Chapter 3: Should Austria establish a NUS?

(1969-1990)

Until 1993, Austria was unusual amongst OECD countries in having a tiny non-university sector
of higher education. with fewer than 10 per cent of students in non-university post secondary
institutions in 1990. An earlier initiative to establish a NUS in 1969/70 was not successful. As a
consequence, expansion of higher education did take place within an homogenous university
system which had to cope with continuously growing numbers of students. This chapter will
discuss why has Austria did not establish a NUS by upgrading its sector of "advanced
vocational education" at upper secondary level; the reasons for the mutual enforcement of
conservative and left wing resistance against diversification; the consequence of not to
establish a NUS; and the question what was different in the late 1980s when the introduction
of a NUS succeeded?


Chronology:

We can identify two culmination points of the controversy: in the years 1969/70 the "Partisch-
Plan" introduced the idea of a NUS to Austrian policy makers. This plan was refused.
Between 1988 and 1990, a new initiative by Busek, stimulated by the intention to join the EU
and by a comparative OECD study re-introduced the idea of a NUS to the political agenda. In
between, during the 1970s and most of the 1980s, a debate about a NUS was literally absent.
Only a OECD-review in the mid 1970s made a short remark about this issue, but it received
no recognition of policy makers or the public.

The following chronological report starts with a brief "prehistory" of the NUS in the 1960s,
when the course for massification was set (a). This helps to understand why the Partisch Plan
was launched in 1969/70 (b). The period of the 1970s and 1980s will be portrayed as as time
of expansion without diversification (c). Finally, there was a controversy about a new
initiative to introduce a NUS between 1998-90 (d).


The "take-off" of educational expansion in Austria in the 1960s
1960s: take off period for expansion of post-compulsory education. Impacts of the reform
of 1962. The role of international organisations (OECD).
The public opinion in the 1960s ("Bildungskatastrophe"); the conservative
attitudes/convictions of school administrators and experts (desperate need of better
educated manpower, but little hope to meet these needs due to an invariable lack of talent;
this assumption shaped the expectations of policy makers, it explains the big surprise at
the end of the 1960s, when it became obvious that the previous assessment was wrong).
The structure of upper secondary education: AHS, BHS, dual system (apprenticeship) .
Expansion of apprenticeship and AHS. Ambiguous effects of AHS: barrier against and pull
effect towards university. Conflicting goals regarding the balance between AHS and BHS:
AHS is much cheaper, as long as expansion of post-compulsory schools is the primary
policy goal, expansion of AHS has many advantages.
The real pace of expansion during the 1960s was much faster and more powerful than
expected by policy makers and most experts. End of 1960s: the level of participation in
upper secondary schools leading to Matura was met with mixed feelings. In particular the
fast expansion of AHS was now a subject of increasing concern. The unanimous support
for expansion and for reforms in favour of increase of participation disappeared.

The "Partisch Plan"
Partisch Plan: Extension and subdivision of BHS as an answer to a situation which was
not anticipated: rapid growth of AHS-graduates, who had little attractive options except to
enter the university; diversification of higher education as an alternative; an attractive
NUS will prevent a massification of universities (who should remain an elite segment for
research and only some academic professions). At the same time restructuring of BHS:
decrease of specialisation at upper secondary level, upgrading of vocational qualification
at post-secondary level. This would at the same time reduce the sharp distinction between
AHS and BHS: extension of a common shared core curriculum at secondary level, option
of entrance for vocational qualification for AHS graduates.
Reasons for the rejection: universities wanted to sustain their monopoly at the post-
secondary level; BHS feared to loose their distinctive profile; chamber of commerce
insisted on a strong vocational training at the upper secondary level. The basic assumption
was: it will be possible to "get the expansion under control" at the secondary level. There
will be no massification of post-secondary education, because the motivation and
aspiration of youngsters (at upper secondary level) will be channelled according to
(conservative) policy goals (early specialisation, direction towards practical preferences).
It would be too late to mould the interests and orientations of students only at the post-
secondary level; this has to happen much earlier, at the age of 14 (conviction: graduates of
AHS are "lost" for practical vocational areas).


