Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 105619 December 12, 1995
MARIA ROSARIO DE SANTOS, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ADORACION G. ANGELES, JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
CALOOCAN CITY, BRANCH 121 and CONCHITA TALAG DE SANTOS,
respondents.

ROMERO, J.:
Can natural children by legal fiction be legitimized?
There being no explicit provision of law in point, the Court is called upon to
cast illumination in a gray area even as it fills up unintentional interstices in
the fabric of Civil Law with overlays of philosophical, historical and
sociological strands. For an understanding of how the issue arose, we now
proceed to unravel the pertinent factual background.
On February 7, 1941, Dr. Antonio de Santos married Sofia Bona, which
union was blessed with a daughter, herein petitioner Maria Rosario de
Santos. After some time, their relationship became strained to the breaking
point. Thereafter, Antonio fell in love with a fellow doctor, Conchita Talag,
private respondent herein. Antonio sought a formal dissolution of his first
marriage by obtaining a divorce decree from a Nevada court in 1949.
Obviously aware that said decree was a worthless scrap of paper in our
jurisdiction which then, as now, did not recognize divorces, Antonio
proceeded to Tokyo, Japan in 1951 to marry private respondent, with whom
he had been cohabiting since his de facto separation from Sofia. This union
produced eleven children. On March 30, 1967, Sofia died in Guatemala. Less
than a month later, on April 23, 1967, Antonio and private respondent
contracted a marriage in Tagaytay City celebrated under Philippine laws. On
March 8, 1981, Antonio died intestate leaving properties with an estimated
value of P15,000,000.00.
On May 15, 1981, private respondent went to court
1
asking for the issuance
of letters of administration in her favor in connection with the settlement of
her late husband's estate. She alleged, among other things, that the
decedent was survived by twelve legitimate heirs, namely, herself, their ten
surviving children, and petitioner. There being no opposition, her petition
was granted.
After six years of protracted intestate proceedings, however, petitioner
decided to intervene. Thus, in a motion she filed sometime in November
1987, she argued inter alia that private respondent's children were
illegitimate. This was challenged by private respondent although the latter
admitted during the hearing that all her children were born prior to Sofia's
death in 1967.
On November 14, 1991, after approval of private respondent's account of
her administration, the court a quo passed upon petitioner's motion. The
court, citing the case of Francisco H. Tongoy, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et
al. (23 SCRA 99 [1983]), declared private respondent's ten children
legitimated and thereupon instituted and declared them, along with
petitioner and private respondent, as the heirs of Antonio de Santos.
Petitioner sought a reconsideration of said order but this was denied in the
court's order dated January 9, 1992.
Hence, she filed the instant petition for certiorari on June 16, 1992,
contending that since only natural children can be legitimized, the trial court
mistakenly declared as legitimated her half brothers and sisters.
This argument is tenable.
Article 269 of the Civil Code expressly states:all the twelve legitimate heirs.
Art. 269. Only natural children can be legitimated. Children born
outside wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception of
the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry
each other, are natural.
In other words, a child's parents should not have been disqualified to marry
each other at the time of conception for him to qualify as a "natural child."
In the case at bench, there is no question that all the children born to
private respondent and deceased Antonio de Santos were conceived and
born when the latter's valid marriage to petitioner's mother was still
subsisting. That private respondent and the decedent were married abroad
after the latter obtained in Nevada, U.S.A. a decree of divorce from his
legitimate wife does not change this fact, for a divorce granted abroad was
not recognized in this jurisdiction at the time. Evidently, the decedent was
aware of this fact, which is why he had to have the marriage solemnized in
Tokyo, outside of the Philippines. It may be added here that he was likewise
aware of the nullity of the Tokyo marriage for after his legitimate, though
estranged wife died, he hastily contracted another marriage with private
respondent, this time here in Tagaytay.
It must be noted that while Article 269, which falls under the general
heading of "Paternity and Filiation," specifically deals with "Legitimated
Children," Article 89, a provision subsumed under the general title on
"Marriage," deals principally with void and voidable marriages and
secondarily, on the effects of said marriages on their offspring. It creates
another category of illegitimate children, those who are "conceived or born
of marriages which are void from the beginning," but because there has
been a semblance of marriage, they are classified as "acknowledged natural
children" and, accordingly, enjoy the same status, rights and obligations as
such kind of children. In the case at bench, the marriage under question is
considered "void from the beginning" because bigamous, contracted when a
prior valid marriage was still subsisting. It follows that the children begotten
of such union cannot be considered natural children proper for at the time of
their conception, their parents were disqualified from marrying each other
due to the impediment of a prior subsisting marriage.
What term should then be coined to distinguish them from natural children
proper (those "born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of the
conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry
each other")? A legal fiction had to be resorted to, that device contrived by
law to simulate a fact or condition which, strictly and technically speaking, is
not what it purports to be. In this case, the term "natural children by legal
fiction" was invented, thus giving rise to another category of illegitimate
children, clearly not to be confused with "natural children" as defined under
Art. 269 but by fiction of law to be equated with acknowledged natural
children and, consequently, enjoying the status, rights and obligations of the
latter. Does this cluster of rights include the right to be legitimated?
Under the Civil Code, there exists a hierarchy of children classified on the
basis of rights granted by law, which must be preserved by strictly
construing the substantive provisions of the law in force.
Under the prevailing Civil Code (which may be considered "old" in light of
the new provisions of the Family Code on "Persons"), much emphasis is laid
on the classification of children vis-a-vis their parents, and the
corresponding rights they are entitled to under the law. Thus, the title on
"Paternity and Filiation" devotes two whole chapters to legitimate children
alone, and one chapter on those deemed by law to be possessed of the
rights of the former, such as legitimated children, because of their
compliance with certain requisites laid down by law; two other chapters deal
with illegitimate children composed of recognized natural children, and those
other than natural, or spurious, whether recognized or not. The well-ordered
delineation of such distinctions among these groups demonstrates a clear
intent on the part of the framers of the Civil Code to compartmentalize and
separate one from the other, for legitimacy/illegitimacy determines the
substantive rights accruing to the different categories of children.
It must be noted that before said Code was enacted, other classes of
illegitimate children were recognized, such as, "manceres" or the offspring of
prostitutes and the "sacrilegious" or children of those who had received Holy
Orders. Subsequently, the Civil Code, in an effort to keep in step with
modern times, limited illegitimate filiation to those which are incestuous,
adulterous and illicit.
At the core of the institution of legitimacy held sacrosanct by Spanish
tradition and culture, lies the "inviolable social institution" known as
marriage. This union, absent any formal or substantial defect or of any vice
of consent, is virtually adamantine. On the whole, the status of a marriage
determines in large part the filiation of its resultant issue. Thus, a child born
within a valid marriage is legitimate, while one born outside of wedlock is
illegitimate. If, however, the latter's parents were, at the time of the child's
conception, not legally barred from marrying each other and subsequently
do so, the child's filiation improves as he becomes legitimized and the
"legitimated" child eventually enjoys all the privileges and rights associated
with legitimacy. Without such marriage, the natural child's rights depend on
whether he is acknowledged or recognized by his parents, but he does not
rise to the level of a legitimate child in the manner that the legitimated child
does.
A child conceived or born of a marriage which is void ab initio or one which is
declared a nullity is illegitimate since there is no marriage to speak of, but it
is the law which accords him the rights of an acknowledged natural child.
Finally, there are illegitimate children who are referred to as "spurious" or
derisively denominated as "bastards" because of their doubtful origins. There
is no marriage valid or otherwise which would give any semblance of
legality to the child's existence. Nothing links child to parent aside from the
information appearing in the birth certificate. When such child is recognized
by one or both parents, he acquires certain rights nowhere approaching
those of his legitimate counterparts.
The Civil Code provides three rights which, in varying degrees, are enjoyed
by children, depending on their filiation: use of surname, succession, and
support.
Legitimate children and legitimated children are entitled to all three.
2
Thus,
they "shall principally use the surname of the father,"
3
and shall be entitled
to support from their legitimate ascendants and descendants,
4
as well as to
a legitime consisting of one-half of the hereditary estate of both parents,
5

and to other successional rights, such as the right of representation. "These
rights as effects of legitimacy cannot be renounced."
6

Natural children recognized by both parents and natural children by legal
fiction shall principally use the surname of the father.
7
If a natural child is
recognized by only one parent, the child shall follow the surname of such
recognizing parent.
8
Both types of children are entitled to receive support
from the parent recognizing them.
9
They also cannot be deprived of their
legitime equivalent to one-half of that pertaining to each of the legitimate
children or descendants of the recognizing parent, to be taken from the free
disposable portion of the latter's estate.
10

Recognized illegitimate children other than natural, or spurious issues, are,
in their minority, under the parental authority of their mothers and,
naturally, take the latter's surname.
11
The only support which they are
entitled to is from the recognizing parent,
12
and their legitime, also to be
taken from the free portion, consists of four-fifths of the legitime of an
acknowledged natural child or two-fifths that of each legitimate child.
13

It must also be observed that while the legitime of a legitimate child is fairly
secured by law,
14
the legitime of any recognized illegitimate child, taken as
it is from the free portion of the hereditary estate which the child shares with
the surviving spouse, may be reduced if it should exceed said portion.
15

Unrecognized illegitimate children are not entitled to any of the rights above
mentioned.
16

These distinctions gain more relevance if we were to consider that while a
legitimated child may enjoy the same successional rights granted to
legitimate children, a natural child by legal fiction cannot rise beyond that to
which an acknowledged natural child is entitled, insofar as his hereditary
rights are concerned.
It is thus incongruous to conclude, as private respondent maintains, that
petitioner's half siblings can rise to her level by the fact of being legitimized,
for two reasons: First, they failed to meet the most important requisite of
legitimation, that is, that they be natural children within the meaning of
Article 269; second, natural children by legal fiction cannot demand that
they be legitimized simply because it is one of the rights enjoyed by
acknowledged natural children.
It may be argued that legitimation is a right vouchsafed to acknowledged
natural children and, therefore, by the same token, to natural children by
legal fiction. This conclusion is arrived at through a syllogism as simple as it
is deceptive, which runs as follows:
The respondent's children are natural children by legal fiction.
Therefore, they have the same status, rights and
obligations as acknowledged natural children.
Acknowledged natural children have the right to be legitimated.
Ergo, respondent's children have the right to be
legitimated (as in fact they were "deemed
legitimated" by the subsequent valid marriage of
their parents in the Philippines in 1967).
The above line of reasoning follows the Euclidian geometric proposition that
things equal to the same thing are equal to each other. This may hold true in
the realm of instructional, as opposed to descriptive science, where the
former calls for the application of absolute, mathematical rules with precision
but not to the latter, particularly those which deal with the social sciences
where human relationships are central to a study whose main concern is not
to leave out anything of significance. The former deals with inanimate
things, those which a scientist has described as the "dead aspect of nature,"
excluding all factors regarded as superfluous to obtaining absolute results
and nothing more. It does not concern itself so much with the whole truth as
with those aspects or parts only through which the inexorable result can be
obtained. To apply the strict rules of syllogism, where the basic premise is
defective, to the arena of paternity and filiation, especially in the
determination of the status and rights of the different kinds of illegitimate
children vis-a-vis the legitimate ones, is bound to spawn mischief and results
never intended by the framers of the provisions of the law under review.
Pursued to its logical, undeviating conclusion, it may eventually be
postulated that "adulterous children shall enjoy the status, rights and
obligations of legitimate children," a doctrine which no moral philosophy
under our social and cultural milieu can countenance.
This conclusion not only presumes that children other than those who are
"natural" can be legitimized in the first place, but also grants acknowledged
natural children (and, consequently, natural children by legal fiction) a
"right" to be legitimized when no such right exists. Legitimation is not a
"right" which is demandable by a child. It is a privilege, available only to
natural children proper, as defined under Art. 269. Although natural children
by legal fiction have the same rights as acknowledged natural children, it is
a quantum leap in the syllogism to conclude that, therefore, they likewise
have the right to be legitimated, which is not necessarily so, especially, as in
this case, when the legally existing marriage between the children's father
and his estranged first wife effectively barred a "subsequent marriage"
between their parents.
The question that must be confronted next is: How are the offspring of the
second union affected by the first wife's death and the ensuing celebration of
a valid marriage between her widower and his ostensible second wife?
Natural children by legal fiction cannot be legitimized in this fashion. Our
archaic law on family relations, patterned as it is after Spanish Civil Law,
frowns upon illegal relations such that the benefits of legitimation under
Chapter 3 of Title VIII do not extend, nor were they intended to extend, to
natural children by legal fiction. Article 269 itself clearly limits the privilege
of legitimation to natural children as defined thereunder. There was,
therefore, from the outset, an intent to exclude children conceived or born
out of illicit relations from the purview of the law.
Another point to be considered is that although natural children can be
legitimized, and natural children by legal fiction enjoy the rights of
acknowledged natural children, this does not necessarily lead to the
conclusion that natural children by legal fiction can likewise be legitimized.
As has been pointed out, much more is involved here than the mere
privilege to be legitimized. The rights of other children, like the petitioner in
the case at bench, may be adversely affected as her testamentary share
may well be reduced in the event that her ten surviving half siblings should
be placed on par with her, when each of them is rightfully entitled to only
half of her share.
The provisions of law invoked by private respondent are couched in simple
and unmistakable language, not at all subject to interpretation, and they all
point to the correctness of petitioner's claim. If it should be asserted that we
now trench on a gray area of law that calls for interpretation, or a lacuna
that cries for filling up, then we have to pierce the shroud unintentionally
created by the letter of the law and expose its spirit as evincing intent, in
this case one which decidedly favors legitimacy over illegitimacy. The
hierarchy of children so painstakingly erected by law and the corresponding
gradation of their rights may conceivably be shattered by elevating natural
children by legal fiction who are incontestably illegitimate children to the
level of natural children proper, whose filiation would otherwise be legitimate
had their parents blessed their union with a valid marriage.
Finally, attention must be drawn to the fact that this case has been decided
under the provisions of the Civil Code, not the Family Code which now
recognizes only two classes of children: legitimate and illegitimate. "Natural
children by legal fiction" are nothing if not pure fiction.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed orders of
the court a quo dated November 14, 1991 and January 9, 1992, are
NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Maria Rosario de Santos is hereby
declared the SOLE LEGITIMATE CHILD of the decedent Antonio de Santos
and, as such, entitled to all the rights accorded to her by law.
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Melo, Puno, Vitug and Mendoza, JJ., concur.



Separate Opinions
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J., concurring:
Do children born out of adulterous relationships have the right to be
legitimated under the New Civil Code? This I believe is the resultant issue in
this case.
In declaring what the law is on this matter, we could not be so unmindful of
the highest regard that our society places on the institution of marriage and
the maintenance of which in its purity the public is deeply interested, for it is
the foundation of the family and of society, Without it there could be neither
civilization nor progress.
1
No less than the Constitution, of which we should
be the staunchest vanguard as we are its ablest defender, marshals us to
protect marriage as an inviolable social institution and the foundation of the
family,
2
for it cannot be denied that the welfare of society is served and
nurtured by a court that exercises its judicial prerogatives not in a vacuum
of cold logic but in the context of the loftiest and most enduring social values
which the citizens, albeit struggling and fumbling in their daily living, try to
approximate in their own lives. The citizens, after all, are our constituents;
3

and so their best interests, embodied in the scale of values which they extol,
are an integral part of the great flux that is the law. As we are concerned
with its exposition, we must strive to continuously refurbish the image of the
law vis-a-vis the welfare of society, to keep it bright, and to subject it to
constant re-analysis so as to keep it in touch with what has always been
right, what is just and fair under present circumstances, and what is most
beneficial for the future generations.
4

It is in this light that we appreciate this case with the following antecedent
facts:
Dr. Antonio de Santos married Sofia Bona on February 7, 1941. Out of this
union was born in 1942 petitioner Maria Rosario de Santos. However,
Antonio and Sofia subsequently parted ways. While separated de facto from
Sofia, Antonio, in 1949, secured a divorce decree against her in Nevada,
U.S.A. He then married private respondent Dr. Conchita Talag in Tokyo,
Japan, in 1951. Antonio and Conchita had eleven children who were all born
between the years 1951 to 1967.
On March 30, 1967, Sofia died in Guatemala. Thereafter, Antonio married
private respondent, for the second time, in Tagaytay City. Antonio then died
on March 8, 1981 at the Capitol Medical Center.
Is special proceedings filed by private respondent on May 15, 1981, before
the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, the court granted her petition for
letters of administration since such petition was unopposed. In the course of
the proceedings, however, petitioner intervened alleging, among others, that
the ten surviving children of private respondent were illegitimate.
After the approval of the Income and Expenses Statement of the decedent's
estate pursuant to Sec. 1, Rule 90 of the Revised Rules of Court on May 6,
1991, the trial court issued an order on November 14, 1991 declaring that
the ten children of the deceased and private respondent must be deemed
legitimated and therefore entitled to inherit as legitimate heirs.
Consequently, the sole issue raised in the instant petition for certiorari is
whether or not said children can be legitimated.
A logical cold deduction based on some pertinent laws would appear to
answer this issue in the affirmative, in this wise:
Article 80 of the New Civil Code considers as marriages void from the
beginning, bigamous marriages not falling under Art. 83 (2). Article 89 of
the same Code, in turn, bestows upon children conceived or born of
marriages void from the beginning, referred to as natural children by legal
fiction, the status, rights and obligations of acknowledged natural children.
Among the rights of acknowledged natural children is the right of
legitimation granted to them under Article 269 in relation to 271 of the same
Code. Since private respondent's children were all born after her marriage to
the deceased in Tokyo in 1951, which marriage is considered bigamous,
hence, void from the beginning, because of its celebration while the
marriage between the deceased and his first wife, Sofia Bona, still subsisted,
said children are natural children by legal fiction who have the rights of
acknowledged natural children, including the right to be legitimated, and
they may now be considered legitimated since the deceased and private
respondent validly married for the second time after Sofia's demise.
It happens that the law may lose its character of being a law by an excess of
caprice in its administration, but it could hardly cease to be law because of
its rigid logical application according to its tenor. When its rigid logical
application, however, amounts to absurdity, the law not only becomes
incapable of just administration but may also become an instrument of legal
injustice. Clearly for us to read the law in the aforegoing manner is to
dangerously teeter on the fulcrum of legal folly for there is no scaling down
its unacceptable implications.
If children born out of an extramarital relationship, but whose parents
contracted a bigamous marriage and still another marriage subsequent
thereto upon the death of the first spouse of the adulterous parent, may
eventually be legitimated, then children of adulterous spouses, by the
expedient contrivance of a bigamous marriage, may later on be legitimated.
The adulterous spouse may still prove himself virtuous and heroic by risking
prosecution for bigamy if only to give his child out of wedlock the chance,
that slim chance, to be legitimated, that is, if he prays enough that his first
spouse dies ahead of him so he could eventually validly marry his paramour.
As such, in the mildest terms, the law would seem to condone extramarital
relationships by providing the seemingly confessant adulterer a way to be a
conscientious parent to his illegitimate children without having to give up his
illicit relations with their mother. At its worst, such a reading of the law
amounts to a mockery of the institution of marriage, which is, under our
Constitution and family laws, an inviolable social institution imbued with
public interest and traditionally and constantly held to be a priority in our
culture's scale of values, for nothing stops the public from concluding that
marriage and a bigamous marriage at that (with its accompanying criminal
consequences), is actually a backdoor to legitimating adulterous children.
The letter of Article 89 of the New Civil Code must be transcended and the
absurd and sheepishly grotesque consequences of its application in the
instant case, rejected. It is not enough that the law exists to be
administered justly; in addition and more importantly, the law needs to
possess a just content. The law must by itself aim at and endeavor to
conform to, some criteria of rightness which repose on values espoused by
the very society it seeks to serve. As it is our duty to declare the law as it is,
there is no escaping the task of revealing the justness of the law in
accordance with society's avowed values. Consequently, it has been called a
golden rule of statutory interpretation that unreasonableness of the result
produced by one possible interpretation of a statute is reason for rejecting
that interpretation in favor of another which would produce a reasonable
result.
5

In resolving the issue at hand, I believe the emphasis should be on Article
269 which is, after all, the law squarely in point under the premises of this
case. Taking the letter of Article 269 as it is, it clearly prescribes the limits of
its applicability upon only natural children. Surely there is no canon against
using both common sense and common weal in construing the law as saying
what it obviously means:
Chapter 3
Art. 269. Only natural children can be ligitimated. Children born
outside wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception of
the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry
each other, are natural.
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 271. Only natural children who have been recognized by the
parents before or after the celebration of the marriage, or have
been declared natural children by final judgment, may be
considered legitimated by subsequent marriage. (Emphasis ours)
Legitimation is a right granted by law only to natural children who,
because their parents could have legally married at the time they were
conceived, cannot be substantially differentiated from legitimate
children once their parents do marry after their birth. This is because
said parents can marry any time, there being no legal impediment
preventing them from validly contracting marriage. The situation
obtaining respecting legitimate children and legitimated natural
children is certainly distinct from that respecting adulterous children
because the parents of adulterous children are admittedly
incapacitated to marry each other at the time said children were
conceived. It may easily be said, thus, that to interpret the law as
allowing adulterous children to be put on equal footing with the
legitimate children, would be putting a premium on adulterous
relationships, which is frowned upon by the society itself. Even the law
on succession under the New Civil Code distinguishes the respective
hereditary rights of the different kinds of children and significantly
assigns a diminishing share in accordance with the degree of
illegitimacy of the child concerned. Thus, Article 895 provides that the
legitime of each of the acknowledged natural children and each of the
natural children by legal fiction shall consist of one-half of the legitime
of each of the legitimate children or descendants and that of
illegitimate children who is neither of the above, four-fifths of the
legitime of an acknowledged natural child. It is, therefore, evident that
the treatment accorded children under the New Civil Code is
determined by the circumstances under which they have been
conceived and born, particularly, the capacity to marry of their parents
at the time that they were conceived.
Private respondent's children were precisely born when their deceased father
was still legally married to Sofia Bona. The marriage of the deceased and
private respondent in Tokyo, Japan, in 1951 could not have given a
semblance of legitimacy to their subsequent cohabitation and their issues
since such marriage was contracted during the subsistence of the deceased's
marriage with Sofia Bona. The relationship between the deceased and
private respondent, therefore, was no less adulterous notwithstanding an
attempt to legitimize the same through a bigamous marriage. There is no
other way to put it but that the deceased and private respondent were
having illicit relations; they were fully aware of the legal and moral
consequences of their actions, and they seemingly, in bad faith, attempted
to circumvent the law in their favor by contracting a bigamous marriage to
the prejudice of the legitimate issue in the person of the petitioner. There is
no quibbling that private respondent's children are adulterous children
whose status, by the simple expedient of a bigamous marriage contracted by
parties fully aware of their incapacity to marry, could never have been
intended by the law to be equated to that of petitioner who is the legitimate
child of the deceased in view of the public policy involved in preserving the
sanctity of marriage and preventing the proliferation of illegitimate issues.
As the earlier interpretation has been shown to lead to unreasonable results
with socially virulent implications, and the same originates from two
provisions, namely, Article 89 and Article 269 of the New Civil Code, we are
wont to state that they are irreconcilable provisions. And the applicable
statutory rule is that where there is an irreconcilable conflict between the
different provisions of a statute, the provision last in order of position will
prevail, since it is the latest expression of the legislative will.
6
More than
that Article 269 is the latest expression of the legislative will, however,
Article 269 on its face specifically states the law on legitimation, limits its
applicability to natural children, and is resonantly silent on the right of
adulterous children to be legitimated in the same way as children born to
parents who, at the time of their conception, were legally capable to marry
each other.
All told, the law tenders to us in no unpretentious terms the basis to rule
that private respondent's children, being adulterous children, have no right
to be legitimated under the New Civil Code. Such a ruling is not only in
accord with the explicit, unequivocal language of Article 269 but more
importantly animates and upholds the public policy as regards the institution
of marriage as the foundation of society.
Needless to say, such ruling sits well with the need to obviate any legal
injustice and social absurdity that may result if we were to rule otherwise.
The final cause of law is the welfare of society. The rule that
misses its aim cannot permanently justify its existence. "Ethical
considerations can no more be excluded from the administration
of justice which is the end and purpose of all civil laws than one
can exclude the vital air from his room and live.
7

