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Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila

FIRST DIVISION
A.C. No. 6353 February 27, 2006
SPOUSES DAVID and MARISA WILLIAMS, Complainants, vs. ATTY.
RUDY T. ENRIQUEZ, Respondent.
R E S O L U T I O N
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Atty. Rudy T. Enriquez stands charged with "unlawful, dishonest, immoral
and deceitful acts in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility
and the Canons of Professional Ethics, and with conduct unbecoming an
attorney." The charges are contained in the Joint Complaint-Affidavit for
Disbarment
1
filed by the spouses David W. Williams and Marisa B.
Williams.
It appears that respondent is the counsel of record of the plaintiffs in Civil
Case No. 13443
2
pending before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33,
Dumaguete City where complainants are the defendants. According to
the complainant-spouses, Marisa Williams bought the lot subject of the
controversy. A Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) was then issued in her
favor, stating that she is "Filipino, married to David W. Williams, an
American citizen."
3
On January 8, 2004, respondent charged her with
falsification of public documents before the Office of the City Prosecutor
of Dumaguete City. The complaint was docketed as I.S. No. 2004-34.
4

The spouses Williams further alleged, thus:
21. That, in malicious violation of the rules governing the practice of law,
Attorney Rudy T. Enriquez cited outdated material in his complaint-
affidavit (Annex A-1) and in his comments to counter-affidavit (Annex A-
2). He then knowingly applied this stale law in a perverse fashion to argue
that Marisa Batacan Williams automatically lost her Filipino citizenship
when she married an American, and was thus prohibited to own land in
the Philippines, thereby making her guilty of falsification in the Deed she
executed to buy property in Negros Oriental.
22. That in paragraph #1 of her counter-affidavit (Annex A-2) Marisa cites
Article IV, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that she
would not lose her citizenship when she married an American unless she
renounced it in a specific act.
23. That, in reply, Attorney Enriquez, quotes more outdated law,
declaring that her "act of marrying" her husband was equivalent to
renouncing her citizenship. He also doggedly attempts to show that the
1987 Constitution supports his position, not Marisas (Annex A-4).
5

Complainants pointed out that the respondent is a retired judge, who
knows that the false charge (that Marisa Williams is an American) "will
not prevail in the end."
6

In his "Comments by Way of Motion to Dismiss,"
7
respondent
enumerated matters which to his mind were evidence of the acts of
falsification of complainant Marisa Williams. He insisted that the
complaint for disbarment was a mere tactic to divert attention from the
criminal charges against the complainants, and that the charges against
him were bereft of any factual basis.
On December 1, 2004, the case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
8

Forthwith, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline scheduled the case for
mandatory conference/hearing. However, only the respondent appeared.
The parties were then directed to submit their verified position papers.
In their Position Paper, complainants claimed that respondent had
maliciously and knowingly filed fabricated cases against them and that his
acts were forms of attempted extortion. They also adopted their joint
complaint-affidavit by way of incorporation, along with their other
pleadings.
For his part, respondent maintained that complainant Marisa Williams
was no longer a citizen of the Republic of the Philippines as a result of her
marriage to David Williams.
In her Report and Recommendation dated June 10, 1995, Commissioner
Rebecca Villanueva-Maala ruled that respondent was guilty of gross
ignorance of the law and should be suspended for six (6) months. The IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline adopted the foregoing recommendation in
its Resolution No. XVII-2005-114 dated October 22, 2005, with the
modification that respondent be "reprimanded, with a warning and
advice to study each and every opinion he may give to his clients."
The Court agrees that respondent is administratively liable for his
actuations. As found by the Investigating Commissioner:
There is no evidence shown by respondent that complainant Marisa
Bacatan-Williams has renounced her Filipino citizenship except her
Certificate of Marriage, which does not show that she has automatically
acquired her husbands citizenship upon her marriage to him. The cases
cited by respondent are not applicable in this case as it is clear that they
refer to aliens acquiring lands in the Philippines.
The Bar has been integrated for the attainment of the following
objectives: (a) elevate the standards of the legal profession, (b) improve
the administration of justice, and (c) to enable the bar to discharge its
public responsibility more effectively (In re: Integration of the Bar of the
Philippines, 49 SCRA 22). In line with these objectives of the Integrated
Bar, lawyers must keep themselves abreast of legal developments. To do
this, the lawyer must walk with the dynamic movements of the law and
jurisprudence. He must acquaint himself at least with the newly
promulgated laws, the recent decisions of the Supreme Court and of the
significant decisions of the Court of Appeals. There are other executive
orders, administrative circulars, regulations and other rules promulgated
by other competent authorities engaged in the administration of justice.
The lawyers life is one of continuous and laborious study, otherwise, his
skill and knowledge of the law and related disciplines will lag behind and
become obscure due to obsoleteness (Canon 5, Code of Professional
Responsibility.)
9

As pointed out by the Investigating Commissioner, Canon 5 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility requires that a lawyer be updated in the latest
laws and jurisprudence.
10
Indeed, when the law is so elementary, not to
know it or to act as if one does not know it constitutes gross ignorance of
the law.
11
As a retired judge, respondent should have known that it is his
duty to keep himself well-informed of the latest rulings of the Court on
the issues and legal problems confronting a client.
12
In this case, the law
he apparently misconstrued is no less than the Constitution,
13
the most
basic law of the land.
14
Implicit in a lawyers mandate to protect a clients
interest to the best of his/her ability and with utmost diligence is the duty
to keep abreast of the law and legal developments, and participate in
continuing legal education programs.
15
Thus, in championing the interest
of clients and defending cases, a lawyer must not only be guided by the
strict standards imposed by the lawyers oath, but should likewise
espouse legally sound arguments for clients, lest the latters cause be
dismissed on a technical ground.
16
Ignorance encompasses both
substantive and procedural laws.
17
lavvph!1.net
We find too harsh the recommended penalty of the Investigating
Commissioner. It must be stressed that the power to disbar or suspend
must be exercised with great caution. Only in a clear case of misconduct
that seriously affects the standing and character of a lawyer as an officer
of the Court and member of the bar will disbarment or suspension be
imposed as a penalty.
18
Pursuant to the IBP Commission on Bar
Disciplines Guidelines for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions,
19
and considering
further that this is respondents first infraction, we find that the penalty
of reprimand as recommended by the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline,
will suffice.
We likewise note that in their pleadings in this case, the parties
repeatedly invoked their arguments in their pending cases below. Thus,
we find it unnecessary to rule over such arguments, which have yet to be
determined on the merits in the courts a quo.
WHEREFORE, for gross ignorance of the law, Atty. Rudy T. Enriquez is
REPRIMANDED and ADVISED to carefully study the opinions he may give
to his clients. He is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of a similar act
shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila
SECOND DIVISION
A.C. No, 6854 April 25, 2007 [Formerly CBD Case No. 04-1380]
JUAN DULALIA, JR., Complainant, vs. ATTY. PABLO C. CRUZ,
Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Atty. Pablo C. Cruz, Municipal Legal Officer of Meycauayan, Bulacan
(respondent), is charged by Juan Dulalia, Jr. (complainant) of violation
Rules 1.01,
1
6.02,
2
and 7.03
3
of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The facts which gave rise to the filing of the present complaint are as
follows:
Complainants wife Susan Soriano Dulalia filed an application for building
permit for the construction of a warehouse. Despite compliance with all
the requirements for the purpose, she failed to secure a permit, she
attributing the same to the opposition of respondents who wrote a
September 13, 2004 letter to Carlos J. Abacan, Municipal Engineer and
concurrent Building Official of Meycauayan, reading as follows, quoted
verbatim:
x x x x
This is in behalf of the undersigned himself and his family, Gregoria F.
Soriano, Spouses David Perez and Minerva Soriano-Perez and Family and
Mr. and Mrs. Jessie de Leon and family, his relatives and neighbors.
It has been more than a month ago already that the construction of the
building of the abovenamed person has started and that the undersigned
and his family, and those other families mentioned above are respective
owners of the residential houses adjoining that of the high-rise building
under construction of the said Mrs. Soriano-Dulalia. There is no need to
mention the unbearable nuisances that it creates and its adverse effects
to the undersigned and his above referred to clients particularly the
imminent danger and damage to their properties, health and safety.
It was represented that the intended construction of the building would
only be a regular and with standard height building and not a high rise
one but an inspection of the same would show otherwise. Note that its
accessory foundation already occupies portion of the vacant airspace of
the undersigneds residential house in particular, which readily poses
danger to their residential house and life.
To avert the occurrence of the above danger and damage to property,
loss of life and for the protection of the safety of all the people
concerned, they are immediately requesting for your appropriate action
on the matter please at your earliest opportune time.
Being your co-municipal official in the Municipal Government of
Meycauayan who is the Chief Legal Counsel of its Legal Department, and
by virtue of Sub par. (4), Paragraph (b), Section 481 of the Local
Government Code of 1991, he is inquiring if there was already full
compliance on the part of the owner of the Building under construction
with the requirements provided for in Sections 301, 302 and 308 of the
National Building Code and on the part of your good office, your
compliance with the provisions of Sections 303 and 304 of the same
foregoing cited Building Code.
Please be reminded of the adverse and unfavorable legal effect of the
non-compliance with said Sections 301, 302, 303 and 304 of the National
Building Code by all the parties concerned. (Which are not confined only
to penalties provided in Sections 211 and 212 thereof.)
x x x x
4
(Emphasis and underscoring partly in the original, partly supplied)
By complainants claim, respondent opposed the application for building
permit because of a personal grudge against his wife Susan who objected
to respondents marrying her first cousin Imelda Soriano, respondents
marriage with Carolina Agaton being still subsisting.
5

To the complaint, complainant attached a copy of his Complaint Affidavit
6

he filed against respondent before the Office of the Ombudsman for
violation of Section 3 (e)
7
of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended (The Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) and Section 4 (a) and (c)
8
of Republic Act
No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees).
9

