GEK 75512k

Revised October 2006

GE Energy
Generator Protection
These instructions do not purport to cover all details or variations in equipment nor to provide for
every possible contingency to be met in connection with installation, operation or maintenance. Should
further information be desired or should particular problems arise which are not covered sufficiently for
the purchaser's purposes the matter should be referred to the GE Company.
2006 General Electric Company
GEK 75512k Generator Protection
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION.......................................................................................................................... 3
A. Standards .................................................................................................................................. 3
B. Protection Responsibility ......................................................................................................... 3
C. Protection Equipment............................................................................................................... 4
II. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OPERATION, PROTECTION AND ALARMS .................... 5
A. Operation and Protection.......................................................................................................... 5
B. Protection and Alarms.............................................................................................................. 5
III. ALARMS ........................................................................................................................................ 5
IV. PROTECTION WHEN GENERATOR IS OFF LINE.............................................................. 6
V. TRIPPING METHODS................................................................................................................. 9
A. Protective Actions for Generator Faults................................................................................... 9
VI. PROTECTION RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................................................... 11
A. Discussion and Recommendations for Generator Faults ......................................................... 11
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1. ................................................................................................................................................ 16
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1. ALARMS................................................................................................................................. 6
Table2.SUMMARYOFGENERATORPROTECTIONRECOMMENDATIONS........................... 32
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Generator Protection GEK 75512k
I. INTRODUCTION
This instruction book insert was prepared to provide a summary of General Electric's recommendations for
protection of its cylindrical rotor synchronous generators. Since a wide variety of technology is applied to
machines of various size and rating, not all of the alarm and protection recommendations are applicable for
a given generator design. For example, references to hydrogen and stator water cooling systems are not
applicable to air cooled machines. The alarm and protection sections are sequenced so that recommenda-
tions which are generally applicable appear first, ones related to hydrogen systems next, and finally stator
water cooling system alarms and protection. Recommendations for excitation system protection are not
included, but are covered in separate instructions.
This instruction book discusses the kinds of protection that are desirable, and the action that is believed to
be best for the needed protection. Specific relays and relay circuits are not discussed.
A. Standards
General Electric turbine-generators are designed and built to meet or surpass applicable industry ac-
cepted standards. For the cylindrical rotor synchronous generators covered by these instructions, these
standards are:
1. ANSI C50.10
General Requirements for Synchronous Machines
2. ANSI C50.13
Requirements for Cylindrical Rotor Synchronous Generator
3. ANSI C50.14
Requirements for Cylindrical Rotor Synchronous Generators
4. ANSI C50.15
Requirements for Gas Turbine Driven Synchronous Machines
5. CEI/IEC 34-1
Rotating Electrical Machines - Rating and Performance
6. CEI/IEC 34-3
Rotating Electrical Machines - Specific requirements for turbine-type synchronous machines
B. Protection Responsibility
There are IEEE Standards covering generator protection which provide guidance material on generator
protective relaying. These include:
1. ANSI/IEEE C37.101
IEEE Guide for Generator Ground Protection
2. ANSI/IEEE C37.102
IEEE Guide for AC Generator Protection
3. ANSI/IEEE C37.106
IEEE Guide for Abnormal Frequency Protection for Power Generating Plants
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GEK 75512k Generator Protection
There are two IEEE Press Books which provide a useful anthology of the background material related
to generator protection. These are:
1. IEEE Press Book - Protective Relaying for Power Systems: Volume 1, 1980
2. IEEE Press Book - Protective Relaying for Power Systems: Volume 2, 1992.
Another useful reference is the IEEE Buff Book from the color series - ANSI/IEEE Std 242 - Protection
and Coordination of Industrial and Commercial Power Systems.
The operating limits specified by the manufacturer may be inadvertently exceeded for a number of
reasons. These include, among others:
internal generator failure
auxiliary equipment failure
operator error
abnormal system conditions
The protection methods and equipment in place should be able to safely protect the generator no matter
which of these circumstances, or combination of them, causes the abnormal operation.
Since protective relays and other devices are not immune to failure, it is recommended that considera-
tion be given to providing back-up protection for those faults where a device failure could subject the
generator to serious damage.
Generator protection is a large and complex subject. These instructions were written to provide infor-
mation on protection, based on our experience as designers and manufacturers, that may not always be
readily available in other forms.
The recommendations contained in these instructions are based on the best available information at the
time of publication. Changes in the state of the art may result in modification of these recommenda-
tions. Such modifications will usually be communicated to all owners of affected turbine-generators
throughGeneralElectric,TechnicalInformationLetter(TIL)series. These modifications will be
incorporatedinperiodicrevisionstotheseinstructions.
C. Protection Equipment
It should not be assumed that any required hardware is part of the turbine-generator supplied, although
in certain cases some protection is due to special requirements or it is integrated into the excitation or
control system.
In either case, it is the owner's or his designate's responsibility to check, adjust, calibrate and connect all
protective equipment to suitable tripping relays or circuits in order to provide the intended protection.
The manufacture should be consulted for specific protection application issues or concerns.
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Generator Protection GEK 75512k
II. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OPERATION, PROTECTION AND ALARMS
A. Operation and Protection
The line between generator operation and protection is not always clear and there is inevitably an area
of overlap. These instructions cover those functions that are mainly performed by protective relaying
or similar devices or functions. A companion instruction (Ref. 1) covers those aspects of generator
operation that are mainly under control of an operator and/or electronic turbine-generator controller.
Both of these publications should be consulted during plant design and should be used in conjunction
with other parts of the instruction book for proper operation of the turbine-generator.
B. Protection and Alarms
Those protective relays or devices that trip the generator should alert an operator as to the cause of any
trip, and be able to take direct action if this should prove necessary. In addition to the tripping relays
there are other relays or devices that initiate only an alarm or data logging. In these cases it becomes
an operator's responsibility to decide what corrective action is required and to take it.
III. ALARMS
Many of the alarm only devices are for temperature measurement. These are Resistance Temperature
Detectors (RTDs) and Thermocouples (TCs). Some measure other variables such as hydrogen pressure
and purity, and stator cooling water pressure, flow and conductivity (if applicable). A typical list of alarm
devices furnished with the generator is given in Table 1, including recommended alarm points and signal
ranges. If additional special instrumentation is supplied, alarm settings will be specified in the appropriate
section of the instruction book.
Table 1 contains information which may be useful when specifying signal monitoring or recording equip-
ment.
The table also includes typical ranges of the variable for each of the devices shown. These ranges do not
represent the actual capabilities of the generator or its auxiliary equipment and should not be used in any
way as a guide for operation.
When a protective device or function signals a trip, or when the operator trips the unit because of an alarm
or other indication of malfunction, it is most important that the cause of the problem be determined and
corrected before attempting to restart or resynchronize. Failure to do so may lead to more serious troubles.
IV. PROTECTION WHEN GENERATOR IS OFF LINE
The need for protecting a generator while on line is well known, but the need when off line may not be as
well understood. Nevertheless, there are circumstances under which a generator could be damaged while
off line.
For this reason, it is recommended that, as a general rule, all alarms and protections be kept operative at
all times. Exceptions to this rule are those protections which would mis-operate or give false signals when
the unit is below rated speed, not excited, or not synchronized. Relaying and interlocking circuitry that
operates when the unit is off line should be reviewed to make certain it does not inadvertently incapacitate
any essential protection.
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GEK 75512k Generator Protection
Table 1. ALARMS
SIGNAL DEVICE RANGE SETTING NOTES
MACHINE TEMPERATURES
GENERATOR WITH
BRUSHLESS EXCITER
BRUSHLESS EXCITER RTD -20 to 80C Generator Cold
Gas +40C
Check Ventilation
GENERATOR WITH STATIC
EXCITATION
COLLECTOR AIR IN RTD or TC -30 to 70C 45C In: Check Filters
COLLECTOR AIR OUT RTD or TC -20 to 80C AIR IN + 20C Out: Check Ventilation
GENERATOR FIELD TRANSDUCER 0 to 150C Reduce field current by
adj. MVAR load.
STATOR COIL (SLOT) RTD 0 to 100C for H
2
O See Ref. 2
0 to 150C for H
2
and
Air
OTHER ALARMS
BEARING VIBRATION VIBRATION DETECTOR --- --- See Recommendation in
this publication.
BEARING OIL TEMP HIGH - --- --- See Turbine Section of
Instruction Book
NEGATIVE SEQUENCE
CURRENT
RELAY --- --- Balance or reduce load.