The final rendering of the meaning of a statute is an act of judgment.
8
This
court has so judged this case at bench, and so we will perhaps be judged
thereby.
I, therefore, vote to grant the petition, set aside the assailed order of the
Regional Trial Court, and remand thereto the case for further proceedings.
VITUG, J., dissenting:
I vote to resolve the controversy in favor of the child. I take it to be the
legislative intent that the pertinent provisions of the Civil Code on children in
the book on persons and family relations are meant to enhance the child's
interest and welfare. This intent finds exemplification in Article 89 of the Civil
Code by explicitly providing that natural children by legal fiction (among
them those conceived or born of void marriages because the parents suffer
from an impediment to marry) shall have the same status, rights and
obligations as acknowledged natural children. If then under Article 269, in
relation to Article 270, of the Civil Code, acknowledged natural children are
given the right to be legitimated by the subsequent marriage of the parents,
the law must, by virtue of Article 89 aforesaid, likewise extend unqualifiedly
to natural children by legal fiction.
No matter how well legal calisthenics are played, there is, I must point out,
not a single provision of the Code that limits or circumscribes the scope and
application of Article 89. The law, I respectfully submit, should be so
construed as to attain congruity, rather than a division, among its several
provisions. The rule is expressed in the maxim interpretare et concordare
legibus est optimus interpretendi upon the theory that the legislature is
presumed not to have enacted conflicting provisions of law but that, on the
contrary, it must have meant to give them such parity and consequence as a
uniform jurisprudential system.
Most regrettably, I still perceive coolness, if not outright hostility, towards
illegitimate children who have not been fortunate enough to be conceived or
born under a better family circumstance. It is not enough that they are
unjustly ostracized by a segment in society; they are also called names
bastards, outcasts, adulterous, spurious that certainly they do not
deserve. If at all, their situation needs sympathy, not hatred or
condemnation.
Any conflict of view, however, would soon be a thing of the past, for as so
keenly observed by Mme. Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero, the Family Code,
which became effective on 03 August 1988, has deleted any reference to
natural children by legal fiction. The Family Code presently categorizes
children of void marriages into two kinds the legitimates which include
those conceived or born of void marriages under Article 36 and Article 52 of
the Family Code before the judicial declaration of nullity of such void
marriages and the illegitimates or children conceived or born of all other void
marriages (but evidently maintaining, for legitimation purposes, the
distinction between those whose parents, at the time of conception, were
not disqualified to marry and those whose parents were disqualified).
Narvasa, C.J. and Bellosillo, J., concurs.
KAPUNAN, J., dissenting:
The principal issue in the case at bench may be capsulized as to whether or
not the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to a lack
or excess of jurisdiction in considering the private respondent's children
legitimated under the facts established herein, and in declaring and
instituting said children as heirs of the decedent. As the law unequivocally
gives them such a right, I respectfully dissent from the majority.
I begin by observing that, taking their cue from the lower court's
inappropriate lifting of an editor's precis or statement from the syllabus of
the case of Tongoy vs. Court of Appeals,
1
both parties in the case at bench
have placed too much emphasis and reliance on the case of Tongoy,
2
the
facts and circumstances of which are not exactly on all fours with those
obtaining in the case at bench. The italicized portion of the syllabus of cases
appearing in official or unofficial reports of Supreme Court Decisions or
Resolutions
3
generally reflect the editor's summary of a discussion of an
issue or a specific point in a case, and, taken out of context, could be
misleading and inappropriate for citation. Judges should strive to read cases
which might have a bearing on cases before them in their entirety, and
quote or obtain their citations from the body of the decision, not the
syllabus.
The principal issue in Tongoy,
4
hinged "on the absence of an
acknowledgment (by the father prior to his death of his illegitimate children)
through any of the modes recognized by the Old Civil Code."
5
It is not,
however clear from the Court's discussion of the facts of the case, whether
the illegitimate children were sired during the subsistence of the first
marriage or after the death of the first wife. On the sale issue of the father's
acknowledgment, the Court therein took a liberal view, recognizing the fact
that the children "were in continuous possession of the status of natural, or
even legitimated, children"
6
and that they were "treated as legitimate
children not only by their parents but also by the entire clan,"
7
in declaring,
on equitable grounds, that the children therein were legitimate heirs.
For better appreciation of our ruling in Tongoy, let me quote the following:
The remaining assignment of error dwells on the question of
whether or not respondents Amado, Ricardo, Cresenciano and
Norberto, all surnamed Tongoy, may be considered legitimated
by virtue of the marriage of their parents, Francisco Tongoy and
Antonina Pabello, subsequent to their births and shortly before
Francisco died on September 15, 1926. Petitioners maintain that
since the said respondents were never acknowledged by their
father, they could not have been legitimated by the subsequent
marriage of their parents, much less could they inherit from the
estate of their father, the predecessor-in-interest of Luis D.
Tongoy, who is admittedly the half brother of the said
respondents.
Both the trial court and the respondent appellate court have
found overwhelming evidence to sustain the following
conclusions: that Amado P. Tongoy, Ricardo P. Tongoy,
Cresenciano P. Tongoy and Norberto P. Tongoy were born
illegitimate to Antonina Pabello on August 19, 1910 (Exh. A),
August 12, 1922 (Exh. B), December 1, 1915 (Exhs. C and C-1)
and August 4, 1922 (Exh. D), respectively; that Francisco
Tongoy was their father; that said Francisco Tongoy had before
them and Antonina Pabello two legitimate children by his first
wife, namely, Luis D. Tongoy and Patricio D. Tongoy; that
Francisco Tongoy and Antonina Pabello were married sometime
before his death on September 15, 1926 (Exh. H); that shortly
thereafter, Luis D. Tongoy and Patricio D. Tongoy executed an
Extra-Judicial Declaration of Heirs, leaving out their half-brothers
Amado, Ricardo, Cresenciano, and Norberto, who were then still
minors; that respondents Amado, Ricardo, Cresenciano and
Norberto were known and accepted by the whole clan as children
of Francisco; that they had lived in Hacienda Pulo with their
parents, but when they went to school, they stayed in the old
family home at Washington Street, Bacolod, together with their
grandmother, Agatona Tongoy; that everybody in Bacolod knew
them to be part of the Tongoy-Sonora clan; and that Luis D.
Tongoy as administrator of Hacienda Pulo, also spent for the
education of Ricardo Tongoy until he became a lawyer; and that
even petitioners admit the fact that they were half-brothers of
the late Luis D. Tongoy.
The bone of contention, however, hinges on the absence of an
acknowledgment through any of the modes recognized by the
Old Civil Code (please see Articles 131 and 135 of the Old Civil
Code), such that legitimation could not have taken place in view
of the provisions of Art. 121 of the same Code which states that
"children shall be considered legitimated by a subsequent
marriage only when they have been acknowledged by the
parents before or after the celebration thereof."
Of course, the overwhelming evidence found by respondent
Court of Appeals conclusively shows that respondents Amado,
Ricardo, Cresenciano and Norberto have been in continuous
possession of the status of natural, or even legitimated children.
Still, it recognizes the fact that such continuous possession of
status is not, per se, a sufficient acknowledgment but only a
ground to compel recognition (Alabat vs. Alabat, 21 SCRA 1379;
Pua vs. Chan, 21 SCRA 753; Larena vs. Rubio, 43 Phil. 1017).
Be that as it may, WE cannot but agree with the liberal view
taken by respondent Court of Appeals when it said:
. . . It does not seem equally manifest, however, that
defendants-appellants stand on a purely technical point in the
light of overwhelming evidence that appellees were natural
children of Francisco Tongoy and Antonina Pabello, and were
treated as legitimate children not only by their parents but only
by the entire clan. Indeed, it does not make much sense that
appellees should be deprived of their hereditary rights as
undoubted natural children of their father, when the only
plausible reason that the latter could have had in mind when he
married his second wife Antonina Pabello just over a month
before his death was to give legitimate status to their children. It
is not in keeping with the more liberal attitude taken by the New
Civil Code towards illegitimate children and the more
compassionate trend of the New Society to insist on a very literal
application of the law in requiring the formalities of compulsory
acknowledgment, when the only result is to unjustly deprive
children who are otherwise entitled to hereditary rights. From
the very nature of things, it is hardly to be expected of
appellees, having been reared as legitimate children by their
parents and treated as such by everybody, to bring an action to
compel their parents to acknowledge them. In the hitherto cited
case of Ramos vs. Ramos, supra, the Supreme Court showed the
way out of patent injustice and inequity that might result in
some cases simply because of the implacable insistence on the
technical amenities for acknowledgment. Thus, it held
Unacknowledged natural children have no rights whatsoever
(Buenaventura vs. Urbano, 5 Phil. 1; Siguiong vs. Siguiong, 8
Phil. 5, 11; Infante vs. Figueras, 4 Phil. 738; Crisolo vs.
Macadaeg, 94 Phil. 862). The fact that the plaintiffs, as natural
children of Martin Ramos, received shares in his estate implied
that they were acknowledged. Obviously, defendants Agustin
Ramos and Granada Ramos and the late Jose Ramos and
members of his family had treated them as his children.
Presumably, that fact was well-known in the community. Under
the circumstances, Agustin Ramos and Granada Ramos and the
heirs of Jose Ramos, are estopped from attacking plaintiffs'
status as acknowledged natural children (See Arts. 283 [4] and
2666 [3], New Civil Code). [Ramos vs. Ramos, supra].
With the same logic, estoppel should also operate in this case in
favor of appellees, considering, as already explained in detail,
that they have always been treated as acknowledged and
legitimated children of the second marriage of Francisco Tongoy,
not only by their presumed parents who raised them as their
children, but also by the entire Tongoy-Sonora clan, including
Luis D. Tongoy himself who had furnished sustenance to the clan
in his capacity as administrator of Hacienda Pulo and had in fact
supported the law studies of appellee Ricardo P. Tongoy in
Manila, the same way he did with Jesus T. Sonora in his medical
studies. As already pointed out, even defendants-appellants
have not questioned the fact that appellees are half-brothers of
Luis D. Tongoy. As a matter of fact, they are really children of
Francisco Tongoy and Antonina Pabello, and only the technicality
that their acknowledgment as natural children has not been
formalized in any of the modes prescribed by law appears to
stand in the way of granting them their hereditary rights. But
estoppel, as already indicated, precludes defendants-appellants
from attacking appellees' status as acknowledged natural or
legitimated children of Francisco Tongoy. In addition to estoppel,
this is decidedly one instance when technicality should give way
to conscience, equity and justice (cf. Vda. de Sta. Ana vs.
Rivera, L-22070, October 29, 1966, 18 SCRA 588) [pp. 196-198,
Vol. 1, rec.].
It is time that WE, too, take a liberal view in favor of natural
children who, because they enjoy the blessings and privileges of
an acknowledged natural child and even of a legitimated child,
found if rather awkward, if not unnecessary, to institute an
action for recognition against their natural parents, who, without
their asking, have been showering them with the same love,
care and material support as are accorded to legitimate children.
The right to participate in their father's inheritance should
necessarily follow.
8

However, acknowledgment is clearly not at issue here. Petitioner makes no
pretense that private respondent's children are not entitled to hereditary
rights.
9
She herself admits that the decedent acknowledged his paternity of
the private respondent's children and that they are indeed her brothers and
sisters.
10
What herein petitioner claims she opposes "is their being judicially
declared legitimated (by the respondent court) so as to entitle them to enjoy
the same rights as a legitimate heir,"
11
to her prejudice. Citing Article 269 of
the New Civil Code as "the law in point" in the case at bench, she contends
that the trial court erred in declaring her half brothers and sisters
legitimated because under the New Civil Code only natural children could be
legitimated. I find this contention, to which the majority of this divided Court
agrees, absolutely untenable.
The New Civil Code appears to limit the right to legitimation only to those
children conceived by parents not disqualified by any impediment to marry
each other, bestowing upon them, prior to such legitimation, the status of
natural children. Article 269 which provides the cornerstone for the
majority's holding today states that:
Art. 269. Only natural children can be legitimated. Children born
outside wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception of
the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry
each other, are natural.
The rule is, however, not absolute because even children conceived or born
out of marriages void from the very beginning under the Civil Code possess
the status of natural children by legal fiction and enjoy the same rights as
acknowledged natural children. Article 89 provides:
Art. 89. Children conceived or born out of marriages which are
void from the beginning shall have the same status, rights and
obligations as acknowledged natural children, and are called
natural children by legal fiction.
Children conceived of voidable marriages before the decree of
annulment shall be considered legitimate; and children
conceived thereafter shall have the same status, rights and
obligations as acknowledged natural children, and are also called
natural children by legal fiction.
Article 89, a creature of legislation (through the Code Commission) which
has remained unmolested since 1950 I must stress, is not an accidental
provision. The Civil Code Commission clearly intended Article 89,
notwithstanding its location in the Code, as a piece of reform, an exception
to the rule furnished by Article 269. More importantly, Article 89 (unlike
Article 269 which came from the Spanish Civil Code of 1889) was a new
provision deliberately introduced by the Code Commission as one of its
revolutionary reforms thirty five years ago. And doubt about the intention of
this piece of legislation should have been laid to rest by the following
explanation from the Code Commission's Report:
This proposed reform is based on the fact that such children
have been brought into this world through no fault of their own,
but through that of their parents. To visit punishment upon them
is most unjust. Moreover, though the marriage is void, or
voidable, at least there was a semblance of legality to the
relationship between the parents. This circumstance should cast
a mantle of protection over the children, who by legal fiction
should be treated as acknowledged natural children.
12

Since the decedent's 1951 marriage in Tokyo with the private respondent
was invalid,
13
being one of those marriages classified as void from the very
beginning under the Civil Code,
14
the status of her children clearly falls
under Article 89 which puts them on par, at least in terms of rights and
obligations, with acknowledged natural children. Since the rights of
acknowledged natural children include the right of legitimation under
Article 270 of the Civil
Code by the subsequent valid marriage of their parents,
15
it therefore
plainly follows that by virtue of Article 89, in relation to Article 270, the
private respondent's children were deemed legitimated by the subsequent
valid marriage of their parents in the Philippines in 1967.
This position is hardly an isolated one. Virtually all Civil and Family Code
commentators are united in the belief that Article 89 furnishes an escape
valve for children found under the circumstances existing in the case at
bench. Dr. Arturo Tolentino, in his commentary on the Civil Code, for
example, writes:
Under Article 89, natural children by legal fiction "shall have the
same status, rights and obligations as acknowledged natural
children." Theoretically therefore, natural children by legal fiction
can be
legitimated. . . . .
The following children by legal fiction . . . can be legitimated: . .
. (2) those born of a bigamous marriage, for the parents can
marry each other again upon the widowhood of the parent who
married twice. . . . .
16

In the same token, Prof. Ernesto L. Pineda, a member of the Family Code
Revision Committee acknowledges this exception the rule, stating that:
By way of exception, some natural children by legal fiction (Art.
89, NCC) can be legitimated such as (a) those born of couples
who married while below the allowable marrying age but who
contracted a new marriage after reaching the proper age; (b)
those born of bigamous marriages but where the parents
married each other upon the widowhood of the disqualified
parent; (c) those born of parents who got married before an
unauthorized officer and the parents contracted a new marriage
before an authorized one; (d) those born of parents who got
married without a marriage license (where license was required)
and the parents contracted a subsequent valid marriage; and (e)
children conceived after (not before) the decree of annulment of
a voidable marriage.
17

Justice Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, writing on the New Family Code
18
underscores
the difference in treatment of the subject of legitimation between the Family
Code and the Civil Code thus:
Under the Civil Code, children of bigamous marriages, who are
natural children by legal fiction, can be legitimated, since the
parents can marry each other upon the death of the first
husband or wife of the parent who married twice. Unfortunately
for such children, they can no longer be legitimated under the
Family Code, which has limited the kind of children to legitimate
and illegitimate and abolished the category of natural children by
legal fiction.
19

"Parenthetically," another commentator on the Family Code, Prof. Melencio
Sta. Maria writes, "under the Civil Code provisions of legitimation which were
repealed by the Family Code," there can be an instances where such children
could be legitimated.
20
Elaborating on these provisions in his 1995
commentary; he states:
This is so because according to the repealed Article 271 of the
Civil Code only acknowledged natural children can be
legitimated, and also according to the repealed Article 89 of the
Civil Code, a child born inside a void marriage was considered a
natural child by legal fiction with all the rights of an
acknowledged natural child. Since a natural child by legal fiction
has all the rights of an acknowledged natural child and the
statutory right to be legitimated was one of the rights of an
acknowledged natural child, the subject child therefore can be
legitimated if the parents subsequently validly remarried.
21

Clearly, the weight of authority in this country recognizes that under the
Civil Code, Article 89 unequivocally furnishes an exception to the rule that
only acknowledged natural children or those who by law have been declared
natural children by final judgment can be legitimated. This exception was, in
fact, acknowledged by the Family Code Revision Committee in its Meeting of
August 24, 1985, when it decided not to accord the same privilege extended
by Article 89 to similarly situated illegitimate children (under the family
Code's simplified classification) in the provisions of the new code. However,
for children born under the Civil Code, the exception is a legal fact which
could not be ignored. If under Article 269, in relation to Article 270 of the
Civil Code, acknowledged natural children are given the right to be
legitimated by the subsequent marriage of the parents, the law must, by
virtue of Article 89, also extend unqualifiedly to natural children by legal
fiction. This not only harmonizes Article 89 with the Civil Code articles on the
rights of acknowledged natural children and the articles on legitimation but
also leads to a result which enhances the welfare and interest of the child.
As Justice Vitug in his 1993 Compendium of Civil Law and Jurisprudence
writes:
The provisions of Art. 269 and 271 of the Civil Code, in a literal
sense appear to limit legitimation in favor of acknowledged
natural children or those who by law have been declared natural
children by final judgment. Considering, however, that natural
children by legal fiction (such as those born of void marriages
because the parents suffer from an impediment to marry) are
expressly given the same status, rights and obligations as
acknowledged natural children (Art. 89 Civil Code), and because
all doubts should be resolved in favor of the child, it is submitted
that the rules on legitimation should likewise extend to such
children.
22

Indeed, it hardly makes sense that the children of private respondent should
be deprived of their full hereditary rights as legitimated children when the
facts and circumstances of the case at bench clearly show the decedent's
intention to remove, once and for all, all manner of legal and moral
obstacles to his second and apparently blissful union with the private
respondent. For immediately after the death of his first wife in Guatemala in
1967, the decedent wasted no time in obtaining a Philippine marriage in
Tagaytay with his second wife. With a fairly considerable estate, it was not
entirely remote that the decedent had in mind not only the intention to
legitimatize his union with the private respondent but also the intention to
accord legitimate status to his children with his second wife. Given the
nature of their relationship and the clear intendment of the Civil Code under
Article 89 to place natural children by legal fiction on equal standing with
acknowledged natural children, a patent injustice and inequity will result if
we uphold herein petitioner's implacable position. Given the clear
intendment of the legislature in enacting the new provision (Article 89) over
thirty years ago when many of the members of this Court were still law
students, the majority's holding in the case at bench amounts to a belated
judicial veto of a valid piece of legislation.
I vote to DENY the instant petition.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Bellosillo, and Francisco JJ., concur.
PANGANIBAN, J., dissenting:
With all due respect, I dissent from the well-written ponencia of Mme.
Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero.
The pertinent portions of Arts. 89, 269, 270 and 271 of the New Civil Code
which are the codal provisions in point, read as follows:
Art. 89. Children conceived or born of marriages which are void
from the beginning shall have the same status, rights and
obligations as acknowledged natural children, and are called
natural children by legal fiction.
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 269. Only natural children can be legitimated. Children born
outside wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception of
the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry
each other, are natural.
Art. 270. Legitimation shall take place by the subsequent
marriage of the parents.
Art. 271. Only natural children who have been recognized by the
parents before or after the celebration of the marriage, or have
been declared natural children by final judgment, may be
considered legitimated by subsequent marriage. . . .
Art. 89 has been repealed by the Family Code (Executive Order No. 209)
which took effect on August 3, 1988 (Uyguangco vs. Court of Appeals, 178
SCRA 684 [1989]; Atienza vs. Brillantes, A.M. No. MTJ-92-706, March 29,
1995). It was one of the provisions under Title III, Book I of the New Civil
Code which have been omitted from the text of the present Family Code. But
it was the law in force at the time the legitimation in the case at bench took
place and should, consequently, govern the present controversy.
Art. 89 was a new provision in the sense that, unlike Articles 269 to 271,
aforequoted, which all came from the Spanish Civil Code of 1889, Art. 89
was one of the reforms instituted by the Code Commission that drafted the
New Civil Code. The Code Commission justified this new article in this wise:
This proposed reform is based on the fact that such children
have been brought into the world through no fault of their own,
but through that of their parents. To visit punishment upon them
is most unjust. Moreover, though the marriage was void, or
voidable, at least there was a semblance of legality of the
relationship between the parents. This circumstance should cast
the mantle of protection over the children, who by legal fiction
should be treated as acknowledged natural children. (Report of
the Code Commission, at p. 81.)
In conferring upon natural children by legal fiction the same status, rights
and obligations of acknowledged natural children, the clear intention of the
law was to put them at par with the latter although in fact they are not.
They are not in fact natural because they were conceived in the presence,
not absence, of an impediment between the parents. They are natural only
by figment of law. Thus, the name natural children by legal fiction.
But this legal fiction precisely operates to exempt them from the
requirement under Art. 269 that there be no impediment between the
parents at the time of the conception as well as from the requirement of
recognition by both parents under Art. 271. Plainly, this is the conclusion
that can rationally be given to the express, unequivocal declaration in Art.
89 that natural children by legal fiction "shall have the same status, rights
and obligations as acknowledged natural children" neither imposing any
condition nor subjecting the grant of status to any qualification or exception
of any kind. Had the intention been to deprive them of the right of
legitimation, the law would have said so. Or it would have inserted a
condition that they could be legitimated only if they can show compliance
with Arts. 269 and 271 of the Code. The fact that these insertions were not
made can only mean that the law intended to exempt this special class of
natural children from the strict requirements normally imposed on ordinary
natural children.
Under the provisions of the New Civil Code, legitimation takes place when
three requisites are met: (a) that the child be a natural child; (b) that he be
recognized by both parents either before or after a valid marriage; and (c)
that there be a subsequent valid marriage of the parents (cf. Paras, Civil
Code of the Philippines Annotated, 1984 Ed., Vol. I, p. 651). A natural child
by legal fiction possesses the first two requisites from inception by virtue of
Art. 89, which places him on the same plane as an acknowledged natural
child. In that sense, he has an advantage over a natural child as defined by
Art. 269, for the latter would still need to be recognized by both parents in
order to have the status and rights of an acknowledged natural child. Thus,
for the purpose of legitimation, the natural child by legal fiction needs to
fulfill only the third requisite: a valid subsequent marriage between his
parents (cf. Paras, op. cit., p. 651; Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines,
1987 Reprinting, Vol. I, p. 570). Where the impediment is permanent or
perpetual, such as incest or the fact that one or both of the parties have
been found guilty of killing the spouse of one of them, no legitimation can
ever take place as no valid marriage can ever be made between the parents
(Tolentino, op. cit., p. 570). But the bigamous character of a marriage is
terminable by, among other causes, the death of the first spouse, making a
subsequent marriage valid. And that simply was what happened in the case
at bench.
Prior to the repeal of Art. 89 by the Family Code, it was suggested by some
civil law scholars that a distinction should be made between natural children
by legal fiction who were conceived during the existence of an impediment,
on the one hand, and those who were conceived after the disappearance of
such impediment, on the other. Their theory was that only the latter would
qualify for legitimation. Such a stance would have been juridically sound
were it not for the fact that Art. 89 does not classify natural children by legal
fiction into the two suggested categories based on the presence or absence
of impediment at the time of conception of the child. Ubi lex non distinguit
nec nos distinguere debemus; where the law does not distinguish, we should
not (Gesolgon vs. Lacson, 2 SCRA 553, 556 [1961]; Libudan vs. Gil, 45
SCRA 17, 33 [1972]; Guevarra vs. Inocentes, 16 SCRA 379, 385 [1966];
Robles vs. Chromite Mining Co., 104 Phil. 688, 690 [1958]). Besides, as
already pointed out, the conferment on natural children by legal fiction of
the same status, rights and obligations as those of acknowledged natural
children under Art. 89, New Civil Code, evidently exempted the former from
the requirements imposed upon ordinary natural children by Arts. 269 and
271 of said Code. And, finally, Art. 220 of said Code fortifies this conclusion,
because said provision declares that in case of doubt, every intendment of
law or fact leans toward, among other things, "the legitimacy of children".
The doubt if there be such at all should therefore be resolved in favor
of sustaining the right to legitimation of the eleven (11) offsprings of the
decedent with private respondent Conchita Talag, regardless of the presence
or absence of an impediment to marry on the part of their parents at the
time of the conception of each of them.
Indeed, it is hardly fair to stigmatize and create social and successional
prejudice against children who had no fault in nor control over the marital
impediments which bedeviled their parents. They are the victims, not the
perpetrators, of these vagaries of life. Why then should they suffer their
consequences? In the final analysis, there are really no illegitimate children;
there are only illegitimate parents. And this dissent finds its philosophy in
this: that children, unarguably born and reared innocent in this world, should
benefit by every intendment of the law, particularly where as in this case
their parents, who originally suffered from a marital impediment, would
now want to overcome the improvident social and successional
consequences of such condition. Therefore, it is most unfair that the these
innocent children should be condemned to continue suffering the
consequences of the impediment they did not cause, when the very
impediment itself has disappeared.
The mere fact that such legitimation would impact adversely upon the
petitioner's successional rights as the lone legitimate child of the first
marriage is no reason to deny the children of the second marriage of their
own legal right to be deemed legitimated. Precisely, legitimation produces
such an effect i.e., diminution of successional rights of the legitimate
children. Art. 272 of the New Civil Code provides in fact that "(c)hildren who
are legitimated by subsequent marriage shall enjoy the same rights as
legitimate children." When the legislature decided to grant to children of void
carriages the same status, rights, and obligations as those of acknowledged
natural children, it is presumed to have carefully weighed precisely these
consequences upon the rights of the other children in the family. The policy
then was to cast a mantle of protection upon children of void marriages.
That policy is evidently enforced by enabling them to get legitimated in the
same manner as acknowledged natural children namely, by the
subsequent valid marriage of their parents. If the Family Code, by repealing
Art. 89 of the New Civil Code, is to be viewed as having reversed or
denigrated that policy (although, by and large, it appears to have
maintained the policy in many other areas of family law), such reversal or
denigration should not, and cannot, in any case impair rights already
acquired by and thus vested in the private respondents.
One last point. Both petitioner and private respondent admit that the eleven
(1l) children of the decedent with private respondent Conchita Talag were
born after the celebration of the bigamous marriage on July 25, 1951. (See
Petition, item 6, page 5; Rollo p. 6.) If any one of them was born prior
thereto, such child, not being a natural child by legal fiction but spurious,
cannot claim the special benefit granted under Art. 89 of the New Civil Code.
Unlike his brothers and sisters who are natural children by legal fiction, he
can only inherit by showing that he has been recognized by the decedent as
the latter's illegitimate child either voluntarily or by final judgment in a
proper paternity suit (Paterno vs. Paterno, 20 SCRA 585; Noble vs. Noble,
18 SCRA 1104; Clemena vs. Clemena, 24 SCRA 720; Divinagracia vs.
Rovira, 72 SCRA 307; Tolentino, The Civil Code of the Philippines, 1987
Reprinting, Vol. I, pp. 616-617.)
Separate Opinions
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J., concurring:
Do children born out of adulterous relationships have the right to be
legitimated under the New Civil Code? This I believe is the resultant issue in
this case.
In declaring what the law is on this matter, we could not be so unmindful of
the highest regard that our society places on the institution of marriage and
the maintenance of which in its purity the public is deeply interested, for it is
the foundation of the family and of society, Without it there could be neither
civilization nor progress.
1
No less than the Constitution, of which we should
be the staunchest vanguard as we are its ablest defender, marshals us to
protect marriage as an inviolable social institution and the foundation of the
family,
2
for it cannot be denied that the welfare of society is served and
nurtured by a court that exercises its judicial prerogatives not in a vacuum
of cold logic but in the context of the loftiest and most enduring social values
which the citizens, albeit struggling and fumbling in their daily living, try to
approximate in their own lives. The citizens, after all, are our constituents;
3