By Report and Recommendation dated May 6, 2005,
10
the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline, through Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-
Maala, recommended the dismissal of the complaint in light of the
following findings:
The complaint dealt with mainly on the issue that respondent allegedly
opposes the application of his wife for a building permit for the
construction of their commercial building. One of the reason[s] stated by
the complainant was that his wife was not in favor of Imeldas
relationship with respondent who is a married man. And the other reason
is that respondent was not authorized to represent his neighbors in
opposing the construction of his building.
From the facts and evidence presented, we find respondent to have
satisfactorily answered all the charges and accusations of complainant.
We find no clear, convincing and strong evidence to warrant the
disbarment or suspension of respondent. An attorney enjoys the legal
presumption that he is innocent of the charges preferred against him
until the contrary is proved. The burden of proof rests upon the
complainant to overcome the presumption and establish his charges by a
clear preponderance of evidence. In the absence of the required
evidence, the presumption of innocence on the part of the lawyer
continues and the complaint against him should be dismissed (In re De
Guzman, 55 SCRA 1239; Balduman vs. Luspo, 64 SCRA 74; Agbayani vs.
Agtang, 73 SCRA 283).
x x x x.
11
(Underscoring supplied)
By Resolution of June 25, 2005,
12
the Board of Governors of the IBP
adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation of
Commissioner Villanueva-Maala.
Hence, the present Petition for Review
13
filed by complainant.
Complainant maintains that respondent violated Rule 1.01 when he
contracted a second marriage with Imelda Soriano on September 17,
1989 while his marriage with Carolina Agaton, which was solemnized on
December 17, 1967, is still subsisting.
Complainant further maintains that respondent used his influence as the
Municipal Legal Officer of Meycauayan to oppose his wifes application
for building permit, in violation of Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
And for engaging in the practice of law while serving as the Municipal
Legal Officer of Meycauayan, complainant maintains that respondent
violated Rule 7.03.
To his Comment,
14
respondent attached the July 29, 2005
15
Joint
Resolution of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon dismissing
complainants complaint for violation of Sec. 3 (e) of RA 3019 and Section
4 (a) and (c) of RA 6713, the pertinent portion of which joint resolution
reads:
x x x A perusal of the questioned letter dated September 13, 2004 of
herein respondent Atty. Pablo Cruz addressed to the Building official
appears to be not an opposition for the issuance of complainants
building permit, but rather to redress a wrong and an inquiry as to
whether compliance with the requirements for the construction of an
edifice has been met. In fact, the Office of the Building Official after
conducting an investigation found out that there was [a] violation of the
Building Code for constructing without a building permit committed by
herein complainants wife Susan Dulalia. Hence, a Work Stoppage Order
was issued. Records disclose fu[r]ther [that] it was only after the said
violation had been committed that Susan Dulalia applied for a building
permit. As correctly pointed out by respondent, the same is being
processed pending approval by the Building Official and not of the
Municipal Zoning Administrator as alleged by complainant. Anent the
allegation that respondent was engaged in the private practice of his law
profession despite being employed in the government as Municipal Legal
Officer of Meycauayan, Bulacan, the undersigned has taken into
consideration the explanation and clarification made by the respondent
to be justifiable and meritorious. Aside from the bare allegations of
herein complainant, there is no sufficient evidence to substantiate the
complaints against the respondent.
16
(Underscoring supplied)
After a review of the record of the case, this Court finds the dismissal of
the charges of violating Rules 6.02 and 7.03 in order.
Indeed, complaint failed to prove that respondent used his position as
Municipal Legal Officer to advance his own personal interest against
complainant and his wife.
As for respondents September 13, 2004 letter, there is nothing to show
that he opposed the application for building permit. He just inquired
whether complainants wife fully complied with the requirements
provided for by the National Building Code, on top of expressing his
concerns about "the danger and damages to their properties, health and
safety" occasioned by the construction of the building.
Besides, as reflected above, the application for building permit was filed
on September 28, 2004,
17
whereas the questioned letter of respondent
was priorly written and received on September 13, 2004 by the Municipal
Engineer/ Building Official, who on the same day, ordered an inspection
and issued a Cease and Desist Order/Notice stating that "[f]ailure to
comply with th[e] notice shall cause this office to instate proper legal
action against you."
18

Furthermore, as the Certification dated April 4, 2005
19
from the Office of
the Municipal Engineer showed, complainants wife eventually withdrew
the application as she had not yet secured clearances from the Municipal
Zoning Administrator and from the barangay where the building was to
be constructed.
Respecting complainants charge that respondent engaged in an
unauthorized private practice of law while he was the Municipal Legal
Officer of Meycauayan, a position coterminous to that of the appointing
authority, suffice it to state that respondent proffered proof that his
private practice is not prohibited.
20

It is, however, with respect to respondents admitted contracting of a
second marriage while his first marriage is still subsisting that this Court
finds respondent liable, for violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
Respondent married Imelda Soriano on September 17, 1989 at the Clark
County, Nevada, USA,
21
when the Family Code of the Philippines had
already taken effect.
22
He invokes good faith, however, he claiming to
have had the impression that the applicable provision at the time was
Article 83 of the Civil Code.
23
For while Article 256 of the Family Code
provides that the Code shall have retroactive application, there is a
qualification thereunder that it should not prejudice or impair vested or
acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.
Immoral conduct which is proscribed under Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, as opposed to grossly immoral conduct,
connotes "conduct that shows indifference to the moral norms of society
and the opinion of good and respectable members of the community."
24

Gross immoral conduct on the other hand must be so corrupt and false as
to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a
high degree.
25

In St. Louis University Laboratory High School v. De la Cruz,
26
this Court
declared that the therein respondents act of contracting a second
marriage while the first marriage was still subsisting constituted immoral
conduct, for which he was suspended for two years after the mitigating
following circumstances were considered:
a. After his first failed marriage and prior to his second marriage or for a
period of almost seven (7) years, he has not been romantically involved
with any woman;
b. His second marriage was a show of his noble intentions and total love
for his wife, whom he described to be very intelligent person;
c. He never absconded from his obligations to support his wife and child;
d. He never disclaimed paternity over the child and husbandry (sic) with
relation to his wife;
e. After the annulment of his second marriage, they have parted ways
when the mother and child went to Australia;
f. Since then up to now, respondent remained celibate.
27

In respondents case, he being out of the country since 1986, he can be
given the benefit of the doubt on his claim that Article 83 of the Civil Code
was the applicable provision when he contracted the second marriage
abroad. From 1985 when allegedly his first wife abandoned him, an
allegation which was not refuted, until his marriage in 1989 with Imelda
Soriano, there is no showing that he was romantically involved with any
woman. And, it is undisputed that his first wife has remained an absentee
even during the pendency of this case.
As noted above, respondent did not deny he contracted marriage with
Imelda Soriano. The community in which they have been living in fact
elected him and served as President of the IBP-Bulacan Chapter from
1997-1999 and has been handling free legal aid cases.
Respondents misimpression that it was the Civil Code provisions which
applied at the time he contracted his second marriage and the seemingly
unmindful attitude of his residential community towards his second
marriage notwithstanding, respondent may not go scotfree.
As early as 1957, this Court has frowned on the act of contracting a
second marriage while the first marriage was still in place as being
contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality.
28

In another vein, respondent violated Canon 5 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides:
CANON 5 A lawyer shall keep abreast of legal developments, participate
in continuing legal education programs, support efforts to achieve high
standards in law schools as well as in the practical training of law students
and assist in disseminating information regarding the law and
jurisprudence.
Respondents claim that he was not aware that the Family Code already
took effect on August 3, 1988 as he was in the United States from 1986
and stayed there until he came back to the Philippines together with his
second wife on October 9, 1990 does not lie, as "ignorance of the law
excuses no one from compliance therewith."
Apropos is this Courts pronouncement in Santiago v. Rafanan:
29

It must be emphasized that the primary duty of lawyers is to obey the
laws of the land and promote respect for the law and legal processes.
They are expected to be in the forefront in the observance and
maintenance of the rule of law. This duty carries with it the obligation to
be well-informed of the existing laws and to keep abreast with legal
developments, recent enactments and jurisprudence. It is imperative
that they be conversant with basic legal principles. Unless they faithfully
comply with such duty, they may not be able to discharge competently
and diligently their obligations as members of the bar. Worse, they may
become susceptible to committing mistakes.
30
(Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Pablo C. Cruz is guilty of violating Rule
1.01 and Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one year. He is WARNED that a
similar infraction will be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant,
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and all courts throughout the
country.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila
THIRD DIVISION
A.C. No. 6057 June 27, 2006
PETER T. DONTON, Complainant, vs. ATTY. EMMANUEL O.
TANSINGCO, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a disbarment complaint against respondent Atty. Emmanuel O.
Tansingco ("respondent") for serious misconduct and deliberate violation
of Canon 1,
1
Rules 1.01
2
and 1.02
3
of the Code of Professional
Responsibility ("Code").
The Facts
In his Complaint dated 20 May 2003, Peter T. Donton ("complainant")
stated that he filed a criminal complaint for estafa thru falsification of a
public document
4
against Duane O. Stier ("Stier"), Emelyn A. Maggay
("Maggay") and respondent, as the notary public who notarized the
Occupancy Agreement.
The disbarment complaint arose when respondent filed a counter-charge
for perjury
5
against complainant. Respondent, in his affidavit-complaint,
stated that:
5. The OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT dated September 11, 1995 was
prepared and notarized by me under the following circumstances:
A. Mr. Duane O. Stier is the owner and long-time resident of a real
property located at No. 33 Don Jose Street, Bgy. San Roque, Murphy,
Cubao, Quezon City.
B. Sometime in September 1995, Mr. Stier a U.S. citizen and thereby
disqualified to own real property in his name agreed that the property
be transferred in the name of Mr. Donton, a Filipino.
C. Mr. Stier, in the presence of Mr. Donton, requested me to prepare
several documents that would guarantee recognition of him being the
actual owner of the property despite the transfer of title in the name of
Mr. Donton.
D. For this purpose, I prepared, among others, the OCCUPANCY
AGREEMENT, recognizing Mr. Stiers free and undisturbed use of the
property for his residence and business operations. The OCCUPANCY
AGREEMENT was tied up with a loan which Mr. Stier had extended to Mr.
Donton.
6

