r defense f or the IiVK and suppor t s ground
f or c e s i n I CTZa s r equest ed, t' rsouch a i r . l i f t , de t e c t i on
and i nt e r di c t i on of i n f i l t r a t i o n r out es , and c l os e air
support.
c, A t tac' men ts
(1) AFiVN General Su2port units aria Speci ai
Forces (LLDH) r e i nf or c e , support arid s s s i s t I Ali7S;'I Corps.
. . . .
8 . .:
major reinf' o;ncenlerli;~, and ccj;.a,,ana i : i 7 . 1 . , >.;:.. :: i , ; v I;-,
I CTZ.
antes i n t he r!.ajor. ci ' , i as 3,' IS1;'Z.
I5) I - ; v - ~~P' us/ 7. 7 ir. 2 i : . Z -erCalc a-L pr es ent md "1
t h i s campaign pl an,
(4)WA F and ?th AF w i l l con-- ~ I AAL. ~ - - I - GO YiG;~i:t*lL
a i r supremacy over ICTZ.
( 5 ) J GS will cont i nue t o maln-<&in5 e r . s ~ ~ ; Zesa?ve
a t t a c b - ~e n t st o I ARVX Corps of a t l eas t uhree battalions
and t ha t t h i s number may be i ncr eas ed i f r equi r ed.
( 6 ) VC a c t i v i t y i n I CTZ may k c p e a s e o r d e c r e ~ e e
i n accordance wi t h t he rate of i n f i l t r a t i o n frorr, Xor t h
Vietnam.
( 7 ) Republic of Korea f or c e s i n ICTZ, a l t h o ~ g h
not a s i gnat or y t o t h i s plan, will cont i nce Lo coordi n-
a t e and cooper at e wi t h I ARVIg Corps and 111 FAF forci ss
toward. the accornpli shyen t of t he conaxon mi . l i t ar y/ g acif-
i c a t i on mi ssi on and agree t o the pr ovi s i ons of t hi . s plar?.
2, ( s ) MISSIOIG
The mi ssi on of I ARW Corps, I11 &iariF,and . nt ner CW21AF
i s t o def eat t he VC/NVA f or ces and assist the r;Vi< t o
ext end c ont r ol t;brouphout I CTZ.
3 . ( s ) EXZCTLTIC;N
a. Concept. Continde t o e xpl oi t s7Accsssee t hat hsve .
been achieved. &tiring 1967 bot h irLcerr.5 of ~z c i l ' l c s ' i i c n
pr ogr ess and oper at i ons agai ns, t ene:i-jr f ' ; r ces9 Dases, and
i n f i l t r a t i o n r out es. Annex Z (Concept of ' ki>loF, !ent of
undergoing HD, except i n Quang il'ghi : v i ~ e r ~ ?L-."oI~:cc~ -c:r;el-.~.e
( b ) Reinforce t he F;G f'oi-ces y~- , - ; - , - - - ~. - ; , , pu, a;
.. -
l e a s t t hr ee ARVN ba t t a l i ons f o r e a c t pro-;?.r,ce, inacql z-
i on t o t he progra;rn~edi ncr eas es r;cj pr ovl nc g i;egic:.ai &l<
Popular Forces.
( 2 ) Offensi ve and Ant i - I nf i l t r e- : i oa C y e r ~ z l ~ ~ . -
(a) Complete St r ong ~o i n t / Ob s t a c i e Lgs t e ~.i;;re
Ear ker ) from the s ea t o St r ong ?oi nt / Pat r ol ~ a s eA-5, EKiL
on or der ext end t he s ys t en a s f a r westward a s pos s i bl e
toward t he Laot i an border.
( b ) Es t a bl i s h c ont r ol over t nc i n i ' i ; t r a c i ~ r
c or r i dor s i n the a e a s :
-
- "cyrl [ ~ - ~ ~ f l A ~
1, inirestern m d s,>u'i21wec+
;;pi asd
Thua %lien Provi nces,
-
r
Q-dan;-:>:%:., i;4"
,,Lp-, pr . & ',,,.-.,-
2, ~ ~ ; ~ ~ . , s t e r n $-id. . W"U-T.-.
Ngai Provinces.
iC ) ~;-CI'PhSa ;Le'zScTeS zo- y ' e.,J;:p' " 2 / . : v ... v / ; . '
a t ~; z c ; i sh g ~ ; i n ~ t sy; &
. . - . .
pocket and riiortar c i ; : ~ ~ ;;:iLl";c;rg
i n s t a l l a t i o n s o
(d ) Iricrease $he.tempo cf oper aui i n s ~ f ~ e a s i v e
n o ~ t h e r nThua 'i'hien and i n t o t he r Cc ; R ~i'Qumg Ti n b o u ~ d e a
by Thang Sinh, Fiiep Duc, Ha i l Dilc,
Kg
( e ) Fi ai nt ai n sur vei i l >: . : ~ce over anc des t r oy
t he 66ti-1 and. 366t h EVA Rocket i-?e~.:.r:le~~-,s.
b . 7 AKVX Cmps
(1)CG, 1st A A n T ~ i v i s i c n / l i t h>?A i n c c z r di na t i on ,
wi t h appr s ?r i a t e ~TS/ ~: ; L" . ' ~ c~.~l~i::m.rl..-;:s:
( a ) On a p r i o r i t y basis suppmt FiD a c t i v i t i e s
i n t. hose s e l e c t e d and approveci a r e a s I n t he, . ,pr::virAces Z
jzuang Tri and Thua Thi en.
( b) Conduct u n i l a t e r a l , j o i n t , r;c-c: ar d c a i , ~ l
ope r a t i 3ns i n s i d e and o u t s i d e cf Fii3 argas t c l oca2e si i i
L A A L i i a e s t r o g S' C/ NVA main f o r c e s and t h e l r ba; sca t:?-'-,"- ?is:.:.~,Tec
a r e a c
( c ) (jn sf't r, i s ~ l r ) S ~ ~ ; , i 3 , ; ' . ~ , ~ or de r ~,>;ii;:;;c';
,- -,.
in,t he 7 ~ 5 ~ of the I;';'::
; j > L i : ; &~ y L;: .;,;.:z;<;
.., , epu t i , ; ns in?.t:; '
T',,. Zonr . ud Spe c i a l
b L b c I.dzT:,
, .
zc bzryle?
s u r v e i l l a n c e and I r , t e r di c t l z r ? d c n g ' - - . -
>. .' . .. . . ,
especLt t l l y i nf l i t r a t lor, r : j dt es in t ~ oar.!,.r - .- . .
, .
...
.
.. . . ...d..
. .
thoA Shau arid A Luoi val l eys and t1:;i; .Lrrr. :;o;<~- .:L:,*C:L~~ -
( f ) Conduct r.csdurces deni al G 2 c r : ~ t l \ ~ : i ,co
a s s i s t s e c t or s i n t he pr ot ect i on of crops a d Z o c ~ s t u f f s
and t o deny them t o t he eneniy i n accoraar.cs w l t i i Arnex 2
(Resources Deni al ) .
( g ) Conduct oper at i ons t o open, keep ol.en,
and secur e LGCs which most e f f e c t mi l i t a r y, economic ar.d
p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y i n accordance wi t h m- e x 3 ( Pe s t or a t i on
andPr ot ect i on of LOCs) ,
(h)Conduct an a c t i ve campaign ~f p s y c n ~l o g i c a l
oper at i ons and c i v i c a c t i on aimed e s pe c i a l l y a t eneniy
cadre andpopul at i on remai ni ng i n a r e a s under enemy 5n-
f l uence i n or der t o i ncr eas e t he nw-ber of i ' c l Shm in
accordance wi t h Annex C ( k i l i t a r y Support of ~3anc:i Annex
B ( Ps yc hol o~$c a l Operat i ons).
( i ) Conduct a c t i ve i nt e l l i ge a c e and codnt er-
i nt e l l i ge nc e campaigns i n accordance wit'n Annex A ( I n t e l -
l i gence) and Appendix 2 ( At t ack of t he V'J 1nf r t ~s t r ; i c t ur e )
t o Annex C ( Mi l i t a r y Support of h 3 j .
( j ) Exer~cj se operat i oi l ai cont l . 01 Gver the
a c t i v i t i e s of CI DG camps through t h e 3-Le~ackcient,Bue,
when es t abl i s hed, anda s s i s t C-l Fieadr,uarters, LLDS, and
t he 3-Detachment t o open new C I l X i mp s i n acccrdance wi t h
.4.nnex F (Em~loyrnentof ~19';). Fri . or t o e s t a bl i skinlent of
L
3-Detnckirnen t, Hue, cot r di na t e operat : onnl c ~n 4 ; r c ~l i;'
CIDG c mp s through C-1 Headquarters, LLDB.
( 2 ) CG, 2nd ARVN Di vi s i on/ l 2t h DTA i n coor di nat i on
wi t h appr opr i at e Us/FWl\iAF commanders:
( a ) On a p r i o r i t y b a s i s support 3D a c t i v i t i e s
i n tilose s e l e c t e d and approved a r e a s i n t he $rl,v-inces of
Quang in and Quang Ngai
( b ) Conduct u n i l a t e r a l , j oi nt , and corrhined
oper at i ons i ns i de and out s i de of RD a r e a s t o i oc a t e and
des t r oy VC/NVA main r or ces and t h e i r bas es wi t hi n
assi gned area.
( c ) On or der of t h i s headquar t er s, conduct
oper at i ons i n t he v i c i n i t y of t he DTA boundary wi t h Quang
Da Speci al Zone.
( d ) Defend c i t i e s and oper at i onal and l o g i s t -
i eal bas es i n assi gned ar ea i n accordance w i t t i Annex i3
(Concept of Zmployment of h i l i t a r y For ces ) .
( e ) Zxer ci s e cperat i o: . al c ~ c l t r o i:,ver t ne
a c t i v i t i e s of CIDG camps t hrough 3-Detachrcent, Z s n g Ngai,
when es t abl i s hed, i n or der t o es t abl i s h m d r; i al r, ~ai n
c ont r ol o L Wi l t r a t i c n r out es cr os s l ng -:he La v tiari
bor der , and especially t hose rsl zt es f x t c i2;mg Yln rrox
- - -.-
Quang Ifam, and ass: s t C - l ?eada--' -- uL- = L-J~ d l ? ~t he - - - n ,, 5-
De~achment t o move and q e n CI DG c ~ z i ? si~ accar cance
-.
wi t h Annex F (Employment of CI UG) . i'rj.3~t o e s t a bl i s h-
t:.ickm,;ient,. Qumg N a f i ,
. - .
2 ; ! c . ; ; ~ : :-,-;ri:i,- ~; ; snt0;' , fi -5~ c;.--o.-- L.L:;&-;s
- 1
c o n t r o l of' CIDG cai ~pst hr ough C-l Hoc<<2unr t sr s, LLDB.
( f ) C.3nduct r cs aur cos c o n i d ope r a t i onu t o
assi st s e c t or g i n the p r o t e c t i o n of c r ops m d f3cLstclfi's
and t o deny them t o t h e enemy i n accor dance with Annex C
( Re s our c e s De ni a l ) .
( g ) Conduct ope r a t i ons t o open, keep cpen, and.
s e c ur e LOCs which rn81st e f f e c t mi l i t a r y , economic, and
p o l i t j c a l a c t i v i t y i n accor dance wi t h Annex 5 j Ee s t o r a t i o n
and Pr o t e c t i o n of LOCs).
( n ) Conduct rn a c t i v e cm.saign of g s y c t o l o ~ i c h ;
ope r a t i ons and c i v i c a c t i o n aimed e s p e c i a l l y a t enezy
cacire and popul a t i on r emai n? ng i n a r e a s clndcr eiiemy' i n-
f l ue nc e i n or de r t o i n c r e a s e t h e n wb e r of Eoi Cnan i n
a c c o r a k c e wi t h Annex C ( I ~ i l i t a r gSuppor t of ED) ar,d
Annex H ( i s - j c hol a gi c a l Ci pcr at i cns) .
(i) ConCuct a c t i v e i n t e l l i g e n c e wid c o i t ~ t e r -
i n t e l l i g e n c e canipaigns i n a. cccrdance with Annex A
( I n t e l l ! gence) and Appendix 2 ( At t i ~ c kcf t he ',JC I n f ~ a -
s t r u c t u r e ) t o Annex C ( T- . i l l t ar y 5Lqpor t cf ?IS).
( 3) C~r, yi, mder, ,;LL=:[:-~&
..
i ; peci al :'z?;e coordina-
I r. rbLz? tionw i t h approgjy ia t e ';~/:,':.r ' ' '-' CGiCi;2;T;ilk I'S:
, . .
;;-Jb: ~; l s .
- -
( a ) in a ? y l ; - ~ r ; ~ ; c . . ~ ~ , r . ; - lid a c ~ i v i t i e s
ifi t hos e s e l e c t e d and ap>n.;vei!
, -
,<s.z_c~? areas 1~~ u &mFr uvi nce.
. . .
( b) Conduct :;niiat,:;r.al, <,;r.-c, and commc?'.ned
o ? e r s t l o n s ifisice a a t s i d e of 3:s arc;^^ LC; L:,!::::,,:,, k. : ; ;
aesl;ro;; :JC/ NV:, :hair -iA-r; & ~ ~ ~ . , - ~ s . ~ ma i r , f o r c e s i ~ ~ i>&s$s w;*'..
L .
a r ea.
( c ) On o ~ d e rof t h i s he a dqua r t e r s , ccnduct
ope r a t i ons i n t he vicinity of the boundaries with 11th
DTA and: 1 2 t h DTA.
(d) Defend c i t i e s and ope Ta t i 9na l and l og-
i s t i c a l b a s e s i n a s s i gne d a r e a i n. accordarice w i t k Annex
B ( Concept of 3mployn;ent of > - i l i t a r y For c e s ) .
( e ) Exe r c i s e ope- a t i 2nd c o n t r o l over zhe
a c t i v i t i e s of C I I j G carl-ips i n c oor di na t i 2n wi t h C I , Eead-
q u a r t e r s , LLDB i n or de r t o e s t a b l i s:-Land rr. aintain con-
t r o l of i n f il t r a t i m r o u t e s cr ossi f i g t he La ot i a n bor de r ,
and assi st C - 1 Ee a dqua r t e r s , LLDB t o rmve and cpen C I DG
carfips i n accor dance wit, Annex F ( 3 1 ~ g l o . ~ ~ ~ e n t :f CT L G) .
( f ) Conduct r e s our c e s deni al oper at i Lons t-
as: i s t s e c t o r s i n tile pr ot e c tioc of c r o l ~ sana fc~dstuffs
and t o deny t hen t o t ne eneiily I n ac - or danf e WL th *Annex 3
( Res our ces ~ e n i a l . ) .
( ) Conduct o p e r a t i ons tc open, keep q e n ,
and s e c ur e LGCs whicl? nust erc'i'ect t f . i l i t a r y , econo;:iic s a d.
p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y . i n a, . ccr d; ul ce w ;i;h Annex 3 j i . ez. l . or at i on
and Pr o t e c t i o n of LGCs ).
( h ) Conduct an a . c t ' l i e ca:.-:at: r, of psyc' r:oiogical
ope r a t i ons and c i v i c a c t l c r , s i r e d cxp. ; ci al l ; . a t ener,:y
cadr e and popul at i on remaining i n &regs masr er~6rr.yit-
f l uence i n or de r t o i ncr eas e t he number of li.39 Ohan i n
accordance wi t h Annex C (Pi i l i t aPy Support of RD) and Ansiex
H ( Psychol ogi cal Oper at i ons) .
( 1) Conduct a c t i ve i nt e l l i ge nc e and count er-
i nt e l l i ge nc e campai gn~ i n accordance wi t h Annex A
( I nt e l l i ge nc e ) and Appendix 2 ( At t ack of t he VC I nf r a -
s t r uc t ur e ) t o Annex C ( Mi l i t a r y Support of ED).
( 4) 10t h Gngi neer Group i n addf t i on t o ni s s i c ns
a s a i s f t d by t he Engfneer Di r ect or at e and i n ccor di nat i on
wi t h MIAS, Speci al Zone Quang-Da, Sect or s , Speci al Sect or
Da Nang and US/FIElPIAF engi neer u n i t s i n I CTZ:
( a ) On a p r i o r i t y ba s i s cons t r uct t he St r ong
Boi nt / Obst acl e System.
( b) I mp r ~v e t he ef f ect i venes s of t he aut poat
system wi t hi n I CTZ. Pr epar e pl ans f o r Cal endar Yebr
1968 f o r cons t r uct i on of a rninin;um of 257 of wei i s e l e c t e d
new out pos t s and r e p a i r a minilxun of 50); o r t he e xi s t i ng
out p: ~at s i de nt i f i e d by t he NACV/ JGS Combined Outpc:st B t udy
Group, and accomplish a t least hal f of "LAorequi red. c o ~ s t -
r uc t i on and r e p a i r s by 30 UTune i96ke
( c ) Ilrlprove and restrJro those =7,&inLLCS which
n ~ s t ef f ecz t he mi l i t a r y, econcrnic, and p d l i t i c a i activi-
t i e s of I CTZ i n accordance w i t h AnrAexZ ( S e s t o r a ' i i ~ nand
Yr at ect i on of LOCs!.
( d ) Provi de a c t i ve englr,t?a;> us s i s t a i c e and
r ei nf or cement f o r RD oper at i cns .
( e ) Be prepared, on or der , t o evacuat e t he
popul at i cn from t hr eat ened a r e a s of :he f l c o d pl ai n.
( 5) Conpany I, LLDB i n coor di nat i on w i t h WAS,
s pe c i a l Zone buang-Da, Sect or s , S?eci al Sect or 3a iLTarrg,
US Speci al 3'orces, and US/?idNAF and i n accordhnce wi t h
Annex I" (~m;;loyment of CI DG) :
( a ) Di r ect and cont r ol CI DG camps wi t hi n I CTZ
t o as s i st i n e s t a bl i s hi ng a system "of bor dsr s ur ve i l 1 ance
and i n ext endi ng GVN cont r ol t hroughout ' I CTZ.
( b ) Pr epar e and execut e mut ual l y suppor t i ng
pl ans and oper at i ons wi t h appr opr i at e f r i e ndl y f or c e s
comnlanders f o r t he t i mel y de t e c t i on and p1-eventicn of i n-
f i l t r a t i o n e s pe c i a l l y i n t he a r e a r :;f :;iie Sann, t he A .
S h a u / ~ Luci val l eys , and t he wes t em a r e a s of quang Ti n,
Quang ? J a n ; , and Gluang N ~ a i .
( c ) Conduct ailibushes, r9:cis arli 13tner ~ z n i i a t e -
r d and j c i n t operaticjns t o tjestraoy or neut , -. ai i ze e!.:cl:1y
f or ces , bases and caches i n accordance wi t h Appendix 2'
( Neut r al i zat i on of VC/I<VA Base Areas) t o Arinex B (Concept .
of Emploplent of I . , i l i t ar y Forces).
( d ) I ncr eas e r e c onna i s s a ~c e oper at i ons i n ~ r a e r
t o c o l l e c t t a c t i c a l and s t r a t e g i c i nt e l l i ge nc e .
-
2 . Cl csi ng, openi ng, tiid moving CI2G c m~ p s
i n accor dance with the p l a n f o r 1966 r e f l e c t e d i n Arfiex F
(Employment of CI DG) .
2. Lo g i s t i c supp ; rt f o r CI DG can12s.
( 6 ) 1st Coa s t a l Di s t r i c t i n adci t i or i t o tasks
d i r e c t e d by Cornlander, ViqN .and i n c o o r a i n a t i f ~ nwith a;;p-
o p r i a t e lCAVFl2RV el ement s:
( a ) Defend t h e n a t i o n a l c o a s t a l area, Da Xang
ha r bor , and t he of f - s hor e i s l a n d s and pr ovi de l o g i s t i c
s uppor t f o r Hoang Sa I s l a nds .
( b ) Car r y o u t pl a ns f(. ~r bl ockade of c o a s t a l
a r e a s and on i nl a nd wat erways of I CTZ.
( c ) Conduct r i v e r oper at i ci i s , e s p e c i a l l y on
Bo Dien Fi ve r , Tan ~ a n iRi ver , Cau Fa'i Bay, Thu Bon h i v e r
( f r om Cua Dai Ri ve r rricuth t o An Hoa), Trucjng Gi ang Ri ver ,
and Tr a %hut Bi ver .
( d j Gr zani ze and c o n i ~u c t f..arke t Time ope r a t i ons
a l ong t he c o a s t a l a r e a s of' I Cl ' Z.
( e ) Fr ovi de na va l ,cunfire~~~~~~~~t f ~ r oper a-
t i o n g ashor e.
' (f) Grnr7mi z. earid cind' ilct na va l es c: : r t and
s e a r c h and rlescue ope r a t i ons .
(g) Conduct psychol ogi c& o p e r a ~i o n sand
c i v i c action i n accrrdancs w i t h Ancax C ( Xi l i t a r y Support
of RD) and Annex f I , Psychol ogi cal Operat i ons).
( 7 f Ust Ta c t i c a l Wing i n addi t i on t o mi ssi ons
assigrled by ComRnder, VNAF and i n coor di nat i on w i t h 7 th
AF:
( a) P:-ovide a i r def ense and mai nt ai n ai r sup-
remacy over I CTZ.
(b) .Frovide cl os e a i r support f or e pound and
waterborne oper cions.
( c ) Provi de a i r t r a ns por t f o r t r oop- l i f t , nat -
e r i a l s , and medical evacuat i on.
( d ) Frovi de a i r reconnai ssance and obser vat i on.
( e) Conduct p s y c h o l ~ ~ ~ i c a l oper at i ons and civic
act i on a c t i v i t i e s .
(f) r h or der conduct ai r s t r i k e s t o des t r oy
enemy f or c e s and bas es and ti) har ass an6 i n t e r d i c t t he
enemy l o g i s t i c a l sgste11i i n I CTZ.
( g ) Conduct a i r - s e a rescue oper at i ons i n I C Y .
j b ) 1st kanger Group.
( a ) Zorps r es er ve,
(b) ae prepared t o condzct o p wa t i c n s on or der s
of t hi s Headquarters:
'I
t r oy t he Vc/ Ni rX i ns i de and out s i de of F.2 a r e s s
-
2. Recomaissance i n Co x - c ~t o c o l l e c t
stratagl c and t a c t i c a l i n t e l l igencs.
( 9 ) Sect o2s and Speci al Sect or s
( a ) Conduct operat i ons t o dest roy VC and t o
cl ear and secure t he sel ect ed and approved ar eas for RD
inaccordance with 1968 Sect or HD Plans.
( b ) Assure continued secur i t y i n previ ousl y
cl ear ed and paci f i ed areas from which RD Tearns have de-
par t ed t o prevent r et ur n of t he VC.
( c ) Provide secur i t y and assi st ance f o r NP and
ot her agenci es i n t he uncovering and dest r uct i on of VC.
i nf r as t r uct ur e.
( d) Prcvide s ecur i t y al ong LOC i n t he province.
( e ) Carry out the Resources Denial Plan i n
accordance wi t h Annex D ( Resources Deni al ).
( f ) Plan and conduct crop pr ot ect i on operat i ons
...
f o r t he Spri ng and Fal l harvest s.
(g) Carry out pl ans f o r blockade of coas t al
ar eas and i nl and waterways of t he sect or .
(h)Prepare and execute s ecur i t y pl ans f o r
defense of c i t i e s , province mi l i t a r y i ns t al l at i onh, and
l o g i s t i c s and st orage f a c i l i t i e s i n accordance with Annex
B ( Concept of Emplo~pen t of Mi l i t ar y Forces).
(i) As s i s t province and district aut hor i t i es ,
i f they are non-military, i n organizing, equipping and
kL . - L
-
IAL
352
6
t r ai ni ng popul ar $ e l f - ~ e f ense Forces f o r hrunlet and viliclge
secur i t y.
( 3 ) Accelerate r ecmi t i ng and f : ; mat i on of
s
' ,,
RF/PF uni t s.
( k ) coordi nat e wi t h appropri at e agenci es fop
. t he conduct of psychological operat i ons and ci vi c act i on
a c t i v i t i e s aimed especi al l y a t enemy cadre and pspul at i on
remaining under enemy i nfl uence i n order t o i ncr ease t he
number of Hoi Chan i n accord&me w i t h Annex '; (Ii l i l i t ary
Support of Paci f i cat i on) and Annex H (Psychological Opera-
t i ons ).
(1)I n coordi nat i cn kith DTA, II'I FLAF/F~+IAP
aad COF,DS a s appropri at e, prepare i n d e t a i l 1966 Sect or
ED Pl ans i n accordance with Annex C ( Pi i l i t ar ySuppcrt of
RD).
(m) Conduct v i ~o r o u s i nt el l i gence and counter-
i nt el l i gence a c t i v i t i e s i n accordance with mnex 11 ( I n t e l l -
i gence).
( n ) G~ith t he assistance or 1 cal i J 5AI i : a;:encies
prepare pl ans f o r r e s e t tlelllunt supp2l.t and c. . nt ~ c l, ~ fmti-
I
comr~lunist refugees i n accordanze w i t n Annex C ( i.,iiit u y
Sup?o r t of F,D)
( 0 ) 'Continae t o carry oi ; t brle Coxbiriea A c tion ' I r -
Plan between PF and US Forces.
c . I I T >;AF' and ot he r Fidfl;AF
i1) CGB, 1st 14ar Di v j 3rd FIW Di v , 'LUIG Ar-oric::'l
Di v, i n caor di nat i on with dppr opr i at e tii2VS col:ur.andcrs, anb
i n addi t i on t o ' tho80 tasks assi gned i n c ur r e nt LOI S and i n
ot he r competent di r e c t i ves :
( a ) In assi gned AOs defend I KG bor der a r c s s
a l o n ~t he ij1.Z ( Cye P-arker p r o j e c t ) and a l mg t he border
I
wi t h Laos.
( b ) Conduct sus-Leined, coor di nat ed, coebi nea,
ground and a i r oper r t i ons t o de s t r c y t he vC/I:\IA r:.ain and
g u e r r i l l a f or c e s and ne ut r a l i z e bases ?ad su-pply d i s t r i b -
ut i on poi nt s wi t hi n t he ar ea desi gnat ed f a r p r i o r i t y of
r t , i l i t ar y of f ehs i ve opera.f;i ; ns, on a n r i o r i t y ba s t s , and
a ga i ns t ener);y f or c e s l oc a t e d out s i de tile p r i c ~ r i t , a r e a
based on hard inte1li:;ence. : t e ~t r n l i z a i : i on of' bas2 a1.es.s
w i l l 'be $n accordance wi t h Appendix 3 ( i J e ~l t r a l i z a t i , - nof
Enemy Dase :,reas) t o Annex B (Concept of :Lm:?lop.ent of'
Pil1itar-y For ces ) .
( c ) 1.iaintain ac t i vg a i l s t i ~~e 4113nc e and ~ , r o ~ i n a
of the b o ~ d c r of t he F Vir wit'n i n AOs ancl known l and anc
s ea i n f i l t r a t i . o n r o ~ l t e s i n t , . t h e ;;VX.
( d ) lriaintain an a c t i ve ~econnai ss; . . n, ce p r o p a x ,
p a r t i c u l a r l y lon;; r anr e pa t r ol s t o l ~ c a t eYL'/J/:~!;,!;, ], ; &i n
f or c e s , t hei r base aroas , and s u p ~ i i e s ycsi t i ' ?cl y
l ocat ed.
( e ) Maintain Li.aPson wi t h adj acent I11 1~2/liWKA?
Commanders f or "he purpoae of coordi nat i ng operst i onv i n
t he vi ci ni t y of pol i t i cal / mi l i tsry boundaries.
( f ) Provide Combat support 02 I ARVN Corps
f or ces a s r equi r ed and as avai l abl e.
(g) Assist I ARmf Corps t o provide secur i t y, a s
requi red and avai l abl e, f o r t hose speci al s ecur i t y ar eas
l ocat ed i n est abl i shed ?'AOFss and assi gned AOs i n accordance
wi t h Appendix 2 (Areas 1 equi r i ns Speci al Secur i t y) to
Annex U ( C~nc e pt of Smployment of I ?i l i t ar y Forces).
( h ) Coordinate wi t k and provide support a s
r equi r ed t o CICr. camps wi t hi n a s s i p e d AOs or a s otherwise
assi zned,
( i ) I n csor di nat i on with NAVF'CjRV Conetruc t i on
Eleriients, a s s i s t CS, I AbWJ Corps t o open, keep open, and
sechre l i n e s of cormuhnications i n accordance wi t h Annex
E ( Rest or at i on and Prot ect 5. m of LOCs).
( j ) Support paci f i cat i on a c t i v i t i e s a s approp-
r i a t e i n est abl i shed T .CI,s and assigned AOs i n accordance
with Annex C ( I i ~i l i t a r y Support of ED) and as follows.:
'1. - As s i s t ' R V ~ ~ A F i n providing t e. r r ?t or i al
secur i t y i n paci f i cat i on areas i n accordance with Annex C
( Mi l i t . l r y Su p p o ~t of
-
2. Assi st a n d o r r e i n f o r c e I AiiVN Cor ps
f or ces and National Pol i ce a s r e wi r e d Go i dent i f y and
cl i rni nat e t he V C i nf r as t r ucFur e in accordance w i ~ r ;A:ger?uix
2 ( ht t a c k on the VL I nf r a s t r uc t ur e ) t o Annex C \ i l i i i t ~ r y
Support of hL) t o i ncl ude as s i s t ance, scppor t and pa r t i c -
i pa t i on iic i v i l / n i l i t a r y i n t e l l i ge nc s c ol l e c t i on and
di ssemi nat i on.
..-
3. Assi st I AF'dR Corps f or c e s i n t he conduct
of o p e r a t i ms L J pr ot e c t and c ont r ol popul zt i on and
r es our ces , t c ceny t he enelny f r e e us e of l and and wat er
LGCs and t a di s r upt VCt a x c ol l e c t i on ef i ' or t s i n accord-
ance w i t h Annex D (Resources Deni al ) .
4. Conduct mi l i t my c i v i c a c t i m i n support
of paci f i c a t i m goal s , i n coor di nat i on wi t h provi nce ri nd
.' .
d i s t r i c t o f f i c i a l s and i n a c c or da ~~c e w i t . : Appendix 3 '
( Ci vi c AC t i o n ) t o Annex C (; ilit a r y sup^ r t of HD).
'
5.S o n d ~ c t r ef hgee c ont r ol messures :n
accoraance w i t h Appendix 4( Refugee Su.pport) t o Annex
C ( I t i l i t a r y bupport cf 3U).
-
6. Advise, a s s i s t , and supgor t t he Ch j eu hoi
prczrgfi i n accordance w i t h kpperldix 5 ( <i i i eu i - oi ) t o Annex
C (~. . i l I l l . , ). i t u . r y ,;uppar tiif
( k ) ;,r#..:vide f o r pronip t , t l - i cl r ' o~~ and ef f ec t- cck:,
i ve screenin:.: anb a j s pos i t i on of ci vi l i ai i de-laineeo i n
. . -
qccordance wi t h A;:po,ndix 6( C i vl l i &r ; .:,t -,n;?iees; tudncex
k ( I n t e l l i ~ e n c e ) ..