Expansion without diversification

None of the expectations of conservative policy makers who refused the Partisch plan did
come true. They planed to channel demand for advanced education at the secondary level into
vocational tracks, partly into the dual system, partly into the BHS. The real development
during the 1970s was totally different: AHS continued to grow. Students and their parents
favoured the AHS which enabled them to postpone the choice of a specialised career. Local
politicians responded to that demand and urged the central government to expand the network
of AHS. Since it is much cheaper to built and to run an AHS than a BHS (in particular a
technical BHS), the federal government had strong incentives to respond to popular demands.
Irrespective of the development plan which emphasised the expansion of BMS/BHS, the
supply of study places in AHS grew much faster during the 1970s.

During the 1970s, expansion spreads to universities: numbers of new entrants almost double,
total enrolments grow by 140%. Factors of growth: demography, gender.

Initially, expansion of advanced education is welcome by policy makers and the public. In the
late 1970s there are first signs for a change of mood. As soon as expansion appeared not only
at the level of new entrants and total enrolments, but also at the level of graduates, labour
markets for graduates ceased to be "seller markets". Unemployment of graduates, which was
extremely rare before more frequent now (although unemployment rates of graduates were
still significantly below the respective rates of less qualified groups of the workforce). This
played an important role for the political assessment of costs and benefits of educational
expansion. The metaphor of "overeducation" which is a bad investment for both, the society
and the individual, became a popular argument.

Against the background of first steps towards a mass system many features of the Austrian
higher education system appeared in a different light. The efficiency of the system became
now a much more urgent question as before. Issues such as drop out and length of study are
now frequently addressed; the performance of the Austrian system is criticised by policy
makers and the public (at least partly for good reasons). Usually, the high drop out and the
long duration of study are attributed to expansion, but this is only partly correct. There was a
minor deterioration, but much less significant as most people believe. In a laissez faire system
which grants extensive freedom to both, students and academics, a high level of attrition is
inevitable. There were some complaints about attrition during the 19
th
century (cf. Cohen
1996, p.225). But the absolute number of students who failed to graduate was low. In a small
elite system policy makers and the public care much less about efficiency issues. In the course
of massification these issues catch much more public attention. One consequence would be to
make higher education more responsive to the needs of an increasingly diverse student body.

However, the problems were seldom addressed in this way. The late 1970s and the 1980s
were characterised by a polarised debate: conservatives blamed the policy of expansion
(which they supported during the 1960) as the reason for decline in quality; social democrats
defended this policy as the basis of social progress in terms of overall levels of qualification
and of equality of opportunity and (for a long while) denied all problems. Nevertheless, there
was a slow, hardly noticeable tendency also in the social democratic camp to reduce the
priority of higher education policy issues. One could get the impression, that the expansive
and egalitarian policy became rather an obligation than a serious concern. Social democrats
felt obliged to defend and continue a policy they had started in the 60ies, but they were less
and less convinced that it was the right policy.

During the late 1980s fiscal consolidation became a top priority for the government; as a
consequence, fiscal conflicts between different governmental activities increased. Public
spending for higher education did not keep pace with the expansion of students. Funding now
became a new policy focus; the overall dissatisfaction with the system increased. In the course
of these conflicts two front lines emerged:
On the one hand an increasing tension between the education community and
representatives of the government (politicians and civil servants) was created. This tension
was felt so hard that it almost hide the interest conflicts among the different groups within
universities (professors, junior researchers, students). Conflicts between these interests
were not absent, but they were felt small compared with the big hostility against
government (which was a kind of "thread from outside", a common enemy who united
the divergent group interests). An incredible amount of mistrust and cynicism (on both
sides) was built up. This tension played an important role during the reform attempts in
the 1990s: it was almost impossible for the government to find allies within the
universities for their reform policy. Without significant support from within governmental
reform initiatives were seen/felt as an hostile intrusion.
On the other hand the conflicts about fiscal policy pushed forward the differentiation
between different actors within the social democratic camp. A conflict between politicians
(and civil servants) representing government on the one side, the unions (and chamber of
labour) on the other side emerged. The former emphasised the overall principles of the
government policy (which was, at this time, strongly determined by the goals of fiscal
consolidation); the latter emphasised the interests of teachers and other employees in the
education sector (which they often identified with the educational needs of society).
Again, this conflict slowly emerged during the 1980s and became an important political
factor during the various higher education reforms in the 1990s.