Complainant averred that respondents act of preparing the Occupancy
Agreement, despite knowledge that Stier, being a foreign national, is
disqualified to own real property in his name, constitutes serious
misconduct and is a deliberate violation of the Code. Complainant prayed
that respondent be disbarred for advising Stier to do something in
violation of law and assisting Stier in carrying out a dishonest scheme.
In his Comment dated 19 August 2003, respondent claimed that
complainant filed the disbarment case against him upon the instigation of
complainants counsel, Atty. Bonifacio A. Alentajan,
7
because respondent
refused to act as complainants witness in the criminal case against Stier
and Maggay. Respondent admitted that he "prepared and notarized" the
Occupancy Agreement and asserted its genuineness and due execution.
In a Resolution dated 1 October 2003, the Court referred the matter to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.
The IBPs Report and Recommendation
In her Report dated 26 February 2004 ("Report"), Commissioner Milagros
V. San Juan ("Commissioner San Juan") of the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline found respondent liable for taking part in a "scheme to
circumvent the constitutional prohibition against foreign ownership of
land in the Philippines." Commissioner San Juan recommended
respondents suspension from the practice of law for two years and the
cancellation of his commission as Notary Public.
In Resolution No. XVI-2004-222 dated 16 April 2004, the IBP Board of
Governors adopted, with modification, the Report and recommended
respondents suspension from the practice of law for six months.
On 28 June 2004, the IBP Board of Governors forwarded the Report to the
Court as provided under Section 12(b), Rule 139-B
8
of the Rules of Court.
On 28 July 2004, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration before the
IBP. Respondent stated that he was already 76 years old and would
already retire by 2005 after the termination of his pending cases. He also
said that his practice of law is his only means of support for his family and
his six minor children.
In a Resolution dated 7 October 2004, the IBP denied the motion for
reconsideration because the IBP had no more jurisdiction on the case as
the matter had already been referred to the Court.
The Ruling of the Court
The Court finds respondent liable for violation of Canon 1 and Rule 1.02
of the Code.
A lawyer should not render any service or give advice to any client which
will involve defiance of the laws which he is bound to uphold and obey.
9
A
lawyer who assists a client in a dishonest scheme or who connives in
violating the law commits an act which justifies disciplinary action against
the lawyer.
10

By his own admission, respondent admitted that Stier, a U.S. citizen, was
disqualified from owning real property.
11
Yet, in his motion for
reconsideration,
12
respondent admitted that he caused the transfer of
ownership to the parcel of land to Stier. Respondent, however, aware of
the prohibition, quickly rectified his act and transferred the title in
complainants name. But respondent provided "some safeguards" by
preparing several documents,
13
including the Occupancy Agreement, that
would guarantee Stiers recognition as the actual owner of the property
despite its transfer in complainants name. In effect, respondent advised
and aided Stier in circumventing the constitutional prohibition against
foreign ownership of lands
14
by preparing said documents.
Respondent had sworn to uphold the Constitution. Thus, he violated his
oath and the Code when he prepared and notarized the Occupancy
Agreement to evade the law against foreign ownership of lands.
Respondent used his knowledge of the law to achieve an unlawful end.
Such an act amounts to malpractice in his office, for which he may be
suspended.
15

In Balinon v. De Leon,
16
respondent Atty. De Leon was suspended from
the practice of law for three years for preparing an affidavit that virtually
permitted him to commit concubinage. In In re: Santiago,
17
respondent
Atty. Santiago was suspended from the practice of law for one year for
preparing a contract which declared the spouses to be single again after
nine years of separation and allowed them to contract separately
subsequent marriages.
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Emmanuel O. Tansingco GUILTY
of violation of Canon 1 and Rule 1.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Accordingly, we SUSPEND respondent Atty. Emmanuel O.
Tansingco from the practice of law for SIX MONTHS effective upon finality
of this Decision.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to
be appended to respondents personal record as an attorney, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Department of Justice, and all
courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED
Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila
FIRST DIVISION
A.C. No. 5542 July 20, 2006
DAYAN STA. ANA CHRISTIAN NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION, INC.
and/or its Officers, Members, namely: MINERVA A. GENATO, JULIETA P.
BENEDICTO, PRAXEDES A. MORENO, PATRICIA DE GUZMAN, PACITA G.
MEQUERIO, HELEN RESUELLO, RIC DE GUZMAN, and ERLINDA RAMIREZ,
complainants, vs. ATTY. NAPOLEON A. ESPIRITU, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
The instant disbarment case was filed by the officers/members of the
Dayan Sta. Ana Christian Neighborhood Association Inc., charging Atty.
Napoleon A. Espiritu with "deceitful conduct, malpractice, gross
misconduct in office, and/or violation of oath of office." The charges are
contained in the Complaint-Affidavit
1
dated May 17, 2001.
Complainants sought the services of respondent sometime in November
1997 regarding a consolidated ejectment case where they were being
sued in their respective capacities as officers and members of the
association. The case, docketed as Civil Case Nos. 153905-90, was
pending before the Municipal Trial Court of Manila, Branch 26.
Complainants lost, however, and respondent advised them to file a
supersedeas bond to stay their eviction.
2
Complainants then entrusted
the following amounts to respondent as payment therefor:
a.) On November 13, 1997 and November 28, 1997, he received the
amount of P12,000.00 and P13,000.00 respectively from Minerva Genato.
(Annexes "B" and "B-1")
b.) On March 31, 1998, he received the amount of P41,257.00 from Rico
Ramirez. (Annex "C")
c.) On March 23, 1998, he received from us the amount of P116,605.00,
which are imparted under the following circumstances:
c.1.) Ric De Guzman ---------- P14,010.00
c.2.) Patricia De Guzman ---------- P15,784.00
c.3.) Ben/Lita Benedicto ---------- P37,870.00
c.4.) Helena Resuello ---------- P11,363.00
c.5.) Praxedes Moreno ---------- P12,040.00
c.6.) Pacita Moquerio ---------- P25,538.00
which he receipted erroneously in the amount of P86,666.72, but duly
corrected by one of the members thereon. The aforesaid amount was
accepted by him in the name of Dayan as shown by the receipt he issued
thereto marked as Annex "D."
d.) Again for the same reason, on July 28, 1998 he received the amount of
P8,930.00 from us the following:
d.1.) Ric De Guzman ---------- P1,250.00
d.2.) Patricia De Guzman ---------- P1,125.00
d.3.) Ben/Lita Benedicto ---------- P3,130.00
d.4.) Helena Resuello ---------- P 625.00
d.5.) Praxedes Moreno ---------- P 935.00
d.6.) Pacita Moquerio ---------- P1,865.00
which he again receipted under Dayan as evidenced by hereto attached
copy of the receipt marked as Annex "E."
e.) On July 28, 1998, he received again from Rico/Erlinda Ramirez the
amount of P3,370.00. (Annex "F")
f.) Also on July 28, 1998, he received from Minerva Genato the amount of
P4,000.00. (Annex "H")
g.) On August 7, 1998, he received from Manuel Rivera/Myrna Sayson the
amount of P2,000.00 (Annex "H") and Prima Fidel the amount of
P4,000.00. (Annex "H-1")
h.) On August 27, 1998, he received from Minerva Genato the amount of
P4,000.00. (Annex "I").
3

According to complainants, respondent deposited only P48,000.00 before
the Clerk of Court as evidenced by receipts furnished by respondent
himself.
4
Association President Minerva Genato then made a verbal
demand for respondent to return the remaining balance, upon which
respondent delivered a personal check for P141,904.00 in the name of
Atty. Leonardo Ocampo. The check bounced for insufficiency of funds.
Consequently, Atty. Ocampo sent a demand letter
5
to Genato to make
good the payment of the check. Genato continued to make verbal
demands and later sent a letter
6
dated May 25, 2000 demanding the
payment of the amount of the check, to no avail. The Association was
thus constrained to seek the help of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP). Through Atty. Helengrace G. Cabasal, another demand letter
7
dated
July 17, 2000 was sent for respondent to return the "remaining balance"
of P206,497.00. An Information
8
charging respondent with estafa was
likewise filed before the RTC of Manila.
In his Comment,
9
respondent admitted that he deposited to the clerk of
court the amount of P48,481.00 as "partial supersedeas bond." In his
desire to help complainants, he talked to the counsel of plaintiffs in Civil
Case No. 153905-90. Respondent likewise admitted that he issued a
postdated check to cover the balance (P141,904.00), and that he was
unable to fund the same. He, however, made arrangements with Atty.
Ocampo and his clients for the payment of the subject check, and
requested the latter for complainants to stay in the subject property until
December 1999, or even beyond. He pointed out that it was upon his
representations that complainants were allowed to stay in the subject
premises up to the present, and that the said amount (P141,904.00 and
not P206,497.00 as falsely claimed by complainants), was meant as
payment for supersedeas bond in Civil Case No. 153686-CV for the use
and occupation of the complainants of the subject property from January
1991 to December 1996. Respondent likewise disclosed that
complainants had lodged several complaints against him for estafa and/or
theft in connection with the amount covered by the postdated check
which he issued in favor of Atty. Ocampo, which, however, are all
baseless. He insisted that complainants have no cause of action against
him, and that the instant administrative complaint must be dismissed
outright for the following reasons:
As stated earlier, the basis of this administrative case as well as the
criminal complaints is the demand letter to Atty. Ocampo to make good
the check issued by respondent, and in case of failure, Atty. Ocampo will
insist on the issuance of the execution. It bears stressing, however, that
because of the arrangement made by respondent with Atty. Ocampo, and
as per their (Atty. Ocampo and the respondent) agreement, Atty. Ocampo
no longer pursued the eviction f the complainants. UP TO THE PRESENT,
complainants are still in the premises in question.
The complainants were never prejudiced by the bounced check and the
demand letter sent by Atty. Ocampo to the complainants. On the
contrary, they have benefited by the representations made by
respondent to Atty. Ocampo. Moreover, respondent had made
representations with the City Council of Manila for the expropriation of
the premises in question, which is now under consideration by the said
City Council.
Hence, complainants have no cause to complain. In fact, they should be
grateful to the respondent because without his representations with Atty.
Ocampo and the plaintiff in CIVIL CASE NO. 153686-CV, and with the City
Council of Manila, complainants have long been evicted from the said
premises. To sanction complainants' administrative and criminal
complaints against the respondent is a mockery of justice; respondent
will be placed in an unjust situation where he has to answer severally a
single offense, if at all. He will be made liable to Atty. Ocampo or to the
plaintiff in CIVIL CASE NO. 153686-CV, to the herein complainants and to
the Honorable Court.
Parenthetically, complainants have absolutely no personality to file or
institute this action against the respondent. As it now clearly appears, the
instant case is a persecution rather than a prosecution, where the aim or
purpose of the complainants is to exact or extort money from the
respondent. Complainants are well aware that they are not entitled to
the money they sought to collect from the respondent which served as
basis of their malicious and perjurious criminal and administrative
complaints. The purpose of the money received by the respondent had
greatly been served through the issuance of the check by respondent to
Atty. Ocampo and respondent's representations with Atty. Ocampo and
his client-plaintiff NOT TO EJECT complainants from the premises.
Complainants have benefited too much from the representations of
respondent with Atty. Ocampo, UNTIL NOW.
To reiterate, it is the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 153686-CV which has a
cause of action against the respondent and not or never the herein
complainants.
10

