People of the Phils Vs Que Po Lay March 29, 1945, Montemayor

(effectivity of laws: is publication needed: Yes : Penal In Character)

Facts: Que Po Lay failed was found in possession of 7000 dollars worth
of US checks and Money orders but failed to sell it to the Central Bank
as required by Circular 20, the circular was issued on 1949 but was
published in the OG on November 1851, que po lay was sentenced by
the lower court to 6 years in prison but it took almost 6 months for the
circular to be published after conviction.
Issue: whether or not publication of Circular 20 in needed for it to
become EFFECTIVE.
Held: It is necessary for a law, rule or circular especially with a penal
character to be published in order to bound the public to its contents,
Que po lay was acquitted.
Askay VS Cosalan September 15,1924, Malcolm
(effectivity of laws: when is publication: exclusion if stated for approval)
Facts: Sakay questioned the jurisdiction of Judge Harvey in the case,
following the line that a certain Act.3107 that basically gives the
secretary of justice to assign judges to a court not of his own,should be
effective only 15 days after the publication. However on the last
section of the Act there states that the acts shall take effect on its
approval.
Issue: whether or not Act.3107 is in effect when Judge Harvey started
to hear the case
Held: Judge Harvey has jurisdiction over the case as Act 3107, provided
a clear section that the act should be in effect upon its approval which
covers the exclusion to the general rule of 15 days after publication.

Balbuena vs Secretary of Education November 29, 1960
(effectivity of laws: Publication: Only in General Application)
Facts: In a case pertaining to Department Order.8, members of the
Jehovah witness find it in violation of the their rights of freedom of
worship and speech especially when they are dismissed for not saluting
the flag. The case was dismissed in the reason that the Flag is not a
religious image together with the entire ceremony. The Jehovas
witnesses members however raised a new issue on the validity of the
the order on the subject of publication as it was not published in the
OG as required in C.A 638, Art.2 New Civil Code.
Issue: Whether or not, Department Order.8 required publication in the
Official Gazette to take effect.
Held: It is the view of the court that this particular order does not
require general publication for it is not a law of general application
because it is addressed only to Director of Public and Private schools
where they have a job to maintain discipline.
Tanada vs Tuvera December 29, 1986 ,Escolin LANDMARK, NEW
BASIS(Effectivity of Laws: Publication: Indespinsable; Ignoratia Legis
Nominem Exusar.. due to the secret files of Marcos.

Facts: A motion for reconsideration pertaining to a previous case that
dealt with the necessity of publication in order for a law to be effective.
While it was found necessary to publish law as a rule, the argument
still continued about the specific clause that states other wise
provided in relation to law that have specific mention of validity on its
approval.
Issue: Whether or not, a law can have full effect right after its approval
without publication on the basis of the clause other wise provided
Held: The clause unless otherwise provided refers to the date of
effectively and not of the requirement of publication itself. As the SC
stated Publication in full or its no publication at all and that the
publication must be made forthwith or at least as soon as possible for
ignoratia legis nominem excusat.

Lara Vs Del Rosario, April 20, 1954, Montemayor
Effectivity of Civil code (Replaced Code of Commerce Art.302 the
governing agency)
Facts: Lara et al were former taxi drivers of the defendant. When the
latter sold some of his vehicles, the plaintiffs who were no longer
needed were dismissed. Because their employer did not give them their
one months salary in lieu of the notice required in Article 302 of the
Code of Commerce, this action was instituted.

ISSUE: Whether or not the New Civil Code took effect on August 30,
1949.

HELD: In this case, the Supreme Court in an obiter dictum held that the
new Civil Code of the Philippines took effect on August 30, 1950. This
date is exactly one year after the Official Gazette publishing the Code
was released for circulation, the said release having been made on
August 30, 1949. The plaintiffs then are not entitled to any
compensation, the New Civil Code having repealed the Code of
Commerce. The case was on latter period on September 24,1950.