See Recommendation for
Unbalanced Armature
Currents.
GENERATOR OVERVOLTAGE RELAY --- Over 1.05 pu
voltage
Reduce machine voltage.
AIR COOLING (if applicable)
COLD AIR RTD -30 to 70C
HOT AIR RTD -10 to 90C
LOCAL OVERHEATING (if
applicable)
CORE MONITOR LEVEL (if
applicable)
CORE MONITOR --- --- See Recommend. for
Local Overheating.
MACHINE HEATING (if
applicable)
SIGNAL VALIDATION
DEVICE
--- --- See Recommend. for
Local Overheating.
@From operating pressure
Two switches
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Generator Protection GEK 75512k
Table 1. ALARMS (Cont'd)
SIGNAL DEVICE RANGE SETTING NOTES
SEAL OIL SYSTEM (if applic.)
DIFF SEAL OIL PRESSURE
LOW
DIFF. PRESSURE
SWITCH
--- 3 psid
[20.7 kPa]
[211 g/cm
2
]
See Ref. 3
DRAIN ENLARGEMENT
LIQUID DETECTOR FULL
LIQUID LEVEL
DETECTOR
--- See Ref. 3
EMERGENCY PUMP RUNNING RELAY --- See Ref. 3
FILTER DIFF. PRESSURE HIGH
(if applicable)
DIFF. PRESSURE
SWITCH
10 psid
[69 kPa
(differential)]
[703 g/cm
2
(diff.)]
See Ref. 3
VACUUM TANK OIL LEVEL
HIGH/LOW (if applicable)
FLOAT SWITCH --- +4/-6 in
[+102/-152 mm]
See Ref. 3
MAIN PUMP MOTOR
OVERLOAD (if applicable)
THERMOSTAT --- See Ref. 2
EMERGENCY PUMP MOTOR
OVERLOAD (if applicable)
THERMOSTAT --- See Ref 2
HYDROGEN GAS SYSTEM
COOLER HOT GAS TEMP HIGH RTD or TC 0100C
COOLER COLD GAS TEMP
HIGH/LOW
RTD or TC 070C
COMMON COLD GAS TEMP
HIGH (if applicable)
RTD 070C
MACHINE GAS TEMP HIGH METER RELAY 0100C See Ref. 4
MACHINE GAS PRESSURE
HIGH/LOW
PRESSURE SWITCH --- +4/-2 psi @
[+27.6/-13.8
kPa]
[+281/-14.1
g/cm
2
]
See Ref. 4
MACHINE GAS PURITY LOW METER RELAY or
TRANSMITTER
50100C
0100C
90% See Ref. 4
GENERATOR CASING LIQUID
DETECTOR FULL
LIQUID DETECTOR --- See Ref. 4
Two switches
@From operating pressure
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GEK 75512k Generator Protection
Table 1. ALARMS (Cont'd)
SIGNAL DEVICE RANGE SETTING NOTES
STATOR COOLING WATER
SYSTEM (if applicable)
INLET TEMP HIGH RTD or TC 070C 2C OVER
MAX.
See Ref. 2
INLET FLOW LOW FLOW SWITCH See Ref. 3
INLET PRESSURE LOW PRESSURE SWITCH See Ref. 3
LIQUID HEADER OUTLET
TEMP HIGH
TC 0100C See Ref. 3
BULK WATER OUTLET TEMP
HIGH
RTD 0100C See Ref. 2
CONN RING TEMP HIGH (if
separately cooled)
TC 0100C See Ref. 2
CONN RING FLOW LOW (if
separately cooled)
FLOWMETER See Ref. 3
HV BUSHING OUTLET TEMP
HIGH
TC 0100C See Ref. 2
HV BUSHING FLOW LOW FLOWMETER 3 gpm LOW
[189 ml/s]
See Ref. 3
MAIN FILTER DIFF PRESSURE
HIGH
DIFF PRESSURE
SWITCH
015 psid
[0103 kPa
(differential)]
[01.05 kg/cm
2
(diff.)]
8 psid
[55 kPa
(differential)]
[562
g/cm
2
(diff.)]
Change filter before 7 psid
[48 kPa (diff.)]
[492 g/cm
2
(diff.)]
CONDUCTIVITY HIGH TRANSDUCER 010 mho/cm
[010 S/cm]
0.5 & 9.9
mho/cm
[0.5 & 9.9
S/cm]
Change resin on first
alarm. Trip manually on
second alarm
TANK LEVEL HIGH/LOW FLOAT SWITCH --- +4/-4 inches
[+102/-102 mm]
Check main pump
RESERVE PUMP RUNNING PRESSURE SWITCH 0150 psi
[01.03 MPa]
[010.5 kg/cm
2
]
10 & 20 psi
below normal
[69 & 138
kPa][0.7 & 1.41
kg/cm
2
]
Check cause and correct
RUNBACK INITIATED RELAY NONE PRESET
Two switches
@From operating pressure
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Generator Protection GEK 75512k
V. TRIPPING METHODS
There are a number of ways a turbine-generator, or a generator alone, may be tripped, i.e., disconnected
from the system or shut down. Some of the factors that should be considered in determining what type of
trip to use for each fault requiring one are:
severity of fault to generator
probability of fault spreading
amount of overspeed resulting
probability of high overspeed
importance of removing excitation
need for maintaining auxiliary power
need for shutting down the unit
time required to resynchronize
effect on the power system
In recognition of the factors above, the manufacturer recommends an action that insures protection of the
generator. Unless otherwise noted, a protective action with a lower number than the recommended action is
allowable (see Table II). Although the lower number protective action may provide faster protection, addi-
tional danger to the turbine is incurred. These dangers include higher overspeed and worse turbine thermal
shock duty. The recommended protective actions are selected based on the manufactures judgement with
regard to providing acceptable generator protection, while minimizing unnecessarily harsh turbine duty.
The owner should select the action to be used based on the importance of the applicable factors in his case.
A. Protective Actions for Generator Faults
1. Simultaneous trip - trips the turbine valves closed, opens generator line breakers and removes
excitation simultaneously, as with a lock-out relay. A simultaneous trip is acceptable for all gen-
erator faults, and generally provides the highest degree of protection for the turbine-generator
although it does permit a small overspeed and there is a slight probability of high overspeed.
2. Generator trip - opens the generator line breakers and removes excitation simultaneously, but
leaves the turbine running near rated speed. Where maintaining speed is not harmful, this provides
as high a degree of protection for the generator as a simultaneous trip (Type 1). If the plant can
operate following a full load rejection, and if the cause of the trip can be identified and rectified
quickly, it may make resynchronization possible in a shorter time than Type 1. Since it does
result in a higher overspeed than Type 1, it should only be used when there is an advantage in not
tripping the turbine.
3. Breaker trip - trips all generator line breakers but not the excitation or the turbine. This trip has
advantages similar to the generator trip when the fault permits excitation to remain applied. Its
advantage over Type 2 is that it provides auxiliary power in cases where this cannot be switched
to another bus. If this is not an advantage, Types 2 or 1 should be used.
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GEK 75512k Generator Protection
4. Sequential trip - trips the turbine first. When the turbine inlet valve limit switches indicate the
valves are closed, and the recommended reverse power relay (or function) operates, normally
after a three-second delay, the generator line breakers are tripped. Opening of the breakers then
trips excitation. This trip should prevent any overspeed and thus is preferred whenever the risk
from a three-second delay in tripping the generator is slight. It is also preferred for most faults
in the turbine or steam generator. Its disadvantage is that certain multiple limit-switch failures,
or a reverse power relay failure, would prevent completing the trip. Although this probability is
small, a second reverse power relay, with a 10 to 30 second time delay, connected to produce a
Type 1 simultaneous trip, is recommended as a back-up. This back-up relay also serves as the
primary protection for motoring which does not occur as part of a sequential trip.
5. Manual trip - turbine is tripped manually. When generator power reverses, reverse power relay
trips generator line breakers. Breaker opening trips excitation. This trip is recommended when-
ever an operator sees the need for a fault trip and is not certain that a runback and trip (Type 6)
will be fast enough. Note that Type 5 is actually a manually initiated sequential trip.