Complainants refuted these allegations, insisting that the basis of the
filing of the instant administrative case, as well as the criminal charges for
estafa against respondent, is the misappropriation or conversion of the
amounts which should have been deposited with the court or with the
lessor in order to cover the required bond or arrears in rental over the
property; the check was adduced in evidence to prove the fact of
misappropriation or conversion, as respondent issued the same after he
failed to deposit the complete amount entrusted to him by complainants;
and due to respondent's unlawful acts, they were prejudiced and suffered
damages, thus:
b. The continuing failure of the respondent to transmit the subsequent
amounts he further collected and received, is not further prejudicial to
the enforcement and effective implementation of the rights of the
complainants under the expropriation ordinance, enacted by the local
government, because of the nonpayment of the backrental constituting
the supersedeas bond, which up to the present, is being demanded by
the lessor, as precondition for negotiating, for the expropriation
compensation due to the lessor-owner.
c. It must be further noted and stressed, there was no representation at
all made by respondent with the lessor through Atty. Ocampo; nor, with
the local government in the enactment and enforcement of said
ordinance. Contrary then, to the respondent's contention, it was through
the coordinative efforts of the complainants through their President,
which caused the passage of said expropriation law. Further, the
continuing stay of complainants in the premises is but the due
consequence of such enactment and not through any representation on
the part of respondent, who failed to protect the interest of the
complainant, as legal counsel of his clients, the herein complainants, in
gross dereliction of his duty as such.
11

The case was then referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
for investigation, report and recommendation.
12
Investigating IBP
Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan scheduled the case for hearing.
Witnesses for complainants testified on November 6, 2003. On the
hearing set for June 13, 2004, however, respondent failed to appear. A
representative informed the Commission that respondent was suffering
from "high sugar blood count." The hearing was reset to February 26,
2004, where respondent was ordered to present his medical certificate.
On the last scheduled hearing of the case on August 26, 2004, respondent
failed to appear despite due notice, hence, complainant's testimony was
heard ex-parte. Complainant was then given 15 days to make a formal
offer of evidence, after which the case was submitted for resolution. The
last notice sent to respondent was returned for being unclaimed.
In her Report and Recommendation dated May 26, 2005, Commissioner
San Juan recommended that respondent be disbarred, considering the
following findings:
The claim of respondent that the complainants [have] no cause of action
against him is without merit. He admitted receiving the funds from
complainants and that he deposited only P48,481.00 with the Clerk of
Court as partial supersedeas bond. The fact that Atty. Leonardo Ocampo
counsel of the plaintiff in the ejectment case accommodated the
respondent with his personal check does not relieve respondent from
liability. On the contrary it is evident that the arrangement was resorted
to in order that respondent could extricate himself from the situation he
was in. By obtaining a loan from Atty. Ocampo in the form of a check is a
clear admission that the money entrusted to respondent by complainants
was misappropriated. Noted is the failure of respondent to make an
accounting of the funds entrusted to him and the absence of an
explanation why only a partial payment of the bond was made. The
contention of respondent that complainants were never prejudiced by
the bouncing check likewise must fail. Neither will the payment of the
check and the funds entrusted to him "doubly prejudice" respondent.
13

On January 28, 2006, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No.
XVII-2006-05, modifying the penalty meted on respondent, to wit:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and
APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part
of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and finding the recommendation duly
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules,
and for obtaining a loan from Atty. Ocampo in the form of a check is a
clear admission that the money entrusted to respondent by complainants
was misappropriated, Atty. Napoleon A. Espiritu is hereby SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for (1) year.
We agree with the foregoing recommendation. It is clear that respondent
misappropriated the money which his clients, herein complainants, had
entrusted to him for a specific purpose, and such an act cannot be
countenanced.
Rule 16.01 of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
provides that a lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or
received for or from his client. A lawyer should be scrupulously careful in
handling money entrusted to him in his professional capacity, because a
high degree of fidelity and good faith on his part is exacted.
14
In Parias v.
Paguinto,
15
the Court had the occasion to state that "money entrusted to
a lawyer for a specific purpose, such as for filing fee, but not used for
failure to file the case must immediately be returned to the client on
demand."
16
Indeed, a lawyer has no right to unilaterally appropriate his or
her client's money.
17

We note that respondent failed to appear before the IBP Investigating
Commissioner to explain his actions, much less present his defense. In
Rangwani v. Dio,
18
we ruled that it is not enough for a member of the bar
to deny the charges:
Quite conspicuously, despite the opportunities accorded to respondent to
refute the charges against him, he failed to do so or even offer a valid
explanation. The record is bereft of any evidence to show that
respondent has presented any countervailing evidence to meet the
charges against him. His nonchalance does not speak well of him as it
reflects his utter lack of respect towards the public officers who were
assigned to investigate the cases. On the contrary, respondent's
comments only markedly admitted complainant's accusations. When the
integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough that he
denies the charges against him. He must meet the issue and overcome
the evidence against him. He must show proof that he still maintains that
degree of morality and integrity which at all times is expected of him.
These, respondent miserably failed to do.
19

The fiduciary duty of a lawyer and advocate is what places the law
profession in a unique position of trust and confidence, and distinguishes
it from any other calling. Once this trust and confidence is betrayed, the
faith of the people not only in the individual lawyer but also in the legal
profession as a whole is eroded. To this end, all members of the bar are
strictly required to at all times maintain the highest degree of public
confidence in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of their profession.
20
The
nature of the office of a lawyer requires that he shall be of good moral
character. This qualification is not only a condition precedent to
admission to the legal profession, but its continued possession is essential
to maintain one's good standing in the profession.
21
Law is a noble
profession, and the privilege to practice it is bestowed only upon
individuals who are competent intellectually, academically, and, equally
important, morally. Because they are vanguards of the law and the legal
system, lawyers must at all times conduct themselves, especially in their
dealings with their clients and the public at large, with honesty and
integrity in a manner beyond reproach.
22

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court;
grounds therefore. A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended
from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before admission to the practice, or for a willful disobedience of any
lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as
an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice
of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
However, the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and
only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and
character of a lawyer as an officer of the Court and member of the bar. It
should never be decreed where any lesser penalty, such as temporary
suspension, would accomplish the end desired.
23
In this case, the Court
finds that one-year suspension from the practice of law will suffice as
penalty against respondent.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Napoleon A. Espiritu is guilty of violating the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is penalized with
SUSPENSION from the practice of law for One (1) Year effective
immediately. Respondent is DIRECTED to return the funds entrusted to
him by complainants, and to inform the Court of the date of his receipt of
this Decision.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to
be appended to respondent's personal records; the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines; and all courts in the country for their information and
guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, C.J., Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez, Chico-Nazario, J.J.,
concur.
Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 6792 January 25, 2006
ROBERTO SORIANO, Complainant, vs. Atty. MANUEL DIZON,
Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Before us is a Complaint-Affidavit
1
for the disbarment of Atty. Manuel
Dizon, filed by Roberto Soriano with the Commission on Bar Discipine
(CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). Complainant alleges
that the conviction of respondent for a crime involving moral turpitude,
together with the circumstances surrounding the conviction, violates
Canon 1 of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility;
2
and
constitutes sufficient ground for his disbarment under Section 27 of Rule
138 of the Rules of Court.
3

Because of the failure of Atty. Dizon to submit his Answer to the
Complaint, the CBD issued a Notice dated May 20, 2004, informing him
that he was in default, and that an ex-parte hearing had been scheduled
for June 11, 2004.
4
After that hearing, complainant manifested that he
was submitting the case on the basis of the Complaint and its
attachments.
5
Accordingly, the CBD directed him to file his Position Paper,
which he did on July 27, 2004.
6
Afterwards, the case was deemed
submitted for resolution.
On December 6, 2004, Commissioner Teresita J. Herbosa rendered her
Report and Recommendation, which was later adopted and approved by
the IBP Board of Governors in its Resolution No. XVI-2005-84 dated March
12, 2005.
In his Complaint-Affidavit, Soriano alleged that respondent had violated
Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and that
the conviction of the latter for frustrated homicide,
7
which involved moral
turpitude, should result in his disbarment.
The facts leading to respondents conviction were summarized by Branch
60 of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City in this wise:
"x x x. The accused was driving his brown Toyota Corolla and was on his
way home after gassing up in preparation for his trip to Concepcion,
Tarlac with his wife. Along Abanao Street, a taxi driver overtook the car
driven by the accused not knowing that the driver of the car he had
overtaken is not just someone, but a lawyer and a prominent member of
the Baguio community who was under the influence of liquor. Incensed,
the accused tailed the taxi driver until the latter stopped to make a turn
at [the] Chugum and Carino Streets. The accused also stopped his car,
berated the taxi driver and held him by his shirt. To stop the aggression,
the taxi driver forced open his door causing the accused to fall to the
ground. The taxi driver knew that the accused had been drinking because
he smelled of liquor. Taking pity on the accused who looked elderly, the
taxi driver got out of his car to help him get up. But the accused, by now
enraged, stood up immediately and was about to deal the taxi driver a fist
blow when the latter boxed him on the chest instead. The accused fell
down a second time, got up again and was about to box the taxi driver
but the latter caught his fist and turned his arm around. The taxi driver
held on to the accused until he could be pacified and then released him.
The accused went back to his car and got his revolver making sure that
the handle was wrapped in a handkerchief. The taxi driver was on his way
back to his vehicle when he noticed the eyeglasses of the accused on the
ground. He picked them up intending to return them to the accused. But
as he was handing the same to the accused, he was met by the barrel of
the gun held by the accused who fired and shot him hitting him on the
neck. He fell on the thigh of the accused so the latter pushed him out and
sped off. The incident was witnessed by Antonio Billanes whose
testimony corroborated that of the taxi driver, the complainant in this
case, Roberto Soriano."
8

