Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 98275 November 13, 1992
BA FINANCE CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
ON. COURT OF APPEA!S, REGIONA! TRIA! COURT OF ANGE!ES CIT", BRANC !#I,
CAR!OS OCAMPO, INOCENCIO TUR!A, SPOUSES MOISES AGAPITO $%& SOCORRO M.
AGAPITO $%& NICO!AS CRU',respondents.

ME!O, J.:
The uestion of petitioner!s responsibilit" for da#a$es %hen on March &, '()*, an accident
occurred involvin$ petitioner!s Isu+u ten,%heeler truc- then driven b" an e#plo"ee of .ino
/astro is the thrust of the petition for revie% on certiorari no% before 0s considerin$ that neither
the driver nor .ino /astro appears to be connected %ith petitioner.
On October '*, '()), the disputed decision in the suit belo% %as rendered b" the court of ori$in
in this #anner1
'. Orderin$ Roc- 2.3. and Ro$elio Villar " 3#are 4ointl" and severall" to
pa" the plaintiffs as follo%s1
a5 To the plaintiff /arlos Oca#po 6 P'7',&89.99:
b5 To the plaintiff Moises Oca#po 6 P7(),899.99
c5 To the plaintiff Nicolas /ru+ 6 P'8;,<;9.99
d5 To the plaintiff Inocencio Turla, Sr. 6 ;),999.99
7. Dis#issin$ the case a$ainst .ino /astro
*. Dis#issin$ the third,part" co#plaint a$ainst STRON=HO.D
;. Dis#issin$ all the counterclai# of the defendants and third,part"
defendants.
8. Orderin$ RO/> to rei#burse 2.3. the total a#ount of P&77,)(9.99 %hich
the latter is ad4ud$ed to pa" to the plaintiffs. ?p. ;&, Rollo5
Respondent /ourt of 3ppeals affir#ed the appealed disposition in toto throu$h @ustice Rasul,
%ith @ustices De Pano, @r. and I#perial concurrin$, on practicall" the sa#e $rounds arrived at b"
the court a quo ?p. 7), Rollo5. Afforts eBerted to%ards re,evaluation of the adverse %ere futile ?p.
*<, Rollo5. Hence, the instant petition.
The lo%er court ascertained after due trial that Ro$elio Villar " 3#are, the driver of the Isu+u
truc-, %as at fault %hen the #ishap occurred in as #uch as he %as found $uilt" be"ond
reasonable doubt of rec-less i#prudence resultin$ in triple ho#icide %ith #ultiple ph"sical
in4uries %ith da#a$e to propert" in a decision rendered on Cebruar" '&, '(); b" the Presidin$
@ud$e of 2ranch & of the Re$ional Trial /ourt stationed at Malolos, 2ulacan. Petitioner %as
ad4ud$ed liable for da#a$es in as #uch as the truc- %as re$istered in its na#e durin$ the
incident in uestion, follo%in$ the doctrine laid do%n b" this /ourt in Perez vs. Gutierrez ?8*
S/R3 ';( D'(<*E5 and Erezo, et al. vs. Jepte ?'97 Phil. '9* D'(8<E5. In the sa#e breadth, Roc-
/o#ponent Philippines, Inc. %as ordered to rei#burse petitioner for an" a#ount that the latter
#a" be ad4ud$ed liable to pa" herein private respondents as eBpressl" stipulated in the contract
of lease bet%een petitioner and Roc- /o#ponent Philippines, Inc. Moreover, the trial court
applied 3rticle 7'(; of the ne% /ivil /ode on solidar" accountabilit" of 4oin tortfeasors insofar as
the liabilit" of the driver, herein petitioner and Roc- /o#ponent Philippines %as concerned ?pp.
&,<, Decision: pp. ;;,;8, Rollo5.
To the uestion of %hether petitioner can be held responsible to the victi# albeit the truc- %as
leased to Roc- /o#ponent Philippines %hen the incident occurred, the appellate court
ans%ered in the affir#ative on the basis of the 4urisprudential do$#as %hich, as aforesaid, %ere
relied upon b" the trial court althou$h respondent court %as uic- to add the caveat e#bodied in
the lease covenant bet%een petitioner and Roc- /o#ponent Philippines relative to the latter!s
dut" to rei#burse an" a#ount %hich #a" be ad4ud$ed a$ainst petitioner ?pp. *7,**, Rollo5.