NOTE
There are no cases for which manually tripping the generator breakers is recom-
mended. This is because the generator breakers should not normally be tripped
until after the turbine has been tripped and power has reversed. Then the gener-
ator breakers should be automatically tripped by the reverse power relay. A pro-
tected bypass switch may be used to permit manually tripping the generator alone
in case of limit-switch or reverse power relay failure. A manual generator breaker
trip should only be used with full recognition of the risk involved.
6. Manual runback and trip - manually decreases turbine output to low level or to zero, followed
by the turbine (sequential) trip. This is the normal trip, which is preferred for all normal shut-
downs. It is also recommended for trips required by alarms when the operator judges a Type 5
manual trip is not essential.
7. Automatic runback - reduces load (via turbine control) at a preset rate to a preset load. It is
recommended here only for loss of stator coolant (if required). It is an alternative to tripping the
unit, and permits continuing on line at a very low load. When it can be used, it has the advantage
of enabling earlier return to full load if the trouble can be quickly corrected.
8. Manual runback - manually reduces load at a rate and to a level determined by operator. This is
useful for some faults which may be load sensitive, such as local overheating, and where there is
no need to trip immediately. It also allows the generator to continue to supply reactive power to
the system.
The recommendations in these instructions are intended to provide the best balanced protection for
the turbine-generator for generator faults. Unusual circumstances or other plant limitations must be
considered by the owner, and may require different actions. Turbine problems should be handled in
accordance with applicable turbine instructions.
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Generator Protection GEK 75512k
VI. PROTECTION RECOMMENDATIONS
The remainder of this instruction book comprises discussions of, and detailed recommendations for, each
of the faults listed in the table of contents, and summarized in Table II.
References are listed at the end of the book.
A. Discussion and Recommendations for Generator Faults
1. Stator Overcurrent
1. Description
Generators are designed to operate continuously at rated kVA, frequency and power factor
over a range of 95 to 105% of rated voltage. Operation beyond rated kVA may result in
harmful stator overcurrent. Note that at rated kVA, 95% voltage, stator current will be 105%.
This is permissible.
Normally, generator load is under the control of an operator. Situations can arise during sys-
tem disturbances, such as accompanying generator or line tripouts, which can result in an
overcurrent condition.
For short times, it is permissible to exceed the current corresponding to rated kVA. This ca-
pability is specified in ANSI Standard C50.13 as follows:
Time (seconds) 10 30 60 120
Armature current (percent) 226 154 130 116
2. Detection
Stator current should be monitored by an operator, and kept within rated value by adjustment
of the turbine-generator controls.
A consequence of overcurrent is stator winding overheating, which should be detected by
winding temperature detectors, usually TCs measuring stator cooling water temperature,
and/or RTD's in slots with the stator winding (if applicable). All functioning TCs and
RTDs should be continuously monitored and alarmed (see Ref. 1, and 2&3 for H
2
0 cooled
machines). However, even though it may not result in excessive stator winding temperatures,
operating above specified currents is not an acceptable practice since unmonitored phe-
nomena, such as temperatures in other parts of the stator circuit, winding forces, abnormal
magnetic fields, etc., may become excessive.
3. Recommendation
Automatic tripping is not provided for protection against stator overcurrent. However, all
operators should be made aware of the importance of operating the generator within its rated
capability. In cases when a generator will operate in an unattended station, some form of
overcurrent (overload) protection should be provided. An alternative is stator overtempera-
ture which provides similar protection. For additional information, see Ref. 1.
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GEK 75512k Generator Protection
2. Stator Ground Fault
1. Description
The generator stator neutral normally operates at a potential close to ground, generally
through a high impedance grounding transformer/resistor. In some cases a reactor is used
in a resonant grounding arrangement. Should a phase winding or any equipment connected
to it fault to ground, the normally low neutral voltage could rise as high as line-to-neutral
voltage, depending on fault location.
Although a single ground fault will not necessarily cause immediate damage, the presence of
one increases the probability of a second. This is because the occurrence of such a fault is
probably the result of damage which is not confined to one spot. In fact, the existence of a
ground fault through tough, high-voltage insulation is usually a result of another, potentially
catastrophic, trouble. Asecond fault, even if detected by differential relays, may cause serious
damage. Asecond fault in the same phase will not be detected by differential relays, and could
cause serious damage as a result.
2. Detection
The usual method of detection is by a voltage relay across the grounding resistor. A current
relay is sometimes used in place of a voltage relay or as a back-up. The relay should be
insensitive to third harmonic voltage, but should have as low a pick-up level at line frequency
as is practical to reduce the unprotected zone at the neutral end of the windings. Methods
are available which are designed to protect the entire winding. These schemes make use of
the relationship of third harmonic voltages at the line and neutral terminals of the generator.
These schemes supplement the fundamental frequency protection.
3. Recommendations
The grounding impedance should limit the ground fault current to less than 25 amperes. The
usual criterion based on circuit capacitance will normally result in less than 10 amperes. The
stator ground fault relay should be connected to trip the unit within several seconds, using a
simultaneous trip, Type 1.
For further information, see Ref. 5.
3. Stator Phase-to-Phase Fault
1. Description
A stator phase-to-phase fault is any electrical fault between two phases of the armature wind-
ing. This type of fault is very serious because very large currents can flow and produce large
amounts of damage to the winding if allowed to persist. Because of the nature of the con-
struction of the armature it is very likely that this type of fault will grow to include ground,
thereby causing significant damage to the stator core.
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Generator Protection GEK 75512k
2. Detection
It is possible to detect a phase-to-phase fault in the winding by means of a differential relay.
This method provides protection for the entire winding, and its sensitivity is limited mainly
by the degree to which the various current transformers are matched.
The differential relay method cannot protect against a fault within one phase of the winding.
Such a turn-to-turn fault can only be detected by the resulting armature current unbalance.
However, such faults are rare and will usually include ground, in which case they will be
detected by the stator ground fault relay.
3. Recommendations
Upon detection of a phase-to-phase fault in the winding, it is imperative that the unit be tripped
without delay, using a simultaneous (Type 1) trip.
4. Over-Voltage
1. Description
Permissible voltage limits under various operating conditions are given in the Generator Op-
eration instructions (Ref. 1). It is normally an operator's responsibility to maintain voltage
(and the corresponding kVA) within specified limits.
With turbine-generators it is unlikely that voltage will depart significantly from the preset
value. If it does, due to a regulator failure or a system disturbance, a trip signal will usually
be produced by one of the protective relays, such as volts/Hertz or maximum excitation limit.
2. Recommended Action
Therefore, specific over-voltage protection is generally not required for the generator. De-
pending on the circumstances, it may be desirable to protect other equipment connected to the
generator. For unmanned generating stations, consideration should by given to implementing
automatic overvoltage protection. For additional information, see Ref. 1.
5. Volts Per Hertz
1. Description
Per unit voltage divided by per unit frequency, commonly called volts/Hertz, is a readily
measurable quantity that is proportional to flux in the generator and step-up transformer cores.
Moderate overfluxing (105%110%) increases core loss, elevating core temperatures for all
generator designs and armature temperatures for generators with conventionally cooled stator
windings. Long term operation at elevated temperatures can shorten the life of the stator
insulation systems. More severe overfluxing (above 110%) further increases core loss, and
saturates portions of the core to the point that flux flows out into adjacent structures. The
resulting induced voltages can be coupled to stator punchings due to the manner in which
cores are assembled and clamped. Severe overfluxing can breakdown interlaminar insulation,
followed by rapid local core melting.
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GEK 75512k Generator Protection
Over-volts/Hertz can be caused by regulator failure, load rejection while under control of the
dc regulator, or excessive excitation with the generator off line.
It can also result from decreasing speed while the ac regulator or the operator attempts to
maintain rated stator voltage.
2. Detection
Volts per Hertz is calculated in a static circuit incorporated in a volts/Hertz relay or sensor.
Timing circuits are also incorporated. The volts/Hertz sensor is normally included as part of
the excitation system.
3. Recommendation
Even though over-volts/Hertz is more likely to occur when off line, it can also occur when on
line. For this reason the volts/Hertz protection should be in operation whenever excitation is
applied.
Refer to Figure 1 for a graphical representation of the recommended V/Hz protection.