It was the prosecution witness, Antonio Billanes, who came to the aid of
Soriano and brought the latter to the hospital. Because the bullet had
lacerated the carotid artery on the left side of his neck,
9
complainant
would have surely died of hemorrhage if he had not received timely
medical assistance, according to the attending surgeon, Dr. Francisco
Hernandez, Jr. Soriano sustained a spinal cord injury, which caused
paralysis on the left part of his body and disabled him for his job as a taxi
driver.
The trial court promulgated its Decision dated November 29, 2001. On
January 18, 2002, respondent filed an application for probation, which
was granted by the court on several conditions. These included
satisfaction of "the civil liabilities imposed by [the] court in favor of the
offended party, Roberto Soriano."
10

According to the unrefuted statements of complainant, Atty. Dizon, who
has yet to comply with this particular undertaking, even appealed the civil
liability to the Court of Appeals.
11

In her Report and Recommendation, Commissioner Herbosa
recommended that respondent be disbarred from the practice of law for
having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.
The commissioner found that respondent had not only been convicted of
such crime, but that the latter also exhibited an obvious lack of good
moral character, based on the following facts:
"1. He was under the influence of liquor while driving his car;
"2. He reacted violently and attempted to assault Complainant only
because the latter, driving a taxi, had overtaken him;
"3. Complainant having been able to ward off his attempted assault,
Respondent went back to his car, got a gun, wrapped the same with a
handkerchief and shot Complainant[,] who was unarmed;
"4. When Complainant fell on him, Respondent simply pushed him out
and fled;
"5. Despite positive identification and overwhelming evidence,
Respondent denied that he had shot Complainant;
"6. Apart from [his] denial, Respondent also lied when he claimed that he
was the one mauled by Complainant and two unidentified persons; and,
"7. Although he has been placed on probation, Respondent has[,] to
date[,] not yet satisfied his civil liabilities to Complainant."
12

On July 8, 2005, the Supreme Court received for its final action the IBP
Resolution adopting the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner.
We agree with the findings and recommendations of Commissioner
Herbosa, as approved and adopted by the IBP Board of Governors.
Under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, conviction for a crime
involving moral turpitude is a ground for disbarment or suspension. By
such conviction, a lawyer is deemed to have become unfit to uphold the
administration of justice and to be no longer possessed of good moral
character.
13
In the instant case, respondent has been found guilty; and he
stands convicted, by final judgment, of frustrated homicide. Since his
conviction has already been established and is no longer open to
question, the only issues that remain to be determined are as follows: 1)
whether his crime of frustrated homicide involves moral turpitude, and 2)
whether his guilt warrants disbarment.
Moral turpitude has been defined as "everything which is done contrary
to justice, modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or
depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his
fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty,
or good morals."
14

The question of whether the crime of homicide involves moral turpitude
has been discussed in International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) v.
NLRC,
15
a labor case concerning an employee who was dismissed on the
basis of his conviction for homicide. Considering the particular
circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime, this Court
rejected the employers contention and held that homicide in that case
did not involve moral turpitude. (If it did, the crime would have been
violative of the IRRIs Employment Policy Regulations and indeed a
ground for dismissal.) The Court explained that, having disregarded the
attendant circumstances, the employer made a pronouncement that was
precipitate. Furthermore, it was not for the latter to determine
conclusively whether a crime involved moral turpitude. That discretion
belonged to the courts, as explained thus:
"x x x. Homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude depending on the
degree of the crime. Moral turpitude is not involved in every criminal act
and is not shown by every known and intentional violation of statute, but
whether any particular conviction involves moral turpitude may be a
question of fact and frequently depends on all the surrounding
circumstances. x x x."
16
(Emphasis supplied)
In the IRRI case, in which the crime of homicide did not involve moral
turpitude, the Court appreciated the presence of incomplete self-defense
and total absence of aggravating circumstances. For a better
understanding of that Decision, the circumstances of the crime are
quoted as follows:
"x x x. The facts on record show that Micosa [the IRRI employee] was then
urinating and had his back turned when the victim drove his fist unto
Micosa's face; that the victim then forcibly rubbed Micosa's face into the
filthy urinal; that Micosa pleaded to the victim to stop the attack but was
ignored and that it was while Micosa was in that position that he drew a
fan knife from the left pocket of his shirt and desperately swung it at the
victim who released his hold on Micosa only after the latter had stabbed
him several times. These facts show that Micosa's intention was not to
slay the victim but only to defend his person. The appreciation in his favor
of the mitigating circumstances of self-defense and voluntary surrender,
plus the total absence of any aggravating circumstance demonstrate that
Micosa's character and intentions were not inherently vile, immoral or
unjust."
17

The present case is totally different. As the IBP correctly found, the
circumstances clearly evince the moral turpitude of respondent and his
unworthiness to practice law.
Atty. Dizon was definitely the aggressor, as he pursued and shot
complainant when the latter least expected it. The act of aggression
shown by respondent will not be mitigated by the fact that he was hit
once and his arm twisted by complainant. Under the circumstances, those
were reasonable actions clearly intended to fend off the lawyers assault.
We also consider the trial courts finding of treachery as a further
indication of the skewed morals of respondent. He shot the victim when
the latter was not in a position to defend himself. In fact, under the
impression that the assault was already over, the unarmed complainant
was merely returning the eyeglasses of Atty. Dizon when the latter
unexpectedly shot him. To make matters worse, respondent wrapped the
handle of his gun with a handkerchief so as not to leave fingerprints. In so
doing, he betrayed his sly intention to escape punishment for his crime.
The totality of the facts unmistakably bears the earmarks of moral
turpitude. By his conduct, respondent revealed his extreme arrogance
and feeling of self-importance. As it were, he acted like a god on the road,
who deserved to be venerated and never to be slighted. Clearly, his
inordinate reaction to a simple traffic incident reflected poorly on his
fitness to be a member of the legal profession. His overreaction also
evinced vindictiveness, which was definitely an undesirable trait in any
individual, more so in a lawyer. In the tenacity with which he pursued
complainant, we see not the persistence of a person who has been
grievously wronged, but the obstinacy of one trying to assert a false sense
of superiority and to exact revenge.
It is also glaringly clear that respondent seriously transgressed Canon 1 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility through his illegal possession of
an unlicensed firearm
18
and his unjust refusal to satisfy his civil
liabilities.
19
He has thus brazenly violated the law and disobeyed the
lawful orders of the courts. We remind him that, both in his attorneys
oath
20
and in the Code of Professional Responsibility, he bound himself to
"obey the laws of the land."
All told, Atty. Dizon has shown through this incident that he is wanting in
even a basic sense of justice. He obtained the benevolence of the trial
court when it suspended his sentence and granted him probation. And
yet, it has been four years
21
since he was ordered to settle his civil
liabilities to complainant. To date, respondent remains adamant in
refusing to fulfill that obligation. By his extreme impetuosity and
intolerance, as shown by his violent reaction to a simple traffic
altercation, he has taken away the earning capacity, good health, and
youthful vigor of his victim. Still, Atty. Dizon begrudges complainant the
measly amount that could never even fully restore what the latter has
lost.
Conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude may relate, not to the
exercise of the profession of lawyers, but certainly to their good moral
character.
22
Where their misconduct outside of their professional dealings
is so gross as to show them morally unfit for their office and unworthy of
the privileges conferred upon them by their license and the law, the court
may be justified in suspending or removing them from that office.
23

We also adopt the IBPs finding that respondent displayed an utter lack of
good moral character, which is an essential qualification for the privilege
to enter into the practice of law. Good moral character includes at least
common honesty.
24

In the case at bar, respondent consistently displayed dishonest and
duplicitous behavior. As found by the trial court, he had sought, with the
aid of Vice-Mayor Daniel Farias, an out-of-court settlement with
complainants family.
25
But when this effort failed, respondent concocted
a complete lie by making it appear that it was complainants family that
had sought a conference with him to obtain his referral to a
neurosurgeon.
26

The lies of Atty Dizon did not end there. He went on to fabricate an
entirely implausible story of having been mauled by complainant and two
other persons.
27
The trial court had this to say:
"The physical evidence as testified to by no less than three (3) doctors
who examined [Atty. Dizon] does not support his allegation that three
people including the complainant helped each other in kicking and boxing
him. The injuries he sustained were so minor that it is improbable[,] if not
downright unbelievable[,] that three people who he said were bent on
beating him to death could do so little damage. On the contrary, his
injuries sustain the complainants version of the incident particularly
when he said that he boxed the accused on the chest. x x x."
28

Lawyers must be ministers of truth. No moral qualification for bar
membership is more important than truthfulness.
29
The rigorous ethics of
the profession places a premium on honesty and condemns duplicitous
behavior.
30
Hence, lawyers must not mislead the court or allow it to be
misled by any artifice. In all their dealings, they are expected to act in
good faith.
The actions of respondent erode rather than enhance public perception
of the legal profession. They constitute moral turpitude for which he
should be disbarred. "Law is a noble profession, and the privilege to
practice it is bestowed only upon individuals who are competent
intellectually, academically and, equally important, morally. Because they
are vanguards of the law and the legal system, lawyers must at all times
conduct themselves, especially in their dealings with their clients and the
public at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond
reproach."
31