Petitioner asseverates that it should not have been haled to court and ordered to respond for the
da#a$e in the #anner arrived at b" both the trial and appellate courts since para$raph 8 of the
co#plaint lod$ed b" the plaintiffs belo% %ould indicate that petitioner %as not the e#plo"er of
the ne$li$ent driver %ho %as under the control an supervision of .ino /astro at the ti#e of the
accident, apart fro# the fact that the Isu+u truc- %as in the ph"sical possession of Roc-
/o#ponent Philippines b" virtue of the lease a$ree#ent.
3side fro# castin$ clouds of doubt on the propriet" of invo-in$ the Perez and Erezo doctrines,
petitioner continue to persist %ith the idea that the pronounce#ents of this /ourt in Duavit vs.
Court of Appeals ?'<* S/R3 ;(9 D'()(E5 and Duquillo vs. Bayot ?&< Phil '*' D'(*(E5 dovetail
%ith the factual and le$al scenario of the case at hand. Curther#ore, petitioner assu#es, $iven
the so,called hiatus on the basis for the a%ard of da#a$es as decreed b" the lo%er and
appellate courts, that 3rticle 7')9 of the ne% /ivil /ode on vicarious liabilit" %ill divest petitioner
of an" responsibilit" absent as there is an" e#plo"er,e#plo"ee relationship bet%een petitioner
and the driver.
/ontrar" to petitioner!s eBpectations, the recourse instituted fro# the rebuffs it encountered #a"
not constitute a sufficient foundation for reversal of the i#pu$ned 4ud$#ent of respondent court.
Petitioner is of the i#pression that the Perez and Erezo cases are inapplicable due to the
variance of the $enerative facts in said cases as a$ainst those obtainin$ in the controvers" at
bar. 3 contrario, the lesson i#parted b" @ustice .abrador in Erezo is still $ood la%, thus1
. . . In previous decisions, Fe alread" have held that the re$istered o%ner of
a certificate of public convenience is liable to the public for the in4uries or
da#a$es suffered b" passen$ers or third persons caused b" the operation
of said vehicle, even thou$h the sa#e had been transferred to a third
person. ?Monto"a vs. I$nacio, (; Phil., ')7 89 Off. =a+., '9): Roue vs.
Maliba" Transit, Inc., =.R. No. .,)8&', Nove#ber '), '(88: Vda. de Medina
vs. /resencia, (( Phil., 89&, 87 Off. =a+., D'9E, ;&9&.5 The principle upon
%hich this doctrine is based is that in dealin$ %ith vehicles re$istered under
the Public Service .a%, the public has the ri$ht to assu#e or presu#ed that
the re$istered o%ner is the actual o%ner thereof, for it %ould be difficult %ith
the public to enforce the actions that the" #a" have for in4uries caused to
the# b" the vehicles bein$ ne$li$entl" operated if the public should be
reuired to prove %ho actual the o%ner is. Ho% %ould the public or third
persons -no% a$ainst %ho# to enforce their ri$hts in case of subseuent
transfer of the vehiclesG Fe do not i#pl" b" this doctrine, ho%ever, that the
re$istered o%ner #a" not recover %hatever a#ount he had paid b" virtue of
his liabilit" to third persons fro# the person to %ho# he had actuall" sold,
assi$ned or conve"ed the vehicle.
Uner the sa!e principle the re"istere o#ner of any vehicle, even if not
use for a pu$lic service, shoul pri!arily responsi$le to the pu$lic or to the
thir persons for in%uries cause the latter #hile the vehicle is $ein" riven
on the hi"h#ays or streets. &he !e!$ers of the Court are in a"ree!ent
that the efenant'appellant shoul $e hel lia$le to plaintiff'appellee for the
in%uries occasione to the latter $ecause of the ne"li"ence of the river,
even if the efenant'appellant #as no lon"er an o#ner of the vehicle at the
ti!e of the a!a"e $ecause he ha previously sol it to another. Fhat is
the le$al basis for his ?defendants,appellant!s5 liabilit"G
There is a presu#ption that the o%ner of the $uilt" vehicle is the defendant,
appellant as he is the re$istered o%ner in the Motor Vehicle Office. Should
he not be allo%ed to prove the truth, that he had sold it to another and thus
shift the responsibilit" for the in4ur" to the real and the actual o%nerG The
defendants hold the affir#ative of this proposition: the trial court hold the
ne$ative.
