Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No.

2 (Extracts, June 2011) 57

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the
author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US govern-
ment endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations.
From the Archives
The Evolution of US Army HUMINT: Intelligence
Operations in the Korean War
John P. Finnegan

By the end of the Korean

War, the Far East
Command had fielded a
large Army-controlled
clandestine collection
apparatus, closely linked
with similarly large
operations in the fields of
partisan and

psychological warfare.
This article was originally
published in a classified issue of
Studi es (44, no. 2) in 2000.
ed.
The traumati c experi ence of
the Korean confl i ct was a
watershed i n the evol uti on of
Army i ntel l i gence. Wi thi n si x
months, the Army found i tsel f
faci ng two major i ntel l i gence
di sasters: i t was caught unpre-
pared by the i ni ti al North
Korean i nvasi on of June 1950
and by the massi ve Chi nese
i nterventi on i n November of
that year. I n response, the
Army hasti l y i mprovi sed a cl an-
desti ne human i ntel l i gence
(HUMI NT) organi zati on, bui l d-
i ng on a smal l exi sti ng i ntel l i -
gence uni t, the Korean Li ai son
Offi ce (KLO). By the end of the
Korean War, the Far East Com-
mand (FECOM) had fi el ded a
l arge Army-control l ed cl andes-
ti ne col l ecti on apparatus,
cl osel y l i nked wi th si mi l arl y
l arge operati ons i n the fi el ds of
parti san and psychol ogi cal war-
fare. More i mportant, the Army
had begun to take steps to cre-
ate a permanent and profes-
si onal HUMI NT servi ce that
coul d carry out posi ti ve i ntel l i -
gence col l ecti on operati ons.
Lack of I ntel l i gence
The sudden outbreak of the
Kor ean war on 25 June 1950
came as a shock to US l eader s.
I n hi ndsi ght, thi s i s not sur-
pr i si ng. Si nce the onset of the
Col d War, the nati ons i ntel l i -
gence assets had been tar-
geted al most excl usi vel y
agai nst the Sovi et Uni on. I n
addi ti on, i ntel l i gence r esponsi -
bi l i ti es i n the Far East wer e
badl y fragmented. General of
the Ar my Dougl as MacAr-
thur s Far East Command
(FECOM), the major theater
headquar ter s i n the ar ea, no
l onger had any jur i sdi cti on
over the Kor ean peni nsul a:
authori ty over the ar ea had
devol ved to the Kor ean Mi l i -
tar y Advi sory Gr oup (KMAG)
after the l ast Ameri can occupa-
ti on for ces l eft i n mi d-1949.
Because the KMAG had no
posi ti ve col l ecti on capabi l i ty,
Kor ea was an i ntel l i gence
vacuum.
a 1
a
For more on i ntel l i gence duri ng thi s
per i od, see Cl ayton Lauri e, A New Pr esi -
dent, a Better CI A, and an Ol d War, i n
Studies in I ntelligence 54, No. 4 (Decem-
ber 2010) and CI A rel ease of documents
fr om the peri od i n www.ci a.gov/l i br ary/
publ i cati ons/hi stori cal -col l ecti ons-publ i ca-
ti ons/i ndex.html .
US Army HUMINT in Korean War
58 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2011)
Maj. Gen. Charl es Wi l -
l oughby, MacArthurs G-2, di d
mai ntai n a resi dual i ntel l i -
gence organi zati on i n Korea,
the KLO. The reports gener-
ated by thi s smal l offi ce, how-
ever, recei ved l i ttl e attenti on i n
a preoccupi ed Tokyo. Si mi l ar
r epor ts submi tted by an Ai r
Force Offi ce of Speci al I nvesti -
gati ons (AFOSI ) team that al so
remai ned i n Korea were l i ke-
wi se di sregarded. I ntel l i gence
emanati ng from the smal l CI A
presence i n Korea recei ved an
equal l y cool recepti on from
FECOM. I ntel l i gence that came
the way of these el ements was
procured l argel y through l i ai -
son wi th Republ i c of Korea
(ROK) sources. As such, i t was
deemed unrel i abl e, and the
i nformati on recei ved was often
confl i cti ng. I ntel l i gence offi cers
back i n Tokyo had heard wol f
cri ed too often to bel i eve that
anythi ng was actual l y goi ng to
happen. Lack of i ntel l i gence
resources and hard data was
paral l el ed by a l ack of i ntel l i -
gence percepti on. Because the
North Korean destabi l i zati on
campai gn agai nst the South
had fai l ed, i t was too easi l y
assumed that the North woul d
turn to pol i ti cal i ni ti ati ves.
2