A new initiative to introduce a NUS

To most experts and observers it came as a big surprise, when in 1988 a new public debate
about the NUS began. This debate was mainly caused by the decision of the government to
join the European Union. It was obvious that this decision had huge consequences for all
sectors of Austrian society, higher education included. One of the questions which
immediately came up was: will Austria be able to maintain its traditional structure of
vocational training? Some policy analysts and some interest groups argued that in a larger
European context the value of a BHS-certificate would not fully be acknowledged. The
country as a whole and the graduates of the BHS in particular would have competitive
disadvantages if Austria would not upgrade the "middle vocational training" to post-
secondary level. This was doubtless an important issue, but the argumentation was hardly
convincing. Why was this concern taken serious by the public and the government? The deep
impact of that debate must be attributed to a number of circumstances which reinforced the
concerns:
The universities were in the middle of a debate about the "overburdening" with students;
there was a deep desire for "relieve" and that helps to understand why the idea of a NUS
suddenly met with sympathy at many academic opinion leaders.
It came as a lucky coincidence, that just at that time the OECD has organised a
comparative study about the development of the NUS in their membership countries. This
study was picked up and used to support the idea of a NUS.
Finally, a new minister for higher education was ambitious to reform the status quo; he
quickly realised that the idea of a NUS could serve as a catalyst of change.

However, there were still influential groups who opposed the establishment of a NUS:
The BHS lobby was afraid of loosing its powerful position within the education system.
The social-democrats were reluctant to approve of a differentiation of the higher education
system.


The consequences of EU-membership
As soon as Austria would be a member of a larger European community, some policy issues
could no longer be decided exclusively by Austrian authorities. At a formal level, education
would remain the responsibility of national governments, but most actors agreed that a new
need for compatibility with other European countries would arise.

One issue which was of particular importance in this context was the structure of vocational
education. While most European countries had upgraded their advanced technical and
commercial training to a post-secondary level. Austria remained as one of the few countries
with a strong vocational education at the upper-secondary level. In fact, the BHS have grown
significantly during the 1980s. In the late 1980s the had already as much graduates as the
gymnasia (in the early 1970s, the gymnasia had three times as much graduates).
Representatives of industry and commerce continued to emphasise the strength and the
advantages of this type of education. As a consequence, the BHS-lobby was very self-
conscious and regarded the BHS as the most useful and most successful part of the education
system. However, there was growing suspicion that this eminent position might be
jeopardised when Austria join the EU. What would be the value of their certificates at a joint
European labour market? Would graduates be allowed to keep the title "engineer"? Would
they have competitive disadvantages against graduates with similar qualifications of other
European countries, however, with a post-secondary degree? Would it be unavoidable that
Austria sooner or later joined the mainstream of OECD countries to upgrade the advanced
vocational education? Would it be a mere necessity to create a NUS in order to compete
successfully with other European nations? These were some of the questions which fostered
the new interest in the NUS in the late 1980s.


