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November 28, 2009


Mr. William C. Haman &

Mr. Kevin Donnelly
Chief Division Counsel
Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
2500 T.C. Jester Blvd.
Houston, Texas 77008

Re: Sanctions et al.

Subject: Carol Ann Davis v. City of Jersey Village et al 4:03-

Mr. Haman & Mr. Kevin Donnelly:

Plaintiff Davis has no objection if you want to produce the ‘duty agent’ i.e.

Special Agent Rick Veterinarian (fact witness) to disclose information relating to

the disjointed and delusional information relayed to him about (retired)Special

Agent Ron Stern in connection with USC SDTX 4:03-CV-Ho-02395 regarding

complaint number 0-62, and 282-H-Ho-59712, under a Rule 60 (b) (6) when Agent

Rick Veterinarian was trying to cover up for Special Agent Al Tribble not

requesting the “booking documents”, not to mention YOU COVERING IT UP

TOO. The statutory requirements have been clearly satisfied as it relates to the

agreement to present special agent Ron Stern and plaintiff limited inquiry. [See

usca 5 pages 3759 filed 10-30-08] to ensure you have a valid reason for not

granting my request, and “playing games” presently by copy of this letter to Judge

Werlein Jr. that Plaintiff Davis is requesting sanctions i.e. Rule 11 motions and

a hearing.

Plaintiff Davis is requesting the court to impose sanctions against you at

least in the amount for the reasonable attorney’s fees and other expenses incurred

to date including the loss of life, and your participation in re- directing the DOJ

investigation that was also involves former United States attorney Laurence

Finder., Judge Werlein Jr. is going to want to hear from the duty agent Rick who

practices veterinary medicine and law enforcement, and Plaintiff is seeking

unspecified damages from YOU and John M. O’Quinn is that delusional and

disjointed enough for you sir. This will include Special Agent Rick Veterinarians

medical diagnosis of Plaintiff Davis; his basis in medicine, fact and law about

disjointed and delusional information where Plaintiff is correcting by “connecting

the dots” to YOU, and Special Agent Al Tribble and appends the information to

Part I ( correction Number One) of the motion to vacate filed at 274 and 275

pursuant to Rule 60 (b) (6) filed in “Federal Court” and in Harris County Probate

Court No. 2 Judge Mike Woods presiding, armed with a verified request for

Declaratory Relief in a Section 1983, where the United States Department of

Justice, Albert N. Moskowitz on July 19, 2002 authorized a Section 1983 civil

lawsuit, 2002 documented in their letter to Plaintiff Davis that she file a civil

rights lawsuit against the City of Jersey Village et al for constitional deprivations,

and YOU continue to punish Plaintiff Davis due to Judge Sim Lake “FILE A


Plaintiff Davis was not as sophisticated in government operations and the

complaint was misdirected and should have been aimed at YOU. Plaintiff Davis

was unaware it was you did not agree with Albert M. Moskowitz, Chief of the

Criminal Section of the United States Department of Justice and know if Plaintiff

Davis discovers “Federal Court” reporter Cher Barron removed that letter from the

“Federal Court” file there is not going to be enough ‘medicine’ to fix the delusion I

have planned for YOU and her in a Federal Court to disjoint both of your freedom

and profits from illegal activity.

Special Agent Rick Veterinarian ‘handing’ Ron Sterns federal information

source clearly not proper and ‘advising’ Plaintiff “Go to the doctor, “for

medication” presumably to medicate her for delusions about O’Quinn and the

FAKE client documented in the “CAPIAS” that it is NOT an illegal dissemination

and an offer of proof of tampering with government data bases not pursuant to the

Texas Government Code , Subchapter F has not been presented, and to seek

‘medicine’ it is detected as a part of YOUR GAME. The medicine is the TML

policy limits and Declaratory Relief granted, and gets you FIRED, sir. The ‘duty

agent i.e. Rick Veterinarian has OBJECTED November 23, 2009 absent a medical

or a law license to Judge Werlein’s continued “Federal Court” jurisdiction,

claiming Plaintiff Davis is delusional ‘fanciful’, and “out of an abundance of

caution” the “Federal Court” is requested to set a hearing, and immediately hear

the EMERGENCY, OF THE DUTY AGENT and the PERIL of Plaintiff Davis

request for ‘medicine’ i.e. sanctions against you, Mr. William C. Haman to

explore your professional violations detected even if you occupy Plaintiff is

needing ‘medicine’ and not her legal right to payment for damages.

Plaintiff Davis made claims against the United States, through the Order of

Judge Sim Lake for the actions of the FBI, and other agents, connected to the

sentencing of Texas DPS Trooper Defendant Richard Rodriguez, for tampering

with governmental data base computers but, Plaintiff Davis still not

understanding the O’Quinn Law Firm ‘s role in ‘representing’ a FAKE client

under the Federal Torts Claim Act (“FTCA”) for abuse of process, malicious

prosecution, concealing the physical assaults of February 18, 2001, and Special

Agent Al Tribble not requesting the “booking documents”, intentional infliction

of emotional distress, false imprisonment, and invasion of privacy is DETECTED

as a part of the cover up.