( 1) Conduct p s y c h o l o ~~i c a l i n o?er at i ons
' accor dmc~?w:i t' r, Annex E (Psych~1o: ; ics.1 ,;:>+;YE-.. r.:).
( P I ) Conduct ot he r o n ~ r , : ~ il>r.sz s
> .
c t e L ~' ; r s
SG, I171.dF.
( 2 ) CG, 1st1\AW i n c o o r d i n a t i ~ n wi t h appr opr i at e
AHVX an6 :','I;lil~Fcomander s, and i n add: t i on t o tilose t as ks
a s s i g e d i n c ur r e nt LOI t s and yt her compe.tent di r e c t i ve s :
(a ) Provi de a i r s ur vei l l ance and i n ~ e r d i c t i c n
t o de t e c t and t o de t e r i.jV.4 i n f i l t r : . . t i u n over the Laos
bor der and ti;r t he K-Z i nt o I C1 Z.
(b ) Provide t a c t i c a l andl o g i s t i c a i r l i f t as
request ed.
( c ) conduct c l os e a i r suppor t a s request ed.
(d) Conuuct a cont i nuous ha r r a s s i ~g and des3truct-
t i ve a i r of f ens i ve a ga i ns t enemy f or c e s , bases, 1 o ~; i s t i c s
s ys t exs and LGC.
( e ) Provi de ot he r suppor t as r equi r ed.
( 3) CG 2nd I-OUiC E r i ~ a d e i n coor di nat i on w i tl-1
appr opr i at e AR'Ji; and 11: L,AF cormanders, 2nd i n a ddi t i on
t o ~ k o s e t a s ks el sewhere a ~ r e e d upon and f oma l i z e d, i s
r equest ed t o accor : ~pl i sht he f -1lowin;: t as ks :
(a ) Conu~c t ope? t i o n s to su,)yort hievolution-
ar y Developmeilt i n assi gned ar eas ,
(b)Dest roy .JC rrlain and l ~ c a i -fort% , +ni t s i n
cssi gned ar ea.
~ ( b ]Assist and reinf. ;rce I AI.-ViU Corps i n
p r o t e c t and c ont r ol n a t i o n a l r es ocr cuu, and t o eot t t i >l i si l
I
an a c t i v e p r o g r m t o di axu?t VC tvx c o l l e c t i o n e f f o r t s .
( d) Conduct ps ych. - l ogi cal oper a : i o n s and
c i v i c a c t i ~ : n s wi t h i n a s s i gne d TACE.
( 4) CG, .!?LC pr ovi de s uppor t as r e qui r e d.
( 5) 1st IiF 3n pr ovi de s uppor t as r e qui r e d.
( 6 ) 3 r d 3n pr ovi de s uppor t a s r equi r ed.
( 7) 7 t h Enrr Bn pr ovi de s uppor t a s r e qui r e d.
( b ) 9t h L3gr 3n pr ovi de s uppor t as r e qui r e d.
( 9 ) 1 1 t h Engr 3n pr ovi de s uppor t a s r equi r ed.
( 10) 244th Psy Gps Co, USA
( a) Pr ovi de equipment and t e c h n i c a l s u7por t
a s r e q u i r e d f o r t h e canduc t of ps yc hol ogi c a l c ~ o r a t i o n s
i n I CTZ.
( b ) conduct s p e c i a l psy opns wi t hi n I CY1/ , as
d i r e c t e d by CG I11 P.AP.
(11)29t h Ci v i l Af f a i r s So pr ovi de su;:port f o r
c i v i l affairs a c t i v i t i e s a s r e qui r e d wi t hi n I CTZ.
d. Ccor di nat i n: I r , s t ~ i ~ c ' c i ~ ~ ~
( 1) ~ o a l s .
Yhe f!-,llowin;: z oa i s ar e e s tublisned
t o be u t i l i z e d as a 1ce:jsur.e oi' pro; ; ress I n t he accor ~p-
l i s hment or' t he o b j e c t i v e s st , at ed in L3;riex I? ( Co ~ c e p t ) .
Piore d e t a i l e d t r - , anGent o: w i l l l ri di v i d ~ h l -6~11~ be
found i n tne appropriate annexee. h a l s , a s l i s t e d b c l o s ~
-
1.Render i nef f ect i . ve a l l er.el:.g it.ain and
i j c a l f ' ~ r c ec4r,its. See Annex jf' h~+lc;~:.:ent ( C ~ r ~ c e i ~ t
i;f L i l i t a r y For ces) .
-
2. I n f l i c t losseson t he VC,/I<T/A f ' cr ces a t
a r a t e y r e a t e r t han t he enerny can r egl ace. See d n i i e ~ 5
(C,;nceyt S &liplapr;ent of lblilitculy i"orces)
-
3. Neuti a l . ze L-J e;:d 2Y 146, j LG.;~ if t?;e
4
i d e n t i f i e d sne;fiy bas e a r e a s i n hni i n acc.::.uance w i t i - ~
the enemy I , se ar eas , i r1si ; al l at i uns aiid c1oi ; cs in.Iid1.i . a. t
t he earliesth, r act i cal - l e dat e. r r 5c . r - i t 7 oT ..f~ ' o , r t iii~~st,
be d'irectei:. z;;.aii.lst t'riose t a r >i . a t s:.;;.ich wi;?. 11;ost of' f' ect-
i ve l y r eds ce irC/;iVA oi'i'ens i ve ca;:.a.bil ..ty i :lst ti;e .:!:-.,:
. ,
s e l e c t e d i r ai : r - . i t - , . ar eas , , ~ ~ ~ i ~ . - i l t ~ ~ , . ' L 0 r 1 >\ . , . ~: . ~. : c Liey aLi:i ce,itc::
.;nd vi.ta.1 col ~. ~: url i c artc;r i es. t i c l r l
j t.) Iil..dll and III i,~F/F\:i.~;ii;' ,.
t he r,love:~,en: ! ne,2 and ateria rial.
-
2. ~ n c r e a s esurveillancearid -, -erat i ori s
-
3. Incrdose by over 1967 t he number
of i ndi vi dual mdcrew s er ved eneny we a p~ns tlirned i n or
recoverwd byRVNAF, GSand ot her FTUJT.iAF. See Annex 3
(Concept of l hpl oyl ~i entof i J ~ i l i t a r y Forces).
-
4. Tr i p l e the number of vol unt ar y i n f u me r s
r e por t i ng a c c ur a t e l y on enemy and enemy a c t i v i t i e s .
-
5. Improve u t i l i z a t i o n and i nt e pr a t i a n o f
6F8VM, US, FVO'AF, and US Acency c ol l e c t i on a s s e t s .
-
6. Improve t he gr oc e s s i n~:and exi j l oi t a-
t i o n of PWs, det ai nees , arid Xoi ~hanhs . "'
-
7. I n t e n s i f y inte1li;;eilce c ol l e c t i qn
t k r ~ ~ p 3 use patrols. ext ens i ve ofs ur f ace recdnnai sance
-
t. A s s i s t c i v i l aut l i i >r i t l es t o in.prove
handl i ng and car e ~ i 'ref' ugeds f r x r e c e kt i on u n t i l r e t ur n
t o nornial l i f e .
-
9. 1ncrez. se t he .nw~,berofi-loi Chanhs to
i l i a n iise, botlr day and ni:;ht, .,I? and LCCsby c>pet:inz
seed: in(; an incr.ec.sed nur,,i;er ;f r.ci.l., ry..;:;d z.nd wat er
LOC's. See Annex 2 . ( he s t or a t i onand: i . , r bt s ct i cnefLGCsj ;
( c ) F r i i . aryI AhN? Corps wi . t h a s s i s t a nc e of
a s aid.as
. -
111 ~ i k ~ / ~ i & ; ; i F r sqt i i r eu a-ic:-l.s';2le:
83389
loI qcr ezs e $ha n wb e r uf pa c i f i e d ham-
l e t s and t he per cent age of t ne poj . : ~l a t i on i n s e c l ne ar eas .
4. Meut r al l ze t he VC I n f r a s t r u c t u r e i n
a l l paci f i cat 5an p r i o r i t y ar eas . .
5. Rel i eve all NYFF mi t s of s e c ur i t y or
p a r d r l i s s i ons bya31 Lar ch 1968: r e t a r g e t t r ~ e s eu n i t s on
a nt i - i nf r a s t r uc t ur e a c t i v i t i e s .
-
6. Meet e s t a b l ' s n e c rT66 hVNAF f or c e
goal s a t t h e e a r l i e s t ~ ~ r a c t i c a b l e dat e.
1. Ir..cr*ove r;,orale, and r a z ~ i ~ t T wel f ar e, c
s ent i s Lent \-f F..V;;AF' ker sunnei .
-
L. Develak wi t hi n F,ViidF a bal anced l og-
istical s y s t e r ~ capabl e of rssp. :nsive s uppar t t o ali of
the r ~ q u i r e l ~ ~ e n t s c f exteilded c,), l;at ~ p e r ~ a t l Lr i s .
-
9. dnhmce ~f ' f ' e c t i vene- n id' 3VliA11' wi t h
-
10. Im:x cve eff' ec ti-velless <)f o ~ t l - o s t sys-
tea wi t hi n each CTZ b.j cor Ls t r ~ct i . ; $: of 25';; of a ~ ~ ~ i i l i i i i i i ~ ~
wel l s e l e c t e d new O L ~ ~ L ~ . $ S and rs&ai r a ~l,ini;l,uiii of ; C: O
,f tiie e x i s t i n g C ~ & ~ $ L S T-, i e n t i f i e d by t ne :.Ac'J/~GS
12. I ncr eas e r i c e aid sait 1 ) r ~ t e c t i ~ n
.-
act , ; ~ i t ! e s t o deny t h e amount ill" r i c e 2nd i~ra;til~..&~~ s a l t
t o tile enemy, while i n c r c a s i n c t he fl3-"1cri' f oodst Li f r "s tc,
s p i r i t of ci ) oper nt i on and c - ; or di na t i on, and a f r e e ex-
chance of assi st ; ance, s uj , p; ~r t , adv3ce and jrif.-:i.r~lstion
bc tween all 1-'-fl:dP and bS/l~~.L:.ilP. Coor;dinatlijn j.r:;cedure s
a r c utli ned i n Annex I., , ( i-roceii;re Tc; p C oird irist i : , n : - ~
~-i ' fi l AT" and US/ ~: . . i . ~k>' Upel-.:: t i ons ) .
( 3) 'iu l , recl ude l I . i 3 ~ d e 1 ' s ~ f . Annex tm1dinv t e r ~ r ~ s ,
tern.3 u scd i n this ;-1an.
for F. b)*
pl anni ng on r e c e i i ~ ta ~ i df u r . exucut j on on 1 January 146b
t h r o u $ ~ 30 Jw.e 1966. Iicc(>rr~:ic:ndeclcl.lnn;<os t o this plan
b r i l l be s . ~bmj . t t e dthrou:*t1 I:';J;,:?.il' cl ~t : , n: ~cl s t r j C,?; T .'iT,'irN
Corps o r tkirc'u5i.i i.::/~~;l.i!~::' cl;n~iliel:: t ) C!:, ITT ; . j ' i i . ' as
(6f offi c a r 3 Subordinatecomaar,deraandc o r n ~ ~ d i n ~ :
addressedhereinwillsubmitquarterlysummarisv ii accor-
dancewithAnnexN (QuarterlyReview)coveringthestatus of
implementatSonofthisplan,progressmade,problemsencoun-
tered,andrecommendationsforimprovement. Summariesare
toberenderedasof31March,30 June,30 September,and
31DecemberandsubmittedtoarrfveatIARVNCo~ps/II1MAF,
asappropriate,notlaterthanthefifthdayfollowingthe
asofdate.
4. (U) ADMINISTRATI5N ANDLOGISTICS. SeeAnnexK( ~ o ~ i a ~ l c s )
5. (u) COMMAND AND COAMUNICATIONS-SLECTRONICS
a. Commandremainsvestedwithinthechainofcommand
ofeachnationalmilitargforcerepresentei3,withcombined
'
operationsconductedonthebasisofcooperationandcoor-
dinationandinaccordancewithAnnexG(Proceduresfor
Coordinatiod).
b. Communications-Electronics. See AnnexL(Comuni-
HOANG XUAN LAM R. E. CUSW.AN, J;..,/
LieutenantGeneral,ARVN Li eut enst GeneraP, USMC
CG,IARVNCorps CG, 111 PAP
- A I nt e l l i ge nc e
B - Copcept of Employment of Ki l i t n r y P o k e s
C - Ki l i t ar y Support of RD
D - Resources Denial
E - ~ e s t o Ga t i o n and Pr ot e c t i on of LOC
F - Employnient of CIDZ- (To be publ i s hed)
G - krocedures f o r Coor di nat i on of RVIVAF and I11
P~~iF/?'!!/iJir?( j per at i ons
H - Psychol ogi cal Operat i ons
I - Troop 1";orale (To be publ i s hed)
J - Publ i c Af f a i r s (To be publ i s hed)
K - Logi s t i c s
L - Comri-unica.tions - Zl e c t r oni c s
I - I ns pect or - General ( To be publ i s hed)
N - Qu a r t e r u Review ( To be i ~ubl i s ! ~e d)
O - Def i ni t i ons ,
-,
Annex A ( I nt e l l i ge nc d) t 3 Combined Czi A3hi ga
7-
YL=,, 1 - ~ 6
REFERENCE: Haps, ~ d b t Operations Gra?h+a, Series 150i,
1:250,000, Sheets ~.4@-l;li, hiD 49-1, NE 49-13, XD 48-8,
and ND 49-5.- . L _ - ,
1. ( S) SUMMARY OF THE E3?lNY SITZTATIOI?.
a. General Situation.
During 1967, t h e l e v e l and i n t e n s i t y of enemy
a c t i v i t y wa s doubl e t h a t of' 1966. Th i s a c t i v i t y was most
evi dent i n t h e c oa s t a l p l a i n s where t he enemy Cegloyad t he
maj or i t y of hi s f or c e s t o a t t a c k and des t r oy s e l e c t e d Lar-
gets, and di s r upt t h e Revol ut i onary Development Prograzti.
Throughoiit t h e t e r r i t o r y , t owns and acr ni ni s t r at i ve and -
mi l i t a r y i n s t a l l a t i o n s were r epeat edl y attacked by i n5i -
r e c t f i r e weapons o r by enemy i n f a n t r y em?loyln;; f or c e s
of company t o r egi ment al s i z e . Th e appar snt purpose of
t he enemy w a s t o c r e a t e a permanently uns t abl e s i t u a t i o n
wi t hi n a l l i e d r e a r a r e a s , di s s i pa t e allied w a r pot e nt i a l
and a t t he same t i me f o s t e r a f avor abl e psychol ogi cal i n-
f l uence over t h e popul ace, In s da i t i on, t h e ademy ,reat-
ly interisi:lcd sabot age arid harassmant a i r ~ c t a da t . i : aj ~r
The anerny experiences increased l os s a s dar i ng
the pas t year , as w e l l as r >ecr ui t i nk;a i i ' r ' i e u l ~ l e u . This
f or ced. the eneiiij- to r e c r u i t gr eat br r uni ber s o r wosiafi ajnd
yout hs as young as 14 yaar s ol d. P r o Ll e ms i r ~t h e r e?l ace-
merit of per sonnel i n existing units W.L $ha a z c . i ve t l c n
of new uni t s may eaplain t ho ,:.;' in;"i;t-/ %t' L ~ L rtr
duri ng 1967 of mar$ than sixty i n f i l t r a t i o n gr oups t ot a l i ng
approxi mat el y 19,000 men as cornparad to agproxi t t at el y ,
17, 000 dur i ng 1966.
Despi t e a decl i ne i n enemy s t l e ngt h, his arroa-
ment arid firepowe~has increased with t he introduction of
r ocket s and augmentation of convent i onal a r t i l l e r y i n t h e
DNZ. There are an estimated f i v e r ockat rjattal-ons ar aea
wi t h 140 and 122mm r ocket s l ocat ed i n c e nt r a l ICTZ.
The enemy possesses s i gni f i c a nt of f ens i ve capa-
b i l i t i e s and will continue a protracted w a r of a t t r i t i o n
as his s t r at egi - f o r eventual vi c t or y, wi t h emphasi s a g a i n s ~
t he Bevol ut i onary Devalop~nent Pr~grai~, .
b. Cha r a c t e r i s t i c s of t he Area.
See curpent t e r r a i n anal " s; s E,-!G Coxblnec Intel-
l i gence Centor, Vietnam ( C I C V ) s t u ~ i e s .
c. Enemy Si t ua t i on.
(1) Strength and i ri sposi t i ons-See cur r ent FLont ' n-
ly Sumary o r Per i odi c I nt e l l i gs nc e Regort s.
( 2) inemg Tact i cs .
During 1967, t he anenj has pl aced gr e a t t r
r e l i mc s on condcct i ng coordinateci sr~l al land r: i e~i urr,s c a l e
a t t a c ks , g a r t i c u l a r l , against s t r ong poi nt s , u t i l i z i n g
sapper f or c e s or collibinedsapp3r - irir' antry r or ces . T o
accomplish t h i s , t he enemy has a c t i v a t s c new za2gsr ticlcs
anti cor l cci t r at ed irn Sapper trclni;-ig aid t he
equipping of local fp*+9 :i&$rntry units up t o b e t ~ a l i o n
I . , . ' -
size. In 1968, the.:w y , w@J. place 'high pr i or i t y on't he
I r $ - , . , , J :
uae of eaqper ,iome&;$&i:,$$taeks - onsecu~e, areha, citiea ,<,+.. ,. %
. " , ' ' ' 2
-<&
.
.!,,*-+,:
and towns.
7.
I .
qc
,.
( 3) ~t cat egg St ~ a t e g i aPl ma.
(a) Stradbegy.
The enem7 i a nbt str- enough t o defkat
f r i endl y f or ces mi l l t ar i l y, and cannot launch hi s Phase 111
General Counteroffensive; t her ef or e, the enemy s t r at egy is
based on the concept of "mobile st r at egy. " St r at egi c mo-
b i l i t y .'is at t ai ned by the deployment of combat f or ces
throughout t h e ar ea of operat i ons, posing t hr eat s i n many
separ at e ar eas and at t empt i ng t o hold our f or ces i n static
defensi ve r ol es , i r i hi bi t i ng t h e i r emplo,ment i n mutual r e-
inforcement, and per mi t t i ng t he enemy t o attack sel ect ed
t a r ge t s only under f i vor abl e dondi t i ons. Within t hi s hon-
cept, t he enemy ef f ect &el y coordi nat es the mi l i t ar y and
p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t i e s of h i s t hr ee types of forces: poli-
t i c a l i nf r as t r uct ur e, i r r egul ar forces, and main and l oc a l
force VC and NVA uni t s . The pr i nci pal employment of t hese
f or ces w i l l be along t he coas t al pl ai ns d6signed t o i nt en-
sify pressure on a l l i e d and ARVR f or ces, t o attack and de-
st r oy sel ect ed t a r ge t s and t o d i s r u p t the Revoiutionary De-
velopment Pr gr.Jm. The enemyfs pr i nci pal tactic for ac-
complishing s t r a t s gi c mobi l i t y i s the utiiization of well
h. Determine if the enemy will cmduct l;, -C x ~ r f ~ r s .
If so, when, where arrd wha,t typs?
(1)General* See cyrrent Other Intelligence Re-
quirements (OIRIs), Collection Tasks, and Specific Intel-
ligence Collection Requirements (SICR1s).
I
(2) Surveillance.
( a) See I Corps Cdordinator Instruction
Q3310.1 (Visual Aerial Suyveillance).
(b) See I11 MkF Order 03310.1A (~hotographic/
Visual Reconnaissance and Surveillance).
(c) See Current CG 111 HhF Letter of Instruc-
tion (Area Surveillance within IcTZ).
b. ARVN Forces. Sae Appendixes I (Intelligance Ac-
quisition Tasks and Requests-ARVB) and 2 (Aerial Survei l -
lance and Ground Reconnaissance-ARW).
4. ( S) lGXXJWS FOR IiuT3LLIGZNCi3 ZXPLOITAT1"N OF AUMAN
a. Suqan sources and captured documents w i l l be ex-
ploited in accordice with HACV diractives j dl - 11, 190-3,
20-5, 111 MA" Order 3461.2A and appropriate AHW directives.
See Appendix 3 for document exploitation procedures and Ap-
pendix 6 (Civilian Detainees).
1
b. Captured materiel will be procassea in accordmc6
381-24
I " , .
w ~ t hU C V r ) i ~ ~ C C F V B andapprapr-at2A:. .u-, L:TSCT~VOS,
Zvactisticn afterh t g l l f gence: exa~inc;r,ionwi31La. , ~hr ough
suppl y channels.
. (S) COmTmmTELLIGE1SCE.
,
a. Mi l i t a r y Security. Commanders w i l l t ake neces-
s a r ymeasures i n accordanca wi t h I UCV Girec' cive 380-5 arid
theappr opr i at e ARVN d i r e c t i v e s t o i ns ur e t he se. cur i t y of
mi l i t a r y i nf or mat i on, i n s t a l l a t i o n s , and troop movements
and concent r at i ons. Marine Corps commands: a t t e n t i o n i s
i nvi t e d t o t he provLsSons of O?hA-i l . , ST 5510.1 ancl l.i,CL
3850.2.
b. Ci v i l Secur i t y. Necessarymeasures I n supportof
t he Revol ut i onary ~e v c +l o ~me n t m i s s l a w i l l be takento
s cr een, and suppor t GVNr e g i c t r a t l o n OF i n h a b i ~ a n t s of
newly c l e a r e d o r s ecur ed ar eas. Commanders w i l l prevent
entry,and whenpos s i bl e, obser vat i on of t r oop areasa d
i ns ~a l l a t i onsbg uni a z pt i f i e a persons. GVNc i v i l s e c ur i t y
measures i n s ecur e areas, suchascurfew, w i l l be support ea.
c. Por t , Fr ont i e r , Tr avsl and Physi cal Secur i t y.
(I)Por t Secur i t y. ~ o k a n d e r sw i l l insurecoor-
a i na t e d e f f o r t s t o de t e c t end prevent enemy h c t i v i t y . i n
portornkrborar eas .
( 2 ) Fr o r ~t i e rY s c ~ r i t y . Coinmariders r3aponuiblef o r
t h e s e c ur i t y of ar eas o r i ns t a l l a t i ons - whi c h coul d be used
f o r hosti&,eent r v by l and, wat er, t o i ncl ude enbar kat i on
I
pnd dabarkat i on, o r air will taka approprlat,e acsion i n
I
qoor di nat i on wi t h c i v i l &ut bbr i t i e s t o i nsur e surveklfanco
and r epor t i ng of suspact persons o r matari el .
{ 3) 'Pravrl Secqpfty: Cornsladera w i l l take
i .
measures, in coodinatfon~. with civil authorities, t o in-
s ur e scr eeni ng of t r a v e l ~ r si n t h e i r area of r e s pons i bi l i t y
and t o a s s i s t i n the kcreeni ng of c i v i l i a n s r et ur ni ng t o
t h e i r hornas a f t a r f or ced evacuat i on dur i ng comLat phases.
(4)Physi cal Secur i t y: The r e s yons i bi l i t y l o r
che i nt e r na l s e c ur i t y of t he co,~.rfiaG, i fi cl udi ng the s ecur i -
t y of per sonnsl , ma t mi e l , bui l di nks an6 a r a a s occupieCj
rests wi t h t he r es puct i vs co~rrmar~de~. ~. t o achi eve In or uer
maximum s e c ur i t y f o r units i n d tenancy st at us, a , r e a e o t s
will be reached between t he base comander s and t he t d n mt
u n i t commanders i n r agar ds t o t h e de l i ne a t i on or' araas of
r a s p o n s i b i l i t ~ , j ur i s di c t i on, a r ~ demployment aild c ont r ol
or s e c ur i t y personnel.
a. Special Operat i ons. Count er i nt al l i ger ~ce or gani -
z a ~ i o r ~ s will cont i nue t o acco~npl i sh t he f o l l o ~ i n , t as ks :
(1) Developner,%'of curreqit ccl9uiLsri:, t e l l i g d r ~ c e
i der i t it';. arid e l lri<ir~ate i ~i f r a s t r ~i c w i t h aiiipha- t he 'v!: t l i r a ,
sis. on erihmcirig i o c a l s a c d p i t y i n s u d ~ c r tof' ' ;?,a i;;wvolu-
-t;onary Davol o2ns ct m i s s i on, -
( 2 ) 2eLecratSari ai,c r LGu t r a l i z o ~i c r A 02 a n ~ x y
I --.
espionage, sabotage, subversion and ter-orist or~4nizations.
(31 AssSst in initiattng deceptive measurss de-
signed to enhance the sacurity ot military operations.
(4) C(mm8ada Whlch hceiie' Communist progagand*
should forward it t a t b e nearest Counterintelligence Rep-
resentative for further disseinination to the nearestNaval
Investigative Service, It is desirable that a repo& of
the circumstances involved be included when forwaruing the
material.
6. ( S) MISCELLANXOUS.
s. ~ommunicatiodsSecurity. (cOMSEC).
See Annex L, Comunications-Electronics III
MAF Order 02230,lB.
b. Censorship. CoL,lmanderswill plan for and upon
direct ion i~tiplemeut censorship plans in accordar~ce with
MACV Directive 380-2, I11 iLA? Order 05530.1 and appru5ri-
ate ARVN directives.
c. Maps and Charts.
See PACV Cirective $17-1 and ARVE directives.
WC
USEC Commands within I11 HA7 will procure maps and charts
in accordanc~with instructions c~ntained in I11 P W Order
3boo.l.
7. (S) i 7!ruRT, AIdD LIS7RIE:ITION. _
a. Reports will be submitted in accordance with FACV
Directives 381-11, 381-21, 351-26, I11 :.AF Order 3820.2 and
the appropriate A R dkmstiues. ~ It is iaperatiue that the
reporte be d~ssual ~pt %di : p&i 0~) ; 21a~5~ to CIDY, bp tho fast-
' * >.>
7 ,*: ,I" , < J
eat means p0saib'2a,~,q.~$4kmk with, operational ~ituation,
3'(":,+,,:"$ r
. ,>5 , YJ . * "..a
Loca1 comandera ~h9uJB. , ~&apprloed, haedirtaly, of in-
- ?"*.
l omat i on of P p e k s h ~ 6nature,
b.
The follow* itsms must be reported wiSh over-
lays or charta and mat be made on a monthly baaia fn the
form of an annex t o the m,onthly and quarterly reaorts.
( 1) &emy Order of BBttle.
( 2 ) Infrastructure and Guerilla Order of Battl e.
(3)Infrastructure and Guerilia elimination situ-
ation.
(4) Population control situation:
(a) Total number of harolots controlled and
newly built.
(bj Total number of pdople under GVN cont r ol ,
people newly controlled or out of GVIf control. The pop-
ul at i on must be classified i n 'categories of 14-45 years ol c
and from 45 years and ol der, both male and female.
( 5) Land control s i t ua t i on:
( a ) Number af hiirr.l?ts, outposts arla/or base
areas built in VC controllec areas.
(Sj Number of hamlets, outposts a r d o r base
areas adjacent t o ;TC cantrolled area which have bean l os t
or abandoned.
concornea staffs and cornm&r,ds at t n e a a r l i e s ~co~~veni ai i ca.
Apps n~ l x e s : 1--1ntellPgence Acqui si t i on, Tasks ana Re-
quests-ARW.
2--Aerial Sur vei i l ar . ca =c Ground Esconnais-
3--Document - pl oi t s t ion
, - - C. I . Es t i ma t e
5--Prison;'rs 02 ; . ar j LO oe , subl i shed)
6--Civilian Detainees
- -
Kwendix b ( Ci vi l i an Det ai nees) t o &ax ~ [ I ~ t a l l i ~ ~ n c e )
t o , Combined Carapaign Plan 1-6:
1. (C) SITUATICN:
a. ker ny, Sl t uat i on. Annex A ( i nt el l i gence)
b. Large numbers of ci vi l i ans suspected of aiding or
abetting t he enemy are picked up i n mi1ital. y and coriibined
B
mi l i t ar y/ ci vi l operat i ons. Some are members of the VC i n-
f r as t r uct ur e. Processing and accounting f o r these de-
tainees i s a growing burden on RVXAP, 111 MAF/AJXA?', GVh:
and U.S. c l vi l i a n aut hor i t i es . As t he war has intensified,
the number of det ai nees has i ncreased a t a r api d rate.
Thi s increiise has caused ser i ous overcrowding at col l ect i on
poi nt s , ternporaq7 det ent i on camps, ana SVN ? ol i c e compounds.
Screening and cl as ni f i cat i on of det ai nees i s slcw; arid or-
t en, due t o overcrowded condi t i ons, persorinel a r t released
w i thout appropri at e idexitif ication o r det erxi fi at t on or
st at us.
2. (U) PI-SSION: To $rovide prompt, t hor ou~h, bnd e f f a c -
t i ve screeni ng, segregat and dispusi t i kn of suspec t,;d
er~er: ~y c i vi l i a n $ 2 , sonrlel ca2t ured o r det i n e d bj Y r - ace
III ;.:AF/ F,~~,JJ .
3. ( u ) xdCC!L'ldN:
a. Concept. Screening of cspt urec? o r det si r-ec sus2scsed
rnun i nt el l i zence and t o mini:!lize the ci et er i t i ~nof i r a o c a n t
CONFIDmTIAE
c i v i l i s n s . Screening procedures r aust be c k s r o s ~ hmd sf-
..
fec5ivzt o grec. lude rescreeni ng once d e t d n e e s are COQ-
firmed as PW and i nt er ned i n a PWcams. Detainees ar e per-
sons who have been detainedbut whose f i nal s t a t us a s t o
TW,r et ur nee (Yoi ~hanh),c i v i l defendant o r inhocent, has
riot been determined. Procedures f o r handling refugees are
cont ai ned i n Annex C ( Mi l i t ar g Support of ED) andL. S. and
GVNdi r ect i ves previ ousl y i ssued; procedures f o r handling
r et ur nees ar e cont ai ned i n Appendix 5 (Chieu fi oi ) t o An-
nex C ( Xi l i t ar ; Support of paci f i cat i on) arid U. S. and GVN
di r ect i ves previ ousl y i ssued; and i ns5r uct i ons on proces-
si ng PW ar e cont ai ned i ndet ai l ed PJACV anc JG3di r ect i ves
I
previ ousl y i ssued. It is important t h a t enemy combat ef-
f e c t i v e ~ , r et ur nees, and refugees ar e processed i n accor-
dance withapp- opr i at e procedures; t ha t c i v i l defendant s
ar e r ef er r ed t o 2roper jud c i a 1 aganci es f o r t r i a l ; and that
doubt ful cases a r e t urned over t o t he Provi nci al ' Securifq
Committee (which i s headed by t he Province Chi ef) f o r ap-
pr opr i at e d i s p o ~ i t i r ~ n . Screening procedures should b.;:de-
signed t o:
(1) Cl assi f y parsonnel r api dl y so t ha t i nt er r oga-
/ .
t i on of sel ect ed i ndi vi dual s can commence as soon a f t e r
capt ure o r det t nt i on as possi bl e.
