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1. LAGRIMAS V. ABALOS and JOSEFINA A. PANGAN,

heir of the late Jose R. Abalos, petitioners, vs. THE
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, PEPITO LACULOB,
NICOLAS LACURUM, MATEO RESPICIO, LUIS DE LA
CRUZ, BENJAMIN MARACHA, FEDERICO MIONES and
ONOFRE FUJIWARA, JR., respondents.

SYLLABUS
1.REMEDIAL LAW; P.D. NO. 1508; REQUIREMENT OF
CONCILIATION; NOT APPLICABLE WHERE THE
PARTIES RESIDE IN DIFFERENT PLACES. The
requirement of conciliation before the barangay
where the property is located cannot be enforced.
Petitioners reside in Caloocan City while private
respondents reside at Barangay Piahan, Quezon
City.(Section 2 of P.D. No. 1508)

2.ID.; ID.; ID.; FAILURE OF RESPONDENTS TO RAISE
ISSUE THEREON AMOUNTS TO A WAIVER OF
DEFENSES. While private respondents raise this
defense in their answer, they effectively waived their
right thereto when they failed to object to the
correction of the residence of petitioners from
Quezon City to Caloocan City, in the reply, with leave
of the Court. And without raising this issue any
further, private respondents participated in the trial
of the merits of the case. The fact that private
respondents took part in the trial, argued their case
and adduced their evidence amounts to a waiver of
this defense. No rule is more settled than that once a
party to a case submits to the jurisdiction of the court
and participates in the trial on the merits of the case,
he cannot thereafter, upon a judgment unfavorable
to his cause, takes a total turnabout and say that the
condition precedent of compliance with P.D. No. 1508
had not been met. One cannot have the cake and eat
it too.

D E C I S I O N
GANCAYCO, J p:
The focal issue in this case is the legal effect of
Presidential Decree No. 1508 in the resolution of the
suit where the parties nevertheless proceeded to the
trial of the case until judgment was rendered.

On July 22, 1983, a complaint for recovery of
possession of property and damages was filed by
spouses Jose R. Abalos and Lagrimas V. Abalos against
private respondents in the Regional Trial Court,
Quezon City, designated as Lot 12, Block 122-D,
situated in Quezon City with an area of about 408
square meters, registered in the name of the Abalos
spouses under TCT No. 287646 issued by the Register
of Deeds of Quezon City.

After the issues were joined and the trial on the
merits' a decision was rendered by the trial court on
May 20, 1986, the dispositive part of which reads as
follows:
ACCORDINGLY, in the light of the foregoing
disquisition, judgment is hereby rendered
1)Adjudging the plaintiffs Jose R. Abalos and Lagrimas
V. Abalos as the true and lawful registered owners of
the property covered by TCT No. 287646;
2)Ordering the intervenors Federico Miones and
Onofre Fujiwara, Jr., the defendants Mateo Respicio,
Luis de la Cruz and Benjamin Maracha and all persons
claiming rights under them, to vacate the premises
and to remove their houses thereon within sixty (60)
days from the finality of this decision; and
3)In the event of failure or refusal by the said
defendants and intervenors to vacate the premises
and remove their houses on plaintiffs' land within the
period herein specified, ordering each of the
aforesaid defendants and intervenors to pay the
plaintiffs the amount of P250.00 a month, until said
defendants and all persons claiming right under them
shall have vacated the lot in question and removed all
improvements thereon.
Without pronouncement as to cost.
SO ORDERED. 1

Private respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals
raising the following issues
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING THE
CASE FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE
CONCILIATION PROCESS PROVIDED FOR IN SECTION 6
OF P.D. NO. 1508, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE
KATARUNGAN PANGBARANGAY LAW.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE
EVICTION OF DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS AND
INTERVENORS-APPELLANTS, IN VIOLATION OF
SECTION 2 OF P.D. NO. 2106.
III
ASSUMING IN GRATIA ARGUMENTI THAT THE
DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT EVICTING
DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS FROM THE PROPERTY IS
NOT VIOLATIVE OF THE LAW, STILL THE LOWER
COURT ERRED IN ORDERING SUCH EVICTION
WITHOUT A SURVEY OF THE PROPERTY BY A DULY
LICENSED SURVEYOR TO DETERMINE THE EXACT
LOCATION OF THE HOUSES OF DEFENDANTS-
APPELLANTS AND INTERVENORS-APPELLANTS IN
RELATION TO THE PROPERTY." 2

In due course, the appellate court promulgated a
decision on February 26, 1990 setting aside the
appealed judgment, dismissing the complaint and
counterclaims with costs against the plaintiff-
appellees therein. A motion for reconsideration
thereof filed by the plaintiffs was denied on July 6,
1990.

Hence, this petition for review of said decision and
resolution the main thrust of which is that the
appellate court erred in dismissing the complaint for
failure to go through the prelitigation process under
P.D. No. 1508 and to order the respondent court to
resolve the merits of the appeal.
The petition is impressed with merit.
It is true that in the complaint, the residence of
plaintiffs (petitioners herein) was alleged to be at 77
West Avenue, Quezon City, while the private
respondents were alleged to be at Lot 12, Block E-122
D Bo. Piahan, Quezon City. In the answer of private
respondents they allege, among others, that the
court has not acquired jurisdiction over the case as
there was no previous compliance with the
conciliation requirement under P.D. No. 1508. In their
reply and answer to the counterclaim, the petitioners,
with leave of court, changed and corrected their
address to 552 Reparo St., Caloocan City, as their
correct residence. Private respondents did not object
thereto.

The trial court as above related decided the case on
the merits and rendered a judgment for the
petitioners. However, the appellate court dismissed
the complaint on the ground that there was a failure
to bring the dispute for possible conciliation
conference at the barangay level.

From the foregoing set of facts, the requirement of
conciliation before the barangay where the property
is located cannot be enforced. Petitioners reside in
Caloocan City while private respondents reside at
Barangay Piahan, Quezon City. Section 2 of P.D. No.
1508 provides as follows:
"SECTION 2.Subject matter for amicable settlement.
The Lupon of each barangay shall have authority to
bring together the parties actually residing in the
same city or municipality for amicable settlement of
all disputes except:
1) Where one party is the government, or any
subdivision or instrumentality thereof;
2) Where one party is a public officer or employee,
and the dispute relates to the performance of his
official functions;
3) Offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding
30 days, or a fine exceeding P200.00;
4) Offenses where there is no private offended party;
5) Such other classes of disputes which the Prime
Minister may in the interest of justice determine,
upon recommendation of the Minister of Justice and
the Minister of Local Government.

Moreover, while private respondents raise this
defense in their answer, they effectively waived their
right thereto when they failed to object to the
correction of the residence of petitioners from
Quezon City to Caloocan City, in the reply, with leave
of the court. And without raising this issue any
further, private respondents participated in the trial
of the merits of the case.

The fact that private respondents took part in the trial
argued their case and adduced their evidence
amounts to a waiver of this defense.
Of course, the respondent court nevertheless opined
that the true address of petitioners is in Quezon City
and not in Caloocan City as the reply stating the
change of residence was made only by petitioners
after the issue of non-compliance with Presidential
Decree No. 1508 was raised and that the reply was
not verified unlike the complaint.
The Court is not persuaded. The finding of the
respondent court is based on surmises and
assumptions. It should be predicated on the facts
brought before it. Petitioners asserted that their true
address is in Caloocan City. Private respondents did
not object thereto and even went to the trial on the
merits. It was only when the judgment against private
respondents was rendered that they remembered to
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raise anew and on appeal the non-compliance with
Presidential Decree No. 1508. It is much too late.

The conclusion of the respondent court that
petitioners were not being truthful in correcting their
place of residence is totally without basis. On the
contrary, in this case, it appears the defense of non-
compliance with P.D. No. 1508 was availed of by
private respondents only to further delay the
determination of the merits of the case.

No rule is more settled than that once a party to a
case submits to the jurisdiction of the court and
participates in the trial on the merits of the case, he
cannot thereafter, upon a judgment unfavorable to
his cause, take a total turnabout and say that the
condition precedent of compliance with P.D. No. 1508
had not been met. One cannot have the cake and eat
it too.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the
appealed judgment of the appellate court dated
February 26, 1990 and its resolution dated July 6,
1990 are hereby SET ASIDE. Let the records of the
case be remanded to the appellate court for a
determination of the merits of the appeal with
deliberate dispatch. No costs in this instance.
SO ORDERED.

2. ROYALES vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
127 SCRA 470

Facts:
Petitioners are lessees of a residential house
owned by respondent Planas. The latter instituted
before the then City Court an ejectment suit against
petitioners. The trial court rendered a decision
wherein petitioners where to immediately vacate the
house and restore possession thereof to Planas.

After the decision became final and executory,
Planas filed a motion for execution and the same was
granted. The same was however restrained by the
RTC upon the filing by the petitioners a petition for
certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction,
assailing that said decision on ground of lack of
jurisdiction, allegedly arising from failure of
respondent Planas to submit the dispute to the
Barangay Lupon for conciliation as required by P.D.
1508.

The RTC decided declaring the judgment of the
trial court null and void for having been rendered
without jurisdiction. Planas appealed to the IAC which
decided confirming the decision of the City Court.
Hence, this petition for review.

Issue:
Whether noncompliance of the condition prescribed
by P.D. 1508, jurisdiction of the court was not
acquired

Ruling:
No. Ordinarily, non-compliance with the condition
precedent prescribed by P. D. 1508 could affect the
sufficiency of the plaintiffs cause of action and make
his compliant vulnerable to dismissal on ground of
lack of cause of action or prematurity; but the same
would not prevent a court of competent jurisdiction
from exercising its power of adjudication over the
case before it, where the defendants, as in this case,
failed to object to such exercise of jurisdiction in their
answer and even during the entire proceedings.

While petitioners could have prevented the
trial court from exercising jurisdiction over the case
by seasonably taking exception thereto, they instead
invoked the very same jurisdiction by filing an answer
and seeking affirmative relief from it. What is more,
they participated in the trial of the case. Upon this
premise, petitioners cannot now be allowed belatedly
to adopt inconsistent posture by attacking the
jurisdiction of the court to which they had submitted
themselves voluntarily.

3. CALIMLIM vs. RAMIREZ

Facts:
Sometime in 1961, a judgment for a sum of money
was rendered in favor of Independent Mercantile
Corporation against a certain Manuel Magali The
Notice of Levy made on a parcel of land covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 9138 registered in the
name of "Domingo Magali, the said levy was only
against "all rights, title, action, interest and
participation of the defendant Manuel Magali over
the parcel of land described in this title." The same
was also stated in the Certificate of Sale executed by
the Provincial Sheriff of Pangasinan. When the Sheriff
issued the final Deed of Sale, it was erroneously
stated therein that the sale was with respect to "the
parcel of land referring to TCT No. 9138 and not only
over the rights and interest of Manuel Magali in the
same. Independent Mercantile Corporation filed a
petition in the respondent Court to compel Manuel
Magali to surrender the owner's duplicate of TCT No.
9138 in order that the same may be cancelled and a
new one issued in the name of the said corporation.
Due to non-compliance of Manuel, the former filed
an ex-parte petition to declare TCT No. 9138 as
cancelled and to issue a new title in its name. The said
petition was granted by the respondent Court and a
new title was issued as TCT No. 68568.

Petitioner Modesta Calimlim, upon learning that her
husband's title over the parcel of land had been
cancelled, filed a petition with the respondent Court,
sitting as a cadastral court, praying for the
cancellation of TCT No. 68568. An opposition to the
said petition was filed by Independent Mercantile
Corporation. After the parties submitted their
respective Memoranda, the respondent Court issued
an order dismissing the petition. Petitioner then filed
the complaint in Civil Case No. SCC-180, praying for
the cancellation of the conveyances and sales that
had been made with respect to the property.
Resolving the said Motion, the respondent Court,
dismissed civil case on the ground of estoppel by
prior judgment.

Issue:
Whether or not Civil Case No. SCC-180 is barred by
estoppel by prior judgment.

Ruling:
We find merit in this appeal.