The foregoing abhorrent acts of respondent are not merely dishonorable;
they reveal a basic moral flaw. Considering the depravity of the offense
he committed, we find the penalty recommended by the IBP proper and
commensurate.
The purpose of a proceeding for disbarment is to protect the
administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this
important function be competent, honorable and reliable -- lawyers in
whom courts and clients may repose confidence.
32
Thus, whenever a
clear case of degenerate and vile behavior disturbs that vital yet fragile
confidence, we shall not hesitate to rid our profession of odious
members.
We remain aware that the power to disbar must be exercised with great
caution, and that disbarment should never be decreed when any lesser
penalty would accomplish the end desired. In the instant case, however,
the Court cannot extend that munificence to respondent. His actions so
despicably and wantonly disregarded his duties to society and his
profession. We are convinced that meting out a lesser penalty would be
irreconcilable with our lofty aspiration for the legal profession -- that
every lawyer be a shining exemplar of truth and justice.
We stress that membership in the legal profession is a privilege
demanding a high degree of good moral character, not only as a condition
precedent to admission, but also as a continuing requirement for the
practice of law. Sadly, herein respondent has fallen short of the exacting
standards expected of him as a vanguard of the legal profession.
In sum, when lawyers are convicted of frustrated homicide, the attending
circumstances not the mere fact of their conviction would
demonstrate their fitness to remain in the legal profession. In the present
case, the appalling vindictiveness, treachery, and brazen dishonesty of
respondent clearly show his unworthiness to continue as a member of
the bar.
WHEREFORE, RESPONDENT MANUEL DIZON is hereby DISBARRED, and
his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of
this Decision be entered in his record as a member of the Bar; and let
notice of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and
on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the
country.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila
FIRST DIVISION
A.C. No. 6963 February 9, 2006
VICTORINA BAUTISTA, Complainant, vs. ATTY. SERGIO E. BERNABE,
Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
In a Complaint
1
filed before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on November 16, 2004,
complainant Victorina Bautista
2
prays for the suspension or disbarment of
respondent Atty. Sergio E. Bernabe for malpractice and unethical conduct
in the performance of his duties as a notary public and a lawyer.
Complainant alleged that on January 3, 1998, respondent prepared and
notarized a Magkasanib na Salaysay
3
purportedly executed by Donato
Salonga and complainants mother, Basilia de la Cruz.
4
Both affiants
declared that a certain parcel of land in Bigte, Norzagaray, Bulacan, was
being occupied by Rodolfo Lucas and his family for more than 30 years.
Complainant claimed that her mother could not have executed the joint
affidavit on January 3, 1998 because she has been dead since January 28,
1961.
5

In his Answer,
6
respondent denied that he falsified the Magkasanib na
Salaysay. He disclaimed any knowledge about Basilias death. He alleged
that before he notarized the document, he requested for Basilias
presence and in her absence, he allowed a certain Pronebo, allegedly a
son-in-law of Basilia, to sign above the name of the latter as shown by the
word "by" on top of the name of Basilia. Respondent maintained that
there was no forgery since the signature appearing on top of Basilias
name was the signature of Pronebo.
On April 4, 2005, respondent filed a manifestation
7
attaching thereto the
affidavit of desistance
8
of complainant which reads in part:
Ako na si, VICTORINA BAUTISTA CAPA, x x x matapos makapanumpa ng
naaayon sa batas ay malaya at kusang loob na nagpapahayag ng mga
sumusunod:
1. Na ako ang siyang tumatayong nagrereklamo laban kay Abogado,
SERGIO EXQUIVEL BERNABE, sa isang kaso sa Tanggapan ng Integrated
Bar of the Philippines na may Blg. CBD CASE NO. 04-1371;
2. Na ang nasabing habla ay hindi ko kagustuhan sapagkat iyon ay
pinapirmahan lamang sa akin ni ELISEO OLOROSO at ng kanyang Abogado
na si Atty. MARCIAL MORFE MAGSINO at sa katunayan hindi ako
nakaharap sa Notaryo Publiko na si Abogado CARLITOS C. VILLARIN;
3. Na ang pagpapapirma sa akin ay isang panlilinlang at ako ay ginawang
kasangkapan para sirain ang magandang pangalan nitong si Abogado
SERGIO ESQUIVEL BERNABE;
4. Na dahil sa ganitong pangyayari, aking hinihiling sa Tanggapan ng
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) na ang reklamo ko laban sa
nasabing Abogado SERGIO ESQUIVEL BERNABE ay mapawa[la]ng bisa.
In the report dated August 29, 2005, the Investigating Commissioner
9

recommended that:
1. Atty. Sergio Esquibel Bernabe be suspended from the practice of the
legal profession for one (1) month;
2. Any existing commission of Atty. Sergio Esquibel Bernabe as notary
public, be revoked; and
3. Atty. Sergio Esquibel Bernabe be barred from being granted a notarial
commission for a period of one (1) year.
10

In a resolution dated October 22, 2005, the Board of Governors of the IBP
adopted and approved the recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner with modification that respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for one year and his notarial commission be revoked and
that he be disqualified for reappointment as notary public for two years.
We agree with the findings and recommendation of the IBP.
The records sufficiently established that Basilia was already dead when
the joint affidavit was prepared on January 3, 1998. Respondents alleged
lack of knowledge of Basilias death does not excuse him. It was his duty
to require the personal appearance of the affiant before affixing his
notarial seal and signature on the instrument.
A notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who
signed the same are the very same persons who executed and personally
appeared before him to attest to the contents and truth of what are
stated therein. The presence of the parties to the deed will enable the
notary public to verify the genuineness of the signature of the affiant.
11

Respondents act of notarizing the Magkasanib na Salaysay in the
absence of one of the affiants is in violation of Rule 1.01,
12
Canon 1 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and the Notarial Law.
13
By affixing his
signature and notarial seal on the instrument, he led us to believe that
Basilia personally appeared before him and attested to the truth and
veracity of the contents of the affidavit when in fact it was a certain
Pronebo who signed the document. Respondents conduct is fraught with
dangerous possibilities considering the conclusiveness on the due
execution of a document that our courts and the public accord on
notarized documents. Respondent has clearly failed to exercise utmost
diligence in the performance of his function as a notary public and to
comply with the mandates of the law.
14

Respondent was also remiss in his duty when he allowed Pronebo to sign
in behalf of Basilia. A member of the bar who performs an act as a notary
public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed the
same are the very same persons who executed and personally appeared
before him. The acts of the affiants cannot be delegated to anyone for
what are stated therein are facts of which they have personal knowledge.
They should swear to the document personally and not through any
representative. Otherwise, their representatives name should appear in
the said documents as the one who executed the same. That is the only
time the representative can affix his signature and personally appear
before the notary public for notarization of the said document. Simply
put, the party or parties who executed the instrument must be the ones
to personally appear before the notary public to acknowledge the
document.
15

Complainants desistance or withdrawal of the complaint does not
exonerate respondent or put an end to the administrative proceedings. A
case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or
lack of interest of the complainant. What matters is whether, on the basis
of the facts borne out by the record, the charge of deceit and grossly
immoral conduct has been proven. This rule is premised on the nature of
disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is
not a civil action where the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent
lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest
and afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and
prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are undertaken for the
purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official ministration of
persons unfit to practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to the
court for his conduct as an officer of the court. The complainant or the
person who called the attention of the court to the attorneys alleged
misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the
outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper
administration of justice.
16

We find the penalty recommended by the IBP to be in full accord with
recent jurisprudence. In Gonzales v. Ramos,
17
respondent lawyer was
found guilty of notarizing the document despite the non-appearance of
one of the signatories. As a result, his notarial commission was revoked
and he was disqualified from reappointment for a period of two years. In
addition, he was suspended from the practice of law for one year.
Finally, it has not escaped our notice that in paragraph 2
18
of
complainants affidavit of desistance, she alluded that Atty. Carlitos C.
Villarin notarized her Sinumpaang Salaysay
19
dated November 12, 2004
which was attached to the complaint filed with the Commission on Bar
Discipline of the IBP, without requiring her to personally appear before
him in violation of the Notarial Law. This allegation must likewise be
investigated.
WHEREFORE, for breach of the Notarial Law and Code of Professional
Responsibility, the notarial commission of respondent Atty. Sergio E.
Bernabe, is REVOKED. He is DISQUALIFIED from reappointment as Notary
Public for a period of two years. He is also SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for a period of one year, effective immediately. He is further
WARNED that a repetition of the same or of similar acts shall be dealt
with more severely. He is DIRECTED to report the date of receipt of this
Decision in order to determine when his suspension shall take effect.
The Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
is DIRECTED to investigate the allegation that Atty. Carlitos C. Villarin
notarized the Sinumpaang Salaysay of Victorina Bautista dated November
12, 2004 without requiring the latters personal appearance.lavvph!1.net
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant,
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and all courts all over the country.
Let a copy of this Decision likewise be attached to the personal records of
the respondent.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila
SECOND DIVISION
A.C. No. 6270 January 22, 2007
HEIRS OF THE LATE SPOUSES LUCAS and FRANCISCA VILLANUEVA,
Complainants, vs. ATTY. SALUD P. BERADIO, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a disbarment case against Atty. Salud P. Beradio (respondent), filed
by the heirs of the late spouses Lucas and Francisca Villanueva (spouses
Villanueva), namely: Ardenio M. Fonacier, Araceli M. Fonacier, Alano M.
Fonacier, Eusebio M. Fonacier, Jr., Rolando V. Nazarro, Alejandro V.
Nazarro, Margarita V. Collado, Felisa Collado, and Herminigildo Ylhi
(complainants).
The Facts
During their lifetime, the spouses Villanueva acquired several parcels of
land in Pangasinan, one of which was covered by Original Certificate of
Title (OCT) No. 2522. Francisca died in 1968, and Lucas in 1974. Their five
children, namely, Simeona, Susana, Maria, Alfonso, and Florencia,
survived them.
On 22 May 1984, Alfonso executed an Affidavit of Adjudication
1
(affidavit
of adjudication) stating that as "the only surviving son and sole heirs (sic)"
of the spouses Villanueva, he was adjudicating to himself the parcel of
land under OCT No. 2522. Alfonso then executed a Deed of Absolute Sale
2
(deed of sale) on 5 July 1984, conveying the property to Adriano
Villanueva. Respondent appeared as notary public on both the affidavit of
adjudication and the deed of sale.
Contrary to the misrepresentations of Alfonso, his sister Florencia was
still alive at the time he executed the affidavit of adjudication and the
deed of sale, as were descendants of the other children of the spouses
Villanueva. Complainants claimed that respondent was aware of this fact,
as respondent had been their neighbor in Balungao, Pangasinan, from the
time of their birth, and respondent constantly mingled with their family.
Complainants accused respondent of knowing the "true facts and
surrounding circumstances" regarding the properties of the spouses
Villanueva, yet conspiring with Alfonso to deprive his co-heirs of their
rightful shares in the property.
In a resolution dated 11 February 2004, this Court required respondent to
comment on the complaint.
In her Comment,
3
respondent admitted that she notarized the affidavit
of adjudication and the deed of sale executed by Alfonso in 1984.
However, respondent denied that she conspired with Alfonso to dispose
of fraudulently the property. Respondent alleged that Alfonso executed
the two documents under the following circumstances:
That the properties of the late spouses [Villanueva] have been divided
equally among their compulsory heirs, but said old couple left for
themselves one titled lot, the subject now of the complaint x x x That said
titled property was the only property left by the old couple, to answer for
their needs while they are still alive until their deaths x x x. Alfonso [and
his wife] were tasked to take care of the old couple, as they were the
ones living in the same compound with their late parents. This fact was
and is known by the other compulsory heirs, and they never questioned
the said act of their parents, as they already had their own share on the
estate of the late [spouses Villanueva]. This fact was also known to me
because [Lucas] and [Alfonso] lived across the street from our house
and I was requested to the house of the old man when he gave said title
to [Alfonso and Tomasa, his wife]. The other compulsory heirs who were
still alive at the time just made visits to their parents and never stayed in
their old house to help in the care of their parents. Even [when] the
parents died, it was [Alfonso and his wife] who took charge of the funeral
and all other acts relative thereto.
x x x x
That said title remain[ed] in the custody of [Alfonso] and after the death
of the old man, when the spouses Alfonso [and Tomasa] needed money
to finance the schooling of their children, it was then that they thought of
disposing the land x x x and said land was sold by them to one Adriano
Villanueva of which in both documents, I notarized the same (sic).
x x x x
I can say with all clean and good intentions, that if ever I notarized said
documents, it was done in good faith, to do my job as expected of me, to
help, assist and to guide people who come to me for legal assistance, as
contained in my oath as a lawyer when I passed the bar. x x x
4
(Emphasis
supplied)
According to respondent, the fact that none of Alfonsos co-heirs filed
their objections at the time he executed the affidavit of adjudication
proved that most of the properties of the spouses Villanueva had earlier
been distributed to the other heirs. It also proved that the heirs had
agreed to abide by the intention of the spouses Villanueva to leave the
property to Alfonso. Respondent asserted that "the personal appearances
and acknowledgment by the party to the document are the core of the
ritual that effectively convert a private document into a public document
x x x."
On 26 May 2004, we resolved to refer the complaint to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP), which designated Commissioner Leland R.
Villadolid, Jr. (IBP Commissioner Villadolid) to investigate, and submit his
report and recommendation on, the complaint.
The IBPs Findings
In his Report dated 16 September 2005, IBP Commissioner Villadolid
found that respondent violated the provisions of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and the spirit and intent of the notarial law when she
notarized the affidavit knowing that Alfonso was not the sole compulsory
heir of the spouses Villanueva. Although he found no evidence of
fraudulent intent on respondents part, IBP Commissioner Villadolid held
that respondent "engaged in conduct that lessened confidence in the
legal system." Thus, he recommended suspension of respondents
notarial commission for one year. He further recommended that
respondent be reprimanded or suspended from the practice of law for up
to six months.
The Courts Ruling
We sustain partly the IBPs findings and recommendations.
A notary public is empowered to perform a variety of notarial acts, most
common of which are the acknowledgment and affirmation of a
document or instrument. In the performance of such notarial acts, the
notary public must be mindful of the significance of the notarial seal as
affixed on a document. The notarial seal converts the document from
private to public, after which it may be presented as evidence without
need for proof of its genuineness and due execution.
5
Thus, notarization
should not be treated as an empty, meaningless, or routinary act.
6
As
early as Panganiban v. Borromeo,
7
we held that notaries public must
inform themselves of the facts to which they intend to certify and to take
no part in illegal transactions. They must guard against any illegal or
immoral arrangements.
8