The ‘duty agent’ so much as said, Plaintiff Davis filed a “Bivens” 1 claims

against FBI agents for due process and Fifth Amendment violations for alleged

violations of the federal Racketeering and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18

U.S.C. § 1961-1968, by The O’Quinn Law Firm, and various employees of these

government operations i.e. State of Texas et al, court reporters, videographers and

interference with economic advantage and benefit, intentional infliction of

emotional distress, and fraud and deceit claims against all defendants connected to

the Department of Justice Special Agent Ron Stern contract that bears Plaintiff

Davis name to collect criminal evidence armed with the July 19, 2002 . While at

the time, Plaintiff was unaware that Judge Sim Lake was talking about you, Mr.

William C. Haman.

The FTCA applies state law to determine the government’s liability for torts

within the FTCA waiver of immunity. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2674. Under

Texas law, there are seven [7] elements for a malicious prosecution claim: (1)

commencement of a criminal prosecution against the plaintiff; (2) causation

(initiation or procurement) of the action by the defendant; (3) termination of the

prosecution in the plaintiff’s favor; (4) the plaintiff’s innocence; (5) the absence of

probable cause for the proceedings; (6) malice in filing the charge; and (7) damage

to the plaintiff. See Richey v. Brookshire Grocery Co., 952 S.W.2d 515, 517 (Tex.

1997). Special Agent Al Tribble did not ask for the “booking documents “as

part of the setup to protect his friend former head of the Houston FBI Office Don

Clark (emphasis added). Attorney John M. O’Quinn hired Don Clark to protect

John O’Quinn and his empire built on corrupt activities with public officials;

racketeering the purpose of Ron Stern’s probe and the contract with Plaintiff Davis

. Your argument; Plaintiff Davis cannot meet the fifth criterion, absence of

probable cause, and blame Plaintiff for the absence of indictments related to the

targets for bribing a public official in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(1)(A)& (C),

which provides: (b) Whoever (1) directly or indirectly, corruptly gives . . .

anything of value to any public official . . . with intent (A) to influence any

official act; or (B) to induce such public official . . . to commit or aid in

committing, or collude in, or allow, any fraud, or make opportunity for the

commission of any fraud, on the United States; shall be [subject to criminal

liability] is not going to be received very well by Judge Werlein. You are aware

Judge Werlein is a stickler about the law; he expects to see a commitment to public

service. Protecting John M. O’Quinn and the FAKE client is not the commitment

that is authorized by the “Federal Court” where YOU joined in the “game”;

“Everyone agrees to lie” to the “Federal Court “and plaintiff Davis.

Probable cause is defined as “the existence of such facts and circumstances

as would excite belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the

knowledge of the prosecutor [complainant], that the person charged was guilty of

the crime for which he was prosecuted.” Richey, 952 S.W.2d at 517 (citation

omitted) (editing original). If the facts necessary to instigate a criminal prosecution

are in dispute, the issue of probable cause is a mixed question of law and fact to be

resolved by Judge Werlein Jr. Where the facts underlying the decision to

prosecute are not disputed, however, then the question of probable cause is a

question of law decided by the court. See Richey, 952 S.W.2d at 518. It is

undisputed that Al Tribble did not collect the “booking documents” and has

continued to PROFIT as a Special Agent for the FBI, and Al Tribble has defended

the employment of Don Clark when Clark was hired by John M. O’Quinn during a

federal investigation about public corruption i.e. Texas Attorney General Dan

Morales remember him? FBI Agent Robert Hightower remember him? The only

dispute concerns Tribble’s s mens rea – what Al Tribble knew or intended. “[T]he

complainant’s failure to make a further investigation into the suspect’s state of

mind does not constitute lack of probable cause if all objective elements of a crime

reasonably appear to have been completed, and the ‘duty agent’ wants Plaintiff

Davis medicated for delusion and disjointed thoughts. Even though the Plaintiff

Davis evidence might have been weak (delusional and or disjointed) and the

prospects of obtaining a conviction may not have been good, before receiving the

medical diagnosis of the Special Agent Veterinarian as a matter of law, the Davis

Plaintiff “ federal information source “ under Special Agent Ron Stern has

proffered proof of probable cause; and thus Plaintiff Davis has not failed to state

a claim for the denial of protection of her civil rights, when Al Tribble did not

collect the “booking documents” from Sgt. Robert “Body Armor” LaRouax

connected to investigation 282-A-HO-59712 where Plaintiff hand wrote about

John M. O’Quinn and his vast government conspiracy on February 18, 2001 and

when Al Tribble ‘investigates’ Don Clark gets a new job , and Plaintiff says

come on back Don it’s over because YOU know everything of John M. O’Quinn ‘s

is mine because if you do not Plaintiff Davis is going to prosecute you too Mr. Don

Clark; and by copy Don Clark is advised. (See Houston Chronicle Archive and the

United States Attorney Ronald G. Woods, and his professional opinion that Clark

working for O’Quinn was “problematic” and for $ 150.00., Plaintiff Davis can turn

“hearsay” in to testimony evidence against the O’Quinn, his billion dollar empire

where Plaintiff Davis says its mine (and the Harris County Rico Victims) – Judge

Werlein Jr. rules, while you too act “impervious to the truth”. 2. Abuse of

Process Under Texas law, there are three elements for an abuse of process claim:

“(1) that Al Tribble made an illegal, improper or perverted use of the process, a use

neither warranted nor authorized by the process; (2) that the Al Tribble et al had an

ulterior motive or purpose in exercising such illegal, perverted or improper use of

the process; and (3) that damage resulted to the plaintiff Davis as a result of such

illegal act.” Sierra Club, Lone Star Chapter v. Cedar Point Oil Co. Inc., 73 F.3d

546, 577 (5th Cir. 1996). The ‘duty agent ‘allegations are fatally defective

because they fail to allege use of the process other than the mere institution of the

veterinarian, insult to injury, “playing games” i.e. obstruction of justice ,

trivializing Plaintiff Davis peril which was not improper. See In re Burzynski, 989

F.2d 733, 739 (5th Cir. 1993). Thus, as a matter of law, Plaintiff Davis has not

failed to state a claim for abuse of process upon which relief can be granted. C.