It is error to consider the dismissal of the petition
filed by the herein petitioner in LRC Record No. 39492
for the cancellation of TCT No. 68568 as a bar by prior
judgment against the filing of Civil Case No. SCC-180.
In order to avail of the defense of res judicata, it must
be shown, among others that the judgment in the
prior action must have been rendered by a court with
the proper jurisdiction to take cognizance of the
proceeding in which the prior judgment or order was
rendered. If there is lack of jurisdiction over the
subject-matter of the suit or of the parties, the
judgment or order cannot operate as an adjudication
of the controversy.

This essential element of the defense of bar by prior
judgment or res judicata does not exist in the case
presently considered. The petitioners alleged therein
that they are the true owners of the property, and
that TCT No. 68568 which they sought to cancel was
issued as a result of the errors which were not of
their own making. In short, the petition raised a
highly controversial matter which is beyond the
judicial competence of a cadastral court to pass upon
or to adjudicate. It may neither be claimed that the
parties have mutually agreed to submit the aforesaid
issues for the determination by the court, it being a
fact that herein private respondent was not a party in
the petition in LRC Record No. 39492. Incidentally,
although the said petition was filed by the herein
petitioners on November 21, 1967, the Opposition
filed by Independent Mercantile Corporation to the
said petition made no mention of the alleged sale of
the property in question in favor of private
respondent Francisco Ramos on July 5, 1967. This
circumstance places in grave doubt the sincerity of
said sale and the claim that the private respondent
was an innocent purchaser for value of the property
in question.

The ruling laid down in Sibonghanoy may not be
applied herein. Neither its factual backdrop nor the
philosophy of the doctrine therein expounded fits the
case at bar. The jurisdiction of a court over the
subject-matter of the action is a matter of law and
may not be conferred by consent or agreement of the
parties. The lack of jurisdiction of a court may be
raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on
appeal. In Sibonghanoy, the defense of lack of
jurisdiction of the court that rendered the questioned
ruling was held to be barred by estoppel by laches.
The petitioners in the instant case may not be faulted
with laches. When they learned that the title to the
property owned by them had erroneously and
illegally been cancelled and registered in the name of
another entity or person who had no right to the
same, they filed a petition to cancel the latter's title.
Their petition to cancel the title in the name of
Independent Mercantile Corporation was dismissed
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upon a finding by the respondent Court that the same
was "without merit." No explanation was given for
such dismissal nor why the petition lacked merit.
There is no unreasonable delay in the assertion by the
petitioners of their right to claim the property which
rightfully belongs to them. They can hardly be
presumed to have abandoned or waived such right by
inaction within an unreasonable length of time or
inexcusable negligence.

In short, their filing of Civil Case No. SCC-180 which in
itself is an implied non-acceptance of the validity of
the proceedings had in LRC Record No. 39492 may
not be deemed barred by estoppel by laches. It is
neither fair nor legal to bind a party by the result of a
suit or proceeding which was taken cognizance of in a
court which lacks jurisdiction over the same
irrespective of the attendant circumstances when a
party commits error in filing his suit or proceeding in
a court that lacks jurisdiction to take cognizance of
the same, such act may not at once be deemed
sufficient basis of estoppel. It could have been the
result of an honest mistake, or of divergent
interpretations of doubtful legal provisions. If any
fault is to be imputed to a party taking such course of
action, part of the blame should be placed on the
court which shall entertain the suit, thereby lulling
the parties into believing that they pursued their
remedies in the correct forum. Under the rules, it is
the duty of the court to dismiss an action "whenever
it appears that the court has no jurisdiction over the
subject matter."

Should the court render a judgment without
jurisdiction, such judgment may be impeached or
annulled for lack of jurisdiction (Sec. 30, Rule 132,
Ibid), within ten (10) years from the finality of the
same. The justness of the relief sought by herein
petitioners may not be ignored or rendered futile by
reason of a doctrine which is of highly doubtful
applicability herein.

4. Ledesma v. Court of Appeals211 SCRA 753

Facts:
Petitioner Cecilia U. Ledesma is the owner-lessor of
an apartment building. Two units were leased (now
unlawfully occupied) by respondent Jose T. Dizon.
Said lease was originally covered by written contracts
and except for the rates and duration, the terms and
conditions of said contracts were impliedly renewed
on a month to month basis. One of the terms of the
lease, that of monthly payments, was violated by
respondent. Upon failure of respondent to honor the
demand letters, petitioner referred the matter to the
Barangay for conciliation which eventually issued a
certification to file action. Petitioner was assisted by
her son, Raymond U. Ledesma (who is not a lawyer)
during the Barangay proceeding as she was suffering
from recurring psychological ailments as can be seen
from prescription and receipts by her psychiatrist.
Due to the stubborn refusal of the respondent to
vacate the premises, petitioner was constrained to
retain the services of a lawyer to initiate the
ejectment proceeding. MTC ordered respondent to
vacate. RTC affirmed the MTC. Respondent however
found favor in the CA because of lack of cause of
action. CA held that petitioner failed compliance with
Sections 6 and 9 of PD 1508.Petitioner submits that
said issue, not having been raised by respondent in
the court below cannot be raised for the first time on
appeal.

Issue:
Whether there is non-compliance with Sections 6 and
9 of PD 1508.

Held:
When respondent stated that he was never
summoned or subpoenaed by the Barangay, he, in
effect, was stating that since he was never
summoned, he could not appear in person for the
needed confrontation and/or amicable settlement.
Without the mandatory confrontation, no complaint
could be filed with the MTC.

Moreover, petitioner tries to show that her failure to
appear before the Barangay was because of her
recurring psychological ailments. But for the entire
year of 1998, there is no indication at all that
petitioner went to see her psychiatrist. The only
conclusion is that 1998 was a lucid interval. There was
therefore no excuse then for her non-appearance.
Therefore, she cannot be represented by counsel or
by attorney-in-fact who is next of kin. Her
noncompliance with PD 1508 legally barred her from
pursuing case in the MTC.

5. Galuba vs. Laureta repudiation of amicable
settlement

F: Wanted amicable settlement to be annulled so
filed with RTC action for annulment H: An amicable
settlement under the Katarungang Pambarangay law
may only be annulled by repudiation within 10d after
the settlement AND NOT by filing a petition for
nullifying the settlement with the court

The amicable settlement and arbitration award shall
have the force and effect of a final judgment of a
court upon the expiration of the 10 days from the
date thereof unless repudiation of the settlement has
been made or a petition for nullification of the award
has been filed before the proper city or municipal
court. Having failed to repudiate the amicable
settlement within the 10-day period, petitioner is left
with no recourse but to abide by its terms.

HENRY GALUBA, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES ALFREDO
and REVELINA LAURETA, HON. JUDGE BRAULIO
YARANON, THE SHERIFF OF BAGUIO CITY,
respondents.

SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; PLEADING
AND PRACTICE: CONCILIATION PROCESS AT THE
BARANGAY LEVEL; CONDITION IN COURT. Section
6 of P.D. 1508 is mandatory in character. Thus, in
Morata v. Go, 125 SCRA 444, Vda. de Borromeo v.
Pogoy, 126 SCRA 216 and Peregrina v. Panis, 133
SCRA 72, We accordingly held that the conciliation
process at the barangay level is a condition precedent
for the filing of a complaint in court.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; EFFECT OF NON-COMPLIANCE TO
A CAUSE OF ACTION. As ruled in Royales v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 127 SCRA 470, non-
compliance with the condition precedent prescribed
by P.D. 1508 could affect the sufficiency of the
plaintiff's cause of action and make his complaint
vulnerable to dismissal on the ground of lack of cause
of action or prematurity.

3.ID.; ID.; ID.; SECTION 13 OF P.D. 1506;
REPUDIATION OF AN AMICABLE SETTLEMENT
WITHIN 10 DAYS REQUIRED BEFORE ISSUANCE OF
CERTIFICATION FOR FILING A PETITION FOR
NULLIFICATION. Any signatory to an amicable
settlement who finds reasons to reject it must do so
within ten (10) days from the date of settlement to
entitle him to a certification to file a petition for
nullification.

4.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; EFFECT OF FAILURE TO REPUDIATE
AMICABLE SETTLEMENT. Failure to repudiate the
amicable settlement or arbitration agreement within
the required time limit shall be deemed a waiver of
the right to challenge the agreements and the latter
shall have the force and effect of a final judgment of a
court.

5.ID.; ID.; ID.; P.D. 1508, PETITION FOR
NULLIFICATION UNDER SECTION 11 THEREOF
IRRELEVANT TO AN AMICABLE SETTLEMENT. It
should be clarified, however, that the "petition for
nullification "mentioned in Section 11 refers to an
arbitration award pursuant to Section 7 of the same
law and not to an amicable settlement.

6.ID.; ID.; ID.; P.D. 1508; PRIMORDIAL OBJECTIVE
THEREOF. The primordial objective of P.D. 1508 is
to reduce the number of court litigations and prevent
the deterioration of the quality of justice which has
been brought about by the indiscriminate filing of
cases in the courts. To allow court actions assailing
unrepudiated amicable settlements would exacerbate
congestion of court dockets. This is repugnant to the
spirit of P.D. 1508.

R E S O L U T I O N
FERNAN, J p:
The issue in this petition for review on certiorari is
whether the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction to
annul an amicable settlement arrived at by the
parties through the mediation of the Lupong
Tagapayapa, in the absence of a repudiation of said
amicable settlement within the 10-day period
provided for in Section 11 of Presidential Decree No.
1508.
In a quitclaim and waiver executed on July 10, 1982,
Alfredo and Revelina Laureta ceded to petitioner all
their rights and interests over a house and lot located
in Quezon Hill, Baguio City for P70,000. Petitioner
paid the Lauretas P50,000 with the balance payable
later.

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When P18,000 of the balance remained unpaid, the
parties brought the matter before the barangay
captain of Victoria Village in Baguio City. On February
10, 1984, the parties entered into an amicable
settlement whereby they agreed that the P18,000
would be paid in monthly installments starting April,
1984 and that non-compliance therewith would
"mean execution in accordance with the Barangay
Law." 1
A month later, petitioner discovered that the house
he had bought was encroaching on the adjoining lot,
that the owner thereof was demanding payment for
such encroachment, and that there were arrears on
electric bills and taxes amounting to P6,117.
Consequently, on July 17, 1984, he filed in the office
of the barangay captain of Victoria Village an unsworn
complaint for the annulment of the amicable
settlement. He alleged therein that his consent to
said settlement had been vitiated by mistake or fraud
and therefore, the amicable settlement should be
annulled and a new one entered into by the parties. 2

Meanwhile, the Lauretas filed in the Municipal Trial
Court of Baguio City, Branch IV, a motion for the
issuance of a writ of execution based on the amicable
settlement. As the inferior court issued the writ,
petitioner filed in the Regional Trial Court of Baguio
City a complaint for the annulment of the amicable
settlement with prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction and/or restraining order. 3

The lower court denied the prayer for the issuance of
a restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction. Thereafter, the Lauretas filed a motion to
dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction over the nature of the action. Alleging
that in praying for a restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction, petitioner wanted to
"circumvent the mandatory provisions of P.D. 1508,"
the Lauretas averred that "without the unmeritorious
petition for preliminary injunction," the dispute
between them and petitioner was subject to amicable
settlement.

They cited Section 6 of P.D. 1508 which provides:
"SEC. 6.Conciliation pre-condition to filing of
complaint. No complaint, petition action or
proceeding involving any matter within the authority
of the Lupon as provided in Section 2 hereof shall be
filed or instituted in court or any other government
office of adjudication unless there has been a
confrontation of the parties before the Lupon
Chairman or the Pangkat and no conciliation or
settlement has been reached as certified by the
Lupon Secretary or the Pangkat Secretary, attested by
the Lupon or Pangkat Chairman, or unless the
settlement has been repudiated.

However, the parties may go directly to court in the
following cases:
[1]Where the accused is under detention;
[2]Where a person has otherwise been deprived of
personal liberty calling for habeas corpus
proceedings;
[3]Actions coupled with provisional remedies such as
preliminary injunction, attachment, delivery of
personal property and support pendente lite; and
[4]Where the action may otherwise be barred by the
Statute of Limitations."