On its face, Alfonsos affidavit does not appear to contain any "illegal or
immoral" declaration. However, respondent herself admitted that she
knew of the falsity of Alfonsos statement that he was the "sole heir" of
the spouses Villanueva. Respondent therefore notarized a document
while fully aware that it contained a material falsehood, i.e., Alfonsos
assertion of status as sole heir. The affidavit of adjudication is premised
on this very assertion. By this instrument, Alfonso claimed a portion of his
parents estate all to himself, to the exclusion of his co-heirs. Shortly
afterwards, respondent notarized the deed of sale, knowing that the deed
took basis from the unlawful affidavit of adjudication.
Respondent never disputed complainants allegation of her close
relationship with the Villanueva family spanning several decades.
Respondent even underscored this closeness by claiming that Lucas
himself requested her to come to his house the day Lucas handed to
Alfonso a copy of OCT No. 2522, allegedly so she could hear the
conversation between them.
Respondent claims she is not administratively liable because at the time
Alfonso executed the affidavit, his co-heirs had already received their
respective shares from the estate of the spouses Villanueva. However, we
are not concerned here with the proper distribution of the spouses
Villanuevas estates. Rather, respondents liability springs from her failure
to discharge properly her duties as a notary public and as a member of
the bar.
Where admittedly the notary public has personal knowledge of a false
statement or information contained in the instrument to be notarized,
yet proceeds to affix his or her notarial seal on it, the Court must not
hesitate to discipline the notary public accordingly as the circumstances
of the case may dictate. Otherwise, the integrity and sanctity of the
notarization process may be undermined and public confidence on
notarial documents diminished. In this case, respondents conduct
amounted to a breach of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which requires lawyers to obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for the law and legal processes. Respondent also
violated Rule 1.01 of the Code which proscribes lawyers from engaging in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct.
We also view with disfavor respondents lack of candor before the IBP
proceedings. The transcript of hearings shows that respondent denied
preparing or notarizing the deed of sale,
9
when she already admitted
having done so in her Comment.
WHEREFORE, for violation of Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, we REVOKE the commission of respondent
Atty. Salud P. Beradio as Notary Public, if still existing, and DISQUALIFY
her from being commissioned a notary public for one (1) year. We further
SUSPEND respondent from the practice of law for six (6) months effective
upon finality of this decision.
Let copies of this decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to
be appended to respondents personal record as attorney. Likewise,
copies shall be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all
courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 5439 January 22, 2007
CLARITA J. SAMALA, Complainant, vs. ATTY. LUCIANO D. VALENCIA,
Respondent.
R E S O L U T I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is a complaint
1
dated May 2, 2001 filed by Clarita J. Samala
(complainant) against Atty. Luciano D. Valencia (respondent) for
Disbarment on the following grounds: (a) serving on two separate
occasions as counsel for contending parties; (b) knowingly misleading the
court by submitting false documentary evidence; (c) initiating numerous
cases in exchange for nonpayment of rental fees; and (d) having a
reputation of being immoral by siring illegitimate children.
After respondent filed his Comment, the Court, in its Resolution of
October 24, 2001, referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
2

The investigation was conducted by Commissioner Demaree Jesus B.
Raval. After a series of hearings, the parties filed their respective
memoranda
3
and the case was deemed submitted for resolution.
Commissioner Wilfredo E.J.E. Reyes prepared the Report and
Recommendation
4
dated January 12, 2006. He found respondent guilty
of violating Canons 15 and 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
and recommended the penalty of suspension for six months.
In a minute Resolution
5
passed on May 26, 2006, the IBP Board of
Governors adopted and approved the report and recommendation of
Commissioner Reyes but increased the penalty of suspension from six
months to one year.
We adopt the report of the IBP Board of Governors except as to the issue
on immorality and as to the recommended penalty.
On serving as counsel for contending parties.
Records show that in Civil Case No. 95-105-MK, filed in the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 272, Marikina City, entitled "Leonora M. Aville v.
Editha Valdez" for nonpayment of rentals, herein respondent, while being
the counsel for defendant Valdez, also acted as counsel for the tenants
Lagmay, Valencia, Bustamante and Bayuga
6
by filing an Explanation and
Compliance before the RTC.
7

In Civil Case No. 98-6804 filed in the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC),
Branch 75, Marikina City, entitled "Editha S. Valdez and Joseph J. Alba, Jr.
v. Salve Bustamante and her husband" for ejectment, respondent
represented Valdez against Bustamante - one of the tenants in the
property subject of the controversy. Defendants appealed to the RTC,
Branch 272, Marikina City docketed as SCA Case No. 99-341-MK. In his
decision dated May 2, 2000,
8
Presiding Judge Reuben P. dela Cruz
9

warned respondent to refrain from repeating the act of being counsel of
record of both parties in Civil Case No. 95-105-MK.
But in Civil Case No. 2000-657-MK, filed in the RTC, Branch 273, Marikina
City, entitled "Editha S. Valdez v. Joseph J. Alba, Jr. and Register of Deeds
of Marikina City," respondent, as counsel for Valdez, filed a Complaint for
Rescission of Contract with Damages and Cancellation of Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 275500 against Alba, respondent's former client in
Civil Case No. 98-6804 and SCA Case No. 99-341-MK.
Records further reveal that at the hearing of November 14, 2003,
respondent admitted that in Civil Case No. 95-105-MK, he was the lawyer
for Lagmay (one of the tenants) but not for Bustamante and Bayuga
10

albeit he filed the Explanation and Compliance for and in behalf of the
tenants.
11
Respondent also admitted that he represented Valdez in Civil
Case No. 98-6804 and SCA Case No. 99-341-MK against Bustamante and
her husband but denied being the counsel for Alba although the case is
entitled "Valdez and Alba v. Bustamante and her husband," because
Valdez told him to include Alba as the two were the owners of the
property
12
and it was only Valdez who signed the complaint for
ejectment.
13
But, while claiming that respondent did not represent Alba,
respondent, however, avers that he already severed his representation
for Alba when the latter charged respondent with estafa.
14
Thus, the
filing of Civil Case No. 2000-657-MK against Alba.
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides
that a lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written
consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
A lawyer may not, without being guilty of professional misconduct, act as
counsel for a person whose interest conflicts with that of his present or
former client.
15
He may not also undertake to discharge conflicting duties
any more than he may represent antagonistic interests. This stern rule is
founded on the principles of public policy and good taste.
16
It springs
from the relation of attorney and client which is one of trust and
confidence. Lawyers are expected not only to keep inviolate the client's
confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-
dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets
to their lawyers, which is of paramount importance in the administration
of justice.
17

One of the tests of inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of
a new relation would prevent the full discharge of the lawyer's duty of
undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of
unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of that duty.
18