In view of the potential consequences it is prudent to provide as conservative protection as
possible consistent with security from false tripping. Selection of a modest maximum trip
level of above 118%, coupled with a 2 second time delay satisfies these objectives. A load
rejection from full rated KVA, rated power factor and 105% of rated voltage will not result
in tripping if an automatic voltage regulator is in service. Operation at 118% should be lim-
ited not to exceed 45 seconds. The curve shape from 118 to 110% V/Hz approximates the
overexcitation capability of many transformers (for stepup and station service power applica-
tions). However if the transformers require lower values, the protective relays should be set
accordingly. Continuous operation above 105% V/Hz is not sanctioned and an alarm func-
tion should be provided to alert the operator that corrective action is needed. The excitation
control limiter (if applicable) should be set to prevent continuous operation above 109%.
The trip signal should produce a simultaneous trip, Type 1, or a generator trip, Type 2.
6. Field Overexcitation
1. Description
The generator field winding is designed to operate continuously at a current equal to that
required to produce rated kVA at rated conditions. In addition, higher currents are permitted
for short times, to permit field forcing during transient conditions. These limits are specified
in terms of a curve of field voltage vs. time defined by the following points in ANSI Standard
C50.13-1977:
Time (seconds) 10 30 60 120
Field voltage (percent) 208 146 125 112
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Generator Protection GEK 75512k
2. Detection
Most excitation systems now being furnished include a Maximum Excitation Limit function.
Its purpose is to prevent prolonged field overcurrent by recalibrating the current regulator,
transferring to another regulator, and, finally, producing a trip signal, as required.
3. Recommendation
The owner's responsibility with respect to this function is to see that the Maximum Excitation
Limit is properly adjusted and maintained, and properly connected to trip the unit when re-
quired. Protection Type 4, sequential trip, or Type 1, simultaneous trip, is recommended. For
high response exciters, a Type 1 trip may be required to avoid rapid overheating of the field
should the exciter stay at ceiling for an extended period of time. In such cases a sequential
trip would take too long.
Since loss of potential transformer signal to the voltage regulator is one cause of field overcur-
rent, relaying to detect this situation and automatic transfer to another regulator is suggested.
Sensing and transfer functions are part of most modern excitation systems.
7. Field Ground
1. Description
The generator field winding is electrically isolated from ground. Therefore the existence of
one ground fault in the winding will usually not damage the rotor. However, the presence
of two or more grounds in the winding will cause magnetic and thermal imbalances plus lo-
calized heating and damage to the rotor forging or other metallic parts. Unfortunately, the
presence of the first ground fault makes detection of a second fault difficult, if not impossi-
ble. In addition, modern rotor winding insulation systems have achieved a level of quality
that reduces the likelihood of a field ground except under unusual circumstances where the
probability of occurrence of a second ground or other serious problem is high.
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GEK 75512k Generator Protection
Figure 1.
2. Detection
The relay necessary to detect a field ground is normally supplied with the excitation system.
3. Recommendation
It is recommended that the field ground detector be connected to produce a sequential trip,
Type 4. Alternatively, a runback, Type 6, or simultaneous trip, Type 1, may be used.
8. Loss of Excitation
1. Description
Loss of excitation (or loss of field) results in loss of synchronism and operation of the gen-
erator as an induction machine. This will result in the flow of slip frequency currents in
the rotor body, wedges, and amortisseur windings (if so equipped), as well as severe torque
oscillations in the rotor shaft. The rotor is not designed to sustain such currents, nor is the
turbine-generator shaft designed to long withstand the alternating torques. The result can be
rotor overheating, coupling slippage and even rotor failure. The length of time before serious
damage occurs depends on the generator load at the time of the incident, slip frequency, and
whether the field winding is open circuited or shorted, and may be a matter of seconds.
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Generator Protection GEK 75512k
Aloss of excitation normally indicates a problemwith the excitation systemwhich, depending
on its nature, could be serious (e.g., collector ring flashover, if so equipped). Because of the
VARs absorbed to make up for the low or lost excitation, some systems cannot tolerate the
continued operation of a generator without excitation. Consequently, if the generator is not
disconnected immediately when it loses excitation, widespread instability may very quickly
develop, and major system shut-down may occur.
2. Detection
Since loss of excitation results in a marked change in reactive kVA, a loss of excitation relay
of the impedance or mho type is usually used (Ref. 6).
3. Recommendation
The generator should be tripped from the power system, using a simultaneous trip (Type 1),
or a generator trip (Type 2). It is important that all excitation power be removed. It should
not be assumed that, since there is loss of excitation, the exciter is not supplying power to an
internal fault.
9. Unbalanced Armature Currents
1. Description
When the generator is supplying an unbalanced load, the phase currents and terminal volt-
ages deviate from the ideal balanced relationship, and a negative phase sequence armature
current (I
2
) is imposed on the generator. The negative sequence current in the armature wind-
ing creates a magnetic flux wave in the air gap which rotates in opposition to the rotor at
synchronous speed. This flux induces currents in the rotor body iron, wedges, retaining rings
and amortisseur windings, if so equipped, at twice the line frequency. Heating occurs in these
areas and the resulting temperatures depend upon the level and duration of the unbalanced
currents. Under some conditions, it is possible to reach temperatures at which the rotor ma-
terials no longer contain the centrifugal forces imposed on them, resulting in serious damage
to the turbine-generator set (Ref. 11).
There is always some low level unbalance in any power system and therefore limits on the
continuous unbalance have been established. For currents above the permissible continuous
levels, a limit on the time-integral of I
2
2
has been established for times up to 120 seconds.
Such levels will often result from faults, open lines or breaker failures.
Unless otherwise specified by the manufacturer as part of the generator design data informa-
tion, the negative sequence current limits are given in the applicable standards (Ref 31 or Ref
32), where I
2
is the per unit negative sequence current on the generator base and t is the time
in seconds. See Ref 1 for further comments on unbalanced loading capability.
2. Detection
The protection scheme should be designed such that it will permit negative sequence currents
up to the continuous limit, but produce a trip signal if the level exceeds this value long enough
to reach the permissible I
2
2
t limit (Ref 13).
17
GEK 75512k Generator Protection
It is also desirable to alert an operator when I
2
exceeds a normal level, which may be lower
than the permissible continuous negative sequence current. This enables him to adjust load
in order to prevent a trip. Ref. 1 describes in more detail the actions an operator may take.
3. Recommendations
A negative sequence relay, similar to that described above, should be used on all units. It
should be arranged to cause a breaker trip, Type 3, generator trip, Type 2, or a simultaneous
trip, Type 1.
10. Loss of Synchronism
1. Description
Loss of synchronism, also referred to as out-of-step operation or pole slipping, can occur as
a result of steady-state transient or dynamic instability. It also may occur as a result of loss
of excitation or synchronizing errors.
2. Detection
The majority of users do not apply specific loss-of-synchronization relaying. However, a
skilled relay engineer can adjust impedance relaying to reliably detect loss of synchronism.
Loss of excitation relays may provide detection, but cannot be relied upon under all condi-
tions. If the electrical center during loss of synchronism is in the transmission system, line
relays may detect it. If they do not, specific relaying should be provided.
3. Recommendation
Out-of-step operation can result in pulsating torques and winding stresses and high rotor iron
currents that are potentially damaging to the generator. Excessive stator winding and core
end heating can also result if the out-of-step operation is caused by reduced or lost excitation.
Therefore, it is recommended that the generator be separated from the system without delay,
preferably during the first slip cycle (Ref. 14, 26, 27.). A breaker trip, Type 3, is recom-
mended, and permits the fastest resynchronization after conditions have stabilized.
11. Abnormal Frequency Operation
1. Description
For a generator connected to a power system, abnormal frequency operation is a result of
a severe system disturbance. An isolated or unconnected unit could operate at low or high
frequency due to improper speed control adjustment or misoperation of the speed control.
There are two effects to be considered. The generator can tolerate underfrequency operation
for long periods, provided load and voltage are sufficiently reduced, as explained in Generator
Operation instructions (Ref. 1).
The generator can also tolerate overfrequency operation provided voltage is within an accept-
able range.
18
Generator Protection GEK 75512k
2. Recommendation
For the generator, specific protection for abnormal frequency operation is not required. How-
ever, the turbine is very sensitive to abnormal frequencies and recommendations given for it
should be carefully studied and followed (Ref. 24, 25). Detection of abnormal frequency
operation may also be used to identify system problems.
Refer unusual frequency operation questions to the GE company for recommendations.
12. Breaker Failure
1. Description
Since most faults involving the generator require tripping of the generator/line breakers, fail-
ure of any of them to open properly results in loss of protection and/or other problems, such
as motoring. If one or two poles of a generator line breaker fail to open, the result can be a
single-phase load on the generator and negative sequence currents on the rotor.