Wong Woo You vs Vivo, March 31, 1965, Angelo
Village Chief cannot celebrate marriage under Philippine Law:
Doctrine Procedurial Presumption
Facts: Wong Woo You a chinese woman was married to Perfecto Blas in
China which was solemnized by a certain Village Chief, Chua Tio. As a
requirement for entry in the Philippines as a non-qouta immigrant, a
binding marriage is required.
Issue: Is the marriage of Wong Woo you and Perfecto Blas legal?
Whether or not the petitioner presented sufficient fact for her
marriage?
Held: The court did not find sufficient and substantial proof of marriage
between the two, other than oral and documentary evidence that has
basically little to no weight at all in proving a husband and wife
relationship, they cannot prove it. More importantly, the validity of the
marriage in China through the village elder may only be proven if again,
they can give enough proof of the case, such as laws. However since
they cannot provide one, the law of the Philippines applies about who
can celebrate marriage, which in this case, thus not include a village
elder. Doctrine of Procedurial Presumption.
Adong vs Cheong Seng Gee, Malcolm, Ignorantia Legis nominem
exusat: A question of fact, must be proven. Ignorance of the fact may
limit liability
Facts: A certain Cheong Boo, deceased, left a certain estate property
with an estimated worth of 100k, now Cheong Seng Gee claimed that
he is the legitimate son of Cheong Boo and Tandit who were married in
China and therefore have the right to the property and not Mora
Adong, who claimed to be lawfully wedded to Cheong Boo in Basilan.

Issue: Whether or not a marriage contracted in China and proven
mainly by an alleged matrimonial letter, valid in the Philippines? Are
the marriages performed in the Philippines according to the rites of the
Mohammedan religion valid?
Held: Sec. IV of the Marriage law provides that all marriages contracted outside
the islands, which would be valid by the laws of the country in which the same
were contracted, are valid in these islands. In order for the marriage between
Cheong Seng Gee and Boo to be valid they must prove a question of fact, which a
matrimonial letter cannot do.
A Philippine marriage followed by 23 years of uninterrupted marital life, should
not be impugned and discredited, after the death of the husband through an
alleged prior Chinese marriage, save upon proof so clear, strong and unequivocal
as to produce a moral conviction of the existence of such impediment. A
marriage alleged to have been contracted in China and proven mainly by a so-
called matrimonial letter held not to be valid in the Philippines.





Coron vs Carino FACTS: Sometime in 1976, an action was filed by the petitioner
before the Court of First Instance of Palawan and Puerto Princesa
City. The action sought to demolish the structures built by the
private respondents alongside the rock causeway of the petitioners'
wharf. After a series of postponements, the trial court, on January 16,
1979 reset the hearing for the latter time for three consecutive dates,
March 20, 21 and 22, 1979 with further warning to the private
respondents that no more postponements shall be allowed. On March
20, 1979 despite proper notice, the private respondents and their
counsel failed to appear at the scheduled hearing.
The petitioner then moved that private respondents' non-appearance
be considered as a waiver on their parts and rights to be heard. The
private respondents went to the appellate court for certiorari but
the petition was dismissed due to lack of merit.

On appeal, the private respondents were required "to submit the
forty (40) printed copies of their record on appeal together with
the proof of service of fifteen (15) copies thereof with appellee."
However, the respondents still failed to comply with the
requirements even after the sixty (60) days extension.

A resolution, dated September 27, 1982, dismissing the private
respondents appeal had became final and executory. The respondents,
in their supplemental motion argued that since under the present
law, printed records on appeal are no longer required, their right
to be heard on appeal must be upheld instead of the rule on
technicalities.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not the procedural rules invoked by the private
respondents be given retroactive effect?

HELD:NO, because the Supreme Court have resolved the issue as to
the extent of the retroactive application of Section 18 of the
Interim Rules of Court. It reiterated that "Statutes regulating the
procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions
pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural
laws are retrospective in that sense and to that extent.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The resolution of
the respondent appellate court dated July 29, 1983 is SET ASIDE.