In his comment and opposition to the motion to
dismiss, petitioner contended that the lower court
had jurisdiction over the case because he had named
as defendants therein the municipal trial court and
the sheriff of Baguio City and hence, the complaint
fell under the exceptions in Section 2 [2] of P.D. 1508.
He also expressed doubt that the Lauretas were still
residing in Baguio City as Alfredo Laureta had been
considered "at large" in some pending criminal cases
against him. He asserted that he had substantially
complied with P.D. 1508 because he filed the
aforementioned complaint of July 31, 1984 before the
barangay captain and that after two months of trying
to locate defendants, the barangay captain of Victoria
Village as "Pangkat Chairman," issued a certification
to file action on October 11, 1984.

Thereafter, the Lauretas filed an addendum to their
motion to dismiss stating that the complaint did not
state a cause of action as petitioner failed to
repudiate the amicable settlement or to file a
"petition for [the] nullification of the award" pursuant
to Section 11 of P.D. 1508, and that said complaint
should have been filed in the municipal trial court.
In his opposition thereto, petitioner argued that the
10-day repudiation period having expired, he was left
with no recourse but to file the action for nullification
in court considering that Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,
specifically Section 9 [1] thereof which gives regional
trial courts exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil
actions in which the subject of litigation is incapable
of pecuniary estimation, and its repealing clause
under Section 47, should prevail over the provisions
of P.D. 1508.

On January 9, 1985, the lower court issued an order
granting the motion to dismiss on the grounds of lack
of jurisdiction as well as cause of action. Citing
Sections 11 and 13 of P.D. 1508, the lower court said:
". . . [T]here is no authorized judicial procedure under
P.D. 1508 for the annulment of an amicable
settlement. Only an arbitration award, which is
different from an amicable settlement, may become
the subject of a petition for nullification to be filed
yet with the proper municipal trial court. . . ." The
Court noted the fact that petitioner failed to
repudiate the amicable settlement within the 10-day
period provided for in Section 11 of P.D. 1508 as the
parties entered into said amicable settlement on
February 10, 1984 and yet it was only on July 27, 1984
when petitioner repudiated it through an unsworn
complaint for its annulment.

The lower court suggested that "an action for the
annulment or rescission of the contract he had with
private defendants with a prayer for injunction to
restrain in the meantime the enforcement of the
amicable settlement" would perhaps be availed of by
the petitioner.

From said order, petitioner filed a notice of appeal to
this Court. The records of the case having been
erroneously transmitted to the Court of Appeals, said
court certified the case to this Court on March 19,
1985. 5

In his petition for review on certiorari, petitioner
contended that "there must be a provision of judicial
procedure that supplements the deficiency of P.D.
1508." Finding it in Rule 143 of the Rules of Court,
petitioner averred that P.D. 1508 being a special law,
the Rules of Court may be applied by analogy or in a
suppletory character. Thus, under Rule 39, his remedy
against an executory amicable settlement which, by
analogy is a final judgment, is am action to annul it.
Moreover, petitioner asserts that he has a cause of
action because of the fraudulent act or
misrepresentation of private respondents herein.

As private respondents failed to file a timely
comment on the petition, they filed an explanation,
apology and comment alleging that during the
extended period for the filing of said comment,
petitioner partially satisfied the a judgment of the
barangay court 6 by paying them P2,000 thus
misleading them to believe that petitioner had
abandoned the petition; that on December 6, 1985,
the deputy sheriff received from Mrs. Elizabeth
Galuba, wife of petitioner, four [4] checks in the total
amount of P10,000 representing full satisfaction of
Galuba's obligation to them; that petitioner himself
requested the municipal trial court of Baguio City to
issue a certification that he had fully settled his
obligation in Barangay Case No. 76 which certification
was issued by the clerk of said court on May 18, 1980;
that as petitioner himself requested for said
certification, they thought that petitioner would take
the initiative of filing a motion to dismiss the petition;
that having settled his obligation in said case,
petitioner is estopped from questioning the
jurisdiction of the barangay captain, and that they
admit that they erred in not informing this Court of
the settlement of the case.

In his reply to said explanation, apology and
comment, the petitioner alleged that he was forced
to satisfy his obligation because "there was nothing
more to stay the execution of the amicable
settlement" [sic] after the municipal trial court had
issued the writ of execution. He insisted that "the
absence of 'authorized judicial procedure under PD
1508' must be supplemented by the Revised Rules of
Court in conjunction with the Judiciary Reorganization
Act of 1980, BP Blg. 129."

We vote to deny the petition for review on certiorari.
Section 6 of P.D. 1508 is mandatory in character.
Thus, in Morata v. Go, 125 SCRA 444, Vda. de
Borromeo v. Pogoy, 126 SCRA 216 and Peregrina v.
Panis, 133 SCRA 72, We accordingly held that the
conciliation process at the barangay level is a
condition precedent for the filing of a complaint in
court. In Royales v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 127
SCRA 470, We ruled that non-compliance with the
condition precedent prescribed by P.D. 1508 could
5

affect the sufficiency of the plaintiff's cause of action
and make his complaint vulnerable to dismissal on
the ground of lack of cause of action or prematurity.

Once the parties have signed an amicable settlement,
any party who finds reasons to reject it must do so in
accordance with Section 13 of P.D. 1508 which states:
"SEC. 13.Repudiation. Any party to the dispute
may, within ten [10] days from the date of the
settlement, repudiate the same by filing with the
Barangay Captain a statement to that effect sworn to
before him, where the consent is vitiated by fraud,
violence or intimidation. Such repudiation shall be
sufficient basis for the issuance of the certification for
filing of a complaint, provided for in Section 6,
hereof."

Pursuant to P.D. 1508, Section 12, Rule VI of the
Katarungang Pambarangay Rules which were
promulgated "for the amicable settlement of disputes
at the barangay level, without judicial recourse," also
provides that "[f]failure to repudiate the settlement
or the arbitration agreement within the time limits
respectively set [in Section 10 thereof], shall be
deemed a waiver of the right to challenge on said
grounds." i.e., fraud, violence or intimidation.
Any party, therefore, who fails to avail himself of the
remedy set forth in Section 13 must face the
consequences of the amicable settlement for he can
no longer file an action in court to redress his
grievances arising from said settlement.

It should be emphasized that under Section 11 of said
law, "[t]he amicable settlement and arbitration award
shall have the force and effect of a final judgment of a
court upon the expiration of the ten [10] days from
the date thereof unless repudiation of the settlement
has been made or a petition for nullification of the
award has been filed before the proper city or
municipal court."

Hence, the lower court correctly held that P.D. 1508
does not provide for a judicial procedure for the
annulment of an amicable settlement because the
remedy of repudiation supplants the remedy of a
court annulment. An aggrieved party may only resort
to a court action after he has repudiated the
settlement in accordance with Section 13 as Section 6
clearly states that repudiation is a pre-condition to
the filing of a complaint regarding any matter within
the authority of the Lupong Tagapayapa. It should be
clarified, however, that the "petition for nullification
"mentioned in Section 11 refers to an arbitration
award pursuant to Section 7 of the same law and not
to an amicable settlement.

The primordial objective of P.D. 1508 is to reduce the
number of court litigations and prevent the
deterioration of the quality of justice which has been
brought about by the indiscriminate filing of cases in
the courts. To allow court actions assailing
unrepudiated amicable settlements would exacerbate
congestion of court dockets. This is repugnant to the
spirit of P.D. 1508.

Having failed to repudiate the amicable settlement
within the ten-day period, petitioner is left with no
recourse but to abide by its terms. He, therefore,
acted correctly when he eventually fully satisfied his
obligation pursuant to the amicable settlement,
thereby, rendering his case moot and academic.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition for review on certiorari is
hereby DENIED. Costs against the petitioner. SO
ORDERED.

6. [G.R. No. 59801. May 31, 1988.]
LEONOR P. FERNANDEZ, CONNIE P. HALL,
BERNARDO PERALTA and MARIANO FERNANDEZ,
petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE FRANCIS J.
MILITANTE, in his capacity as Judge, Court of First
Instance of Cebu, Branch XII, ESTRELITO P.
CAPUTOLAN, GONZALO P. CAPUTOLAN, RAQUEL C.
ANIBAN, ESTANISLAO L. CAPUTOLAN and WILFREDO
ANIBAN, respondents.

SYLLABUS
1.REMEDIAL LAW; KATARUNGANG PAMBARANGAY;
NON-COMPLIANCE WITH CONCILIATION PROCESS
COULD AFFECT PLAINTIFF'S CAUSE OF ACTION.
This Court has repeatedly ruled that the conciliation
process at the Barangay level is a condition precedent
for filing of actions before the regular trial courts and
ordinarily, non-compliance therewith could affect the
sufficiency of plaintiff's cause of action and make his
complaint vulnerable to dismissal on the ground of
lack of cause of action or prematurity.

2.ID.; ID.; CONDITION PRECEDENT; SUBJECT TO
WAIVER. Failure to raise it as a defense in the
answer or in a timely motion to dismiss is deemed a
waiver of such precondition.

3.ID.; ID.; CONCILIATION PROCEDURE; NOT A
JURISDICTIONAL REQUIREMENT. The conciliation
procedure under Pres. Dec. No. 1508 is not a
jurisdictional requirement and its non-compliance
cannot affect the jurisdiction which the court has
already acquired over the subject matter or over the
person of the defendant.

4.ID.; KATARUNGAN PAMBARANGAY; LUPON HAS
NO AUTHORITY OVER DISPUTES WHERE PARTIES
RESIDES IN DIFFERENT CITIES OR MUNICIPALITIES.
Section 2 (of Pres. Dec. No. 1508) specifies the
conditions under which the Lupon of a barangay
"shall have authority" to bring together the
disputants for amicable settlement of their dispute:
The parties must be "actually residing in the same city
or municipality." At the same time, Section 3 while
reiterating that the disputants must be "actually
residing in the same barangay" or in "different
barangays within the same city or municipality
unequivocably declares that the Lupon shall have "no
authority" over disputes "involving parties who
actually reside in barangays of different cities or
municipalities," except where such barangays adjoin
each other.

D E C I S I O N
CORTES, J p:
The case at bar involves the assumption of
jurisdiction by a trial court over a complaint without
prior conciliation proceedings between the parties
before the Lupong Tagapayapa as prescribed by Pres.
Dec. No. 1508 (Katarungang Pambarangay Law). This
Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order on March
9, 1982 enjoining respondent Judge from taking
further action in the case during the pendency of the
petition.

The facts are simple. Private respondents brought
action against petitioners before the then Court of
First Instance of Cebu, Branch XII, for "Declaration of
Nullity of Deed of Sale and of Transfer Certificates of
Title" and docketed as Civil Case No. R-20105.
Petitioners filed on March 9, 1981 their answer
raising special and affirmative defenses including a
counterclaim. Subsequently, the case was set for pre-
trial and on April 15, 1981, the first pre-trial
conference was held.

On May 27, 1981, petitioners filed a Motion to
Dismiss on the ground that the court never acquired
jurisdiction over the case for non-compliance with the
requirement of conciliation before the Lupong
Tagapayapa. The trial court overruled the arguments
raised by the petitioners and denied their motion on
June 17, 1981. Motion for reconsideration was also
denied for being filed out of time.

Hence, this petition for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction.

The present petition is premised on the argument
that inasmuch as the complaint before the trial court
is a proper subject of conciliation before the Lupong
Tagapayapa, non-compliance with such requirement
is a jurisdictional defect which renders the complaint
vulnerable to dismissal.

The parties do not dispute the fact that the case now
before the lower court was never referred to the
Lupong Tagapayapa for conciliation. This Court has
repeatedly ruled that the conciliation process at the
Barangay level is a condition precedent for filing of
actions before the regular trial courts and ordinarily,
non-compliance therewith could affect the sufficiency
of plaintiff's cause of action and make his complaint
vulnerable to dismissal on the ground of lack of cause
of action or prematurity [Royales v. Intermediate
Appellate Court. G.R. No. 65072, January 31, 1984,
127 SCRA 470; Vda. de Borromeo v. Pogoy, G.R. No.
63277, November 29, 1983, 126 SCRA 217; Morata v.
Go, G.R. No. 62339, October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 444].
However, failure to raise it as a defense in the answer
or in a timely motion to dismiss is deemed a waiver of
such precondition.