and so their best interests, embodied in the scale of values which they extol,
are an integral part of the great flux that is the law. As we are concerned
with its exposition, we must strive to continuously refurbish the image of the
law vis-a-vis the welfare of society, to keep it bright, and to subject it to
constant re-analysis so as to keep it in touch with what has always been
right, what is just and fair under present circumstances, and what is most
beneficial for the future generations.
4

It is in this light that we appreciate this case with the following antecedent
facts:
Dr. Antonio de Santos married Sofia Bona on February 7, 1941. Out of this
union was born in 1942 petitioner Maria Rosario de Santos. However,
Antonio and Sofia subsequently parted ways. While separated de facto from
Sofia, Antonio, in 1949, secured a divorce decree against her in Nevada,
U.S.A. He then married private respondent Dr. Conchita Talag in Tokyo,
Japan, in 1951. Antonio and Conchita had eleven children who were all born
between the years 1951 to 1967.
On March 30, 1967, Sofia died in Guatemala. Thereafter, Antonio married
private respondent, for the second time, in Tagaytay City. Antonio then died
on March 8, 1981 at the Capitol Medical Center.
Is special proceedings filed by private respondent on May 15, 1981, before
the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, the court granted her petition for
letters of administration since such petition was unopposed. In the course of
the proceedings, however, petitioner intervened alleging, among others, that
the ten surviving children of private respondent were illegitimate.
After the approval of the Income and Expenses Statement of the decedent's
estate pursuant to Sec. 1, Rule 90 of the Revised Rules of Court on May 6,
1991, the trial court issued an order on November 14, 1991 declaring that
the ten children of the deceased and private respondent must be deemed
legitimated and therefore entitled to inherit as legitimate heirs.
Consequently, the sole issue raised in the instant petition for certiorari is
whether or not said children can be legitimated.
A logical cold deduction based on some pertinent laws would appear to
answer this issue in the affirmative, in this wise:
Article 80 of the New Civil Code considers as marriages void from the
beginning, bigamous marriages not falling under Art. 83 (2). Article 89 of
the same Code, in turn, bestows upon children conceived or born of
marriages void from the beginning, referred to as natural children by legal
fiction, the status, rights and obligations of acknowledged natural children.
Among the rights of acknowledged natural children is the right of
legitimation granted to them under Article 269 in relation to 271 of the same
Code. Since private respondent's children were all born after her marriage to
the deceased in Tokyo in 1951, which marriage is considered bigamous,
hence, void from the beginning, because of its celebration while the
marriage between the deceased and his first wife, Sofia Bona, still subsisted,
said children are natural children by legal fiction who have the rights of
acknowledged natural children, including the right to be legitimated, and
they may now be considered legitimated since the deceased and private
respondent validly married for the second time after Sofia's demise.
It happens that the law may lose its character of being a law by an excess of
caprice in its administration, but it could hardly cease to be law because of
its rigid logical application according to its tenor. When its rigid logical
application, however, amounts to absurdity, the law not only becomes
incapable of just administration but may also become an instrument of legal
injustice. Clearly for us to read the law in the aforegoing manner is to
dangerously teeter on the fulcrum of legal folly for there is no scaling down
its unacceptable implications.
If children born out of an extramarital relationship, but whose parents
contracted a bigamous marriage and still another marriage subsequent
thereto upon the death of the first spouse of the adulterous parent, may
eventually be legitimated, then children of adulterous spouses, by the
expedient contrivance of a bigamous marriage, may later on be legitimated.
The adulterous spouse may still prove himself virtuous and heroic by risking
prosecution for bigamy if only to give his child out of wedlock the chance,
that slim chance, to be legitimated, that is, if he prays enough that his first
spouse dies ahead of him so he could eventually validly marry his paramour.
As such, in the mildest terms, the law would seem to condone extramarital
relationships by providing the seemingly confessant adulterer a way to be a
conscientious parent to his illegitimate children without having to give up his
illicit relations with their mother. At its worst, such a reading of the law
amounts to a mockery of the institution of marriage, which is, under our
Constitution and family laws, an inviolable social institution imbued with
public interest and traditionally and constantly held to be a priority in our
culture's scale of values, for nothing stops the public from concluding that
marriage and a bigamous marriage at that (with its accompanying criminal
consequences), is actually a backdoor to legitimating adulterous children.
The letter of Article 89 of the New Civil Code must be transcended and the
absurd and sheepishly grotesque consequences of its application in the
instant case, rejected. It is not enough that the law exists to be
administered justly; in addition and more importantly, the law needs to
possess a just content. The law must by itself aim at and endeavor to
conform to, some criteria of rightness which repose on values espoused by
the very society it seeks to serve. As it is our duty to declare the law as it is,
there is no escaping the task of revealing the justness of the law in
accordance with society's avowed values. Consequently, it has been called a
golden rule of statutory interpretation that unreasonableness of the result
produced by one possible interpretation of a statute is reason for rejecting
that interpretation in favor of another which would produce a reasonable
result.
5

In resolving the issue at hand, I believe the emphasis should be on Article
269 which is, after all, the law squarely in point under the premises of this
case. Taking the letter of Article 269 as it is, it clearly prescribes the limits of
its applicability upon only natural children. Surely there is no canon against
using both common sense and common weal in construing the law as saying
what it obviously means:
Chapter 3
Art. 269. Only natural children can be ligitimated. Children born
outside wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception of
the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry
each other, are natural.
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 271. Only natural children who have been recognized by the
parents before or after the celebration of the marriage, or have
been declared natural children by final judgment, may be
considered legitimated by subsequent marriage. (Emphasis ours)
Legitimation is a right granted by law only to natural children who,
because their parents could have legally married at the time they were
conceived, cannot be substantially differentiated from legitimate
children once their parents do marry after their birth. This is because
said parents can marry any time, there being no legal impediment
preventing them from validly contracting marriage. The situation
obtaining respecting legitimate children and legitimated natural
children is certainly distinct from that respecting adulterous children
because the parents of adulterous children are admittedly
incapacitated to marry each other at the time said children were
conceived. It may easily be said, thus, that to interpret the law as
allowing adulterous children to be put on equal footing with the
legitimate children, would be putting a premium on adulterous
relationships, which is frowned upon by the society itself. Even the law
on succession under the New Civil Code distinguishes the respective
hereditary rights of the different kinds of children and significantly
assigns a diminishing share in accordance with the degree of
illegitimacy of the child concerned. Thus, Article 895 provides that the
legitime of each of the acknowledged natural children and each of the
natural children by legal fiction shall consist of one-half of the legitime
of each of the legitimate children or descendants and that of
illegitimate children who is neither of the above, four-fifths of the
legitime of an acknowledged natural child. It is, therefore, evident that
the treatment accorded children under the New Civil Code is
determined by the circumstances under which they have been
conceived and born, particularly, the capacity to marry of their parents
at the time that they were conceived.
Private respondent's children were precisely born when their deceased father
was still legally married to Sofia Bona. The marriage of the deceased and
private respondent in Tokyo, Japan, in 1951 could not have given a
semblance of legitimacy to their subsequent cohabitation and their issues
since such marriage was contracted during the subsistence of the deceased's
marriage with Sofia Bona. The relationship between the deceased and
private respondent, therefore, was no less adulterous notwithstanding an
attempt to legitimize the same through a bigamous marriage. There is no
other way to put it but that the deceased and private respondent were
having illicit relations; they were fully aware of the legal and moral
consequences of their actions, and they seemingly, in bad faith, attempted
to circumvent the law in their favor by contracting a bigamous marriage to
the prejudice of the legitimate issue in the person of the petitioner. There is
no quibbling that private respondent's children are adulterous children
whose status, by the simple expedient of a bigamous marriage contracted by
parties fully aware of their incapacity to marry, could never have been
intended by the law to be equated to that of petitioner who is the legitimate
child of the deceased in view of the public policy involved in preserving the
sanctity of marriage and preventing the proliferation of illegitimate issues.
As the earlier interpretation has been shown to lead to unreasonable results
with socially virulent implications, and the same originates from two
provisions, namely, Article 89 and Article 269 of the New Civil Code, we are
wont to state that they are irreconcilable provisions. And the applicable
statutory rule is that where there is an irreconcilable conflict between the
different provisions of a statute, the provision last in order of position will
prevail, since it is the latest expression of the legislative will.
6
More than
that Article 269 is the latest expression of the legislative will, however,
Article 269 on its face specifically states the law on legitimation, limits its
applicability to natural children, and is resonantly silent on the right of
adulterous children to be legitimated in the same way as children born to
parents who, at the time of their conception, were legally capable to marry
each other.
All told, the law tenders to us in no unpretentious terms the basis to rule
that private respondent's children, being adulterous children, have no right
to be legitimated under the New Civil Code. Such a ruling is not only in
accord with the explicit, unequivocal language of Article 269 but more
importantly animates and upholds the public policy as regards the institution
of marriage as the foundation of society.
Needless to say, such ruling sits well with the need to obviate any legal
injustice and social absurdity that may result if we were to rule otherwise.
The final cause of law is the welfare of society. The rule that
misses its aim cannot permanently justify its existence. "Ethical
considerations can no more be excluded from the administration
of justice which is the end and purpose of all civil laws than one
can exclude the vital air from his room and live.
7

The final rendering of the meaning of a statute is an act of judgment.
8
This
court has so judged this case at bench, and so we will perhaps be judged
thereby.
I, therefore, vote to grant the petition, set aside the assailed order of the
Regional Trial Court, and remand thereto the case for further proceedings.
VITUG, J., dissenting:
I vote to resolve the controversy in favor of the child. I take it to be the
legislative intent that the pertinent provisions of the Civil Code on children in
the book on persons and family relations are meant to enhance the child's
interest and welfare. This intent finds exemplification in Article 89 of the Civil
Code by explicitly providing that natural children by legal fiction (among
them those conceived or born of void marriages because the parents suffer
from an impediment to marry) shall have the same status, rights and
obligations as acknowledged natural children. If then under Article 269, in
relation to Article 270, of the Civil Code, acknowledged natural children are
given the right to be legitimated by the subsequent marriage of the parents,
the law must, by virtue of Article 89 aforesaid, likewise extend unqualifiedly
to natural children by legal fiction.
No matter how well legal calisthenics are played, there is, I must point out,
not a single provision of the Code that limits or circumscribes the scope and
application of Article 89. The law, I respectfully submit, should be so
construed as to attain congruity, rather than a division, among its several
provisions. The rule is expressed in the maxim interpretare et concordare
legibus est optimus interpretendi upon the theory that the legislature is
presumed not to have enacted conflicting provisions of law but that, on the
contrary, it must have meant to give them such parity and consequence as a
uniform jurisprudential system.
Most regrettably, I still perceive coolness, if not outright hostility, towards
illegitimate children who have not been fortunate enough to be conceived or
born under a better family circumstance. It is not enough that they are
unjustly ostracized by a segment in society; they are also called names
bastards, outcasts, adulterous, spurious that certainly they do not
deserve. If at all, their situation needs sympathy, not hatred or
condemnation.
Any conflict of view, however, would soon be a thing of the past, for as so
keenly observed by Mme. Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero, the Family Code,
which became effective on 03 August 1988, has deleted any reference to
natural children by legal fiction. The Family Code presently categorizes
children of void marriages into two kinds the legitimates which include
those conceived or born of void marriages under Article 36 and Article 52 of
the Family Code before the judicial declaration of nullity of such void
marriages and the illegitimates or children conceived or born of all other void
marriages (but evidently maintaining, for legitimation purposes, the
distinction between those whose parents, at the time of conception, were
not disqualified to marry and those whose parents were disqualified).
Narvasa, C.J. and Bellosillo, J., concurs.
KAPUNAN, J., dissenting:
The principal issue in the case at bench may be capsulized as to whether or
not the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to a lack
or excess of jurisdiction in considering the private respondent's children
legitimated under the facts established herein, and in declaring and
instituting said children as heirs of the decedent. As the law unequivocally
gives them such a right, I respectfully dissent from the majority.
I begin by observing that, taking their cue from the lower court's
inappropriate lifting of an editor's precis or statement from the syllabus of
the case of Tongoy vs. Court of Appeals,
1
both parties in the case at bench
have placed too much emphasis and reliance on the case of Tongoy,
2
the
facts and circumstances of which are not exactly on all fours with those
obtaining in the case at bench. The italicized portion of the syllabus of cases
appearing in official or unofficial reports of Supreme Court Decisions or
Resolutions
3
generally reflect the editor's summary of a discussion of an
issue or a specific point in a case, and, taken out of context, could be
misleading and inappropriate for citation. Judges should strive to read cases
which might have a bearing on cases before them in their entirety, and
quote or obtain their citations from the body of the decision, not the
syllabus.
The principal issue in Tongoy,
4
hinged "on the absence of an
acknowledgment (by the father prior to his death of his illegitimate children)
through any of the modes recognized by the Old Civil Code."
5
It is not,
however clear from the Court's discussion of the facts of the case, whether
the illegitimate children were sired during the subsistence of the first
marriage or after the death of the first wife. On the sale issue of the father's
acknowledgment, the Court therein took a liberal view, recognizing the fact
that the children "were in continuous possession of the status of natural, or
even legitimated, children"
6
and that they were "treated as legitimate
children not only by their parents but also by the entire clan,"
7
in declaring,
on equitable grounds, that the children therein were legitimate heirs.
For better appreciation of our ruling in Tongoy, let me quote the following:
The remaining assignment of error dwells on the question of
whether or not respondents Amado, Ricardo, Cresenciano and
Norberto, all surnamed Tongoy, may be considered legitimated
by virtue of the marriage of their parents, Francisco Tongoy and
Antonina Pabello, subsequent to their births and shortly before
Francisco died on September 15, 1926. Petitioners maintain that
since the said respondents were never acknowledged by their
father, they could not have been legitimated by the subsequent
marriage of their parents, much less could they inherit from the
estate of their father, the predecessor-in-interest of Luis D.
Tongoy, who is admittedly the half brother of the said
respondents.
Both the trial court and the respondent appellate court have
found overwhelming evidence to sustain the following
conclusions: that Amado P. Tongoy, Ricardo P. Tongoy,
Cresenciano P. Tongoy and Norberto P. Tongoy were born
illegitimate to Antonina Pabello on August 19, 1910 (Exh. A),
August 12, 1922 (Exh. B), December 1, 1915 (Exhs. C and C-1)
and August 4, 1922 (Exh. D), respectively; that Francisco
Tongoy was their father; that said Francisco Tongoy had before
them and Antonina Pabello two legitimate children by his first
wife, namely, Luis D. Tongoy and Patricio D. Tongoy; that
Francisco Tongoy and Antonina Pabello were married sometime
before his death on September 15, 1926 (Exh. H); that shortly
thereafter, Luis D. Tongoy and Patricio D. Tongoy executed an
Extra-Judicial Declaration of Heirs, leaving out their half-brothers
Amado, Ricardo, Cresenciano, and Norberto, who were then still
minors; that respondents Amado, Ricardo, Cresenciano and
Norberto were known and accepted by the whole clan as children
of Francisco; that they had lived in Hacienda Pulo with their
parents, but when they went to school, they stayed in the old
family home at Washington Street, Bacolod, together with their
grandmother, Agatona Tongoy; that everybody in Bacolod knew
them to be part of the Tongoy-Sonora clan; and that Luis D.
Tongoy as administrator of Hacienda Pulo, also spent for the
education of Ricardo Tongoy until he became a lawyer; and that
even petitioners admit the fact that they were half-brothers of
the late Luis D. Tongoy.
The bone of contention, however, hinges on the absence of an
acknowledgment through any of the modes recognized by the
Old Civil Code (please see Articles 131 and 135 of the Old Civil
Code), such that legitimation could not have taken place in view
of the provisions of Art. 121 of the same Code which states that
"children shall be considered legitimated by a subsequent
marriage only when they have been acknowledged by the
parents before or after the celebration thereof."
Of course, the overwhelming evidence found by respondent
Court of Appeals conclusively shows that respondents Amado,
Ricardo, Cresenciano and Norberto have been in continuous
possession of the status of natural, or even legitimated children.
Still, it recognizes the fact that such continuous possession of
status is not, per se, a sufficient acknowledgment but only a
ground to compel recognition (Alabat vs. Alabat, 21 SCRA 1379;
Pua vs. Chan, 21 SCRA 753; Larena vs. Rubio, 43 Phil. 1017).
Be that as it may, WE cannot but agree with the liberal view
taken by respondent Court of Appeals when it said:
. . . It does not seem equally manifest, however, that
defendants-appellants stand on a purely technical point in the
light of overwhelming evidence that appellees were natural
children of Francisco Tongoy and Antonina Pabello, and were
treated as legitimate children not only by their parents but only
by the entire clan. Indeed, it does not make much sense that
appellees should be deprived of their hereditary rights as
undoubted natural children of their father, when the only
plausible reason that the latter could have had in mind when he
married his second wife Antonina Pabello just over a month
before his death was to give legitimate status to their children. It
is not in keeping with the more liberal attitude taken by the New
Civil Code towards illegitimate children and the more
compassionate trend of the New Society to insist on a very literal
application of the law in requiring the formalities of compulsory
acknowledgment, when the only result is to unjustly deprive
children who are otherwise entitled to hereditary rights. From
the very nature of things, it is hardly to be expected of
appellees, having been reared as legitimate children by their
parents and treated as such by everybody, to bring an action to
compel their parents to acknowledge them. In the hitherto cited
case of Ramos vs. Ramos, supra, the Supreme Court showed the
way out of patent injustice and inequity that might result in
some cases simply because of the implacable insistence on the
technical amenities for acknowledgment. Thus, it held
Unacknowledged natural children have no rights whatsoever
(Buenaventura vs. Urbano, 5 Phil. 1; Siguiong vs. Siguiong, 8
Phil. 5, 11; Infante vs. Figueras, 4 Phil. 738; Crisolo vs.
Macadaeg, 94 Phil. 862). The fact that the plaintiffs, as natural
children of Martin Ramos, received shares in his estate implied
that they were acknowledged. Obviously, defendants Agustin
Ramos and Granada Ramos and the late Jose Ramos and
members of his family had treated them as his children.
Presumably, that fact was well-known in the community. Under
the circumstances, Agustin Ramos and Granada Ramos and the
heirs of Jose Ramos, are estopped from attacking plaintiffs'
status as acknowledged natural children (See Arts. 283 [4] and
2666 [3], New Civil Code). [Ramos vs. Ramos, supra].
With the same logic, estoppel should also operate in this case in
favor of appellees, considering, as already explained in detail,
that they have always been treated as acknowledged and
legitimated children of the second marriage of Francisco Tongoy,
not only by their presumed parents who raised them as their
children, but also by the entire Tongoy-Sonora clan, including
Luis D. Tongoy himself who had furnished sustenance to the clan
in his capacity as administrator of Hacienda Pulo and had in fact
supported the law studies of appellee Ricardo P. Tongoy in
Manila, the same way he did with Jesus T. Sonora in his medical
studies. As already pointed out, even defendants-appellants
have not questioned the fact that appellees are half-brothers of
Luis D. Tongoy. As a matter of fact, they are really children of
Francisco Tongoy and Antonina Pabello, and only the technicality
that their acknowledgment as natural children has not been
formalized in any of the modes prescribed by law appears to
stand in the way of granting them their hereditary rights. But
estoppel, as already indicated, precludes defendants-appellants
from attacking appellees' status as acknowledged natural or
legitimated children of Francisco Tongoy. In addition to estoppel,
this is decidedly one instance when technicality should give way
to conscience, equity and justice (cf. Vda. de Sta. Ana vs.
Rivera, L-22070, October 29, 1966, 18 SCRA 588) [pp. 196-198,
Vol. 1, rec.].
It is time that WE, too, take a liberal view in favor of natural
children who, because they enjoy the blessings and privileges of
an acknowledged natural child and even of a legitimated child,
found if rather awkward, if not unnecessary, to institute an
action for recognition against their natural parents, who, without
their asking, have been showering them with the same love,
care and material support as are accorded to legitimate children.
The right to participate in their father's inheritance should
necessarily follow.
8