RICO Plaintiff claims and argues that Judge Werlein is going to err in dismissing

you from the prosecution of Plaintiff Davis RICO claims against the government

agents i.e. Al Tribble and private defendants on the basis of qualified immunity,

when it was Al Tribble deliberate act that gives Plaintiff Davis FIRST CHAIR,

based on the letter written by the Department of Justice, and YOU have NOT

earned the right to be a GOVERNMENT LAWYER and YOU have ABUSED

YOUR OFFICE . Government officials performing discretionary functions are

shielded from “liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate

‘clearly established’ statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person

would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) but Tribble

knew NOT to ask for the “booking documents” How ? Plaintiff Davis advises him

in a delusional and disjointed manner, and this is your chance to sell it to the

Judge – that you are innocent too. Plaintiff has been talking to this Judge since

2003 sometimes represented by counsel most of the time not. This Judge has

permitted his Plaintiff to file 27 post trial motions after a four day trial. This

Judge has commitment to public service and he is going to look at you and your

commitment to public service and this judge is going to make an inquiry in the

public interest due to his commitment to serve the United States of America and its

citizens a job that you are supposed to be interested in but you want to “play

games”. It is standard operating procedure to request the “booking

documents”. The district court will determine that Al Tribble is not entitled to

qualified immunity from the RICO claim because the Plaintiffs can show a

violation of statutory rights secured by RICO. Specifically, the district court WILL

reasoned that “[t]he FBI agent IS liable for RICO violations in the performance of

their duties BUT there can be no RICO claim against federal officials on account

of their alleged official misconduct,” citing McNeily v. United States , 6 F.3d 343,

350 (5th Cir. 1993). The holding in McNeily , which held that the FDIC cannot be

sued under the RICO statute because the FDIC, as a federal agency, is not

chargeable, indictable or punishable for violations of state and federal criminal

provisions. See id., relying on Berger v. Pierce, 933 F.2d 393, 397 (6th Cir. 1991).

Had the Plaintiffs named the FBI as a defendant to this suit, the district court

would have been on firm ground in dismissing RICO claims against that federal

agency based on McNeily. However, McNeily does not support the grant of

qualified immunity to the FBI agents or to the private individuals who acted at the

direction of John M. O’Quinn just like those ‘attorneys’ at the Texas Attorney

General Law Enforcement Division , David Talbot, Karen Matlock et al who

accepted the setup letter of attorneys Larry Mayo and Leona Filis working

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together to achieve one single purpose ; protect O’Quinn and his billion dollar

empire. However, if the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on some

alternative ground, the district court’s may affirm a dismissal however doubtful

See Gulf Island IV, 940 F.2d at 952. In assessing a claim of qualified

immunity, Judge Werlein Jr. must determine whether: (1) the plaintiff Davis has

asserted a constitutional or statutory violation; (2) the law regarding the alleged

violation was clearly established at the time of the operative events; and (3) the

record shows that the violation occurred, or at least gives rise to “a genuine issue

of material fact as to whether the Al Tribble actually engaged in conduct that

violated the clearly- established law, by not requesting the “booking documents.”

Kerr v. Lyford, 171 F.3d 330, 338 (5th Cir. 1999). If Judge Werlein Jr. determines

that Al Tribble official’s conduct violated clearly established law, we address

whether that conduct was objectively reasonable. See Wren v. Towe, 130 F.3d

1154, 1159 (5th Cir. 1997). The Racketeering and Corrupt Organizations Act

RICO imposes criminal and civil liability upon those who engage in “a pattern of

racketeering activity” defined as “any act or threat involving” specified state-law

crimes, acts indictable under various specified federal statutes, and other federal

offenses. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1). Section 1964(c) allows a private party who has

been sustained damages from a RICO violation, to recover those damages. See 18

U.S.C. § 1964(c). And, you are aware even if you think it is delusional and

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disjointed Plaintiff Davis herein alleges that the Government and private

defendants’ racketeering activities included mail and wire fraud, which are

included among the enumerated predicate acts or a RICO claim. See 18 U.S.C. §

1961(1). . In McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987), the Supreme Court

held that the mail fraud statute did not prohibit schemes that defrauded people of

their intangible rights to an honest and impartial government. Following McNally ,

Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 1346, 2 which, in one sentence, provided that “[f]or

the purposes of this chapter, the term ‘scheme or artifice to defraud’ includes a

scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible right of honest services.” In

1997, the Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, held that, by enacting § 1346, Congress

intended to protect the intangible right of honest services from wire fraud schemes

by state actors. See United States v. Brumley, 116 F.3d 728, 733 (5th Cir. 1997)