The record shows that petitioners' answer to the
complaint never raised the defense that the private
respondents' complaint did not comply with the
conciliation process prescribed by Pres. Dec. No.
1508. The failure to raise said defense in the answer
is deemed a waiver thereof which no belated motion
to dismiss can rectify.
6

Moreover, there is no merit to the petitioners'
contention that private respondents' failure to
comply with the conciliation process is fatal to the
trial court's jurisdiction. The conciliation procedure
under Pres. Dec. No. 1508 is not a jurisdictional
requirement and its non-compliance cannot affect
the jurisdiction which the court has already acquired
over the subject matter or over the person of the
defendant. [Gonzales v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. L-
59495-97, June 26, 1987, 151 SCRA 287; Millare v.
Hernando, G.R. No. L-55480, June 30, 1987, 151 SCRA
484].

It is likewise noteworthy that petitioners have
invoked the jurisdiction of the respondent trial court
by filing an answer and seeking affirmative relief from
it. They cannot now repudiate that jurisdiction to
which they have submitted themselves voluntarily
[Royales v. Intermediate Appellate Court, citing Tijam
v. Sibonghanoy, G.R. No. L-21450, April 15, 1968, 23
SCRA 29].
Even assuming that petitioners' motion to dismiss had
been filed on time, it is doubtful whether the Lupon
has authority over the controversy considering
allegations regarding the residence of the parties
involved. Petitioners and private respondents are
admittedly all residents of Jones Avenue, Cebu City,
with the exception of petitioner Connie P. Hall who is
a citizen of the United States of America and a
resident of Greenberry Drive, La Puerte, California,
U.S.A.

The ruling in the case of Tavora v. Velasco [G.R. No.
60367, September 30, 1982, 117 SCRA 613] resolves
this point.
. . . Section 2 (of Pres. Dec. No. 1508) specifies the
conditions under which the Lupon of a barangay
"shall have authority" to bring together the
disputants for amicable settlement of their dispute:
The parties must be "actually residing in the same city
or municipality." At the same time, Section 3 while
reiterating that the disputants must be "actually
residing in the same barangay" or in "different
barangays within the same city or municipality
unequivocably declares that the Lupon shall have "no
authority" over disputes "involving parties who
actually reside in barangays of different cities or
municipalities," except where such barangays adjoin
each other.
Thus, by express statutory inclusion and exclusion,
the Lupon shall have no jurisdiction over disputes
where the parties are not actual residents of the
same city or municipality, except where the
barangays in which they actually reside adjoin each
other. [Emphasis supplied]

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and
the order of the respondent trial court in Civil Case
No. R-20105 denying petitioners' motion to dismiss is
AFFIRMED. The Temporary Restraining Order issued
by this Court on March 9, 1982 is hereby LIFTED and
SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.

7. [G.R. No. 85475. June 30, 1989.]
MANUEL A. RAMOS, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS and DOMINGO RAMOS,
respondents.
Ramos v. CA, 174 SCRA 690 (1989)

FACTS:
Domingo Ramos authorized his brother Manuel to sell
his share of lands owned by them in common with
their other brothers and sisters. Manuel did. Later,
Domingo revoked the power of attorney and
demanded an accounting from Manuel. Manuel
refused. Domingo then filed a complaint with the
Punong Barangay of Pampanga, Buhangin District,
Davao City. Manuel appeared but Domingo did not on
the schedule hearing by the Punong Bgy. Domingo
was represented, however, by his wife who said her
husband wanted to avoid a direct confrontation with
his brother. She requested that the Punong Bgy issue
a certification that no settlement had been reached
so a complaint could be filed in court. The Punong
Bgy complied. Thereupon, Domingo sued Manuel in
the RTC Davao, also for accounting, in Civil Case No.
18560-87.

Manuel moved to dismiss the complaint on the
ground of non-compliance with the requirements of
PD1508. He cited the failure of the Punong Bgy to
refer the dispute to the Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo
after the unsuccessful mediation proceedings
convened by him. The motion was denied. Manuel
then filed with this Court a petition for certiorari
which we referred to the CA. CA denied the petition.
It held that there was no need for such referral
because Domingo had clearly indicated, by his refusal
to appear before the Punong Bgy, that no
extrajudicial settlement was possible between him
and his brother. Manuel is now before us to question
this decision.

HELD:
The dispute should not have ended with the
mediation proceedings before the Punong Barangay
because of his failure to effect a settlement. It was
not for the Punong Barangay to say that referral to
the Pangkat was no longer necessary merely because
he himself had failed to work out an agreement
between the parties. The Pangkat could have exerted
more efforts and succeeded (where he had not) in
resolving the dispute. If the complainant refuses to
appear before the Punong Barangay, he is barred
from seeking judicial recourse for the same course of
action. The parties must appear in person without
assistance of counsel, except minors and
incompetents.

8. GR. No. 154295 July 29, 2005
METROMEDIA TIMES CORPORATION and/or ROBINA
GOKONGWIE-PE,Petitioner v. JOHNNY PASTORIN,

Facts:
This case is Petition for Review on Certiorari. The
respondent filed a complaint for constructive
dismissal, non-payment of back wages and the other
money claims with the labor arbiter. A copy of which
petitioner received.

The complaint was resolved in favor of
respondent. Respondent did not commit
insubordination or disobedience, so as to warrant her
transfer, and that petitioner was aggrieved by the
respondents failure to settle his obligations.

Issue:
Whether or not lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the case, heard and decided by the
labor arbiter, raised for the first time before the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) by a
litigant who had actively participated in the
proceedings, which it belated by questions.

Held:
Dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
At issue in this Petition for Review 1 on certiorari
under Rule 45 is whether or not lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the case, heard and
decided by the labor arbiter, may be raised for the
first time before the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) by a litigant who had actively
participated in the proceedings, which it belatedly
questioned.

The facts, culled from the records, are as follows:
Johnny Pastorin (Respondent) was employed by
Metromedia Times Corporation (Petitioner) on 10
December 1990 as a Field Representative/Collector.
His task entailed the periodic collection of receivables
from dealers of petitioner's newspapers. Prior to the
subject incident, respondent claimed to have
received a termination letter dated 7 May 1998 from
management terminating his services for tardiness
effective 16 June 1988. Respondent, member of
Metro Media Times Employees Union, was not
dismissed due to the intervention of the labor union,
the collective bargaining agent in the company.

In May 1998, he obtained a loan from one of the
dealers whom he dealt with, Gloria A. de Manuel (De
Manuel), amounting to Nine Thousand Pesos
(P9,000.00). After paying One Thousand One Hundred
Twenty-five Pesos (P1,125.00), respondent reneged
on the balance of his loan. De Manuel wrote a letter
dated 6 July 1998 to petitioner, and seeking
assistance for collection on the remainder of the loan.
She claimed that when respondent became remissed
on his personal obligation, he stopped collecting
periodically the outstanding dues of De Manuel. 2

On 9 July 1998, petitioner sent a letter addressed to
respondent, requiring an explanation for the
transaction with De Manuel, as well as for his failure
to pay back the loan according to the conditions
agreed upon. In his reply letter 3 dated 13 July 1998,
respondent admitted having incurred the loan, but
offered no definitive explanation for his failure to
repay the same.

Petitioner, through a Memorandum 4 dated 24
August 1998, imposed the penalty of suspension on
respondent for 4 days, from 27 August to 1
September 1998, for violating Company Policy No.
7

2.17 5 and ordered his transfer to the Administration
Department.

On 2 September 1998, respondent wrote a letter 6 to
petitioner, stating that he wanted to sign a transfer
memo before assuming his new position.

On September 7, 1998, he was handed the Payroll
Change Advice 7 (PCA), indicating his new assignment
to the Traffic and Order Department of Metromedia.
Nonetheless, respondent stopped reporting for work.
On 16 September 1998, he sent a letter 8 to
petitioner communicating his refusal to accept the
transfer.

Respondent duly filed a complaint for constructive
dismissal, non-payment of backwages and other
money claims with the labor arbiter, a copy of which
petitioner received on 28 September 1998. The
complaint was resolved in favor of respondent. In a
Decision 9 dated 28 May 1999, Labor Arbiter Manuel
P. Asuncion concluded that respondent did not
commit insubordination or disobedience so as to
warrant his transfer, and that petitioner was not
aggrieved by respondent's failure to settle his
obligation with De Manuel. The dispositive portion
read:
WHEREFORE, the respondents are hereby ordered to
reinstate the complainant to his former position, with
full backwages from the time his salary was withheld
until he is actually reinstated. As of this date, the
complainant's backwages has reached the sum of
P97,324.17. The respondents are further directed to
pay the complainant his 13th month pay for 1998 in
the sum of P3,611.89. The claims for allowance and
unpaid commission are dismissed for lack of sufficient
basis to make an award.
SO ORDERED.

Petitioner lodged an appeal with the NLRC, raising as
a ground the lack of jurisdiction of the labor arbiter
over respondent's complaint. Significally, this issue
was not raised by petitioner in the proceedings
before the Labor Arbiter. In its Decision 11 dated 16
March 2001, the NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter on
the ground that the latter had no jurisdiction over the
case, it being a grievance issue properly cognizable by
the voluntary arbitrator. The decretal portion of the
NLRC Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision under review is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE, and a new one entered, DISMISSING
the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.

The motion for reconsideration having been denied
on 18 May 2001, respondent elevated the case
before the Court of Appeals (CA) through a petition
for certiorari 13 under Rule 65.

The CA Fifteenth Division reversed the Decision of
NLRC, and reinstated the earlier ruling of the Labor
Arbiter. Adopting the doctrines by this Court in the
cases of Alfredo Marquez v. Sec. of Labor 14 and ABS-
CBN Supervisors Employees Union Members v. ABS-
CBN Broadcasting Corporation, 15 the CA ruled that
the active participation of the party against whom the
action was brought, coupled with his failure to object
to the jurisdiction of the court or quasi-judicial body
where the action is pending, is tantamount to an
invocation of that jurisdiction and a willingness to
abide by the resolution of the case and will bar said
party from later on impugning the court or body's
jurisdiction. The appellate court then disposed the
case in this wise:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the
petition having merit, in fact and in law, is hereby
GIVEN DUE COURSE. Accordingly, the challenged
resolution/decision and orders of public respondent
NLRC are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the
decision of the Labor Arbiter dated May 28, 1999
REINSTATED with a slight modification that the 13th
month pay be in the amount of P7, 430.50. No costs.
SO ORDERED. 16

Petitioner sought reconsideration 17 of the above
Decision 18 but the CA denied the motion in the
assailed Resolution 19 dated 27 June 2002. Hence, its
recourse to this Court, elevating the following issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT METROMEDIA IS ESTOPPED FROM
QUESTIONING THE JURISDICTION OF THE LABOR
ARBITER OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE
FOR THE FIRST TIME ONLY IN THEIR APPEAL BEFORE
THE NLRC.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE AWARD OF 13TH MONTH PAY
BY THE LABOR ARBITER MAY BE MODIFIED,
NOTWITHSTANDING THAT THE SAME WAS NEVER
ASSIGNED AS AN ERROR.
Anent the first assignment of error, there are
divergent jurisprudential doctrines touching on this
issue. On the one hand are the cases of Martinez v.
Merced, 20 Marquez v. Secretary of Labor, 21 Ducat
v. Court of Appeals, 22 Bayoca v. Nogales, 23 Jimenez
v. Patricia, 24 Centeno v. Centeno, 25 and ABS-CBN
Supervisors Employee Union Members v. ABS-CBN
Broadcasting Corporation, 26 all adhering to the
doctrine that a party's active participation in the
actual proceedings before a court without jurisdiction
will estop him from assailing such lack of jurisdiction.
Respondent heavily relies on this doctrinal
jurisprudence.