However, acknowledgment is clearly not at issue here. Petitioner makes no
pretense that private respondent's children are not entitled to hereditary
rights.
9
She herself admits that the decedent acknowledged his paternity of
the private respondent's children and that they are indeed her brothers and
sisters.
10
What herein petitioner claims she opposes "is their being judicially
declared legitimated (by the respondent court) so as to entitle them to enjoy
the same rights as a legitimate heir,"
11
to her prejudice. Citing Article 269 of
the New Civil Code as "the law in point" in the case at bench, she contends
that the trial court erred in declaring her half brothers and sisters
legitimated because under the New Civil Code only natural children could be
legitimated. I find this contention, to which the majority of this divided Court
agrees, absolutely untenable.
The New Civil Code appears to limit the right to legitimation only to those
children conceived by parents not disqualified by any impediment to marry
each other, bestowing upon them, prior to such legitimation, the status of
natural children. Article 269 which provides the cornerstone for the
majority's holding today states that:
Art. 269. Only natural children can be legitimated. Children born
outside wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception of
the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry
each other, are natural.
The rule is, however, not absolute because even children conceived or born
out of marriages void from the very beginning under the Civil Code possess
the status of natural children by legal fiction and enjoy the same rights as
acknowledged natural children. Article 89 provides:
Art. 89. Children conceived or born out of marriages which are
void from the beginning shall have the same status, rights and
obligations as acknowledged natural children, and are called
natural children by legal fiction.
Children conceived of voidable marriages before the decree of
annulment shall be considered legitimate; and children
conceived thereafter shall have the same status, rights and
obligations as acknowledged natural children, and are also called
natural children by legal fiction.
Article 89, a creature of legislation (through the Code Commission) which
has remained unmolested since 1950 I must stress, is not an accidental
provision. The Civil Code Commission clearly intended Article 89,
notwithstanding its location in the Code, as a piece of reform, an exception
to the rule furnished by Article 269. More importantly, Article 89 (unlike
Article 269 which came from the Spanish Civil Code of 1889) was a new
provision deliberately introduced by the Code Commission as one of its
revolutionary reforms thirty five years ago. And doubt about the intention of
this piece of legislation should have been laid to rest by the following
explanation from the Code Commission's Report:
This proposed reform is based on the fact that such children
have been brought into this world through no fault of their own,
but through that of their parents. To visit punishment upon them
is most unjust. Moreover, though the marriage is void, or
voidable, at least there was a semblance of legality to the
relationship between the parents. This circumstance should cast
a mantle of protection over the children, who by legal fiction
should be treated as acknowledged natural children.
12

Since the decedent's 1951 marriage in Tokyo with the private respondent
was invalid,
13
being one of those marriages classified as void from the very
beginning under the Civil Code,
14
the status of her children clearly falls
under Article 89 which puts them on par, at least in terms of rights and
obligations, with acknowledged natural children. Since the rights of
acknowledged natural children include the right of legitimation under
Article 270 of the Civil
Code by the subsequent valid marriage of their parents,
15
it therefore
plainly follows that by virtue of Article 89, in relation to Article 270, the
private respondent's children were deemed legitimated by the subsequent
valid marriage of their parents in the Philippines in 1967.
This position is hardly an isolated one. Virtually all Civil and Family Code
commentators are united in the belief that Article 89 furnishes an escape
valve for children found under the circumstances existing in the case at
bench. Dr. Arturo Tolentino, in his commentary on the Civil Code, for
example, writes:
Under Article 89, natural children by legal fiction "shall have the
same status, rights and obligations as acknowledged natural
children." Theoretically therefore, natural children by legal fiction
can be
legitimated. . . . .
The following children by legal fiction . . . can be legitimated: . .
. (2) those born of a bigamous marriage, for the parents can
marry each other again upon the widowhood of the parent who
married twice. . . . .
16

In the same token, Prof. Ernesto L. Pineda, a member of the Family Code
Revision Committee acknowledges this exception the rule, stating that:
By way of exception, some natural children by legal fiction (Art.
89, NCC) can be legitimated such as (a) those born of couples
who married while below the allowable marrying age but who
contracted a new marriage after reaching the proper age; (b)
those born of bigamous marriages but where the parents
married each other upon the widowhood of the disqualified
parent; (c) those born of parents who got married before an
unauthorized officer and the parents contracted a new marriage
before an authorized one; (d) those born of parents who got
married without a marriage license (where license was required)
and the parents contracted a subsequent valid marriage; and (e)
children conceived after (not before) the decree of annulment of
a voidable marriage.
17

Justice Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, writing on the New Family Code
18
underscores
the difference in treatment of the subject of legitimation between the Family
Code and the Civil Code thus:
Under the Civil Code, children of bigamous marriages, who are
natural children by legal fiction, can be legitimated, since the
parents can marry each other upon the death of the first
husband or wife of the parent who married twice. Unfortunately
for such children, they can no longer be legitimated under the
Family Code, which has limited the kind of children to legitimate
and illegitimate and abolished the category of natural children by
legal fiction.
19

"Parenthetically," another commentator on the Family Code, Prof. Melencio
Sta. Maria writes, "under the Civil Code provisions of legitimation which were
repealed by the Family Code," there can be an instances where such children
could be legitimated.
20
Elaborating on these provisions in his 1995
commentary; he states:
This is so because according to the repealed Article 271 of the
Civil Code only acknowledged natural children can be
legitimated, and also according to the repealed Article 89 of the
Civil Code, a child born inside a void marriage was considered a
natural child by legal fiction with all the rights of an
acknowledged natural child. Since a natural child by legal fiction
has all the rights of an acknowledged natural child and the
statutory right to be legitimated was one of the rights of an
acknowledged natural child, the subject child therefore can be
legitimated if the parents subsequently validly remarried.
21

Clearly, the weight of authority in this country recognizes that under the
Civil Code, Article 89 unequivocally furnishes an exception to the rule that
only acknowledged natural children or those who by law have been declared
natural children by final judgment can be legitimated. This exception was, in
fact, acknowledged by the Family Code Revision Committee in its Meeting of
August 24, 1985, when it decided not to accord the same privilege extended
by Article 89 to similarly situated illegitimate children (under the family
Code's simplified classification) in the provisions of the new code. However,
for children born under the Civil Code, the exception is a legal fact which
could not be ignored. If under Article 269, in relation to Article 270 of the
Civil Code, acknowledged natural children are given the right to be
legitimated by the subsequent marriage of the parents, the law must, by
virtue of Article 89, also extend unqualifiedly to natural children by legal
fiction. This not only harmonizes Article 89 with the Civil Code articles on the
rights of acknowledged natural children and the articles on legitimation but
also leads to a result which enhances the welfare and interest of the child.
As Justice Vitug in his 1993 Compendium of Civil Law and Jurisprudence
writes:
The provisions of Art. 269 and 271 of the Civil Code, in a literal
sense appear to limit legitimation in favor of acknowledged
natural children or those who by law have been declared natural
children by final judgment. Considering, however, that natural
children by legal fiction (such as those born of void marriages
because the parents suffer from an impediment to marry) are
expressly given the same status, rights and obligations as
acknowledged natural children (Art. 89 Civil Code), and because
all doubts should be resolved in favor of the child, it is submitted
that the rules on legitimation should likewise extend to such
children.
22

Indeed, it hardly makes sense that the children of private respondent should
be deprived of their full hereditary rights as legitimated children when the
facts and circumstances of the case at bench clearly show the decedent's
intention to remove, once and for all, all manner of legal and moral
obstacles to his second and apparently blissful union with the private
respondent. For immediately after the death of his first wife in Guatemala in
1967, the decedent wasted no time in obtaining a Philippine marriage in
Tagaytay with his second wife. With a fairly considerable estate, it was not
entirely remote that the decedent had in mind not only the intention to
legitimatize his union with the private respondent but also the intention to
accord legitimate status to his children with his second wife. Given the
nature of their relationship and the clear intendment of the Civil Code under
Article 89 to place natural children by legal fiction on equal standing with
acknowledged natural children, a patent injustice and inequity will result if
we uphold herein petitioner's implacable position. Given the clear
intendment of the legislature in enacting the new provision (Article 89) over
thirty years ago when many of the members of this Court were still law
students, the majority's holding in the case at bench amounts to a belated
judicial veto of a valid piece of legislation.
I vote to DENY the instant petition.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Bellosillo and Francisco, JJ., concur.
PANGANIBAN, J., dissenting:
With all due respect, I dissent from the well-written ponencia of Mme.
Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero.
The pertinent portions of Arts. 89, 269, 270 and 271 of the New Civil Code
which are the codal provisions in point, read as follows:
Art. 89. Children conceived or born of marriages which are void
from the beginning shall have the same status, rights and
obligations as acknowledged natural children, and are called
natural children by legal fiction.
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 269. Only natural children can be legitimated. Children born
outside wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception of
the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry
each other, are natural.
Art. 270. Legitimation shall take place by the subsequent
marriage of the parents.
Art. 271. Only natural children who have been recognized by the
parents before or after the celebration of the marriage, or have
been declared natural children by final judgment, may be
considered legitimated by subsequent marriage. . . .
Art. 89 has been repealed by the Family Code (Executive Order No. 209)
which took effect on August 3, 1988 (Uyguangco vs. Court of Appeals, 178
SCRA 684 [1989]; Atienza vs. Brillantes, A.M. No. MTJ-92-706, March 29,
1995). It was one of the provisions under Title III, Book I of the New Civil
Code which have been omitted from the text of the present Family Code. But
it was the law in force at the time the legitimation in the case at bench took
place and should, consequently, govern the present controversy.
Art. 89 was a new provision in the sense that, unlike Articles 269 to 271,
aforequoted, which all came from the Spanish Civil Code of 1889, Art. 89
was one of the reforms instituted by the Code Commission that drafted the
New Civil Code. The Code Commission justified this new article in this wise:
This proposed reform is based on the fact that such children
have been brought into the world through no fault of their own,
but through that of their parents. To visit punishment upon them
is most unjust. Moreover, though the marriage was void, or
voidable, at least there was a semblance of legality of the
relationship between the parents. This circumstance should cast
the mantle of protection over the children, who by legal fiction
should be treated as acknowledged natural children. (Report of
the Code Commission, at p. 81.)
In conferring upon natural children by legal fiction the same status, rights
and obligations of acknowledged natural children, the clear intention of the
law was to put them at par with the latter although in fact they are not.
They are not in fact natural because they were conceived in the presence,
not absence, of an impediment between the parents. They are natural only
by figment of law. Thus, the name natural children by legal fiction.
But this legal fiction precisely operates to exempt them from the
requirement under Art. 269 that there be no impediment between the
parents at the time of the conception as well as from the requirement of
recognition by both parents under Art. 271. Plainly, this is the conclusion
that can rationally be given to the express, unequivocal declaration in Art.
89 that natural children by legal fiction "shall have the same status, rights
and obligations as acknowledged natural children" neither imposing any
condition nor subjecting the grant of status to any qualification or exception
of any kind. Had the intention been to deprive them of the right of
legitimation, the law would have said so. Or it would have inserted a
condition that they could be legitimated only if they can show compliance
with Arts. 269 and 271 of the Code. The fact that these insertions were not
made can only mean that the law intended to exempt this special class of
natural children from the strict requirements normally imposed on ordinary
natural children.
Under the provisions of the New Civil Code, legitimation takes place when
three requisites are met: (a) that the child be a natural child; (b) that he be
recognized by both parents either before or after a valid marriage; and (c)
that there be a subsequent valid marriage of the parents (cf. Paras, Civil
Code of the Philippines Annotated, 1984 Ed., Vol. I, p. 651). A natural child
by legal fiction possesses the first two requisites from inception by virtue of
Art. 89, which places him on the same plane as an acknowledged natural
child. In that sense, he has an advantage over a natural child as defined by
Art. 269, for the latter would still need to be recognized by both parents in
order to have the status and rights of an acknowledged natural child. Thus,
for the purpose of legitimation, the natural child by legal fiction needs to
fulfill only the third requisite: a valid subsequent marriage between his
parents (cf. Paras, op. cit., p. 651; Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines,
1987 Reprinting, Vol. I, p. 570). Where the impediment is permanent or
perpetual, such as incest or the fact that one or both of the parties have
been found guilty of killing the spouse of one of them, no legitimation can
ever take place as no valid marriage can ever be made between the parents
(Tolentino, op. cit., p. 570). But the bigamous character of a marriage is
terminable by, among other causes, the death of the first spouse, making a
subsequent marriage valid. And that simply was what happened in the case
at bench.
Prior to the repeal of Art. 89 by the Family Code, it was suggested by some
civil law scholars that a distinction should be made between natural children
by legal fiction who were conceived during the existence of an impediment,
on the one hand, and those who were conceived after the disappearance of
such impediment, on the other. Their theory was that only the latter would
qualify for legitimation. Such a stance would have been juridically sound
were it not for the fact that Art. 89 does not classify natural children by legal
fiction into the two suggested categories based on the presence or absence
of impediment at the time of conception of the child. Ubi lex non distinguit
nec nos distinguere debemus; where the law does not distinguish, we should
not (Gesolgon vs. Lacson, 2 SCRA 553, 556 [1961]; Libudan vs. Gil, 45
SCRA 17, 33 [1972]; Guevarra vs. Inocentes, 16 SCRA 379, 385 [1966];
Robles vs. Chromite Mining Co., 104 Phil. 688, 690 [1958]). Besides, as
already pointed out, the conferment on natural children by legal fiction of
the same status, rights and obligations as those of acknowledged natural
children under Art. 89, New Civil Code, evidently exempted the former from
the requirements imposed upon ordinary natural children by Arts. 269 and
271 of said Code. And, finally, Art. 220 of said Code fortifies this conclusion,
because said provision declares that in case of doubt, every intendment of
law or fact leans toward, among other things, "the legitimacy of children".
The doubt if there be such at all should therefore be resolved in favor
of sustaining the right to legitimation of the eleven (11) offsprings of the
decedent with private respondent Conchita Talag, regardless of the presence
or absence of an impediment to marry on the part of their parents at the
time of the conception of each of them.
Indeed, it is hardly fair to stigmatize and create social and successional
prejudice against children who had no fault in nor control over the marital
impediments which bedeviled their parents. They are the victims, not the
perpetrators, of these vagaries of life. Why then should they suffer their
consequences? In the final analysis, there are really no illegitimate children;
there are only illegitimate parents. And this dissent finds its philosophy in
this: that children, unarguably born and reared innocent in this world, should
benefit by every intendment of the law, particularly where as in this case
their parents, who originally suffered from a marital impediment, would
now want to overcome the improvident social and successional
consequences of such condition. Therefore, it is most unfair that the these
innocent children should be condemned to continue suffering the
consequences of the impediment they did not cause, when the very
impediment itself has disappeared.
The mere fact that such legitimation would impact adversely upon the
petitioner's successional rights as the lone legitimate child of the first
marriage is no reason to deny the children of the second marriage of their
own legal right to be deemed legitimated. Precisely, legitimation produces
such an effect i.e., diminution of successional rights of the legitimate
children. Art. 272 of the New Civil Code provides in fact that "(c)hildren who
are legitimated by subsequent marriage shall enjoy the same rights as
legitimate children." When the legislature decided to grant to children of void
carriages the same status, rights, and obligations as those of acknowledged
natural children, it is presumed to have carefully weighed precisely these
consequences upon the rights of the other children in the family. The policy
then was to cast a mantle of protection upon children of void marriages.
That policy is evidently enforced by enabling them to get legitimated in the
same manner as acknowledged natural children namely, by the
subsequent valid marriage of their parents. If the Family Code, by repealing
Art. 89 of the New Civil Code, is to be viewed as having reversed or
denigrated that policy (although, by and large, it appears to have
maintained the policy in many other areas of family law), such reversal or
denigration should not, and cannot, in any case impair rights already
acquired by and thus vested in the private respondents.
One last point. Both petitioner and private respondent admit that the eleven
(1l) children of the decedent with private respondent Conchita Talag were
born after the celebration of the bigamous marriage on July 25, 1951. (See
Petition, item 6, page 5; Rollo p. 6.) If any one of them was born prior
thereto, such child, not being a natural child by legal fiction but spurious,
cannot claim the special benefit granted under Art. 89 of the New Civil Code.
Unlike his brothers and sisters who are natural children by legal fiction, he
can only inherit by showing that he has been recognized by the decedent as
the latter's illegitimate child either voluntarily or by final judgment in a
proper paternity suit (Paterno vs. Paterno, 20 SCRA 585; Noble vs. Noble,
18 SCRA 1104; Clemena vs. Clemena, 24 SCRA 720; Divinagracia vs.
Rovira, 72 SCRA 307; Tolentino, The Civil Code of the Philippines, 1987
Reprinting, Vol. I, pp. 616-617.)
Footnotes
1 Special Proceeding Case No. C-851 filed before Branch 121 of
the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City.
2 Civil Code, Articles 264 and 272.
3 Ibid, Article 364.
4 Id., Article 291 (2).
5 Id., Article 888 (1st par.).
6 J.B.L. Reyes and R.C. Puno, An Outline of Philippine Civil Law,
Vol. I, 1965, p. 248, citing Arts. 301, 905, and 1347.
7 Civil Code, Article 366-367.
8 Ibid, Article 366.
9 Id., Article 291(3) and (4), in relation to Article 89.
10 Id., Article 895, in relation to Article 282.
11 Id., Articles 288 and 368.
12 Id., Article 291 (5).
13 Id., Article 895 (2nd and 3rd pars.).
14 Id., Article 886.
15 Id., Article 895 (3rd par.).
16 Reyes v. Court of Appeals, No. L-39537, March 19, 1985,
citing Alabat v. Alabat, 21 SCRA 1479 (1967); Mise v. Rodriguez,
95 Phil. 396 (1954); Magallanes v. Court of Appeals, 95 Phil. 797
(1954); Canales v. Ugarte, 91 Phil. 6 (1952); Malonda v.
Malonda, 81 Phil 149 (1948); Buenaventura v. Urbano, 5 Phil. 1
(1905).
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J., concurring:
1 Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil. 855, 864.
2 Sec. 2, Art. XV, 1987 Constitution.
3 Davies, Jack, Legislative Law and Process, 1986 Edition, p.
324.
4 Lloyd, Dennis, The Idea of Law, 1981 Edition, p. 327.
5 Sands, C. Dallas, Sutherland Statutory Construction, 1972
Edition, p. 37.
6 Crawford, Earl T., The Construction of Statutes, 1940 Edition,
p. 263.
7 Cardozo, Benjamin, The Nature of the Judicial Process, 1921
Edition, p. 66, citing Dillon.
8 Frankfurter, Felix, "Some Reflections on the Reading of
Statutes," in Statutes and Statutory Construction by C. Dallas
Sands, Vol. 3, 1973 Edition, p. 414.
KAPUNAN, J., dissenting:
1 123 SCRA 99 (1989). The lower court partly based its decision
on the following statement, quoted from the syllabus of the
decision, which does not appear in the body of the decision
itself: "The Supreme Court now takes a liberal attitude on the
status of children born out of wedlock such that if a person while
married begets children with another woman whom he later
marries after he becomes a widower, and during his lifetime he
showered such children with all paternal affections and favors,
then they should be deemed as legitimated, even in the absence
of an action for recognition.
2 Id.
3 For e.g., Philippine Reports and the Supreme Court Reports
Annotated.
4 Id.
5 Id., at 125.
6 Id., at 126.
7 Id.
8 Supra, note 3.
9 Rollo, p. 79.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 REPORT OF THE CODE COMMISSION, 81.
13 The third paragraph of Article 17 in relation to Article 15 (on
personal status and capacity) of the Civil Code provides:
"Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or properly, and
those which have for their object public order, public policy and
good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or
judgments promulgated or by determinations or conventions
agreed upon in a foreign country."
14 Civil Code, art. 80(4).
15 Civil Code, art. 270, provides: "Legitimation shall take place
by the subsequent marriage of the parents."
16 TOLENTINO, I COMMENTARIES AND JURISPRUDENCE ON THE
CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, 570 (1987).
17 ERNESTO L. PINEDA, THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES
ANNOTATED, 271 (1992).
18 ALICIA V. SEMPIO DIY, HANDBOOK ON THE FAMILY CODE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, 251 (1991 ED.).
19 Id.
20 MELENCIO S. STA. MARIA, JR., PERSONS AND FAMILY
RELATIONS LAW 485 (1995).
21 Id., at 485-486.
22 JOSE C. VITUG, COMPENDIUM OF CIVIL LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE, 86 (1993).
Legitimation of an illegitimate child
POINT OF LAW By POINT OF LAW by Teresita J. Herbosa | Updated May 6,
2003 - 12:00am
Legitimation is the process by which a child born out of wedlock may be
legitimated and enjoy the same status and rights as a legitimate child. It
takes place when the parents of the child who were not married to each
other at the time of conception, enter into a valid marriage after the birth of
the child.


Who can be legitimated? Before the Family Code took effect on Aug. 3,
1988, the applicable provision was Art. 269 of the Civil Code which provided
that "[O]nly natural children can be legitimated. Children born outside of
wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception of the former, were
not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other, are natural." The
Family Code, in Art. 177, now provides: "Only children conceived and born
outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception of the
former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other may
be legitimated." The only change was the deletion of "natural". This had to
do with the elimination of the classification of natural children. Under the
Family Code, there are only two classifications of children, namely,
legitimate and illegitimate.


Children conceived and born outside a valid marriage are illegitimate. They
are those born of parents who were not married or those born of common
law marriages, incestuous marriages, bigamous marriages, adulterous
relations, marriages void for reasons of public policy, couples below 18 years
of age, other void marriages except those based on the psychological
incapacity of the spouse(s) and remarriage of such psychologically
incapacitated spouse(s) where the requirements have not been met.
However, not all illegitimate children can be legitimated. Otherwise, Art. 177
could have just said that all children born outside of wedlock may be
legitimated. To qualify for legitimation, the illegitimate child’s parents
should not have been disqualified by any impediment to marry at the time of
conception.