(“fraud statutes cover the deprivation of intangible rights.”). However, prior to the

en banc resolution of Brumley, such rights were clearly established by the

enactment of § 1346. See id. At 736 (dissent) (“It is therefore incomprehensible to

us that the majority can conclude . . . that [§ 1346] reflects a clear statement of a

Congressional intention to protect the citizenry of a state from corrupt state

officials.”). Because the rights asserted by Plaintiff Davis are clearly established at

the time of defendants’ alleged acts, Judge Werlein Jr., will conclude and not err in

not dismissing Plaintiff Davis RICO claims. D. Supremacy Clause and State

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Law Claims Plaintiff Davis has yet to bring state law claims for civil conspiracy,

invasion of privacy, interference with economic advantage and benefit, intentional

infliction of emotional distress, 3 and fraud and deceit. Plaintiff Davis contends she

is not on the ground that she is barred by the federal supremacy clause, even when

you argue Plaintiff Davis is delusional and makes disjointed comments, you make

consider that Judge Werlein understand the illusion of good government, the RICO

of John M. O’Quinn, and shares an understanding of his Plaintiff ‘disjointed ‘ from

Agent Ron Stern is YOUR FAULT, and know Plaintiff Davis is going to advise his

wife, United States Attorney Julia Stern, by facsimile, and she will have it by the

time you read this line. 4

1. Government Agents

The individual agents’ immunity from suit under Texas law is

the issue. The Attorney General has not certified under 28 U.S.C. §

2679(d)(1) that the agents acted within the scope of their employment

at the time of the events at issue, thereby substituting the United

States as defendant on those claims, see Gutierrez de Martinez v.

Lamagno , 515 U.S. 417, 420 (1995). This procedure is not challenged

but no doubt in “the game” the government is still working for

O’Quinn and you will and you have because you did not seek a

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decision knowing the whole time Al Tribble did not request the

“booking documents” on purpose and you want to “play games” with

a former Special Agent in this case Ron Stern’s Federal Information

Source, where YOU waived YOUR rights to prosecute your friends

softly for public corruption crime and YOU know Plaintiff Davis is

requesting Judge Werlein to take it all, exclude you and – it is


2. Private Defendants

The district court will not dismiss Plaintiff Davis state law

claims against the private defendants under the federal supremacy

clause. While this Court has not addressed the issue of whether the

supremacy clause preempts state law tort claims against private

defendants acting at the direction of the federal government, there is

some precedent to guide us and it is NOT disjointed. In Boyle v.

United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988), the Supreme Court

considered the issue of whether the supremacy clause preempted state

law liability of independent contractors performing work for the

federal government. Under Boyle, state law may be preempted where:

(1) there is a uniquely federal interest and (2) there is a significant

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conflict between federal policy and the operation of state law. See

Boyle, 487 U.S. at 504-05, 507.

The liability of private defendants for actions taken at the

direction of agents acting within their authority is a unique federal

interest. Private businesses and individuals provide invaluable

assistance as informants who provide evidence against law violators

or, as in this instance, lend credibility to FBI undercover

operations. If private businesses were not eligible for immunity from

state law claims arising from assisting undercover federal operations,

this would provide a major disincentive to assisting law enforcement

and would undermine the needs and interests of the federal

government. At issue then, is whether the federal policy conflicts

with the operation of state law. If the private defendants committed

what would have been illegal acts under state law at the direction and

control of agents acting within their authority, the operation of state

law would conflict with federal policy. In Hunter v. Wood, 209 U.S.

205 (1908), where state law conflicted with a federal court order, the

Court will not preclude a state law prosecution of a railroaded federal

information source who worked with another federal information

source both who worked with federal agents i.e. Ron Stern in this

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case, and has made an offer of proof in the FAKE client documented

in the “CAPIAS” is not public corruption when the same ‘client’ was

used to high jack legal processes , government operations, waste,

fraud and abuse now under investigation at Texas State Auditor John

Keel’s Office pursuant to and in that order. Similarly, this Court has

suggested that federal immunity privilege should be extended to

preclude an action against a telephone company who assisted federal

law enforcement agents with wiretapping. See Fowler v. Southern

Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co., 343 F.2d 150, 156-57 (5th Cir.

1965). See also Connecticut v. Marra, 528 F. Supp. 381 (D. Conn.

1981) (holding that defendant working at direction of FBI was entitled

to federal immunity from state law prosecution). State law cannot

operate to impede individuals who have government authority and act

as is necessary and proper within that authority. See, e.g.,

Cunningham v. Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 75 (1890). If the private

defendants acted in good faith by reasonably relying upon the

authority of government agents, their actions are shielded from state

law action. In this case, the private defendants, in good faith, did not

support the FBI’s undercover operation with credibility and

legitimacy attached to Special Agent Ron Stern (a turf war). There is

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ample evidence that the private defendants acted maliciously or

attempted to derive personal gain from not assisting in the operation.

Moreover, the private defendants’ actions, consistent with the

apparent authority granted by the government agents, were objectively

not reasonable. Under the veil of apparent authority, the private

defendants had ample reason to believe that their actions were illegal

or would cause injury to Plaintiff Davis and her witnesses. Thus,

Plaintiff Davis state law claims against the private defendants are not

barred by the supremacy clause.

E. FTCA and Bivens Claims: Statute of Limitations

You are not authorized to argue that the district court erred in

finding that Plaintiff Davis FTCA causes of action and Bivens claims

are not barred by the statute of limitations. The district court will

not err in holding that Plaintiff Davis Bivens claims are not time

barred, and you nevertheless affirm the those claims on the basis of

qualified immunity when you “play games.”