Relieve for universities

Another factor affecting the debate about the NUS was the condition of the universities. The
discontent of the academic community and parts of the public with the status quo increased. It
was focused on two issues: the tight governmental regulation of universities which resulted in
the request for more autonomy; and the insufficiency of governmental spending for
universities. It was the latter issue which was related to the debate about the NUS. It became
evident that the increase of public expenditure for higher education did not match the increase
of enrolments. During the 1980s there was a permanent and significant decrease in the per
capita expenditures (cf. table xx). Two remedies for this problem seemed possible: to raise
expenditure and/or to reduce enrolment at universities. The main emphasis of the higher
education community was on the first solution. However, the increasing concern of the
government with fiscal consolidation made it unlikely that this goal could be achieved. The
second solution was also quite difficult to achieve, because nobody dared to challenge the
"open access policy" at universities which the government has practised since the 1970s,
when other European countries introduced a "numerus clausus" policy. A practicable way out
of that dilemma seemed to be the establishment of a NUS which could serve as a relieve for
universities. Suddenly, the idea that a NUS could substantially relieve the mass universities
seemed plausible to a relatively large group of academic opinion leaders. How such an idea
could be realised was debated in any detail: Should some subject areas be shifted from the
university sector to the NUS (which would actually be a "downgrading" of the respective
fields)? What would be candidates for such a shift? Would the new sector be a competitor in
terms of (good) students and funding? Just to raise these questions makes evident, that no
"relieve" was possible without settling enormous conflicts. Looking back, one can not avoid
the impression, that the whole idea of a relieve of the mass university was just very vague
wishful thinking about a return to the good old days of the elite university. Anyway, the
slogan of "relieve for universities" was popular at that time and supported the advocates for a
NUS.


OECD-study: Alternatives to universities

Austria participated in a comparative study organised by the OECD about the development of
the NUS in different countries. The Austrian case study (cf. Lassnigg & Pechar 1987) was an
opportunity to raise again the topics which were debated when the Partisch plan was refused.
Usually, such studies are not met with big interest by a larger public. The coincidence of the
completion of this study with a new broader interest in this issue provided the proponents of a
NUS with a welcome expertise.


An opportunity for political change

When Busek started as a new minister for higher education he had a clear vision to change the
system
1
. The establishment of a NUS seemed to be a promising opportunity to "shake up" the
established structures.

The clearest opponents of such a policy were the BHS-lobby and some social-democrats.
Representatives of the BHS did fear that the establishment of a NUS would endanger the
attractiveness and prestige of advanced vocational education at the upper secondary level.
From their point of view, it was Austria who has maintained a reasonable structure of
vocational education, whereas most other countries have tread into a wrong way by upgrading
their former secondary vocational systems. According to them, those other countries would
envy Austria the traditional but still superior BHS pattern. The BHS representatives had strong
links to the interest groups of industry and commerce, who predominantly supported their
position.

The mainstream of the social-democrats opposed the idea of a NUS for different reasons.
Their policy to enhance equality of opportunity and access of children from low income
families to higher education made the assumption, that the best way to achieve these goals
was to secure uniform standards within a homogenous structure. They were convinced that ...
For those reasons social democrats were sceptical against all plans to diversify the system of
higher education. According to their view, all kind of diversification would lead to re-
introducing elite structures with the unavoidable consequence, that students from lower social
strata would be excluded from the prestigious university sector and pushed aside in a sector of
less quality and esteem. They could imagine only one kind of differentiation: differentiation
along the vertical axis of quality and prestige. The notion of an education which was
"different, but equal" in quality and prestige was in their view just an ideological manoeuvre
to confuse the re-establishment of an elite system. According to that assumption, a NUS
would necessarily offer a "second rate higher education", and to avoid this the social-
democrats preferred to stick with a uniform structure. Many of them would agree, that such a
system had certain drawbacks, that it was more difficult in such a system to ensure a sufficient
match between the preferences and abilities of students with the offerings of universities.
However, they would argue, this are the trade-offs one has to pay for more social equality

1
This was linked to his general political ambitions as chairman of the conservative party. In order to establish
himself as a convincing candidate as head of the government, he needed political success in his particular
ministry.
Actors

Opponents of a NUS

Representatives of BHS: This group was the most stable opponent of a NUS; their position did
not change from the early 1970s to the late 1980s. It was mainly driven by the concern of a
loss in the status of their educational segment. Their spokesmen had an influential voice
because this type of school always enjoyed a particular backing by the employers
organisations. This gave them the public image of being the most serious profile of education
(talking business, while other just made fuzzy words). From the late 1970s on they gained
additional self-confidence by the fact that it was the fastest growing education sector. Any
reform which would weaken their position could then be labelled as neglecting the interests of
the parents.