2. Detection
Both types of failure described above will cause conditions that may be detected by other pro-
tective devices, e.g., reverse power, loss of synchronism or negative sequence relays. How-
ever, a more direct method is the use of Breaker Failure Protection (BFP) which is energized
when the breaker trip is initiated. After a suitable time interval, if confirmation of breaker
tripping in all three lines is not received, a signal is generated.
3. Recommendation
Industry past practice has not always recognized the need for breaker failure protection be-
cause of the reliability of line breakers. However, it is recommended that BFP be used with
all tripping relays that can trip a generator line breaker. The BFP signal should trip all line
breakers that can feed current to the generator through the failed breaker (Ref. 15).
13. System Back-Up
1. Description
System back-up protection is also known as external fault back-up protection. As this name
implies, it is used to protect the generator from supplying short circuit current to a fault in an
adjacent system element because of a primary relaying failure (Ref. 15, 16).
2. Detection
Either voltage restrained or current restrained inverse-time overcurrent or distance relays may
be used, depending on the kind of relaying with which the back-up relays must be selective.
Negative sequence relays, in addition to their primary protective role, are sometimes con-
sidered for system back-up protection. However, these will not provide protection against
balanced faults.
19
GEK 75512k Generator Protection
3. Recommendation
System back-up protection is recommended. A breaker trip Type 3 is recommended, which
permits the fastest resynchronization after the system fault has been cleared. In Steam tur-
bines, if immediate resynchronization is not a priority, a type 1 trip may be considered to trip
the turbine, exciter and generator breaker simultaneously.
14. Voltage Surges
1. Description
Certain abnormal conditions could occur which might subject the generator to high voltages
surges. Among these are:
Switching surges from circuit breakers at generator voltage
Positive and negative surges arriving simultaneously on two phases
Ineffective direct stroke shielding
Failure of high side surge protective equipment
Accidental connection between high and low side transformer windings, due to internal
failure, external flashover or other cause
The latter category is not a normal protective function of lowvoltage arrestors and would sub-
ject them to excessive duty which could cause their failure. In view of the potential personnel
hazard in the event of surge arrestor failure, the user should consider physically isolating the
surge arrestor cubicles and limiting access to them.
2. Recommendation
To provide protection for these and similar situations, surge arrestors are recommended for all
units. Surge capacitors are generally not required for machines with single-turn coils. They
are provided on some packaged generators where optional installation of surge capacitors
close to the surge arrestors would not be convenient. Application of LCI (load commutated
inverters) for turbine-generator starting may also obviate the use of surge capacitors on multi-
turn coil machines.
Optimal protection requires surge protection be located in close proximity to the generator
terminals.
15. Transmission Line Switching
1. Description
The switching of transmission lines at or near generating stations for maintenance purposes,
or simply restoring a line to service after a relayed tripout, are recognized as normal functions
in the course of operating a power system. In some cases these line switching operations can
subject nearby generating units to excessive duty. The effect on the generator in severe cases
20
Generator Protection GEK 75512k
is the same as for poor synchronizing in causing possible stator winding and shaft fatigue
damage (Ref. 7).
2. Detection
A measure of the severity of a switching event is the sudden step change in power (P) seen
by the generator at the instant of switching. As a general guide, studies have shown that where
P does not exceed 0.5 per unit on the generator kVA base the duty will be negligible (Ref.
17, 18). Values of P greater than 0.5 per unit may be determined to be non-harmful to the
generator, for specific units and system switching events, but these cases should be carefully
studied and identified.
Predetermination of duties associated with line-switching operations and operating proce-
dures which limit these duties to acceptable values can be found from simulating these op-
erations, using a computer program such as that normally used for stability studies (Ref. 17,
18).
3. Recommendation
The recommended procedure for avoiding excessive duty for the normal planned line-switch-
ing operation is to establish, where necessary, operating procedures which limit the machine
P to either the general 0.5 per unit level or an individually determined level for that unit.
As an adjunct to established operating procedures, phase angle check relays at key breaker
locations can prevent line closings under circumstances predetermined to be excessive. Note,
however, that such check relays should not be applied without reliable means of overriding
which would permit necessary line closing operations under emergency circumstances.
16. High Speed Reclosing
1. Description
High speed reclosing of transmission circuits directly out of generating stations or electrically
close to the station may cause significant shaft fatigue damage to the turbine-generator unit,
particularly where high speed reclosing following severe multi-phase faults is permitted (Ref.
7, 19). The actual fatigue duty which a unit may experience during its lifetime from this
cause depends on many factors, including both the unit's and the system's characteristics, the
frequency of fault occurrence, etc. Studies substantiate that significant shaft damage could
occur with unsuccessful reclosing for close-in three-phase faults.
2. Recommendation
In order to eliminate or reduce the potential effects of unrestricted high speed reclosing of
lines near generating stations, an alternative reclosing practice such as one of the following
is recommended:
Delayed reclosing, with a delay of 10 seconds or longer.
Sequential reclosing, i.e., reclose initially only from the remote end of the line and block
closing at the station if the fault persists. This is recommended only if the remote end of
the line is not electrically near other turbine-generator units.
21
GEK 75512k Generator Protection
Selective reclosing, i.e., high speed reclosing only for the less severe faults such as single
line-to-ground; delayed reclosing on others. Other relaying practices providing selectiv-
ity on the basis of fault severity would also be effective in reducing shaft fatigue duty.
Where such alternative reclosing practices are not considered acceptable to the user, it is
recommended that either:
a. Detailed studies be performed to determine the probable lifetime fatigue damage which
might be experienced for the reclosing practice contemplated, or
b. Torsional monitoring equipment be installed to determine the accumulated fatigue dam-
age being incurred.
17. Subsynchronous Resonance (SSR)
1. Description
When a turbine-generator is connected to a transmission network that has series capacitor
compensation or a high voltage dc (HVDC) transmission system, it is possible to develop
subsynchronous (under line frequency) current oscillations in the lines and in the genera-
tor armature. In the case of series compensated ac systems, these currents interact with the
synchronously rotating flux to produce torque pulsation on the generator rotor. If these pul-
sations are at a frequency close to one of the torsional natural frequencies of the turbine-gen-
erator, high levels of torsional vibration can be induced in the shafts. Torsional instability
of the turbine-generator shaft system has the potential for being extremely damaging to the
turbine-generator shafts, and resulted in two shaft failures in the early 1970s. A more re-
cently observed phenomenon involves interaction between torsional modes and HVDC con-
trols (Ref. 28). This could lead to an unstable situation, resulting in spontaneous growth of
torsional vibrations and potential damage to the shaft.
2. Detection
Unstable or high levels of torsional vibration may be detected by observing the variations in
angular velocity of the turbine-generator. A common measuring system involves a toothed
wheel, a magnetic pickup and a frequency demodulator. Strain gauge telemetry systems have
also been utilized in short-term tests to detect shaft torsional oscillations. Indirect methods
of identifying subsynchronous resonance steady-state instability problems involve monitor-
ing generator electrical terminal quantities. The armature current relay described in Ref. 20
utilizes this approach.
3. Responsibility for Detection
It should be understood by those utilities that utilize series capacitor compensation, or have
HVDC transmission in their system, that the potential for damaging torsional vibrations is a
consequence of the special electrical characteristics of the transmission network. It is, there-
fore, the owner's responsibility to implement devices to detect, and protect the machine from,
the influences of subsynchronous torsional interaction. In the case of HVDC transmission
lines, the potential for interaction between the HVDC controls and the turbine-generator ro-
tor system needs to be accounted for in HVDC control design. General Electric has worked
closely with many utilities on system studies to define the requirements for protective devices
22
Generator Protection GEK 75512k
on particular systems. The company has also manufactured and has in service protective de-
vices. This equipment includes (Ref. 20):
a. A static subsynchronous resonance filter (static blocking filter)
b. A supplementary excitation damping control (excitation system damper)
c. A machine frequency relay (armature current frequency relay) (Ref. 21)
d. A torsional vibration monitor (Ref. 22)
In addition, generators that are applied for use in series capacitor compensated systems or
systems containing HVDC transmission are sometimes furnished with pole-face amortisseur
windings. The addition of pole-face amortisseur windings does not necessarily enhance neg-
ative sequence capability. The function of amortisseur windings is to reduce the machine
electrical resistance in the subsynchronous frequency range, which reduces the potential for
torsional interaction at subsynchronous frequencies.