The case of De Santos vs. Hon. Angeles, et al. (Dec. 12, 1995; 251 SCRA
206) exhaustively tackled a gray area of legitimation under the Civil Code
– whether Art. 289 allows legitimation of not only "natural children
proper" but also "natural children by legal fiction". Under the Civil Code,
children born of marriages which are void from the beginning or after the
decree of annulment in voidable marriages are "natural children by legal
fiction". Children conceived of parents who, at that time, were not
disqualified to marry by any impediment are the "natural children proper".
Briefly, the parents of the child in the De Santos case could not validly marry
because one had a prior subsisting marriage. They did marry but their
marriage was bigamous or void from the beginning. The issue was whether
the child born of that bigamous marriage who is considered a "natural child
by legal fiction" became legitimated when his parents married after the
death of the first spouse. The Supreme Court held that even if Art. 89 of the
Civil Code gave natural children by legal fiction the same status, rights and
obligations as acknowledged natural children, Art. 269 applies only to
natural children proper or those born outside of wedlock of parents who, at
the time of the conception, were not disqualified by any impediment to
marry. The De Santos case and the repeal of Art. 89 of the Civil Code thus
support a strict interpretation of Art. 177 of the Family Code.


Supposing that the prior subsisting marriage is void or voidable, can the
illegitimate child of one of the spouses born before the declaration of
absolute nullity or judgment of annulment be legitimated. The prevailing
view is that the illegitimate child cannot be legitimated because the parent
with the prior subsisting marriage was disqualified to marry at the time of
conception. Even if the prior subsisting marriage is void or voidable and a
declaration of absolute nullity or judgment of annulment is obtained after
the birth of the illegitimate child, legitimation cannot take place.


Justice Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, who was a member of the Civil Code Revision
Committee that drafted the Family Code, cited as one of the reasons for
limiting legitimation the unfairness to the legitimate children in terms of
successional rights. Presently, therefore, children of adulterous relations,
incestuous and bigamous marriages, and other void marriages, and
marriages void by reason of public policy under Art. 38 of the Family Code
(marriages between collateral blood relatives up to the fourth civil degree,
other relatives by affinity or adoption and where one killed his spouse or the
spouse of the other party) are incapable of legitimation.


Legitimation takes place by the subsequent marriage of the parents of the
child. Justice Diy opines that as long as the requisites of Art. 177 are
complied with, the child is ipso facto legitimated no matter how long a period
of time has elapsed from the birth of said child to the subsequent marriage
of his parents. In fact, even if the subsequent marriage turns out to be
voidable and is annulled, the child remains legitimated. Further, the effects
of legitimation retroact to the time of the child’s birth.


Legitimation may be impugned by those prejudiced in their rights within five
years from the time their cause of action accrues. Those prejudiced are the
legitimate children or their heirs since they will suffer a diminution of
inheritance. Since the prejudice involves successional rights, the cause of
action accrues upon the death of the common parent.


(The author is a senior partner of Angara Abello Concepcion Regala & Cruz
Law Offices. She may be contacted at 830-8000; fax at 894-4697 or email
at: accra@accralaw.com)
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-18753 March 26, 1965
VICENTE B. TEOTICO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
ANA DEL VAL, ETC., oppositor-appellant.
Antonio Gonzales for petitioner-appellant.
J.C. Zulueta, G. D. David and N. J. Quisumbing for oppositor-appellant.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Maria Mortera y Balsalobre Vda. de Aguirre died on July 14, 1955 in the City
of Manila leaving properties worth P600,000.00. She left a will written in
Spanish which she executed at her residence at No. 2 Legarda St., Quiapo,
Manila. She affixed her signature at the bottom of the will and on the left
margin of each and every page thereof in the presence of Pilar Borja, Pilar C.
Sanchez, and Modesto Formilleza, who in turn affixed their signatures below
the attestation clause and on the left margin of each and every page of the
will in the presence of the testatrix and of each other. Said will was
acknowledged before Notary Public Niceforo S. Agaton by the testatrix and
her witnesses.
In said will the testatrix made the following preliminary statement: that she
was possessed of the full use of her mental faculties; that she was free from
illegal pressure or influence of any kind from the beneficiaries of the will and
from any influence of fear or threat; that she freely and spontaneously
executed said will and that she had neither ascendants nor descendants of
any kind such that she could freely dispose of all her estate.
Among the many legacies and devises made in the will was one of
P20,000.00 to Rene A. Teotico, married to the testatrix's niece named
Josefina Mortera. To said spouses the testatrix left the usufruct of her
interest in the Calvo building, while the naked ownership thereof she left in
equal parts to her grandchildren who are the legitimate children of said
spouses. The testatrix also instituted Josefina Mortera as her sole and
universal heir to all the remainder of her properties not otherwise disposed
of in the will.
On July 17, 1955, Vicente B. Teotico filed a petition for the probate of the
will before the Court of First Instance of Manila which was set for hearing on
September 3, 1955 after the requisite publication and service to all parties
concerned.
Ana del Val Chan, claiming to be an adopted child of Francisca Mortera, a
deceased sister of the testatrix, as well as an acknowledged natural child of
Jose Mortera, a deceased brother of the same testatrix, filed on September
2, 1955 an opposition to the probate of the will alleging the following
grounds: (1) said will was not executed as required by law; (2) the testatrix
was physically and mentally incapable to execute the will at the time of its
execution; and (3) the will was executed under duress, threat or influence of
fear.
Vicente B. Teotico, filed a motion to dismiss the opposition alleging that the
oppositor had no legal personality to intervene. The probate court, after due
hearing, allowed the oppositor to intervene as an adopted child of Francisca
Mortera, and on June 17, 1959, the oppositor amended her opposition by
alleging, the additional ground that the will is inoperative as to the share of
Dr. Rene Teotico because the latter was the physician who took care of the
testatrix during her last illness.
After the parties had presented their evidence, the probate court rendered
its decision on November 10, 1960, admitting the will to probate but
declaring the disposition made in favor of Dr. Rene Teotico void with the
statement that the portion to be vacated by the annulment should pass to
the testatrix's heirs by way of intestate succession.
Petitioner Teotico, together with the universal heir Josefina Mortera, filed a
motion for reconsideration of that part of the decision which declares the
portion of the estate to be vacated by the nullity of the legacy made to Dr.
Rene Teotico as passing to the legal heirs, while the oppositor filed also a
motion for reconsideration of the portion of the judgment which decrees the
probate of the will. On his part, Dr. Rene Teotico requested leave to
intervene and to file a motion for reconsideration with regard to that portion
of the decision which nullified the legacy made in his favor.
The motions for reconsideration above adverted to having been denied, both
petitioner and oppositor appealed from the decision, the former from that
portion which nullifies the legacy in favor of Dr. Rene Teotico and declares
the vacated portion as subject of succession in favor of the legal heirs, and
the latter from that portion which admits the will to probate. And in this
instance both petitioner and oppositor assign several errors which, stripped
of non-essentials, may be boiled down to the following: (1) Has oppositor
Ana del Val Chan the right to intervene in this proceeding?; (2) Has the will
in question been duly admitted to probate?; (3) Did the probate court
commit an error in passing on the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the
will and in determining who should inherit the portion to be vacated by the
nullification of the legacy made in favor of Dr. Rene Teotico?
These issues will be discussed separately.
1. It is a well-settled rule that in order that a person may be allowed to
intervene in a probate proceeding he must have an interest in the estate, or
in the will, or in the property to be affected by it either as executor or as a
claimant of the estate (Ngo The Hua v. Chung Kiat Hua, et al., L-17091,
September 30, 1963); and an interested party has been defined as one who
would be benefited by the estate such as an heir or one who has a claim
against the estate like a creditor (Idem). On the other hand, in Saguinsin v.
Lindayag, et al., L-17750, December 17, 1962, this Court said:
According to Section 2, Rule 80 of the Rules of Court, a petition for
letters of administration must be filed by an "interested person." An
interested party has been defined in this connection as one who would
be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim
against the estate, such as a creditor (Intestate Estate of Julio
Magbanwa 40 O.G. 1171). And it is well settled in this jurisdiction that
in civil actions as well as special proceedings, the interest required in
order that a person may be a party thereto must be material and
direct, and not merely indirect or contingent (Trillana vs. Crisostomo,
G.R. No. L-3370, August 22, 1951; Rapinosa vs. Barrion, 70 Phil.
311).
The question now may be asked: Has oppositor any interest in any of the
provisions of the will, and, in the negative, would she acquire any right to
the estate in the event that the will is denied probate?
Under the terms of the will, oppositor has no right to intervene because she
has no interest in the estate either as heir, executor, or administrator, nor
does she have any claim to any property affected by the will, because it
nowhere appears therein any provision designating her as heir, legatee or
devisee of any portion of the estate. She has also no interest in the will
either as administratrix or executrix. Neither has she any claim against any
portion of the estate because she is not a co-owner thereof, and while she
previously had an interest in the Calvo building located in Escolta, she had
already disposed of it long before the execution of the will.1wph1.t
In the supposition that, the will is denied probate, would the oppositor
acquire any interest in any portion of the estate left by the testatrix? She
would acquire such right only if she were a legal heir of the deceased, but
she is not under our Civil Code. It is true that oppositor claims to be an
acknowledged natural child of Jose Mortera, a deceased brother of the
deceased, and also an adopted daughter of Francisca Mortera, a deceased
sister of the testatrix, but such claim cannot give her any comfort for, even
if it be true, the law does not give her any right to succeed to the estate of
the deceased sister of both Jose Mortera and Francisca Mortera. And this is
so because being an illegitimate child she is prohibited by law from
succeeding to the legitimate relatives of her natural father. Thus, Article 992
of our Civil Code provides: "An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab
intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother;
... ." And the philosophy behind this provision is well expressed in Grey v.
Fabie, 68 Phil. 128, as follows:
Between the natural child and the legitimate relatives of the father or
mother who acknowledged it, the Code denies any right of succession.
They cannot be called relatives and they have no right to inherit. Of
course, there is a blood tie, but the law does not recognize it. On this,
article 943 is based upon the reality of the facts and upon the
presumption will of the interested parties; the natural child is
disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate family; the legitimate
family is, in turn, hated by the natural child; the latter considers the
privileged condition of the former and the resources of which it is
thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the natural child nothing
but the product of sin, a palpable evidence of a blemish upon the
family. Every relation is ordinarily broken in life; the law does no more
than recognize this truth, by avoiding further grounds of resentment.
(7 Manresa, 3d., p. 110.)
The oppositor cannot also derive comfort from the fact that she is an
adopted child of Francisca Mortera because under our law the relationship
established by adoption is limited solely to the adopter and the adopted and
does not extend to the relatives of the adopting parents or of the adopted
child except only as expressly provided for by law. Hence, no relationship is
created between the adopted and the collaterals of the adopting parents. As
a consequence, the adopted is an heir of the adopter but not of the relatives
of the adopter.
The relationship established by the adoption, however, is limited to the
adopting parent, and does not extend to his other relatives, except as
expressly provided by law. Thus, the adopted child cannot be
considered as a relative of the ascendants and collaterals of the
adopting parents, nor of the legitimate children which they may have
after the adoption, except that the law imposes certain impediments to
marriage by reason of adoption. Neither are the children of the
adopted considered as descendants of the adopter. The relationship
created is exclusively between the adopter and the adopted, and does
not extend to the relatives of either. (Tolentino, Civil Code of the
Philippines, Vol. 1, p. 652).
Relationship by adoption is limited to adopter and adopted, and does
not extend to other members of the family of either; but the adopted
is prohibited to marry the children of the adopter to avoid scandal. (An
Outline of Philippine Civil Law by Justice Jose B. L. Reyes and Ricardo
C. Puno, Vol. 1, p. 313; See also Caguioa, Comments and Cases on
Civil Law 1955, Vol 1, pp. 312-313; Paras, Civil Code of the
Philippines, 1959 ed., Vol. 1, p. 515)
It thus appears that the oppositor has no right to intervene either as
testamentary or as legal heir in this probate proceeding contrary to the
ruling of the court a quo.
2. The next question to be determined is whether the will Exhibit A was duly
admitted to probate. Oppositor claims that the same should not have been
admitted not only because it was not properly attested to but also because it
was procured thru pressure and influence and the testatrix affixed her
signature by mistake believing that it contained her true intent.
The claim that the will was not properly attested to is contradicted by the
evidence of record. In this respect it is fit that we state briefly the
declarations of the instrumental witnesses.
Pilar Borja testified that the testatrix was in perfect state of health at the
time she executed the will for she carried her conversation with her
intelligently; that the testatrix signed immediately above the attestation
clause and on each and every page thereof at the left-hand margin in the
presence of the three instrumental witnesses and the notary public; that it
was the testatrix herself who asked her and the other witnesses to act as
such; and that the testatrix was the first one to sign and later she gave the
will to the witnesses who read and signed it.
Pilar G. Sanchez also testified that she knew the testatrix since 1945; that it
was the testatrix herself who asked her to be a witness to the will; that the
testatrix was the first one to sign and she gave the will later to the witnesses
to sign and afterwards she gave it to the notary public; that on the day of
the execution of the will the testatrix was in the best of health.
Modesto Formilleza also testified that he was asked by the testatrix to be
one of the witnesses to the will; that he read and understood the attestation
clause before he signed the document, and all the witnesses spoke either in
Spanish or in Tagalog. He finally said that the instrumental witnesses and
the testatrix signed the will at the same time and place and identified their
signatures.
This evidence which has not been successfully refuted proves conclusively
that the will was duly executed because it was signed by the testatrix and
her instrumental witnesses and the notary public in the manner provided for
by law.
The claim that the will was procured by improper pressure and influence is
also belied by the evidence. On this point the court a quo made the following
observation:
The circumstance that the testatrix was then living under the same
roof with Dr. Rene Teotico is no proof adequate in law to sustain the
conclusion that there was improper pressure and undue influence. Nor
is the alleged fact of isolation of the testatrix from the oppositor and
her witnesses, for their supposed failure to see personally the
testatrix, attributable to the vehemence of Dr. Rene Teotico, to
exclude visitors, took place years after the execution of the will on May
17, 1951. Although those fact may have some weight to support the
theory of the oppositor, yet they must perforce yield to the weightier
fact that nothing could have prevented the testatrix, had she really
wanted to from subsequently revoking her 1951 will if it did not in fact
reflect and express her own testamentary dispositions. For, as testified
to by the oppositor and her witnesses, the testatrix was often seen at
the Escolta, in Quiapo and Sta. Cruz, Manila, walking and accompanied
by no one. In fact, on different occasions, each of them was able to
talk with her.
We have examined the evidence on the matter and we are fully in accord
with the foregoing observation. Moreover, the mere claim that Josefina
Mortera and her husband Rene Teotico had the opportunity to exert pressure
on the testatrix simply because she lived in their house several years prior
to the execution of the will and that she was old and suffering from
hypertension in that she was virtually isolated from her friends for several
years prior to her death is insufficient to disprove what the instrumental
witnesses had testified that the testatrix freely and voluntarily and with full
consciousness of the solemnity of the occasion executed the will under
consideration. The exercise of improper pressure and undue influence must
be supported by substantial evidence and must be of a kind that would
overpower and subjugate the mind of the testatrix as to destroy her free
agency and make her express the will of another rather than her own (Coso
v. Deza, 42 0. G. 596). The burden is on the person challenging the will that
such influence was exerted at the time of its execution, a matter which here
was not done, for the evidence presented not only is insufficient but was
disproved by the testimony of the instrumental witnesses.
3. The question of whether the probate court could determine the intrinsic
validity of the provisions of a will has been decided by this Court in a long
line of decisions among which the following may be cited:
Opposition to the intrinsic validity or legality of the provisions of the
will cannot be entertained in Probate proceeding because its only
purpose is merely to determine if the will has been executed in
accordance with the requirements of the law." (Palacios v. Palacios, 58
0. G. 220)
... The authentication of a will decides no other questions than such as
touch upon the capacity of the testator and the compliance with those
requisites or solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity of
wills. It does not determine nor even by implication prejudge the
validity or efficiency of the provisions, these may be impugned as
being vicious or null, notwithstanding its authentication. The questions
relating to these points remain entirely unaffected, and may be raised
even after the will has been authenticated. ...
From the fact that the legalization of a will does not validate the
provisions therein contained, it does not follow that such provision lack
the efficiency, or fail to produce the effects which the law recognizes
when they are not impugned by anyone. In the matter of wills it is a
fundamental doctrine that the will of the testator is the law governing
the interested parties, and must be punctually complied with in so far
as it is not contrary to the law or to public morals. (Montaano v.
Suesa, 14 Phil. 676, 679-680)
To establish conclusively as against everyone, and once for all, the
facts that a will was executed with the formalities required by law and
that the testator was in a condition to make a will, is the only purpose
of the proceedings under the new code for the probate of a will. (Sec.
625.) The judgment in such proceedings determines and can
determine nothing more. In them the court has no power to pass upon
the validity of any provisions made in the will. It can not decide, for
example, that a certain legacy is void and another one is valid.
(Castaeda v. Alemany, 3 Phil. 426, 428)
Pursuant to the foregoing precedents the pronouncement made by the court
a quo declaring invalid the legacy made to Dr. Rene Teotico in the will
Exhibit A must be set aside as having been made in excess of its jurisdiction.
Another reason why said pronouncement should be set aside is that the
legatee was not given an opportunity to defend the validity of the legacy for
he was not allowed to intervene in this proceeding. As a corollary, the other
pronouncements touching on the disposition of the estate in favor of some
relatives of the deceased should also be set aside for the same reason.
WHEREFORE, with the exception of that portion of the decision which
declares that the will in question has been duly executed and admitted the
same to probate, the rest of the decision is hereby set aside. This case is
ordered remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings. No
pronouncement as to costs.
Bengzon, C.J., Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Regala,
Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.
Dizon, J., took no part.
Teotico vs Del Val
Teotico vs Del Val
GR No. L18753, March 26, 1965

FACTS:

Maria Mortera died on July 1955 leaving properties worth P600,000. She
executed a will written in Spanish, affixed her signature and acknowledged
before Notary Public by her and the witnesses. Among the legacies made in
the will was the P20,000 for Rene Teotico who was married to the testatrixs
niece, Josefina Mortera. The usufruct of Marias interest in the Calvo
Building were left to the said spouses and the ownership thereof was left in
equal parts to her grandchildren, the legitimate children of said
spouses. Josefina was likewise instituted, as sole and universal heir to all
the remainder of her properties not otherwise disposed by will. Vicente
Teotico filed a petition for the probate of the will but was opposed by Ana del
Val Chan, claiming that she was an adopted child of Francisca (deceased
sister of Maria) and an acknowledged natural child of Jose (deceased brother
of Maria), that said will was not executed as required by law and that Maria
as physically and mentally incapable to execute the will at the time of its
execution and was executed under duress, threat, or influence of fear.

ISSUE: WON defendant has right to intervene in this proceeding.

HELD:

It is a well-settled rule that in order that a person may be allowed to
intervene in a probate proceeding is that he must have an interest in the
estate, will or in the property to be affected by either as executor or as a
claimant of the estate and be benefited by such as an heir or one who has a
claim against it as creditor. Under the terms of the will, defendant has no
right to intervene because she has no such interest in the estate either as
heir, executor or administrator because it did not appear therein any
provision designating her as heir/ legatee in any portion of the estate. She
could have acquired such right if she was a legal heir of the deceased but
she is not under the CIVIL CODE. Even if her allegations were true, the law
does not give her any right to succeed the estate of the deceased sister of
both Jose and Francisca because being an illegitimate child she is prohibited
by law from succeeding to the legitimate relatives of her natural father and
that relationship established by adoption is limited solely to the adopter and
adopted and does not extend to the relatives of the adopting parents except
only as expressly provided by law. As a consequence, she is an heir of the
adopter but not of the relatives of the adopter.

Hence, defendant has no right to intervene either as testamentary or as
legal heir in the probate proceeding.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 92326 January 24, 1992
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ZENAIDA C. BOBILES, respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Mariano B. Miranda for private respondent.

REGALADO, J.:
Dissatisfied with the decision of respondent Court of Appeals promulgated on
February 20, 1990
1
which affirmed in toto the decision of Branch 2 of the
Regional Trial Court of Legaspi City
2
granting the petition of herein private
respondent to adopt the minor Jason Condat, petitioner seeks the reversal
thereof in the present petition for review on certiorari.
On February 2, 1988, Zenaida Corteza Bobiles filed a petition to adopt Jason
Condat, then six (6) years old and who had been living with her family since
he was four (4) months old, before the Regional Trial Court of Legaspi City,
docketed therein as Special Proceeding No. 1386.
3

The court a quo, finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance,
issued an order dated February 15, 1988 setting the petition for hearing on
March 28, 1988.
4
The order was duly published, with copies thereof
seasonably served on the Solicitor General; Assistant Provincial Fiscal
Mediavillo, Jr. of Albay; Salvador Condat, father of the child; and the social
worker assigned to the court. A copy of said order was posted on the bulletin
board of the court and in the other places it had required for that purpose.
Nobody appeared to oppose the petition.
5

Compliance with the jurisdictional requirements having been proved at the
hearing, the testimonies of herein private respondent, together with that of
her husband, Dioscoro Bobiles, and one Ma. Luz Salameno of the
Department of Social Welfare and Development were taken and admitted in
the proceedings.
On March 20, 1988, the trial court rendered judgment disposing as follows:
ACCORDINGLY, it is declared that henceforth, the minor child,
JASON CONDAT, be freed from all legal obligations of obedience
and maintenance with respect to his natural parents, and be, to
all intents and purposes, the child of the spouses Dioscoro and
Zenaida Bobiles, and the surname of the child be changed to
"Bobiles" which is the surname of the petitioner.
Furnish the Office of the Solicitor General, Manila, the
Department of Social Welfare and Development, Regional Office,
Region V, Legaspi City, and the Local Civil Registrar of Tiwi,
Albay, with copies of this decision.
6

Herein petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which, as earlier stated,
affirmed the aforesaid decision of the court below. Hence, this present
petition with the following assignment of errors:
1. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the Family
Code cannot be applied retroactively to the petition for adoption
filed by Zenaida C. Bobiles; and
2 The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial
court's decision which granted the petition to adopt Jason Condat
in favor of spouses Dioscoro Bobiles and Zenaida C. Bobiles.
7

The petition for adoption was filed by private respondent Zenaida C. Bobiles
on February 2, 1988, when the law applicable was Presidential Decree No.
603, the Child and Youth Welfare Code. Under said code, a petition for
adoption may be filed by either of the spouses or by both of them. However,
after the trial court rendered its decision and while the case was pending on
appeal in the Court of Appeals, Executive Order No. 209, the Family Code,
took effect on August 3, 1988. Under the said new law, joint adoption by
husband and wife is mandatory.
On the foregoing consideration, petitioner contends that the petition for
adoption should be dismissed outright for it was filed solely by private
respondent without joining her husband, in violation of Article 185 of the
Family Code which requires joint adoption by the spouses. It argues that the
Family Code must be applied retroactively to the petition filed by Mrs.
Bobiles, as the latter did not acquire a vested right to adopt Jason Condat by
the mere filing of her petition for adoption. We are not persuaded.
Preliminarily, we observe that petitioner's theory implies that the non-
inclusion of Dioscoro Bobiles as a co-petitioner is a jurisdictional defect,
hence its prayer for an outright dismissal on that score. It could not be
taking exception only on the ground of non-joinder since petitioner must be
aware that non-joinder is not a ground for the dismissal of an action or a
special proceeding. 8 We further apprehend that this objection has been
raised for the first time on appeal in respondent court. Nonetheless, we shall
clarify petitioner's misgivings as postulated in its aforestated assignment of
errors.
Article 246 of the Family Code provides for retroactive effect of appropriate
relevant provisions thereof, subject to the qualification that such
retrospective application will not prejudice or impair vested or acquired
rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.
A vested right is one whose existence, effectivity and extent does not
depend upon events foreign to the will of the holder.
9
The term expresses
the concept of present fixed interest which in right reason and natural justice
should be protected against arbitrary State action, or an innately just and
imperative right which enlightened free society, sensitive to inherent and
irrefragable individual rights, cannot deny.
10
Vested rights include not only
legal or equitable title to the enforcement of a demand, but also an
exemption from new obligations created after the right has vested.
11