On the other hand, the cases of Dy v. NLRC, 27 La
Naval Drug v. CA, 28 De Rossi vs. CA 29 and Union
Motors Corporation v. NLRC 30 buttress the position
of petitioner that jurisdiction is conferred by law and
lack of jurisdiction may be questioned at any time
even on appeal.

The Court of Appeals adopted the principles in the
cases of Martinez, Marquez and ABS-CBN in resolving
the jurisdictional issue presented for its resolution, to
wit:
Indeed, we agree with petitioner that private
respondent was estopped from raising the question
of jurisdiction before public respondent NLRC and the
latter gravely abused its discretion in addressing said
question in private respondents' favor. As early as
Martinez vs. De la Merced, 174 SCRA 182, the
Supreme Court has clearly ruled thus: "For it has been
consistently held by this Court that while lack of
jurisdiction may be assailed at any stage, a party's
active participation in the proceedings before a court
without jurisdiction will estop such party from
assailing such lack of jurisdiction."
xxx xxx xxx
The same principle was adopted by the Highest
Tribunal in the case of Alfredo Marquez vs. Sec. of
Labor, 171 SCRA 337 and quoted in the latter case of
ABS-CBN Supervisors Employees Union Members vs.
ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation, 304 SCRA 497,
where it was ruled that: "The active participation of
the party against whom the action was brought,
coupled with his failure to object to the jurisdiction of
the court or quasi-judicial body where the action is
pending, is tantamount to an invocation of that
jurisdiction and a willingness to abide by the
resolution of the case and will bar said party from
later on impugning the court or body's jurisdiction."

We rule differently. A cursory glance at these cases
will lead one to the conclusion that a party who does
not raise the jurisdictional question at the outset will
be estopped to raise it on appeal. However, a more
circumspect analysis would reveal that the cases cited
by respondent do not fall squarely within the issue
and factual circumstances of the instant case. We
proceed to demonstrate.

The notion that the defense of lack of jurisdiction may
be waived by estoppel on the party invoking the same
most prominently emerged in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy.
32 Indeed, the Marquez case relied upon by the CA is
in turn grounded on Tijam, where We held that:
. . . a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to
secure affirmative relief against his opponent and,
after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief,
repudiate or question that same jurisdiction (Dean vs.
Dean, 136 Or. 694, 86 A.L.R. 79). In the case just cited,
by way of explaining the rule, it was further said that
the question whether the court had jurisdiction either
of the subject-matter of the action or of the parties is
barred from such conduct not because the judgment
or order of the court is valid and conclusive as an
adjudication, but for the reason that such a practice
cannot be tolerated obviously for reasons of public
policy.

Furthermore, it has also been held that after
voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an
adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the
loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the
court . . . And in Littleton vs. Burges, 16 Wyo, 58, the
Court said that it is not right for a party who has
affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a
particular matter to secure an affirmative relief, to
afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape a
penalty.

However, Tijam represented an exceptional case
wherein the party invoking lack of jurisdiction did so
only after fifteen (15) years, and at a stage when the
proceedings had already been elevated to the Court
of Appeals. Even Marquez recognizes that Tijam
8

stands as an exception, rather than a general rule. 34
The CA perhaps though felt comfortable citing
Marquez owing to the pronouncement therein that
the Court would not hesitate to apply Tijam even
absent the extraordinary circumstances therein:
". . . where the entertainment of the jurisdictional
issue at a belated stage of the proceedings will result
in a failure of justice and render nugatory the
constitutional imperative of protection to labor."

In this case, jurisdiction of the labor arbiter was
questioned as early as during appeal before the NLRC,
whereas in Marquez, the question of jurisdiction was
raised for the first time only before this Court. The
viability of Marquez as controlling doctrine in this
case is diminished owing to the radically different
circumstances in these two cases. A similar
observation can be made as to the Bayoca and
Jimenez cases.

Neither do the other like-minded cases squarely
settle the issue in favor of the respondent. In the case
of Martinez, the issue is not jurisdiction by estoppel
but waiver of preliminary conference. In that case, we
said:
As pointed out by petitioners, private respondents
had at least three opportunities to raise the question
of lack of preliminary conference first, when private
respondents filed a motion for extension of time to
file their position paper; second, at the time when
they actually filed their position paper in which they
sought affirmative relief from the Metropolitan Trial
Court; and third; when they filed a motion for
reconsideration of the order of the Metropolitan Trial
Court expunging from the records the position paper
of private respondents, in which motion private
respondents even urged the court to sustain their
position paper. And yet, in none of these instances
was the issue of lack of preliminary conference raised
or even hinted at by private respondents. In fine,
these are acts amounting to a waiver of the
irregularity of the proceedings.

For it has been consistently held by this Court that
while lack of jurisdiction may be assailed at any stage,
a party's active participation in the proceedings
before a court without jurisdiction will estop such
party from assailing such lack of jurisdiction.

The case of Ducat was categorical in saying that if the
parties acquiesced in submitting an issue for
determination by the trial court, they are estopped
from questioning the jurisdiction of the same court to
pass upon the issue. But this should be taken in the
context of the "agreement" of the parties. We quote
from said case:
Petitioner's filing of a Manifestation and Urgent
Motion to Set Parameters of Computation is
indicative of its conformity with the questioned order
of the trial court referring the matter of computation
of the excess to SGV and simultaneously thereafter,
the issuance of a writ of possession. If petitioner
thought that subject order was wrong, it could have
taken recourse to the Court of Appeals but petitioner
did not. Instead he manifested his acquiescence in
the said order by seeking parameters before the trial
court. It is now too late for petitioner to question
subject order of the trial court. Petitioner cannot be
allowed to make a mockery of judicial processes, by
changing his position from one of the agreement to
disagreement, to suit his needs.

If the parties acquiesced in submitting an issue for
determination by the trial court, they are estopped
from questioning the jurisdiction of the same court to
pass upon the issue. Petitioner is consequently
estopped from questioning subject order of the trial
court.

Centeno involved the question of jurisdiction of the
Department of Agrarian Reform Arbitration Board
(DARAB). The Court did rule therein that
"participation by certain parties in the administrative
proceedings without raising any objection thereto,
bars them from any jurisdictional infirmity after an
adverse decision is rendered against them." 39 Still,
the Court did recognize therein that the movants
questioning jurisdiction had actually sought and
litigated for affirmative reliefs before the DARAB in
support of a submitted counterclaim. No similar
circumstance obtains in this case concerning the
petitioner.

Evidently, none of these cited precedents squarely
operates as stare decisis on this case, involving as
they did different circumstances. The question now
lies as to whether the precedents cited by petitioner
are more apropos to this case.
Petitioner seeks to convince this Court that the
instant case falls squarely within the purview of this
Court's ruling in the case of Dy. Admittedly, a
different factual mileu was present insofar as the
questioned jurisdiction was alleged to have been
properly lodged in the SEC instead of NLRC. Yet the
rationale employed by the Court therein warrants
serious consideration. The aforementioned case was
ruled in this wise:
. . . More importantly, estoppel cannot be invoked to
prevent this Court from taking up the question of
jurisdiction, which has been apparent on the face of
the pleadings since the start of litigation before the
Labor Arbiter. It is well settled that the decision of a
tribunal not vested with appropriate jurisdiction is
null and void. Thus, in Calimlim vs. Ramirez, this Court
held:
"A rule that had been settled by unquestioned
acceptance and upheld in decisions so numerous to
cite is that the jurisdiction of a court over the subject
matter of the action is a matter of law and may not
be conferred by consent or agreement of the parties.
The lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any
stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. This
doctrine has been qualified by recent
pronouncements which stemmed principally from the
ruling in the cited case of Sibonghanoy. It is to be
regretted, however, that the holding in said case had
been applied to situations which were obviously not
contemplated therein.

The exceptional circumstances involved in
Sibonghanoy which justified the departure from the
accepted concept of non-waivability of objection to
jurisdiction has been ignored and, instead a blanket
doctrine had been repeatedly upheld that rendered
the supposed ruling in Sibonghanoy not as the
exception, but rather the general rule, virtually
overthrowing altogether the time honored principle
that the issue of jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or by
estoppel.
xxx xxx xxx
"It is neither fair nor legal to bind a party by the result
of a suit or proceeding which was taken cognizance of
in a court which lacks jurisdiction over the same
irrespective of the attendant circumstances. The
equitable defense of estoppel requires knowledge or
consciousness of the facts upon which it is based. The
same thing is true with estoppel by conduct which
may be asserted only when it is shown, among
others, that the representation must have been made
with knowledge of the facts and that the party to
whom it was made is ignorant of the truth of the
matter (De Castro vs. Gineta, 27 SCRA 623). The filing
of an action or suit in a court that does not possess
jurisdiction to entertain the same may not be
presumed to be deliberate and intended to secure a
ruling which could later be annulled if not favorable
to the party who filed such suit or proceeding in a
court that lacks jurisdiction to take cognizance of the
same, such act may not at once be deemed sufficient
basis of estoppel. It could have been the result of an
honest mistake or of divergent interpretation of
doubtful legal provisions. If any fault is to be imputed
to a party taking such course of action, part of the
blame should be placed on the court which shall
entertain the suit, thereby lulling the parties into
believing that they pursued their remedies in the
correct forum.

Under the rules, it is the duty of the court to dismiss
an action 'whenever it appears that court has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter.' (Section 2, Rule
9, Rules of Court) Should the Court render a judgment
without jurisdiction, such judgment may be
impeached or annulled for lack of jurisdiction (Sec.
30, Rule 132, Ibid), within ten (10) years from the
finality of the same (Art. 1144, par. 3, Civil Code)." 40

The jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter was assailed in
the cases of De Rossi v. NLRC 41 and Union Motors
Corporation v. NLRC 42 during appeal to the NLRC.
Since the same circumstance obtains in this case, the
rulings therein, favorable as they are to the
petitioner, are germane.

In De Rossi, this Court elucidated:
Petitioner maintains that MICC cannot question now
the issue of jurisdiction of the NLRC, considering that
MICC did not raise this matter until after the case had
been brought on appeal to the NLRC.

However, it has long been established as a rule, that
jurisdiction of a tribunal, agency, or office, is
conferred by law, and its lack of jurisdiction may be
questioned at any time even on appeal. In La Naval
Drug Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 236 SCRA 78,
90, this Court said:
9

"Lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
suit is yet another matter. Whenever it appears that
the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter,
the action shall be dismissed. This defense may be
interposed at any time, during appeal or even after
final judgment. Such is understandable, as this kind of
jurisdiction is conferred by law and not within the
courts, let alone the parties, to themselves determine
or conveniently set aside." 43

We held in the Union Motors Case:
The long-established rule is that jurisdiction over a
subject matter is conferred by law. [Ilaw at Buklod ng
Manggagawa v. NLRC, 219 SCRA 536 (1993); Atlas
Developer & Steel Industries, Inc. v. Sarmiento
Enterprises, Inc., 184 SCRA 153 (1990); Tijam v.
Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29, 30 (1968)]. Estoppel does
not apply to confer jurisdiction to a tribunal that has
none over a cause of action. Where it appears that
the court or tribunal has no jurisdiction, then the
defense may be interposed at any time, even on
appeal or even after final judgment. Moreover, the
principle of estoppel cannot be invoked to prevent
this court from taking up the question of jurisdiction.

The rulings in Lozon v. NLRC 45 addresses the issue at
hand. This Court came up with a clear rule as to when
jurisdiction by estoppel applies and when it does not:
Lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit
is yet another matter. Whenever it appears that the
court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, the
action shall be dismissed (Section 2, Rule 9, Rules of
Court). This defense may be interposed at any time,
during appeal (Roxas vs. Rafferty, 37 Phil. 957) or
even after final judgment (Cruzcosa vs. Judge
Concepcion, et al., 101 Phil. 146).

Such is understandable, as this kind of jurisdiction is
conferred by law and not within the courts, let alone
the parties, to themselves determine or conveniently
set aside. In People vs. Casiano (111 Phil. 73, 93-94),
this Court, on the issue of estoppel, held:
"The operation of the principle of estoppel on the
question of jurisdiction seemingly depends upon
whether the lower court actually had jurisdiction or
not. If it had no jurisdiction, but the case was tried
and decided upon the theory that it had jurisdiction,
the parties are not barred, on appeal, from assailing
such jurisdiction, for the same 'must exist as a matter
of law, and may not be conferred by consent of the
parties or by estoppel' (5 C.J.S., 861-863).