PAFLU VS Secretary of Labor
FACTS: PAFLU File for writs of certiorari and prohibition to restrain
Secretary to enforce an order of cancellaion of SSSEmploymentAssoc
which is Afilliated with PAFLU
And annul all proceedings in connection with the cancellation
AND prohibit enforcing sec.23 of R.A 875
and prey for a writ of preliminary injunction pending the final
determination of the case, no W.P.I pendent lite has been issued
It appears that on September 25, 1963, the Registration of Labor Org,
issued a hearing on October 17, 1963, on the matter of cancelation of
SSSEA because
1: Failure to furinish BOLandRel, with verified copies of financial report
2.Failure to submit to this office, the names and addresses of the non
subversive affidavits of the officers of the union.
They violated, sec.23, of R.A.875, registration of labor organizations.
Councel of SSSEA moved the hearing to submit such documents but
nobody appeared, the next day October 22 SSEA ass.sec filed the
documents and the constitution and by laws.
October 23, BOLandR cancelled,SSSEA registration certificate.
Alfredo Fajardo, President of SSSEA, filed a reconsideration of the
decision and asked for time to November 15,..
December 4, the registrar declared that SSSEA failed to submit, non-
subversive affidavits and names and addresses.
SSEA then filed the case at hand, claiming that Sec.23 RA875 violates
their FREEDOM of ASSEMBLY and ASSOCIATIOn, and is inconsistent of
the UDHR, that it unduly delegates judicial power to an Admin agency.
*FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION is DEVOID OF FACTUAL
BASIS because registration is not a limitation but for a condition an org
or assoc. to acquire legal personality. Those financial statements are
also reasonable since they collect huge amount of money on behalf of
the org, making the demand reasonable.

*Section 23 does not impinge upon the right of organization by UDHR
or to ILO on the matter of employee to create an organization.
*SSSEA would still exist because it is their right but its judicial
personality and statutory rights and priviledges would be suspended
thereby.
*the period within which decision should be rendered is directory and
not mandatory, the judgement therefore is not null and void, those
who is incharge of the judgment may only be dealt with
administratively but the judgment still stands.
Also there is now law requiring the approval of Sec for cancellation,
because once the condition is meet, judgment on cancellation can be
rendered.
It also shows that the petitioners failed to exhaust all remedies for they
directly went to court against the secretary when the secretarty is not
needed yet on a decision since there was a pending petition for
extension to the registar.

PETITION FOR WRITS PRAYED FOR DENIED WITH COST AGAINST
PETITIONERS.

TANADA VS CUENCO

After the 1955 elections, members of the Senate were chosen. The Senate was overwhelmingly
occupied by the Nacionalista Party. The lone opposition senator was Lorenzo. Diosdado on the
other hand was a senatorial candidate who lost the bid but was contesting it before the SET.
But prior to a decision the SET would have to choose its members. It is provided that the SET
should be composed of 9 members; 3 justices, 3 senators from the majority party and 3
senators from the minority party. But since there is only one minority senator the other two
SET members supposed to come from the minority were filled in by the NP. Lorenzo assailed
this process. So did Diosdado because he deemed that if the SET would be dominated by NP
senators then he, as a member of the Liberalista will not have any chance in his election
contest. Cuenco et al (members of the NP) averred that the SC cannot take cognizance of the
issue because it is a political question. Cuenco argued that the power to choose the members of
the SET is vested in the Senate alone and the remedy for Lorenzo and Diosdado is not to raise
the issue before judicial courts but rather to leave it before the bar of public opinion.

ISSUE: Whether or not the issue is a political question.

HELD: The SC took cognizance of the case and ruled in favor of Lorenzo and Diosdado. The
term Political Question connotes what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of
policy. It refers to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.