The Revised Motor Vehicle .a% ?3ct No. *((7, as a#ended5 provides that
the vehicle #a" be used or operated upon an" public hi$h%a" unless the
sa#e is properl" re$istered. It has been stated that the s"ste# of licensin$
and the reuire#ent that each #achine #ust carr" a re$istration nu#ber,
conspicuousl" displa"ed, is one of the precautions ta-en to reduce the
dan$er of in4ur" of pedestrians and other travelers fro# the careless
#ana$e#ent of auto#obiles, and to furnish a #eans of ascertainin$ the
identit" of persons violatin$ the la%s and ordinances, re$ulatin$ the speed
and operation of #achines upon the hi$h%a"s ?7 R. /. .. ''<&5. Not onl"
are vehicles to be re$istered and that no #otor vehicles are to be used or
operated %ithout bein$ properl" re$istered fro# the current "ear, furnish the
Motor Vehicle Office a report sho%in$ the na#e and address of each
purchaser of #otor vehicle durin$ the previous #onth and the
#anufacturer!s serial nu#ber and #otor nu#ber. ?Section 8DcE, 3ct No.
*((7, as a#ended.5
Re$istration is reuired not to #a-e said re$istration the operative act b"
%hich o%nership in vehicles is transferred, as in land re$istration cases,
because the ad#inistrative proceedin$ of re$istration does not bear an"
essential relation to the contract of sale bet%een the parties ?/hinchilla vs.
Rafael and Verda$uer, *( Phil. )))5, but to per#it the use and operation of
the vehicle upon an" public hi$h%a" ?section 8DaE, 3ct No. *((7, as
a#ended5. the #ain ai# of #otor vehicle re$istration is to identif" the o%ner
so that if an" accident happens, or that an" da#a$e or in4ur" is caused b"
the vehicle on the public hi$h%a"s, responsibilit" therefor can be fiBed on a
definite individual, the re$istered o%ner. Instances are nu#erous %here
vehicles runnin$ on public hi$h%a"s caused accidents or in4uries to
pedestrians or other vehicles %ithout positive identification of the o%ner or
drivers, or %ith ver" scant #eans of identification. It is to forestall these
circu#stances, so inconvenient or pre4udicial to the public, that the #otor
vehicle re$istration is pri#aril" obtained, in the interest of the deter#inations
of persons responsible for da#a$es or in4uries caused on public hi$h%a"s.
One of the principle purposes of #otor vehicles
le$islation is identification of the vehicle and of the
operator, in case of accident: and another is that the
-no%led$e that #eans of detection are al%a"s available
#" act as a deterrent fro# laB observance of the la%
and of the rules of conservative and safe operation.
Fhatever purpose there #a" be in these statutes, it is
subordinate at the last to the pri#ar" purpose of
renderin$ it certain that the violator of the la% or of the
rules of safet" shall not escape because of lac- of
#eans to discover hi#. The purpose of the statute is
th%arted, and the displa"ed nu#ber beco#es a Hshare
and delusion,H if courts %ould entertain such defenses
as that put for%ard b" appellee in this case. No
responsible person or corporation could be held liable
for the #ost outra$eous acts of ne$li$ence, if the"
should be allo%ed to pace a H#iddle#anH bet%een
the# and the public, and escape liabilit" b" the #anner
in %hich the" reco#pense their servants. ?>in$ vs.
2reha# 3uto#obile /o., Inc. ';8 S. F. 7<), 7<(.5
Fith the above polic" in #ind, the uestion that defendant,appellant poses
is1 should not the re$istered o%ner be allo%ed at the trial to prove %ho the
actual and real o%ner is, and in accordance %ith such proof escape or
evade responsibilit" and la" the sa#e on the person actuall" o%nin$ the
vehicleG Fe hold %ith the trial court that the la% does not allo% hi# to do
so: the la%, %ith its ai# and polic" in #ind, does not relieve hi# directl" of
the responsibilit" that the la% fiBes and places upon hi# as an incident or
conseuence of re$istration. Fere a re$istered o%ner allo%ed to evade
responsibilit" b" provin$ %ho the supposed transferee or o%ner is, it %ould
be eas" for hi#, b" collusion %ith others or other%ise, to escape said
responsibilit" and transfer the sa#e to an indefinite person, or to one %ho
possesses no propert" %ith %hich to respond financiall" for the da#a$e or
in4ur" done. 3 victi# of rec-lessness on the public hi$h%a"s is usuall"
%ithout #eans to discover or Identif" the person actuall" causin$ the in4ur"
or da#a$e. He has no #eans other then b" a recourse to the re$istration in
the Motor Vehicles Office to deter#ine %ho is the o%ner. The protection that
the la% ai#s to eBtend to hi# %ould beco#e illusor" %ere the re$istered
o%ner $iven the opportunit" to escape liabilit" b" disprovin$ his o%nership.