The advance of T-34 tanks
across the 38th paral l el shat-
tered the i l l usi ons of FECOM
pol i cymakers. The rapi d col -
l apse of ROK forces meant that
onl y outsi de mi l i tar y hel p coul d
prevent a communi st takeover
of the whol e Kor ean Peni nsul a.
At the di recti on of the presi -
dent and acti ng under the
authori ty of the UN, FECOM
qui ckl y moved to i ntervene. But
i t found that i n the fi el d of
i ntel l i gence, as i n al most every-
thi ng el se, fi ve years of peace-
ti me occupati on duty had l eft
Ameri can for ces i n Japan l ess
than wel l equi pped to meet an
outsi de chal l enge.
3
On paper, FECOM control l ed
substanti al i ntel l i gence assets.
Wi l l oughby had more than
2,500 i ntel l i gence personnel at
hi s di sposal , but these el e-
ments were organi zed to sup-
port an army of occupati on. The
l argest si ngl e i ntel l i gence com-
ponent wi thi n FECOM was the
441st Counter I ntel l i gence
Corps (CI C) Detachment, tar-
geted agai nst Japanese subver-
si ve el ements. I t reported to
MacArthur i n hi s capaci ty as
Supreme Commander Al l i ed
Powers, not as head of FECOM.
The four Army di vi si ons i n
Japan had no organi c CI C
detachments.
4
A l arge Mi l i tary I ntel l i gence
Servi ce Company of Japanese
i nterpreters supported the
441st CI C Detachment, but
there were onl y two Korean l i n-
gui sts at G-2s di sposal .
FECOMs Techni cal I ntel l i -
gence Secti on had been di scon-
ti nued i n 1949. The PHOTI NT
capabi l i ty of the command had
shri vel ed. Cryptol ogi c resources
wer e equal l y l acki ng. The Ar my
Securi ty Agency, Paci fi c (ASA-
PAC) had two compani es and
two detachments i n the Far
East, but these were trai ned
and equi pped for fi xed-si te
operati ons and coul d not easi l y
be shi fted to the fi el d. ASA was
not abl e to depl oy a tacti cal
uni t i n Korea unti l October,
when a company was shi pped
from the Uni ted States.
5
A Need for HUMI NT
The adverse combat si tuati on
confronted by FECOM and the
Ei ghth Army i n Korea duri ng
the summer of 1950 cr eated a
cri ti cal need for hard i ntel l i -
gence. Wi th other assets
unavai l abl e, thi s coul d onl y be
provi ded by HUMI NT. An orga-
ni zati on was qui ckl y bui l t
around the nucl eus of the KLO,
usi ng personnel from the 441st
CI C Detachment. To carry out
i ts mi ssi on, the KLO hasti l y
recrui ted Korean peasants,
gave them sketchy trai ni ng,
and ai rdropped them behi nd
enemy l i nes wi th i nstructi ons
to return wi th i ntel l i gence
reports. I n addi ti on, i t set up
Tacti cal Li ai son Offi ces (TLOs)
at di vi si on l evel to recrui t Kore-
ans as l i ne-crosser s to gather
cl andesti ne HUMI NT.
a