4. Recommendation
It is vital that the electric utility work closely with the manufacturer at the planning stage to
define the need for auxiliary equipment to protect the machine. This equipment, if required,
needs to be operational when the machine is first connected to the network containing series
capacitor compensated and/or HVDC transmission lines. It needs to be highly reliable, as
misoperation could result in major machine failure.
18. Inadvertent Energization
1. Description
When a generator is energized three-phase while at standstill or reduced speed, it will behave
and accelerate as an induction motor. The equivalent machine impedance during the high
slip interval can be represented by negative sequence reactance (X
2
) in series with negative
sequence resistance (R
2
). The machine terminal voltage and current during this interval will
be a function of generator, transformer and system impedances. If the generator-transformer
is connected to an infinite system, the machine currents will be high (several per unit), and
conversely, if the unit is connected to a weak system, the machine current could be low (12
per unit). During the period the machine is accelerating, high currents will be induced in the
rotor and the time to damage may be on the order of a few seconds.
NOTE
Negative sequence reactance of a steam turbine-generator is approximately equal
to the subtransient reactance X"
dv
.
Anumber of generators have been accidentally energized while at standstill or very lowspeed.
While many have survived the experience with minor damage, others have not.
23
GEK 75512k Generator Protection
2. Detection
While there are several generator zone relays that may detect this contingency, their perfor-
mance may be marginal. Therefore, the preferred approach is to provide detection means
specifically designed for this purpose.
One such method is to use overcurrent relays that are armed by a speed relay when the gen-
erator is off line.
3. Recommendation
It is recommended that the detection scheme described above be used to protect every gen-
erator. To prevent damage to the rotor, stator bearings, etc., it is desirable that high speed
protection be provided for this contingency. The relaying should be connected to trip the
main generator breaker, trip any breakers which could feed current to the generator if breaker
failure is detected, and be so implemented that it is never taken out of service when the unit
is shut down for any purpose, even with the rotor removed.
19. Bearing Vibration
1. Description
High vibration (as defined below) on a generator is a symptom of a problem. There are many
possible causes of vibration, including:
Unbalance
Misalignment
Thermal sensitivity
Damaged bearings
Oil whip
Rubbing
Bent overhangs
Out-of-round journals or collectors
Stiffness dissymmetry.
2. Detection
All bearings are normally provided with vibration detectors and recorders. Either velocity
probes, proximity probes, or both are used. These permit recording and monitoring of vi-
bration, and alarming and/or tripping at predetermined levels of vibration. The vibration
recorders do not provide the frequency spectrum information which could be useful in deter-
mining the cause of the vibration. This information must be obtained with a portable vibration
analyzer.
24
Generator Protection GEK 75512k
3. Recommendation
For both generator and alternator bearings provided with proximity probes, the table below
summarizes recommendations for various levels of shaft vibration. The vibration levels are
given in mils [m], peak-to-peak, unfiltered.
For Vibration Level Exceeding
2 Poles 4 Poles
(mils) (m) (mils) (m)
Recommendations
10 254 12 305 Sequential trip (Type 4)
7 178 10 254 Runback and trip within 15 minutes
(Type 6)
6 152 8 203 Correct at first opportunity
3 76 5 127 Correct when convenient
For generators provided with velocity probes which monitor endshield or pedestal deflection
in the vicinity of the bearing, the alarm level is 0.5 in/sec, and the trip level is 1 in/sec.
4. Reference
For more detailed information on vibration, refer to the turbine section of the instruction book
(Ref. 24).
20. Synchronizing Errors
1. Description
Improper synchronizing of units to the line may occur for a number of reasons. The most
severe of these results from incorrect connection of potential transformer or synchronizing
aids such that gross out-of-phase synchronizing, such as a 120 error, may occur. A failure of
automatic synchronizing equipment may also result in large synchronizing errors. While tur-
bine-generators are designed to withstand these rare occurrences without catastrophic results,
provided stator current does not exceed the three-phase short circuit value, they can result in
damage, such as slipped couplings, with resulting high vibration, loosened stator windings,
and fatigue damage to the shaft and other mechanical parts (Ref. 7).
Careless synchronizing, while generally a less severe incident, may, on an accumulated basis,
have the same result.
The following synchronizing limits are recommended to avoid damaging effects:
Breaker closing within 10 (electrical angle)
Voltage matching within 0 to +5%
Slip slower than 10 seconds per slip cycle for manual synchronization.
Slip slower than 6 seconds per slip cycle for automatic synchronization.
25
GEK 75512k Generator Protection
2. Detection
A severe out-of-phase synchronizing incident will be evident from the physical effects of
noise and turbine-generator foundation vibration. In addition, a tripout may result from the
vibration trips or from electrical protective relays. Poor synchronizing routine is less evi-
dent but would be observable by the synchroscope and an oscillation of electrical quantities
(power, VARs) subsequent to the synchronizing.
3. Recommendations
Careful checking of circuits during initial installation or equipment changeout and the estab-
lishment of well-adhered-to procedures for manual synchronizing are key elements in mini-
mizing out-of-phase synchronizing incidents.
A Synch Check function should monitor manual synchronizing to prevent large errors (Ref.
8).
Automatic synchronizing relays can provide very high accuracy. Where such relays are used,
however, it is important that a check function be applied to provide an independent back-up.
Failure of the primary relays to perform should be alarmed, since this might otherwise not be
noticed.
21. Motoring
1. Description
Motoring of a generator will occur when turbine output is reduced such that it develops less
than no-load losses while the generator is still on line. Assuming excitation is sufficient,
the generator will operate as a synchronous motor driving the turbine. The generator will
not be harmed by synchronous motoring, but, if it occurs as a result of failure to complete a
sequential trip, protection for the fault originating that trip is lost. In addition, a steam turbine
can be harmed through overheating during synchronous motoring.
If field excitation is lost, along with turbine output, the generator will run as an induction
motor, driving the turbine. In addition to possible harm to the turbine, this will produce slip-
frequency currents in the rotor and could cause it to overheat if continued long enough.
A third type of motoring occurs when the generator is accidentally energized when at low
speed. This is discussed separately under Accidental Energization.
2. Detection
Motoring following loss of turbine output can be detected with a reverse power relay. To
avoid false trips due to power swings, a time-delay pick-up of 10 to 30 seconds is suggested.
This is the backup relay suggested in the description of Trip 4 - sequential trip. Measurement
of very low power levels at very low power factors will require relatively high precision. Re-
duction in reactive power flowin the generator will reduce the requirement for high precision.
This may be accomplished through control action of the excitation system or by operator ac-
tion.
26
Generator Protection GEK 75512k
3. Recommendation
It is recommended that the reverse power relay referred to above be used and connected to
produce a Type 1, simultaneous trip. Alternatively, a Type 2 generator trip or Type 3 breaker
trip could be used. Breaker Failure Protection (see page 23) should be initiated, since line
breaker failure may be the cause of the motoring. In addition, the turbine section of the in-
struction book (Ref. 9) should be consulted and followed.
22. Stator Overtemperature
1. Description
Stator overheating may result from overcurrent operation, improper gas pressure or purity (if
applicable), gas or water cooling system malfunction, internal cooling passage blockage, etc.
2. Detection
Armature bar temperatures are monitored by either TCs measuring stator cooling water tem-
perature and/or RTD's in the stator slots (if applicable). All functioning RTDs and TCs should
be constantly monitored and alarmed (see Ref 1, and 2&3 for H
2
0 cooled machines). As
pointed out in the stator overcurrent section, these temperature detectors do not provide com-
plete protection against damage due to overcurrent operation, because temperatures in other
parts of the winding, winding forces, abnormal magnetic fields, etc. may become excessive.
3. Recommendation
Automatic shutdown is not always provided for protection against stator overheating on gen-
erators with conventionally cooled stator windings. Section 26 describes automatic protection
recommended for liquid cooled armature windings. All operators should be made aware of
the importance of operating the generator within its rated capability. In cases where a gen-
erator will operate in an unattended station, some form of overtemperature protection should
be provided. Implementation of an automatic stator overtemperature protection scheme also
provides some overcurrent protection, and is generally easier to implement than overcurrent
relaying.
23. Loss of Coolant to Gas Coolers (if applicable)
1. Description
Serious overheating of all generator components will occur if coolant flow to the gas coolers
is lost. Various machine temperature alarms will detect the overheating condition prior to
any damaging overtemperatures. However, without human monitoring and intervention, the
condition will persist.