Under the Child and Youth Welfare Code, private respondent had the right to
file a petition for adoption by herself, without joining her husband therein.
When Mrs. Bobiles filed her petition, she was exercising her explicit and
unconditional right under said law. Upon her filing thereof, her right to file
such petition alone and to have the same proceed to final adjudication, in
accordance with the law in force at the time, was already vested and cannot
be prejudiced or impaired by the enactment of a new law.
When private respondent filed her petition in Special Proceeding No. 1386,
the trial court acquired jurisdiction thereover in accordance with the
governing law. Jurisdiction being a matter of substantive law, the
established rule is that the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the
statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action.
12
We do not
find in the present case such facts as would constitute it as an exception to
the rule.
The first error assigned by petitioner warrants a review of applicable local
and foreign jurisprudence. For that purpose, we start with the premise that
Article 185 of the Family Code is remedial in nature. Procedural statutes are
ordinarily accorded a retrospective construction in the sense that they may
be applied to pending actions and proceedings, as well as to future actions.
However, they will not be so applied as to defeat procedural steps completed
before their enactment.
13

Procedural matters are governed by the law in force when they arise, and
procedural statutes are generally retroactive in that they apply to pending
proceedings and are not confined to those begun after their enactment
although, with respect to such pending proceedings, they affect only
procedural steps taken after their enactment.
14

The rule that a statutory change in matters of procedure will affect pending
actions and proceedings, unless the language of the act excludes them from
its operation, is not so extensive that it may be used to validate or invalidate
proceedings taken before it goes into effect, since procedure must be
governed by the law regulating it at the time the question of procedure
arises.
15

The jurisdictional, as distinguished from the purely procedural, aspect of a
case is substantive in nature and is subject to a more stringent rule. A
petition cannot be dismissed by reason of failure to comply with a law which
was not yet in force and effect at the time. As long as the petition for
adoption was sufficient in form and substance in accordance with the law in
governance at the time it was filed, the court acquires jurisdiction and
retains it until it fully disposes of the case.
16
To repeat, the jurisdiction of
the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the
commencement of the action. Such jurisdiction of a court, whether in
criminal or civil cases, once it attaches cannot be ousted by subsequent
happenings or events, although of a character which would have prevented
jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance.
17

On the second issue, petitioner argues that, even assuming that the Family
Code should not apply retroactively, the Court of Appeals should have
modified the trial court's decision by granting the adoption in favor of private
respondent Zenaida C. Bobiles only, her husband not being a petitioner. We
do not consider this as a tenable position and, accordingly, reject the same.
Although Dioscoro Bobiles was not named as one of the petitioners in the
petition for adoption filed by his wife, his affidavit of consent, attached to the
petition as Annex "B" and expressly made an integral part thereof, shows
that he himself actually joined his wife in adopting the child. The pertinent
parts of his written consent read as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
2. That my wife, ZENAIDA O. CORTEZA BOBILES and I mutually
desire to adopt as our child, a boy named JASON CONDAT, still a
minor being six (6) years old, likewise residing at 18 C. Imperial
Street, Legaspi City, Albay, also in the Philippines;
3. That we are filing the corresponding Petition for Adoption of
said minor child, JASON CONDAT, before the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations court, now the Regional Trial Court in Legaspi
City, Albay in the Philippines;
4. That I, Dioscoro C. Bobiles as the husband and father, am
giving my lawful consent to this adoption of said minor child,
JASON CONDAT;
5. That further, my wife ZENAIDA O. CORTEZA BOBILES, and I
have continuously reared and cared for this minor child, JASON
CONDAT since birth;
6. That as a result thereof, my wife and I have developed a kind
of maternal and paternal love for the boy as our very own,
exercising therein the care, concern and diligence of a good
father toward him;
7. That I am executing this document, an AFFIDAVIT OF
CONSENT for whatever it is worth in the premises as to the
matter of adoption of this minor child, JASON CONDAT, by my
wife ZENAIDA O. CORTEZA BOBILES and by me, DIOSCORO C.
BOBILES, in any court of justice; (Emphasis supplied.)
18

xxx xxx xxx
The foregoing declarations, and his subsequent confirmatory testimony in
open court, are sufficient to make him a co-petitioner. Under the
circumstances then obtaining, and by reason of his foreign residence, he
must have yielded to the legal advice that an affidavit of consent on his part
sufficed to make him a party to the petition. This is evident from the text of
his affidavit. Punctiliousness in language and pedantry in the formal
requirements should yield to and be eschewed in the higher considerations
of substantial justice. The future of an innocent child must not be
compromised by arbitrary insistence of rigid adherence to procedural rules
on the form of pleadings.
We see no reason why the following doctrines in American law should not
apply to this case and, for that matter, in our jurisdiction. It is a settled rule
therein that adoption statutes, as well as matters of procedure leading up to
adoption, should be liberally construed to carry out the beneficent purposes
of the adoption institution and to protect the adopted child in the rights and
privileges coming to it as a result of the adoption.
19
The modern tendency
of the courts is to hold that there need not be more than a substantial
compliance with statutory requirements to sustain the validity of the
proceeding; to refuse would be to indulge in such a narrow and technical
construction of the statute as to defeat its intention and beneficial results or
to invalidate proceedings where every material requirement of the statute
was complied with.
In support of this rule it is said that it is not the duty of the courts to bring
the judicial microscope to bear upon the case in order that every slight
defect may be enlarged and magnified so that a reason may be found for
declaring invalid an act consummated years before, but rather to approach
the case with the inclination to uphold such acts if it is found that there was
a substantial compliance with the statute.
20
The technical rules of pleading
should not be stringently applied to adoption proceedings, and it is deemed
more important that the petition should contain facts relating to the child
and its parents, which may give information to those interested, than that it
should be formally correct as a pleading. Accordingly, it is generally held
that a petition will confer jurisdiction if it substantially complies with the
adoption statute, alleging all facts necessary to give the court jurisdiction.
21

In determining whether or not to set aside the decree of adoption the
interests and welfare of the child are of primary and paramount
consideration.
22
The welfare of a child is of paramount consideration in
proceedings involving its custody and the propriety of its adoption by
another, and the courts to which the application for adoption is made is
charged with the duty of protecting the child and its interests and, to bring
those interests fully before it, it has authority to make rules to accomplish
that end.
23
Ordinarily, the approval of the adoption rests in the sound
discretion of the court. This discretion should be exercised in accordance
with the best interests of the child, as long as the natural rights of the
parents over the child are not disregarded. In the absence of a showing of
grave abuse, the exercise of this discretion by the approving official will not
be disturbed.
24

In the case at bar, the rights concomitant to and conferred by the decree of
adoption will be for the best interests of the child. His adoption is with the
consent of his natural parents.
25
The representative of the Department of
Social Welfare and Development unqualifiedly recommended the approval of
the petition for adoption
26
and the trial court dispensed with the trial
custody for several commendatory reasons, especially since the child had
been living with the adopting parents since infancy.
27
Further, the said
petition was with the sworn written consent of the children of the adopters.
The trial court and respondent court acted correctly in granting the petition
for adoption and we find no reason to disturb the same. As found and aptly
stated by respondent court: "Given the facts and circumstances of the case
and considered in the light of the foregoing doctrine,
28
We are of the
opinion and so hold that the decree of adoption issued by the court a quo
would go a long way towards promoting the welfare of the child and the
enhancement of his opportunities for a useful and happy life."
29

Adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the interests and
welfare of the child to be of paramount consideration. They are designed to
provide homes, parental care and education for unfortunate, needy or
orphaned children and give them the protection of society and family in the
person of the adopted, as well as to allow childless couples or persons to
experience the joys of parenthood and give them legally a child in the
person of the adopted for the manifestation of their natural parental
instincts. Every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and
fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law.
30

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla and Nocon, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1 Penned by Justice Oscar M. Herrera, with Justices Jose C.
Campos, Jr. and Asaali S. Isnani concurring, in CA-G.R. CV No.
17911.
2 Per Judge Angel M. Alegre in Sp. Proc. No. 1386.
3 Rollo, 15.
4 Original Record, 8.
5 Rollo, 18.
6 Ibid., 25-26.
7 Ibid., 6.
8 Sec. 11, Rule 3, in relation to Sec. 2, Rule 72, Rules of Court.
9 J.B.L. Reyes and R.C. Puno, Outline of Philippine Civil Law, 15
(1964).
10 Ayog, et al., vs. Cusi, etc., et al., 118 SCRA 492, 499 (1982).
11 16A Am Jur 2d, Constitutional Law, 651.
12 People vs. Paderna, 22 SCRA 273 (1968); People vs. Mariano,
et al., 71 SCRA 600 (1976); Lee, et al. vs. Presiding Judge, etc.,
et al., 145 SCRA 408 (1986); Atlas Fertilizer Corp. vs. Navarro,
etc., et al., 149 SCRA 432 (1987).
13 82 C.J.S., Statutes, 998.
14 Cohen vs. Reckseit, 53 N.Y.S. 2d 365, 184 Misc. 107.
15 People ex rel. Central New England Ry. Co. vs. State Tax
Commission, 26 N.Y.S. 2d 425, 261 App. Div. 416; Mich.-
Clugston vs. Rogers, 169 N.W. 9, 10, 203 Mich. 339.
16 Republic vs. Pielago, G.R. No. 72218, Resolution, July 21,
1986.
17 Ramos, et al., vs. Central Bank of the Philippines, 41 SCRA
565 (1971), and cases therein cited.
18 Original Record, 4. This was executed on October 17, 1987 in
Chicago, Illinois, U.S.A. where he was then residing due to his
employment in the Saint Francis Hospital there, and was duly
authenticated in the Philippine Consulate General in that city.
19 2 Am Jur 2d, Adoption, 865.
20 Ibid., id., 900.
21 2 C.J.S., Adoption of Children, 418.
22 2 Am Jur 2d, Adoption, 910.
23 Ibid., id., 907.
24 2 C.J.S., Adoption of Children, 412.
25 Original Record, 3.
26 TSN, March 28, 1988, 7.
27 Rollo, 21-22.
28 Citing Daoang vs. Municipal Judge of San Nicolas, Ilocos
Norte, 159 SCRA 369 (1988).
29 Rollo, 29.
30 Bobanovic, et al. vs. Montes, etc., et al., 142 SCRA 485
(1986).
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-34568 March 28, 1988
RODERICK DAOANG, and ROMMEL DAOANG, assisted by their father,
ROMEO DAOANG, petitioners,
vs.
THE MUNICIPAL JUDGE, SAN NICOLAS, ILOCOS NORTE, ANTERO
AGONOY and AMANDA RAMOS-AGONOY, respondents.

PADILLA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision, dated 30 June 1971,
rendered by the respondent judge * in Spec. Proc. No. 37 of Municipal Court
of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, entitled: "In re Adoption of the Minors Quirino
Bonilla and Wilson Marcos; Antero Agonoy and Amanda R. Agonoy,
petitioners", the dispositive part of which reads, as follows:
Wherefore, Court renders judgment declaring that henceforth
Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos be, to all legitimate intents
and purposes, the children by adoption of the joint petitioners
Antero Agonoy and Amanda R. Agonoy and that the former be
freed from legal obedience and maintenance by their respective
parents, Miguel Bonilla and Laureana Agonoy for Quirino Bonilla
and Modesto Marcos and Benjamina Gonzales for Wilson Marcos
and their family names 'Bonilla' and 'Marcos' be changed with
"Agonoy", which is the family name of the petitioners.
Successional rights of the children and that of their adopting
parents shall be governed by the pertinent provisions of the New
Civil Code.
Let copy of this decision be furnished and entered into the
records of the Local Civil Registry of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte,
for its legal effects at the expense of the petitioners.
1

The undisputed facts of the case are as follows:
On 23 March 1971, the respondent spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy filed
a petition with the Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, seeking the
adoption of the minors Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos. The case, entitled:
"In re Adoption of the Minors Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos, Antero
Agonoy and Amanda Ramos-Agonoy, petitioners", was docketed therein as
Spec. Proc. No. 37.
2

The petition was set for hearing on 24 April 1971 and notices thereof were
caused to be served upon the office of the Solicitor General and ordered
published in the ILOCOS TIMES, a weekly newspaper of general circulation in
the province of Ilocos Norte, with editorial offices in Laoag City.
3

On 22 April 1971, the minors Roderick and Rommel Daoang, assisted by
their father and guardian ad litem, the petitioners herein, filed an opposition
to the aforementioned petition for adoption, claiming that the spouses
Antero and Amanda Agonoy had a legitimate daughter named Estrella
Agonoy, oppositors' mother, who died on 1 March 1971, and therefore, said
spouses were disqualified to adopt under Art. 335 of the Civil Code.
4

After the required publication of notice had been accomplished, evidence
was presented. Thereafter, the Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte
rendered its decision, granting the petition for adoption.
5

Hence, the present recourse by the petitioners (oppositors in the lower
court).
The sole issue for consideration is one of law and it is whether or not the
respondent spouses Antero Agonoy and Amanda Ramos-Agonoy are
disqualified to adopt under paragraph (1), Art. 335 of the Civil Code.
The pertinent provision of law reads, as follows:
Art. 335. The following cannot adopt:
(1) Those who have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged
natural children, or children by legal fiction;
xxx xxx xxx
In overruling the opposition of the herein petitioners, the respondents judge
held that "to add grandchildren in this article where no grandchil is included
would violate to (sic) the legal maxim that what is expressly included would
naturally exclude what is not included".
But, it is contended by the petitioners, citing the case of In re Adoption of
Millendez,
6
that the adoption of Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos would not
only introduce a foreign element into the family unit, but would result in the
reduction of their legititimes. It would also produce an indirect, permanent
and irrevocable disinheritance which is contrary to the policy of the law that
a subsequent reconciliation between the offender and the offended person
deprives the latter of the right to disinherit and renders ineffectual any
disinheritance that may have been made.
We find, however, that the words used in paragraph (1) of Art. 335 of the
Civil Code, in enumerating the persons who cannot adopt, are clear and
unambiguous. The children mentioned therein have a clearly defined
meaning in law and, as pointed out by the respondent judge, do not include
grandchildren.
Well known is the rule of statutory construction to the effect that a statute
clear and unambiguous on its face need not be interpreted; stated
otherwise, the rule is that only statutes with an ambiguous or doubtful
meaning may be the subject of statutory construction.
7

Besides, it appears that the legislator, in enacting the Civil Code of the
Philippines, obviously intended that only those persons who have certain
classes of children, are disqualified to adopt. The Civil Code of Spain, which
was once in force in the Philippines, and which served as the pattern for the
Civil Code of the Philippines, in its Article 174, disqualified persons who have
legitimate or legitimated descendants from adopting. Under this article, the
spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy would have been disqualified to adopt
as they have legitimate grandchildren, the petitioners herein. But, when the
Civil Code of the Philippines was adopted, the word "descendants" was
changed to "children", in paragraph (1) of Article 335.
Adoption used to be for the benefit of the adoptor. It was intended to afford
to persons who have no child of their own the consolation of having one, by
creating through legal fiction, the relation of paternity and filiation where
none exists by blood relationship.
8
The present tendency, however, is
geared more towards the promotion of the welfare of the child and the
enhancement of his opportunities for a useful and happy life, and every
intendment is sustained to promote that objective.
9
Under the law now in
force, having legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or
children by legal fiction, is no longer a ground for disqualification to adopt.
10

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The judgment of the Municipal Court of
San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte in Spec. Proc. No. 37 is AFFIRMED. Without
pronouncement as to costs in this instance.
SO ORDERED.
Yap, Melencio-Herrera, Paras and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
* Judge Pascual C. Barab.
1 Rollo, pp. 19-20.
2 Id., p. 8.
3 Id., p. 12.
4 Id., p. 13.
5 Id., p. 14.
6 G.R. No. L-28195, June 10, 1971, 39 SCRA 499.
7 2 Sutherland, Statutory Construction, 3rd. ed., Section 4502,
p. 316.
8 In re Adoption of Resaba, 95 Phil. 244.
9 Santos vs. Aranzanso, 123 Phil. 160.
10 Child and Welfare Code, Art. 28.
Daoang vs. Municipal Judge of San Nicolas
Daoang v. Municipal Judge of San Nicolas
GR L-34568, 28 March 1988 (159 SCRA 369)


Facts:

On 23 March 1971, spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy filed a petition with
the Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte seeking the adoption of
minors Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos. However, minors Roderick and
Rommel Daoang, assisted by their father and guardian ad litem, the
petitioners herein filed an opposition to the said adoption. They contended
that the spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy had a legitimate daughter
named Estrella Agonoy, oppositors mother, who died on 1 March 1971, and
therefore said spouses were disqualified to adopt under Article 335 of the
Civil Code, which provides that those who have legitimate, legitimated,
acknowledged natural children or children by legal fiction cannot adopt.

Issue: Whether the spouses Antero Agonoy and Amanda Ramos are
disqualified to adopt under paragraph 1 of Article 335 of the Civil Code.

Held:

The words used in paragraph (1) of Article 335 of the Civil Code, in
enumerating the persons who cannot adopt, are clear and unambiguous.
When the New Civil Code was adopted, it changed the word descendant,
found in the Spanish Civil Code to which the New Civil Code was patterned,
to children. The children thus mentioned have a clearly defined meaning in
law and do not include grandchildren. Well known is the rule of statutory
construction to the effect that a statute clear and unambiguous on its face
need not be interpreted. The rule is that only statutes with an ambiguous or
doubtful meaning may be the subjects of statutory construction. In the
present case, Roderick and Rommel Daoang, the grandchildren of Antero
Agonoy and Amanda Ramos-Agonoy, cannot assail the adoption of Quirino
Bonilla and Wilson Marcos by the Agonoys.
The Supreme Court denied the petition, and affirmed the judgment of the
Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte (Special Proceedings 37),
wthout pronouncement as to costs.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-46345 January 30, 1990
RESTITUTO CENIZA and JESUS CENIZA, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, MAGNO DABON, VICENTA DABON,
TERESITA DABON, EUGENIA DABON, and TOMAS DABON, respondents.
Vicente P. Valera and Pedro Rosito & Jesus F. Balicanta for petitioners.
Victorino U. Montecillo for respondents.

GRINO-AQUINO, J.:
This is a petition for review of the order dated October 29, 1976, of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 48546 entitled, "Restituto Ceniza, et al. vs.
Magno Dabon, et al.," dismissing the petitioners' complaint for reconveyance
of their shares in co-ownership property and reversing the decision of the
trial court in their favor.
On June 14, 1967, the petitioners filed against private respondents, an
action in the Court of First Instance of Cebu for recovery of their title to Lots
Nos. 627-B and 627-C (being portions of Lot No. 627 with an area of
approximately 5,306 square meters) situated in Casuntingan, Mandaue,
Cebu (now Mandaue City), which originally formed part of "Hacienda de
Mandaue" of the Seminario de San Carlos de Cebu. The Property is covered
by reconstituted Original Certificate of Title No. RO-10996 issued on
February 8, 1939 (formerly Decree No. 694438 issued on February 27,
1934) in the name of "Vicente Dabon married to Marcela [or Marcelina]
Ceniza." (pp. 7 and 19, Record on Appeal).
Petitioners are the descendants of Manuel Ceniza while the private
respondents are the descendants of his sister, Sofia Ceniza. Sofia Ceniza
was childless but she had an adopted daughter named Flaviana Ceniza, who
begot a daughter named Marced Ceniza and who in turn had a daughter
named Marcelina (or Marcela) Ceniza who married Vicente Dabon. Private
respondents are the children of this marriage and they are the great-great-
grandchildren of Sofia Ceniza.
On the other hand, Manuel Ceniza had an only son, Pablo, who had two
sons, Santiago and Jose Ceniza. Petitioners Restituto and Jesus Ceniza and a
certain Nemesia Ceniza-Albina are their children and the great-grandchildren
of Manuel Ceniza.
The records disclose that when Hacienda de Mandaue was subdivided for
resale to the occupants in 1929, Jose Ceniza and Vicente Dabon, who were
residing in the hacienda, jointly purchased Lot 627 on installment basis and
they agreed, for convenience, to have the land registered in the name of
Dabon. Since then, Jose Ceniza, Vicente Dabon, and their heirs have
possessed their respective portions of the land, declared the same for
taxation, paid real estate taxes on their respective shares, and made their
respective installment payments to the Seminario de San Carlos de Cebu.
After Dabon died in 1954, his seven (7) children, named Magno, Jacinta,
Tomas, Flaviana, Soledad, Teresita and Eugenia, succeeded to his
possession of a portion of the land.
On November 4, 1961, a private land surveyor, Espiritu Bunagan, on the
request of Jacinta Dabon and Restituto Ceniza who jointly defrayed the cost,
divided Lot 627 into three parts, namely:
(1) Lot No. 627-A with 3,538 square meters for Marcela Ceniza;
(2) Lot No. 627-B with 884 square meters for Restituto Ceniza;
and
(3) Lot No. 627-C with 834 square meters for Nemesia Ceniza-
Albina, who later bequeathed her share to her brother, Jesus
Ceniza. (p. 19, Record on Appeal).
The present controversy arose because the private respondents refused to
convey Lots Nos. 627-B and 627-C to the petitioners. They claimed that
their predecessor-in-interest, Vicente Dabon, was the sole and exclusive
owner of Lot 627, by purchase from the Seminario de San Carlos de Cebu.
In their answer to the petitioners' complaint for reconveyance in June 1967,
they alleged that the petitioners' right of action had already prescribed.
Petitioners replied that Vicente Dabon held the land in trust for them, as co-
owners, hence, their action for reconveyance was imprescriptible.
On August 31, 1970, the trial court rendered judgment for the petitioners.
Finding that there existed a co-ownership among the parties, it ordered the
private respondents to execute deeds of conveyance of Lots Nos. 627-B and
627-C in favor of the plaintiffs, Restituto and Jesus Ceniza, respectively (p.
35, Record on Appeal).
On appeal by the defendants (now private respondents) the Court of Appeals
on October 29, 1976, reversed that decision of the trial court. It ruled that
the petitioners' right of action had prescribed after the lapse of 20 years
from the date of registration of the land on February 8, 1939 in Vicente
Dabon's name (p. 32, Rollo).
The petitioners have appealed to this Court by a petition for review under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The legal issue presented by the petition is whether the registration of the
title of the land in the name of one of the co-owner, constituted a
repudiation of the co-ownership for purposes of acquisitive prescription.
We find merit in the petition for review.
The trial court correctly ruled that since a trust relation and co-ownership
were proven to exist between the predecessors- in-interest of both
petitioners and private respondents, prescription did not run in favor of
Dabon's heirs except from the time that they repudiated the co-ownership
and made the repudiation known to the other co-owners, Restituto and
Jesus Ceniza (Cortes vs. Oliva, 33 Phil. 480).
Paragraph 5 of Article 494 of the Civil Code provides-
No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir
against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or
impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.
The registration of Lot No. 627 in the name of Vicente Dabon created a trust
in favor of his co-owner Jose Ceniza, and the latter's heirs. Article 1452 of
the Civil Code states:
If two or more persons agree to purchase property and common
consent the legal title is taken in the name of one of them for
the benefit of all, a trust is created by force of law in favor of the
others in proportion to the interest of each.
This Court has ruled in numerous cases involving fiduciary relations that, as
a general rule, the trustee's possession is not adverse and therefore cannot
ripen into a title by prescription. Adverse possession requires the
concurrence of the following circumstances:
a) that the trustee has performed unequivocal acts of
repudiation amounting to the ouster of the cestui que trust;
b) that such positive acts of repudiation have been made known
to the cestui que trust; and
c) that the evidence thereon should be clear and conclusive.
The above elements are not present here for the petitioners/ co-owners
have not been ousted from the land. They continue to possess their
respective shares of Lot 627 and they have been paying the realty taxes
thereon. Restituto's house stands on his portion of the Land. Assuming that
the private respondents' rejection of the subdivision plan for the partition of
the land was an act of repudiation of the co-ownership, prescription had not
yet set in when the petitioners instituted the present action for
reconveyance. These circumstances were overlooked by the Court of
Appeals.
In Custodio v. Casiano 9 SCRA 841, we ruled that:
Where title to land was issued in the name of a co-heir merely
with the understanding that he would act as a trustee of his
sisters, and there is no evidence that this trust relation had ever
been repudiated by said trustee, it is held that a reaction of co-
ownership existed between such trustee and his sisters and the
right of the successors-in-interest of said sisters to bring the
present action for recovery of their shares therein against the
successors-in-interest of said trustee cannot barred by
prescription, despite the, lapse of 25 years from the date of
registration of the land in the trustee's name. (Emphasis
supplied.)
In Escobar v. Locsin, 74 Phil. 86, we affirmed the duty of the courts to shield
fiduciary relations "against every manner of chicanery or detestable design
cloaked by legal technicalities" and to guard against misuse of the Torrens
system "to foment betrayal in the performance of a trust."
In this case, since the statutory period of limitation within which to file an
action for reconveyance, after the defendants had repudiated the co-
ownership in 1961, had not yet run its course when the petitioners filed said
action in 1967, the action was not barred by prescription.
WHEREFORE. the decision of the Court of appeals is hereby REVERSED AND
SET ASIDE and the decision dated August 31, 1970 of the then Court of First
Instance of Cebu, Branch VI, in Civil Case No. R-10030 is reinstated. Costs
against the private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Cruz, Gancayco and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. L-29727 December 14, 1988
PEDRO OLIVERAS, TEODORA GASPAR, MELECIO OLIVERAS and
ANICETA MINOR, plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
CANDIDO LOPEZ, SEVERO LOPEZ, HIPOLITO LOPEZ, EUGENIA LOPEZ,
PRIMITIVO GASPAR, CORAZON LOPEZ, ALEJANDRO CACAYURIN,
FAUSTINA BOTUYAN, MODESTO SALAZAR, ADORACION BOTUYAN,
CLAUDIO GANOTICE and ENONG BOTUYAN, defendants-appellants.
Venancio B. Fernando for defendants-appellants.