If the polic" of the la% is to be enforced and carried out, the re$istered
o%ner should not be allo%ed to prove the contrar" to the pre4udice of the
person in4ured, that is, to prove that a third person or another has beco#e
the o%ner, so that he #a" thereb" be relieved of the responsibilit" to the
in4ured person.
The above polic" and application of the la% #a" appear uite harsh and
%ould see# to conflict %ith truth and 4ustice. Fe do not thin- it is so. 3
re$istered o%ner %ho has alread" sold or transferred a vehicle has the
recourse to a third,part" co#plaint, in the sa#e action brou$ht a$ainst hi#
to recover for the da#a$e or in4ur" done, a$ainst the vendee or transferee
of the vehicle. The inconvenience of the suit is no 4ustification for relievin$
hi# of liabilit": said inconvenience is the price he pa"s for failure to co#pl"
%ith the re$istration that the la% de#ands and reuires.
In s"nthesis, %e hold that the re$istered o%ner, the defendant,appellant
herein, is pri#aril" responsible for the da#a$e caused to the vehicle of the
plaintiff,appellee, but he ?defendant,appellant5 has a ri$ht to be inde#nified
b" the real or actual o%ner of the a#ount that he #a" be reuired to pa" as
da#a$e for the in4ur" caused to the plaintiff,appellant.
If the fore$oin$ %ords of %isdo# %ere applied in solvin$ the circu#stance %hereof the vehicle
had been alienated or sold to another, there certainl" can be no serious eBception a$ainst
utili+in$ the sa#e rationale to the antecedents of this case %here the sub4ect vehicle %as #erel"
leased b" petitioner to Roc- /o#ponent Philippines, Inc., %ith petitioner retainin$ o%nership
over the vehicle.
Petitioner!s reliance on the rulin$ of this /ourt in Duavit vs. Court of Appeals and in Duquillo vs.
Bayot ?supra5 is le$all" unpalatable for the purpose of the present discourse. The vehicles
adverted to in the t%o cases shared a co##on thread, so to spea-, in that the 4eep and the truc-
%ere driven in rec-less fashion %ithout the consent or -no%led$e of the respective o%ners.
/o$ni+ant of the inculpator" testi#on" spe%ed b" defendant Sabiniano %hen he ad#itted that
he too- the 4eep fro# the $ara$e of defendant Dauvit %ithout the consent or authorit" of the
latter, @ustice =utierre+, @r. in Duavit re#ar-ed:
. . . Herein petitioner does not den" o%nership of the vehicle involved in the
#ishap but co#pletel" denies havin$ e#plo"ed the driver Sabiniano or
even havin$ authori+ed the latter to drive his 4eep. The 4eep %as virtuall"
stolen fro# the petitioner!s $ara$e. To hold, therefore, the petitioner liable
for the accident caused b" the ne$li$ence of Sabiniano %ho %as neither his
driver nor e#plo"ee %ould be absurd as it %ould be li-e holdin$ liable the
o%ner of a stolen vehicle for an accident caused b" the person %ho stole
such vehicle. In this re$ard, %e cannot i$nore the #an" cases of vehicles
forcibl" ta-en fro# their o%ners at $unpoint or stolen fro# $ara$es and
par-in$ areas and the instances of service station attendants or #echanics
of auto repair shops usin$, %ithout the o%ner!s consent, vehicles entrusted
to the# for servicin$ or repair.?at p. ;(&.5
In the Duquillo case, the defendant therein cannot, accordin$ to @ustice Dia+, be held liable for
an"thin$ because of circu#stances %hich indicated that the truc- %as driven %ithout the
consent or -no%led$e of the o%ner thereof.
/onseuentl", there is no need for 0s to discuss the #atter of i#puted ne$li$ence because
petitioner #erel" presu#ed, erroneousl", ho%ever, that 4ud$#ent %as rendered a$ainst it on the
basis of such doctrine e#bodied under 3rticle 7')9 of the ne% /ivil /ode.
FHARACORA, the petition is hereb" DISMISSAD and decision under revie% 3CCIRMAD
%ithout special pronounce#ent as to costs.
SO ORDARAD.