Chamber of Commerce: the interest group of the employers unequivocal opposed the Partisch
plan in 1969/70. This was mainly due to a conservative assessment about the further demand
for advanced qualification. They insisted that the Austrian economy is dominated by small
and medium enterprises which have only a very limited need for technical qualification above
the secondary level. The overwhelming majority of these firms would be perfectly served
with a work force being composed of graduates from the dual system and the BHS. The
upgrade of BHS would raise the cost of wages without giving the firms adequate benefits.
Additionally, they feared that the proposed reform would result in a declining supply of
graduates of the dual system (by further promoting educational expansion).

During the late 1970s and 1980s they had to realise that educational expansion continued even
without the establishment of a NUS; and that expansion in a homogenous higher education
system was from their point of interest much worse than the scenario of the Partisch plan
to which they opposed. They did not formally correct their position, but slowly turned into the
camp of the proponents of a NUS.

Universities: In 1969/70, representatives of universities did not play a crucial role in the
debate about the Partisch plan. Anyway, they opposed the reform, because they wanted to
maintain the monopoly of universities in post-secondary education. Those years were in
Austria just the initial phase of higher education expansion. The actual pace of expansion in
the coming years seemed then to be unthinkable for most actors. Like the chamber of
commerce, the rectors conference became a supporter of a NUS during the late 1980s.

Proponents of a NUS

Experts: In the early 1970s and in the late 1980s experts recommended the establishment of a
NUS. In the early 1970s, it was basically one person, Mr. Partisch, a civil servant in the
ministry of education, who launched the idea. He had a clear vision which was based on a
stringent policy analysis, and he was strongly committed to the reform project. It was not
unusual in these days
2
that civil servants made use of the social sciences; but Partisch was
unusual in that sense that he published a couple of papers and a book
3
, which opened his
arguments for public debate. However, few people were ready to discuss the issue on such a

2
During the late 1960s and early 1970s a new paradigm of policy making disseminated in the ministerial
bureaucracy: it was no longer based on legal expertise, but rather employed instruments and theories of the
social sciences.
3
Partisch ......
sophisticated level. The actual debate was rather a battle of interests. The main problem of
Partisch was, the he literally stood alone, that he had no strong support from policy makers.
This fact is clearly expressed in the term Partisch plan; it is very unusual that civil servants
step out of anonymity and give their name to a reform initiative, but in this case it was
appropriate.
The Partisch plan soon fall into oblivion, but in the late 1980s it was rediscovered, when a
group of experts again strted to deal with the issue of a NUS. This was initiated by the
Austrian contribution (Lassnigg & Pechar 1987) to a comparative OECD study (OECD 199?).
The main difference to the early 1970s was, that this time there was great political interest in
the expertise. When Busek became minister, he immediately encouraged further elaboration
on that topic and ordered a new concept to establish a NUS. In the public debate, it was not an
expert group, but a minister who advocated the establishment of a NUS.

Policy makers: The political interest in the topic of diversification od higher education was
quite different between the two periods: in the early 1970s the government was undecided and
quickly abandoned any reform intentions when opposition from interest groups appeared.
In the late 1980s, at least one politician (Busek) was strongly committed to the idea and
backed the further elaboration of expertise. Busek was not only minister of science and
research, but at the same time he was chairman of the conservative party (VP) and in this
function he was vice-chancellor in the government. He was in desperate need of getting a
strong, distinctive political profile in order to increase his chances to win the next elections
for the federal parliament (in 1990). He realised that the plan to establish a NUS could be easy
communicated and he made this concept to one of the main points in his political agenda.