( 2 ) Provide a means f o r t a c t i c a l u r i i t s r api dl y t o
ext r act 2xgl oi t abl e information f r m det ai nees.
( 3 ) Prlzclude t h e i nt roduc
A-612'
i nt o t he al r eady sat ur at ed j udi ci al and p n a l system of
(4)lnsure that &I; nlrho&ekdetainesswho are
e l i gi bl e fur PW ;.tatua a& interned i n PW camps.
,
( 5 ) Conduct screefiing of captured personnel
'and det ai nees a t t he lowest aohel,onof command pr act i cabl e.
( 6) Locate screeni ng poi nt s, where pr act i cabl G,
near s > c t o r or subsect or htjadquarters t o t ake rnaxinum ad-
vanta,-e uf Kational Pol i ce, MSS, and ot her i nt el l i gence
f i l e s a t t hose headquart ers.
( 7 ) Idfake maximum use of t he Combine6 Ii I:--A?/
FCfiAF I nt er r ogat i on Sys sem.
b. 111 blA7/FWMP aSd RVNA? commanders, i n coordina-
t i on with the i i at i onal Pol i ce a ~ ~ d s e c ~i r i t y of- l ocal GVN
fi c i a l s , w i l l i n s u r e that:
(I) ~a c t i ' c a l screeni ng cent er s are est abl i shed
uk-~ezievort h e r j i s an operat i on conducted bj RVxAP uni t s.
So.bined t act i cal . s cr eeni ng enters w i l l be estabiished
whenevar t her e i s an operat i on condLlctsdby I11 1'iA.F'/MaA3
~ i i i t ~ or by ~?%A?/IIIPiAP/$Ti$i AP u n i t s . Estabzishment of
t h c t i c a l o r co~bi nsd. t act i ca! screerLing cel i t er s w i l l be in-
cl i i dec i n advance opax.utiona1 planning. The mi..sion of the
t b c t i c d a r cot ~~l i ned t act i c81 screanl:-,- c e ~ t o ri s t o pro-
vide ~ n t e g r a t lon of 35% k .?mcmd/or 111 P;.;kF/F.~;k~' and agpro-
pr i a t e .GVii civil s ecur i t - per soi mel f o r s c r e mi z g <,fa l l
CONFIDEnTTIAL .
, >
Y
personsdet ai ned by.RVNAF/fIIMA?/F PAP.
I nt er r cgs t or
augmentation f o r sup,bo-rt 09t a c t i c a l o r chmbined t a c t i c a l
screeni ng cent er s d Z 3 berequebslOd t h~ough the conmernd
channels of theRVNAF/. III MAL$/F~~MBF uni t cont r ol l i ng t he
operat i on. A t a c t i o a l or ocrabined tacti cal acreeni ngLcen-
t e r w i l l have jointr epr osent at i on fromp ~ x t i c i p a t i r ~ g uni ts
and c i v i l aut ' or i t i e s . The 2 ' ~ i i ~ ~ / I f co .nander o r t he 1F&F/
!WXQ uni t cont r ol l i ng the operat i on w i l l reduest c i v i l
participation f r ~ mt he Province C:,ief. TheProvince Chief
i s r esponsi bl e i'or i nsur i ng c i v i l par t i ci pat i on. Ideal l y,
t he De ~u t y Province Chiefl o r Securi t y ands r e pe s e nt a t i ve
from the oper at i onal mi t willfunct i on a s co-chairmen,
In addi t i on t o par t i ci pat i on by vari ous s t :ffe1eaner.t~of
the o p s r a ~i o n a l unft s, t he HL3 , Pro\ i nci al / Di s trict h a t i ma l
I ol i c s , i ncl udi ng t he Speci al Branch, and the ~e' t or / Sub- '
s ect or S2, w i l l hg\ e r epr essnt at i on i n t he cent er .
(2)1.lili: arg i nt el l i ger , ce i nt er r ogat or s s c r ~ e l ~ all
c i vi l i a ns apprehended by mi l i t ar y kni t s. Det . i l ed screen-
i ng procecures a r s cont ai ned i n TabA ( Det ai l ed Screening
I'rocedures!. Det ai l ed r egi s t r at i on, accounting and di s-
,
posi t i an procedures ar, cont, lined i n Tab 3 (Det ai l ed Ac -
counting "rocedures). Pr ovi nce/ di st r i ct o f f i c : a l s srers-
sponsi bl e f o r returniiit: i.lrloc.znt c Lviiiaiis 'so t he i r v i l -
l a y s 3 or them t c r e f ~ ~ g \ : a appropri - t r a : ~ s f e r r i ~ ~ , cnxps, t i u
9t e. In:locer,!; c i v i l i a ~ s w i i l b, ; I - s i t i vel ; i dent i fi ec: ,
- - - .
photographed, wad fi r ~ger pr i nt sdby. tl=s; < & L i ~ l ; h ~ 5c w ~ 1 ~
pr i or t o release t o f a c i l i t a t e i d e n t i f ' i c a t i c ~ u c . srdocf3s-
si ng i f they ar e agai n det ai ned.
( 3) Adequate temporary f a c i l i t i e s ar e const ruct ed
t o ef f ect complete segregat i on of PWs, innocent ci vi l i ans ,
and c i v i l i m det ai nees as soon as t h e i r s t a t us i s aet er -
mined.
(4) A l l doubt ful cases, s u a p e c t ~dmambers or t he
VC i nf r as t r uct ur e, or ot her . ci vi l i ans suspect sd of al di ng
t he enemy, but who do not qual i f y as pr i soner s of war, a r e
t r ansf er r ed t o c i vi l i a n aut hor i t i es f o r ul t i mat e det er~ni na-
t i on of s t a t us and f ur t her procassing.
(5)A l l mi l i t ar y uni t s e f f e c t the 2hysi cal t r ans-
f e r of c i vi l i a n det ai nees t o c i vi l i a n detention f a c i l i t , i e s
at t he province and d i s t r i c t according t o s peci f i c i nst r uc- .
t i ons provided by t he GVN Province or Di s t r i c t Chief, The
;jrovince a d d i s t r i c t chi ef s w i l l provide transpuri;ation,
wi t hi n t h e i r capabi l i t i es , . f or c i v i l i a n det ai nees t o de-
t ent i on cent er s. Transport at i on r s qui r j d beyond province/
d i s t r i c t capabi l i t y w i l l be provided b; F?vNA?/I_ I Fd"i_p/
FWx.4? 6
( 6 ) Mi l i t ar g i nt el l i gence i n t er l . ogat or s ti.-sf sr
t o t he Tol i ce Speci al Sranch all information appr opr i at e
or per t i nent t o the case of each d a t ~ i n a atrmsf2rrad t o
c i vi l i a n aut hor i t y.
' L
( 7) The G\1? Provi nce Chief provides auequst e de-
t e nt i on f a c i l i t i e ' s f o r c i v i l i a n det ai nees , aecur i t y of
thesef a c i l i t i e s , f u r t h e r screening,and ul t i mat a dater-
mi nat i on' of st a t us , i ncl udi ng l e g a l proceedings.
( 8) Uni t commanders int he fieldpr ovi de additic::
81support upon r eques t of t he Provi nce Chief, withinLn-
di vi dual uni t c a pa bi l i t i e s . Such support w i l l i ncl ude
commodities a s w e l l astemporary deployment of j oi nt c i v i l /
mi l i t a r y i nt er r ogat i on t o m s t o s cr een md determines t a t u s
of s us pect s *
c. I11 MAF/Pi6i.AF commanders, incoor di nat i ons with
RWJAF Commanders, andpr oper c i v i l i a n a ut hor i t i e s , where
I ' ,
appr opr i at e, w i l l i ns ur e t h a t t hose t as ks out l i ne d i n 2tira-
graph b. above a r e acccrnplished and/ or support ed t o tbe
na xi num . ext dnt pos s i bl e. IIIHA?uni t s w i l l u t i l i z e t he
combined t a c t i c a l scr3eni ng of det ai nees concept out l i ned
i n t h i s !innex and appropriateMACVdi r e c t i ve s .
. 4. (U) LOGISTICS
a. Caro mid feeding of det ai nees wnilei n custody of
mi l i t a r y f or ces i s t h e r a s pons i bi l i t y of tsuch mi l i t a r y
f or ces .
b. Logi s t i c support of det ai nees whi l e i n mi l i ' t a r y
cust ody w i l l be 2rovi aed i n acco~dance wi t h AnnexK (Lo-
g i s t i c s ) .
c. Care and feedi ng of detaineesi n c ~ s t d a go f c i v i l
a u t h o r i t y i s :'!-ie r e s pons i bi l i t y of t k a t aut hcr i zg, s. o~-
..
mal l y t he Provi nce oP District Chi sf . Di s t r i c t s w i l l .
s u b mi t c os t s of such care and feed!ng to Provi nce f o r r:-
Inbursement. In an emergency, U.S. Provi nce o r di s: r i ct
advi s or s may be able t o provide assistance -in the form of
f oods t uf f s t o t h e province o r d i s t r i c t s .
Tabs: A-Detailad S c r s e n i ~ gProcesures
E-Det ai l ed Accounting Procsdures
Tab A (Detailed Screening B~ocsdurs2je c A2;a:~c;x o (Z9~ilk-
sn. Det ai neea) t c Amex A (&tei l i gsnsa> GO Cozbi n~i iCa ~r p a i g ~
Pl a n 1-68
1. A t t he time o r capt ure, each det ai nee w i l i be tgg6al
and a Detainee Card (USARV Form 365 f o r U.S. units) f i l l e d
out as compl et el y. as possi bl e. O f extreroe importance &re
dat a r ef l ect i ng circumstance of capt ure, and i n f o ma t i ~ r ~ as
t o whether documents or weapons are found on t he det ai nee.
2. A Detainee Report Form (USBRV 361; f o r C.S. uni t s )
w i l l be' completed t o r e f l e c t f a c t s concerning t'ae a c t i v i t i e s
I
performed by t he det ai nee. This i s i xpor t ant because a ma-
j or f act or f o r dat ermi nat i on of s t at us i s t he a c t being per-
f omed by t he det ai nee at t he time or cast ure.
3. A bl ackl i s t furni shed by count er i nt el l i zenca 615-
rnsnts, X J I C C , PIC, I'Si3, et c. , supglemented by t he provl ncl &l
aud d i s t r i c t pol i ce bnowl ed~e o l t hs ar ea and i t s i r ~ h a b i t a i ~ s ,
i s es s ent i al f o r confirming t he i dent i t y of inciividu.als, and
f o r determining the ver aci t y of sonrce s t at ument s . i'he name
of t he det ai nee w i l l . . be checked akai nst the ~ l a c k l f s t . I f
it appears on t he l i s t , a not at i on t o - t h a t ef f ect w i l l be
ent er ed on t h e Detainee Rep~rt ~For-i n ( i t em 15, Remarks,
UShRV Form 3b4 f or U.S. uni t s ) . The f dct t hat a suspect was
picked up i n a VC-controlled ar ea does not i n itself j us t i f y
the c l a s s i f i c a t i on of a det ai nee as a PX. Therefore, ever y
b i t of i nr omat i on tbat t ends t o subs. cmtiar;e t he ' cor r ect
. ste,tstis of t he detainae must be entared on %ha eoms.
,4.
Trace met al det ect or k i t s snoula be ~ 3 a 3as a?-
pr opr f at e. Positive madings wi n be recorded on the De-
t ai nee Repor t , Form,
5. Returnees and in~0mants:wfll be used to identify
6. Mi l i t ar y I nt el l i gence ( MI ) i nt er r ogat or s w i l l be
a l e r t a t all times t o det ect det ai nees vhd pomess hnedi -
ately expl oi t abl e i nformat i on concerning enemy pl ans, po-
s i t i o n s and su>$l y caches. It i s v i t a l t hat such informa-
t i on be o b t a i n e ~as a mat t er of p r i o r i t y as soon as possi -
bl e a f t e r capt ure.
7. Upcn coznpletion of M I i nt er r ogat i on, the ~ o mc a l
processes of 2opul at i on cont r ol are i ni t i a t e d. Biographic
dat a is recorded*, and f i nger pr i nt s a r e ~ a k e nand camparea
w i t h t hose on t h e individualsfs I D card. The det ai nee is
then ghotographed. k copy of t he photozraph s ho' ~l dbe
pl aced on r i l e io chc P 3 , and i n t h e PI C and DUICC, when
pr es ent . If ~ h e r ai s no reason t o suspect t he aet ai nee as
a VC, he is i nt . ; rvi ewed by t h e p at ion dl Po i i c e Speci al
3ranch. Using t he b l a c ~l i u i ; mil t h e r e s u l t s of $ha MI in-
terrugation, information is s oi ; i ci t ed per t ai ni n2 to t h a de-
- . --
s uch a m a n n ~ ras t o gain tht; corrff ~ e i i c e L , o o ~ of
the i c di vi du~l ;thus he o r she mt i at be treated with pol i t e-
nes s and dignity.
" c
6. If t he detainee is et i l l . s us yec' t a f t e r the, caii@e-
t i o n of the above, National Pol i ce interrogators contgnue
attempts ei t her t o obt ai n addi t fdnal i p c r h b a t i n g evidence
o r conclude t hat t here i s i ns uf f i ci ent cause t o hold the
cet ai nee f ur t her , An i ndi vi dual doasi er w i l l be prepared
f or everyone who i s i nt errogat ed as suspect. When time/
di st ance f act or s $e mi t , d i s t r j c t pol i ce f i l e s wi l l . be
checked t o determine any previous record of apprehension.
The dossi ers, or a t l e a s t ' a copy of a l l bformat i on con-'
t ai ned t herei n, w i l l be t r ansf er r ed t o t he d i s t r i c t pol i ce
when t he screening cent er i s relocated, I n' t he case of a
detainee classified as PW, a copy o f the Preliminary I nt er -
rogat i on Rep-rt (PI?) w i l l be sent with the Pii t o t he Corp
Pi; Camp where he i s t o be interned.
9. Segregation of det ai nees is an important' aspect of
t he operation. Detainees ar e t o be grouped i n holding
areas as follows z
a. Apparent PWs.
b. Lnown VC i ddnt i ' fi ea Ly bl ackl i s t s .
c. Sus pect ad civil defendants,
d; Innocents.
10. Dispersion of these holalng areas . shoul d be suf - .
f i c i e nt t o preclude normal voice communicatibn between areas.
8
I
The holding area8 should be ahreanad by canvss or maStiPg
to deny vaaual ~bse~vatiun one of area irm aaotbes..
11. TO foreatals *ejpctfDa by pj ~ s l ~ p o f PW ~cmam~dlera
\ ,,. '
,of questionable st at us, kPrfr attempt wS11 be made t~ auq- 4
s t ant i at e any evidence Leading t o the Judg(ugpt by the in-
t errogat or t ha t t he detainee is entitlad t o PW status.
Factors to be cunuioered are: raenberilhip i n V f e t Gong or
North Viatnamese Armed Forces; capture while performiag W
overt hostile a c t in combat; captwe wbile carrying weagona,
documents or i ndi vi dual papers t hat pmvide cl ues as t o the
PW s t at us of t he individual; wearing of mi f or ha and die-
t i nct i ve insignia; admission by t he det ai nee himself, con-
f irmatory statements by witnesses arid colleagues of the .dew
tainee; and posi t i ve zleadin&s through the use of metal de-
t e c t or hl t s, or other aci ent i f i c devices.
12. Co;i$assion w i l l be shown t o the aged, women and
young. Every attempt will be made ear l y i n the'screening
procesa t o segregate the obviously' i n n ~c e n t individuals
and t o r el ease them l ocal l y as soon as pract i cabl e.
13. Consideration will be given t o detainees who have
cooperated i n provi cl i n~ irifol-mation conceining the enemy
SO t i , at the;: may be accotded ret urnee st at us.
4. I n t ~ me d i a t s corrlmsias w i l l corisistently r e v i e w and
Yl onl tc;r t . Aecl as s i f i cat i on grocedures of su' oorcinate uni t s
and take t i k e l j act Aoc t o mi ni mi ze arbitrary classifications
or mi scar r , hges of j ust i ce.
15. Inipr~op6rlycoc~: xsnt edPW .*ii;lr.,oi; be evacL,Sad zc,
-.--
PW camps. Svery e f f o r t will be made to r esol ve cani' iicf;ki&
views between U. S. and RVN interrogators prior to the trans-
fer to and internment of PW in the Corps PW camp.
Tab8 (Detai l ed ~ c c o u n i i n ~ Procedurarr) toAppendU b
( Ci vi l i an etab bees) toPllaax.8 ( Int el l i gace) to Can- 3 ,I
L
binedCampaignPlan 1-68.
1. ( U I11MAF/ FW Forces. ,
a.
A l l detainems taken by 111iYAt/Bw@2 niL1, beae-
countedforonastandardf o m Enclosure+ I, (Detaaee ,_
. , .
AccountRecord).
I
b. USMC R@giments, U.S.A. Brigades,'4- , ROKBrigadqa
areresponsibleforaccomplishmentofthisregistration.
c . I11YAF/pt;IMAT units below~agfPent/ ~ri gade lev@%
arenotauthorizedtore1tre.e dctaineos40 civilauthori-
- .
t i e s .
d. If the detainee i s adj udgd tobeaPW,onecopy
ofthe-fomwillbeforwardedtodivisionandtwo
copiestoICorpsAdvisoryGroup, Attn:
' SIA, APOSF
96337.
e. Ifthedetaineeisadjudgedtobearon-PW, one
copyoftheformwillbepzssed, withthedetainee,totho
civil authorityreceivingthedetalnse; ocs copywfPl be
passedtothePermanent Office/D~lC~at ' Frovi nce/ ~i a; ri ct
dependinguponthelave1 atwhich the detainee is passad;
4 t
twocopieswillbef~rwardedtoI CorpsAdvisoryGroup,
Attn: G- 2, APOSF96337,
f.Thisreportwillbefoxwardedonaweeklybasis,
2. (u) RVNAF Forces.
a. Alldetaineestaken byRVNAP willbeaccountedI'br
onastandardforin(Inclosure1, Detainee AccountRecord),
b, ARVX Regiment a areresponsibleforaccomplishment
ofthisregistration.
c. ARVN Unitsbelow regimentallevelare NOTautho-
rizedtoreleasedetaineestocivilauthorities.
d. IfthedetaineeisadjudgedtobeaPW, onecopy
or theform willbeforwardedtodlvislonandtwocopies
t a G-2,ICorps.
/
e. ,If thedetaineeisadjudged to be a ; ~o i i - P~, orie
copyoftheformwillbepassed,withthedetainee,tothe
civilauthorityreceivingthedetainee;one,copywillbe
passedtot he Pamanent O ~ ~ ~ C ~ / D ~ I C C at~rovince/~istrict
dependinguponthelevel,at-whichtheG-taineeis .passed;
and two copi es w i i ' be passed toG2, ICorps,
f. This r e p ~ r twillbeforwardedonawe e dy basi s.
3, (U) Province/DistrictChiefs.
a. Itistheresponsibilitydf the ~rovinca/Distrfct -
Chiefs t o insure that m y G W c i v i l aut hor i t y having cus-
tody of c f v l l detainaas f ~ m ~ k ap aacowating of those
s
detainbba 613P, stan&%%q~rrh. ..@lclortu~e1, (be5taineo k-
i c .
count Record).
b. One copy of the repor* will be Ti l ad a t ' t h e Per-
Inanent Office/DOICC; two copiea w % l l be forwarded t o 62,
I Corps.
4. (U) Administration. '
a. dach agency of the GVN and each uni t of RW~AF\U.S./
PWIEiF f or ce above r agi ment al / b~i gade l e ve l which r ecei ves
or passes a detained w i l l complete the Dataihee Account
Record and d i s t r i b u t e it l a t e r a l l y o r upward, always f or -
warding two copi es t o G2, I C~r ps(GVK and 3VIIAF agenci es .
and uni t s ) or I Corps Advisory Group, httn: SIA ( U. S. /
WUF units).
b. G2, I Corps, w i l l pas> one copy of ll&a>nee Ac-
count Record t o I Corps I nt er r ogat i on cent er' and ons 'copy
t o S I A , I Corps.
c. S I B , I Corps Advisory Group, will pass one co2j of
Detainee L CCOL L ' ~ ~ The remaining bopies- from Record t o I C I C ;
:;.S./?;,?CAF u r l i t s and t he 3VNAP w i l l be passed t o ti;e I.
Cbrps Col l at i on Point.
5. (V) I Corps Col l at i on Point.
a. S OI C , Rsgion I, will establish a col l at i on ~ o i n t
f o r uet ai nee r egi s t r at i on.
- CONFIDENTIAL
b. T h i a collaiion point is responsi5ie far r ecei vi ad
a l l dat a furnished under the Detainee AccourAt Hocumi sya-
tern; carding Of all i nfomat i on Sy qme and by preeazlt
location; revising and updating these cards on a timeiy
basis; and t o expeditiously r e pl y t o req..ests f o r infor-
mat i on from GViJ agenci es and RVIUJP/U.S./~W~~IAFunits and.
6ther interest~d and e l i g i b l e agencieu.
Encl osures: 1 Det ai nee Account Record.
---------------'------I---- ............................
~ u f qu$n
Heeidence
-
........................... ----------------------------
B& b&t ho#c h8i chhnh ngiy
Datb'of Capture or Return
n- - rrrr- - - - r- - - - - r- - - - - - - - - ............................
Tga d@ /P2ace
( Coordinates )
-----------r----------------
( P) TG YhiGn C#ng /W.
(N) KhBeg i ~ t;i W;/NOlu-Pw
(H) ~ 8 ichinh /Hoi chanh
............................
(C) ~ h & nhGn /Cantdssion
............................
Dan v i v i tri
Unit or Pos i t i on
I
----------------------------4-
Ddn V$ b e t f
Capturing Unit
i
I
............................
Cd quan giam gia
Locat ion/Diepoeitiion
Apnex B ( Concept of Employnent of &.iif-ca,-y
Porces ) Go Combined C3~$3idYlP i 3 ~X d r
.-.
Annex Ei ( Co f i c ~p tof Empl opent of Iu:ili.;azpJr 2~rcksjtt.
Combined C ~ ~ p a i g n p l a n 1-68
I, (U) SITUATICN
a. General. Thi s annex out l i ne s the employment of
ARVN and U S J ~ A F t he basic obJect i ves of i n support of
t he campaign a s expressed i n t he mission.
b. Enemy Forces. Annex A ( I nt el l i gence)
c. Fr i endl y Forces. Paragraph 1, Basic P l a n .
d. Assumpt i ~ns. Paragraph 1, Basic Tlan.
2 . ( S ) ~LISSIOXAND TASKS T3 ACCOPlI'LISH BASIC O a J 6 C Y I V S S
a. Nission. Defeat the VC/ NVA f or c e s i n I CTZ, and
a s s i s t GVN t o extend cont r ol t hr oughmt I CTZ.
b. Objective: , To def eat VC/NVA f or ces. The rel at ed.
t asks are:
(1)Defend t he bor der s of t he fiVN.
( 2 ) Conduct sust ai ned, coordi nat ed, . . and conbinea
of f ensi ve oper at i ons a ga i ns t VC/KVA f or ces, base =eas
and . l ogi s t i c a l ays t eks.
( 3 ) Conduct a continuous har assi ng and dest r uc-
t i ve a i r offengi ve agai nst enemy f or ces , base areas, an5
l o g i s t i c a l systems i n I CTZ and in aut hori zed c o n t i ~ u o u s
fireas.
(4)Execute crowid, sea o p c r a t i o r , ~ti; ar,ci a i ~
i n t e r d i c t VC/NVA land and. wat er LOCI s.
( 5) Deny the enemy r i c e k 2 ot her suppl i es.
(6 ) ha i nt a i n airsupremac7,
( 7 ) Conduct psychol bgi cai oper at i ans agai ns t
' VC/ NVA personnel and o i v i l i a ns undert he i nf l uence of t he
enemy.
I
(81 Conduct i nt e l l i ge nc e and count er i nt el l i gence
oper at i ons.
( 9 ) Conduct bor der s ur vei l l ance, c r os s border
oper at i ons a s aut hor i zed, and c ount e r - i nf i l t r a t i on
operat i on.
c. Obj ect i ves: To ext end GVN cont r ol t hronghout
ICTZ.
The r e l a t e d t as ks are:
(1) Secure t he xa j or political,.e.conomic, f ooa
producing and popul at ed cent er s .
(2 ) Es t abl i s h, mai nt ai n, and secur e mi l i t a r y
Snst a l l a t i ons .
( 3 ) Conduct militaryclearingand securing
oper at i ons t o e s t a bl i s h and mai nt ai n s e c ur i t g f o r areas
undergoing paci f lcation.
(4)?rhovi des e c ur i t y f?;.ces erg&; Tec.
- .
l r
anti c&r t l . ci l ~at e i n , t he i dent i i ' i c~i t 5onan\<ell~,,,lxs::is5
of the 'JC i nf' ras LII..; ct u ~ e .
(5)As s i s t c i vi l i s r , a~itk10r.i ties t o or; ; aci ze,
eqbi p and t r a i n t he harr,let and v i l l a : - a s.-lf-ae:'ecse r ' or cas.
. . -
( 6 ) Iblaintain secl;rit;. of L y e k s i ~ ,w>;,;n s a c i f i ca-
f At- 1
t i on t u a i y heve moved; ~ u s ~ a l n . ~ ; j c ,' . . >. .. ... _ -;.;;& &J.: ... .- ~gc; ~; - . . i .. e ,a <A
. -.
.-a T
i 7 ) Operi and Y ~ C E . T ~ ~ ~ ~ > ~ o r ; ; 2 r , ~ ;
.,
;I LOCI s ::.;I.L.:..-;
economic and p o l i t i c a l e f f o r t s .
( 6 ) Pa r t i c i pa t e ' i n p o p ~ l a t i o ~ anand resoi i rces
cont r ol programs..
( 9 ) Conduct mi l i t a r y c i vi c act i oi ? t o w i n z?ie
support . of t he peopl e t o t he , GVN.
( 1 0 ) Conduct r ef ugee cori t rol and s-qpar t r-a&-
s ur es u n t i l assumed by r es pans i bl e c i v i l i a n agenci es.
a. Concept
(1)The mi l i t a r y of f ens i ve power =LC r e l z t s d
r es our ces of t he RVNAF, U S and tQXA% a-e to 5e appl i aG
t o pr i or i t y areas consi der ed c r i t i c a l zo surccessfui
acco~;plisl1?~rient of the ove r a l l mi ssi on. fiVNAF'3 bS and
WAF accompl i sh t h i s r i ~i ssi on i n accordance wi t h establish-
. -
ed obj e c t i ve s and as s i gaed t as ks . Within t h i s cont ext ,
f or c e s a r e employed i n t hr ee inter-aepanden-c r ol es :
. j a ) Containment or an'i t - i nvas i an oper at i ons
al ong t he DIJIZ aria opposi t e t he enemy1 s i a o t i a ~ sanct uar y
t o pr event r;iajsr i ncur s i ons i n t o Sout h Vie t ~ ~ i ,
. .
( b ) Ofi ' ensi vc: opt -1st i l ?ns riia-!.r?,tain sus; ; ai ned
and unr ei ent l ng 5r e us ur e on 'JC/2iV6 20?cv;s ~ y d :r.air: base
areas i n I ZTZ.
( c ) Forces a r c corc:ii t t e a 5ehi nd t he pro-tec-
t he campaign, t he m i l l t a r y e f f o r t pr ovi ae 3 t e r ~ i t o r l a l
s e c ur i t y i n pa c i f i c a t i on a r e a s a t a l e v e l adequate t o
L
permi t the de s t r uc t i on of t he VC i nfras' ; ruct ure and the
uni nt er npt ed and accel er at ed pr ogr es s o>ol l t i c a l ,
s oci ol ogi cal and psychol ogi cal programs of the GnT.
( 2 ) Mi l i t a r y f or c e s i n I CTZ aze p r h a r i l y
committed i n t he anki-main f or c e war t o cont ai n t he enemy
al ong t he DMZand t he Laot i an border and t o des t r oy t he
2nd NVA Div and ot her enemy f or c e s and bases i n I CTZ.
GVNpa c i f i c a t i on a c t i v i t i e s cont i nue a t about t hd same
l e v e l a s i n 1967, except i n Quang Xgai Provi nce where w
t hey aret o be i ncr eas ed by roughl y 5%.
( 3, ) .Offensi ve oper at i ons a r e pl anned and can-
duct ed t o enhance t e r r i t o r i a l s e c ur i t y of pa s t and pr es ent
pa c i f i c a t i on a r e a s and of t hose key a r e a s r equi r i ng
s pe c i a l s ecur i t y. The maj or i t y of the popul at i on and
major food produci ng c e nt e r s and ot her r es our ces a r e
wi t hi n t he a r e a designat,ed by t h i s p l w ~a s t he a r e a
f o r p r i o r i t y of i ni l i t a r y ofi' ensive oper at i ons. The enemy
i a t o be dest royed o r dr i ven from t h i s a r e a i nt o gpar s el y
popul at ed, food ; , came areas so a s t o p6ni i i t the SVli t o
pr ot e c t t he p o p u l a t i ~ n , cont r ol resources, and grovi.de
unr e s t r i c t e d use of tihe major l i n e s of cormnlinications.
See Appecdlx 1. (Area f o r pr f or i zg of Pl i l i t a r y Ci' renaive
Operat i ons) and appendix 2 ( Ar eas Requf s i n g Speci al Secur-
i t y) . -
(4)Systematic neut r al i zat i on of base ar eas
and capt ure or dest r uct i on of his i ns t al l at i ons , suppl i es,
and caches is t o be pursued aggressi vel y. Pr i or i t y of
e f f o r t i s t o be di r ect ed towards t he neut r al i zat i on of
L/
t hose base ar eas di r e c t l y af' fecting key popul at i on and
economic cent er s and v i t a l commclnications a r t e r i e s , par-
t i c u l a r l y t hose ar eas newly marked f o r paci f i cat i on
a c t i vi t y, t hus support i ng the over al l paci f i cat i on ef f or t .
,b. Employment
(1)RVNAF have t he primary r es pons i bi l i t y for
2ar t i ci pat i ng i n and supporting paci f i cat i on w i t h pr i or -
i t y of e f f o r t t o provi di ng t e r r i t o r i a l s ecur i t y f o r
t he ael ec t ed pr i or i t y areas.
,.
( a ) PF provide l ocal secur i t y f o r hamlets
and vi l l ages and a s r et r ai ni ng occurs par t i ci pat e act i vel y
i n paci f i cat i on. PF ar e t o be t a ~ g e t e d pr i mar i l y agai ns t
the VC g u e r r i l l a uni t s .
( b ) RF support and r ei nf or ce PF t o provide
s ecur i t y f o r hamlets and vi l l a z e s and ar e t ar get ed
pr i nci pal l y agai nst t he r egi onal uni t s of t he VC,
i ncl udi ng t he province companies.