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1. FTCA Claims

The FTCA applies a two-year statute of limitations from the

accrual date of the cause of action. See 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b). A cause

of action accrues, under federal law, “when the plaintiff knows or has

reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action.” See

Moore v. McDonald, 30 F.3d 616, 620-21 (5th Cir. 1994). The

plaintiff's knowledge of the injury depends on two elements: (1) the

existence of the injury; and (2) the connection between the injury and

the defendant's actions. See Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 51 F.3d

512, 516 (5th Cir. 1995). After carefully reviewing the veterinarian

comments Plaintiff Davis would ask Judge Werlein Jr. to permit a

PLAINTIF FIFTH Amended Complaint, concluding Lindy filed the

first one, Jerry S. Payne filed the second one, Plaintiff Davis sued

O’Quinn and that is the Forth one, Beverly Thompson and Plaintiff

have sought Declaratory Relief and that is the fifth one , and this is the

Sixth one, and that Plaintiff Davis et al claims for assault, false

imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and

invasion of privacy are NOT barred by the statute of limitations. They

rest on allegations of events that occurred in with Special Agent Ron

Stern and Plaintiff Davis, and have been presented more than two-

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years after the events giving rise to the ongoing and continued

complaint, and Judge Werlein is correct in NOT dismissing them,

and Judge Hitter is not correct for trying to dismiss Plaintiff Davis


2. Bivens Claims

Judge Werlein Jr., is holding that Plaintiff Davis et al and (the

class action claims) i.e. Bivens claims for due process and Fifth

Amendment violations are not barred by the statute of limitations.

Under Bivens, a person may sue a federal agent for money damages

when the federal agent has allegedly violated that person's

constitutional rights, not asking for the “booking document” when

advised to do so by Plaintiff Davis, and not following procedure in

seeking to “booking documents”. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named

Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). A Bivens

action is controlled by the applicable state statute of limitations. See

Alford v. United States, 693 F.2d 498, 499 (5th Cir. 1982) (per

curiam). This Court, applying Texas law, has held that the statute of

limitations period on a Bivens claim is two years. See Pena v. United

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States, 157 F.3d 984, 987 (5th Cir. 1998). Plaintiff Davis became

aware that he had been injured by the Defendants’ alleged violation of

his constitutional rights on 12:26 PM November 23, 2009 when the

FBI agents revealed to her that she needed to see a doctor had been

expending her time and energy in furthering the deceptions of FBI

Agent Ron Stern, rather than the government’s business interests.

Likewise, the pleadings herein allege that the FBI revealed the

undercover scheme to Plaintiff Davis on November 28, 2009 when

Ramon Viada sent a police officer to kick in Plaintiff Davis front door

at 25311 Sugar Valley Lane, Spring, Texas 77373. However, Judge

Werlein Jr., will find nothing in the record that establishes when

Plaintiff Davis was made privy to this information she did not act in

the government’s best interest because she always tells Judge Werlein

Jr. EVERYTHING! Judge Werlein will affirm and hold that

Plaintiff Davis et al Bivens claims are not barred by Texas’ two-year

statute of limitations, but will find that you unable to argue the district

court not dismissing Al Tribble and Don Clark from Plaintiff Davis

Bivens claims on statute of limitations grounds other than the usual

lying, and misrepresentations in litigation, and considering Judge

Werlein knows about Judge Sim Lake YELLING AT YOU, “as a

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precautionary matter and out of an abundance of caution” you best

dial up your ‘friends’ attorney Lori Gillespie and Ken Wall and

process Plaintiff Davis a check for policy limits, have the check for

damages ready to present to Judge Werlein Jr. and quit “playing

games” in a “Federal Court” case where you have no place on the

“game” board or in the “playpen”.

3. Qualified immunity

Although neither the pleadings, herein are coherent to YOU the

Judge Werlein will order the briefs develop the analysis, it is obvious

that Al Tribble et al defendants do not have a qualified immunity

defense to the Bivens claims. Therefore, in the interest of judicial

economy, Judge Werlein Jr., will not dismiss Plaintiff Davis Bivens

claims on that alternative ground. See Gulf Island, IV, 940 F.2d at

952. “Governmental officials performing discretionary functions are

shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct

[does] not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights

of which a reasonable person would have known.” Wyatt v. Cole, 504

U.S. 158, 166 (1992). Plaintiff Davis Bivens claims are not bottomed

on defendant Al Tribble et al violations of Plaintiff Davis

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constitutional due process rights. Judge Werlein court has not

addressed the particular issue presented by this case: the specific

limits on federal agents’ authority in undercover operations and their

continued turf war i.e. Ron Stern (Justin Fox) commitment to

prosecute public corruption versus Al Tribble Don Clark et al to be

paid ( public money) to cover up public corruption. The district

court will find no limits on the power of federal agents operating

under cover, reasoning that if Plaintiff Davis is allowed to pursue

state law causes of action it would “effectively stop” unauthorized

federal undercover operations because, “by their very nature [ they]

seek to invade the privacy of those who violate the law.” The district

court will say use legal authority, that “[t]he constitutional structure of

our federal system does permit private litigants to police federal law

enforcement activities by asserting state law claims against federal

law enforcement agencies or their agents who play games with other

agents “federal information source.” The district court will not err in

this regard and you asked the wrong question and reached the wrong

conclusion. The Judge will ask whether it was constitutionally

permissible for federal agents to inflict damages on innocent non-

targets during an undercover operation and refuse them

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compensation or assistance. Because the Fifth Amendment due

process guarantee against conscience-shocking injury imposes clear

limits on law enforcement conduct, Judge Werlein will conclude that

it was neither necessary nor proper for the Al Tribble on November

23, 2009 at 12:23 PM in this case to destroy the lives and businesses

of innocent non-targets in the name of law enforcement, nor is the

dispatching a one man mission to arrest Plaintiff Davis on November

24, 2009. Pretend you do not know “The touchstone of due process is

protection of the individual against arbitrary action of government.”

Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) it is your job on the line

because you want to “play games” with Plaintiff Davis. The Due

Process Clause was intended to prevent government officials from

“playing games” abusing their power or employing it as an instrument

of oppression. See Collins v. City of Harker Heights, Tex., 503 U.S.

115, 126 (1992). The cognizable level of executive abuse of power is

“playing games” and then it is “total police power” that which

“shocks the conscience,” violates the “decencies of civilized conduct”

or interferes with rights “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”

Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 209-210 (1952). Obviously, this

guarantee of due process protects citizens against deliberate harm

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from government officials See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331

(1986) is a delusion and or a disjointed conversation. Allegations of

lesser culpability have been held adequate to state a claim in some

circumstances. For example, deliberate indifference suffices to impose

due process liability when government actors fail to provide adequate

care for pretrial detainees with serious medical needs. See Hare v.

City of Corinth, 74 F.3d 633 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc) and you said

Plaintiff Davis needed a ‘doctor ‘and ‘medicine” when YOU know

Plaintiff Davis testified the best medicine for Section 1983 and other

constitional deprivations was an attorney like Jerry S. Payne (unless

Cher Barron deleted that testimony on her wave digital recorder)

However, harm inflicted due to government actors’ simple negligence

is categorically beneath the threshold of constitutional due process.

See Daniels, 474 U.S. at 328. The Supreme Court recently provided a

road map for navigating mid-level-culpability due process claims. In

County of Sacramento v. Lewis , 523 U.S. 833 (1998), parents of a

motorcycle passenger killed in a high-speed police chase brought a 42

U.S.C. § 1983 action against the officer and governmental agencies

involved, alleging deprivation of their decedent’s substantive due

process right to life. Lewis, 118 S. Ct. 1708, 1712. The Supreme Court

24 | P a g e
rejected the plaintiff’s contention that proof of deliberate indifference

by the officer would be sufficient to establish a due process violation.

Id. at 1711. “A police officer deciding whether to give chase must

balance on one hand the need to stop a suspect and show that flight

from the law is no way to freedom, and, on the other, the high-speed

threat to everyone within stopping range, be they suspects, their

passengers, other drivers or bystanders .” Id. at 1720. Analogizing

the circumstances of a police chase to the situation of officers called

on to quell a prison riot, the Supreme Court held that “‘[a] deliberate

indifference standard does not adequately capture the importance of

such competing obligations, or convey the appropriate hesitancy to

critique in hindsight decisions necessarily made in haste, under

pressure, and frequently without the luxury of a second chance.’” Id.

at 1720, quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320 (1986). The

court went on to distinguish situations where mid-level fault was

sufficient to impose liability. For example, liability for deliberate

indifference to inmate welfare rests upon the luxury enjoyed by

prison officials of having time to make unhurried judgments, upon the

chance for repeated reflection, largely uncomplicated by the pulls of

competing obligations. See Lewis, 118 S. Ct. at 1720. “When such

25 | P a g e
extended opportunities to do better are teamed with protracted failure

even to care, indifference is truly shocking. But when unforeseen

circumstances demand an officer’s instant judgment, even precipitate

recklessness fails to inch close enough to harmful purpose to spark the

shock that implicates ‘the large concerns of the governors and the

governed’” Id., quoting Daniels v. Williams , 474 U.S. at 332 when

you and your agents behave in a delusional fashion a remedy is

requested that Judge Werlein Jr., get you some medicine too located

at the infirmary at the “Federal Court” detention center and that you

do not pass “Go” i.e. the Exit sign at the Federal Court House but go

straight to jail. Applying the Lewis analysis to the FBI’s alleged

activity in this case, Judge Werlein will conclude that the FBI made

decisions which harmed the Plaintiffs after ample opportunity for cool

reflection. In fact, they invested almost years and thousands of man

hours in developing the sting operation attached to the name of



the due process clause protects the Plaintiff Davis from any harm that

arose from the officers and Agent Al Tribble et al including you and

your deliberate indifference. The facts, as pleaded, establish at least

26 | P a g e
that level of federal agent culpability as Special Agent Ron Stern

Operation on Public Corruption – 062 where he armed Plaintiff Davis

with a government tape recorder evolved into a disaster at your office

but a windfall for the “probe’ attached to Special Agent Ron Stern

where Stern and Judge Werlein snag a bounty for the RICO Victims

and Texas; as it should be. Therefore Judge Werlein Jr., will hold

that Plaintiff Davis allegations that federal agents inflicted damages

on him, an innocent non-target, during this particular undercover

operation and refused her assistance and compensation states a claim

under Bivens . However, because Judge Werlein will address today

for the first time the parameters of due process protections afforded

innocent third parties injured by law enforcement sting operations run

amok, ( the Estate of Melinda Honerkamp , the estate of Marvin Leo

West, the estate of Susan Carol Sherman, Al Johnson, Beverly

Thompson, Joe Olson and the other RICO victims, now including

adult children ) and because the Supreme Court’s language that drives

our analysis appeared in a case decided in 1998, Plaintiff Davis can

say that the due process rights claimed by Plaintiff Davis ( and

Melinda Honerkamp when she sued Judge William M. “Bill “ Elliot)

were clearly established during 1992-94. See Lewis, 523 U.S. 833.