Chamber of Commerce: After converting to the proponents of a NUS the interest group of the
was faced with a dilemma: how to support the NUS without stab the BHS in the back. In the
initial phase of the debate, the Chamber of Commerce had not yet a consistent position (which
probably reflected conflicting interests within the organisation). Eventually the Chamber was
successful in advocating the position that BHS and NUS must not be exclusive alternatives.

Universities: the academic opinion leaders experienced a similar development as the interest
group of the employers. They had to realise that the opposition to the Partisch plan in the
early 1970s was motivated by a profoundly wrong assessment of the future pace of expansion
in higher education. The monopoly they wanted to secure in the early 1970s was then felt as
an immense burden when growth of students exceeded all expectations. During the late 1980s,
university representatives were among the most outspoken advocates for a NUS. In those
years they perceived a NUS just as a relive of their institutions from too many students. The
obvious objection that a NUS might as well be a competitor for public funding was not yet an
issue in those days.
The policy change of university representatives is linked to Brnner who was head of the
Austrian rectors conference in the late 1980s
4
. He supported the Fachhochschul policy of
Busek from the very beginning. It was mainly his merit that in the late 1980s and early 1990s
the universities supported the establishment of Fachhochschulen.


4
Brnner was unusual in the sense that he tried to be an active rector even within the legal framework of the old
organisational law which prevented all managerial functions of this office. As the head of the rectors conference
he also played an active role which in some respects brought him in opposition to parts of the academic
oligarchy.
Conflict areas:

Attitudes towards educational expansion

The proposal to establish a NUS can be regarded as an answer to an unprecedented expansion
of advanced secondary education during the 1960s. The debate about that proposal was
accompanied by a controversy over the benefits and the further prospects of educational. How
much advanced education does Austria need? How much can it afford?

Such questions were raised again after some years of unanimous encouragement of
educational ambitions by most relevant political actors. However, if we regard that issue in a
long-term perspective, we must conclude that through most of the history of modern Austria,
governments and educational authorities have strictly limited access to advanced education
5
.
Reservations against overeducation and the overcrowding of advanced career paths are
deeply rooted in convictions and rhetoric of authorities and the educated elites. The sharp
increase of enrolments in AHS during the 1960s has quickly revitalised these positions. The
political mainstream in those years
6
still insisted, that individuals and society would benefit
from further educational expansion. But this was increasingly challenged.
......Piskaty..rztekammer??

The Partisch plan took a ambiguous, in some ways mediating position. The reform proposal
was based on the conviction, that growth of enrolments beyond certain limits could result in
undesired effects. Yet it differed in many ways from the conservative opponents to expansion:
In the confidence that it is on principal beneficial to raise the level of qualification. And in the
estimation that it would be extremely difficult to impose effective barriers to educational
ambitions. From many advocates of expansion the Partisch plan differed in the conviction,
that differentiation of learning and career paths offers better condition for ...... than a
homogenous system (even if the latter corresponds with certain egalitarian principles).


Homogeneous vs differentiated system?

Should expansion of student participation in higher education be accompanied by a
diversification of post-secondary provisions? Many countries voted for that option on the
grounds that it makes massification easier:
A diversified system has lower entrance barriers (which is an advantage for newcomers
who other wise might be deterred).
The expectations of students are "channelled" in a realistic way (a pragmatic compromise
between the desire for expanded participation and the fear of "over-qualification").
It is possible to protect "elite segments" from the pressure of participation.