( c ) 1 ARVN Corps re@lfi2 ur:i", G:I s a r r i t -
o r i a l s ecur i t y missions arupporc and reinforce 8P uni t s
i n t h e i r r es pons i bi l i t y f o r support i ng paci f i cat i ono
They extend ar ea secur i t y where necessmy by conaucting
pr ovi nci al search and dest r oy oper at i ons agai nst VC l oc a l
f or ces ( i ncl udi ng the pr ovi nci al bat t al i ons ) and against
VC/NVA main f or ce u n i t s where requi red,
( d ) I ARVN Corps r egul ar f or ces not wsigri-
ed t o RD support o r t e r r i t o r i a l secur i t y mi ssi ons are
assi gned t o di vi si on mobile s t r i k e f or ces and t o cont ai n-
ment operat i ons along the DkZ as part of Pr oj ect Dye
Marker, The di vi si on mobile s t r i ke f or ces conduct
coordi nat ed and combined operat i ons agai nst VC/ NVA main
f or ces, r eact i on operat i on support of paci f i cat i on and
other misaions as di r ect ed by CG I Corps.
( 0 ) Ranger bat t al i ons- ar e normally the
Corps r eact i on f or ce, but they may be at t ached t o a
di vi si on a s a s t r i k e f or ce f o r a par t i cul ar mission.
(f) RmTAF General Reserve mag be committed
t o bot h coordinated and combined search and dest r oy
operat i ons wi t h the di vi si on iilobile s t r i ke force, Cor ps
Reserve uni t s , and 111 l%IF o r ot her bS/r'iiLAF.
( 2 I ARVN Corps al s o has the primary
r es pons i bi l i t y f o r provi di ng t e r r i t o r i a l secur i t y f o r
LOC13 t hat support prf o r i t g economic and pol i t i c a l e f f or t s
na t i ona l r e s oi i xe s , goverman. t c e n t e r s , =2 ~ - - - ~ r , - - -L .,.AdC. " - + L
have undergone p r i o r pa c i f i c a t i on,
( 3 )
I11 MAF wi t h othef? US, / ~dbl b. . F has had.
t he pri mary r e s pons i bi l i t y f or :
( a ) Cont ai ment opera-lions al ong t he DXZ
and adj acent border sanct uar y a r e a s t o deny the enemy use
of i n f ilt i a t i on .and i nvas i on r out es . S r i o r i t y of e f f o r t
t o Pr oj e c t Dye Mirker f o r u n i t s assi gned r e s pons i bi l i t y
f o r t he DMZ o r por t i ons t hereof.
( b ) Dest royi ng t he VC/;WA main f or ces ,
base a r e a s snd resources. Appendix 3 ( Ne u t r a l i z a t i m of
VC/NVA Base Areas.
I c ) As s i s t i ng and r e i nf or c i ng I Ai?VN
Corps as neces s ar y i n openi ng and s ecur i ng LOC1 s,
povl di ng s e c ur i t y f o r s e l e c t e d p r i o r i t y a r e a s and
pr ot e c t i ng na t i ona l r esour ces.
(4)Although I ARVN Co ~ p si s as s i gned t he
primary r e s pons i bi l i t y f o r suppor t i ng pa c i f i c a t i on and
t he I11 MAF w i t h ot her PIWIL~Fhas t n e primary responsi b-
i l f t y f o r des t r oyi ng t he main Y ~ / N V A f or c e s arid bases,
this i s only a gener al di vi s i on of ~ e s p o n s i b i l l t i e s ,
Overlaps o r s h i f t s , depending on t he s l ~ u a t i o r i , ~o r i t l n -
genci es, o r oppor t uni t i es t o e x p l o i t enar;g I nt el Li gence,
ui l l occur.
-ex C ( Y i P i t a r y SupgorL for iLD ) to
Combined Cmpaign Pl an I-66.
C CJEFIDENTIAL
Annex C (WiiitargSypport of RB)t a Conbir-eC Ccir,>~L= PLw-
1-68
1, ( U ) SITWATIONt
a. . General. This annexo u t l i n e s the rolecC themi l f *
t a r y i n suppor t dRD, t he conoept f o r pa c i f i c a t i on, and
de f i ne s t he f unc t i ons of RWAF and I11MAF/m~F cmxanciera
i n pa c i f i c a t i on a c t i v i t i e s .
b. EnemyForces, Annex A - I nt e l i i ge nc e ,
c. Fr i endl y Fo.rces. Paragraph 1, Basi c Pl ane
d. Assumptions, Paragraph 1, BasicP l a n ,
2, (C)KISSION: . RVNAF andI11YAF/WUF, i n conj unat %on
wi t h c i v i l el ement s, conduct mi l i t a r y oper at i ons t o sugporf,
FDa c t i vi . t i e s i n s e l e c t e d popul at ed areas t hroughout TCTZ,
3, (C)CONCEPTS:
a, Pa c i f i c a t i on
(1)
Behindt.ne s hi e l d provi ded by thecontainment
enkoffensive oper at i ons of 111YAF/FWFLA? endAWVN Ps ~s e a ,
a GVXpa c i f i c a t i on program of syetematio andaooelsrated
I
ac t i v i t f e s i n mi l i t a r y, economic, and,soci ol og-
i cal ' pr opma i s being conduct ea withtbas l . l et anc e s f
theUS, I t i s support ed by and pr ovi de& the f oundat i on $ 0 ~
nation-building e c t i v i t i e a . ~ a c i f i c a t i o n hast hree o b j ~ o -
i n t e ?nal s e c ur i t y agai nst VC l o c a l f or ces , gderr%i%sas
t e r r o r i s t s , suSverai ves and VZ in
C-l
adequat e t o per mi % tho, uni nt er r upt ed ancl i l ccel er ut ci l conduce
of aconomlc, sycial and p o l i t i c a l pro[{ran.
( b ) To establish @I ef l ' ect i ve i,70:fticaJ S ~ I X C -
ture a t the l o c d l evel capable of' respdndifig t o and e l f c i t -
ing t he p a r t i c i p a t i o n of t he people.
( c ) To stirnula t e sel f - sust ai ni ng; economic
a c t i v i t y capabl e of expansion.
( 2 ) The pa c i f i c a t i on caxripaign provi des s us t ai ned
t e r r i t o r i a l s e c ur i t y i n t he count r ys i de and c o n c u r ~ e n t l y t o
i nt r oduce p o l i t i c a l , economic and s oc i a l reforms wnich w i l l
es i a bl i s h condi t i ons f avor abl e f o r f u r t h e r growth and st ab-
i l i t y . Operat i ons t o a nni hi l a t e t he eneniy a r e by t hemsel ves
i nadequat e. The peopl e ~ i u s t be s epar at ed and wsn ove r from
t he enemy, and t h i s can onl y be done w i t h the a c t i ve coop-
sratLcxl of t& themselves.
( 3) The e s s e n t i a l f i r s t s t e p toward -&acifi c a t i o n
5s t o cr eat e a secur e environment i n which z c t i v i t i e s
desi gned t o e l i c i t the pa r t i c i ga t i on of tile ::eople in'the
elir.:S.nation of i n J u s t i c e , f e a r , =d r i ~i ~e r : y tjeglr? with CES:
son;e pror~i i se of success. Tne r e q u i s i t e d e p e e 6' securi t ; ?.
i s to b6 appl i e d by t he Rm<ki;; t . i e I<&t?.cca:P o l i c e , th2
Revol ut i ozary 3evel o~r nent Ca d r e t acr csei ves, 3 n c l c z ~ ; l y
. - -
.. .
coor&i r, nt ed c9mbi nat i o>s t':st s j i i i ;r?ry c;epci:c.i:-;::,... L;?CT: v:ie
CONFIDENTIAL
( b)
~ o n c u ~ r l s n k :er; i t s r . . ' ^ ~ ~ l wi t h the proi l ~sl . or[22'
s e c ur i t y, e f r ~ r t ~ r.ok' ur.aii zs t o i d e n t i f y and el-lrr:ir,ace or
t he V C f f i f r as t r uct ur e a r e intensified. The l i a t l o n ~ l . ?ol i ce
Fi e l d Forces, a c t i ng a s t he e xpl oi t a t i on arm of t he combined
i nt e l l i ge nc e community, conduct agcr es s i ve oper at i ons
a ga i ns t key members of t he i nf r a s t r uc t ur e ,
(51
I nt e gr a l t o pa c i f i c a t i on i s r evol ut i onar y
developvent. ED covers t hose s pe c i f i c endeavors i n t ne
haml et s and vi l l a ge s . I t i ncl udes a l l or gani zed e f f o r t s
t o ext end GWT presence and c mt r a l t hroughout t he count ry,
t hrough t he use of t he RD Cadre groups, and, Ci vi l - Ki l i t a r g
RD tearns, a s wel l as hanilet and vi l hage sponsored s el f - hel p
pr oj e c t s ,
( 6 ) Economic and s oci ol ogi cal programs d e s l p e d t o
devel op. l o c a l governrr~ent and gai n ttle pa r t i c i pa t l on of t he
people a r e c a l l e d New Li f e Development programs. I nt r o-
duced by t he Revol ut i onary Development Cadre o r ot her means,
t hes e programs pr ovi de f o r t he s t i r ni l at i on of and support
f o r s e l f - s us t a i ni ng economic a ~ d p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y , which
i s st r engt hened cn d cont i nued t hrough corr~i~uni ty devel ol ~ment
follow-on programs.
b. Se c ur i t y
(1) The key t o p c i f i c a t i o n i s t,lc pr ovi s j on cf
' sust ai ned t e r r i t o r i a l s e c ur i t y. ' -' arri t o r i a l s czur i t y i :;
d e f i n 8 d . a ~ s e c ur i t y from YC l o c a l f or cas"and E ~ e r r i l L a
u n i t s and VC/IWA main f or ce uni t s . I t also i ncl udes the
az.0 Popul ar Forces ( PF) arid I;e:;ior,al i~' orces (HF), ARVN
ba t t a l i ons w i l l be assi gned t o the t e r r i t o r i a l s e c ur i t y
f or ce where t hs P?'and t he RF s t r e ngt hs a r e i nhdequat e,
The two ?ar t s t o t e r r i t o r i a l s e c ur i t y are:
( a ) Secur i t y f o r a r e a s un6ergo5. n~ FD; and
(b) Secur i t y f o r ot her i mnort ant a r e z s i ncl u-
di ng pr evi ous l y pa c i f i e d a r e a s , LOC, r e s owc e s , and Govern-
I
ment c e nt e r s ,
\
( 3 ) The r o l e s of t he d i f f e r e n t f or c e s i n p r o v i d i ~ g
t e r 4 r i t o r i a l s e c ur i t y, a r e cont ai ned i n Arnex E! ( ~ c n c e p t of
Employment of l Al i t a r g Far ce) .
(4) The i t at i onal Folic;, (I.i?) have t he prirnary
r e s pons i bi l i t y f o r i nt e r na l s e c ur i t y and f o r oper at i ons
a;ainaz t he V C i nf r a s t r uc t ur e, w,Jfth silppor t rroni a l l l #, i l i -
t a r y and c l v i l i nt e l l i ge nc e a!:encies; knd f o r nom~a l l aw
and or der . The LTP Fi el d ?orces (:iPFF) s . ; oul d be r e t a r ge t e d
as the e xpl oi t a t i on arr~' of t , , c i n t e l l i , cnce c )vl:uri i t y
agai ns t t he VC S nf r a s t r uc Lure. i3cised p r l L8 ar aily a t i . 1 ~
provl nce and d i s t r i c t l e v e l , and. operat;n& c l os e l y r ~ i t c ithe
X? Speci al Br wcn, t i l e ;;?F ccndkc 'i a,;-,r e ,sive oy;eratior, s
a s s i n 4- key xerckers cr" he : nf r as t r ~ c k ~ r o accz~rci ance i -
.;' w i t h t h e smne p r i o r i t i e s e s cablisriled f ~j ri , aci . f i cat i on. , A S
t he paci fdcat i c n process proceeds, t..e 2P as siu,:e r es pons i -
5 i l p y f o r law=d order. The 3ecur.i tg e i s n c n t o f t he 35
Cndqe Groups L;na thepeople t hexssl vos, or,ce s r ya : ~izec? i ncr,
sel f - def ense groups, &so provi de i r i t er nul s ecur i tyi n vary-
i ng degrees depending on the Local s i t ua t i on,
( 5 ) Se c ur i t y f o r RD, as s t a t e d above i s provi ded
by t e r r i t o r i a l s e c ur i t y f or c e s i n t he f ol l owi ng manner:
( a ) The organi zed hamile t sel f - def ense forces
provi de a c t i ve and pas::ive def ense f o r t:?e hamlet t o i ncl ude
she1 t e r s , i nt e l l i ge nc e f o r mi l i t a r y f or ces , warning t o tihe
popul at i on of a t t a c k, and similar act i ons . When t hese
f or c e s a r e armed, t hey w i l l provi de f o r i nt e r na l s e c ur i t y
of t he h a r l e t and may e s t a b l i s h guard pos t s , l i s t e n i n g pos t s ,
and pa t r ol s , dependinl; upon t h e i r c a pa bi l i t y t r e sircia-
t i on, The Nat i onal Pol i ce e s t a b l i s h pol i c e pos t s , and
pa t r ol s , and conduct oper at i ons t o a t t a c k t:ie VC i nl ' r ast r uc-
t ur e.
( b ) The Popul ar Porce (I-':') u n i t s oper at e i n a
cont i guous zone out s i de trle hal - l et by cc;nuuction night
s a t ur a t i on pa t r ol s , mbushes, e s l a l i s h i n ~out pos t s and
sing othera n t i - g v e ~ . r i l l z t a c t i c s , corduc Ling ml y i . i xi t e c
day time oper at i ons such as at t acki ng VC tax'col l ec, zi on
poi nt s .
Usingt h e s e sa~Le ~ ~ c . ; z c s , -..
.- .
( c ) :-;.? f i ~- . - . c - - ~& A L A
For'ce (RF) ur . i t s ill oy;e~:,-,;i, tj.riji;;:.,ui;; 2;;o .,..r,- a:;cs
c ~ n t i s o u st o tjlat of t'e : J ~ T , b.uz f:l--+,.herC ~ S T , . - ' i'r.(ji,; tfie
~ L L L L U A -
hamlet o r vi l l a ge .
2ON FIDZNTIAL
w i l l conduct oper at i ons t o elirriintlto t k ~ VC by u s i c g searck.
and des t r oy t a c t i c s as well ad a n t i - e r r i l P a tae'tfwb
c . Revol ut i on Development
(i)
The ED pol i c y f o r 1968 i s t o expand GVN can-
r o l l e d ar eas by f ocus i ng ED e f f o r t s on t he development of
new l i f e h m ~ e t s ( ~ p Doi Loi ) and pa c i f i e d h a t s (Lp ainh
Dinh) and t he s t r engt heni ng of r egr es s ed naml et s ( hp T a n h
Si nh) and t o implement, i n pr evi ous l y pa c i f i e d areas, a
program of mai nt ai ni ng t he s e c ur i t y and cont i nui ng t he
development. I t i s a cont i nuat i on o f t he I D program of
1967 wi t h an unchanged basic ~ o l i c y , The har. l et s ui 11 be
s e l e c t e d on t he ba s i s of t h e i r popul at i on dens i t y, t he
pr os pe r i t y of' t h e i r econoniy, t h e i r s t r a t e g i c ~ o s i t i o n , and
the. a b i l i t y o f t he s e c u ~ i t yf or c e s t o p r o t e c t them. '?'rig
-
s e l e c t e d haml et s n u s t be grouped ui';aln v i l l a g e s and
. ,
hi
pl anned a c t i v i t i e s n u s t be conpl et ed i n one village 'oer'cre
novi ng on t o anot her vi l l a 5e .
( 2 ) Because ED i s m and i nt e gr a l e e ! ~ ~ i l i t a r y c i v i l
ci3e.d a t all ecncl ons.
d. iiL campaigns.
(1) FtD campai gs , lzunched i n 3-96? d 11 be expand-
ed i n 1968 t o encor;lFass a cer t ei r , nmber of new haii;let;s,
or organized i n t he a e a s newly p i a
C-6
CONFIDENTIAL
( 2 )
Campaignsw i l l be or gsni zsd a t provi nce or
d i s t r i c t l e v e l , or a t the Levelof anyappropriate mi l i t a r y
u n i t accordingt o the degree cF importance, Campaignscan
be organi zed i n t he ar s aa cpe~at edby'threa o r morecadr e
. groups. The l i m i t s . of t he campaign encompass tb RDa r e a ,
and t heneces s ar y cont i guous t e r r i t o r y t o pr ovi de s e c u r i t y
f o r t he RD ar ea.
( 3 ) Pa r t i c i pa t i on i n t he cm' paign i s r equi r ed f or
t he ARVN u n i t s at t ached insuppor t of the RD carr~paign; RF,
,
PF, Nat i onal Pol i ce, RD Cadre Groups, Hanllet Self-Defense
Forces, per sonnel r egi onal mi l i t a r y agenci es, andadmin-
i s t r a t i v e , pol i c e and' t echni cal personnel belonging t o t he
s e r vi c e s and o f f i c e s i n the provi nce.
,
(4) AFVN u n i t s employed i n s upr c ~r t of RD w i l l
oper at e normal l y under t he oper at i onal cont r ol of provi nce/
s ect or . The a ut hor i t y t h a t exer ci s es c o n t ~ 01willdes i gnat e
an a r e a of r e s p e n s i b i l i t y f o r t he unit; t h i s a r e a nus t 'be
approved by Co r p . Uni t s nay be w i thdrawn from t h e i r ar ea
when recamrnended by t he Provi nce Chief and a2proved by
Corps. I n an emergency, e m&. when the u n i t i s r equi r ed
t o a s s i s t a f r l e ndl y f or ce t h a t cor~lesunder a;taclt suddenly,
t he u n i t may be usad out s i de t he a r e a f o r a pef i od not t o
exceed s i x hours provi ded ot he r l oc a l resources al r eady
w e .comriitted afid a ~r,inimur.. securalty f o r c e ror: ai . ns i n the
are.a whi l e t he u n i t i s abiag.
( 5 ) . Pl i l i t a r y, a c t i v i t i e s aread; . ! i ni et cr ed t hrough
L
CONFIDENTI AL
- .-- . .
t heJ83 and subordinate RVNAF t r c b l o ~ s o pr ovi nc e end
I /
d i s t r i c t leveler Regional, pr ov l noi al , and df s t r i c t f i i ~
act i v2t i d ' s Ind insuzle that ' t hemi ut ary and c i v i l aspecte
40 ( 8 ) TASKS*
a. PLRVN
( 3)
CG I Corps coor di nat e, t hrough the regional. RD
counci l , pacifi oat f on' pl ans and a c t i v i t i e s of adj acent
provi noes wi t hi n t he CTZ t o i ns ur e t h a t they a r e coordi nat ed,
and a l l oc a t e mi l i t a r y r esour ces, Incl udi ng autnor8it y t o
r e c r u i t RF and F'F, t o provi nces f o r conduct of paci f i cat i on.
(2)
ARVN Di vi si on/ Speci al Zone Comandel s are
r es pons i bl e f o r pl anni ng and execut i on of mobile s t r i k e
I
oper at i ons a ga i ns t enemy u n i t s and bas es t o s uppor t pro-
v i n c i a l pa c i f i c a t i on ef i ' or t s . With r e s pe c t t o 3a c i f i i c a -
t i on, s p e c i f i c f unct i ons of t hes e comnanders are: .
( a)
Coordi nat e pl anni ng and execut i on cf
mobi l e strike o p e ~ a t i o n s wi t h t e r r . i t or i a 1 s e c ur i t y pl ans
and a c t i v i t i e s .
( b )
Becor:lnona t o I C o r ~ stklc app, r opr i at e
a l l oc a t i on of foroes.wi t hi n t he i:9I of t t l e di vi s i on between
mobile s t r i k e oper at i ons and pa c i f i c a t i on. ,
I
( c )
I n accordance wi t 1 1 guidance from I Corps,
a s s i s t pr s vi nces i n pr epar i ng t e r r i t c r i a l s e c ur i t y plans.
( df
S u p p ~ r t adririnist r a t i v e l y an.a l o g i s t i c a l l y
di vi s i on u n i t s assi gned by C'IZ t o operati. ona1 cont r ol of
CONFIDENT1AL
Appendix2 ( A % ~ ~ o K ~nf' rast, ~zlctiir?'to ~ z ~ i e x C (Hili- on VC j
wy Support of paci f i cat i on) Gmlpaign P1~3.n 1-68. co ~onbf r r ~xi
1, ( C ) SITUATION:Despite ppogreasi np a c i f i cat f on programs
and i n t he mi l i t ar y e f f or t , theVC infras' cmrcture remains
l ar gel y i n t a c t throughout Vietnam. A 1though many agencles
areengaged i n thee f f or t , a more ef f ect i ve, sust ai ned
at t ack on t he i nf r as t r uct ur e can be waged, Thfs can be
accmpl i ahed by s peci f i c del i neat i on of r esponsi bi l i t y,
improved coordi nat i on, and more concent rat ed employment
of exi s t i ngU S and GVN programs and resources f o r col l ec%i on,
col l at i on and t i mel y expl oi t at i on of i nt el l i gence on the
VC i nf r as t r uct ur e,
Techniques, procedures and f unct i ons asr el at ed to
scr eeni nr , processi ng and handl i ng VC c i v i l i a n det ai nees,
as well as t he cont r ol s and gui del i nes designed t o i nsur e
/
t i mel y di ssemi nat i on and expl oi t at i on of i nt el l i gence stnd
oper at i onal i nformat i on, need t o be sys ternaeically stand-
ardi zed and irproved. In ad i t i o n , i t isessential. t hat
cent r al i zed r epor t i ng systems, keyed t o support i n t e l l i -
gence col l ect i on, oper at i onal ~ l a n n i n ~ ~ , , management and
eval uat i on, be developed.
2 . C S I O N I dent i f y, l ocat e, harass, di s r upt ,
neut r a l i ze and. el i ml nat e the VC i nf r as t r ucture.
3, ( C ) EXECUTION
a. ,Concept. The P~ovi nce Chiefi s r es pons i bl e f o r che
at t ack-agai nst the inCrast r uct ur e a t ProvFnce l evel ; t he
Di s t r i c t Chi ef f s r e s p n s i b l e f o r X.5 s t k k c d %:;&.;Y;: LC&
i nf r a s t r uc t ur e ar, District l o v ~ l r
(1) ColLoction Ef f o r t
( a) The Provinoe I nt el l i genca Coordi nat i ng
Commiti ee ( PICC) provi des a s ui t a bl et base f o r coor di nat i ng
t he a t t a c k a ga i ns t t he VC i nf r a s t ni c t ur e , Membership
should be expanded t o i ncl ude r e pr e s e nt a t i ve s of agenci e s
havi ng r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s f o r e xpl oi t a t i on and de t e c t i on
as pect s of t he a t t a c k a ga i ns t t he i nf r a s t r uc t ur e . P I CC
should i hcl ude: Deputy Chief Eor Se c ur i t y (chai rman), Seni or
I
Commander of mi l i t a r y u n i t s assi gned t o Provi nce, Provi nce
Pol i ce Chi ef, Chief of Pol i c e Speci al Branch, Chief af.rYSS,
CO of Nat i onal Pol i ce, Fi e l d Force, and Sect or 52 and S 3 .
( b ) The Permanent Of f i ce of t he PICC conduct s
the d a i l y ope r a t i o n s i nvol ved i n t he c ol l e c ti on, c o l l a t i on
and a na l ys i s of i nt e l l i ge nc e concerni ng t he VC i n f r a s t r kc t ur e
a t Provi nce l e ve l . The Permanent Of f i ce, super vi sed by t he
Se c t or S2 f o r t he P I C C chairman, w i l l i&clude f ul l - t i me
r epr esen t a t i o n frorn all GVN agenci es and a l l F:VNAF/GS/FWNAF
uni t s and agenc!es t asked wi t h the col ' l ect i on of i nt el l i gence.
( c ) Di s t r i c t Op r a t i o n s and I nt e l l i ge nc e
Coordi nat i ng Cent ers ( D O I C C s ) will be esl;. abljshedi n ever y
d i s t r i c t where s i g n i f i c a n t pa c i f i c a t i on a c t i d i t i e s ar e
bei ng c ~nduc t e d. These d i s t r i c t c e nt e r s wi . 1 1 oper at e under
,phe general d i r e c t i o n of t he GVN di s' t r i c9: chi ef wi t h U S
advi ce, guidance and pa r t i c i pa t i on. D C I C C s wi 11 be organ-
. -
f
c-2-2
CONFI DENTI AL
i zed F r m personriel avai l abl e at d i s t r i c t i ncl udi ng repre-
, t t *
s e nt a t i ue s from the ~ u b a s c t o r ' 5 2,Natiorrab Pol i c e Speci al
t
Branch, end Census Grievance. 0, t her membership ahould
i ncl ude r epr es ent at i on from Pr ovi nci al Reconnaisssnce Uni t s
I
( P RU) , Nat i onal Pol i ce Fi e l d Force (NPFF), Revol ut i onary
Development Cadre, and subsec t or S-3. Iri i ns ecur e ar eas
where mi l i t a r y oper at i ons predominate, t he subsect or S-2
should head t he DOI CC. I n ot he r more secur e d i s t r i c t s ,
t he chi ef of t he Di s t r i c t Pol i ce Speci al Branch may be i n
charge.
( d) I ndi vi dual i nt e l l i ge nc e or gani zat i ons
t ar get ed againit t he VC i nf r a s t r uc t ur e w i l l ens.zre t h a t
c ol l e c t i on requi rement s a r e geared toward Ancreasi ng t he
qua l i t y and quant i t y of i nt e l l i ge nc e . Col l ect i on e f f o r t s
should r e f l e c t de t a i l e d sket ches and i nf or n~at i on t h a t w i l l
=*
he l p i a e n t i f y and l oc a t e i ndi vi dual VC or VC s us pe c t s , .
( 2 ) Col l at i on Effcr t
(a) The provi nce l e ve l of r,he GVIi i s t he f oc a l
poi nt f o r a l l de t a i l e d pl anni ng and c, ;. ordination of US/FWI\LAF
and SVN pa c i f i c a t i t e n a c t i v i t i e s . I j i f t r i c t and 212 Cmpai gn
a r e a s ar e priniary l e v e l s of execut i on,
( b ) The ~ r o v i n c i a l Inter:.o;..ati,xi ~ e n ~ e r
- -
col i at i : ; n secti.:.:n w i l l be tke ' cent r al r 6; 3~si t o; c. yof 811
pr ovi nci al i nf r a s t r uc t ur e i n r e l l l ~ e r l c ? .
( c ) ~ a c hDOI C: w i l l orpani ze a c ol l a t i on
s ect i on which wi l l secve as a cent r al rej>csii.or:; f o r all
i nf r a s t r uc t ur e i nt e l l i ge nc e r ecei ved tit district, -. - .. Ir4: v;-
dual VC i nf r a s t r uc t ur e dos s i e r s and f f l & car ds sk,c~;d be
mai nt ai ned t o f a c i l i t a t e rapid recovery of i nf or mat i on,
A l l i nformat i on obt ai ned on i ndi vi dual V2 w i l l be f i l e d i n
t he s ubj e c t s dos s i e r and i ncl udb copi es of i nt e l l i ge noe
r e por t s , i nt e r r oga t i on r e por t s , VC documents, photographs,
and any. ot he r documents conf i nni ng -i nformat i on about t he
( d )
Card f i l e s on VC and s us pect VC w i l l be
mai nt ai ned a t DOICCs by a r e a , Area Bl a c kl i s t s can be made
from car d f i l e s which c c nt a i n all i nformat i on t h a t w i l l
assist i n t he i d e n t i f i c a t i o n and l oc a t i on of i ndi vi dual UC
o r vc suspect .
( 8 ) DOI CCa w i l l mai nt ai n c ha r t s that di agmn
t he VC p o l i t i c a l or gani zat i on i n d i s t r i c t s and vi l l ages .
( 3 ) Di ssemi nat i on of I nt e l l i ge nc e
'( a) I nf r as t r uct ur e' i nt e l l i ge nc e w i l l fl ow
both v e r t i c a l l y and l a t e r a l l y t o ensure that a l l appr opr i at e
agenci es and uni t s a r e r ecei vi ng i nt e l l i ge nc e i nf or mat i on
neces s ar y. f or a c t i on agai ns t t he VC i nf r a s t r uc t ur e .
(b-) I nf r a s t r uc t ur e i nt e l l i ge nc e w i l l f l ow
v e r t i c a l l y between d i s t r i c t , provi nce, and corps, while
t a c t i c a l i nt e l l i ge nc e w i l l fl ow from d i s t r i c t , provi nce,
d i l i s i o n , t hen corps.
( c ) Wherde'DOICCs ar e f unct i oni ng, d i s t r i c t
l e v e l i nt e l l i ge nc e coverace ,will not depend s o l e l y upon
.--
--1--_ ._
-"
C-2-4
:.he i r l t t i l l i gence col l ect ed l oc a l l y. ConlcJn~ou; L n p ~ tw i l l
be r equi r ed f r om provi nce and hi gher , l s v s i u i n .the form of -
agent r e por t s , PI C i nt e r r oga t i on Pepor ts, capt ured doculnents,
and vi l l a ge and hamlet f o l d e r s pe r i odi c a l l y updat ed.
( d ) I n Di s t r i c t s wi t hout DOI CCs t he Permanent
Offi ce of t he PICC w i l l be r es pons i bl e f o r i ns ur i ng timely
di ssemi nat i on t o appr opr i at e d i s t r i c t per sonnel of a l l
pe r t i ne nt province-produced i nf or mat i on. The P I C C w i l l
s t i mul at e and encourage i t s f u1l qs t ' - Ut i l i s a $i o. I n such
d i s t r i c t s where t he Di s t r i c t chi ef has developed a coordi -
nat i ng mechanism s i mi l a r t o t he DGI CC, t he obj e c t i ve w i W
be t o ensur e adequat e a t t e n t i o n t o! t he a t t a c k on VC inf'ra-
s t r uc t ur e and t o pr ovi de guidance and a s s i s t a nc e t o achi eve
t h i s goal .
( 4) Expl oi t a t i on o f I nt e l l i ge nc e
(a) The cent er of gr a vi t y of i nt e l l i ge nc e
oper at i ons agai nst the VC i nf r a s t r uc t ur e and i r r e g u l a r
f or c e s must ne c e s s a r i l y r e s t a t t he provi nce l evel .
Coordi nat i on and di vi s i on of l abor i s r equi r ed t o ensure
t h a t maxinlwfi use i s. nmde o f pr of es s i onal / t echni cal i n t e l l -
i gence s k i l l s a va i l a bl e snd t hnt cl os e coor di nat i bn i s
mai nt ai ned wi t h subor di nat e i n t e l l i ;;ence and opma t i ng
el ement s a t t he d i s t r i c t l e v e l wherae the bulk of' t he ai . ~aci t s
on l ow-l evel i nf r a s t r uc t ur e and l o c a l irregular f or c e s rr,us t
be generazed and c s r r i e d out .