TITLE: Emetrio Cui v Arellano University
CITATION: GR NO. L15127, May 30, 1961 | 112 Phil 135

FACTS:

Emetrio Cui took his preparatory law course at Arellano University. He then
enrolled in its College of Law from first year (SY1948-1949) until first semester of
his 4
th
year. During these years, he was awarded scholarship grants of the said
university amounting to a total of P1,033.87. He then transferred and took his
last semester as a law student at Abad Santos University. To secure permission
to take the bar, he needed his transcript of records from Arellano University. The
defendant refused to issue the TOR until he had paid back the P1,033.87
scholarship grant which Emetrio refunded as he could not take the bar without
Arellanos issuance of his TOR.

On August 16, 1949, the Director of Private Schools issued Memorandum No. 38
addressing all heads of private schools, colleges and universities. Part of the
memorandum states that the amount in tuition and other fees corresponding to
these scholarships should not be subsequently charged to the recipient students
when they decide to quit school or to transfer to another institution. Scholarships
should not be offered merely to attract and keep students in a school.

ISSUE: Whether or not Emetrio Cui can refund the P1,033.97 payment for the
scholarship grant provided by Arellano University.

HELD:

The memorandum of the Director of Private Schools is not a law where the
provision set therein was advisory and not mandatory in nature. Moreover, the
stipulation in question, asking previous students to pay back the scholarship grant
if they transfer before graduation, is contrary to public policy, sound policy and
good morals or tends clearly to undermine the security of individual rights and
hence, null and void.

The court sentenced the defendant to pay Cui the sum of P1,033.87 with interest
thereon at the legal rate from Sept.1, 1954, date of the institution of this case as
well as the costs and dismissing defendants counterclaim.

Compulsory RecognitionBernabe v. Alejo [G.R. No. 140500, January 21,
2002]PONENTE: Panganiban, J.FACTS:

The late Fiscal Ernesto Bernabe allegedly fathered a son with Carolina Alejo, his secretary for 23
years.

The son, Adrian Bernabe, was born on September 18, 1981. Fiscal Bernabe died on August 13,
1993 while his wifeRosalina died on December 3, 1981, leaving Ernestina as their sole surviving
heir.

Carolina, on behalf of Adrian, frilled a complaint praying that Adrian be declared as an
acknowledged illegitimate son of
Fiscal Bernabe and as such, be given his share in Fiscal Bernabes estate, which was being held
by Ernestina as the sole
surviving heir.

The RTC dismissed the complaint, ruling that under the provisions of the Family Code,
the complaint was alreadybarred.

On appeal to the CA, it ruled that the subsequent enactment of the Family Code did not take
away the right of Adrianto file a petition for recognition within four years from attaining
majority age.

Hence this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, praying for (1)
nullification of the July 7,1999 CA decision and (2) reinstatement of two (2) orders issued by
RTC.

ISSUE:
1)

Whether or not Adrian Bernabe can petition for compulsory recognition now that his alleged
father is dead.
HELD:
1)

Yes, Adrian Bernabe can petition for compulsory recognition even when his alleged father is
already dead.
RATIONALE:
The Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988, Adrian was only 7 years old then and he was
only 12 years old when his father died.The Supreme Court
ruled that Adrians right to an action for recognition which was granted by Article 285 of the
Civil Code, had
already vested prior to the enactment of the Family Code.
Article 255 of the Civil Code states:
This code
shall have retroactiveeffect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights
in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.

Article285 of the Civil Code states:

The action for recognition of the natural children may be
brought only during the lifetime of thepresumed parents except in the following cases: (1) If the
father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case thelatter may file the
action before the expiration of four years from the attainment of his majority; (2) If after the
death of the fatheror of the mother a document should appear of which nothing had been
heard and in which either or both parents recognize thechild. In this case, the action must be
commenced within four years from the finding of the document.The petition for compulsory
recognition was filed by Carolina on behalf of Adrian on May 16, 1994, when Adrian was still a
minor or13 years old. This is well before the expiration of four years from the attainment of his
majority