2. Primicias vs. Fugoso [L-18000.

Jan 27, 1948]Doctrine:

Clear and Present Danger Test, Freedom of Assembly and Expression
FACTS:
This case is an action of mandamus instituted by petitioner Cipriano Primicias, manager of the
Coalesced Minority Parties, against respondent Manila City Mayor, Valeriano Fugoso, to compel the
latter to issue a permit for the holding of a public meeting at the Plaza Miranda on Nov 16, 1947.
The petitioner requested for a permit to hold a peaceful public meeting. However, the respondent refused to
issue such permit because he found that there is a reasonable ground to believe, basing upon
previous utterances and upon the fact that passions, specially on the part of the losing groups,
remains bitter and high, that similar speeches will be delivered tending to undermine the faith and
confidence of the people in their government, and in the duly peace and a disruption of public
order. Respondent based his refusal to the Revised Ordinances of 1927 prohibiting as an offense
against public peace, and penalizes as a misdemeanor, "any act, in any public place, meeting,
or procession, tending to disturb the peace or excite a riot; or collect with other persons in a body
or crowd for any unlawful purpose; or disturb or disquiet any congregation engaged in any lawful
assembly." Included herein is Sec. 1119, Free use of Public Place.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Mayor has the right to refuse to issue permit hence violating freedom
of assembly.
HELD:
The answer is negative. Supreme Court states that the freedom of speech, and to peacefully
assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances, are fundamental personal rights of
the people recognized and guaranteed by the constitution. However, these rights are not absolute.
They can
be regulated under the states police power
that they should not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor to the
rights of the community or society. The Court holds that there can be 2 interpretations of Sec.
1119: 1) the Mayor of the City of Manila invested with unregulated discretion to grant or refuse, to
grant permit for the holding of a lawful assembly or meeting, parade, or procession in the streets
and other public places of the City of Manila; and 2) The right of the Mayor is subject to
reasonable discretion to determine or specify the streets or public places to be used with the view
to prevent confusion by overlapping, to secure convenient use of the streets and public places by
others, and to provide adequate and proper policing to minimize the risk of disorder. The court
favored the second construction since the first construction is tantamount to authorizing the
Mayor to prohibit the use of the streets. Under our democratic system of government no such
unlimited power may be validly granted to any officer of the government, except perhaps in cases
of national emergency. It is to be noted that the permit to be issued is for the use of public places
and not for the assembly itself. The Court holds that the assembly is lawful and thus cannot be
struck down. Fear of serious injurycannot alone justifies suppression of free speech and assembly.
It is the function of speech to free men from the bondage of irrational fears. To justify
suppression of free speech there must be reasonable ground to fear that serious evil will result if
free speech is practiced. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the danger apprehended
is imminent. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the evil to be prevented is a serious
one. The fact that speech is likely to result in some violence or in destruction of property is not
enough to justify its suppression. There must be the probability of serious injury to the state.
PETITION IS GRANTED.
3. PASEI v. DrilonG.R. No. 81958 June 30, 1988, Sarmiento, J.
FACTS:
Phil association of Service Exporters, Inc., is engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers,
male and female of overseas employment. It challenges the constitutional validity of Dept. Order No. 1
(1998) of DOLE entitled Guidelines Governing the Temporary Suspension of Deployment of Filipino
Domestic and Household Workers. It claims that such order is a discrimination against males and
females. The Order does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with
similar skills, and that it is in violation of the right to travel, it also being an invalid exercise of the
lawmaking power. Further, PASEI invokes Sec 3 of Art 13 of the Constitution, providing for worker
participation in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be
provided by law. Thereafter the Solicitor General on behalf of DOLE submitting to the validity of the
challenged guidelines involving the police power of the State and informed the court that the respondent
have lifted the deployment ban in some states where there exists bilateral agreement with the Philippines
and existing mechanism providing for sufficient safeguards to ensure the welfare and protection of the
Filipino workers.

ISSUE:
Whether or not D.O. No. 1 of DOLE is constitutional as it is an exercise of police power.
RULING:
[Police power] has been defined as the "state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with
personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare." As defined, it consists of (1) an
imposition of restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in order to foster the common good. It is not capable of
an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its all-comprehensive
embrace.

The petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the contested measure should be nullified. There is
no question that Department Order No. 1 applies only to "female contract workers," but it does not
thereby make an undue discrimination between the sexes. It is well-settled that "equality before the law"
under the Constitution does not import a perfect Identity of rights among all men and women. It admits of
classifications, provided that (1) such classifications rest on substantial distinctions; (2) they are germane
to the purposes of the law; (3) they are not confined to existing conditions; and (4) they apply equally to
all members of the same class.
The Court is satisfied that the classification made-the preference for female workers rests on
substantial distinctions.