Al though i t operated i n sup-
port of Ei ghth Army and i ts tac-
ti cal commanders, the whol e
structure remai ned fi rml y
under Wi l l oughby's control .
6
Agent casual ti es were hi gh,
and the qual i ty of i ntel l i gence
produced unsati sfactory. But, i n
the earl y stages of the war, i t
In the field of intelligence, as in almost everything else, five
years of peacetime occupation duty had left American forces in
Japan less than well equipped to meet an outside challenge.
US Army HUMINT in Korean War
Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2011) 59
was al l the UN forces had.
Nonethel ess, the KLO tri ed to
i mprove the col l ecti on si tua-
ti on as ear l y as August 1950.
One basi c probl em was that
both agent i nserti on tech-
ni ques used by the KLOpara-
chute drops and l i ne-
crossi ngwere i ntri nsi cal l y
hazardous, and even parachute
agents had to exfi l trate through
enemy l i nes to bri ng back thei r
reports. The KLO came up wi th
the i dea of usi ng smal l boats
both to l and i ts agents behi nd
enemy l i nes and to retri eve
them, thus bypassi ng the dan-
gers of the fi ghti ng front. The
cooperati on of the ROK Navy
was necessary for thi s effort,
however, and thi s was di ffi cul t
to obtai n.
a
The whol e i dea was
temporar i l y abandoned i n Sep-
tember, when the needs of the
for thcomi ng amphi bi ous opera-
ti on at I nchon absor bed al l
avai l abl e shi ppi ng.
7
Some I mprovement
By the ti me of the I nchon
l andi ng, the i ntel l i gence pi c-
tur e i n FECOM was i mprovi ng.
The theater had recei ved addi -
ti onal i ntel l i gence assets, and
focus on the Korean probl em at
the nati onal l evel was produc-
i ng resul ts. The rapi d col l apse
of the North Korean Army
appeared to make further
efforts at establ i shi ng a per ma-
nent i ntel l i gence organi zati on
unnecessary. But the very suc-
cess of UN forces exacted a
pri ce: i ntel l i gence el ements
repeatedl y had to move to keep
up wi th the pace of the
advance, and thi s di sor gani zed
the i ntel l i gence structure and
i mpai red i ts operati onal capa-
bi l i ti es.
The Chi nese Threat
The comi ng of November
brought a new thr eat, the possi -
bi l i ty of i nterventi on by the
Peopl es Republ i c of Chi na. Chi -
nese Forei gn Mi ni ster Zhou
Enl ai had publ i cl y announced
that Chi na woul d enter the war
i f US forces crossed the 38th
paral l el . Al though the Uni ted
States had deci ded to i gnore
thi s threat as a bl uff, Ameri can
i ntel l i gence was aware that
400,000 troops of Chi nas best
formati on, the Fourth Fi el d
Army, were bei ng concentrated
just across the Yal u Ri ver i n
Manchur i a. Some of these
forces crossed over i nto Korea
i n October and earl y Novem-
ber. Sharp cl ashes wi th UN
troops ensued, and Army i ntel -
l i gence di scovered the Chi nese
presence by fi ndi ng that US
and ROK forces had taken Chi -
nese pr i soner s.
8

The meani ng of al l thi s
remai ned eni gmati c. The Chi -
nese soon di sengaged, and the
Chi nese pri soners of war, when
i nterrogated, cl ai med they were
members of Speci al Mi l i tary
Uni ts whi ch at fi rst were
assumed to be onl y token cad-
res from the Fourth Fi el d Army.
Whi l e Army i ntel l i gence real -
i zed the Chi nese di d have the
mi l i tary capabi l i ty for a ful l -
scal e i nterventi on, i t doubted
they woul d pursue such a
course. I f the Chi nese had
fai l ed to i ntervene i n August,
when the Ei ghth Army was
trapped i n the Pusan peri me-
ter and i nterventi on coul d have
been deci si ve, i t seemed i rr ati o-
nal for them to i ntervene when
North Korea had been broken.
I t appeared more pl ausi bl e to
assume the Chi nese pr esence i n
Korea was i n the nature of a
face-savi ng gesture.
9

The hard fact was that
FECOM agai n found i tsel f
reduced to specul ati on about
enemy i ntenti ons because i t
sti l l l acked the i ntel l i gence
resources needed to resol ve the
a
Of the ear l y parachute agents, Mar shal l
noted that Frequentl y the Commandi ng
Gener al 's pl ane was used to carr y these
men i nto nowher e. The TLO, as one offi -
cer put i t, was basi cal l y a gl ori fi ed r econ-
nai ssance uni t desi gned to obtai n order
of battl e i nformati on by usi ng agents to
conduct shal l ow penetr ati on mi ssi ons. To
ensur e i t r emai ned under GHQ FECOM
contr ol , the TLO was al so assi gned a
noti onal str ategi c i ntel l i gence mi ssi on.
Agents wer e a mi xed bag whose number s
i ncl uded hi gh school -age chi l dr en, women,
the aged, and deser ters fr om both the
Nor th and South Korean armi es.
a
Marshal l gr i ml y noted that i n these
operati ons, Onl y the l oss r ate ful fi l l ed
expectati ons. Returni ng agents r an the
ri sk of bei ng mi staken for enemy i nfi l tr a-
tor s and shot by tr oops fr om thei r own
si de.
By the time of the Inchon landing, the intelligence picture in FE-
COM was improving.
US Army HUMINT in Korean War
60 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2011)
pr obl em. Manchur i a was off-
l i mi ts to photographi c recon-
nai ssance because of di pl o-
mati c consi derati ons, l i mi ted
aeri al survei l l ance of Korea was
unproducti ve, and other sophi s-
ti cated col l ecti on mechani sms
were targeted excl usi vel y
agai nst the Korean probl em
and l acked the l i ngui sti c and
techni cal capabi l i ty to swi tch
qui ckl y.
10