2. Detection
The RTD's monitoring the hot and cold gas temperatures may be used as the basis for estab-
lishing protection against the loss of gas coolant. Refer to Table 1 for Alarm information.
27
GEK 75512k Generator Protection
3. Recommendation
For machines which run unattended, consideration should be given to implementing an auto-
matic runback (trip 6) or trip 4 (sequential trip), based on the cold and hot gas RTD's.
24. Reduced Seal Oil Pressure (if applicable)
1. Description
A floating, radial ring-type seal is used to prevent hydrogen leakage from the generator along
the shaft. Oil is supplied to the seals at a pressure slightly higher than that of the hydrogen in
the generator.
For large, liquid cooled generators, the oil is supplied by a seal oil pumping unit. The main
pump is driven by an ac motor. An emergency back-up pump is driven by a dc motor. This
pump will start automatically if the oil discharge pressure of the main pump decreases or if
ac power is lost. In addition to the main and emergency pumps, bearing header pressure is
available to maintain hydrogen pressure in the generator at a maximum of approximately 8
psig or 5 psid less than the available bearing header pressure, whichever is lower.
For most conventionally cooled hydrogen generators, seal oil is supplied from the lube oil
tank by the same pump supplying bearing oil. The main pump is driven by an ac motor. An
emergency lube oil back-up pump is driven by a dc motor. This pump will start automatically
if the seal oil differential pressure decreases or if ac power is lost. Some machines are pro-
vided with a specific DC seal oil emergency backup pump in addition to the lube oil backup
pump. Higher pressure (greater than 30 psig) conventionally cooled machines are provided
with separate seal oil pumps. See Ref. 10 for details on the seal oil system provided.
2. Detection
Alarms indicate low differential seal oil pressure, main pump motor overload, and emergency
pump running (see Table 1).
3. Recommendation
If the main pump is lost an operator should take immediate action to determine the cause.
If the problem requires more than a few hours to correct, gas pressure should be reduced to
the lowest value required for the generator load, as determined from the reactive capability
curves. This procedure is recommended because the emergency pump has only the bearing
header pressure as back-up on liquid cooled machines, and no additional backup is provided
on conventionally cooled generators. Careful consideration of the DC supply capacity and
the purge cycle time is required to decide how long it is safe operate on the backup DC pump.
If this gas pressure cannot be maintained, additional reductions in both gas pressure and load
will be required. Operation for long periods with the emergency pump or the bearing header
supply only will result in a reduction of hydrogen purity. For most generators under these con-
ditions, gas must be scavenged from the generator to maintain hydrogen purity as described
in Ref. 4. Some conventionally cooled machines will automatically increase the scavenge
gas rate in an attempt to maintain purity. Again, see Ref. 4 for details.
28
Generator Protection GEK 75512k
25. Local Overheating (if applicable)
1. Description
Before synchronization, there are at least two areas of possible overheating in the generator
which are a function of field excitation:
Stator core heating, which is related to the stator flux (volts/Hertz).
Generator field heating, which is related to field current.
After synchronization, in addition to these two, there is also the possibility of stator winding
heating (including end windings, connection rings, leads, and high voltage bushings), which
is related to armature current.
Local overheating can be caused in a number of ways. One is damage to the laminations at
the inner diameter of the stator core. This might cause electrical contact between laminations
leading to a flow of current and therefore heating. This type of damage may be caused by a
foreign object striking the core under the influence of electromagnetic forces in the machine.
Overheating may also be caused by improper cooling or by faulty or damaged insulation,
allowing excessive leakage current to flow. It can also be caused by operating outside the
capability limits, especially in underexcited regions.
2. Detection
On hydrogen-cooled steam turbine-generators, overheating can be detected by the use of the
Generator Gas Monitoring System (GGMS). The GGMS consists of a generator Core Moni-
tor, a Signal Validation Control and a Pyrolysate Collector. The generator Core Monitor is an
ionization-type particulate detector that is connected to the generator so that a constant flow
of cooling gas passes through it. The cooling gas is monitored for the presence of submicron
particles (particulates). Under normal conditions, the gas coolant contains no particulates
that can be detected by the monitor. When overheating occurs, the thermal decomposition of
organic material, epoxy paint, core lamination enamel or other insulating materials produces
a large number of particulates which can be detected by the monitor to produce an alarm. The
particulates can be collected by the Pyrolysate Collector which is designed to operate when
a generator Core Monitor alarm occurs. Confirmation of overheating may be accomplished
by laboratory analysis of the particulates.
The Validation Control is used to automatically discriminate between a Core Monitor alarm
caused by an instrument malfunction and one caused by local overheating. When the alarm
is verified, the Validation Control actuates a machine heating alarm.
3. Recommendation
When a machine heating alarm occurs, load should be reduced by manual runback (Type
8) until the alarm signal clears. If the alarm signal does not clear within five minutes the
generator should be tripped manually (Type 5).
Contacts are provided in the Validation Control which can be used to actuate runback or trip
circuits if this feature is desired.
29
GEK 75512k Generator Protection
Additional information may be found in specific Generator Gas Monitoring System publica-
tions in the Operation and Maintenance Manual (O&M Manual).
26. Loss of Stator Coolant (if applicable)
1. Description
Stator winding cooling water is supplied by one of two identical pumps. The pump not run-
ning is in a standby mode and is connected to start automatically if the discharge pressure of
the operating pump falls.
Cooling flow may be reduced or lost because of:
a. System restrictions such as plugged filters or strainer, or a buildup of material such as
copper oxide in the stator winding strands
b. Localized restriction in a single bar or group of bars in the winding
c. Pipe break
d. Loss of pumps
e. Misadjustment of the control valve
f. Control valve failure
g. Freeze-up of the system or instrument lines containing moisture
2. Detection
a. System restrictions downstream of the control valve sensing point will be signaled by the
low flow alarm. System restrictions upstream of the sensing point will be compensated
for by the control valve. If the limits of control valve operation are reached, a restriction
will be signalled by the low pressure and low flow alarms. A high differential pressure
will occur across the component containing the restriction, and the most likely place for
this is the main filter. On newer units, filter pressure is monitored by a differential pres-
sure alarm. System restrictions can also be signalled by the bulk water outlet temperature
sensor which provides an alarm function, and by the individual liquid header outlet TCs
and slot RTDs.
b. Localized restrictions in a single bar or group of bars might be detected by the individual
liquid header outlet TCs and the slot RTDs.
c. A pipe break will be detected by a rise in the bulk outlet temperature and the individual
liquid heater TCs, or by the low pressure alarm and a temperature rise indicated by the
slot RTDs.
d. Loss of both pumps will be detected by low pressure and low flow alarms and by a tem-
perature rise signalled by all of the slot RTDs.
30
Generator Protection GEK 75512k
e. Misadjustment of the control valve, which causes a flow restriction, will be detected by
low pressure, low flow, and high bulk outlet temperature alarms. The individual outlet
TCs and slot RTDs will also be affected.
f. Control valve failure is likely to cause higher flow than required. There are no alarms to
detect this, but the situation will, in time, be apparent to an operator when higher than
normal flows and pressures are observed.
g. Freezing temperatures in the station are particularly dangerous because some of the pro-
tective devices may freeze and either fail to operate or operate incorrectly. The generator
should not be operated above its no-liquid capability when station temperatures are be-
low freezing unless provisions are made to protect vital parts of the system from the low
temperature.
3. Recommendation
Most serious faults will initiate an alarm. These are listed in Table 1. Appropriate operator
action should be taken at the time of the alarm (Ref. 2, 3). The nature of the problem dictates
the action required, as discussed below.
Abnormal temperatures in the stator require that a check be made of the cooling flow. If a
pumping unit abnormality is not apparent, a local restriction in the stator winding may be
the cause. Temperature limits are outlined in the generator instruction book (Tab 30). Load
reduction may be necessary to prevent exceeding limits.
Problems with the cooling system should be corrected at the time of the alarm. If they are
not, and the condition (flow, pressure, etc.) becomes more abnormal, a second contact will
operate. This should be used to initiate either a runback or a trip, as selected by the owner
during the design stage. If tripping was selected, a sequential trip, Type 4, may be used.
Operators should be advised, however, not to wait for automatic protection to operate but to
take corrective action immediately. This is the reason for the alarm.