However, if the lower court had jurisdiction, and the
case was heard and decided upon a given theory,
such, for instance, as that the court had no
jurisdiction, the party who induced it to adopt such
theory will not be permitted, on appeal, to assume an
inconsistent position that the lower court had
jurisdiction. Here, the principle of estoppel applies.
The rule that jurisdiction is conferred by law, and
does not depend upon the will of the parties, has no
bearing thereon. 46 (Emphasis supplied)

Verily, Lozon, Union Motors, Dy and De Rossi aptly
resolve the jurisdictional issue obtaining in this case.
Applying the guidelines in Lozon, the labor arbiter
assumed jurisdiction when he should not. In fact, the
NLRC correctly reversed the labor arbiter's decision
and ratiocinated:
What appears at first blush to be an issue which
pertains to the propriety of complainant's
reassignment to another job on account of his having
contracted a private loan, is one which may be
considered as falling within the jurisdiction of the
Office of the Labor Arbiter. Nevertheless, since the
complainant is a union member, he should be bound
by the covenants provided for in the Collective
Bargaining Agreement.
xxx xxx xxx
Based on the foregoing considerations, it appears
that the issue of validity of complainant's
reassignment stemmed from the exercise of a
management prerogative which is a matter apt for
resolution by a Grievance Committee, the parties
having opted to consider such as a grievable issue.
Further, a review of the records would show that the
matter of reassignment is one not directly related to
the charge of complainant's having committed an act
which is inimical to respondents' interest, since the
latter had already been addressed to by
complainant's service of a suspension order. The
transfer, in effect, is one which properly falls under
Section 1, Article IV of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement and, as such, questions as to the
enforcement thereof is one which falls under the
jurisdiction of the labor arbiter."

In line with the cases cited above and applying the
general rule that estoppel does not confer
jurisdiction, petitioner is not estopped from assailing
the jurisdiction of the labor arbiter before the NLRC
on appeal.

Respondent relied solely on estoppel to oppose
petitioner's claim of lack of jurisdiction on the part of
the labor arbiter. He adduced no other legal ground
in support of his contention that the Labor Arbiter
had jurisdiction over the case. Thus, his claim falls flat
in light of our pronouncement, and more so
considering the NLRC's correct observation that
jurisdiction over grievance issues, such as the
propriety of the reassignment of a union member
falls under the jurisdiction of the voluntary arbitrator.

Since jurisdiction does not lie with the Labor Arbiter,
it is futile to discuss about the computation of the
13th month pay.

WHEREFORE, the questioned decision of the Labor
Arbiter and the Court of Appeals are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the decision of the
NLRC in dismissing the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.

9. Spouses Morata vs Spouses Go
125 SCRA 444 GR No. L-62339

FACTS:
On August 25, 1982, the spouses Go filed a complaint
against petitioners Morata for recovery of a sum of
money plus damages amounting to P49,400.

On the basis of the allegation that the parties-litigants
are all residents of Cebu City, petitioner filed a
motion to dismiss citing as grounds the failure of the
complaint to allege prior availment by the plaintiffs of
the barangay conciliation process required by PD
1508, as well as the absence of certification by the
Lupon or Pangkat Secretary that no
conciliation/settlement has been reached by the
parties.

The motion to dismiss was denied on September 2,
1982. The petitioners' motion for reconsideration was
also denied on October 3, 1982.
ISSUE:
Whether the conciliation process at the barangay
level, prescribed by PD 1508 as a precondition for
filing a complaint in court, is also compulsory for
actions cognizable by the RTC.

HELD:
Yes. Sec.6, PD 1508 provides that the confrontation
of the parties and conciliation before the Lupon is a
precondition for filing a complaint, except when:

The accused is under detention;
A person has otherwise been deprived of personal
liberty calling for *habeas corpus* proceedings;
Actions coupled with provisional remedies; and
Where the action may be barred by the Statute of
Limitations.
Sec.2 provides additional exceptions, such as when:

One party is the government, or any subdivision or
instrumentality;
One party is a public officer/employee and the
dispute relates to the performance of his official
functions;
Offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding 30
days or a fine exceeding P200;
Where there is no private offended party; and
Such other classes of disputes which the Prime
Minister may, in the interest of justice, determine
upon recommendation of the Minister of Justice and
the Minister of Local Government.

Thus, except in the instances enumerated in Secs. 2
and 6 of the law, the Lupon has the authority to settle
amicably all types of disputes involving parties who
actually reside in the same city or municipality.

The law makes no distinction whatsoever with
respect to the classes of civil disputes that should be
compromised at the barangay level. Where the law
does not distinguish, we should not distinguish.

By compelling the disputants to settle their
differences through the intervention of the barangay
leader and other respected members of the
barangay, the animosity generated by protracted
court litigations between members of the same
political unit, a disruptive factor toward unity and
cooperation, is avoided. It must be borne in mind that
10

the conciliation process at the barangay level is also
designed to discourage indiscriminate filing of cases
in court in order to decongest its clogged dockets and
enhance the quality of justice dispensed by it.

The law obviously intended to grant the Lupon as
broad and comprehensive authority as possible as
would bring about the optimum realization of the
aforesaid objectives. These objectives would only be
half-met and easily thwarted if the Lupon's authority
is exercised only in cases falling within the exclusive
jurisdiction of inferior courts.

Jurisdiction over cases involving real property or any
interest therein, except forcible entry and detainer
cases, has always been vested in the Courts of First
Instance.

The authority of the Lupon is clearly established in
Sec.2 of the law; whereas Secs. 11, 12 and 14 deal
with the nullification or execution of the settlement
or arbitration awards obtained at the barangay level.
These sections conferred upon the city & municipal
courts the jurisdiction to pass upon and resolve
petitions or actions for nullification or enforcement of
settlement/arbitration awards issued by the Lupon,
regardless of the amount involved or the nature of
the original dispute. But there is nothing in the
context of said sections to justify the thesis that the
mandated conciliation process in other types of cases
applies exclusively to said inferior courts.

Therefore, the conciliation process at the barangay
level, prescribed by P.D. 1508 as a pre-condition for
filing a complaint in court, is compulsory not only for
cases falling under the exclusive competence of the
metropolitan and municipal trial courts, but for
actions cognizable by the regional trial courts as well.

10. Gegare v. CA, 177 SCRA 471 (1989)
this case involves a small piece of land. The decision
was to cut it into 2 between the parties. Petitioner
wants the whole lot while the private respondent if
happy with his half.

FACTS:
a 270sq.mtr lot situated in GenSan was titled in the
name of Paulino Elma. A reversion case was filed by
the Republic against Paulino and the lot was reverted
to the mass of public domain subject to disposition
and giving preferential right to its actual occupant,
Napoleon Gegare. Both petitioner and private
respondent filed an application for the lot in the
Board of Liquidators (Board). Board resolved to
dispose the lot in favor of petitioner by way of a
negotiated sale. Private respondent protested against
the application of petitioned, then Board denied the
said protest. A request for recon of private
respondent was referred by the Board to Artemio
Garlit, liquidator-designee, GenSan Branch for
verification and investigation. After which, Garlit
submitted a report to the Manila Ofc recommending
division of the lot to the parties. Nevertheless, the
Board denied the protest because the case had
already been decided by the court.

However, a MfR filed by private respondent was
favorably considered by the Board. Board directed
the chief of LASEDECO to investigate the occupancy
and area of the lot. Findings were that only private
respondent was the actual occupant so the LASEDECO
chief recommended the division of the property.

Both parties appealed to the Ofc of the President but
both appeals were dismiss. A MfR filed by petitioner
was denied on 29may84

Private respondent paid for the value of of the lot
and applied for the issuance of a patent. Patent was
issued to portion of the lot. Petitioner was also
advised to file his application and pay his portion.

Petitioner filed an action for Annulment and
Cancellation of Partition and/or to Declare them Null
and Void against private respondent and the Board.

Private respondent filed MtD the complaint on the
grounds et al (5) lack of conciliation efforts pursuant
to sec6 PD1508. The motion was granted.

Petitioner MfR thereof to which an opposition was
filed by private respondent. MfR was granted and
private respondent was required to file his responsive
pleading. Private respondent filed his answer. On
24jul86, private respondent asked for a prelim
hearing of the grounds for the MtD in his affirmative
defenses. This was denied.

Private respondent filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition in the CA questioning the said orders of
the trial court. CA granted the petition, declaring the
questioned orders null and void, and directing the
trial court to dismiss the civil case for lack of
jurisdiction. MfR filed by petitioner was denied. Thus,
the herein petition.

HELD:
Where the case involves residents of the same
barangay, it must comply with conciliation
proceedings even if a government instrumentality is
one of the defendants. If the other only adverse party
is the government or its instrumentality or
subdivision, the case falls within the exception. But
when the government instrumentality is only one of
multiple adverse parties, a confrontation should still
be undertaken among the other parties.

11. Vda. de Borromeo v. Pogoy, 126 SCRA 217
(1983):
Petitioner seeks to stop respondent Judge Pogoy of
MTC Cebu from taking cognizance of an ejectment
suit for failure of the plaintiff to refer the dispute to
the Bgy Lupon for conciliation.

FACTS:
The intestate estate of the late Vito Borromeo is the
owner of a building located at F. Ramos, Cebu City.
Said building has been leased and occupied by
petitioner Petra Vda. de Borromeo at a monthly
rental of Php500. Private respondent Atty Reyes,
administrator of the estate, served upon petitioner a
letter demanding that she pay the overdue rentals
and thereafter vacate the premises.

Petitioner failed to do so. Atty Reyes instituted an
ejectment case against the Petra in the MTC.
Petitioner moved to dismiss the case, advancing et al,
the want of jurisdiction of the MTC. Petitioner
contends that the court could not exercise jurisdiction
over the case for failure of Atty Reyes to refer the
dispute to the Bgy Court as required by PD1508.

Respondent judge denied the MtD. After MfR was
denied, petitioner filed petitioner for Certiorari with
SC. Atty Reyes admitted not having availed himself of
the bgy conciliation process, but justified such
omission by citing par4, sec6 PD1508 which allows
the direct filing of an action in court where the same
may otherwise be barred by the Statute of Limitations
as applying to the case at bar.

HELD:
Referral of a dispute to the Barangay Lupon is
required only where the parties thereto are
individuals. An intestate estate is a juridical person
and not an individual. The administrator may file the
complaint directly in court.

12. San Miguel v. Pundogar, 173 SCRA 704 (1989):

FACTS:
Petitioner San Miguel Village School (SMVS) entered
into a contract of services with private respondent
Christina Trio, where Trio would teach at SMVS
during SY1985-86 which would start june85 and end
March86. Sometime Aug85, Trio suddenly stopped
teaching at SMVS without giving notice of termination
and thereby causing difficulties for SMVS. SMVS filed
a complaint for breach of contract with damages
against respondent Christina Trio before RTC03
Lanao del Norte. A Certificate to File Action, signed by
the Bgy Capt of Bgy Palao, Iligan City, bearing the
notation that the respondent cannot be contacted
was filed along with the complaint. Summons was
served upon private respondent thru her husband.
Private respondent failed to file an answer within the
reglementary period, petitioner SMVS move to
declare her in default. RTC granted the motion,
declared private respondent in default and
designated the Clerk of Court to receive the evidence
of the petitioner and thereafter report back to court.

Trio filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment with
the RTC, alleging that the court had no jurisdiction to
render its decision for failure of petitioner to go
through the mandatory conciliation procedure
prescribed by sec2&6 of PD1508. Trio argued that
the certification of the Bgy Capt of Palao was
inadequate compliance with PD1508, Trio being a
resident of Bgy Tomas Cabili, and not Bgy Palao. RTC,
this time presided by Judge Pundogar, issued an order
upholding Trios contentions and setting aside the
assailed decision. Judge Pundogar acknowledged the
impropriety of the Petition for Relief from Judgment,
he nonetheless in effect granted the relief sought,
holding that the RTC in rendering the decision, acted
11

without jurisdiction over parties and the subject
matter of the action for failure of petitioner to
comply with PD1508. A MfR by petitioner was denied
by respondent judge.