Wi th hi s armi es on the
threshol d of vi ctorythe van-
guards of the Ei ghth Army
were across the Chongchon
Ri ver i n western Korea, those
of X Corps neari ng the Yal u i n
the EastMacArthur was i n no
mood to be depri ved of tri umph
by the mere specter of a Chi -
nese Army. He deci ded to sub-
ject the questi on of just what
Chi nese i ntenti ons mi ght be to
an aci d test. On 24 November
1950, he ordered hi s wi del y di s-
persed forces to attack i nto the
unknown.
11

KLO Handi caps
The UN offensi ve ran head-on
i nto 30 Chi nese di vi si ons that
had secretl y crossed over from
Manchuri a. The attack became
a fi ghti ng retreat. The Ei ghth
Army fel l back from the
Chongchon wi th heavy l osses; X
Corps began the di ffi cul t pro-
cess of cutti ng i ts way back
through the mountai ns to the
port of Hungnam. By mi d-
December, as UN forces conti n-
ued thei r retreat, the Chi nese
once more di sengaged. Pursued
by an overwhel mi ng force, the
Ei ghth Army found i tsel f com-
pl etel y i gnorant of how thi s
force was di sposed or where i t
mi ght be attacki ng next.
a 12

At thi s cri ti cal juncture,
FECOM turned once more to
cl andesti ne HUMI NT to meet
i ts pressi ng need for i ntel l i -
gence. But the KLO organi za-
ti on (now offi ci al l y ti tl ed the
Far East Command Li ai son
Group, Korea) was i n no condi -
ti on to meet the requi rements.
There were no agent assets i n
the areas i n whi ch the Chi nese
were advanci ng. The KLO di d
have the capabi l i ty of i nserti ng
parachute agents i n bl i nd
drops, usi ng Ai r Force C-47s,
but the AVI ARY program, as i t
was cal l ed, operated under
severe di sabi l i ti es. The stan-
dard of agent trai ni ng was l ow,
and the KLO had no radi os
sui tabl e for agent wor k and no
agents trai ned i n radi o opera-
ti on. I n a desperate attempt to
cl ari fy the tacti cal si tuati on,
the KLO was reduced to drop-
pi ng 12 two-man agent teams
equi pped wi th smoke grenades
north of UN l i nes to establ i sh
the l ocati on of the Chi nese
forces. Onl y a few teams ever
managed to si gnal Ai r Force
spotter pl anes, al l wi th nega-
ti ve resul ts.
13

The 442d CI C Detachment
I n these darkest days of the
war, FECOM responded to the
i ntel l i gence chal l enge by set-
ti ng up a new uni t to conduct
an expanded program of cl an-
desti ne HUMI NT. The 442d
CI C Detachment was acti vated
on 20 December 1950 i n Seoul
wi th 50 assi gned per sonnel to
take over operati onal control of
the KLO central offi ce and the
di vi si on l evel TLOs. On paper,
the 442d was a nor mal CI C
uni t, organi zed under a stan-
dar d cel l ul ar Tabl e of Or gani za-
ti on and Equi pment (TOE 30-
500) and commanded by a regu-
l ar army offi cer, Col . C.A.
Di ckey. I n r eal i ty, i t was a
hi ghl y unusual organi zati on
assi gned a posi ti ve cl andesti ne
col l ecti on mi ssi on that went far
beyond the CI Cs nor mal
responsi bi l i ti es.
14

The 442d had a tur bul ent
begi nni ng. Two days after the
uni t was offi ci al l y acti vated i n
Seoul , the deteri orati ng mi l i -
tary si tuati on forced i t to estab-
l i sh a r ear headquarter s i n the
ci ty of Taegu. The rest of the
headquar ter s soon fol l owed to
escape the second Communi st
occupati on of the South Korean
capi tal . But the rapi d revi val of
the Ei ghth Army's fortunes
a
Upon assumi ng command of the Ei ghth
Ar my, Gen. Matthew B. Ri dgway recal l s
that al l he had i n the way of i ntel l i gence
about the enemy north of hi s l i nes was a
map showi ng A bi g red goose egg...wi th
174,000 scr awl ed i n the mi ddl e of i t. The
si tuati on di d not qui ckl y i mpr ove; i n Feb-
ruar y 1951, Ri dgway repor ted that, We
have a cur tai n beyond the range of our
i mmedi ate combat i ntel l i gence acti vi ti es
whi ch I fi nd extr emel y di ffi cul t to pi er ce.
At this critical juncture, FECOM turned once more to clandes-
tine HUMINT to meet its pressing need for intelligence.
US Army HUMINT in Korean War
Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2011) 61
under i ts new commander,
Gen. Matthew B. Ri dgway, put
an end to further UN retreats.
Worki ng from a secure base,
the 442d was abl e to upgr ade
the FECOM cl andesti ne
HUMI NT program between
January 1951 and the fi r st
armi sti ce negoti ati ons i n June,
maki ng si gni fi cant accompl i sh-
ments i n the areas of agent
i nserti on, communi cati ons, and
trai ni ng.
15