27 | P a g e
Judge Werlein will therefore affirm Plaintiff Davis Bivens claims on

the alternative basis of qualified immunity. Based on the foregoing,

get me my check for policy limits today and allow me to speak to

Agent Ron Stern because Judge Werlein when I request it , will affirm

Plaintiff Davis and not dismiss her Section 1983 law suit.

The Duty Agent i.e. Randy i.e. veterinarian suggesting

medication, hospitalization if proper for YOU to have conveyed

to Plaintiff Davis, YOU should have filed a proper motion in

court to “handle “ the federal information source instead of

“playing games” to protect attorney Ramon Viada from lying

and withholding in a ‘federal investigation’ or trying to

intimidate the “federal information source”. Judge Sim Lake

told “the federal information source” (and Beverly Thompson)

to file a complaint on the United States Attorney, we did not

know it was you. With the threats made on my life and false

arrest of Arvin Leo West, the ‘authorized’ activities of your

ATF division, i.e. Ronnie Holley (and Cheryl Yates Webb)

when the “federal information source” was making her first

attempt to vacate the corrupted verdict obtained by lawyer

misconduct i.e. Racketeering, your “contract’ and your silly

28 | P a g e
little “game” detected with Mary Docherty et al and the

undercover private investigator. Your ‘Duty Agent’, Rick

( the ‘Veterinarian’) clearly has ‘credible’ information but

not related to the 878 pages of documents Andrew Duffin

downloaded to the State of Texas Computer for attorney

Warren Tom Harrison, that was discovered in the Brazos

County case that “Lindy” filed against Sandstone Center and

‘Dr.’ John Vernon Kin Ross Wright that “connects the dots” to

attorneys Barbara W. Palmer, Richard Sewell along with

O’Quinn and attorney Charles Soechting to this “vast

government conspiracy” where you occupy a fanciful notion

and play games in your busy practice that a DOJ “federal

information source” under Special Agent Ron tern is going to

let you PROFIT from the murder of another “federal

information source” and any further concealment of the

HUB, John M. O’Quinn.

Judge Werlein Jr., suggested settlement but the

‘government lawyers’ want to measure the damage to a “federal

information source” by the Texas Double Standard. US Julia

Stern says “I do not want anything to happen to you”; expert

29 | P a g e
Charles Dean Huckabee “lawyers lie” is it you are her we will

see in “Federal Court” because this motion is live under a Rule

60 (b) (6) and armed with Declaratory Relief request and you

want to play games . This motion i.e. ticket to the game is not

be a waiver of any privilege or statutory protection applicable

to the material and or information Plaintiff Davis has requested

and previously requested. Finally this Motion for Sanctions

and a request (to amend Plaintiff Davis original complaint)

is in compliance with rule 5 and 11 of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure has been satisfied. Should you have any

questions in this regard, call me otherwise; I will see you at the

“Federal Court”; your office cannot be trusted with matters of

truth and justice explaining why Judge Sim Lake in court told

Plaintiff Davis and Beverly Thompson to file a complaint on

the United States Attorney Office. Please extend the complaint

process to former United State Attorney Lawrence D. Finder as

I have clearly stated in my disclosures and other supporting

sworn motions connected to the case before Judge David

Hittner, did not have jurisdiction. Your Department authorized

this Section 1983 court case a long time ago based on the false

30 | P a g e
police reports of officer Defendant Robert LaRouax, and the

withholding of attorney Ramon Viada i.e. the “booking

documents”, and again requested is your SWORN response


did nothing to save Lindy’s life, but will spend millions of

public money to protect the RICO of John M. O’Quinn. Be

prepared for voir dire and an inquiry why the ‘O’Quinn” Law

Firm was excused from this particular exercise the “Touhy

letter” and the other exercise you have decided in violation of

the Texas Rules of Professional Conduct, when attorney Lin

Wood subpoenaed Mr. Don Clark and all those favors Mr.

John M. O’Quinn talks about under oath he does for the FBI, be

sure you bring that “Touhy letter” agreement to court when

Don Clark testified in the Anna Nicole case; Judge Werlein is

going to ask you for it and requested is to give Judge Werlein

Jr., total control when Judge Dagget took the Corvette, in

violation of the Judicial and Professional Rules of conduct just

Judge Squiers and Bill Elliot. Plaintiff Davis must be stupid

not to have looked at you and how you and the ‘duty agent’

play games in a “Federal Court” case and its “Due Course”

31 | P a g e
where what Plaintiff Davis says it is YOU which is disjointed,

delusional and requiring medication adjustment, in the Federal

Detention Center and where you and the “federal information

source” diverge based on Albert M. Robert Moskowitz, Chief

Criminal Section of the United States Department of Justice

letter for PLAINTIFF DAVIS to prosecute this Section 1983

case, and the next thing I am going to ask you is how do you

know ‘agent’ Batista, and to promptly respond to requests,

concentrate on identifying main files in the Central Records

System at FBI Headquarters( emphasis added).