This is a mix of arguments, some of which are closer to social democratic (lowering barriers),
others to conservative ideologies (protecting elite segments). This ambiguous character of
diversification could make a compromise between the ideological camps easier, because each

5
During the last two centuries we find two relatively short periods which are exceptions from that general rule.
In the 1860s and early 1870s, a liberal government set the course for increased enrolments at all levels of
education. From the 1880s on the government tried (not very successfully) to end that growth of educational
participation (Cohen 1996). The other exception are the 1960s (and to a lesser extend the 1970s).
6
In 1970, a social democratic government was elected which declared that enhancing educational opportunities
was one of its priorities.
party could emphasise the positive aspect from its one perspective. In the case of Austria it
worked the other way round: Each party stressed the negative aspect from its own perspective
and hence refused this option. This is an indication that each party was convinced to succeed
with its own programme without making compromises.

The left side was strongly determined to keep the uniform character of university education.
Universities should be opened for new participants, but these newcomers should not get a
"second best" higher education, all students should be united at the highest quality level in the
Austrian system. (This reminds on the British debate about the "gold standard".) Social
democrats were convinced that in a diversified system students from lower social strata would
be pushed aside to the less attractive levels. On the other hand they did not pay too much
attention to the argument that students from families with low educational attainment might
have serious difficulties in traditional universities; this was considered to be an elitist,
conservative ideology. (understandable: in the optimistic 70s; but similar arguments were
used in the late 80s, when the counterproductive nature of expansion without diversification
was already evident; but then this position had only low credibility and authority even in its
own camp and finally was pushed back).

From a general point of view, conservative politicians were rather in favour of diversified
systems. On the other hand, a diversified higher education system was also considered to have
the drawback of making access too easy. At the early 1970s, conservatives, in particular
members of the business federations were already quite sceptical about the economic benefits
of educational expansion. Some years earlier, in the mid-1960s, they had strongly advocated
for a expansionist education policy. As many others, they were surprised, how fast and how
powerful these policies were successful (e.g. table xx). In the late 1960s they gradually came
to the opinion that expansion might be overdone; they now reversed their policy. At that time,
educational expansion was still restricted to the upper secondary level, mainly to the AHS.
However, there were good reasons to believe that most graduates of the AHS would continue
to enrol in universities. After all, the AHS was designed as a preparation for universities; the
main qualification they acquired was the ability to learn and study at higher levels. Without
policy intervention a further of expansion of universities would be unavoidable.

Conservatives were convinced, that no further growth of higher education should be
encouraged. Such policy goals cannot be realised in a simple way: Austrian universities do
not select their students, neither with respect to academic talent nor according to available
study places. Universities relied on the judgements of the secondary schools with respect to
the talent of students, and they relied on the readiness of the government to allocate resources
in accordance with the number of students. As a consequence, access to higher education is
basically controlled by the two types of upper secondary education which award the Matura
to their graduates.

The conservative strategy was to channel students at the secondary level from the AHS to the
BHS. During the 1960s the AHS were expanded (not at least because this was the cheaper way
to qualify students with the Matura). Now this direction should be reversed: expansion of
AHS should be stopped (otherwise expansion of universities would be unavoidable). Instead
the BHS should be made more attractive, counsellors should advice students and their parents
that this education opens more opportunities etc. The assumption was that only a small
fraction of graduates from BHS would enrol at universities.

To sum up: the conservative assumption was that a certain amount of educational expansion
was unavoidable (maybe even desirable); but this expansion basically should be confined to
the secondary level. This could be realised by a proper balance between AHS and BHS. Only
the AHS "heats up" aspirations of students to transfer to post-secondary level. At the BHS
their ambitions would be channelled realistically towards vocational orientations. Provided
such a proper balance with a growing percentage of students enrolling at BHS one would need
no NUS in order to protect the universities against massification. On the contrary: the NUS
would be the easy way to delay a vocational career and to transfer to post-secondary
education. Many who would not dare to enrol at universities would have less reservations to
enrol at the NUS. Thus the NUS would be a "pull factor" to expand post-secondary education.
Sooner or later this expansion would spill over to universities.