Unti l ear l y 1951, agents had
been i nserted by l i ne-crossi ng
and by parachute drop. At the
TLO l evel , hundreds of Korean
peasants were sent to gather
l i mi ted i nformati on about
enemy di sposi ti ons i n front of
the UN l i nes. The KLO had i ts
own l i ne-cr osser s; i t al so par-
adropped smal l er numbers of
Kor ean agents on l ong-range
col l ecti on mi ssi ons, usi ng Ai r
Force AVI ARY C-47s control l ed
by Ei ghth Armys Speci al Acti v-
i ti es Mi ssi on. Both techni ques
r esul ted i n heavy l osses of
agents.
a
To remedy thi s si tua-
ti on, the 442d began to suppl e-
ment i ts ground and parachute
i nserti on methods by usi ng
boats to l and agents behi nd
enemy l i nes, a course fi rst sug-
gested i n the summer of 1950.
16

SALAMANDER
Confronted by an unaccept-
abl e l oss r ate among thei r l i ne-
crossers, the TLO teams of the
3d and 25th I nfantr y Di vi si ons
began transporti ng agents by
smal l boats around the enemys
fl ank on the west coast of
Korea. At the same ti me, the
442d CI C Detachment's head-
quarters el ement i mpl emented
a much l arger program of
amphi bi ous espi onage and was
gi ven the codename SALA-
MANDER. Thi s i nvol ved the
use of Korean-manned fi shi ng
boats to i nser t l ong-range
agents deep wi thi n enemy terri -
tory. SALAMANDER opera-
ti ons were i ni ti al l y conducted
from the numer ous i sl ands off
the Korean west coast that
were to the rear of the enemy's
l i nes. These i sl ands wer e r en-
dered more or l ess secure from
hosti l e attack by the UN naval
bl ockade, and many were
al ready i n the hands of anti -
Communi st North Korean
parti sans.
17

The fi rst SALAMANDER
operati ons were mounted from
the i sl and of Paengyong Do,
just bel ow the 38th paral l el .
They soon moved to a mor e
advanced base at Cho Do, str a-
tegi cal l y l ocated just fi ve mi l es
off the North Korean coast. The
posi ti on gave the 442ds agents
access to the whol e west coast
of Korea up to the Yal u Ri ver.
To compl ement thi s west coast
oper ati on, the 442d l ater i ni ti -
ated pl ans to establ i sh an east
coast SALAMANDER base on
the bl eak and i nhospi tabl e
i sl and of Yodo. Thi s move woul d
provi de i ntel l i gence coverage of
another enemy fl ank, as wel l as
al l ow agents to provi de exten-
si ve l ateral coverage of North
Korean posi ti ons, because they
coul d l and on one coast and
exfi l trate from the other.
Because the nati ve fi shi ng
boats used by the operati on
wer e both smal l and unseawor-
thy, the 442d qui ckl y took steps
to secure fast Amer i can craft.
18

Better Communi cati ons
Agent communi cati ons were
al so i mproved. Unti l the end of
December 1950, radi os had
been unavai l abl e, and the
442ds agent handl er s wer e
forced to wai t unti l an agent
actual l y r etur ned to base befor e
they coul d procure any i ntel l i -
gence. The si tuati on gradual l y
i mproved i n 1951. Radi o teams
equi pped wi th SCR-300 wal ki e-
tal ki es were provi ded for both
AVI ARY and SALAMANDER
oper ati ons.
a
Par achute operati ons were parti cul ar l y
costl y: a former AVI ARY oper ati ons offi cer
esti mated that onl y 20 percent of agents
di spatched managed to make i t back to
UN l i nes. (However, he thought i t possi bl e
that an unknown number of the agents
who fai l ed to r eturn were str anded Nor th
Koreans who had used AVI ARY as an ai r-
l i ne ti cket home.) Unti l agents coul d be
furni shed radi os, these operati ons al so
i nvol ved l ong del ays i n pr ocuri ng i ntel l i -
gence: because of the di stances i nvol ved,
par adr opped agents commonl y took two to
thr ee months to compl ete thei r mi ssi ons.
At the same time, the 442d CIC Detachment's headquarters el-
ement implemented a much larger program of amphibious es-
pionage and was given the codename SALAMANDER.
US Army HUMINT in Korean War
62 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2011)
The use of voi ce radi o al l owed
agents to furni sh Army i ntel l i -
gence wi th i nformati on on a
r eal -ti me basi s. But thi s was
not a panacea. Voi ce radi o had
i ts l i mi tati ons; i ts short range
meant that rel ays had to be
usedSALAMANDER agents
passed thei r messages through
the Cho Do baseor that ai r-
craft had to hover i n the i mme-
di ate area of the agent radi o
teams, ri ski ng compromi se of
the mi ssi on. An addi ti onal com-
pl i cati on was that some of the
Ai r Force crews who provi ded
communi cati ons support to
AVI ARY operati ons were i nex-
peri enced because they fl ew the
mi ssi on for an aver age of onl y
two weeks. Many agent radi o
teams were l ost. Conti nuous
wave (CW) radi os, wi th thei r
l onger range, woul d have
hel ped, but agents had not yet
been trai ned i n Morse code.
a 19