(b) ULI C ,s w i l l pul l to;.e t her c ur r e nt i nt e l l - '
i t : ~; ~c a ,t o inclucio: i nt oI l i , 7enca f~ilaizr-ilp and papi d rscii-
t i o n ope r a t i ons wi t h l o c a l f o r c e s under ' d i s t r f c t cont r ol ;
pr oposi ng t o Provi nce s p e c i f i c r e a c t i o n oper at i ons o r s p e c i f i c
t a r g e t s f o r r e a c t i on oper at i ons ; p e r i o d i c a l l y as s es s i ng,
on t he b a s i s of i n t e l l i g e n c e acqui r ec, t he adequacy of
a va i l a bl e i n t e l l i g e n c e c o l l e c t i o n e f f o r t s i n t L, e Di s t r i c t .
( c ) Di s t r i c t l e v e l i n t e l l i ence elercenrs
w i l l be pr epar ed t o pr ovi de i n t e l l i g e n c e s uppor t i n t he
form of human a s s e t s wi t h know'ledge 0:' t he a r e a and of ' JC
p e r s o n a l i t i e s ( gui des, Eoi Chanh, l oc a l pol i c e , e t c .) , t o
t a c t i c a l u n i t s when t hey a r e oper a t i n & i n the I ; l s t r oi ct ,
When a v a i l a b l e , c a i = > ~ ' , ~ l y selec. Led, qi l al i f ' i ed Eoi :hank
w i l l be t r a i n e d as i n t e r r o ~ a t o r s t o suppor t t he ZJIC!; or
i t s p a r t i c i p a t i n g el ement s.
( 5) Di s pos i t i c n of Det ai nees
( a) Prauipt and cot; t r o l l e d scr eeni ng, i n t e r r -
o. zation, j udi c a l pr ocessi ng, 1-.r;-?t det ent i on, he r ap:pr!:pri-
a t e d i s p o s i t i c n of det ai nees . Sce Appendix 6 ( C; . v i l i a n
Det ai nees ) t c Annex A ( Intelli~( 3 n c e )
( 6 ) r sycr , ol ogi cal ,,;jcr.a.t.i n s
( a ) O;,tinun! ut i l 5zat i : ~n .,f : I - ~ H , - r~iia;:i:d
~ p p r o p r i a t e ps ci f i . cat i on and nil;.ta:r.;,r < ~ ~ ~ ? z . t i o n s ,
ib)U. E, psychol ogi cal c:,fir;2c i ons
~ ..
$5:;; ~, , : - 5
~iiilr e c o ~ e i ~ d r r br r bu~r i d. oper at i ons basedupm 6xp: : di t nbl e
a va i l a bl e a s event s occur. If as s i at ancb i s naehed t o
p r i n t psychol ogi cal mat er i al , t he Ue S. 244thpsycho10gicE;1
oper at i ons company at Corps l e v e l iiavai l abl e.
( c ) DOICCsa r e encourage t o proFose psychol c-
gi c a l oper at i ons based upon r e a di l y expl oi t abl e event s
t aki ng pl ace i n d i s t r i c t s . Di s t r i c t s s h ~ u l d r e l a y . proposal s
t o provi nce f o r act i on.
( 7 ) Coordi nat i on
( a ) The Provi nce Chief and Provi nce Senior
Advisor w i l l i ns ur e t h a t appr opr i at e coor di nat i on i s hff-
ec t ed be tween oper at i onal u n i t s a t t a c ki ng t he VC i n f r a s t -
ructureand t h a t t a r ge t i ng f o r i nf r a s t r uc t ur e oper at i ons
ar e developed bot h a t tkie Peraanent Offi ce of t he PI CC
andDOICC.
(b)The FICCw i l l convene on a ti.r!lely ba s i s
and r e f l e c t pa r t i c i pa t i on and r e p r e s e n t a t i ~ n from all '
a c t i on el ement s concerned wi t h t he a t t a c k a ga i ns t t he VC
i nf r a s t r uc t ur e .
( a ) Pe r i o d i c r ep rtsar e r equi r ed t a r:easilre
pr ogr ess i n e l i mi n a t i m o f anb evk 2. - thei n f ' r a ~ t ~ r u c t u r e tr>
uat e t he enemyt s s ucces s i n r e c r ui t i ng g. i er r i l l as .
CC.NFIl).iijTIAL
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c o i l a t ed i n t e l 1 , i ~ e n c e on t he VC i n r r a s t r u c Lure pr e vi dus l y
. acqui r ed by a l l agenci es .
. ( 2 ) I n f om- at i on and i n t e l l i g e n c e p e r t a i n i n g t o
t ne VC i n f r a s t r u c t u r e c o l l e c t e d by i n t e l l < g e n c e a ge nc i e s
OT acqui r ed t hr ough a c t i o n o r r e a c t i o n ope r a t i ons w i l i be
i m~i e di a t e l y di s s emi nat ed t o i n t e r e s t e d agenci es and w i l l be
f or war ded wi t hout de l a y t o i30I!:Cs f o r i nf cr mat i on a.1-d
p c s s i b l e f ur t l i e r z c t i ~ n , t o t h e Pem~men' ; :3;)ffice of t 2e
PICC, and t o t he Fr o v i n c i a l I n t e r r o g a t i o n Cent er [ P; C) .
( 3 ) i ? r ovi nc i a l Reconnai ssance LLi t s , w i l l conduct
, .
s1:ecial oper u. t i ons t o c o l l e c t o r exp1: : i t i n t e l l i g e n c e .
a g a i n s t t he VC i n f r a s t r u c t u r e . I n t e l l i g e n c e c o l l e c t e d w i l l
Se pr ovi ded t o t he DSICCs, t , l e ?isrr,.ane~lt ' J f f i c e af t he
clpa' se i n :=rsu2.j >r t coorai nr. t ea oper st i r i ns of o'cher f o r c e s
a g a i n s t t he i nf ' r ns t r uc t ur e.
c. FVIU Llati:;nal Pol i c e .
PICC.
( 2 ) The NPFF, a c t i c g as the a c t i on arcn of %ha
Nat i onal Pol i ce Speci al Branch, fs respo-nsi bl e f o r e l hina-
t i on of t he VC i nf r a s t r uc t ur e i n d i s t r i c t s , villages mci
haml et s t'hrough over t pol i c e oper at i ons . NPF? will sarti-
c i pa t e i n oper at i cns mounted by RVNAF and 111 IviF/BL;IiLkF
uni ts and oper at i ons gener at ed by provi nce and d i s t r i c t
coor di nat i ng cent er s . Once t h i s main t aks has baen dis-
chargad, t he NPFF has t he pri mary r e s pons i bi l i t y- o f pr eve-
n t i n g VC r esur gence and the ul t i ma t e mi ssi on of safeguardi ng
t he ext ens i on OF ot her NP presence i n t o t he r u r a l araea.
The NPFF oper at es w i t h military f or c e s i n suppor t o f t he
2aci f ' i cat i on program by a c t i ng as t he s ear ch and a r r e s t
elenlent dur i ng c or dm and s ear ch mi ssi ons; perr'c;.,nlrLg
r es our ces cont r ol d u t i e s and s uppr es s i ns any riots or c i v i l
di s t ur bances . The assumption of uni f or : ~p h i c e 6 u ~ i e sf c r
s h o r t per i ods of time dur i ng t he t r a n s i t i o n ~ e r i o t between
-,, , l oc a l ?,re, mi l i t a r y oper at i ons an6 t he est abl . ' s h i e n t t '
EWkF/i%l/;l;~units i n a p: l i ce sugpcri; r o l e i n 31-3cr t o per-
form pri mary i nt er r ogat i on and a s s i s t i n 3 i ri t he ck. r . t r ol of
r ef ugees; t hus f er r e. t i ngc u t VC i nf r a s t r uc t ur e el ement s
us i ng r ef ugee cover t . 1 i nf ilt i a t e pa c i f i e d areas.
I i x ~ l o i t i n g
i nformat i on by conduct i ng mibush6u ar,d r a t d s 5 s a I'url;lrer
mi ssfon of NFFF, A t r egi onal l ave1 it r~eyr ai nl cnr ; e
provi nce NPFF u n i t s o r car r y o u t ope r nt i ~r i swhich r e q ~ f r a
cr os s i ng of province, boundari es by' employing t he Regi onal
Reserve NPFF ~ a t . t a l i on,
d, Hoi Chanh c a p a b i l i t i e s w i l l be used t o t he maxinum
, e x t e n t i n suppor t of t he a t t a c k on i nf r a s t r uc t ur e , bot h
t o induce VC t o r e t u r n t o the GVN ai de and t o suppart
i nt e l l i ge nc e and r e a c t i on a c t i v i t i e s . The Nat i onal Pol i ce
ar e r es pons i bl e f o r t he es t abl i s hment of Bona Fi des of
Chieu Hois, Personnel of mi l i t a r y i nt e l l i ge nc e , na t i ona l
pol i ce and ot her agenci es who ar e concerned &wi t h the
e xpl oi t a t i on of Hoi Chanh, ar e c a ut i omd t h a t such ' act i ons
w i l l n o t be prosecut ed i n such a manner a s t o com~romi se
t he s p i r i t or i n t e n t of t he Nat i onal ( G ~ J )Cpen Ar ms
Program. The s t a t u s of Hoi Chanh a s a d i s t i n c t and sep-
a r a t e cat egory, unl i ke PW, w i l l be c a r e f ul l y upheld,
Sel ect ed Hoi Chanh w i l l be used a s i nt er r o, yat or s , gui des
and i n ot her s ui t a bl e r o l e s for whi ch they a r e i ndi vi dua l l y
qua l i f i e d, such as i nt e r r oga t i on of r e a g e e s from t h e i r
:j\:n ;:er,erai' &rka to , j bt ai . n inf- r . mal i on cjn tile JC i nf r z -
styo- i f i t ha t area. . , b ~ t t i ~ ~
6. All u n i t s , agencies and a c t i v i t,ie.c: en.~;~gcl?din t h e
at t ack on he VC i n f r a s t r u c ~ u r ew i l l , E S ay;pro:.rj a t e and
i n accordance wi t h pr es cr i bed ~r o c e o u r e s , ir.sur2e r api d
- -
CONFIDENTIAL
, _. .--
%
and ef f ect i ve screening of det ai ness, i dent i , f i cat i on of
VC suspect s, and ear l y r el ease of inr~oc(3ntperemis. See
~ppendi xG ( Civ5lian Detainesd) t o Araex H {I nt el l i gence1,
VC suspect s w i l l be t r anapwt sd promptly t o t he appropri at e
i nt er r ogat i on aot i vi t y f o r timely i nt el l i gence expl oi t at i on
and- f ur t her proeeseing and/or det ent i on. Before r el eaae,
ci vi l i ans w i l l be f f dger pr f nt ed and photographed,by thk
Nat i on&. Pol i ce, o r support i ng elements, i n order t o '
provide posi t i ve i dent i fi ' cat i on of i ndi vi dual s and t o
es t abl i s h t hei r presence a t a knmn time and l ocat foa.
4. (.C) ADKINISTRATION AND L6GISTICS:
.
a. Logi st i cs. The PSB, NPFF and PEU f ar ces w i l l be
furni shed requi red l ogi s t i cal support ( t o include t rans-
por t at i on which i s beyond t he i r w n capabi l i t y) by RVNAF/
111W/-fi~ when operat i ng wi t h such forces.
be Personnel,
(1) I n addi t i on t o employing el 1 avai l abl e
resources, speci al emphasis w i l l be placed on i nt er r ceat i on
of PW, c i v i l -det ai nees, and Hoi Chanh f o r t he acqui si t i on
of i nt el l i gence on the VC i ni ' rast urct ure and tho Tdent i fi -
cat i on of VC i nfrast Vuct ure personnel.
( 2 ) I nt el l i gence coordi nat i an cent ers w l l l develop
techniques and procedures t o cat egori za information on
a l l PW, c i v i l det ai nees, and Hoi Chanh.
5. (C) COI2AND ASD SISNAL:
p a l i c e c ha i n cP comlmd,
c, averd 1 coor di nat i ng auth-?pit y wi t h i n LSF&.C'J f o r
the direction of the infrastructure attack f s r e t a i n e d
by Deputy t o CGPiLSPiACV f o r CORDS.
Signal. See Annex L ( Co mn u n l c a t i o ~ ~ and Z l s c t -
r o n i c s j .
Araurex D ( Besources Deni al )i to
Combined Oa p s i g a Pl an I-%*
.-
Annax D (Fiesourccjs Deni al ) t o Con~bi ncdCa::.pn';:fi L~,M-L 1-66
1. SITUATLLS
a* Enemy ?orces. Annax A ( I t Yt e l l i ~ @n c ~ )
b. Fr i endl y Porcos. Paragraph 1,bas i c pl an.
c . Background
(1) I n 1967, r e sources de ni a l measures ac t ~i eved
few s i z n i f i c a n t r e s u l t s . kany a u t h o r i t i e s d i d not know
how t o appl y s e l e c t i ve de ni a l rr!easures so as t o a s s i s t
economic devslopment i n t he count ry-si de, r a i s e t he l i v l n g
s t andar ds of the peopl e and des t r oy t ho enemy1s l o g i s t i c
s e l f -suf f ' i ci ency which has prol oneed t he war and under r ~i ned
t he na t i ona l econony.
( 2 ) Ddri ng 1966t he procrar.. f o r Resources 2eniaL
willbe iri-?roved, s o t h a t t?,e enemy cx: ; l oi t at i ,n of nat i onal
r es our ces can be ef i , ec t i v e l g f r u s t r a t e d wi'chout ' riindering
development of t he econor;;y.
2. ( I ? . To p r o t e c t t ~ l ei l anpower andn s t e r i a l
r es our ces of I CTZ and. t o aeng v i t a l resources t o t he ener,!y.
3 . ( c ) ~ G~ ~ ~ _ " I C; ; :
a. C ~ n c e p t
( 2 ) T.:esources d c n i a l 'is an ; . l e~. ; cnt of'ezcin0ml.c
CONFI3E:iT TAL
Ing f wne r f - 3 crops Zn or der t o c a r r y or, r,hb were
( b ) Cont r ol l i ng t he ri ov&~, ent or : ~i i l i t a r yuse
s uppl i e s , medi ci nes foodst i l ff s, e t c . t o t he i,'C f r on govern-
ment c ont r ol l e d ar eas .
( c ) DestrogPng VC f i nance =LU ecnncjmy a d
ot her or gani zat i ons and vent ur es which cont r i but e t o VC sei T-
s uf f i ci ency.
( 2 ) The scope of t h i s program i s l i ml t e d t o t'nose
measures under t aken wi t hi n I CTZ i ncl udi ng i t s r i v e r s and
c oa s t a l wat er s.
( 3) I nt e l l i ge nc e ef f ' or t s silould be 2 i ~ e c t ea to
c ol l e c t i ng and e xpl oi t i ng i nf ori ~; at l on w!;ich i d e n t i f i e s i zexs
c r i t i c a l t o t h e enemy war e f f o r t , szrong and weak points o r
t n e e nmy f i n a n c i a l and l o g i s t i c s t r uc t a r e s , and enen:y plans
and oper at i - , r Ls desi gned t o des t r oy t he 2- t i ona l economy~
( 4) A Resources Cont r ol Co:~;.clitl;ee w P i l be e s t a bl i s he d
a t Corps Ta c t i c a l Zone, DTA, Sect or , and Speci al Sect or
l e ve l s . Ccnpost i on and mi ssi on ar e s e t f o r ~ hi n t he
coor di nat i ng i ns t r uc t i on.
and d i s t r i c t c hi e f s t-, i r; cl i J&~;6r;2::.y
. .
i x . i ~ Ch2a- ~ ; 2 2 i . ~ t y ~ ~ ~ 3
. - - . . .
- " e ;-..
b i l i t i e s and f r i e ndl y resource: ; arid c:.;jav;i; ~;,i;; ;:: .A
c uvt per s onal l y do-;alop md exclcu.Lc; i;r,c; g!;&ri iri. CJT. C. O~' 'LC
explo' i t tt~eir:.rnowledga of the i o c a l si %,a.tion,
2 Execut i on Phase. Provl ncc: and l oc a l chief':,
must cont i nual l y eval uat e t ' nei r i oc a l s r e a s t o determine
boundri es of secur e and i ns ecur e a r e a s s o as t o implement
s e l e c t i ve deni al measures.
( a) Secure Areas. Enphasi s shaal d be on
pr ot ect i on on r i c e movement t o towns and c i t i e s . Check
poi nt s ( most l y mobi l e) w i l l be operated. t o check car go on
vehi cl es enr out e t o i ns ecur e a r e a s i n or der t o appl y popula-
t i o n cont r ol and t o i nt e r c e pt mi l i t a r y use medi cal and
chemical s uppl i es .
(b) Insecure Areas. Wi t hi n i ns ecur e areas,
t he s a l e , purchase and movement of mi l i t a r y us e sup;;lies
and f oods t uf f s w i l l be ccnt r ol l ed. P l a n s shoul d be made LC
pr ot e c t corr~r,odi t i e s a ga i ns t VC capt ur e dur l n~- shipments
c. D ~ R / s $ ~c i a 1 Zone
(1) Guide and a s s i s t Sect or s and Spe c i a l Sect or s i n
pr epar i ng appr 3pr i a t e r es our ces t o r deri i al pi anu ; ~ o n i and
eval uat e exe cl, ti J n of tile !~lan s .
{ 2 ) 'il'ocus i nt e l l i ge nc e e f f o r t s or, thtj cl ol l ecs i on
l o g i s t i c s ,ant; rr!ar,ur"c;cturing s i . t es ,
Cdl l oct i on Sy s ~ e n ,
( 5) Provfde a s s i s t a nc e a s r e q u f ~ e dto Se c %or s ana
S p c i a 1 Se c t or s t o or gani ze and execut e a system of road
and waterways checkpoi nt s i n secur e and insec;rs ar eas w L t ~
emphasis cn the use of mobile cneckpoi nt s.
d. Sect or s and Speci al Sect or s i n coordination wi t h TI1
XAF/FCY?IAF, Xat i onal Pol i ce , and appr opr i at e cl vi ; i l an
agenci es.
(1) P r e p r e and execut e r es our ces deni al pl ans t o
pr ot e c t t he r es our ces of Sect or s , ~ e c t o r s / ~ p e c i a l
( 2 ) As s i s t t he NP i n establishing r oa c and wat er-
uays checkpoi nt s i n secur e areas.
( 3 ) Cont r ol r es our ces i n i ns ecur e a r e a s wi t h t he
a s s i s t a nc e of t he NP.
(4) Conduct and/ or a s s i s t i n oper at i ons t o elirrLi-
nat e VC Tax Col l e c t i on System.
( 5) I ncr eas e psycnol opi cal oper at i ons md c l v l c
actions t o o5t a i n cooper at i on from tr:e ,,ec;;~le ;r, ci,!>st?lqva-
- 2 ,,J. : ~f n a t u r a l r e s o u ~ c e swlrlcl dori3a1 t o t . 1 ~er;en,y. P I .
headquar t er s e s t a b l i s h secur e c o n ~~~u n a : storage f o r safe-
guardi ng t he produce of v i l l a . es and f o? ; i o l d i n ~i ' o o a s t ~ f f s
capt ur ed f r o x t he enemy.
- - (7,) Conduct her bi ci de oper at i ons - ~ o des t r oy enemy
must be kndn~ni f f edi n accor dance w i t h the pr ocs aayes i n s'fiTA
3 i r e c t i v e No. ~ ~ ~ ~ / T ~ / T C / C T C T / T L C 6 May 1967. af
e. 1st ARVN MP Ba t t a l i o n i n c oor di na t i on wi t h D'I'bbs
Spe c i a l Zone, Se c t or s , Sp e c i a l Se c t or s &id Cfie III ii'ikl;?/FrdT;Y:~F:
(1) Pr ovi de p e r s o me i and equi pcent as r e qul r e d t o
p a r t i c i p a z e i n j o i n t and combfned cceckpoi nt s , f i naa ma
mobi l e.
( 2 ) As s i s t NP ope r a t i ons i n secur e a r e a s .
( 3 ) Assist NP i n t he mai nt enance of s e c u r i t y and
or de r i n towns and i n p r o v i n c i a l t e r ri t o r i e s .
( 4) Advise NP f o r c e s on j u d i c i ~ imatters i n &k:e
performance of t h e i r p o l i c e d u t i e s .
f. Xaval Coliunand, 1st Coas t al Zone i n c oor di na t i on witn
US Naval f o r c e s a s s i gne d and t asked by CGi\.2,iAVTGliV:
(1) Pr ovi de na va l f o r c e s as r eqt i i : ed t o essl st i n
t h e ba s i c t a s k s of r e s our c e s de ni a l .
( 2 ) Pay p a t i c u l a r a t t e n t i o n i;o t h e d e t e c t i o n ,
.. .
. .
l ~t ; er . ; : ct i sn, and d e s t r u c t i o n of s,a ak.2 rive,? .Lornc --r s ~ ~ . ? -
. - . .
Zone, Se c t o r s , and Special Se c t or ta a s - i ~ o : . ,,si-;r ~ ' : i l ; t : ckecli-
p o i n t s on c o a s t a l and L n l ~ n awh t e r ws y s .
(4) z s t a b l i s i ; c or , t r ol c!;ec%.~oi;..ts c : r , t ; - ~ l
wat er bor ne t r df i c i n ' C a ~ a n ~ Itar'uo:..
, &. ,;- ,.,
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conauct of r es our cas de ni a l a c t i v i t i e s ,
4. ( C) CCORDI NATI ON INSTRIJCTIOXS
a, Pr i o r i t y of r es our ces de ni a l activities dt oul d be
di r e c t e d t o t h e s e l e c t s 6 RD areaa.
b.
Primary r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r r es our ces a e ni a l i n secLra
ar eas r e s t s wi t h t he GVN c i v i l i a n aEenc:es wi t h t he as s i s z-
ance d:ARVN, I11 MAF/ WAF, ,and U S Ci v i i i m agenci es.
( 1) Coordi nat i ng r e s p o n s i ~ i l i t i e s f o r execut i on
of th r es our ces de ni a l pl an i n secur e ar eas : e e t s wi t h
t he NP.
( 2 ) Compliance wi t h curfew orciers bnc p o p ~ 1 2t i ~ n
c ont r ol measures f o r t ne apprehensi on or" a e s e r t e r s and. d r a f t
evader s w i l l be i n accordant e wi t h c ur r e nt l aws and e s t hb-
fish 2rocedures.
( 3 ) Accounting f o r and ' rlandlin- of uj dy a2prehenaed
r ; es er t er s a d draft evaders; w i l l be in accbrdance wi t h
c dr r e nt r e gul a t i ons 2nd or der s.
c. The pr oper t y of c i v i l j a r i s wi l l '3e ~Asecon;y ir, t h e
e ~ye ntof . ; perat i ofi &l ne c e s s i t y i n c ~ d e r Q ~ S Z T L - .CG I L ~ T ^ . . ~ Y ~ . T z ~
ctier, t ker eof .
d. 3ecc rs acid S k e c i k l Se z t s r s sui;r:it resorts q ~ ~ q t l - c y
of r e s ~ ~ p c e ~ a c ~ i v i t i e si n acc rdanca iinllex N de ni a l hiLti;
( Quar t er i y Review).
2 , ;!ice Pr o t a c t i o n
j. Use oil Be r bi c i de s
4. Control of Water houzev
. Cont r ol , Disposition snk Safh -;a?clA>g oZ
- \
.J Xp2and'Ls 2 (:7 1 c ~i ' ~ ' o t ~ c t i o n ) LO Annex , J L T : L ~ J ~ ~ : ~ 2 k L ,
t d ~ o x b i n o di:m12ait.~Plan 1-68
2 . (U) fl Li ~i oSE, This apgonciix outlinc-3s t uuks t s bo :,cGL,.,.-
p l i shad and t echni ques t o be us ed f n p r o a c t i n g r i c e .
I
2~ ( C ) TASKS
a. CGs of DTAs and Commander Spe c i a l Zone:
(1) As s i s t s e c t o r s as r e qui r e d i n he pr e pa r a t i on
and e xe c ut i on of plans f o r p r o t e c t i o n o r r i c e dur i ng t he
ha r ve s t and duri n@ movernent t o towns.
( 2 ) Review r e q u e s t s f c r d e f o l i b t i o n and f or war &
r e q u e s t s t o ICTZ f o r d e s t r u c t i o n of cr ops t h a t cannot be
pr ot e c t e d.
( 3 ) Super vi s e d i s t r i c t r i c e a c c ount i ng a ~ ds t or a ge
p ocedur es.
b. Se c t o r C~m; ; ~ander s t
(1) . 14ai ht ai n a c c o u n t a b i l i t y f o r t he r i c e f r o z each
c,--,,-, I S S ~ , especially f o r t he pe ri r~abetween ha r ve s t s .
( 2 ) Pr e pz r e arid stibrriit t o t he IX?A o r L2a e i a i Zone
f o r a ppr s va l , p l a n s f o r pr ot ect i ~>i - , e s c h r i c e t i a r vos t , KOVG-
ment of r i c e t o a d between s e c ur e ar eas, and st , ) r la,; arid
marketing of r i c e .
. .
( 3 j Submit &e f i ~ i t a t i s r , :>l.-j,?s t; ..' :. v.. 221:..,
7Lone f w &Fp,;rva;, ci es t r ccZi On o"i:rL,.hs ;-'..--,?. . - ,zT, .-'A.. cifs;-..-
be ; r, ot ect ed.
. . i i ? c : - . , 2 - :
( 4) c oor a i na t e w i t h t?,e ;;r.>\rl ;nce c::L-;L' A. v i...h%)
-2
-1
LC set L? rice s t or age i n secur e ar ei s ,
*
(,Cj i?.,Q:7:r.- ."'T . .
05 i'zij ,-;DL; T<ES . ; (, ,,, ,
a. Conduct ps yc h; . l o~i c a l 0peraticjr.3 9rior t o, dur i ng
and a f t a r ha r ve s t s t o ehc<:urage v i l l a g a r s t o p a r t i c i p a t e
I n vhe r i c e c ont r ol pl an.
b. I r e pa r e of ice Ltirvest. a pl an f o r t he y o t e c ~ f o ~ t he
c. Prepare a pr ogr m wi t h i nci t i s i ve da t e s , priarity of
e f f o r t , and a movement system t o i ncl ude t he necessar y
t r a ns por t . t i on, schedules and s e c ur i t y f o r t he est i rrat ed
r r l axi n~u~a har ves t .
d. Es t a bl i s h s t or age f a c i l i t i e s i n secure a r e a s f o r
t he e s t h a t e d rnaxinium har ves t .
e. Nake pr cvi s i ons f o r the necessar y f wk s t o
.,,rchase
t he vi l l a ge r s ' har ves t ed r i c e and t o r e s e l l i t t o them
when necessar y. r
f . ha i nt a i n cl os e account abi l i t y, cont r ol and s e c ur i t y
d
f o r t he r i c e s t or ed.
g. Pr epar e pl ans t o t r a ns por t s ur pl us r i c e . t o ot ~z e r
s ecur e a r e a s a s r equi r ed.
Provi nce
Annual Lut put F.or,th s
Guang-Nam
11l,9(>0Y::ns Jan, Flar, Apr, Sept.
Oct, Nov, Dec
--
--
- - - _
CONFIDENTTAL
Quang-W gai 14100 Tons ti
-
& - # i i . ~ r; . A; , ; - . 5
,.
LZ:T
Q c L , .;;ov, ;;*s
Guang-Tin
65000 Tons
2 3rl # Ib,axx /!F $ :; i>
Qucng-l' ri l.+3@00Tons Apr, Sun, Se pt
low00 Tons Kar,
C c t ,
Apr,
Nov
Aug
Tot a l 47OQOO Tons
CONFIDENTIAL
Appendix 5 ( c ont r ol , Dfs poai t i on arLh%s-afegubrdirA:;o f Vi ot -
name se Pr oper t y, Capture i mete^-i a1 rm C: F ~ c a
~ u p p l i e a )t o Annex D (h' suourcos Lisniul) t o
Combined Car~paign Plan 1-68
1. (U) PURPOSE: This appendix o u t l i n e s pol i c y md procea-
ur e s for:
a, Cont rol , di s pos i t i on, and s a f e gua ~di ng o f pr i va t e
pr oper t y and food s uppl i es dur i ng c mb a t o p e r a t i ms ,
b. Cont rol and di s pos i t i on af capt ur ed ma t e r i a l and
auppl i es.
2. (C) GENERAL:
a. Food Suppl i es and p ~ i v a t e proper t y.
(1) I n VC c ont r ol l e d ar eas , RVXAF, U S and ot her
FWBUF m d s t t ake all pr a c t i c a bl e measures t o minimize t he
de s t r uc t i on o f bot h publ i c and pr i vc t e proper t y and t ake
appr opr i at e measures as f e a s i bl e t o pr ot e c t such pr oper t y.
It must be remembered t h a t c i v i l i a n s who l i v e i n VC
cont r ol l ed ar egs m y be under VC cont r ol a ga i ns t t h e i ~
w i l l and may not be sympat het i c t o t he enemy. Tr eat i ng
such per sons l i k e enemies, des t r oyf ng t h e i r pr oper t y o r
depr i vi ng them. o f t he' i r goods i s i ncompat i bl e w i t h l ong
range obj e c t i ve s o f expanding t he i nf l uence cf the G W
throughout RVIJ,
( 2 ) Speci al a t t e nt i on ni ust be gi ven t,o t h e pr ot e c -
t i on of pr i va t e pr oper t y and of l eg3 t i mat e f ood s u p ~ ~ l i e s ,
s s p c i o l l y wnrcl i ouse ::, t o avoid t.nrrding t l l a j ndi vi ~ual ' s
l l vol i hooc i FOI d t;klu vlllogu ecorlomy, tk4du cal;lalr:;( urtr;occje-
s a y discontent. Such di scon t e n t 1s easily expl oJ. l ed by
t he enemy and makes at t ai nment of CrVN obj oot i ves more
d i f f i c u l t .
b, Capt ured 1' ~a t e r i a l and s u~; pl i e s . Sei zur e and
des t r uct i on af enemy mat er i al and supplSea i s a s epar at e ,
measure f o r t he s pe c i f i c purpose of depr i vi ng t he enemy.of
t h e i r use,and of improving t he r e l a t i v e pos i t i on of
RVNAF and I11 PIAF/FW~AF.
,a, DTA, S p c i a 1 Zone, Sect or a:ld Speci al Sect or
corrimanders i n r es pect i ve a r e a s of r es pons j - bi l i t y and i n
coor di nat i on wi t h appr opr i at e 111 ~.-,%F/FWL-AP commanders
d 11:
( 1)
I nsur e t h a t a l l u n i t s mi n~mi ze des t r uc t i un
of property.
( 2) Devel!-p procedures, i n coor di nat i on , with
111 P.AJ?/WL~Fcommanders, t o i ncl ude s e c ur i t y, t ransporbt -
a t i on and l abor f o r tb ext r8ac t i on of cay; t ur e d s uppl i es
t o pr ecl ude t r i ei r f u r t h e r use by t he enerr.7.
( 3 ) Es t a bl i s h proce_hussa di ntPikb;ti&y c a pt ur e d
r i c e t o r ef ugees , war vi ct i ms end ot hel n cdy peol.~lc.