HELD:
Failure of a plaintiff to comply with the requirements
of Katarungang Pambaranggay does not affect the
jurisdiction of the court that tried the action. Failure
of a plaintiff to go through the required conciliation
procedure merely affects the sufficiency, or the
maturity or ripeness of the cause of action and the
complaint becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss,
not on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, but rather
for want of cause of action or for prematurity. Where,
however, the defendant in an action fails for one
reason or another to respond to a notice to appear
before the Lupon, the requirement of conciliation
proceedings must be regarded as having been
satisfied by the plaintiff.

A defendant cannot be allowed to frustrate the
requirements of the statute by her own refusal or
failure to appear before the Lupon and then later to
assail a judgment rendered in such action by setting
up the very ground of non-compliance with
conciliation proceedings. The alleged failure on the
part of a plaintiff to comply with conciliation
proceedings must be raised in a timely manner, that
is, at the first available opportunity, if such alleged
failure is to provide legal basis for dismissal of the
complaint. Such failure must be pleaded, in a timely
motion to dismiss or in the answer. Failure to so set
up that defense produces the effect of waiver of such
defense.

13. SPOUSES FELICIANO BEJER AND GLORIA BEJER,
petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
AND SPOUSES AND SPOUSES SOLANO SAMAR AND
"JOHN DOE/S", respondents.
SYLLABUS
1.REMEDIAL LAW; VENUE; KATARUNGANG
PAMBARANGAY LAW; NON-COMPLIANCE THEREWITH
DOES NOT WARRANT JURISDICTIONAL OBJECTIONS.
Non-compliance with P.D. 1508 does not warrant
jurisdictional objections; non-availment of the
conciliation process required therein only renders the
complaint vulnerable to a timely motion to dismiss
for lack of cause of action or prematurity.

The private
respondents in the two cases at bar seasonably raised
that affirmative defense in their respective answers
filed in the court a quo, hence waiver of such
objection or estoppel by laches are not in issue in the
present controversy.

2.ID.; ID.; ID.; RESIDENCE CONSTRUED. In
procedural law, however, specifically for purposes of
venue it has been held that the residence of a person
is his personal, actual or physical habitation or his
actual residence or place of abode, which may not
necessarily be his legal residence or domicile
provided he resides therein with continuity and
consistency.

3.ID.; ID.; ID.; PURPOSE; RESIDENCE ALONE OR MERE
MEMBERSHIP, NOT SUFFICIENT. Evidently,
therefore, the primary purpose of P.D. 1508 is to
provide the conciliation mechanism, as an alternative
to litigations in dispute settlement, to member of the
corresponding barangays who are actually residing
therein. Residence alone, without membership, in
said barangays would not be an accurate and reliable
criterion, considering that such residence may be
actual but be merely temporary, transient or
categorized into other permutations as in the case of
a house guest or a sojourner on a visit of a day or
two. On the other hand, mere membership in a
barangay, without actual residence therein, should
not suffice since absentee membership would not
subserve the avowed purpose of P.D. 1508 for lack of
the common bond and sense of belonging generally
fostered in members of an identified aggroupment.

4.ID.; ID.; ID.; B.P. 337 APPLIES THERETO. That such
regulatory provisions in B.P. 337 on barangays should
be read conjointly with and applies to P.D. 1508 is
shown by the provision in the former (Sec. 114).

D E C I S I O N
REGALADO, J p:
Considering the identity of petitioner lessors, the
subject matter and the issues in these two cases, and
that the respondents therein are tenants in the same
property involved, a joint decision is indicated.

An identical pivotal issue, which would be
determinative of the present recourses in both cases,
presents itself for resolution by the Court: Does P.D.
1508 (Katarungang Pambarangay Law), which
requires the compulsory process of conciliation as a
pre-condition for filing a case in court, apply where
the plaintiffs are permanent residents of another
province but, at the time of the institution of the
action, are temporarily residing for a transient
purpose in the same city where the defendants
reside?
The petitioners in these cases are the owners of a
parcel of land and the building erected thereon
located at and known as No. 1162-B San Andres St.,
Malate, Manila. In 1984, the petitioners entered into
a verbal contract of lease with the Samar spouses,
respondents in G.R. 79404, on a month-to-month
basis over a portion of the said premises at a monthly
rental of P75.00. In September, 1985, petitioners
notified said respondents of their need to repossess
the leased premises for their own use and due to the
immediate need therefor by their family, and granted
the respondents up to December 31, 1985 to vacate
the premises. Respondents stayed on and despite
another 3-month notice to pay and vacate they not
only failed to do so but refused to pay their monthly
rentals from December, 1985, hence the petitioners
filed a complaint against them on April 21, 1986 in
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila. 1

The same antecedent facts obtain with respect to the
respondent Esplano spouses, involved in G.R. No.
80045, against whom a separate complaint was filed
and raffled to the same trial court. The aforesaid two
cases, together with that against a third tenant-
defendant but which is not involved in these
appellate proceedings, were the subjects of a
consolidated decision of the lower court 2 rendered
on November 7, 1986 ordering therein defendants
and all persons claiming rights under them to vacate
their respective leased premises; to pay the rentals
from December, 1985 until they shall have vacated
the premises, with legal interest thereon; and to
individually pay P1,000.00 as attorney's fees, plus
costs of suit.

In said cases, the defendants, respondents herein,
duly raised in their respective answers the defenses
of lack of cause of action of the plaintiffs and/or that
the lower court had no jurisdiction for non-
compliance with the conciliation requirement of P.D.
1508; and further that they could not be ejected by
reason of the applicability and proscription in their
favor of P.D. 1517 (Urban Land Reform Law) in
relation to P.D. 1520.

However, the lower court held that P.D. 1508 was not
applicable in both cases since the plaintiffs were
actual residents of Orense, Bauan, Batangas and, at
the time of filing the individual suits against the
respective defendants therein, the former were
merely transient residents of 1284 Burgos Street,
Pandacan, Manila. Defendants' invocation of P.D.
1517 was given short shrift in view of the doctrine
laid down by this Court in Santos, et. al. vs. Court of
Appeals, et al., 3 holding that
". . . P.D. No. 1517, in referring
to the preemptive or
redemptive right of a lessee
speaks only of urban land
under lease on which a tenant
has built his home and in which
he has resided for ten years or
more. If both land and the
building belong to the lessor,
the right referred to
hereinabove does not apply."

Therein defendant Samar spouses appealed to the
Regional Trial Court which affirmed 4 the judgment of
the lower court, further pointing out that therein
plaintiffs' "occasional visits to the Pandacan
apartment of their children do not make plaintiffs
'ACTUAL RESIDENTS' of that place. In short, plaintiffs
are as strangers to the community at Burgos Street,
Pandacan, Manila as they can be." With respect to
defendants' reliance on P.D. 1517 and P.D. 2016, it
was additionally noted that said decrees require that
the area must be defined and proclaimed to be within
a specified Urban Land Reform Zone, 5 that is, the
245 depressed areas covered by Proclamation No.
1967 and within the Area of Priority Development
and the ZIP Program of the Government. The
premises in controversy were within an area not yet
proclaimed by only being recommended for feasibility
study for the Zonal Improvement Program. 6

Therein defendants elevated the case on a petition
for review to the Court of Appeals, 7 which, in its
decision on July 23, 1987 sustained the ruling on the
inapplicability of P.D. 1517. 8 However, it held that
12

P.D. 1508 was applicable to the case although the
therein private respondents were only "temporarily
residing at 1284 Burgos Street, Pandacan, Manila"
since P.D. 1508 merely requires that the parties are
"actually residing" in the place involved. The decisions
of the two lower courts were consequently set aside
and the ejectment case was dismissed on the ground
of lack of cause of action or prematurity. 9

Herein petitioners fared no better in their case
against the Esplano spouses who likewise appealed
from the aforesaid consolidated decision of the
Metropolitan Trial Court to the Regional Trial Court of
Manila 10 which affirmed in toto the decision of the
lower court. However, on a petition for review in the
Court of Appeals, the decision of the trial court was
set aside and the complaint for ejectment was
dismissed likewise for lack of cause of action or
prematurity. Said decision 11 of the Sixth Division of
respondent Court of Appeals specifically adverted to
and noted with approval the aforesaid decision of the
Fourteenth Division in CA-G.R. SP. No. 11697.

Both decisions of the respondent court are now
before Us presenting the same determinant issue
stated at the outset of this decision.

Prefatorily, this Court has heretofore repeatedly held
that non-compliance with P.D. 1508 does not warrant
jurisdictional objections; non-availment of the
conciliation process required therein only renders the
complaint vulnerable to a timely motion to dismiss
for lack of cause of action or prematurity. 12 The
private respondents in the two cases at bar
seasonably raised that affirmative defense in their
respective answers filed in the court a quo, hence
waiver of such objection or estoppel by laches are not
in issue in the present controversy.

Instead, the contending parties have locked their
argumentative horns on the nature or concept of the
"residence" requirement in P.D. 1508, the petitioners
contending that permanent residence is required for
the application thereof, while the private
respondents insist that all that is required is actual
residence, whether temporary or permanent, at the
time the dispute arose. In procedural law, however,
specifically for purposes of venue it has been held
that the residence of a person is his personal, actual
or physical habitation or his actual residence or place
of abode, 13 which may not necessarily be his legal
residence or domicile provided he resides therein
with continuity and consistency, 14 thus:
". . . We lay down the doctrinal
rule that the term 'resides'
connotes ex vi termini 'actual
residence' as distinguished
from 'legal residence or
domicile'. The term 'resides',
like the term 'residing' or
'residence' is elastic and should
be interpreted in the light of
the object or purpose of the
statute or rule in which it is
employed . . . In other words,
'resides' should be viewed or
understood in its popular
sense, meaning, the personal,
actual or physical habitation of
a person, actual residence or
place of abode. It signifies
physical presence in a place
and actual stay thereat . . . No
particular length of time of
residence is required though;
however, the residence must be
more than temporary"
(Emphasis supplied).

Parenthetically, the lower courts held that herein
petitioners are permanent residents of Orense,
Bauan, Batangas, although they periodically come to
visit and stay for a few days at the aforesaid place in
Pandacan where their children live while attending
classes. Both complaints filed by them in the
Metropolitan Trial Court also state that they are
"residents of Orense, Bauan, Batangas, and
temporarily residing at 1284 Burgos Street, Pandacan,
Manila."

Tested by the rules on sufficiency of pleadings, it is
readily apparent that the allegation regarding their
temporary residence should be treated as an
inconsequential surplusage. However, as already
stated, respondents' reliance is place squarely and
literally on the reference of P.D 1508 to persons
"actually residing" in the barangays as the rationale
for its applicability. We feel, however, that for an
adequate denouement, the inquiry should go farther
than such statutory provisions.
It will be noted that the first preambular paragraph of
P.D. 1508 15 provides:
"Whereas, the perpetuation
and official recognition of the
time-honored tradition of
amicably settling disputes
among family and barangay
members at the barangay level
without judicial recourse would
promote the speedy
administration of justice and
implement the constitutional
mandate to preserve and
develop Filipino culture and to
strengthen the family as a basic
social institution;" (Emphasis
supplied).

Evidently, therefore, the primary purpose of P.D.
1508 is to provide the conciliation mechanism, as an
alternative to litigations in dispute settlement, to
member of the corresponding barangays who are
actually residing therein. Residence alone, without
membership, in said barangays would not be an
accurate and reliable criterion, considering that such
residence may be actual but be merely temporary,
transient or categorized into other permutations as in
the case of a house guest or a sojourner on a visit of a
day or two. On the other hand, mere membership in
a barangay, without actual residence therein, should
not suffice since absentee membership would not
subserve the avowed purpose of P.D. 1508 for lack of
the common bond and sense of belonging generally
fostered in members of an identified aggroupment.