On the other hand, at l east
agents were now provi ded wi th
some mi ni mal trai ni ng. I n
Mar ch 1951, the 442d set up a
trai ni ng school at Pusan that
provi ded 20 agents at a ti me
wi th a basi c two-week course of
i nstructi on. (The faci l i ty moved
to Taegu i n June.) After com-
pl eti ng trai ni ng, the new agents
went to the TLO teams and the
442ds central offi ce. Unsurpri s-
i ngl y, Ameri can i ntel l i gence
personnel rated the new breed
of agents as far superi or to
thei r predecessors. For exam-
pl e, reports noted that the new
agents appear to be enthusi as-
ti c and have a basi c i dea of
the mi ssi on.
Better trai ni ng seems to have
been parti al l y offset by
i ncreased enemy securi ty mea-
sures. Li ne-crossi ng conti nued
to be a hazardous operati on,
and agent capture rates
i ncreased, al though a surpri s-
i ngl y l arge number of detai ned
agents were abl e to escape and
make i t back to UN l i nes. At
any rate, the new recrui tment
and trai ni ng program made i t
easi er to obtai n repl acements.
20

I mproved Capabi l i ti es
The growi ng effi ci ency of
FECOM's cl andesti ne HUMI NT
operati ons was paral l el ed i n
other i ntel l i gence fi el ds, as l an-
guage and other probl ems were
r esol ved. The over al l i mprove-
ment of i ntel l i gence capabi l i -
ti es took pl ace duri ng a peri od
when the Ei ghth Armys for-
tunes were on the upswi ng. As
ear l y as mi d-Januar y 1951, UN
for ces had been abl e to mount a
l i mi ted counterattack. I n
March, Seoul was recaptured.
Whi l e MacArthur was r el i eved
for i nsubordi nati on i n Apri l and
repl aced by General Ri dgway,
UN forces conti nued to push
the enemy back across the 38th
par al l el . On 23 June 1951, the
Sovi et UN Ambassador
announced that North Korea
was now i nterested i n peace
tal ks, and Ri dgway offered
armi sti ce negoti ati ons to the
enemy commander.
21

Peace was not at hand, how-
ever. Al though peace tal ks
began and the UN forces hal ted
thei r advance, there was no
ceasefi re. Negoti ati ons dragged
on for two years, accompani ed
by a stati c war of attri ti on i n
whi ch hi l l s changed hands from
ti me to ti me i n bl oody ski r-
mi shes whi l e the mai n battl e-
l i ne remai ned stabl e. No l onger
forced to respond to the i ntel l i -
gence cri ses of the moment,
FECOM began to bui l d up an
el abor ate semi per manent cl an-
desti ne HUMI NT structure to
meet the needs of a new ki nd of
war.
The Li ai son Detachment
The new effort was conducted
under a revi sed organi zati onal
structure. The 442d CI C
Detachment was i nacti vated on
26 Jul y 1951, and i ts personnel
and assets transferred to a new
organi zati on, the 8240th Army
Uni t. (I n addi ti on to i ts Korea-
based assets, the 8240th con-
si sted of a headquar ter s el e-
ment i n Tokyo and a l ogi sti c
el ement i n Sapporo, Japan.)
The former KLO/TLO organi za-
ti on now became known as the
Far East Command Li ai son
a
Twenty UHF-VHF ai r-sea rescue sets
had been acqui red i n mi d-December but
had ar r i ved wi thout oper ati ng manual s
and pr oved to be of i nsuffi ci ent range to be
useful . Once voi ce r adi os became avai l -
abl e, ai r bor ne r adi o contr ol suppor t was
pr ovi ded by the C-46s of the 438th Troop
Car ri er Command stagi ng out of Japan.
The growing efficiency of FECOM's clandestine HUMINT oper-
ations was paralleled in other intelligence fields, as language
and other problems were resolved.
US Army HUMINT in Korean War
Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2011) 63
Detachment, Korea. The Li ai -
son Detachment, commanded
by Col . Wi l l i am I . Russel l , had
an authori zed str ength of 104.
Because of a shortage of i ntel -
l i gence speci al i sts, and the
Army's deci si on to return grad-
ual l y al l CI C personnel to thei r
normal assi gnments, i t took
some ti me to gather the neces-
sary numbers. Col onel Russel l
started out wi th onl y the 50-odd
peopl e he had i nheri ted from
the 442d.
22