FERNAN, C.J.:
This case exemplifies the Filipino custom of keeping inherited property in a
prolonged juridical condition of co-owner ship.
Lorenzo Lopez owned Lot 4685 of the Cadastral survey of Villasis,
Pangasinan with an area of 69,687 square meters as evidenced by
Original Certificate of Title No. 15262.
1
In December, 1931, Lorenzo
Lopez died,
2
leaving said property to his wife, Tomasa Ramos and six
(6) children. From that time on, the heirs of Lorenzo Lopez did not
initiate any moves to legally partition the property.
More than twenty-one years later, or on February 11, 1953, Tomasa Ramos
and her eldest son, Candido Lopez, executed a deed of absolute sale of the
"eastern undivided four thousand two hundred and fifty seven-square
meters (4,257) more or less, of the undivided portion of (their) interests,
rights and participation" over Lot 4685, in favor of the spouses Melecio
Oliveras and Aniceta Minor, in consideration of the amount of one thousand
pesos (P1,000).
3

On the same day, Tomasa and Candido executed another deed of absolute
sale of the "undivided" four thousand two hundred and fifty-seven (4,257)
square meters of the "eastern part" of Lot 4685 in favor of the spouses
Pedro Oliveras and Teodora Gaspar, also in consideration of P1,000.
4
Each
of the said documents bear the thumbmark of Tomasa and the signature of
Candido.
In his affidavit also executed on February 11, 1953, Candido stated that a
month prior to the execution of the deed of sale in favor of Melecio Oliveras,
he offered his: "undivided portion" of Lot 4685 to his "adjacent owners" but
none of them was "in a position to purchase" said property.
5

Since the execution of the two deeds of absolute sale, the vendees, brothers
Melecio and Pedro, had been paying the real property taxes for their
respectively purchased properties.
6
They also had been in possession of
their purchased properties which, being planted to palay and peanuts, were
segregated from the rest of Lot 4685 by dikes.
7

More than thirteen years later or on November 21, 1966, the counsel of the
Oliveras brothers wrote the heirs of Lorenzo Lopez reminding them of the
Oliverases' demands to partition the property so that they could acquire
their respective titles thereto without resorting to court action, and that,
should they fail to respond, he would be forced to file a case in court.
8

Apparently, the Lopezes did not answer said letter since on December 15,
1966, the Oliveras brothers and their wives filed a complaint for partition
and damages
9
in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan.
10

The Oliverases stated in their complaint that possession of the disputed
properties was delivered to them with the knowledge and consent of the
defendants; that they had been paying the real estate taxes thereon; that
prior to the sale, said properties were offered to the other co-owners for sale
but they refused to buy them; that on February 18, 1953, the transactions
were duly annotated and entered in the Memorandum of encumbrances of
OCT No. 15262 as adverse claims; and that their desire to segregate the
portions of Lot 4685 sold to them was frustrated by defendants' adamant
refusal to lend them the owner's duplicate of OCT No. 15262 and to execute
a deed of partition of the whole lot.
In claiming moral damages in the amount of P2,000.00 plaintiffs alleged that
defendants also refused to allow them to survey and segregate the portions
bought by them. Plaintiffs prayed that the court order the defendants to
partition Lot 4685 and to allow them to survey and segregate the portions
they had purchased. They also demanded payment of P800.00 as attorney's
fees and cost of the suit.
In their answer, the defendants alleged that no sale ever transpired as the
alleged vendors could not have sold specific portions of the property; that
plaintiffs' possession and occupation of specific portions of the properties
being illegal, they could not ripen into ownership; and that they were not
under any obligation to lend their copy of the certificate of title or to accede
to plaintiffs' request for the partition or settlement of the property. As
special and affirmative defenses, the defendants contended that the deeds of
sale were null and void and hence, unenforceable against them; that the
complaint did not state a cause of action and that the cause or causes of
action if any, had prescribed.
Defendants averred in their counterclaim that despite repeated demands,
plaintiffs refused and failed to vacate the premises; that the properties
occupied by the plaintiffs yielded an average net produce in palay and
peanuts in the amount of P1,600.00 annually, and that the complaint was
filed to harass them. They prayed for the dismissal of the complaint and the
payment of P1,600.00 per year from 1953 until plaintiffs shall have vacated
the premises and P1,000.00 for attorney's fees.
Plaintiffs filed an answer to defendants' counterclaim, denying all the
allegations therein and stating that defendants never demanded that
plaintiffs vacate the portions of Lot 4685 they had bought.
The lower court explored the possibility of an amicable settlement between
the parties without success. Hence, it set the case for trial and thereafter, it
rendered a
decision
11
declaring valid the deeds of absolute sale
12
and ordering the
defendants to allow the segregation of the sold portions of Lot 4685 by a
licensed surveyor in order that the plaintiffs could obtain their respective
certificates of title over their portions of said lot.
In resolving the case, the lower court passed upon the issue of whether the
two deeds of absolute sale were what they purported to be or merely
mortgage documents. It considered as indicia of plaintiffs' absolute dominion
over the portions sold to them their actual possession thereof without any
opposition from the defendants until the filing of the complaint, their
payment of taxes thereon and their having benefited from the produce of the
land. The court ruled that the defendants' testimonial evidence that the
deeds in question were merely mortgage documents cannot overcome the
evidentiary value of the public instruments presented by the plaintiffs.
On the issue of whether the two deeds of absolute sale were null and void
considering that the land subject thereof had not yet been partitioned, the
court observed that the total area of 8,514 square meters sold to plaintiffs
by Candido was less than his share should Lot 4685 with an area of 69,687
square meters be divided among the six children of Lorenzo Lopez and their
mother. In this connection, the lower court also found that during his
lifetime, and before Candido got married, Lorenzo Lopez had divided Lot
4685 among his children who then took possession of their respective
shares. *
The defendants appealed said decision to this Court contending that the
lower court erred in declaring the two deeds of absolute sale as valid, in
ordering the segregation of the sold portions of Lot 4685 to enable the
plaintiffs to obtain their respective certificates of title, and in not considering
their defense of prescription.
The extrinsic validity of the two deeds of absolute sale is not in issue in this
case in view of the finding of the trial court that the defendants admittedly
do not question their due execution.
13
What should pre-occupy the Court is
the intrinsic validity of said deeds insofar as they pertain to sales of
designated portions of an undivided, co-owned property.
In a long line of decisions, this Court has held that before the partition of a
land or thing held in common, no individual co-owner can claim title to any
definite portion thereof. All that the co-owner has is an Ideal or abstract
quota or proportionate share in the entire land or thing.
14

However, the duration of the juridical condition of co-ownership is not
limitless. Under Article 494 and 1083 of the Civil Code, co-ownership of an
estate should not exceed the period of twenty (20) years. And, under the
former article, any agreement to keep a thing or property undivided should
be for a ten-year period only. Where the parties stipulate a definite period of
in division which exceeds the maximum allowed by law, said stipulation shall
be void only as to the period beyond such maximum.
15

Although the Civil Code is silent as to the effect of the in division of a
property for more than twenty years, it would be contrary to public policy to
sanction co-ownership beyond the period set by the law. Otherwise, the 20-
year limitation expressly mandated by the Civil Code would be rendered
meaningless.
In the instant case, the heirs of Lorenzo Lopez maintained the co-ownership
for more than twenty years. We hold that when Candido and his mother
(who died before the filing of the complaint for partition) sold definite
portions of Lot 4685, they validly exercised dominion over them because, by
operation of law, the co-ownership had ceased. The filing of the complaint
for partition by the Oliverases who, as vendees, are legally considered as
subrogated to the rights of Candido over portions of Lot 4685 in their
possession,
16
merely served to put a stamp of formality on Candido's
otherwise accomplished act of terminating the co-ownership.
The action for partition has not prescribed. Although the complaint was filed
thirteen years from the execution of the deeds of sale and hence, as
contended by the defendants-appellants, prescription might have barred its
filing under the general provision of Article 1144 (a) of the Civil Code, Article
494 specifically mandates that each
co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in
common insofar as his share is concerned. Hence, considering the validity of
the conveyances of portions of Lot 4685 in their favor and as subrogees of
Candido Lopez, the Oliverases' action for partition was timely and properly
filed.
17

We cannot write finis to this decision without commenting on the compliance
with the resolution of September 1, 1986 of counsel for defendants-
appellants. In said resolution, the court required the parties to move in the
premises "considering the length of time that this case has remained
pending in this Court and to determine whether or not there might be
supervening events which may render the case moot and academic.
18
In his
manifestation and motion dated August 12, 1987, said counsel informed the
Court that he had contacted the defendants-appellants whom he advised "to
move in the premises which is the land in question and to maintain the
status quo with respect to their actual possession thereon" and that he had
left a copy of said resolution with the defendants-appellants" for their
guidance in the compliance of their obligations (sic) as specified in said
resolution."
19

Obviously, said counsel interpreted literally the Court's directive "to move in
the premises." For the enlightenment of said counsel and all others of similar
perception, a "move in the premises" resolution is not a license to occupy or
enter the premises subject of litigation especially in cases involving real
property. A "move in the premises" resolution simply means what is stated
therein: the parties are obliged to inform the Court of developments
pertinent to the case which may be of help to the Court in its immediate
disposition.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court insofar as it declares the
validity of the two deeds of sale and directs the partition of Lot 4685, is
AFFIRMED. The lower court is hereby ordered to facilitate with dispatch the
preparation of a project of partition which it should thereafter approve. This
decision is immediately executory. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., concur in the result.

Footnotes
1 Exh. A.
2 TSN, October 9, 1967, p. 2.
3 Exh. B.
4 Exh. F.
5 Exh. G.
6 Exhs. C to C-1 4; Exhs. 1 to I-1 3.
7 TSN, July 17, 1967, p. 10.
8 Exh. E.
9 Named defendants therein were Candido, Severo, Hipolito,
Eugenia and Corazon Lopez Eugenia's husband Primitive Gaspar,
Corazon's husband Alejandro Cacayurin and the heirs of Catalina
Lopez, namely, Faustina Botuyan and her husband Modesto
Salazar, Adoracion Botuyan and her husband Claudio Ganotice
and Enong Botuyan.
10 Civil Case No. U-973,
11 Penned by Judge Amado S. Santiago.
12 Lazatin vs. House Electoral Tribunal.
* The lower court underplayed the significance of this finding in
the absence of documentary evidence attesting to a formal
partition of the property, and the fact that in his testimony,
Pedro Oliveras himself surmised that when Lorenzo Lopez died,
his children were still minors and could not have taken
possession of their respective designated portions in the real
property (TSN, October 9, 1967, p. 5).
13 Record on Appeal, p. 28.
14 Diversified Credit Corporation vs. Rosado, L-27983,
December 24, 1968, 26 SCRA 470.
15 II Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, 1972, ed., p. 494
citing 7 Llerena 505.
16 See Dancel vs.Dancel, 29 Phil. 25.
17 De Castro vs. Echarri, 20 Phil. 24.
18 Rollo, p. 32.
19 Rollo, pp. 39-40.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 76351 October 29, 1993
VIRGILIO B. AGUILAR, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and SENEN B. AGUILAR, respondents.
Jose F. Manacop for petitioner.
Siruello, Muyco & Associates Law Office for private respondent.

BELLOSILLO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 03933 declaring null and
void the orders of 23 and 26 April, 1979, the judgment by default of 26 July
1979, and the order of 22 October 1979 of the then Court of First Instance
of Rizal, Pasay City, Branch 30, and directing the trial court to set the case
for pre-trial conference.
Petitioner Virgilio and respondent Senen are brothers; Virgilio is the
youngest of seven (7) children of the late Maximiano Aguilar, while Senen is
the fifth. On 28 October 1969, the two brothers purchased a house and lot in
Paraaque where their father could spend and enjoy his remaining years in a
peaceful neighborhood. Initially, the brothers agreed that Virgilio's share in
the co-ownership was two-thirds while that of Senen was one-third. By
virtue of a written memorandum dated 23 February 1970, Virgilio and Senen
agreed that henceforth their interests in the house and lot should be equal,
with Senen assuming the remaining mortgage obligation of the original
owners with the Social Security System (SSS) in exchange for his possession
and enjoyment of the house together with their father.
Since Virgilio was then disqualified from obtaining a loan from SSS, the
brothers agreed that the deed of sale would be executed and the title
registered in the meantime in the name of Senen. It was further agreed that
Senen would take care of their father and his needs since Virgilio and his
family were staying in Cebu.
After Maximiano Aguilar died in 1974, petitioner demanded from private
respondent that the latter vacate the house and that the property be sold
and proceeds thereof divided among them.
Because of the refusal of respondent to give in to petitioner's demands, the
latter filed on 12 January 1979 an action to compel the sale of the house and
lot so that they could divide the proceeds between them.
In his complaint, petitioner prayed that the proceeds of the sale, be divided
on the basis of two-thirds (2/3) in his favor and one-third (1/3) to
respondent. Petitioner also prayed for monthly rentals for the use of the
house by respondent after their father died.
In his answer with counterclaim, respondent alleged that he had no
objection to the sale as long as the best selling price could be obtained; that
if the sale would be effected, the proceeds thereof should be divided equally;
and, that being a co-owner, he was entitled to the use and enjoyment of the
property.
Upon issues being joined, the case was set for pre-trial on 26 April 1979 with
the lawyers of both parties notified of the pre-trial, and served with the pre-
trial order, with private respondent executing a special power of attorney to
his lawyer to appear at the pre-trial and enter into any amicable settlement
in his behalf.
1

On 20 April 1979, Atty. Manuel S. Tonogbanua, counsel for respondent, filed
a motion to cancel pre-trial on the ground that he would be accompanying
his wife to Dumaguete City where she would be a principal sponsor in a
wedding.
On 23 April 1979, finding the reasons of counsel to be without merit, the
trial court denied the motion and directed that the pre-trial should continue
as scheduled.
When the case was called for pre-trial as scheduled on 26 April 1979,
plaintiff and his counsel appeared. Defendant did not appear; neither his
counsel in whose favor he executed a special power of attorney to represent
him at the pre-trial. Consequently, the trial court, on motion of plaintiff,
declared defendant as in default and ordered reception of plaintiff's evidence
ex parte.
On 7 May 1979, defendant through counsel filed an omnibus motion to
reconsider the order of default and to defer reception of evidence. The trial
court denied the motion and plaintiff presented his evidence.
On 26 July 1979, rendering judgment by default against defendant, the trial
court found him and plaintiff to be co-owners of the house and lot, in equal
shares on the basis of their written agreement. However, it ruled that
plaintiff has been deprived of his participation in the property by defendant's
continued enjoyment of the house and lot, free of rent, despite demands for
rentals and continued maneuvers of defendants, to delay partition. The trial
court also upheld the right of plaintiff as co-owner to demand partition.
Since plaintiff could not agree to the amount offered by defendant for the
former's share, the trial court held that this property should be sold to a
third person and the proceeds divided equally between the parties.
The trial court likewise ordered defendant to vacate the property and pay
plaintiff P1,200.00 as rentals
2
from January 1975 up to the date of decision
plus interest from the time the action was filed.
On 17 September 1979, defendant filed an omnibus motion for new trial but
on 22 October 1979 the trial court denied the motion.
Defendant sought relief from the Court of Appeals praying that the following
orders and decision of the trial court be set aside: (a) the order of 23 April
1970 denying defendants motion for postponement of the pre-trial set on 26
April 1979; (b) the order of 26 April 1979 declaring him in default and
authorizing plaintiff to present his evidence ex-parte; (e) the default
judgment of 26 July 1979; and, (d) the order dated 22 October 1979
denying his omnibus motion for new trial.
On 16 October 1986, the Court of Appeals set aside the order of the trial
court of 26 April 1979 as well as the assailed judgment rendered by default.,
The appellate court found the explanation of counsel for defendant in his
motion to cancel pre-trial as satisfactory and devoid of a manifest intention
to delay the disposition of the case. It also ruled that the trial court should
have granted the motion for postponement filed by counsel for defendant
who should not have been declared as in default for the absence of his
counsel.
Petitioner now comes to us alleging that the Court of Appeals erred (1) in
not holding that the motion of defendant through counsel to cancel the pre-
trial was dilatory in character and (2) in remanding the case to the trial court
for pre-trial and trial.
The issues to be resolved are whether the trial court correctly declared
respondent as in default for his failure to appear at the pre-trial and in
allowing petitioner to present his evidence ex-parte, and whether the trial
court correctly rendered the default judgment against respondent.
We find merit in the petition.
As regards the first issue, the law is clear that the appearance of parties at
the pre-trial is mandatory.
3
A party who fails to appear at a pre-trial
conference may be non-suited or considered as in default.
4
In the case at
bar, where private respondent and counsel failed to appear at the scheduled
pre-trial, the trial, court has authority to declare respondent in default.
5

Although respondent's counsel filed a motion to postpone pre-trial hearing,
the grant or denial thereof is within the sound discretion of the trial court,
which should take into account two factors in the grant or denial of motions
for postponement, namely: (a) the reason for the postponement and (b) the
merits of the case of movant.
6

In the instant case, the trial court found the reason stated in the motion of
counsel for respondent to cancel the pre-trial to be without merit. Counsel's
explanation that he had to go to by boat as early as 25 March 1979 to fetch
his wife and accompany her to a wedding in Dumaguete City on 27 April
1979 where she was one of the principal sponsors, cannot be accepted. We
find it insufficient to justify postponement of the pre-trial, and the Court of
Appeals did not act wisely in overruling the denial. We sustain the trial court
and rule that it did not abuse its discretion in denying the postponement for
lack of merit. Certainly, to warrant a postponement of a mandatory process
as pre-trial would require much more than mere attendance in a social
function. It is time indeed we emphasize that there should be much more
than mere perfunctory treatment of the pre-trial procedure. Its observance
must be taken seriously if it is to attain its objective, i.e., the speedy and
inexpensive disposition of cases.
Moreover, the trial court denied the motion for postponement three (3) days
before the scheduled pre-trial. If indeed, counsel for respondent could not
attend the pre-trial on the scheduled date, respondent at least should have
personally appeared in order not to be declared as in default. But, since
nobody appeared for him, the order of the trial court declaring him as in
default and directing the presentation of petitioner's evidence ex parte was
proper.
7

With regard to the merits of the judgment of the trial court by default, which
respondent appellate court did not touch upon in resolving the appeal, the
Court holds that on the basis of the pleadings of the parties and the
evidence presented ex parte, petitioner and respondents are co-owners of
subject house and lot in equal shares; either one of them may demand the
sale of the house and lot at any time and the other cannot object to such
demand; thereafter the proceeds of the sale shall be divided equally
according to their respective interests.
Private respondent and his family refuse to pay monthly rentals to petitioner
from the time their father died in 1975 and to vacate the house so that it
can be sold to third persons. Petitioner alleges that respondent's continued
stay in the property hinders its disposal to the prejudice of petitioner. On the
part of petitioner, he claims that he should be paid two-thirds (2/3) of a
monthly rental of P2,400.00 or the sum of P1,600.00.
In resolving the dispute, the trial court ordered respondent to vacate the
property so that it could be sold to third persons and the proceeds divided
between them equally, and for respondent to pay petitioner one-half (1/2) of
P2,400.00 or the sum of P1,200.00 as monthly rental, conformably with
their stipulated sharing reflected in their written agreement.
We uphold the trial court in ruling in favor of petitioner, except as to the
effectivity of the payment of monthly rentals by respondent as co-owner
which we here declare to commence only after the trial court ordered
respondent to vacate in accordance with its order of 26 July 1979.
Article 494 of the Civil Code provides that no co-owner shall be obliged to
remain in the co-ownership, and that each co-owner may demand at any
time partition of the thing owned in common insofar as his share is
concerned. Corollary to this rule, Art. 498 of the Code states that whenever
the thing is essentially, indivisible and the co-owners cannot agree that it be,
allotted to one of them who shall indemnify the others, it shall be sold and
its proceeds accordingly distributed. This is resorted to (1) when the right to
partition the property is invoked by any of the co-owners but because of the
nature of the property it cannot be subdivided or its subdivision would
prejudice the interests of the co-owners, and (b) the co-owners are not in
agreement as to who among them shall be allotted or assigned the entire
property upon proper reimbursement of the co-owners. In one case,
8
this
Court upheld the order of the trial court directing the holding of a public sale
of the properties owned in common pursuant to Art. 498 of the Civil Code.
However, being a co-owner respondent has the right to use the house and
lot without paying any compensation to petitioner, as he may use the
property owned in common long as it is in accordance with the purpose for
which it is intended and in a manner not injurious to the interest of the other
co-owners.
9
Each co-owner of property held pro indiviso exercises his rights
over the whole property and may use and enjoy the same with no other
limitation than that he shall not injure the interests of his co-owners, the
reason being that until a division is made, the respective share of each
cannot be determined and every co-owner exercises, together with his co-
participants joint ownership over the pro indiviso property, in addition to his
use and enjoyment of the
same.
10

Since petitioner has decided to enforce his right in court to end the co-
ownership of the house and lot and respondent has not refuted the
allegation that he has been preventing the sale of the property by his
continued occupancy of the premises, justice and equity demand that
respondent and his family vacate the property so that the sale can be
effected immediately. In fairness to petitioner, respondent should pay a
rental of P1,200.00 per month, with legal interest; from the time the trial
court ordered him to vacate, for the use and enjoyment of the other half of
the property appertaining to petitioner.
When petitioner filed an action to compel the sale of the property and the
trial court granted the petition and ordered the ejectment of respondent, the
co-ownership was deemed terminated and the right to enjoy the possession
jointly also ceased. Thereafter, the continued stay of respondent and his
family in the house prejudiced the interest of petitioner as the property
should have been sold and the proceeds divided equally between them. To
this extent and from then on, respondent should be held liable for monthly
rentals until he and his family vacate.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated 16 October 1986 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The decision
of the trial court in Civil Case No. 69.12-P dated 16 July 1979 is
REINSTATED, with the modification that respondent Senen B. Aguilar is
ordered to vacate the premises in question within ninety (90) days from
receipt of this and to pay petitioner Virgilio B. Aguilar a monthly rental of
P1,200.00 with interest at the legal rate from the time he received the
decision of the trial court directing him to vacate until he effectively leaves
the premises.
The trial court is further directed to take immediate steps to implement this
decision conformably with Art. 498 of the Civil Code and the Rules of Court.
This decision is final and executory.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Davide, Jr., Quiason, JJ., concur.