Hence, the Local Government Code 16 thereafter
specifically provided 17 for the appointment of a
barangay secretary with the duties, inter alia, to:
xxx xxx xxx
"(c)Prepare separate lists of the
members of the barangay and
the registered voters of the
barangay assembly, and have
the same posted on
conspicuous places within the
barangay;
(d)Redster all new members of
the barangay;"
xxx xxx xxx
That such regulatory provisions in B.P. 337 on
barangays should be read conjointly with and applies
to P.D. 1508 is shown by the provision in the former
as follow:
"Sec. 114.Amicable Settlement
of Disputes on the Barangay
Level. There shall be a system
of amicable settlement of
disputes on the barangay level
which shall be governed by
law."

Incidentally, the importance of membership, and not
mere actual residence, in the barangay is
underscored by the requirement that it must have an
actual population of at least one thousand
inhabitants, 18 which cannot but mean barangay
members actually residing therein. Membership in
the barangay is also required for candidacy to an
office therein, 19 to be considered as persons in
authority 20 and for membership in the kabataang
barangay assembly. 21

Turning now to the cases at bar, there is no dispute
that the petitioners are not members of the barangay
in question. There is no evidence of that fact nor was
there a certification that they are residents of 1284
Burgos Street, Pandacan, Manila, in contrast to the
respondents in both cases whose residence at 1162-B
San Andres Street, Malate, Manila was certified to by
the barangay chairman thereof. 22 Petitioners cannot
even be accurately categorized as temporary
residents but as mere periodic and brief sojourners
who only used to come to visit and attend to their
children's needs while in school. From all the
foregoing disquisitions, therefore, we cannot confirm
the existence of the requisite residential or, for
purposes of the issue involved, the legal nexus
between the petitioners and the Pandacan barangay
involved.

The literalism in respondents' suggested construction
of the pertinent provisions of P.D. 1508 may even
result in unwanted, if not absurd, results not
contemplated in and contrary to its purposes. For
instance, if a transient visitor, like the herein
13

petitioners, obtains a loan of P15,000.00 on a verbal
agreement from a barangay member during the
former's brief stay in that barangay in Manila and fails
to pay the same but, like the petitioners herein, he is
a resident of Batangas, following respondents' theory
prior conciliation proceedings must first be conducted
in said Manila barangay before suit may be brought in
the municipal trial court in Batangas as the court of
proper venue. This situation could not have been
within the intendment of P.D. 1508.

On the equities of these cases, it bears mention that
petitioners and their family have been prevented up
to now from repossessing their own house and lot for
their use despite their demonstrated compliance with
the legal requirements therefor as found by the two
courts below, and that the respondents have
deliberately refused to pay the respective stipulated
rentals for their occupancy of said premises.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered SETTING
ASIDE the assailed decisions of the Fourteenth and
Sixth Divisions of the respondent Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP. No. 11697 and CA G.R. No. SP-11893,
respectively; REINSTATING the decisions of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila in Civil Cases Nos. 87-
39033 and 87-39032 thereof; and ORDERING the
respondents to vacate the premises in question and
surrender possession thereof to the petitioners. This
decision is immediately EXECUTORY.
SO ORDERED.

14. AGBAYANI v. BELEN

Facts:
The respondent judge in this case dismissed the civil
action instituted by Teresita and Lucas Agbayani
against private respondents and other persons for
quieting of title and damages involving three (3)
parcels of land in Dayomaca (Tobuan), Poblacion,
Sual, Pangasinan.

The Court sustained the motion to dismiss on the
ground that the court has not acquired jurisdiction try
the case" because of the failure of the petitioners to
submit the controversy to conciliation proceedings
pursuant to P.D. No. 1508 before filing their
complaint with the Court. The court held that the
instant action falls within the authority of the Lupon
Tagapayapa, and therefore the parties should first
appear before the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat of
the barangay (Tobuan, Sual, Pangasinan) where the
properties are located. It held that while it appears in
the record that the parties reside in barangays of
different cities or municipalities, the real property
subject matter of the case are not however located in
different barangays but in one and the same
barangay, that is, Barangay Tobuan, Sual, Pangasinan

Issue:
whether the "precondition,", the prior submission of
the dispute to the Barangay Lupon for conciliation,
should apply to actions affecting real property
situated in one city or municipality although the
parties actually reside in barangays which are located
in different cities or municipalities and do not adjoin
each other

Held: No.

Ratio: PD 1508 declares that generally, disputes
involving parties actually residing in the same city or
municipality, or in adjoining barangays of different
cities or municipalities, should first be brought before
the appropriate Barangay Lupon which shall have the
authority to bring together the parties for amicable
settlement." The proceedings before the Lupon are a
"precondition" to the filing of any action or
proceeding in court or other "government office," PD
1508 further declaring that "No complaint, petition,
action or proceeding involving any matter within the
authority of the Lupon as provided in Section 2 hereof
shall be filed or instituted in court or any other
government office for adjudication unless there has
been a confrontation of the parties before the Lupon
Chairman or the Pangkat and no conciliation or
settlement has been reached as certified by the
Lupon Secretary or the Pangkat Secretary, attested by
the Lupon or Pangkat Chairman, or unless the
settlement has been repudiated."

A complaint or petition filed in court or other
government office without compliance with the
precondition may be dismissed on motion of any
interested party on the ground that the complaint
fails to state a cause of action. The defect may
however be waived by failing to make seasonable
objection, in a motion to dismiss or answer, the
defect being a mere procedural imperfection which
does not affect the jurisdiction of the court.

The venue of these pre-requisite proceedings for
conciliation is the Lupon of the barangay: (1) in which
the parties to the dispute are actually residing, or (2)
where the respondent or any of the respondents
actually resides, if the parties are actual residents of
different barangays within the same city or
municipality, or (3) where the real property or any
part thereof is situated, if the dispute affects real
property or any interest therein.

But the "precondition" does not apply to disputes
over which the Lupon has no authority, namely: those

1) where one party is the government or any
subdivision or instrumentality thereof;
2) where one party is a public officer or employee,
and the dispute relates to the performance of his
official functions;
3) involving "offenses punishable by imprisonment
exceeding 30 days or a fine exceeding P200.00,"
or "where there is no private offended party;
4) which the Prime Minister may in the interest of
justice determine, upon recommendation of the
Minister of Justice and the Minister of Local
Government;
5) involving parties who actually reside in barangays
of different cities or municipalities, except where
such barangays adjoin each other; and
6) involving real property located in different
municipalities.

In Tavora vs. Veloso, et al., the Court en banc held
that the "precondition" had no application to cases
over which the Lupon had no authority. Specifically,
the Court ruled that by express statutory inclusion
and exclusion, the Lupon shall have no jurisdiction
over disputes where the parties are not actual
residents of the same city or municipality, except
where the barangays in which they actually reside
adjoin each other."

In such a situation, where the Lupon is without
jurisdiction of the controversy because the parties are
not actual residents of the same city or municipality
or of adjoining' barangays, the nature of the
controversy is of no moment-whether or not affecting
real property or interest therein, located in the same
city or municipality. And the principle is not at an
altered by the proviso of Section 3 of PD
1508(governing venue) that "disputes which involve
real property or any interest therein shall be brought
in the barangay where the real property or any part
thereof is situated." The "quoted proviso should
simply be deemed to restrict or vary the rule on
venue prescribed in the principal clauses of the first
paragraph of Section 3;" but obviously, the rule on
venue is utterly in-consequential as regards a case
over which the Barangay Lupon does not, in the first
place, have any jurisdiction.

Since the dispute between the parties in this case was
never within the authority or jurisdiction of the
Barangay Lupon because the parties admittedly
reside in different cities and municipalities (and not in
adjoining barangays), there was no occasion or
reason to invoke or apply the rule on venue governing
disputes concerning real property. Petitioners were
there-fore under no obligation to comply with the
"precondition" of first referring their dispute with
private respondents to the Barangay Lupon for
conciliation and amicable settlement before
instituting their suit in court.

Disposition: Decision of the court is annulled and set
aside. Case remanded. Petition granted.

15. MONTOYA V. ESCAYO, G.R. NO. 82211-12,
MARCH 21, 1989, 171 SCRA 442

FACTS:
All formerly employed as salesgirls in Montoyas
store, the "Terry's Dry Goods Store," separately filed
complaints for the collection of sums of money
against the petitioner for alleged unpaid overtime
pay, holiday pay, 13th month pay, ECOLA, and service
leave pay: for violation of the minimum wage law,
illegal dismissal, and attorney's fees. Montoya moved
for the dismissal of the complaints claiming that
among others, salesgirls failed to refer the dispute to
the Lupong Tagapayapa for possible settlement and
to secure the certification required from the Lupon
Chairman prior to the filing of the cases with the
Labor Arbiter. These actions were allegedly violative
of the provisions of P.D. No. 1508.

14

ISSUE:
WON P.D. 1508 (Katarungang Pambarangay Law) is
applicable to labor disputes?

HELD:
No. The provisions of P.D. No. 1508 requiring the
submission of disputes before the barangay Lupong
Tagapayapa prior to their filing with the court or
other government offices are not applicable to labor
cases. Requiring conciliation of labor disputes before
the barangay courts would defeat the very salutary
purposes of the law. Instead of simplifying labor
proceedings designed at expeditious settlement or
referral to the proper court or office to decide it
finally, the position taken by the petitioner would
only duplicate the conciliation proceedings and
unduly delay the disposition of the labor case.

16. Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy

Facts:
After one month from the effectivity of the
Judiciary Act of 1948, spouses Tijam filed a collection
case against spouses Sibonghanoy. The preliminary
attachment filed by the plaintiff was dissolve by a
counter bond posted by the defendants through a
surety company. After being duly served with
summons the defendants filed their answer in which,
after making some admissions and denials of the
material averments of the complaint, they interposed
a counterclaim. This counterclaim was answered by
the plaintiffs.

The Court rendered judgment in favor of the
plaintiffs and, after the same had become final and
executory, upon motion of the latter, the Court issued
a writ of execution against the defendants.

The writ having been returned unsatisfied, the
plaintiffs moved for the issuance of a writ of
execution against the Surety's bond, against which
the Surety filed a written opposition upon two
grounds, namely, (1) Failure to prosecute and (2)
Absence of a demand upon the Surety for the
payment of the amount due under the judgment.
Upon these grounds the Surety prayed the Court not
only to deny the motion for execution against its
counter-bond but also the following affirmative relief:
"to relieve the herein bonding company of its liability,
if any, under the bond in question"

Issue:
Whether or not the surety company can still question
the jurisdiction of the trial court.

Held:
No, though it is clear that the case is outside the
jurisdiction of the of the Regional Trial of Cebu,
defendants were estopped from questioning the
court's jurisdiction. The Court explained "a party may
be estopped or barred from raising a question in
different ways and for different reasons. Thus we
speak of estoppel in pais, or estoppel by deed or by
record, and of estoppel by laches.

Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do
that which, by exercising due diligence, could or
should have been done earlier; it is negligence or
omission to assert a right within a reasonable time,
warranting a presumption that the party entitled to
assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert
it.

The doctrine of laches or of "stale demands" is based
upon grounds of public policy which requires, for the
peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims
and, unlike the statute of limitations, is not a mere
question of time but is principally a question of the
inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to
be enforced or asserted.

The facts of this case show that from the time the
Surety became a quasi-party, it could have raised the
question of the lack of jurisdiction [it only raised the
question of jurisdiction after 15 years] of the Court of
First Instance of Cebu to take cognizance of the
present action by reason of the sum of money
involved which, according to the law then in force,
was within the original exclusive jurisdiction of
inferior courts. It failed to do so. Instead, at several
stages of the proceedings in the court a quo as well as
in the Court of Appeals, it invoked the jurisdiction of
said courts to obtain affirmative relief and submitted
its case for a final adjudication on the merits. It was
only after an adverse decision was rendered by the
Court of Appeals that it finally woke up to raise the
question of jurisdiction. Were we to sanction such
conduct on its part, We would in effect be declaring
as useless all the proceedings had in the present case
since it was commenced and compel the judgment
creditors to go up their Calvary once more. The
inequity and unfairness of this is not only patent but
revolting."

Moreover, adds the Court, "we frown upon the
'undesirable practice' of a party submitting his case
for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if
favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction,
when adverse,"