The ti ght personnel si tuati on
l ed to a new devel opment i n
agent trai ni ngagent
netsthat were set up by the
summer of 1951. These con-
si sted of permanent agent orga-
ni zati ons behi nd enemy l i nes,
l i nked to headquar ters by r adi o
control and suppl i ed and rei n-
forced by SALAMANDER and
AVI ARY operati ons. These nets
were now entrusted wi th trai n-
i ng, thus al l owi ng the school at
Taegu to be shut down. Under
the new arrangements, each net
recrui ted i ts own agents (many
from the l arge refugee camps
on the i sl and of Koje-do), put
them through a two-week trai n-
i ng course, and sent them to the
frontl i ne TLO teams for assi gn-
ment i n the fi el d. Agents who
successful l y compl eted fi ve l i ne-
crossi ng mi ssi ons were gi ven
two weeks of addi ti onal trai n-
i ng and then went i nto the
SALAMANDER or AVI ARY
programs.
The new approach was not
compl etel y successful . I n prac-
ti ce, onl y 25 percent of agents
managed to compl ete as many
as four l i ne-crossi ng mi ssi ons
for the TLOs. Central i zed trai n-
i ng was revi ved i n October,
when three nets were consol i -
dated and a new school set up
i n Seoul . Ul ti matel y, a compro-
mi se between the two
approaches was reached: the
nets provi ded basi c agent trai n-
i ng and the school became
r esponsi bl e for advanced r adi o
and parachute trai ni ng.
23

New Sources of Agents
I n addi ti on, the Li ai son
Detachment found new sources
from whi ch to procure agents. A
Korean rel i gi ous group wi th
many adherents i n the North,
the Chando Kyo, was tapped to
provi de an agent network. Chi -
nese POWs who ral l i ed to the
UN si de were di spatched on
order of battl e mi ssi ons. Fi nal l y,
the Li ai son Detachment
acqui r ed 124 agents for merl y
empl oyed by the ROK Armys
Headquarters I ntel l i gence Di vi -
si on (HI D). These agents had
been operati ng from bases on
the Korean east coast, both at
Yodo, where there were al ready
Li ai son Detachment opera-
ti ves, and on i sl ands i n Won-
san Harbor. Because the HI D
had run out of funds, the US
Army pi cked up the tab and the
peopl e.
24

The Li ai son Detachment al so
further i mproved agent commu-
ni cati ons. By the summer of
1951, i t was at l ast possi bl e to
set up a 10-week Morse code
course for agents, whi ch permi t-
ted the nets to use l ong-range
CW radi os. By September, an
el abor ate communi cati ons sys-
tem was i n pl ace. A network of
safehouses forward of UN l i nes
recei ved i ntel l i gence reports
from agents vi a voi ce radi o. The
reports were then rel ayed back
to the vari ous TLOs by means
of Mor se code. The safe houses
empl oyed SSR-5-R CW radi os;
the TLOs were equi pped wi th
the standard Army AN/GRC-
9s. Message traffi c was then
passed on by the TLOs to Li ai -
son Detachment headquarters.
The mai n SALAMANDER base
at Cho Do communi cated wi th
headquar ter s and i ts west coast
agents by si mi l ar means.
25

By the fal l of 1951, the Li ai -
son Detachment began to
reeval uate i ts procedures for
i nser ti ng l ong-range penetr a-
ti on agents. The SALAMAN-
DER operati on, whi ch used
boats to l and and r etri eve
agents, had been very success-
ful . By contrast, the AVI ARY
program, whi ch dropped para-
chute agents deep wi thi n
enemy terri tory and then
requi red them to make i t back
to UN l i nes on thei r own, pro-
duced l ess sati sfactor y r esul ts.
Al though AVI ARY operati ons
were i ntensi vel y pursued111
By the summer of 1951, it was at last possible to set up a 10-
week Morse code course for agents, which permitted the nets
to use long-range CW radios.
US Army HUMINT in Korean War
64 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2011)
agents were parachuted i n dur-
i ng a si ngl e monththe rate of
return was di scouragi ngl y l ow.
At one poi nt i n October, the
Li ai son Detachment contem-
pl ated reduci ng i ts ai rborne
operati ons by 50 percent.
I nstead, i t deci ded to adopt a
new techni que. Agents woul d be
dropped i n teams cl ose behi nd
enemy l i nes, weari ng enemy
uni forms and carryi ng smal l
arms. I n thi s way, they coul d
i mpersonate enemy patrol s
and, i f necessary, shoot thei r
way back to UN l i nes. Use of
thi s tacti c, al ong wi th better
screeni ng of agents and more
speci fi c i ntel l i gence assi gn-
ments, greatl y reduced l osses
and gave AVI ARY a renewed
vi abi l i ty.
26