(4) Insure t h a t eyer- t i o n s c r e planned anu
conducted wit^. Froper r egar d for. psyci i ol ogi cal c 2nsi dera-
t i ons . . ( ~ n n e xB, Psychol ogi cal Oy ~ r a t i c n s ) .
i,,
the j ~ ~ c ~ d ; i ; . . z ~ ; _ Y-, L >-. ---. , , - C,,irisiy ~. . ~i. th l i ct , ki ; , ; ' L a - _-i
a:7aph ,;;di,jt%t iafor2 V;;i~fy . 113;, a ' " iiestr.oyi.~fi;cC&$,pd;"(jd 3;1$1;1.,
-I
( 6 j Prapare an i nvent or y of ca;,tuo\?l sup2lles
zrid a r e por t of t i l e c i r c u ~ s t a n c e sof capt ur a ii? accorciarice
with paragraph Sc below.
0. 111 PiAF/MAF Coxriianders i n coor di nat i on wi,.Lh
appr opr i at e RVNAF commanders, w i l l :
(1) I nsur e t h a t all u n i t s minimize des t r ucs i on ~f
propert y.
( 2 ) Ext r a c t and di spose at capt ur ed s uppl i e s i n
accordance wi t h paragraphs 4 and 5 below.
( 3 ) I nsur e t h a t oper at i ona ar e pla'nned an6 coc-
duct ed w i t h pr oper r egar d f o r psgchoi ogi cal consi aerat l oni a .
j dnnex I;, Psychol ogi cal Operat i onsJ
4. Pol i cy
a. Pr i va t e 2r oper t y and goods
(I) Oi s pos i t i on of pr i va t e pr oper t y and s uppl i e s
i s t he r es pons i . bi l i t y of GVN o f f i c i a l s .
( 2 ) Des t r uct i on of pr i va t e ijropeyty, homes, l i v e
st ock, a d goods is f or bi dden except i n cas es of ove r r i di ng
oper at i onai neces s i t y.
( 3 2 Tne de s t r uc t i on of dwel l i ngs a d i - i v e s ~ o z L2s
a d e n i d xsasur e, i s t he r e s ~ o n s i b i l i t y of GVX \ : u ~ ~ ; G P ~ x ~ s s
or RWAF units. Request s by Vietnariiese a u t h o r i t i e s SGT
employment olr iiS f or c e s i n t'ne deliberate dl s t r i l c t i on a:
I
n o n - ~o r r i b a t ~t s ' pr oper t y as a deni el TE -;-.size w i l l be
1;-5-3
L
CONFIDENTIhL
b. ,' Captured ma t e r i a l and s uppl i es Ut: t o be consi agl -ed
a val uabl e a s s e t t h a t w i l l be e xt r a c t e d ii' a t a l l ?os s i bl e.
Newly i nt r oduced i t ems or i t ems wi t h unusual moai f i cat i ons
w i l l be evacuat ed t hrough i nt e l l i ge nc e channel s. US
t a c t i c a l conmanders w i l l i ncl ude i n oper at i on pl ans pr ovi -
s i ons f o r s e c ur i t y and i me d i a t e r e l e a s e t o RVXAF of all
capt ured food s uppl i es . RVNAF w i l l use capt ur ed r i c e t o
suppl anent t h e i r food r a t i ons , i f r equi r ed, and d i st r i b ~ t e
t he excess t o needy people to promote t h e i r s u p ~ o r t f o r
RVNAF and t he GVN. Among needy peopl e, r ef ugees hnd war
vi ct i ms must be given f i r s t p r i o r i t y i n r e c e i vi ng capture^
r i c e i n accordance ~ t h RVNAF, JGSEi r e c t i ve s . Captured
food caches wi l l be e xt r a c t e d -andd i s t r i b u t e d usi ng 8VNAZ
r es our ces and t r ans por t at i on t he f i ~axi m~n: t o e x t e ~ l t p r a c c -
cabl e. Kajor USt a c t i c a l col;xi;anaers w i l l m a 3 e the fin&
deci s i on t o des t r oy s i gni f i c a nt food caches capt ured by
ijS f or c e s onl y ai t e r detem::inSng t1is.t e xt r a c t i nn i s not
f e a s i bl e ,
~ ~ ~ ~ ;
.'.2 -."..,T.,....,...-*< ..,...,, ..*...;
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L
. , . & , , I'. , . = , ,' \*'.
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~ . l : ~ : J ~ ~ , ~ ~ ~ a -<,, 1 :, ..;. ...,, '. . .. l:;d(>.?.c: :
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'ay c&pt Uyi n; $u ; ; i Ls t )rGugL!~ " ~ ~ > ( > ; ' i ~ ; r ~ ~ , cG;::riaL<i c : : ; - < , ~ L ~ ~ ; ~ : ; ~ ~ ( , L
c h a r i e l s o r 1ef.i; I. nt s. ct and. i n pl t ; ce,
5. Pr ocedur es
a, vrfian t he r e c ove r y of ca p t u i . e ~3-;,4~i.c/yci<;n-, . si;l;.:y 1i.~;. s =A:;
requires fa c i l i t l e s beyond thoseavkS.lk' ;,ie LC, pie 5aczi c a l
cor xander , a r e q u e s t wi t h t h e f oi l owi ng Ir~i'o;-r;.a~ion w i l l
be f pr war ded t o thenexthi ct - er heaciqi;arter.s ?G? I , 3 2 * L' r .
r ecover y and di s y; os i t i on of't he items;
(1)
Type andq u a n t i t y of n, a-i ; eri a. i / su~: ~l i es,
( 2 ) Locat i on.
( 3 LaboL a.nd t r a r i s por t s t i or . rac_:;irei=.
( k ) Ta c t i c a l s i t u a t i o n i nc l udi ng ar,g rec-zlre~i-ez~s
f o r s e c u r i t y f o r c e s ,
5) Ot her r e l a t e d dat a. s uc h as t i : e c i t ~ a x . l a n , 222
2.7';: ~;,CLF; ~flocalp o ~ u l a c emu GVM autl~ori.tics.
5. Are;,cr.t r:.aie:,iai/s~ip;):lie'r ; ; ~ s t ~ f .c ~ ~ p t u r e d be
? r e p? r e d h s f ol l ows :
(11 ' I' J?~and quaf i t - i t>-0 ; ' itel:is cap;. L~~' c;:o
( 2 ) Dat e a.n6 l ocnt ' c' n oi' c2. pt ura-~ c,.
. .
( 3 ) : . i ~. c f :~fO~ I . , L? I E.
( $ j ofpack c;, C O C L E . ! , ~ . : ~ ~ ,
+-.- ~
. -
::-:T:.i-A:;a , i5) L a i e l or: L;ie:r: ~5.r.~: ~ ~
Annex H ( Psychological a e r a t i o n s ) to
Combined G w n i s Plan 1-68.
3ef : {a) Y%CV/JGS Combined Campaign Pl m 1-68,bB U3
(5)
III?t!d &der 3hfG.1 (x' EP SCP)
( c)
ICorps FSYOP ,302 (To be issued)
(1)
Gcidance cont ai ned her ei n i s appl i cabl e t o a l l ps vc~o-
i oE; l cal oper at i ons i n support of lTv?!hF/III and apmopr i at e ~RJ/ us/ I f % '
,I.< agenci es d i r e c t l y or indirectly enya3ed i n combating erim-y f or c e s in
1 . It support.- Lsriorit:r t a s ks assi bned by hi gher a n t h o r i ~ y , and
or gani zes t hese t a s ks i n t o s ; x c j fi c car,?ai,ns :
( a )
Shieu i - hi Carnpaign ( k p p n ~ kL j
(b)
tinti -?G Carnpaidn ( ~ ~ ~ e n d i x 5)
( c )
&ti :.T\:B Catqxiign ( ~ ~ ~ e n a b : 6)
( c i )
d u p ~ r tJ q/.jr .,a;rl,~ai,,n (i.i7pentiix 7 )
( e )
;c: arCs Z;uopai,,n (hp1)e~~c1i- C )
( 2)
Annex a l s o i n c l ~ d c ~ i n s ~ r ~ c t i o l i s iort h e cocdact
of_,~,rch~io;icol+ s r ~ t i o r , s b. s ~ p p r t of :
( a) 2i vi c kct i on
5 . ..numy Forces.
. ..-
(1)
&nex 6 ( ~r i t el l . i gt ; ncc; t;:, :.,w!;Lir:ti; ' ) ; T! ; - ~- L~; L I'LL. --*..L: .
( 2)
Appendix 1 (FLjYOP I nt el l i gence) Lo Chis P J X ~ ~ X .
c . Fri endl y Forqes.
(1) ?.$CV/JGS/JUSPA~/~'IS provides :
(a)
Policy guidance concerning nat i onal a b ~ and pol i ci es
and s t r at egi cal o-perations.
(b)
24edia planning and production support f o r l e a f l e t s ,
post ers, and a e r i a l broadcast tapes.
(2)
7t h FbYOP Group provides backu? ?;YO:' support requested
through l mAi 7.
( 3)
Lt i t :';YGP Group provides backup ? I Y ~ ?support t o 111 I'D.
(4)
Pl i ght "A1', 9th A i r Cornando Squadron, 5 ; .3 . A i r Force
and eiements of t he V'NU provides a c r i a l suppo~twi t hi n IGTZ f o r ' l e d l e t
dissemination and a e r i a l broadcast s.
( 5 )
Appendix 2 (P,'IL? Asset 7nvectory).
a. b~t ; r , pt i onr , See basic pl an.
2. ( 2 j ImSZm
I11 :=/I Corps,- i n c o~r di na t i onwith 3131i:J" , ?LI C. / ' JS, c o n d ~c t
i3sychological' warfare operat i ons a.;.ainsr. ' J ~ / ; < ' J A ~m-sori neland ci vi l i ans
under Viet Gong influence; psychological operations in con:-action with
, ~, i i l t . =y 0l'I"er.siv2s a~di n st pport or' ~c i f i cat i on a ~ dfiation bui;ding
clt;ect;v.ves
&&.iSz : - I ,. ,,.A* * , - ' 1~ . coric;i;ctic:; - Gsychol o2; i c~l cpai-r;tior,s as ye-
4mst ed w i t 9 resources avaS.Pab!.c.
, a , goxcepc
.
ol
.-
Gaeraations.
(1) Psychologic o- p- zt i ons w1i . i 52 oan&ucted 1rLa,:,: o-3xif.,ce
with Appendix 3 ( ~ a t i o n a l Psyci?ological Opr at i ons ?larLj.
( 2) l St r at egi c psychological o.perakions w i l l k e conducted zs
di rect ed by higher headquarters.
(3)
Tact i cal gsycnologicai operations w i l l be conducted by
dKIJA;I'/III YdF Commanders. utilizing organic, attached and supporting SYOF
as s et s operat i ng wi t hi n the f rarae work of obj ect i ves and c ml ~ i g r l sout -
lined i n t h i s Annex.
(&)
Psychologiczl operations ar c di rect ed a t t he people i n
tine area as wel l as a t t he enemy. '?nether t he people be l i : i t i ai i y
f r i endl y, uncommitteci or hos t i l e toward the gover;li&en',, she c.b;ective ;2
%YaP, as of a l l AD, i s t o persucie t he .people t o suj port t he ST.71. TG
t h i s ezd, disciplineci, r,rell-behaved troo2s sl : o~~~i r, g -c..LL.j j a fr2.--<'--5x - e ~ r e
h t e r e s t ir, t he people and a res-mct f o r individual r i ~i s ssnd ?r?p~rt ; / .
xi11 heve t h e r:ost favorable i x; ~act upori t:le 1oc::l psoplc. 7 Y5. P itr,c-.es
. . < - 7 . - -
- -p . ,--
L:. aL, ~~e cx; ~l anat i onsof why troops art : i n t h e mea and %Piat r i Lj cw
i c for t he people by t hei r cooncrating wi t h t h e <'Ad. Agairxt t he ener~jr,
-?.iT;i;r' ocgective is t o permat!e t l l i . ,,.-,? S ~ . i ~ ' ) ? ~ ~ ' . ~ i : i . ~ t i 6 individuutii s o l d i c r ti, s t - t2
;qe enen;[ cause 2r.r:ci t o r a l l y tc tile ,.jvJ:i 6,;:c: ui'iieu i i oi hnd Z&l 5oai t ! ~ r o ~ , : l ~
Let programs. ience, PdLGIs t:~en,es x i l i stress thc wcjsiiive benel' its ol
as s et s avai l abl e.
(2)
C O K ~ ~ U C % c;ii.;.,r,~28 ~yc hot ogi c a S, o.pjrb9,ioiis wi t h .iP:.
Revolutionary Development and Chieu Uui.
( 3)
Conduct ;>syohological opr a t i ons i n support of resources
deni al operat i ons on a high pr i or i t y basi s.
(4,)
Conduct psychologica1 operat i ons designed t o nul l i f y
enemy propaganda and t o gain popular undmstanding of and support of t he
herbi ci de progrm.
c. I hj or 111 TW Ground Forces.
(I)' Conduct t a c t i c a l psychological operations i n support of
XV~'AF/III1h''JIF combat operat i ons i n ICTZ with mi l i t ar y psychological
operations as s et s avai l abl e.
(2 )
Conduct psychologica1 operations with emphasis u p n
Revolutionary Jevelopment and Shieu iIgi.
(3)
Conduct ,sychological operations designed t o nuUi f y
enemy popaganda and t o gai n popular understanding and support of t he
herbi ci de program.
d. ?&st Xarine Air S:inpl.
(1)
Be prepared on order t o provide a e r i a l leaflet dissenlin-
at i on by both t ransport and high performance del i very means.
(2)
;)rovi.de p i o r l t y t ransport at i on t o E Y 3 T Teems on request >
.leadquartera, I11 iW'.
3 )
. i i t hi n capabi l i t y conduct s peci al pychol ogi cal operations
aimed at t he accomplivhnent of pr i or i t y t asks l i s t e d in Aapendix 3
( ~ a t i o n a l .;LY(i? plan) t o t h i s Annex.
e , F&ce h g i s t i c s Golmdnd.
dl t t l i n capabi l i t y conduct s.*cial psychological operations
-.- - --
H-4 C O N F I D E ~ ComIzNTm
jNrtiona1 EY0P ~ l m ) t o t h i s kuiexl
f. 2nd Brigade ROKXC.
(1)
Conduct psychological ope~at i cns i n coordination wit' n
GVN and US Forces, with support p-ovided by t h i s Headquarters.
(2 )
Within capabi l i t y conduct speciai psychological opr a i i ons
aimed a t t he accomplishment of pr i or i t y t a s ~ s listed i n Appendix 3
(National PSY9P plan) t o t h i s Annex.
g.
US Naval Forces, Korthern Survsilarrce Group/VN Navy.
(1)
Conduct r i ve r and coas t al waterborne psychological
operations throughout ICTZ with emphasis on 3evolutionary Development
and Chieu Koi.
(2)
Ensure psychological operations i n suj por t of t he
rssources deni al program ore coordinated with I Corps, 3Tkis and sect or s.
h. Province Chiefs.
(1)
Conduct psychological operatioris with einphasis ch
.
-&*j . 2 -
3evelopnent andChi euHoi . .L J
( 2)
Ensure cqntifiue.! estab1ishmcn.t of Provbci al ?sycho-
lsgica:Cperations Cormnittees.
( 3) -&sure Arnled Propaganda Tearts are org;in:zb.;, t r a i ~ e d ,
equipped and armed t o conduct psychological operations a ~ s s i o n s i n
sl;gpor?, cf mi l i t ary operat i ons as w e l l as F'rovincial ob2ece;ves.
.-.
i;6giscal Po. , ~I E; ~~: 13rt;e:.
- L5szSt 0t l i . e~'V > i sl esent s %y::' :.-DL- -. . c . ~on~j~ci-,ln;-; >;,.;th-,.. ' a - , ~;3;1
ntvc2citiori~ryJ e v e l c ~ r ~ e n t ar,d C ? i m :!ci theaes.
j,
1Wn :?OL.W Ba$talioo and 7th KJPL)P Sat t ai ron .
(1)
!?rovide deeign, proctuctidn und di ~segdri t i or~ cf l oc a l
printed materials and t apes Lased ur>on dubmitted requeste.
(2) Ensure adequate st ockpi l es of high usage standard media
is maintained at a l l times.
(3)
Priority of l oc a l printing is t o quick reaction Chieu
Hoi and t a c t i c a l si t uat i ons.
k. Coor di nat i n~ I nst r nct i ons .
(1)
Target Audiences, Themes and Campaign ubjectives are
l i s t e d i n t he at t ached A~pendixesf or t he following CamHgns:
(a) ~ h i e uHoi Inducement Campaign ( ~ p p e n d h4)
(b)
Anti VC Campaign ( ~ppendi x 5 )
(c)
Anti iiVA Campaign ( ~ppendi x6)
(d)
Support SVN Campaign ( ~ p p n d i x7)
(e)
Ci vi l i an Aewarde Propam ( ~ppendi x8)
( 2)
Psykhological operations support w i l l be r ~n d e r e din t he
fol-& priin-ity:
(a) St r at egi c psycho1o;;ical warfare, including Zhieu
tioi.
(b)
Psychologics1 warfare i n s u n ~ r t of t a c t i c a l
operations.
(c)
Psycho1ogic::l operations i n support of paci fi cat i on.
(3)
Psychological o p ~ r a t i ~ n s willbe coordinated with
i ~ o v i n c i a l Psycnological dpcr at i ons !;or;l'?ittees, where f cnsible, in order
t o achieve corrmrl deals and ,.r!sure maxim~zcoordination.
(4)
Fsychol o~i cal oi ~crat i ons 1rr:s within each sect or,
-
- - \
H-6
subsector or n:;%ononous c i t y, a c e $ in unu~ualcFr cur ~t ; . nc ~sw i l l be
coordinated wi t a a:)propiat,e 3\1%/111 !&b' i;o~unar.&rz,mr: *;ancies,
( 5 )
Atandard media w i l l be ut i l i aed t o the maxinun t o ,
conserve our quick r eact i on capabi l i t y f o r t r uc tart ct s of opnortunity ,
(,6)
Psychological operat i ons supAmrt beyond organic
resources w i l l be requested in accordance wi t h references (b) and ( c ) .
( 7 )
Planning f or t he conduct of psychological operations
m u s t 6e conducted concurrent l y and cl osel y coordinated witill combat
operat i onal planning. Speci al em@asis will bc di rect ed toward early
i dent i f i cat i on of PSYOP as s et s u ~ p r t required. See A l ~ n d l x2 (PSOP
Asset Inventory) t o t h i s Annex. A l l commanders w i l l include BYOP
annexes in operat i onal plans which involve cont act with enemy forces
and/or ci vi l i an population.
h. (c) ~ L ; E ; ~ Z WT ; C . ~ . LJGIGTj:, :G!';
a. LoListics.
MV,:/I~I psychological opr,rations uni t s are responsi bl e
f o r support oL" s ba r ; i r l a t ~ iii~it~ f or missior~ type equiplent and exgmdable
suppl i es.
"6. Fersonnel.
(1)
Local Vietntilest: w i l l be employed as requi red t o provide
or supplement l i n g i i s t i c c a x t i l i t i e s and s o c i o l o ~i c a l howledge. 3ubmit
request s 50 t h i s Aead qua-tt.rs ( ~ t t ' n : J-~/I"~YOP)with J us t i f i cat i oh, f o r
approval. .
c . : ? a p r t s .
I . r , \
To be subrai'tted In accordance x l t h r s . l ' ~r e; . z~si~; &;l<i iz 1 a
5. (U) C O ; ~ ' WD AND CBPUNICATIONS
a. Execution will be under the joint supervision of 111 ?%i? ai d
I Coi-ps.
b. See current command COXSOP a d SGI.
c . . Annex L ( Cor n- ~l ect ) .
1 PSYGP Int el l i gence
2 PSYOP Asset Inveritory
3 National PSYGP Plan
b c'nieu Hoi Inducerent Campaicn
5 Anti VC Canpaign
h An t i SVA Carcpaign
7 Scpport 3;:Campaign
8 Ci vi l i an itewards Program
Ihy bsn Q ( ~$.nh-nghlo ) chn Kg-Hopch
X8n-hgp &u$n-s$ P-68.
Annex 0 ( Definitions ) t o Combined
Campaign Plan 1-68.
L : ~ b a s i c o r advanced t r a i n i n g r;c:.s:~r-~i:~I b; . d : ~2 ; ;.. ..
-( C!
. .
-pi
..
>.& 7,;'- +-
o r l o ~ i s t i c a lh e a d q ~ a r t e r s ; for, s t cFage L~; L -.- 8 d -
of medi ci ne, or dnance, food, PGL, a?c,ar;;er . : ; %I - :.ZTG-.:E-;
. -
a s a s i t e used by combat u n i t s t c rest, ~ C ~ ~ r h C Z , , r ezr al r i ,
evade f r i e n d l y 3perst . i ;ns and/ or i n i t i z t e .:.re,. t i ~al ; or y
phase cf : oi ' f s ns i ve ::pera t i o n s .
( c ) Neht r al i zeLi VC/ ; ~VA Rase Ar es ; k c z s e
a r e a which the eneroy is not abl e to us e for I'cs i nt e nde d
-, . . -
purpose. Temporary n e u t r a l i z a t i 9 n can be a c c r r . ; . ~i s ne c :
.. 2 l , L i A, l "1:5 by e x t e n s i v e de s t r i ; c t i on 9f f a c ! . l i ~5 . e si ' c ~ c d..:: -."'r '-'-
.. ..
u e a , o r bg the i,r-eser,ce 'in.<,.par :dnd ti.:(; 3 ; : r - , p ~ t ? i ? i ~ ~ j ~ i ~ ;
' A
a c c e s s . t . 3 the ar7,a ;'or, u s e a s z s af e 'riavctl. l,,eii c-:
alizat ; i .:.'c
CONFIDENTIAL
pt2r:llnnen t l y dl sabl ed.
r e t ur n t o t h e i r u n i t s because of sever e d i s a b i l i t y .
Est i mat ed a s a por t i on of t he DO\{ f i g u ~ e s .
( 5 ) Ret drnees (Hoi Chanh). VC/NVA p q l i t i c a l and
mi l i t a r y cadre w;l o ar e o r ove r t o i nduced t o r ~ e t ~ r n c9x;ie
GilN c ont r ol under ( Open ~ ~ 1 s ) t he Chieu E!oi E.ro:rm..
( a ) P. i l i t ar y Roi Chanh. The ni i l i t , %r y
r et ur nee' under the Chi eu Hoi progrw, .
f b ) P o l i t i c a l Koi Chanh. The p o l i t i c ~ l
r et ur nee uncier t he Chieu Iioi proirar21.
( 6 ) Er i s oner s 3f ': a r (F!:). l e r s c ns xi-!u , - u s l j f y
~l nde r the Geneva Conventi )n, Ta r t I , Ar t i c l 5 ,, on ~r l s o n e r - s
of War. I n a d u i t i x , t he f ~ l l o wi n e per s- >ns,>'11c e ext ended
t he pr ot ect i on of tLis Pr i s : ~n e r3f War a r i ' c l e i n Viet.na14.
( a ) Fersons wn.-)ar e ct?] t;irl::d whi l e act -
u a l l y engagi ng i n cor.lbat o r a b e l l i ~ e y e ~ n t . than a c t ot he r
I
an a c t of t err13ri sn?, sabot a. : e c:r s ; ; y i n ~ a;-aicst; t he 3el . ubl i c
of Vietnam, t he L. S. o r o t r i e r :+ee 2icrla :..!litary Armed
Forces.
C
( b ) Any capt i ve ;iielnter .>f.tl.e ' : o r t h
Vietnar..*ese i,r::led ? ' G ~ C C Scr.>fL : L ~Vie LCdn:.?, xl:t: t ,.er
ca!. tureci i r ? c ?nisitor* n:)t, c ; : c e; t a tcra:c:.i Y,i . , - $ . ~t ? ~? . c i i ; .
whose fl nal s t a t us , i . a. , inr1oce:it c j v: ; i %: . i , : c. L i . d , r ~ . . c ? ,
u n i t wi t h no a2par ent i n t e n t i o n of r e t : i ri l i fi g,
( 9 ) Ci v i l Defendant. Per sons xilo a r e sus-sz s e r
bei ng s >i e s , s abot eur s , t e r r o r i s t s , or a - of cl-i::-:inais snc
wh c do n o t q a a l i f y as p r i s o n e r s of war -dnder. ?ara.::r2:.4!
3.b.i 6 ) above.
c. Snemy Act i 2ns.
(1) At t acks. An i n c i d e n t i n which t;;e eneny
at t e1r i i . t ~ t o i n f l i c t cas ual t i e s and/ or 6. rogerty cial-.a;e.
At t acks a r e i d e n t i f i e d by t y p e a i d. s i z e . The brzadc~
t e r n L a r ~ eScal e At t ack Kay !je sea 50 enc..;x;jass a t t a c k s
r;iade by a ' ~ a t t a l i g nsr l a v e r f o r c e . The terii: S m a l l Scal e
At t ack w i l i i ncl ude t l . l ~r e at t 6c: cs by f o r c e s :zl" l e s s t kan
b a t t a l i o n si . ze. Theye ar e ti-irce t y p e s ..r" :;t'caclz:
ambush, a s s a u l t , and f'j.r.e.
( a ) Arribiish. A s u r p r i s e a t t a c k , u s u a l l y
c*::ie~ctc;(,fr-,lr?,,lan.:erl 1; #s- it , i . , ns , a::ai.ri:;i; a rr.:>v'i.ri[! or,
t en. k~r . : : ~r i i y cc: nv~y. k-01ie(, I;.?~i:p ur,j. t, i;P
(b) As; . aul t . An a t t a c k in i.li;ic:l; . J I.,i-,c,c:sc3:'l-7
jot:. fl ye ar.d y~.,gleuve,r.in a-1 at,ts; ; t t..) ~~2 ze o r
..-.. - r 7 u .2ij;ectj.lJe;,. ; h6nL
. . . -
( c ) $-ri g>+;&ci< >;:A.;c:- c>c;-:,-,;
a;. -Lr.al;erey dar:lagc.
( 2 ) Iitzrasament. An i n c i a e n t i n w:,f C L ~CL ~ , r , r ~ : . ~ s ~ y
obj a c t i ve i s t o di s r upt r ; en; por ui l y 't:le a c t i v i t i s s ,P e
uni t , i n s t a l l a t i ~ n , v i l l a g e , hanlle t, o r a c ~ i v i t y r zt l - i ~r
t han t o i n f l i c t s e r i o u s c a s u a l t i e s o r c;arGsEe. B a ? a s ~ . ~ e r ~ t
y l l l be c l a s s e d a s e i t h e r har assment a f ~a i r t s z c i v l l l a n o r
r ni l i t a r y t a r g e t s .
(a) Harassment of C i v l l i ~ - i 5 . A l i i r A z i C e ~ ~ : ~
of h a r a s me n t d i r e c t e d a[ ; ai nst t a r , e t s t i ~ h ttA7e ;~erlr_:;~jz;in-
t l y of a c i v i l i a n nat ur e. Sxa[!il e s aye bilinln,p: of croy;s
o r harile t har assment .
( b ) Earaszment of P , i l i tar7. I n c i d e n t s
of har assment a g a i n s t n i i i i t a r y t a r ge t s .
-.
,xai.:;,les i r. -l ?-ce I l r Cl
s ni pi ng a t a i J a c r ; l , har as s i ng Ti ye, booby ixa1.s io;=
. . . .. .
z:iiitary ; e r . s ~n . ~e l , Kiln ,nG i n c i d e n t s t i ~, a j asi: i . . ~ i l zm;:
ten.-p ,-,A ,%,ts t r i at ar e not a c t s of' sabot age.
That area i n t he RW t ha t i s con,sidered to be of 3tich
importance a s t o Warrant; the pr i nc i pa l oi'for,L m d weikyk~t
of of f ens i ve power.
b. Area of Oper at i cns (80).A n a r e a where US/FWI~,AF
conduct oper at i ons dur i ng a s pe c i f i c p e r i ~ dof time.
These oper at i ons will be coor di nat ed w i t h , and advance
agreement obt ai ned from , appr opr i at e GVN r epr es ent at i ve.
An ACi i s assi gned nohaal l y f o r a apeci f i c qper at i on
which may be wi t hi n or out s i de of a t a c t i c a l a r e a of
r es pons i bi l i t y.
c. Ta c t i c a l Areas of Res pons i bi l i t y ( TAOH) . A'
pr es cr i bed area which has been assi gned s p e c i f i c a l l y t o a
cornlander who i s r es pons i bl e f o r , and has t he authoritf
/
t o a c t an, t he devel > p e n t tind ~r ~ai nt enance ~f i n s t a l l a t i - ns ,
t he c 3nt r ol of movement, and tile cot ~ductof t a c t i c a l
oper at i ons w i t h t r oops under h i s c::nt?rolli - A l l f i r e and
nl beuver c9nducted wi t hi n t he TAOR, o r whose e f f e c t s
irrlpinqe upon it, m c s t be coordinn::ed wi t h t he corcnaander
of tile f or c e as:;i.1;ricd tlie TACFl.
. d. Ta c t i c a l Arens of I nt a r e s t ( ' T ~ i r 1 ) . An area i n c l u d -
i ng, ' but not ne c e s s a r i l y 1irr:ited t o, t h e Ta c t i c a l Ar ens or
oper at i m s of a l l . ; \ i ; f c r c c s a:;c i r ~ s i ~ i ' l a . t i S l L 2 ca,.!;.3s n s ,
CONFI DGNTIAL
t i o n c oo~. di nnt l - m, she maxi:'un e f f e c t of t oe ca:..bined
.
friendly f' t:rces and fire power. The 'i.4tJI dif' i' er 2 I' r~rn
t he TAOR i n t h a t , U S / F ~ A Fcomi,anders ar e n o t char17ed
wi t h pri mary t a c t i c a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y nor are t hey expect ed
t o conduci t a c t i c a l oper at i ons on a c mt i n u i n g b a s i s i.n %e
e. Combined Operat i on. An ope r a t l 3n cmduc t ed by
1
el ement s of two or more na t i ons oper at i ng t o p t he r o r i n
c l a e c o md i n a t i ~ n .
f. Cl ear i ng Operat i ans. An oper at i on t a c l e a r an ai.ea
permanent l y of organi zed V C ~ V Ama i n f &)rcea, i ncl udi ni :
t he pr ovi nci al ba t t a l i ons , in . , r der co e l i mi na t e the
i m. edi at e t h r e a t of ove r t enen~y i nt e r f e r e nc e wi t h r e v ~ 1 -
u t i ma r y developrcent a c t i v i t i e s that ar e t 3 foll .w.
g . Sear ch and Dest r oy Gperat i un. An off' ensi ve
oper at i on c 2nducted f . ) r zke purpose of see:ring out and
i#
des t r oyi ng enemy f or c e s , i n s t a l l a t i ms, r es our ces and
base ar eas . These c;l3erati~.ms a r e orien1;ed ;n the enemy
h. Se c ur i t y J~eratiqn. * . ?.rat i . I ns whose pur p. >se i s
t;o ~ ~ r o t e c t , cal, ecml2mic, and mi l i t ul - y f r j enciiy p ~ i i t i
.
r es our ces aad i ns : . a l l o Lions, such an cl i : t r i c I, cas i t ~l l s
l i n e s ,)f c o i ~. u n i c a t i : ns, food stor.t,s and r(3ditcti ~n ar . es- s;
and de, o t s ari.1. Lase 3 s . a r ~
-
CONFIDT3"T IAL
-.
i. Cordon and sear ch opcr.ut;ior.s, AIL c;. ;e;~~:i;l:)r~ 5.:.
which r egul ar , pa r a r r l i l i t a ~y, and/or !;:itionai o; i co ~ ' ( ~ I ' c c L
e nc i r c l e a v i l l a c e , hahl et o r araeat o pr event ent r ance t o
or e x i t from the a r e a andt o provi de s e c ur i t y t o f or c e s ,
i ncl udi ng r e gul a r , par ami l i t ar y, and l i i l i t z r y 5ecur i t y
Ser vi ce, Pol i ce Speci a1 Branch, Pr ovi nci al 3econi--aissance
Uni t s, and Nat i onal Pol i ce Fi e l d Forces i ns i ce t qe e nc i r c l e d
/
ar ea whi l e t hey pr f or m/ s ear ches f o r VC, VC i n f r ~ s t r u c t u r e ,
d r a f t dodser s, i l l e g a l r e s i de nt s , cont r eband, e t c .
j. Paul 3unyan O.perati*)ns. These ar e f q r e s t c l e a r i ng
opepat i ons usinr: Rome plows and ot her s ~ e c i a l i z e d equipnenr;.