If runback, rather than trip, was selected, but the runback fails to occur, a trip signal will be
produced.
In many cases a load reduction to the no-liquid capability of the generator is required before
maintenance can be performed, such as adjustment of the control valve, changing filters or
calibrating sensors. These tasks should be performed periodically as recommended in the
applicable instruction (Tab 33 of Generator Instruction Book).
27. High Water Conductivity (if applicable)
1. Description
High purity water is required to cool the stator winding conductors safely. The water purity
is maintained by fine filtration and a deionizer. A reduction in deionizer resin capacity will
result in an increase in water conductivity.
31
GEK 75512k Generator Protection
2. Detection
Water conductivity is continuously monitored at both inlet and outlet of the stator. A conduc-
tivity above 0.5 mhos/cm [0.5 S/cm] will initiate an alarm. A second alarm will register
when conductivity rises to 9.9 mhos/cm [9.9 S/cm].
3. Recommendation
The operator should replace the deionizer resin after the first alarm at 0.5 mhos/cm [0.5
S/cm], and before the second alarm. The unit should not be operated with water conductivity
above the second alarm point, which is 9.9 mhos/cm [9.9 S/cm]. If this alarm sounds, the
unit should be removed from service, using manual runback and trip (Type 6).
Table2.SUMMARYOFGENERATORPROTECTIONRECOMMENDATIONS
Fault Type Recommendation Page
Electrical Faults
Stator overcurrent
Stator ground fault
Stator phase-to-phase fault
Over-voltage
Over-volts/Hertz
Field overexcitation
Field ground
Loss Of excitation
Runback 8 or 7
Trip 1
Trip 1
Restore normal voltage 13
Trip 1 (or 2)
Trip 4
Trip 4 (or 6)
Trip 1 (or 2)
11
11
12
13
13
14
14
16
System Faults
Unbalanced armature currents
Loss of synchronism
Abnormal frequency
operation
Breaker failure
System Back-up
Voltage surges
Trip 3
Trip 3
See Turbine Instructions
Use Breaker Failure
Protection
Trip 3
Use surge arrestors
17
17
18
18
19
19
System Operations
Transmission line switching
High speed reclosing
Subsynchronous resonance
Inadvertent energization
Limit magnitude of power
step
See detailed recommendations
See detailed recommendations
See detailed recommendations
20
21
21
22
Mechanical or Thermal
Faults
32
Generator Protection GEK 75512k
Fault Type Recommendation Page
Bearing vibration
Synchronizing errors
Motoring
Stator Overtemperature
Loss coolant to gas coolers
Reduced seal oil pressure
Local Overheating
Loss of stator coolant
High water conductivity
Trip 4
Use check relays
Trip 1 (or 2 or 3)
Aarm (Trip 6 or 4)
Trip 6 (or 4)
Reduce H
2
pressure & load
Runback 8(or 7) or Trip 5
Runback 7 or Trip 4
Trip 6
23
24
25
26
26
27
28
29
30
Protective Actions Key
1 Simultaneous trip
2 Generator trip
3 Breaker trip
4 Sequential trip
5 Manual trip
6 Manual Runback and trip
7 Automatic runback
8 Manual runback
This table does not purport to summarize all the descriptive material contained in the
referenced pages. These must be read and understood when using this summary.
REFERENCES
1. GeneratorTabinO&MManual.
2. OperatorActiononHighTemperatureAlarms,GeneratorSectionofO&MManual.
3. OperatorActiononLowFlowandLowPressureAlarms,GeneratorSectionofO&MManual.
4. GasControlSystem,GeneratorSectionofO&MManual.
5. Brown,P.G.,Johnson,I.B.andStevenson,J.R.,GeneratorNeutralGrounding,IEEETrans.,
Vol.PAS-97,No.3,1978,pp.683694.
6. Berdy,J.,LossofExcitationProtectionforModernSynchronousGenerators,IEEETrans.,
Vol.PAS-94,1975,pp.14571463;availableasGEPublicationGER3183.
7. Brown,P.G.andQuay,R.,TransmissionLineReclosing-Turbine-GeneratorDutiesand
StabilityConsiderations,TexasA&MRelayConference,April1976.
8. Winick,Kenneth,RelaySupervisionofManualSynchronizing,availableasGEPublication
GER2624.
9. SequentialTrippingandPreventionofMotoring,TurbinesectionofO&MManual.
10. ShaftSealingSystem,GeneratorSectionofO&MManual.
33
GEK 75512k Generator Protection
11. Linkinhoker,C.L.,Schmitt,N.andWinchester,R.L.,InfluenceofUnbalancedCurrentson
theDesignandOperationofLargeTurbine-Generators,IEEETrans.,Vol.PAS-92,1973,
pp.15971604;availableasGEPublicationGER2874.
12. ANSIStd.C50.13-1977,Sections6.3and6.5.
13. Graham,P.J.,Brown,P.G.andWinchester,R.L.,GeneratorProtectionwithNewStaticNeg-
ativeSequenceRelays,IEEETrans.,Vol.PAS-94,1974,pp.12081223.
14. WorkingGroupReport,OutofStepRelayingforGenerators,IEEETrans.,Vol.PAS-96,
No.5,1977,pp.15561564.
15. IEEECommitteeReport,LocalBack-upRelayingProtection,IEEETrans.,Vol.PAS-89,
No.6,1970,pp.10611608.
16. Hoffman,D.C.,Back-upProtectionforSystemFaultsattheGenerator,GeneralElectric
Review,February1950.
17. Walker,D.N.,Adams,S.L.andPlacaek,R.J.,TorsionalVibrationandFatigueofTurbine-
GeneratorShafts,IEEEPowerEngineeringSociety1978IEEE/ASME/ASCEJointPower
GenerationConference;DigestStateoftheArtSymposium,Turbine-GeneratorShaftTor-
sionals.
18. IEEEWorkingGroupoftheSubsynchronousMachineCommittee,SteadyStateSwitching
Guide.
19. Joyce,J.S.andLambrecht,D.,StatusofEvaluatingtheFatigueofLargeSteamTur-
bine-GeneratorsCausedbyElectricalDisturbances,IEEEPowerEngineeringSociety1978
IEEE/ASME/ASCEJointPowerGeneratorConference;DigestStateoftheArtSymposium,
Turbine-GeneratorShaftTorsionals.
20. Counter-measurestoSubsynchronousResonanceProblems,IEEESubsynchronousRes-
onanceWorkingGroupoftheSystemDynamicPerformanceSubcommittee;IEEETrans.,
Vol.PAS-99,No.5,1980,pp.18101818.
21. Bowler,C.E.J.,etal.,TheNavajoSMFTypeSSRRelay,IEEETrans.,Vol.PAS-97,No.
5,1978,pp.14891495.
22. Farmer,R.G.,et.al.,NavajoProjectReportonSSRAnalysisandSolution,IEEETrans.,
Vol.PAS-96,No.1,1977,pp.12261232.
23. ResistanceTemperatureDetectorspublication,GeneratorSectionofO&MManual.
24. StartingandLoading,publication,TurbinesectionofO&MManual.
25. Smaha,D.W.,Rowland,C.R.andPope,J.W.,CoordinationofLoadConservationwithTur-
bine-GeneratorUnderfrequencyProtection,IEEETrans.,Vol.PAS-99,No.3,1980,pp.
11371150.
26. Berdy,J.,Out-of-StepProtectionforGenerators,availableasGEPublicationGER3179.
34
Generator Protection GEK 75512k
27. Berdy,J.,ApplicationofOut-of-StepBlockingandTrippingRelays,availableasGEPub-
licationGER3180.
28. Piwko,R.J.andLarsen,E.V.,HVDCSystemControlforDampingofSubsynchronousOs-
cillations,IEEEPaperNo.81-TD660-0(presentedSeptember1981atIEEETransmission
andDistributionConference).
29. ANSI/IEEEC37-101IEEEGuideforGeneratorGroundProtection.
30. ANSI/IEEEC37-102IEEEGuideforACGeneratorProtection.
31. CEI/IECstandard34-3RotatingElectricalMachines-Specificrequirementsforturbine-type
synchronousmachines.
32. ANSIC50.13RequirementsforCylindricalRotorSynchronousGenerator.
GERsareGeneralElectricCompanypublicationswhichmaybeobtainedthroughthenear-
estGESalesOffice.
35
GEK 75512k Generator Protection
GE Energy
General Electric Company
www.gepower.com
36