The stern rule against representation of conflicting interests is founded
on principles of public policy and good taste. It springs from the
attorney's duty to represent his client with undivided fidelity and to
maintain inviolate the client's confidence as well as from the injunction
forbidding the examination of an attorney as to any of the privileged
communications of his client.
19

An attorney owes loyalty to his client not only in the case in which he has
represented him but also after the relation of attorney and client has
terminated.
20
The bare attorney-client relationship with a client
precludes an attorney from accepting professional employment from the
client's adversary either in the same case
21
or in a different but related
action.
22
A lawyer is forbidden from representing a subsequent client
against a former client when the subject matter of the present
controversy is related, directly or indirectly, to the subject matter of the
previous litigation in which he appeared for the former client.
23

We held in Nombrado v. Hernandez
24
that the termination of the relation
of attorney and client provides no justification for a lawyer to represent
an interest adverse to or in conflict with that of the former client. The
reason for the rule is that the client's confidence once reposed cannot be
divested by the expiration of the professional employment.
25

Consequently, a lawyer should not, even after the severance of the
relation with his client, do anything which will injuriously affect his former
client in any matter in which he previously represented him nor should he
disclose or use any of the client's confidences acquired in the previous
relation.
26

In this case, respondent's averment that his relationship with Alba has
long been severed by the act of the latter of not turning over the
proceeds collected in Civil Case No. 98-6804, in connivance with the
complainant, is unavailing. Termination of the attorney-client relationship
precludes an attorney from representing a new client whose interest is
adverse to his former client. Alba may not be his original client but the
fact that he filed a case entitled "Valdez and Alba v. Bustamante and her
husband," is a clear indication that respondent is protecting the interests
of both Valdez and Alba in the said case. Respondent cannot just claim
that the lawyer-client relationship between him and Alba has long been
severed without observing Section 26, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court
wherein the written consent of his client is required.
In Gonzales v. Cabucana, Jr.,
27
citing the case of Quiambao v. Bamba,
28

we held that:
The proscription against representation of conflicting interests applies to
a situation where the opposing parties are present clients in the same
action or in an unrelated action. It is of no moment that the lawyer would
not be called upon to contend for one client that which the lawyer has to
oppose for the other client, or that there would be no occasion to use the
confidential information acquired from one to the disadvantage of the
other as the two actions are wholly unrelated. It is enough that the
opposing parties in one case, one of whom would lose the suit, are
present clients and the nature or conditions of the lawyer's respective
retainers with each of them would affect the performance of the duty of
undivided fidelity to both clients.
29

Respondent is bound to comply with Canon 21 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which states that "a lawyer shall preserve the
confidences and secrets of his client even after the attorney-client
relation is terminated."
The reason for the prohibition is found in the relation of attorney and
client, which is one of trust and confidence of the highest degree. A
lawyer becomes familiar with all the facts connected with his client's
case. He learns from his client the weak points of the action as well as the
strong ones. Such knowledge must be considered sacred and guarded
with care.
30

From the foregoing, it is evident that respondent's representation of
Valdez and Alba against Bustamante and her husband, in one case, and
Valdez against Alba, in another case, is a clear case of conflict of interests
which merits a corresponding sanction from this Court. Respondent may
have withdrawn his representation in Civil Case No. 95-105-MK upon
being warned by the court,
31
but the same will not exculpate him from
the charge of representing conflicting interests in his representation in
Civil Case No. 2000-657-MK.
Respondent is reminded to be more cautious in accepting professional
employments, to refrain from all appearances and acts of impropriety
including circumstances indicating conflict of interests, and to behave at
all times with circumspection and dedication befitting a member of the
Bar, especially observing candor, fairness and loyalty in all transactions
with his clients.
32

On knowingly misleading the court by submitting false documentary
evidence.
Complainant alleges that in Civil Case No. 00-7137 filed before MTC,
Branch 75 for ejectment, respondent submitted TCT No. 273020 as
evidence of Valdez's ownership despite the fact that a new TCT No.
275500 was already issued in the name of Alba on February 2, 1995.
Records reveal that respondent filed Civil Case No. 00-7137 on November
27, 2000 and presented TCT No. 273020 as evidence of Valdez's
ownership of the subject property.
33
During the hearing before
Commissioner Raval, respondent avers that when the Answer was filed in
the said case, that was the time that he came to know that the title was
already in the name of Alba; so that when the court dismissed the
complaint, he did not do anything anymore.
34
Respondent further avers
that Valdez did not tell him the truth and things were revealed to him
only when the case for rescission was filed in 2002.
Upon examination of the record, it was noted that Civil Case No. 2000-
657-MK for rescission of contract and cancellation of TCT No. 275500 was
also filed on November 27, 2000,
35
before RTC, Branch 273, Marikina
City, thus belying the averment of respondent that he came to know of
Alba's title only in 2002 when the case for rescission was filed. It was
revealed during the hearing before Commissioner Raval that Civil Case
Nos. 00-7137 and 2000-657-MK were filed on the same date, although in
different courts and at different times.
Hence, respondent cannot feign ignorance of the fact that the title he
submitted was already cancelled in lieu of a new title issued in the name
of Alba in 1995 yet, as proof of the latter's ownership.
Respondent failed to comply with Canon 10 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall not do any falsehood,
nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the
Court to be mislead by any artifice. It matters not that the trial court was
not misled by respondent's submission of TCT No. 273020 in the name of
Valdez, as shown by its decision dated January 8, 2002
36
dismissing the
complaint for ejectment. What is decisive in this case is respondent's
intent in trying to mislead the court by presenting TCT No. 273020 despite
the fact that said title was already cancelled and a new one, TCT No.
275500, was already issued in the name of Alba.
In Young v. Batuegas,37 we held that a lawyer must be a disciple of truth.
He swore upon his admission to the Bar that he will "do no falsehood nor
consent to the doing of any in court" and he shall "conduct himself as a
lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all
good fidelity as well to the courts as to his clients."
38
He should bear in
mind that as an officer of the court his high vocation is to correctly inform
the court upon the law and the facts of the case and to aid it in doing
justice and arriving at correct conclusion.
39
The courts, on the other
hand, are entitled to expect only complete honesty from lawyers
appearing and pleading before them. While a lawyer has the solemn duty
to defend his client's rights and is expected to display the utmost zeal in
defense of his client's cause, his conduct must never be at the expense of
truth.
A lawyer is the servant of the law and belongs to a profession to which
society has entrusted the administration of law and the dispensation of
justice.
40
As such, he should make himself more an exemplar for others
to emulate.
41

>On initiating numerous cases in exchange for nonpayment of rental
fees.
Complainant alleges that respondent filed the following cases: (a) Civil
Case No. 2000-657-MK at the RTC, Branch 272; (b) Civil Case No. 00-7137
at the MTC, Branch 75; and (c) I.S. Nos. 00-4439 and 01-036162 both
entitled "Valencia v. Samala" for estafa and grave coercion, respectively,
before the Marikina City Prosecutor. Complainant claims that the two
criminal cases were filed in retaliation for the cases she filed against
Lagmay docketed as I.S. No. 00-4306 for estafa and I.S. No. 00-4318
against Alvin Valencia (son of respondent) for trespass to dwelling.
As culled from the records, Valdez entered into a retainer agreement with
respondent. As payment for his services, he was allowed to occupy the
property for free and utilize the same as his office pursuant to their
retainer agreement.
42

Respondent filed I.S. Nos. 00-4439
43
and 01-036162
44
both entitled
"Valencia v. Samala" for estafa and grave coercion, respectively, to
protect his client's rights against complainant who filed I.S. No. 00-4306
45

for estafa against Lagmay, and I.S. No. 00-4318
46
against Alvin Valencia
47

for trespass to dwelling.
We find the charge to be without sufficient basis. The act of respondent
of filing the aforecited cases to protect the interest of his client, on one
hand, and his own interest, on the other, cannot be made the basis of an
administrative charge unless it can be clearly shown that the same was
being done to abuse judicial processes to commit injustice.
The filing of an administrative case against respondent for protecting the
interest of his client and his own right would be putting a burden on a
practicing lawyer who is obligated to defend and prosecute the right of
his client.
On having a reputation for being immoral by siring illegitimate children.
We find respondent liable for being immoral by siring illegitimate
children.
During the hearing, respondent admitted that he sired three children by
Teresita Lagmay who are all over 20 years of age,
48
while his first wife
was still alive. He also admitted that he has eight children by his first wife,
the youngest of whom is over 20 years of age, and after his wife died in
1997, he married Lagmay in 1998.
49
Respondent further admitted that
Lagmay was staying in one of the apartments being claimed by
complainant. However, he does not consider his affair with Lagmay as a
relationship
50
and does not consider the latter as his second family.
51
He
reasoned that he was not staying with Lagmay because he has two
houses, one in Muntinlupa and another in Marikina.
52

In this case, the admissions made by respondent are more than enough
to hold him liable on the charge of immorality. During the hearing,
respondent did not show any remorse. He even justified his transgression
by saying that he does not have any relationship with Lagmay and despite
the fact that he sired three children by the latter, he does not consider
them as his second family. It is noted that during the hearing, respondent
boasts in telling the commissioner that he has two houses - in
Muntinlupa, where his first wife lived, and in Marikina, where Lagmay
lives.
53
It is of no moment that respondent eventually married Lagmay
after the death of his first wife. The fact still remains that respondent did
not live up to the exacting standard of morality and decorum required of
the legal profession.
Under Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a
lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct. It may be difficult to specify the degree of moral delinquency
that may qualify an act as immoral, yet, for purposes of disciplining a
lawyer, immoral conduct has been defined as that "conduct which is
willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to
the opinion of respectable members of the community.
54
Thus, in several
cases, the Court did not hesitate to discipline a lawyer for keeping a
mistress in defiance of the mores and sense of morality of the
community.
55
That respondent subsequently married Lagmay in 1998
after the death of his wife and that this is his first infraction as regards
immorality serve to mitigate his liability.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court finds respondent Atty. Luciano D. Valencia
GUILTY of misconduct and violation of Canons 21, 10 and 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
three (3) years, effective immediately upon receipt of herein Resolution.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished all courts of the land, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines as well as the Office of the Bar Confidant
for their information and guidance, and let it be entered in respondent's
personal records.
SO ORDERED.

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