4.
BREW MASTER INTERNATIONAL INC. V NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR UNIONS (NAFLU)
DAVIDE, JR; April 17, 1997
NATURE
A special civil action for certiorari seeking the reversal of the decision of the National Labor Relations
Commission(NLRC) which modified the decision of the Labor Arbiter by directing the
reinstatement of private respondent Antonio D. Estrada, the complainant, without loss of seniority rights and
benefits.
FACTS
- Private respondent NAFLU, a co-complainant in the labor case, is a labor union of
which complai nant is member.- Complainant was first employed by Brew Master on 16 September 1991 as
route helper with the latest daily wage of P119.00.- From 19 April 1993 up to 19 May 1993, for a period of 1 month,
complainant went on absent without permission(AWOP).- On 20 May 1993, Brew master sent him a Memo: Please
explain in writing within 24 hours of your receipt of this memo why no disciplinary action should be
taken against you for the following offense: You were absent since April 19, 1993 up to May 19,
1993.- In answer to the aforesaid memo, complainant explained:Sa dahilan po na ako ay hindi nakapagpaalam
sainyo dahil inuwi ko ang mga anak ko sa Samar dahil ang asawa koay lumayas at walang mag-aalaga sa mga anak
ko. Kaya naman hindi ako naka long distance or telegrama dahilwala akong pera at ibinili ko ng gamot ay puro
utang pa.- Finding said explanation unsatisfactory, the company issued a Notice of Termination: ...we regret to
inform you that we do not consider it valid. You are aware of the company Rul es and Regulations
that absence without permission for 6 consecutive working days is considered abandonment of work...-
Complainants contend that individual complainants dismissal was done without j ust cause;
that i t was not sufficiently established that individual complainants absence from April 19, 1993 to June 16,
1993 are unjustified; that the penalty of dismissal for such violation is too severe; that in imposing such penalty,
respondent should have taken into consideration complainants length of service and as a first offender, a penalty
less punitive will suffice such as suspension for a definite period.- Upon the other hand, respondent contends that
individual complainant was dismissed for cause allowed by the company Rules and Regulations and the
Labor Code; that the act of complainant in absenting from work for 1 month without official leave is
deleterious to the business of respondent; that it will result to stoppage of production which will not only destructive
to respondents interests but also to the interest of its employees in general; that the dismissal of complainant from
the service is legal.- The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of merit, citing
the principle of managerial control, which recognizes the employers prerogative to prescribe reasonable
rules and regulations to govern the conduct of his employees. He relied on
Shoe mart, Inc. vs. NLRC
: ...that individual complainant has indeed abandoned his work...therefore, under the law and jurisprudence which
upholds the right of an employer to discharge an employee who incurs frequent, prolonged and unexplained
absences as being grossly remiss in his duties to the employer and is therefore, dismissed for cause. An employee is
deemed to have abandoned his position or to have resigned from the same, whenever he has been absent there from
without previous permission of the employer for three consecutive days or more. - the NLRC modified the
Labor Arbiter' s decision and held that complainant s dismissal was invalid
for thefollowing reasons:Co mp l a i na n t -
a p p e l l a n t s p r o l o nge d a b s e nc e s , a l t h o u g h u n a u t h o r i z e d , ma y n o t a mo u n t t o g r o s s n e g
l e c t o r abandonment of work to warrant outright termination of employment. Dismissal is too severe a
penalty...Reliance on the ruling enunciated in the cited case of Shoe mart is quite misplaced because of the obvious
dissimilarities--complainant in the Shoe mart Case was an inveterate absentee who does not deserve reinstatement
compared to herein complainant-appellant who is a first offender
ISSUE
WON the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in modifying the decision of the Labor Arbiter
HELD
NO
Ratio
a) Petitioners finding that complainant was guilty of abandonment is misplaced. Abandonment as a just and valid
ground for dismissal requires the deliberate, unjustified refusal of the employee to resume his employment. Two
elements must then be satisfied: (1) the failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason; and
(2) a clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship. b) Verily, relations between capital and labor
are not merely contractual. They are impressed with public interest and labor contracts must, perforce, yield to
the common good. While the employer is not precluded from prescribing rules and regulations to govern the conduct
of his employees, these rules and their implementation must be fair, just and reasonable.
Reasoning
- Complainants absence was precipitated by a grave family problem as his wife unex pectedly
deserted him and abandoned the famil y. Considering that he had a full -time j ob, there was no one
t o whom he could entrust the children and he was thus compelled to bring them to the province. He was then
under emotional, psychological, spiritual and physical stress and strain. The reason for his absence is, under these
circumstances, justified. While his failure to inform and seek petitioner's approval was an omission which must be
corrected and chastised, he did not merit the severest penalty of dismissal from the service.- the elements of
abandonment are not present here. First, as held above, complainant's absence was justified under the
circumstances. As to the second requisite, complainant immediately complied with the memo requiring him to
explain his absence, and upon knowledge of his termination, immediately sued for illegal dismissal. These plainly
refuted any claim that he was no longer interested in returning to work.- our Constitution looks with
compassion on the workingman and protects his rights not only under a general statement of a state
policy, but under the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights, thus placing labor contracts on a higher plane
and with greater safeguards.- While we do not decide here the validity of petitioner' s Rules and
Regulations on continuous, unauthorized absences, what is plain is that it was wielded with undue haste
resulting in a deprivation of due process, thus not allowing for a determination of just cause or abandonment. In this
light, petitioner's dismissal was illegal. This is not to say that his absence should go unpunished, as
impliedly noted by the NLRC in declining to award back wages.
Disposition
petition is hereby DISMISSED and the decision of the NLRC is hereby AFFIRMED.