The structure of vocational qualification: early vs late specialisation

One of the reasons why the Partisch plan was refused was that it unconditionally linked the
establishment of a NUS with a major reform of the BHS. According to that plan, the BHS
would not be abolished; however it would loose its core characteristic: the combination of
Matura (right to enrol at universities) with vocational qualification. According to the Partisch
plan, the vocational qualification would be upgraded, leading to a post-secondary certificate
7
.
What would be left at the secondary level would come closer to the AHS. There would then
rather be a kind of comprehensive school at the upper secondary level with different tracks
(the former BHS being the vocational track, the former upper cycle of the AHS being the
academic or general track).

The rationale for that change was twofold:
On the one hand it should guarantee that the vocational training of the engineers could
keep pace with the rapid changes of technology. In the view of the reformers this would
result in ever more demanding training requirements. For that reason technical training
even at the middle level could no longer be confined at secondary schools; it had to be
upgraded to post-secondary level.
On the other hand, the upgrading of vocational training requirements would it make
possible to strengthen the general education at the secondary level. While there were
complaints from many sides that the general education was insufficient
8
, it was
considered to be one of the problems of the BHS that the curriculum was already
congested with too many demands. The time burden on BHS students was already
significantly higher than at AHS; it was not possible to add additional subjects. The
conclusion of the Partisch plan was: a qualified vocational training at secondary level is
only possible at the expense of general education. But a more thorough general education
would be possible by relieving the curriculum from vocational demands.

This concept was met with significant resistance from many sides:
What was conceptualised as an upgrading of the "middle level" of vocational training was
felt as a downgrading by the BHS-lobby. In their view the distinctive profile of the BHS
would be destroyed; they did not want to become just another kind of teacher at secondary
schools but insisted on their eminent position.
According to the Chamber of Commerce the middle level of vocational qualification was
sufficiently served by the BHS. They argued that this profile of vocational training is

7
The Partisch plan did not envisage a higher education degree, because the vocational academies were not
conceptualised as institutions of higher education.
8
Complaints of this kind came occasionally from the universities; but there were also complaints from the
business community that BHS graduates had deficiencies in foreign languages and even in their mother tongue.
perfectly matched with the predominance of small and middle sized enterprises in Austria.
In their view the upgrading of these qualifications would just serve the status interests of
certain groups and would significantly raise the wage cost of Austrian industry.
BHS are a very attractive type of school for owners of small and medium sized
enterprises. They sent their children preferably to BHS where they can acquire a
combination of a reasonable level of general education with the vocational qualification
and the licence to run that particular trade (Gewerbeberechtigung). This allows them take
over the firm of their parents. The much less attractive alternative would be to enrol as an
apprentice in the dual system. This group was in past quite successful in lobbying against
any substantial change of BHS.

Summarising the debate in 1969/70 we can conclude, that resistance from the BHS-lobby and
its allies was probably decisive for the failure of the Partisch plan. The influence of this group
was strong enough to prevent the establishment of a NUS as long the latter was seen as a
danger for the BHS.

What was different in the late 1980s? During the early stages of th debate there was a
tendency in the expert group to go on from the unchanged concept of the Partisch plan. An
internal policy document for minister Busek which outlined the basic steps to establish a NUS
(198?) distinguished two options: a big solution (which was basically a copy of the Partisch
plan, including a fundamental reform of the BHS); and a small solution (which would leave
the BHS untouched). The conclusion of the document was that the big solution would be
preferable.

The debate in the following months made it very clear that little had changed in almost two
decades with respect to the strong position of the BHS lobby. Representatives of the BHS
continued to oppose unconditionally any plans to establish a NUS. The chamber of commerce
had a different position than two decades earlier: it was now in favour of a NUS, but at the
same time it opposed to any changes in the BHS structure.

Busek quickly drew the conclusion and opted for the smal solution. It is very unlikely that
the proponents of a NUS would succeed if they still had insisted on a major intervention into
the structure of the BHS. Their plans were successful only because they de-coupled these two
issues.