In the end Plaintiff Davis decided to follow the Department of Justice letter

about filing a civil suit on the chance that she could be restored for something like

frivolous charges attached to the illegal disseminations of government data bases

as documented in the “CAPIAS” and connected to the O’Quinn Law Firm et al

and his “vast government conspiracy” and you are aware Plaintiff Davis is

directed to follow protocol and speak with the Department of Justice veterinarian

i.e. duty agent and following the instruction directed to Plaintiff Davis that,

theoretically, could prevent me from bringing future suit against the agency, and

discover finally if agent Ron Stern, his wife, Julia Stern for playing a game with

Plaintiff Davis. Basically, when submitting to a federal judge a motion to file a

32 | P a g e
civil suit against any federal agency, that judge first, before any discovery

processes or otherwise occurs, must deem whether the civil suit is worth pursuing;

if the judge finds the request frivolous, he or she can apply a variety of

punishments to the plaintiff, known as sanctions. Sanctions can be monetary fines

and can also contain other specific directives solely at the discretion of the judge

such as banning the plaintiff from ever filing future suit against the agency in

question, but in this case the Department of Justice directed me to protect my legal

right and now you want to “play games”. Requested sanctions, and a disclosure of

your investigation connected to Plaintiff Davis where I have requested the former

FBI Agent Ron Stern to come to court in a Section 1983 civil lawsuit. Where,

when, what, why, and what role has supposed mental illness played, especially as a

tool employed by the investigation itself in its goal of discrediting Plaintiff Davis

attempts to gain information regarding the investigation and be paid damages. You

ignore the evidence of retired FBI Agent Justin Fox’s named in a reckless manner

and requested is you explain that too when you tender the TML policy limits and

do not come to court without my check to be paid for damages in your silly little

game to protect John M. O’Quinn and his FAKE client to exact harm i.e.
RETALIATE on Ron Sterns criminal investigation.

Respectfully submitted,

33 | P a g e
Carol Ann Davis
25311 Sugar Valley
Spring, Texas 77373

34 | P a g e
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388 (1971). Added by Pub.L. 100-690, Title VII, § 7603(a),
3 Davis
Nov. 18, 1988, 102 Stat. 4508. is bringing separate claims for

intentional infliction of emotional distress. The claims brought pursuant to

Texas state law are addressed here. The causes of action seeking relief
under the Federal Tort Claims Act are discussed above the game is over.

It is not clear from the record before Plaintiff Davis and the question need

not be reached whether Plaintiff Davis state law claims are governed by

the Texas two year statute of limitations, Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code

Ann. § 16.003 or the four year statute of limitations, Tex. Civ. Prac. &

Rem. Code Ann. § 16.004. See Williams v. Khalaf, 802 S.W.2d 651, 658
(Tex. 1990). Plaintiff Davis and Thompson et al are bringing

additional Bivens claims based on violations of their rights and the other

RICO victims and seek to consult with an attorney during their encounters

with agents. Thompson et al has made a clear allegation that she suffered

similar violations by her signature below and;

Davis & Thompson emphasize at the outset that the legitimacy of the

operation vis-a-vis those who violate the law, i.e. the targets of Ron Stern’s

PUBLIC CORRUPTION PROBE is a BIG issue in this law suit and the

request for Declaratory Relief and for Judge Werlein to “catch all “ of the

MONEY. Because it is a legitimate windfall for the Ron Stern probe- and

United States wins and the State of Texas wins – Davis and Thompson

about your ‘friends’ – Game over and Lindy told you repeatedly “Paybacks

are hell” and now that Al Johnson lived to tell Judge Werlein Jr. about the

“game” when Cheryl Yates Webb became a ‘private investigator’

undercover due to the delivery of criminal evidence connected to Carla

Roberson Cummings the poster child of lying and the dots are connected to

the Right Hand Man ex-Texas DPS trooper attorney Charles Soechting Mr.

O’Quinn’s “stalwart partner” who is now screaming, and reported by

Carolyn Logan is Soechting is going to shut Plaintiff Davis down , the

question is where because he does not have a chance in “Federal Court” and

its “Due Course” is set on him and Professor Treece the ‘applicant’ when

they “play games” with Judge Werlein Jr. knowing full well Judge Werlein

Jr. rules Judge Mike Wood of Probate No. 2 and that Judge Wood as a

precautionary measure vacate his Order where he granted Gerald T. Treece

application to act as EXECTOR where a “Federal Court” in “Due course”

is going to absolve the same because of the reasons stated by Maria

Yolanda Lopez , assistant Harris County Probate No. 2 “ We do not listen

to the federal court , we do things our own way here” is simply not in

compliance with the law; well settled law and the game of John M.

O’Quinn is finally over, AND DO NOT EVER INSULT MY JUDGE

AGAIN is the message to ALL OF THE LAWYERS ! (Excluding attorney

Jerry S. Payne who knows better). Mr. Haman you and me – we are done ,

GOOGLE “RAMON VIADA” & visit the website dedicated to the Texas

Double Standard that you have worked so hard to protect , and then you are

well advised to seek the counsel of attorney Alla Petard

www.greatlawyer@ this demand is what Alla says you are

looking for