These oper at i ons wj 11be used pri. . a r i l y i n c,.n.junc tisn
withbase arean e u t r a l i z a t i o n t o rendor tl-,e area u n s u i t a b l e
f o r f u r t h e r us e bg t he enem-y. i:owever, t~ e s e e r a t j hnz
. rbla:Ja l s o be en1;loyed t o c l e a r a r e a s a l o n l ~ key LkCf s and
ot her s e n s i t i v e ar eas .
k. Road Runner. I he name as-itsned. t o t he p r - 3 p a h ti)
r e s t o r e pr onr es s i vel y t he ]l ai n a:ld sec nbary ma d n e t s t o
I c n r ;I. The concept ?i' Rl1ad Runnel' i s n s pe c i a l l y
t a i l ~r e c ifolaco Lr a v e r ~ i n y ,; l ai n anu s. ; c %ndur 3yrl;acls t o
cieralonstrs>e ur i nt ont i In arlcl a b i l i t y t usc .\ad!ice]. open
e x i s t i n r rl . a1~: : .
res, onsi b i l i t y 1TAW) wher e her e t of or e ti--ey :-ave bec:i a bl e
t o r,,ove wi t h r e l a t i v e i mpuni t yo
m. Combat Support Coordi nat i on Cent er (CSCC). The
CSCC i s a f a c i l i t y withinwhich a r e grouped repr.eser:atives
of a r t i l l e r y , ai r , naval gunf i r e, and ot her ai;encies a s
deerned. necessary by t he coinr.-anuer(s). These re;;resenta-
t i v e s a s s i s t t he coumander(s) t h r o u ~ h t he ~ 2 / ~ 3 i n planzit--p;,
coor di nat i nc, and c , . nt r ~l l i ni 7; a l l meansof cortibat suppor t
L
a va i l a bl e i n an operat i on, .
n'. Reserve React i on Forces. Reserve r er . ct i on f or c e s
area l l uncomnii t t e d f ~ r c e s avai l cbl e t o t he coraliander.
They luay be any s i z e u n i t and i ncl ude r e a c t i on for oes
anywhere, f or ces i n t r ai . ni ng, f l ) r c c s underzoi ng r e n a b i l i t a -
t i on, and newly a r r l ve d r ; r c e s ~ n d e r s o i c - n 3 s t r ead' nes s 11-
pr epar at i ons .
(1) Se nr c i ~and Des t r. j y ( Fe ~i . xi a 1) ;Oper at i ms t ,
des t r oy or ne ut r a l i z e i \ i V; i / V~ ; ~, ai nand j>errillnl' .:rczs,
base a r e a s and.sup;;ly poi nt s. and Ye:~,r>cl~' best.l- :y (t ; c: : . i s)nal )
oper.atirjps . L~I , I -t-, . t i n r,u18;;ort .?f; l aci l ' i c n t i ..In.
( 2) Search arla Ijeatr .:y( i S~~ovj . nci al ) .i yer nt i i ms
adj acent t o pL)pul at ed aTeas under .:.:$1.: con!;r,!l or t.1 are-.s '
direct ' suppor t of p;acif'icr~ltion wiGch ar.5 ccjriLi,,c ,.,i;,: L;:. ;;y
ad$acent t o ED a r e a f o r t he purpose of Gas-,;. :;-;;,:; I ; : :
l o c a l f or c e s , g u e r r i l l a f or c e s and t r L A c Inf~as tLJ.re,
( 4) Se c ur i t y Operat i ons. Oper azl xi s wa , se i,u:.s:~ 2
i s t o pr ot e c t p o l i t i c a l , econoni c an:! a i l i t a r y res. 2i ; rces
and i n s t a l l a t i a n s , such as d i s t r i c t c kpi z a l s fir popwl zt sd
ar eas , l i n e s of coniinunication, food s t - r e s an6 p r o t i ~ c t T ~ n
ar eas , and depot s and base we z s . For r e por t i ng purposes,
oper at i ons i n defense of nl i l i t a r y a r e a s acd I n s t h l i a t i s n s ,
e.g,, mi l i t a r y a i r bases and l oz i s ' i i c co,r~,,lexes, =e r ~ s t
consi der ed i n s ~i ppor tof paci f' i cat i or. .
( 5 ) Reserve ~, , i s s i on. A r t i s s i o n in Mr. : ck f ' f ~ ~ c c s
are Involved. i n t r a i ni ng or unde r g. ~i ng r e h a c i i l t k2; i sn.,
It a ppl i e s a l s o t o newly a r r i ve d f or c e s undergoi ng c o l ~ ~ b a t
r e a di ne s s pr e pa r a t i on anu/ or a l e r t e d r e ~ c t f o n f or ces .
a , Pa c i f i c a t i on i s t he n i l i t a r y , p o i l t i c n ' i . , ec: ; nci ?, i c
% . . , . .
2nd sr; ci ai I-.rr;cess of e.sts.biisi,.ii-igo r :-cesi,ao~isr.:..iii;l . ~ c a l
. -
governn;efit yes, o:-isiye ts ar:d jr:v ,lving Y. I :e : . a r ' ~ l z i , ii~.i:;5
. .
of t h e psol , l e, It i ncl udes tl :e ,,r ; v- - 5: . ?n ~ J C: ' . ; ~ i s ~ : i : l ; o ~ ,
credi' [, ic t r , r r i. - i ~r i s i ."jeci;~.; t,y, :,,!,(-: , . ic. ;:$i, ; ,;cjL: ..:,%> :,<x
gc,.,..... -n.-- . . ,-,+
u3 - (; b AA~Ti c; ~L L ~ C J i r i i t i a L%~ > l c i ~ i ' > ~ ! , ; - L ~ , p l . ~ ?,;LC:
. /
a c t i v i &y ctl&ablu of s e l f - ~ u s t e n a - ~ c e hni: er;;~!k~i s$:?f i .
/i
e c o n o ~ i c o l e ~ ~ e n t t he of of' pac i f i c a t , i on i ncl ul j es 0 p e n i . n ~
r oa ds and wat erways and t he mai nt enmce o r l i n e s of com-
muni cat i on imnpor tan t t o economic and m l l it a r y ac ti v l ty.
b. Revol ut i onar y devel opment , the 1tia~li:g edge of
p a c i f i c a t i o n , i s the f or r ; i al i zed Sovernr(.;ene o f ' v ' i e t r : ~ ~
p r o g r m, under t he s pons or s hi p of t he i ~; i r , i s t r y05 Eevol i i t i ori -
7
a r y Development, i n s p e c i f i e d harile ts loca-c.eci i : : er, ersi g
wi t h i n RD campaign areas. I t i n c l ~ d e e t?:e l o c a l s e c ~ r i ~ y
. -
f o r t hos e h a r ~ l e t sand ?he p o l i t i c a l , e c ~c r j r : i c , aZCi S G C > . B ~
. ,
a c t i v i t i e s a t t h a t l e v e l *
c. Kat i on buliding Is the, econo:i,i3s, p c i i i l c a l , r"i 5
s o c i a1 ac t i . . vi t y navirig an in.i;act na t i oz wi ue a ? . d / c ~iri
c r S m c e n t e r s . I t i s r e l a t e d ;r: t o ~ j a c i f i c a t i : ? ~ s?;;t;t I t
--. J u i l d s , on t h e r e s i l t s of pa c i i ' i c a t i on tznz cc:n : r . i - ~u t es
. -
;o t ke estab1ish:::ent of a v i a b l e econori-ic a.x5 soe :ai
ca?muni tg.
d. i.,,ili t a r y Suppor t of Yac iflcatj. ;)fi. ; j l 7' ci , ;2Py
rcjie ~ f ' r : l i i i t a r - y f o r c e s C( . , y i r i j : tkle : ;i~;'; i,:;t,i : : r l : : . ' ~ ~ c \ J : : s
. .<
5 tc e s t a bi . i 211 t e y j i t ~ r l a is,:curj ty ::~:i, ~i.i..cb; , i j i i , . . i : i; r..;
0..
.( -
.
- .
J d c , l ~ L c a t L ~ n c ~ ~ acid i ~ Li . ~ ~ :,;<.;<;,a.::i c;! ~ v LG ~ , L ~ j . ~ c . i , & ~ ~ ' a :;i::s
-....,+; uLA bl i=:ucki 'LC: ,e 2, . ' - ; - .,, &:;,-. ,< 2 L : :., 2 ~ . .l &, . - - , Y . ---. :.!A '. . l-c>' L L v j i :L:Lt:A~y<
I , \ r - : - , , .
k ? . C . L j , . Lh-L;l zLLq; LGLs -d;Ly,A;.r2 * i < . . L , < Z < , , - * :.,:.;'.,,h :>i., <.&:.:,
, ~ 7 1 y . , ' ,.ur-'-roi
Ap
ri!
L o l ~Li&; c -2;) ~ 3ii-;;: ~ ] ~ : ; ~ ~ <;I,
" ',J A\
c o ~ ~ & ; l ~ ~ ~ ~j
Sevel o2i ng Ap Boi Pioi t o the ext enc t h u t caiirc no lon;;,sr;
a r e r e qui r e d on a permanent basis and t h e ~ ei s an on-soi nd
progran t o cont i nue t he developrfient of t hese ' r ; ~ ~ ~ l e t s .
( 2 ) VC g u e r r i l l a and known VC j . nfrasi ; ruct ure
el ement s based i n t he a r e a have been des t r o3ea arid avai l -
able r t ~ i l i t a r y and. pol i c e f or c e s ':lave an or; rani zea on-g.7lng
progrm:l t o pr event t he re-emergerice of t hese el er t ent s.
( 3 ) Hai l l et s i n t he area have adequat e cay and
r L F L i "
:r. :---+ -I
s e c a r i t y f o r c e s and GVN cadr e e1err;e;lts a r e able t o rerf:al;.i_
overnj. ght i n t hes e 'nax,let s without't h r e a t fro, ?. t k e 'JC,
. . .
( 4)Rca ds connecting h mi e t s arid v i 1 l n ; e s 1" ;fie
a r e a a r e safe rrom VC a t t a c k dbr i ng da>- l i ght P - G L ~ S with
minla-m s e c a r i t y r equi r ed.
( S j '?he a r e a i s f r e e of VC incidents excei - t f o r
sscr a<i c i nai vi t i ual a c t s of t er r - or 3sn anci sabo%a&e,
( 6 ) 3Vi;A.F' ~r i u / o rUS/ F~~~. , A~; . a r e available t o $:rlevent
:'r;e i nc; r . s l ~r ; cf .-.,r;:arlized ener;,y l'rirce S r i t : ti.e u . r e 8 .
f'.Area Gnder.;,r,oin;: Yecur, i . rl g. An al>ea.i :; itiL:i<:I , , . . : ; n;'
and ; =t ent t o d,sd, shoul d Sc consldsrt:d. c &] ~a r i e ol'
or f or i ng o r ~ a n i z e d r e s i s t a nc e .
( 2 ) RVi\JAF and/or US/FWTLAF a r e a b h t o pr event t he
i ncur s i on of an organi zed eneziiy f or c e I nt o t he ar ea.
( 3 ) BVNAF and/or US / F ~ ~ AF a r e oper at i ng i n zne
a r e a a s neces s ar y t o clestroy VC g u e r r i l l a and I n f r a s t r u c t -
ur e el ement and e s t a b l i s h l o c a i a r e a s e c ur i t y and s e c ur i t y
f o r t he popul at i on and cadre elene:?ts.
( 4) Revol ut i onar y Development Cadre, o r ct ker
o f f i c i a l l y recogni zed cadr e, a r e workink; i n t h e a r e a
or a r e programled t o be a va i l a bl e when she r e q u i s i ~ e l o c a l
s e c ur i t y has been es t abl i s hed.
g. Cont est ed Area. An a r e a i s concesteci ~i t ~ef i :
(1)The a r e a has been s e l e c t e d f o r t he intr;. d:;cil, -I1-1
of r e vol s t i ona r y development a c t i v i t i e s aiid/or Is req~ired
f o r zile c-:nduct of aper at i ons t o provi de a defei i se i n
dept h a ga i ns t t he i ncur s i on of enenly f c r c e s i n t o nearby
ar eas wkere r evol ut i onar y develo;-.a;en~ a c t i v l
. .
t l e s are
-bdk?.riz:/lace. p
( 2 j !.V;;ky anci/or a1.c > s / ~ + ' . ; ~ ~ ~ . ; A~ ' coy:c;lct.i-~.-- L ~ i ; , ,.)n s G ,c;T''...' . . J: . %
S 7 1 ttea. r cn wi 'ik Lkc; t as k t c. 1 cl ear . i;iic ;ir.i;:; ..,i:it i 3:-it. . :; ~,j.'j'.
t;l-a:,
- . .
t , L. .
. .
:.
.
( 2) i<ei s l u e 1 s a' t ' ; ; ~; , , l ; t : i ~~: . -.,i.i. " : . : .. ..-
o r nili it arty over a ~ ~ e u ! I i . . , ' . ; - , c <: irli' luonce t;hc ex ~, ; for. l.i:c: .,. .,.,L.'!.
of t r a n s i e n t t p c opel-ati(:ns.
. . L - A . i, VC Cont r ol l e d Ar ea, An a r e a . i c i::~-ider iiS c o n t r o l 'd+=>--
i 1) VC/MVA f o r c e s a r e p r e s e n t i n o r necr. he a r a s
and a r e a b l e t o e x e r t p o l i t i c a l and/o?" r ~ i i i t a r y i n f l ~ e n c e
over t he a r e a .
' ( 2 ) R WA F and/ or US/F' ~~.LIF, i.i: i : ~ , e s e n ti n C?s =ee,
I
are conduc t i ne; o n l y t r a n s i e n t sear ci ; and d e s t r o y t>-.;;e
ope r a t i o n s wit t . 1 no i n t e n t t o g a i n ;.erri.iane;.it a r e a ccn tr2l.
j . Ap Doi h o i ( Ee a l Ne w Li f e Ear r i l et ) , k h a l j l e t d e s i g n h t e c
i n a p r o v i n c i a l RD pl a n f o r a pr~;rr_l;i cf d e v e l o - , ~( , e n ~ maor
the s u p e r v i s i o n of RD c a dr e t o a c i . i ~ v e the el ever , ob2eccl vcs
( a s p i r z t i o n s ) . The e l e ve n o b j e c t i v e s are:
(1)Z l i a i n a t e t h e VC i n f r a s t r ~ c t u r e .
( 2 ) El i mi na t e c d r r u p t p r a c t i c e s and d i s c i ~ a r g e
c i r r u p t o f f i c i a l s .
( 3 ) Devel op a new s p i r i t .
( 4 ) i i s t a b l l s h pi pul l i r Kovernii.ent a ; d scc i u:
oper at1ons.
C ~ U ( 5; C; T: ; =~~ ze t kl c peopl e so!.. sellS-di;i' on -: o
, -
( 9) 3ev61op kgri cuf %re ;LC rk.nc;cr3z~: l na uvt r l 2 ,
( 10) Imp:.ove cG I I L ~ ~ L T ' . ~ 1h e s of ctA ti~ n .
(11')tiaward deser vi ng s o i d i a r s , publ i c s c r vmt s
and c i t i z e n s who have ccnt r i but ed t o F D p r o g r ~ i ~ s .
k. Ap Tan Si nh (New Li f e Ear nl et ) . A haml et t n s s was
completed bef or e 31 Decen,ber 1966 =d ,:as che f ,:i.~vi:n&
6 c r i t e r i a :
1 1) Census comple ted, VC i nf rast r c c t ~ r edest royed
or ne ut r a l i z e d.
( 2 ) Sel ect eu anti trai. >ed. sel f' -aefense i' ;rcez,
e q u i p ~ e d a s appr opr i at e.
( 3 ) Zf f e c t l ve hm.le t uef el - i s~ syster:,.
( 4)Orsani zed lia i son arid l c c i z ! l c s-,-:;ere,
( 5 ) . Es t abl i s hed s oc i a l or gar . i zar ; i m.
( 6 ) i' opular Eovernxen t e l e c t e d.
(These ha; l e t s a r e ti.evel -!;.eci and i cl pr oved by t he villa:.;e
L
LJ ;ial"ttr,sa farces, cpganlzinp: a dcft.nsc :,j; 5 :,c;.~i.~ j. r:j-c
,porri:ls i ' rn-26 s and e l e c t i ng i;;nt? hu<1e goverr;r:lc::, 'i
counci l , an Ap Binh Dinh s i ~oul dbo raoady f o r c(. )nver~i . ori Lo
an Ap Do1 1"li in t he f ol l owi ng year.
m. Civil - Ni l i t a r y RD Team. An RD group, or gani zed
on t he 59-man ba s i s , formed from one PF or FiF pl at oon
and pr ovi nc i a l a dmi ni s t r a t i ve . and t echni cal cadr e, whose
purpose i s t o perform tasks similar t o t hose performed by
RD cadre.
n. Truong Son RD Team. A 70-man ED group, ge ne r a l l y
a l l of hi ghl ander e t hni c o r i g i n , employed i n t he highland
a r e a s of South Vietnam t o perform t as ks s i mi l a r t o t hose
performed by RD cadr e, except t h a t these t a s ks a r e nodi f i e c
t o s u i t t he hi ghl ander t r i b a l popul at i on,
o. Te r r i t o r i a l Secur i t y. Se c ur i t y from VC l o c a l f or c e s
sne g u e r r i l l a u n i t s and VC/WVA main f or c e s ur i i t s i n or'
t hr ea. t eni ng t b a t ar ea.
p. Local Secur i t y. That p a r t of t e r r i t o r i a l s ecur i t g
wr,ick pr ovi des s e c u r i t y from VC l o c a l f or c e s and gue r r bi l i a
i;ni ts.
q. RD Campaign. The mi l i t a r y or ga ni z a t i ,n e s t a bl i s he d
by i nt er - v. i r ~i st e r i a l d i r e c t i v e #032/ j [ 0/ 31/ ; 5~~and
+ 1 5 5 8 / ~ ? / ~ ~ / 3 dated 6 i Lar 67. That d;rec.clve a s t a b l i s k e s
pr ocecur es rer c --tr831, c >or ci i nat i oa anu i r . i e- r at i on
of milit nr y, RDC groups and admini3trzi;l ve el^. sLl -r s Sr .
suppor t of REi n p ~ o v i n c e p r i o r i t y k.3 areas. I n t t i ~ s e
a r e a s , an RD c a , pai gn rnust be organi zed where t hr ee or
more RDC groups oper at e. The l i m i t s of t he cai . qai gn wiii
anconpass t he RD a r e a and the necessary t e r r i t o r y t o
provi de s e c ur i t y f o r t he hD ar ea.
6. (C)LOGISTICS
a. Cormon Item ( RVN) . Equipment or nia-cerial useu by
two or mvre s er vi ces .
b. Common It em ( U S ) . Cl ass I, I11and tho'se Cl as s Ti
and I V i t ems cur1: ent l y speci l ' i ed f o r Corncon Supply
System Support , plus any addi t i !, nal i i ; ems of suppl y
mut ual l y agreed upon bet ween, t he s e r vi c e s i nvgi ved.
c. Ser vi ce Peck1iarItern ( f ; VT<) . Equiprilent or rrzi t eri al
used bujonl y one of t he r ~ i l i t a r y s er vl ccs .
d. 3 e ~ v ' ~ c e i t ems n, , t >e c u l i z r Itera (US). A l l inclcciec',
f
f.Suppl y Yupporzt. Thc l . s F i r i ~oi" ,fsupl.,l-y h r r ~ t e r , i . s
as der i ned her ei n.
-
c. Cross Ser vi ce Sup! , ! or t . ..ni' orf!,rl.~:edby That f ' ~. n c - c ~
:>ner , i l i t a r y s er vi ce i n supgr7rt cfa n o t l ~ e r;..iiitary
. .
s er vi ce 1.01. srr.lcilr,:i:::'t;.~rss:,e::i; isr.cc;~,,".red rr.3~; ~ h e
. .
- ncl 2t ; ci , >t , . ~y i i i s c . ~ e r ~ j i c e rleci; , ! - \ J; . ! - , ~: S : , , . . : . : ~ ~ L - i l : l l d ~ ~
h. Ci.bss Nat i onal Force suppoi t . The sat;fe'a&.Cros:,
Servi ce uppo port except t hat suppor t ,is rendered by forcea ,v
of one nation r o r f o r c ~ aof anot her na t i on.
i. Line( s ) of' Communication ( Logi s t i cs ) (LOCJ. Al l or
t he r ~ u t s ,l and, water, and a i r which' canaec' t an oper at i ng
mi l i t a r y r or ce ni t h a base of oper at i ons, and al ong which
suppl i es and r ei n&orc=ent s 1; ove. Also d e s i p n t e d r out es
that suppcmt econonlic and p: >l i . t i cai efforts.
j. LUC Secur i t y G o d s
\
1 ) f i 3f the LGC between two poi nt s S e g ~ ~ e n t
. .
i s physi cal l y open. TrVi?/Ii~/5"d&iAF c:>ntrdl if he s ur r s ~ndi ng
ar ea i s such t hat t r a f f i c can fi-cve d.rlln&dayl i ght 'rlours
w i t h r e l a t i v e freedoxri from VC sabot:.ge, a t .ac:;s .,r harass-
nent . Armed es cor t r equi r ed. I s ol at ed i nci dori t s i s n ~ t '
rl-a'] Occur.
. .
( 2 )i U i 3 ~ R : Sepi ent of the LOC between tv.ro poi nt s
i s ~~kr - ysi cal l y clpon. Secsr j t y o f s u~r oundi ngal.ea i s sach
2
t hat fhor3u:.-h scc-, r:ty l . e z ~ ~ < . l ~ e g , i ns l ~~d! n; ;arlr.c,d csco17i s,
are required. F1-equent Sncidenlo rrSn:: cccu.r.
( 3 ) IED: LCjC between two r o i n t s 13 cl bs ed by VC/ I JVA
m: l i t ar y contr.f:l of' ' t he ar aa ::r ky ext ensi ve yhyslcal
i nt er di ct i on. i ega-siro r t act i c21 ope1 at i ons and/or en :: ne-
I
Assistance A c t of 1961, as Armrlduu, as (J:: . i n c t Tr r Zr -
Econonlic A i d and other pro,gratns author5zed. (In hW, t he
f unct i ons of F i are now covered by tJie l . i l i t ar y Assi st ari cc
Servi ce Fund (BUSF) Pl an which provi des f o r inciivid. dl LJS
mi l i t a r y department ( s er vi ce) pr opar mi ng, budgc t i n g and
funding of mi l i t ar y assistance. ) .
1. ~ i l i Constructi. sn pro- taTy Co n s t r ~c t i o n( I - I L C ..I<).
grammed and funded under the US xai l i t ar y departx:entsl
milbt a r y const r dct i un p r ~ ~ g r a r ~ ~ s , and wtiich require
Congressi onal , approval.
a ne x P ( Di s t r i but i on ) to
Combined Cmpafgn Plan 1-68.
-
*
-,.
2 5 ~ & 2 ~l&>/ G"L/,
C.&2<o.3~ xf - . " T *<a
er. w a
&Q GO& 2 I Uu 52 CT
W@5~4i i
rmng d o h 55 ap ainh
~i xh/ =/ @&ng- ~r f
rfznh/~i~/ThGa-~ni&n
T~&/TW@AA~ Tin
~innflX/~uAng~m
! Pl n . h / ~ ~ / ~ u h n g Ng i i i
T S ~ T h i chinh 3 &b g
nac lrhu 3; ~ l n g
X3y dpg (VP/%fng t d n g )
Lztu - h8 Sb
CMC
CINCPAC
COrnSIEACV
CG FMFPAC
CG USARV
COMNAVFORV
COHSEVENTHAP
COHXAVSUPPACT, DANAN G
COMTHIRDNCB
CG 1st NarDiv
CG 3d MwDiv
CG America1 Dfv
CG 1st FdW
CG FLC
CG Ninth NAB
CG 2nd ROKMC Brigade
' DSA, I ARVN Corps
5th SFG ( A M )
l e t MP 1Bn
3d MP Bn
7th Engr E! n
9th Engr En '
11th Zngr Bn
5th Canmn Bn
244th BsyOpnsCo
29th Cf v i l Affairs Co
File
Tot a l
RE GWE D UNCLASSIFIED
ORDER SEC ARMY BY TAG PER
7 6 2 5 5
- -
, &yL22-k.-
of r ~ e d i c i n e , or dnance, f ood, PGL, m C : j i ; ~ e r -
. -
. , : - \ - 5
as a s i t e used by conibat units tc rest,ro;;rc;;, r e t r a i r i ,
evade f r i e n d l y 2 p e r s t i ;ns and/ or in5tiste;re, aratory
phase cf: ol ' r ens l ve c pe r a t i ons .
~
( c ) Ne ht r a l i z e d VC/, IVA 3asz dr ear A
.
c ~ s e
a r e a whicht h e enerf,:/ i s notabl e t o us e foritsi n ~ e n d e d
- . . -
pur pose. Temporaryn e u t ~ a l i z a t i q ncan be accr; r. ; . ~isri ec
.. -
me a , o r bg t.k:e i,r-aser,cein.,-l,ra r -;dncj Gi-rzL f' : . i . enci y
f o r c e s s ~ d f f i c i e n tt r 2 deny t::~;ener:;: fyet i.,::,<; ; f i r e. ~ r t c t z : :
. - .
ac c es s t.2 thea r ~ a;'or. use 2 s a s af e haven. ;eucr:ai1zati.?~s
5 c; nztr i c c e s s a r i l y peraanontand f i r ~ ~ t be r e e v a l u a t e d esc; ?
' c.:; ;,,.r, :.(-,c:,> :,;.!:
.
;,
. L . - A ..:L' zcti7pL z s ' rs;:l;: :: : ?. . <. <' ; , - <- - , a, . t - " , , : A ; L A : ' & .
- .-. ..
I s
. I ? . . ' ? . - ,
i
C
j >, j I)P, ii .;,VL,! .L ( 21-'.::: 0 iflr-;-.e ( 2: ; :,;.:-:;!, .<>(, ,-,
b
. -- . . . .
r?.I;:-:;:. "". 3 . , ; ; St: , i2.L ,.'. I . . . . -. U
REGRADED UNCLASsIFIED
*--dJ . .
.- . - > - - ,. .
ORDER SEC ARMY BY TAGPER
- '
\ . , : - > d .' L 2 A > > \
' ;'
7 6 2 5 5
yarillanantly dl sabl ed,
( 4) l e r n~a ne nt l yDisablec;. i ersc. r, nel x!.b car. :. st
r e t ur n t o t hei r units because of' sever e d i s a b i l i t y .
Est i mat ed as a por t i on of the DOW f i gu1. e~.
( 5) Retilrnees (Hoi ~hanh) . VC/ NVA p q l i t i c a l and
mi l i t a r y cadre w;lo are i nduced t o r e t i r n o r c me over t o
Gi M c ont r ol under the Chieu I!oi (Open Ar ms ) F.rozran.
( a ) Li l i t a r y Iioi Chanh. The mi l i t 2 r y
r et ur nee' under the Chi eu Hoi pr ogr m.
(b) P o l i t i c a l Koi Chanh. The p o l i t l c ~ l
r et ur nee unrier t he Ct-lieu E o i prol;rar;l.
(6)1, r i s oner s o f ;lap (F!.:). l e r s c ns xklo - us l j f j r
under t he Geneva Conventi )n, Ta r t I , Ar t i c l e ,, on I - r l s o n e ~ s
of gar. I n adcii t i m, t he f ~ l l o wi n c per s- >ns ;;ill ;ie- extended
the pr ot ect i on of t hi s Yrisisner 3f War ar i. c l e i n Viet.naill.
( a) Fersons wii.-, ar e coj Ril;,::ci whi l e act -
u a l l y engagi ng i n conbat o r a b e l l i ~ e i - e p t . a c t ot he r than
f
an a c t of t e r r l ~ r i s n , sabot a. : e c:r sijyinp a; - ai cst t h e i t ei . ubl i c
of Vie tnan;, t he L. S . o r ot ?i er ?ree j s r l a : . . i Ll it a r y Armed
Forces.
C
Vietnar;,ege I;r::led :Jorces cr . - ~f t;ile Vie t Cdn:.?, ui:t: i ,:er
Ca!. Lured ir! c ?mi : at or1 n.)t, c.:cey t a t r : ~ ' : c:*i s i . , : : ?- ??! . t ?~i i . ,
W~ GS + : fl nal status, i . e. , inr1oce:;t cj . v. 1: i 3 : . i ,
G-e
- .
c-sb, 1 Li <j i . ~L: d&sL3 0:. ;.,pis(,JrJ,:$y>>? i P ; p < y , ;.,:,:., :, , ( . _ . . ,.-
de -coynL: fied.
( 8) Deser ;;ere i n d i v i c i ~ a la;!senr; i.' r?rr; i - i i s
unit wi t h no a2parent i n t e ~ t i o nof r e t . ~ r n l n g ,
( 9 ) Civil Def endant . Per s ons ;JL-o a r e sus- sc ;ec
of be i ng s2i e s , s a bot e ur s , t e r y o r i s t s , o r CI--5i::inais ant
who do n o t q u a l i f y as p r i s o n e r s of war . dnaer >zra;:rai)kl
3. S. i 6) above.
c. Snerfiy Act i ons.
(1)At t a c ks . An i n c i d e n t i n v h i c h t he eneyiy
atterrii. t s t o i n f l i c t c a s ua l t i e s ana/ or c r o p e r t y uxr.age.