# Footnotes
1 Page 97, Rollo.
2 Presumable per month although the decision does not so
specify.
3 Jungco v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 78051, 8 November
1989, 179 SCRA 213.
4 Sec. 2, Rule 20, Rules of Court; Insular Veneer v. Plan, G.R. L-
40155, 10 September 1976, 73 SCRA 1.
5 Pacweld Steel Corp. v. Asia Steel Corp. No. L-26325, 15
November 1982, 118 SCRA 229.
6 Guzman v. Elbinias; G.R. No. 57395, 17 April 1989, 172 SCRA
240.
7 Ravelo v. Court of Appeals, No. L-40111, 27 October 1983,
125 SCRA 366.
8 Reyes v. Concepcion, G.R. No. 56550, 1 October 1990, 190
SCRA 171.
9 Article 486, Civil Code.
10 Pardell v. Bartolome, 23 Phil. 450 (1912).
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 134166. August 25, 2000]
SPOUSES MARIO REYES and CONCEPCION DOMINGUEZ-REYES, and
SPOUSES DOMINADOR VICTA and ARACELI DOMINGUEZ-VICTA, petitioners,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS and SPOUSES JAIME RAMOS and NILDA ILANO-
RAMOS, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
BELLOSILLO, J.:
At the core of the controversy are several parcels of land located in Palico,
Imus, Cavite, with a total area of 3,000 square meters. The disputed
property, which once formed part of a bigger tract of land known as Lot No.
4705 measuring 21,087 square meters covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. RT-10922 and registered in the name of the late Florentino
Dominguez, constituted the undivided shares of herein petitioners
Concepcion Dominguez-Reyes and Araceli Dominguez-Victa in the estate of
their father Florentino Dominguez.
Sometime in August 1991 spouses Jaime Ramos and Nilda Ilano-Ramos filed
two (2) separate actions for specific performance against spouses Mario
Reyes and Concepcion Dominguez-Reyes and spouses Dominador Victa and
Araceli Dominguez-Victa to compel them to segregate a total of 3,000
square meters of land from their respective shares in Lot No. 4705 and to
execute the necessary deed of conveyance transferring to the plaintiffs the
above-mentioned property.i[1]
The Ramos spouses asserted that on different dates Concepcion sold to them
a total of 1,700 square meters of land while Araceli sold likewise at different
times an aggregate of 1,300 square meters of land as evidenced by eighteen
(18) Deed(s) of Absolute Sale and Transfer.ii[2] Except as to the dates,
amounts of consideration and areas of the property sold, all the deeds
contained substantially identical terms and conditions -
That I, CONCEPCION D. REYES, of legal age, Filipino, married and resident
of Caridad, Cavite City, for and in consideration of the sum of TEN
THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00), Philippine Currency, of which FIVE
THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) is payable upon the signing of this deed and
FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) is to be paid when the lot herein sold is
already segregated, technically described and titled separately in favor of
herein buyer, have SOLD, TRANSFERRED and CONVEYED by way of absolute
sale, in favor of JAIME M. RAMOS, of legal age and married to NILDA J.
ILANO, and residents of Poblacion, Imus Cavite, his heirs, successors and
assigns, a lot corresponding to ONE HUNDRED SQUARE METERS (100 sq.
m.), more or less, located and situated along the National Highway, adjacent
to the ONE THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SQUARE METERS (1,100 sq. m.)
previously sold to the BUYER, to be taken out of my (SELLERs) share, which
is one sixth (1/6) portion of the property hereinafter described, as an heir by
virtue of an extra-judicial partition of the estate of Florentino Dominguez,
who died on 17 July 1960 (Doc. No. 482; Page No. 98 Book I, Series of
1978, of Notary Public Jacinto Dominguez of Manila, dated August 6, 1978) x
x x (description of property) of which property or portion herein sold, I am
the true, legal and absolute owner, free from liens and encumbrances, and I
hereby bind myself and undertake to execute any deed or document to vest
complete and absolute title to herein buyer.
In early 1991 Lot No. 4705 was finally subdivided into several smaller lots
and partitioned extrajudicially among the five (5) heirs of Florentino
Dominguez although the records only disclosed three (3) names, Concepcion
Dominguez-Reyes, Araceli Dominguez-Victa and Fortunata Dominguez.
Concepcion acquired a 2,440-square meter lot covered by TCT No. 304193,
while Araceli took possession of two (2) lots with a combined area of 2,340
square meters for which TCTs Nos. 304190 and 304192 were issued in her
name.
Upon learning of the partition, the Ramoses repeatedly demanded from
Concepcion and Araceli to make good their undertakings under the deeds of
sale - to segregate a total of 3,000 square meters from their respective
shares in Lot No. 4705 and to execute the necessary deed of conveyance
therefor - but the latter refused, insisting that the deeds did not reflect the
true intention of the parties as their real intention was simple loans of
money the payment of which was to be secured by mortgages.
Concepcion D. Reyes and Araceli D. Victa averred that between 1980 to
1985 they obtained individually various loans from Nilda Ramos which were
covered by handwritten receipts prepared either by her or by her daughter
Dinah Ramos and signed by Concepcion and Araceli.iii[3] Sometimes they
were furnished by Nilda Ramos with duplicate copies of the corresponding
receipts although in most instances only one (1) copy was prepared which
Nilda retained.iv[4]
The loans were released by Nilda to Concepcion and Araceli on a piecemeal
basis, and every time the loans reached an aggregate amount of P10,000.00
to P20,000.00 Nilda would prepare a Deed of Absolute Sale and Transfer
which purported to convey in her favor a portion of the undivided shares of
Concepcion and Araceli in Lot No. 4705. To entice them to sign the deeds,
Nilda represented to them that the instruments were merely for purposes of
complying with the formalities required by ARVI Finance Corporation, which
she owned, and where the amounts loaned to them presumably came from.
Nilda Ramos further assured Concepcion and Araceli that the deeds would
not be notarized nor would they be enforced against them.v[5] That
however out of a total of eighteen (18) deeds of sale signed by Concepcion
and Araceli, it appeared that three (3) were actually notarized. Finally,
Concepcion and Araceli offered to settle their indebtedness but Nilda refused
to accept payment.
Since identical issues and similar transactions were involved, the two (2)
cases were consolidated and a joint trial was held. On 17 June 1993 the trial
court rendered a decision in favor of the Reyes and Victa spouses holding
that "the alleged sales were not really sales but receipts of sums of money
by way of loans."vi[6] The Court of Appeals however disagreed and reversed
the ruling of the trial court on appeal. In its assailed Decision of 21 October
1997 the Court of Appeals held -
We have examined the instruments evidencing the transactions under
consideration and found the language of each clearly and without ambiguity
to be setting forth a contract of sale and purchase. And the authenticity and
due execution of these deeds, it must be emphasized, are not disputed.
They are in fact admitted x x x x In the mind of this court, appellants have
convincingly proven the reality of the sale of the parcels of land subject
hereof x x x these pieces of evidence are not mere drafts of contracts since
everything for the existence of a perfect contract of purchase and sale are
present. Neither can they possibly be mistaken for receipts inasmuch as
even their title typewritten in capital letters and underlined proclaims
what each of the documents is all about x x x x When contracting minds
have reduced their agreement into writing, the contents of the writing
constitute the sole repository of the terms of the contract between the
parties x x x x
Appellees invite our attention to Article 1602 of the Civil Code providing that
a contract shall be presumed to be an equitable mortgage in any of the
following instances: (1) when the price of a sale with right to repurchase is
unusually inadequate; (2) when the vendor remains in possession as lessee
or otherwise; x x x x (5) when the vendor binds himself to pay the taxes on
the thing sold; (6) in any other case, where it may be fairly inferred that the
real intention of the parties is that the transaction shall secure the payment
of a debt or the performance of any other obligation x x x x It is then
pointed out that (a) the purported consideration is grossly inadequate
bearing in mind the strategic location (along a highway) of the property in
question; (b) the appellees, with their co-owners, have been paying real
estate taxes on the lot; (c) the appellees, thru their tenant, have remained
in possession of the property; and, (d) a number of receipts furnished by
appellants to the appellees clearly indicate that the amount the latter
received from the former were loans. Not one of the circumstances or
incidents pointed out by appellees indicate, under the premises, the
presence of an equitable mortgage.vii[7]
The appellate court in its Resolution of 15 June 1998 denied the motion for
reconsideration of the Reyes and Victa spouses.
In this petition for review, petitioners tenaciously insist that the transactions
in question were not what they purported to be but were in reality equitable
mortgages. In stark contrast, respondents maintain in their comment that
the transactions were absolute sales as clearly shown in the subject Deed(s)
of Absolute Sale and Transfer.
The pivotal issue then is whether the parties intended the contested Deed(s)
of Absolute Sale and Transfer to be bona fide absolute conveyances of
parcels of land, or merely equitable mortgages.
Preliminarily, the question involved in the instant case is primarily one of
fact since extraneous evidence is required to ascertain the real intention of
the parties to the transactions. The rule is well-settled that in the exercise
of the power to review the factual findings of the Court of Appeals are
normally conclusive and binding on this Court.viii[8] However, since the
factual findings of the appellate court are at variance with those of the trial
court, we are constrained to go over the records of the case and examine
the arguments of the parties in their pleadings in light of the factual milieu.
In determining whether a deed absolute in form is a mortgage, the court is
not limited to the written memorials of the transaction. The decisive factor
in evaluating such agreement is the intention of the parties, as shown not
necessarily by the terminology used in the contract but by all the
surrounding circumstances, such as the relative situation of the parties at
that time, the attitude, acts, conduct, declarations of the parties, the
negotiations between them leading to the deed, and generally, all pertinent
facts having a tendency to fix and determine the real nature of their design
and understanding. As such, documentary and parol evidence may be
submitted and admitted to prove the intention of the parties.ix[9]
It must be stressed, however, that there is no conclusive test to determine
whether a deed absolute on its face is really a simple loan accommodation
secured by a mortgage. In fact, it is often a question difficult to resolve and
is frequently made to depend on the surrounding circumstances of each
case. When in doubt, courts are generally inclined to construe a transaction
purporting to be a sale as an equitable mortgage, which involves a lesser
transmission of rights and interests over the property in controversy.x[10]
As already mentioned in the assailed decision, Art. 1602 of the Civil Code
enumerates the instances when a contract, regardless of its nomenclature,
may be presumed to be an equitable mortgage: (a) when the price of a sale
with right to repurchase is unusually inadequate; (b) when the vendor
remains in possession as lessee or otherwise; (c) when upon or after the
expiration of the right to repurchase another instrument extending the
period of redemption or granting a new period is executed; (d) when the
purchaser retains for himself a part of the purchase price; (e) when the
vendor binds himself to pay the taxes on the thing sold; and, (f) in any other
case where it may be fairly inferred that the real intention of the parties is
that the transaction shall secure the payment of a debt or the performance
of any other obligation.
For the presumption of an equitable mortgage to arise under Art. 1602, two
(2) requisites must concur: (a) that the parties entered into a contract
denominated as a contract of sale, and (b) that their intention was to secure
an existing debt by way of a mortgage. The existence of any one of the
circumstances defined in the foregoing provision, not the concurrence nor an
overwhelming number of such circumstances, is sufficient for a contract of
sale to be presumed an equitable mortgage.xi[11] The provision also applies
even to a contract purporting to be an absolute sale, as in this case, if
indeed the real intention of the parties is that the transaction shall secure
the payment of a debt or the performance of any other obligation.xii[12]
After a thorough examination of the records, we find the petition to be
impressed with merit. The facts and evidence decidedly show that the true
intention of the parties was to secure the payment of the loans and not to
convey ownership over the property in question. The transactions were
replete with veritable badges of equitable mortgage.
First. It is not contested that during all the time material to this controversy
petitioners were sorely pressed for money. Petitioners explained in their
testimony that respondent Nilda Ramos had assured them that the deeds
were merely a formality, a requirement for the loan. They obviously signed
the documents to satisfy their extreme financial needs. Thus, Concepcion
testified -
Q: And of course you also understand what loan means even if that is in
English?
A: Yes, sir. I understand the word utang.
Q: You understood well the distinction that you have mentioned when you
executed the deeds of absolute sale. Is it not? The different deeds of
absolute sale in favor of spouses.
A: I do not understand it well x x x x
Q: And so you mean to say that you signed, you affixed your name with
the witnesses without understanding what you have written, what you have
signed x x x x
A: They were the ones who offered us that is the requirement, as
formality x x x x
Q: What do you mean by that Mrs. Witness, the terms requirement and
formality?
A: Requirement means they want us to sign the document and formality
means in case I will be unable to pay, they will get the land x x x x
Q: But nevertheless, you have signed the different deeds of sale even if
the title of the documents say it is a deed of absolute sale. Is it not?
Court: Stating that it was a mere formality. So that was the essence
of her testimony. It was merely formality, the signing of the documents.
Q: Now, did you not ask spouses Ramos to change the contents of the
documents since it does not reflect your understanding that that is just a
formality or requirement considering that the documents state is the deed of
absolute sale?
A: I did not ask her because I trust her, sir.xiii[13]
For her part, Araceli testified -
Q: Do you recall having a discussion with Mrs. Ramos at one point in time
when you were in dire need of fund or money?
A: In our church, sir, I remember that we have (sic) talked about it. At
the kapilya.
Q: And do you remember the subject of your discussion at that time?
A: It is about the deed of sale and the payment.
Q: You mentioned the word payment. Why are you discussing payment
at the time?
A: Because I borrowed money from her and I will pay in money, sir x x x
xxiv[14]
Q: Mrs. Witness, you testified that you received money from Mrs. Ramos
in installments. Can you explain how you received this from Mrs. Ramos?
A: First of all I trusted her because she is my kumadre and when the Ten
Thousand Pesos is completed in installments and then for formality, I signed
it.
Q: What is your understanding of the word formality when you agreed
to sign the document?
A: If I cannot pay her my loan I will sell my lot, sir.
Q: Whose formality is it that you were required to sign this (sic) deeds of
sale?
A: Mrs. Ramos and ARVI Financing.xv[15]
These questions may be asked: why is it then that petitioners agreed to
sign the documents when they were fully aware that they were contracts of
sale, and when the intention of the parties was only to mortgage their
property to secure their loans? Should they not have demanded instead a
re-writing or reformation of their agreements to reflect their true intention?
In hindsight, it is indeed easy to heap blame on petitioners but a borrowers
urgent need for money places him at a disadvantage vis--vis the lender
who, in almost all cases, virtually dictates the terms of their contract. Even
persons of average intelligence invariably find themselves in no position
whatsoever when bargaining with their creditor such as private respondent
whose primary business concern includes the giving of loans.
As we ruled in Labasan v. Lacuesta,xvi[16] while it was true that plaintiffs
were aware of the contents of the contracts, the preponderance of evidence
showed however that they signed knowing that said contracts did not
express their real intention, and if they did so notwithstanding this, it was
due to the urgent necessity of obtaining funds. Necessitous men are not,
truly speaking, free men; but to answer a present emergency will submit to
any terms that the crafty may impose upon them.
Second. The records show that even after the execution of the disputed
deeds of sale, petitioners remained in actual possession of the property
through their tenant Enrique Diaz. This is an undeniable act of dominion.
The lease contract between petitioners and Enrique Diaz involving the
disputed property subsisted until 1991 when Diaz voluntarily surrendered
the premises to its owners. In addition, petitioners continued to pay the real
estate taxes due on the property - a usual burden attached to ownership -
even after the purported sales, as evidenced by Annexes "4" to "10,"
inclusive, which are the official tax receipts in the name of Fortunata
Dominguez, petitioners sister. As is well known, the payment of taxes
coupled with actual possession of the land covered by the tax declaration
strongly supports a claim of ownership.
But even if we indulge in the conclusion reached by the Court of Appeals that
respondents were justified in not taking possession of the property and
paying the taxes thereon considering that what was sold to them were only
the rights, interests and participation of petitioners in the undivided portion
of the property, such fact will not alter our conclusion for there are other
circumstances, which will be discussed at length in the succeeding
paragraphs, that support the finding that the transactions herein involved
were, in reality, merely loan accommodations.
Third. Petitioners presented several receiptsxvii[17] prepared by respondent
Nilda Ramos proving that on various occasions they received several
amounts of money from her as loans. The existence and due execution of
the receipts were admitted by her, although she claimed in her testimony
that the amounts represented by the receipts were not loans but payments
for the Palico property she purchased from petitioners -
Q: The receipts which have been presented here from Exhibits H, I, J, K
and the receipts marked as Exhibits P, Q, R, some of them are in
handwriting. Would you be able to identify those handwritings or whose
writings are those found on these receipts? The handwritten part only.
A: That is my handwriting.
Q: Do you now admit the receipts were prepared by you?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And the receipts were presented to the defendants for them just to
sign?
A: They received the money before they signed it x x x x
Q: And these receipts as you claimed, what are they representing?
A: The receipts represented our payments to them for the Palico
lot which they sold to us.xviii[18]
This is, however, belied by the receipts, particularly Exhs. 3, 8, 9, 10,
11, 12 and 13, which expressly state on their faces that the amounts
received by petitioners were loans; and further, that the receipts disproved
respondents claims of title over the disputed property.
Lastly. Striking differences in the selling price of the property are very
apparent from the eighteen (18) Deed(s) of Absolute Sale and Transfer. For
purposes of clarity, hereunder is a tabulated summary of the contents of the
eighteen (18) deeds of sale subject of the instant case -
Table 1. Civil Case No. 555-91 (Sps. Ramos v. Sps. Reyes)
DATE OF SALE AREA SOLD UNIT PRICE TOTAL VALUE
27 Dec. 1982 200 sq.m. 100.00/sq.m. P20,000.00
14 Jan. 1982 200 sq.m. 100.00 20,000.00
Feb. 1983* 100 sq.m. 100.00 10,000.00
March 1983* 100 sq.m. 100.00 10,000.00
June 1983* 300 sq.m. 100.00 30,000.00
June 1983* 100 sq.m. 100.00 10,000.00
June 1983* 100 sq.m. 100.00 10,000.00
July 1983 200 sq.m. 100.00 20,000.00
1984* 100 sq.m. 100.00 10,000.00
Nov. 1984* 100 sq.m. 100.00 10,000.00
May 1985* 100 sq.m. 100.00 10,000.00
TOTAL 1,600 sq.m. 100.00 P160,000.00
Table II. Civil Case No. 563-91 (Sps. Ramos v. Sps. Victa)
DATE OF SALE AREA SOLD UNIT PRICE TOTAL VALUE
1 March 1980 200 sq.m. 50.00/sq.m. P10,000.00
- - - - - - - - - * 200 sq.m. 100.00 20,000.00
May 1983* 200 sq.m. 100.00 20,000.00
- - - - - - - - - * 100 sq.m. 100.00 10,000.00
June 1984* 100 sq.m. 200.00 20,000.00
Nov. 1984* 100 sq.m. 200.00 20,000.00
May 1985* 100 sq.m. 100.00 10,000.00
TOTAL 1,000 sq.m. P110,000.00
* Exact dates of sale not on record
The 100-square meter parcel allegedly sold by Concepcion in November
1984 was valued at P100.00/square meter. Yet, curiously, during the same
period Araceli was able to sell an equal portion of the Palico property which
commanded a much higher price of P200.00/square meter. Also noteworthy
is the sudden and drastic depreciation in the selling value of the property of
Araceli, from P200.00/square meter in November 1984 to half the price or
P100.00/square meter six (6) months later, in May 1985. It represents an
anomalous 100% decrease in the value of the property at a time when the
prices of real estate were skyrocketing, like all other commodities. It may
be fairly inferred from these circumstances that the amounts stated in the
deeds were in truth based on the amounts of indebtedness of petitioners to
respondent Nilda Ilano-Ramos, and not the true and fair value of the
property. We are not unaware of the common practice of individual money
lenders of taking possession of documents evidencing ownership of real
estate from the debtor to ensure his faithful compliance with the obligation
to pay the loan. Consequently, we cannot help concluding that the deeds of
sale in question are in reality mortgages, hence, the agreement and
understanding of the parties will have to be enforced in accordance with
their true intent at the time of the execution of their contracts.
WHEREFORE, we find the Decision of respondent Court of Appeals
inconsistent with law and equity, for the transactions involved herein are
forthrightly equitable mortgages. Conformably therewith, the assailed
Decision dated 21 October 1997 and Resolution dated 15 June 1998 in
question are REVERSED and the decision of the trial court REINSTATED and
AFFIRMED. Consequently, Civil Case Nos. 555-91 and 563-91 are
DISMISSED for want of cause of action.
However, petitioners are ordered to PAY their respective loans to private
respondents within thirty (30) days from the finality of this Decision as
follows: (a) P160,000.00 from spouses Mario Reyes and Concepcion
Dominguez-Reyes; (b) P110,000.00 from spouses Dominador Victa and
Araceli Dominguez-Victa; (c) interest at the rate of 12% per annum
computed from the date of the transactions up to the time of payment; and,
(d) the costs. In case of default on the part of petitioners to settle their
respective obligations within the period herein set forth, the property shall
be sold at public auction and the proceeds applied to the mortgage debts
and the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Mendoza, Quisumbing, Buena, and De leon, Jr., JJ., concur.





i[1]

Docketed as Civil Case No. 555-91, "Spouses Jaime Ramos and Nilda Ilano-Ramos v.
Spouses Mario Reyes and Concepcion Dominguez-Reyes;" and Civil Case No. 563-91, "Spouses
Jaime Ramos and Nilda Ilano-Ramos v. Spouses Dominador Victa and Araceli Dominguez
Victa."
ii[2]

Eleven "Deed(s) of Absolute Sale and Transfer" signed by Concepcion Dominguez-Reyes,
Annexes A to K, inclusive (see Vol. I, Records, pp. 5-16); Seven "Deed(s) of Absolute Sale
and Transfer" signed by Araceli Dominguez-Victa, Annexes A to G, inclusive, (see Vol. II,
Records, pp. 4-11).
iii[3]

Records, pp. 27-29; Annexes 1, 2 and 3.

iv[4]

TSN, 25 March 1993, pp. 47-61.
v[5]

Id., 30 March 1993, p. 7.
vi[6]

Penned by Judge Luis R. Reyes, RTC-Br. 22, Imus, Cavite.
vii[7] Penned by Associate Justice Cancio C. Garcia, concurred in by Associate Justices Delilah
Vidallon-Magtolis and Marina L. Buzon.
viii[8]

See American Express, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128899, 8 June 1999.
ix[9]

Zamora v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 102557, 30 July 1996, 260 SCRA 10.
x[10]

Art. 1603, New Civil Code.
xi[11]

Uy v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 104784, 3 March 1994, 230 SCRA 664; Claravall v.
Court of Appeals, No. L-47120, 15 October 1990, 190 SCRA 439, 448.
xii[12]

Art. 1604, New Civil Code.
xiii[13]

TSN, 25 March 1993, pp. 5-11.
xiv[14]

Id., pp. 43-44.
xv[15]

TSN, 31 March 1993, pp. 3-4.
xvi[16]

No. L- 25931, 30 October 1978, 86 SCRA 16, 22.
xvii[17]

Exhs. 1 to 13, inclusive.
xviii[18]

TSN, 1 April 1993, pp. 28-30.