At t a c ks a r e i d e n t i f i e d by t y , e wid s i z e . 'The t r ~ a d e - r
t e r x L a r ~ e Sc a l e At t a c k xajr ?;e used t o enc.:o.:jass a t t a c k s
niade by a ' b a t t a l i 3 n sr l ar . zer f o r c e . The t en, : Smal l Sc a l e
At t a c k w i l i i f i cl i t de tllqce a t t a c x s bjr f o r c e s :,.I" l e s s thar.
b a t t a l i o n s i z e . Theye a r e ti-irce t y p e s -.r" :itLac!::
ambush, a s s a u l t , and f i r e .
( a ) Amb.dan. A surprise at t xci c , u s u a l l y
c,:ric;luctec, fr<.:~r: ,,lan;:e(l 1; s3 t , i . , ns, a::a 1.n:;L a rr.::v'i:r~[! or>
ten:i, ~r. r:r. iiyk;nl ied i;yoi;p i i nj t,, ;;r cc:nTJoy.
J (b) i l s L . a u l t . An a t t a c k in y V j i ; ' : c h I,!;,c c:sa;>:??
us ed j::tYL and p.arleitve,r~In a-1 %T; ~E. ; ; t t.1 ~r3c7, e 01'
fi ;*r,a~!; ?.,. .t..ls ob5 e c t ',.V B @
> .
( c ; ?i re, An a',+;&ciy ir: ;,;\,-ici- t':.$ efii;,--,; A .
JI. ,rbaper.ey dalitlge.
( 2 ) Iiarassrrient. An i nci aen t i n K:.I CL! Cric: 2~~7;:Altir.y
obj e c t i ve i s t o di s r upt t er npor a- i l g .t;:le ~ c t . i v i t i e s,i' e.
u n i t , i n s t a l l a t i ~ n ; v i l l a g e , han~l e t, o r a c t i v i t y rat!ii;r
T1 CS.7
thaii t o i n f l i c t s e r i o u s c a s u a l t i e s o r ciarmz?. KG, ~ L S A I C L ~
y i l l be c l a s s e d a s e i t h e r har assment airair,sf, c i v l l i a r i o r
mi l i t a r y t a r g e t s .
(a) Harassment of Ci vl l i ari s. , Lceri:s /*ii - ; y r , : . L . L , L
of harassr:.ent d i r e c t e d a g a i n s t t a r , e t s t i l h t ;,re grecl~:i.Lr,zn-
t l y of a c i v i l i a n nat ur e. Sxarii l e s a r e ' tj-iinlnc ol" crol;s
o r har, l e t har as s xent .
( b ) kar aszment of I , i . l i t . ary. I n c i d e n t s
of har assment a c a i n s t n ~ i l i t a r y t a r ge t s .
-.
,xa-::,les i i - n l ~e e a b
s ni pi ng a t a j,azr ;i, har as s i ng f?re, booby ixa1.s f or .
t a r g e t s t' rat a r e not a c t s of' s a b o t a ~ e .
That a r e a i n the hVN t h a t i s congi dered to be 01 3t:ch
importance as t o warrarlt t he pr i nc i pa l of f or $, m d weicti*l
of offensive power.
b. Area of Operat i ons ( A O ) . An ar ea where US/ F~~~? , AF
conduct oper at i ons dur i ng a s pe c i f i c per i ad of time.
These oper at i ons w i l l be coor di nat ed wi t h, and advance
agr6emen.t obt ai ned from , appr opr i at e GVN r e pr e s e nt a t i ve .
An -46 i s assi gned norrrially for a s p e c i f i c oper at i on
which rnay be wi t hi n o r out s i de of a tac t i ca. 1 a r e a of
r e s pons i bi l i t y,
c. Ta c t i c a l Areas of Res pons i bi l i t y ( TAOH). A'
pr es cr i bed ar ea which has been assi gned s p e c i f i c a l l y t o a
cornlander who i s r es pons i bl e f o r , and has t he a ut hor i t f
t o ac t on, t he devel .>pment and laaintenance 9f i n s t al l at i e: ns ,
t he c a nt r ol of m~verrlent, and t he c ~t l d u c tof t a c t i c a l
oper at i ons wi t h t r oa ps under h i s c:nt>ol:i A l l f i r e and
nl heuver coaduct ed wi t hi n t he TAOR, or whose e f f e c t s
irnpinqe upon i t , mcst be coordinn::ed with t he comnander
of t he f or c e as:;j. (-ricd tlie TACE
d. Ta c t i c a l Areas of I n t e r e s t ( ' TAi r J ) . An ar ea i n c l u a -
i ng,
, .
but not ne c e s s a r i l y 1irr:ited t o, t he ' Tact j cal Areas of
*, -.
oper at i >ns of all G V i i f c r c c s a:;c i n s i ~ i l o . t In s , ;1L'; C ~ . . ~ ; - , S
and ED a r e a s i n or.jer t..- ac, . ; eve, t hr. : ; ~. ~: ; ccoper a- 1~.~t:cl:11.
t i o n c o o ~d i n a t l ? n , t he r na xi : , ~e f f e c t of t1.1e cz::;Sined
.
f r i e ndl y f ' cr ces andf i r e power. The 1' Ai j I d i f ' r e ~ sf r ~ m
t he TAORi n t h a t , U S / ~ A Fcormlanders ar e n o t char , - ed
w i t h pri mary t a c t i c a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y nor are t ney expect ed
t o conducd t a c t i c a l oper at i ons on a c mt i n u i n g b a s i s i.n t he
TAOI.
e. Combined Operat i on, An o p e r a t i m c:)nducted by
I
el ement s of two or more na t i ons oper at i ng t oget her or i n
f. Cl ear i ng Operat i ans. An oper at i on t o c l e a r an ai.ea
permanent l y of organi zed V C ~ J V Ama i n, f b ~ r c e s , i ncl udi ng
t he pr ovi nci al ba t t a l i ons , i n . ~ r d e rt o e l i mi na t e t he
imr,.ediate t h r e a t of ove r t eneniy interference wi t h r e v ~ l -
ut i 9nar y developrcent a c t i v i t i e s t h a t ar e t3f o l l .w.
g. Sear ch and Dest r oy Operat i on. An off' ensj ve
oper at i on c 2nducted f.lr t he pur pme of see' ri ng out and
1.
des t r oyi ng enemy f or c e s , i ns t a l l a t i . ! ns , r es our ces and
base ar eas . These z >e r a t i f ms a r e or i ent ed ;n the enemy
i ns i de ' ' or out s' l ae a 1AOR.
h. Se c ur i t y j ~ e r a t i q n . . . ? . r a t i . ms whi >sc purp. ?se i s
t o ~ ~ r r ) t e c t , c a l , and mi l i t a r y frjendi y p ~ i i t i ecqnomic,
.
r es our ces arid i no: . al l a Lions, sucha3 u i ~ . t r i c I, ca&it n l 3
or popu1u'it;d ar eas , t o i ncl uce pr ( , vi . o~i s l y > , A c ~l ' i e c l ar eas ,
andde, o t s aficj,38se S. 8 r ~ ~
CONF T D~ F TIAL
*.
-
-------- _>_ /
i. Cordon s i <.:- and sear ch opc: ~' at i on isLc;. ;<;~~;, . :~:~f~
which r hegul ar , pa r a r r l i l i t a ~y, and/or !: : i i ; i o~i ~l i:o; i c ~ i i ' cj : , ( : i . ~
e nc i r c l e a v i l l a g e , hahl et o r ar ea t o prlevent ent r ance t o
or e x i t from the a r e a andt o provi de s e c ur i t y t o f or c e s ,
i ncl udi ng Pegul ar , pa r a mi l i t a r y, and l . , i l i t s r y s e c ur i t y
Ser vi ce, Pol i ce Speci al Branch, Pr ovi nci al Zeconr-aissnnce
Uni t s, and Nat i onal Pol i ce Fi e l d Forces i ns i c e t n e e nc i r c l e d
ar ea i i hi l e t hey perfom; s ear ches f o r VC, VC i nf r Ls t r uc t ur e ,
d r a f t d o d ~ e r s , i l l e g a l r e s i de nt s , cont raband, e t c.
j. 2 a u l 3unyan O.perati.)ns. These aref ~ r e s tc l e a r i ng
oper at i ons usi nr?Rome plows and ot her s pe c i a l i z e d equipxenr;.
These oper at i ons w j 11be used pri. ; arilyi n c $ , n j unct i on
wi t h base area n e u t r a l i z a t i o n t;o r ender the ar ea uns ui t a bl e
f o r i' urther use by theenen.y. ilowever, tlese e r a t i ons :A
. r,.a:j a l s o be &~:,loyedt o c l e a r a r e a s al ong key LkC1 s sad
ot her s e n s i t i v e ar eas .
k. Road Runner, !he neme t o t he pr.sh;r.ul; t o a s ~ i ~ s n e d
r e s t o r e pr onr es s i vel y zkie ~ i a i n a;ld sec ns a r y rr,ad n e t s t o
1 n t The ~concept ?i' R13fid Hunner i s a s ; j eci zl l y
t a i l o r e d fol. ca Lr aver si ng :lain anu s. : c -nd:irByr G a r l s t8
&er;ionstrat,e . ur intent, :-,n &ld a bi . 1i . t ~t,:usc :\.;id. keel . open
yes, onsi b i l i t y 1TAOH) wher c her e t of ~mt: t!-ley :.%ve beex a bl e
t o I ~ ~ O V ~ wi t ; & r e l a t i v e i mpuni t yo
m. Combat Support Coordi nat i on Cent er ( CSCC) . The
CSCC i s a f a c i l i t y wi t hi n which a r e grouped r s pr bes ennt i ves
of a r t i l l e r y , ai r , naval gunf i r e, and ot her agenci es a s
deemed . necessar y by t he colnr.-anuer(s). These r e2r es ent a-
t i v e s a s s i s t t he coumander( s) t hr l - ) u~ht ke G2/ G3 i n pl anzi ag,
coor di nat i nz, and c mt r ~ l l i n i ; : a l l means of coxbat suppor t
.
a va i l a bl e i n an oper at i on.
n'. Reserve React i on Forces. ht?serve r e c c t i on f or c e s
are a l l ~ncomni i t ~t ed f ~ r c e sa va i l s bl e t o t he co:nua;lder.
They n~ay be any s i z e u n i t and i ncl ude r e a c t l s n f or oe s
anywhere, f or c e s i n t r a i ni ng, f l > r c ~ s underzoi ng r e n a b i l i t a -
,
t i on, and newly a r r l ve d f ; r ces ~nde r goi r i - c mb s t rea. i 2ness
pr epar at i ons .
3. I..issi 11s.
(1) Senrc11 and Destr' jy (Feci ->ri al ), ' Ope r a t i ms t )
base ar eas ant! sup;;ly poi nt s . arld Ye o ~c i ~' bestlo :y ( t ; i : : . i a) ns l )
( 2 ) Search aria Ijeutr.:y ( P~. ovj . nci al ) . i - y2r at i ons
. .
-
i n I ndi r e c t su;; o r t of gs c i f i cn t i on w:':icti ar:s c .ndl;c ~ec?
adj acent t:, pi ~pul at ed a?eas uudcr ,:..::;1.: con?;r-:l or t,) ar.e-.s '
5
d i r e c t ' support of ~a c i f ' i c a t i on w h i c h s-5 ccjr;;:,:: L,CL: i:: ;;r4
l o c a l i ' or ces, g u e r r i l l a f or c s s ana infrast r , Ac - ~L~. r ( 2.
( 4) Se c ur i t y Operat i ons. Operat l S2ns'y:r,.,se ~,uI-;;x B
i s t o pr ot e c t p o l i t i c a l , economic aad f ; . i l i t a r y r e s J Lr c e s
and i n s t a l l a t i a n s , such as d i s t r i . c t cagi - i al s ctr popu:sted
ar eas , l i n e s of corririunication, food. s t z r e s and proci.i;ction
ar eas , and depot s and base we a s . For r e por t i ng gur poses,
oper at i ons i n def ense of mi l i t a r y a r e a s 2cd i n s t a l i a Xi s ns ,
e, g, , mi l i t a r y a i r bgses and l o z i s t i c coirii;lexes, ar e r i ot
consi der ed i n suppor t of p a c i l ' i c a ~i o n .
a r e Involved. i n t r a i ni ng or underg-j i ng rehbbi i l t at i : ; i -i .
I t a ppl i e s a l s o t o newly ar r i ved f or c e s undergoi ng c ol r ~. ~a t
r e a di ne s s pr e pa r a t i on a n d o r a l e r t e d reuc t i on f or c e s .
( 5 ) PACIFICATICN:
a, Pa c i f i c a t i on i s the n l l i tary, p o i i t i cs; . , ec :nci?ilc
go\rernint.;nt Lile ir,i
.
~
-
~
. .
~ ~ ~ ~
L, G: j;+;<.::
; < ;
;c - :;:
c,;' >
s.::<; z:
5
i.l-
act i vi . ?y ca;.,ablu of s e l f - s - u s t z n ~ ~ c e :~nc: ex,.~:~-,s:oa,
y, -,
- - A L
economic o l e ~ l e n t of' paci f' i cat , i : , n inciudos t he 0 p e n i . n ~~ o r t '
r oa ds and wat erways and t he ma i n t e n ~ r c e ~ i "l i n e s of con-
muni cat i on i l npor t ant t o economic r r d r;,ill' ca.ry ec t i vi ' i y.
b. 3e vol ut i ona r y cievelopmen t, the iehcl5i:g edge of
p a c i f i c a t i o n , i s t he fom; i al i zed Governn:ent 3,' Vie tria7:
program, under t he s pons or s hi p of t he I l i n i s t r g o l F;evoii;tion-
a r y Development, i n s p e c i f i e d harrllets l oc a - ~e c : ; : - er . e~kl l g
~ r i t h i nRD c a mpa i m a r e a s . It i nc l ude s tre i oca; s e c ~c r l t g
f o r t hos e h a r ~ l e t s and t h e y n l i t i c a l , e c 3 r . ~r - l c ,ar,d srj c-a;
a c t i v i t i e s a t t h a t l e v e l ,
c. Nat i on b u l i d i c g i s t he e ~ o n o r i ~ l c , p c i i +, l c , ~ 1 ,w d
s o c i a l a c t i : vi t y havi ng an b~.!jact nat l o; ?wi de &. ?d/ c~;l f i
urbar, c e n t e r s . I t i s r e l a t e d t o >ac' i f i cat i : ?n ;n sYj&r. 1.;
-L. ~ ~ i i d s on t he r e s i l t s of p a c i i ' i c a t i o n a n d con ; r. i : : ~i ~e s
;c t k-e est a' sl i shr . i ent of a v i a b l e econori-ic m c i s ~ i c i a l
c o A~ i u n i t y.
7 '
i c a t l j r , 2 c t i v i t j . e ~and tc i,.sj.;-.+
L , L .
:: ' . , L . - ~ :
.
-1
.
.-
- - - L , ; r ,,*~,if :.;c;ciA..~:
- i yAf - $i z;icki t<:,e k:j - c < v j i .-L:-tLA-y: - - - r . - - - , , , . . .... ..:.., . - . ! . .
- . L i :i , _I ii - . ._-.
- -
' ; ( z,'.,j
\ ;5Ll ? y Ge , i c i s - ~ ~ ! " ' , ~ z #
.*d#. * L,'j ,.rA :;rLf> &x e e ; : . j {::,;.' .,k :<, .>:- ;;'L,,::.:. -*.
5a cun$rcl as conll;lctzd A p "' ' L - j ~ i ? c j l - -<;I sic;;: l j j : ; >; A a l ~ {;I>
devel opi ng Ap i3oi Pi01 t o t he ext enc t hat caiirt: r.o liini-ey, L_,
a r e r e qui r e d on a permanent bas i s and tiisre 2 s an zr i - ~ci n;
program t o cont i nue t ne devel opnent of t hese L1uiLets.
( 2 ) VC g u e r r i l l a an? known VC i . nfrasi ; r-uct i l ~e
el ement s based, in t he a r e a have been d ~ s t r o y e aan5 a va i l -
abl e r r ~i l i t a r y and pol i c e f a r c e s !lave an orj rani zea on-g.?ing
progrmi t o pr event t he re-emergence of t hese elerfients.
. -
( 3 ) I i mi l l et s i n t he art38 have adequat e aay ar?c; c i g c t
seciclrity f o r c e s and GVN cadr e e l e ~r ; e i ~t s a r e abl e t o re~::aln
over ni ght i n t hes e ' nm,le t s wi t hout ' t h r e a t fro^. Zke VC.
( 4)3.ads connect i ng h m, l e t s vi 1l a ; e s i n c.'rie
a r e a a r e saf e from VC z t t a c k dur i nz da;-iighz coLr s wl 5 - i
rnlnin:m s e c ~ r ' l t g r equi r ed.
( 5j The ar ea i s f r e e of VC i ncl dei l t s excel. +y f o r
s s cr ai l c ind'lviaual acts of t er r - or : i sn alicl sabot nke,
( 6 ) RVi;AF' ~r i u/ or~~s / F~- , AI ; . a r e cl vai l abl e to pr event
:Pie i f i c; ; r . sl ~r ; cf -;r;:afiized ener;,y I'c,r.ce Jr ! L -: t l . e u.rea,
f'.Area Uncjer.!l,oini; Yeciir~.i.r~g.An ar8eil is ' U ~ > : ~ C ; I " . , < : c -
sec: ~r i n{;when:
( 1j >he cl ea; . ed of' v - e1.C;~hs- s beuii rjr; . h r i j ~ f ; ( i ' r' dsj ..>
+ CI
. k s 2 .2 a ;.jl&.;;on s i z e or Is;.::c:r. i i 9 j . i car , a , c:, , . ide,
orGarii y , ~ . ;?37,,j e~ep 87;; ,>-.-.PTF - .J , - " .,L --'g-.>:-
t h a t is oiv,-;a2 zcc a n d equ.i;-;.ed -u .. ' ;.:sii,a L;; ;iie .; 226
I
CONFI DENTI AL
arld fi t ; ht 3 s c o h e c i v 6 mi, tkrcl oxk:i. bi :,s 1 ; ~ : . : ~ : . , 1 1: =; ;
/
"
and i n t e n t t o ds sij, shoul < : . i ; l e of' collsiGsrod calu..
of f e r i ng organi zed r es i s &ance .
( 2 ) EVNAF and/or US / ~ WJ ~ APa r e abl e t o pr event t he
i ncur s i on of an organi zed enen;y f or c e i nt o the ar ea.
( 3 ) &WAFand/or US/F'!~KAF a r e oper at i ng in the
a r e a a s neces s ar y t o clestroy VC g u e r r i l l a and I n f r a s t r u c t -
u r e el ement and e s t a b l i s h l oc a l a r e a s e c ur i t y and s e c ur i t y
f o r t he popul at i on and cadre e l e ~ e n t s .
( 4)Revol ut i onar y Development Cadre, or ct r-er
o f f i c i a l l y recogni zed cadr e, a r e working i n t he ar ea
or a r e pr ogr m: e d t o be a va i l a bl e when -;he r e q u i s i ~ e l o c a l
s e c ur i t y has been es t abl i s hed.
g. Contested Area. A n a r e a i s concestacl t;~, er~:
(1)'The a r e a has been s e l e c t e a f o r the f a x ; &~ci ; - r i
of r evol ut i onar y development a c t i v i t i e s and/ or i s r e q ~ i r c a
f o r che c.:nduct of aper at i ons t o ?ravi . de a defeiise i n
dept h a ga i ns t t he i ncur s i on of enenly f or c e s i n t o nearby
areas wkere r e vol ut i or ~a r y de\ielo;;xr,e-n~a(; ~ i v i Lies ar e
. . . . . -
?La ;ninr,e.bit ~ F : l eArea. s.2 arr.ea. is ~ 1 . f .,ifi---' 3,..-. L, - t b: >~i ; i ~r ~ci : : L A ,
or mi l i t a r y i nf l uence ovup t;hc &l.eu ~)xc;:\ I t f ' 3 ~ti!~? C~ j i l t i i . , <
of t r a n s i e n t t y - p opel-at.il:ns,
i. VC Cont r ol l ed Area, A n ar ea .i: ~:niiel-'dC c ont r ol xi--erL-,:
i l ) VC/MVA f or c e s are preseri t 15 o r near the ar ea
and a r e a bl e t o e x e r t p o l i t i c a l a nd/ o~> s i l i t a r y i n f l ~ s n c e
over t he ar ea.
: ( 2 ) RVXAF and/ or USAF'~&..,+~F, i i.' serit i n V G j ~: r , e the =,o.-
I
arc conduct i ng onl y t r a n s i e n t 3earc.i.; anti des t r oy t y ' e
oper at i ons wi t h no i n t e nt t o gai n ~. er r , i ar e; ~t a r e a ccnt r ;i.
j , Ap h a ~ ~ , l s Doi kloi ( Ee a l New Li f e I-iarille t ). k t desi cnt i t ed
,
i n a pr ovi nc i a l RD pl an Tor i;;?dc;r a pr~;:rrm of' deve10, ~l f ~ent
t he s uper vi s i on of RD cadr e t o aci, ieve the el everL o i j j e c z l - v . ~ ~
( a s p i r e t i o n s ) . The el even obj e c t i vs s are:
(1)El i ni na t e t ne VC i n f r a s t z ~ ~ c t u r e .
( 2 ) El i mi nat e cdr r upt pr a c t i c ks and di s char ge
c. . j rrupt o f f i c i a l s .
( 3 ) Develop a new s ~ i r i t .
oper at i ons .
( e. ) 2 q i e r : ; e n t l a n d rei'crr:.
. 1.
( 10) 1~ip:love line s of C G I I L ~ ~ L ~ E ~ C ~ . , L ~ O ~ P
(11) fieward daser 7vi ng s o i i i i e r s , p u b l i c s c r vwr s
and c i t i z e n s who nave c c n t r i b u t e d t o FD p r o g r u s .
k. Ap Tan Si nh (New Li f e Kaml et ) . A haml et t h a t was
compl et ed b e f o r e 31 Decenber 1966 afid has the f . l i ow; ng
6 c r i t e r i a :
( 1) Census cornpie ~ e d ,VC i n f r a s t r u c t ~ r ede s t r oye d
o r n e u t r a l i z e d .
( 2 ) Se l e c t e u and t r ai neci sel f' -aef' eri se i ' sr cec,
equi pped a s a ppr opr i a t e .
(3) Zf f e c t i v e h m l e t ue f e ns r syster:,.
( 4) Or ~ mi z e c i l i a i s x ~arid l c; . ; i zi. l c - syeterse
( 5) ' . Es t a bl i s he d s o c i a l or gar . i zar ; i m,
( 6 ) Yopul zr governxen t e l e c t e d .
( Thes e i-iai l e t s a r e ti.evel-!;-ed and ii-x.-~roveii by t h e vi l l a; . ; e
and hml e t of i " i ci a1s . )
1, Ap 3ini.i i i n h ( Faci f i c a t i , . -I Iim.le t ). A ilaJr.:l.et
desi [: nat ed i r ? a , , r : >vi nci ai i . , . :,:!an 'i'orc j;ri':-.r,mof
t l -2n a c .;.eve ttlr; . . I, ' t,\,dCI (>i' L k ! t > r,ielft?ri cons t r a ~ c L o 1-lr...
,idfc.~:sa i ' a~?ces,oia$;anizi ng a def' ec:, ~ .,j L Lei J %:;t :: . s' C
~ a e r r ~ i l l s tht?hwLl er;govcr.r.r;l~r' s i ' m- c e ~and e l e c t i n g
counci l , an Ap i3inh Dinh st l oul d bo ~ a u a d yf o r c ~ ~ n v e r s i t o o ) ~
an A p Doi I%oi in t he f ol l owi ng year.
m. Ci v i l - Mi l i t a r y RD Team. An RI> group, or gani zed
on t he 59-man b a s i s , formed from cne P F or 5F pl at oon
and pr ovi nc i a l a dmi ni s t r a t i ve and t echni cal cadr e, whose
purpose i s t o perform t as ks similar t o t hose performed by
RD cadre.
n. Truong Son RD Team. A 70-man RD group, ge ne r a l l y
a l l o f hi ghl ander e t hni c or i gi n, employed i n t he hi ghl and
a r e a s of Sout h Vietnam t o perform t as ks s i mi l a r t o t hose
performed by RD cadre, except t h a t t hes e t a s ks a r e nodi f l e c
t o s u i t t he hi ghl ander t r i b a l popul at i on,
o. ? e r r i t o r i a l Secur i ty. Se c ur i t y frorr, VC l o c a l f o r c e s
2nd g u e r r i l l a u n i t s and VC/ I ~ VA main f or 8ces u r ~ i t s i n o r
t h e a .t e ni ng t ~atarea.
p. Local Secur i t y. That p a r t of t e r r i t o r i a l s e c ur i t y
wr,ick- pr ovi des s e c u r i t y from VC l o c a l f or c e s and guer r ' i l i a
~ n i t s .
q. Campaign. The mi l i t a r y or ga ni z a t i , n e s t a bl i s he d
by i nt e r - v. i r ~i s t e r i a 1 a i r e c t i v e #032/ j ~~/ 31/ i I S~E and
j l C / 5 8 / ~ F / ~ s / 3 dat ed 6 iAar67. That directive a s t a b l i s k e s
procecur. es f' zr c ,-- tr,2l, c >or a i na t i on anu Ir. i e; : rat i on
of mi l i t a r y, RDC groups and ad.mini3trz' ;; ve e2;: 8bL.:s Ir.
suppor t of RE i n provi nce p r i o r i t y k t 3 areas. I.n t!l,se
ar eas , an RD c a pai gn rnust be organi zed where t hr e e or
more RDC groups oper at e. The limits of t he caAagai gn w i l l
snconipass t he RD a r e a and the necessary t e r r i t o r y t o
provi de s e c ur i t y f o r t he KD ar ea.
a. Cormon Item ( RVN) . Equipment or a. ar;erial useu by
two or mure s er vi ces .
b. Comrnon Item ( US) . Clash I, I11 and thobe Cl as s 11
and I V iterns c u r i e n t l y s pe c i f i e d f o r Corncon Supply
System Support , plus any a ddi t i ona l i t ems of suppl y
mut ual l y agreed upon between t he s e r vi c e s i n v ~ i v e d .
c. Ser vi ce Pe c kl i a r Itenl ( FVT;) . 3quiprlLent or ~ c a c e r i a l
used b."; onl y one of t he n: i l i t ar y s e r vl c c s .
d. S e r ~ ~ i c e i - e c ul l r r I t e ~ n ( L S ) . A 1 1 i terns n :t i n c l ~c i e 6
Lr? sr,5 k f l n i t i n for. Cms on Iteia ( US) .
e. Desipl?-ated I tern. Zqui l , l bt cnt C J ri,aterl a1 i de: i t i f l e d ~
a s def i ned her ei n.
-
c. Cr oss Ser vi ce Sup, lort. r, i ( ; r f , ) ~~r . t ; d That i ' d n c ~ ~ b:j
h. C+bss Nat i onal Force support , The sat;feha& . Cross
Servi ce uppo port except that 8uppo~t ,f s rendered by f or ces ,.
of one nat i on mr SOFCUBof another na t i on*
i. Line( s) of' Communication ( Logi s t i cs ) ( Luc ) . A l i of'
t he mut e s , land, wat er, and a i r wlLich' cansect an oper at i ng
r r ~i l i t ar y f or ce wj t h a base of oper at i ons, and al ong which
suppl i es and rein^ orcm. ents 1: ove. Also desi gnat ed r nut es
t h a t s u p p ~ r t econoniic and p: >l i . t i cal e f f or t s .
j. LUG Secur ~i t yGo d s
1
1 G Se we n t 3f the LGC between two poi nt s
. .
i s physi cal l y open. XV~J/US/~~&ULF he c:!ni;r /l 3f s u r r ~ n d i n g
area i s such t hat t r af i ' i c can fi-cve d . ring dayl i ght l:ours
w i t h r e l a t i v e freedon: from VC sabot ; . ~e, a t .acLs .>rharass-
nent . Armed es cor t i s 11~t requi red. ' I s ol at ed incidents
i;-ar bcciir,
( 2 )A~IBLR: S e p e n t of the LGC between t wo 1;oints
i s l ~hys i c a l l y3pcn. Secdr j t y of suprounding a l e a i s sach
2
t hat flhorJu:-:'n ~ c c - ~ r : t g i ncl i ~di n: ; nrit.crd cscol1Ls, ~ . e a c ~ . t ~ ~ e s ,
ar e req~circ. d. Frequent Sncidcr?t o [:a:,r CCCU-T' .
( 3 ) F.ED: LCiC between t wo poi nt s i s clclsed by VC/NVC. ,
ml l i t a r y cont r ( : l of 'the ar 3a >r ky ext ens i ve yhys*cal
i nt c r di cLion. i eqt-aire s t a c t i c a l ope1 at i ons and/ or en:: ne-
. .
Assi st ance Act crf 196lS as Ameriduu, as o L:< .1nct. f . r i ~
Econaniic Aid and other pro,grams author5zed. (In hVI\T, t he
f unct i ons of 16rAP are now covered by $133 3, i l i t ar y Assi st arl cc
Servi ce Fund (FIAsF) Pl an which provj-des Tor !nciivid. dl LJS
mi l i t ar y department ( servi ce) prop;rmmnning, budgc t5ng and
funding of mi l i t ar y assistence. ) -
1. X i l i tapy Const r i ct i on (I-ILc ..I<). Co n s t r u c t i ~npro-
grammed and funded under the US ~ c ~ i l i tary d e ~ a r tr::ent s'
r ni l i t ar y cons t r act i un pr~2grarris, and wiiicki r equi r e
Con~j es s i onal , approval.
Annex P ( Di stri buti on ) to
Combined Canpaf gn Plan 1-68.
-- -
I
~ & / , ~ ~ J- ~, ~ ,>-
d&l/ t&, a
2<<o,3& X/-&& ,3: CY
~a ~ o i n21ichu 32CT
WGp5w-36
Tr ung d o h 51 q binh
~ k ~ ~ a / m/ @n ~ - ~ r i
2!fmh/~X/!R&a-l?ini~n
~ i n h / ~ I c / ~ ~ h g !tin
T i ~ f l ~ / ~ L l i h l g N a
TInh/~~/~ubng Ng3i
~ 6 o Thichinh3 & h g
D$c khu3: Egng
BZ) X5yd$ng (J@/Mngt d n g )
- h696
CMC
CINCPAC
C O ~ S K A C V
CGFMFPAC
CGUSAHV
COMNAVF'ORV
COHSEVENTHAP
C~KNAVSUPPACT, DANANG
COMTHIRDNCB
CG1stMarDiv
CG3d PiarDiv
CG he pi c a1 Dfv
CG 1st PAW
CG FLC
CG Ninth PIAB
CG 2nd ROKMC Brigade
DSA, I ARVN Corps
5th SFG ( ABN)
1st MP En
3d MP 'Ba
7th Ehgr &I
9th Engr Bn
11th En@ m
5th Conmn Bn
244th PsyopnsCo
29th Civil Affairs Co
Fi l e
Tot a l
REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ORDER SEC ARMY BY TAG PER
7 6 2 5 5