CCRAK and the Li ai son
Detachment
The Armys cl andesti ne
HUMI NT effort i n Korea had
now become part of a wi der
secret war, waged on an exten-
si ve but uncoordi nated basi s. I n
paral l el wi th the Li ai son
Detachments operati ons, the
Ei ghth US Army was support-
i ng a growi ng parti san effort on
the Korean west coast that was
based on the same i sl ands that
served as SALAMANDER
bases. These i sl ands al so pro-
vi ded bases for var i ous cl andes-
ti ne operati ons undertaken by
the US Ai r Force, whi ch used
them to gather i ntel l i gence and
to support the escape and eva-
si on of downed fl i ers. The CI A
was another pl ayer i n the
secret war.
27

To better coordi nate these
fragmented efforts, a new the-
ater-l evel structure was cre-
ated on 10 December 1951,
cal l ed the Combi ned Command
for Reconnai ssance Acti vi ti es,
Korea (CCRAK). CCRAK was
an umbrel l a organi zati on set up
to i mpose central i zed control on
the secret acti vi ti es of the
armed servi ces, the CI A, and
the ROK al l i es. At the same
ti me CCRAK was formed, the
Army deci ded to pl ace al l i ts
covert and cl andesti ne efforts
under a si ngl e headquar ter s.
The Ei ghth Armys 8086th
Army Uni t, whi ch had been
r unni ng the parti san effort, was
di ssol ved. The Li ai son Detach-
ment took over i ts functi ons
and assets.
28

The Li ai son Detachment thus
became a mi ni ature Army ver-
si on of the Worl d War I I OSS,
wi th responsi bi l i ti es for secret
i ntel l i gence and speci al opera-
ti ons, the fi rst ti me these two
functi ons had been combi ned i n
a si ngl e Army organi zati on.
The arrangement had a certai n
l ogi c to i t. I n accordance wi th
exi sti ng doctri ne, i t moved con-
trol of parti san warfare from
the fi el d army to the theater
l evel . The reorgani zati on al so
provi ded the Li ai son Detach-
ment wi th a parti san force that
coul d protect i ts i sl and bases
and provi de i t wi th suppl emen-
tary i ntel l i gence reports. And
the Li ai son Detachment was
fi nal l y i n a posi ti on to prevent
parti san operati ons from i nad-
vertentl y jeopardi zi ng i ntel l i -
gence acti vi ti es.
29

More Manpower
Thi s i ncrease i n the Li ai son
Detachments responsi bi l i ti es
brought wi th i t an i ncrease i n
per sonnel . By Februar y 1952,
the Detachment had 150
assi gned or attached personnel
on board; by the ti me a cease-
fi re was fi nal l y concl uded i n the
summer of 1953, the Detach-
ment had a str ength of 450.
(Even then, there were com-
pl ai nts that the Detachment
sti l l had too few i ntel l i gence
per sonnel to ful fi l l mi ssi on
requi rements.) Whi l e Army
strength i n Korea remai ned
stabl e from 1951 on, the pr opor-
ti on of resources devoted to
i ntel l i gence and covert acti vi -
ti es was much expanded.
Because UN pol i cy rul ed out
addi ti onal terri tori al gai ns on
the battl efi el d, the secret war
was the onl y combat arena i n
whi ch efforts coul d be
i ntensi fi ed.
30

A good part of the growth per-
mi tted by thi s strength i ncrease
went i nto expandi ng the cl an-
desti ne HUMI NT effort. By
1953, a l ar ge, for mi dabl e or ga-
ni zati on had been fi el ded. The
Li ai son Detachments I ntel l i -
gence Di vi si on control l ed fi ve
separate I ntel l i gence Com-
mands. Each had i ts own geo-
graphi c area of responsi bi l i ty
The Liaison Detachment thus became a miniature Army ver-
sion of the World War II OSS, with responsibilities for secret in-
telligence and special operations,
US Army HUMINT in Korean War
Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2011) 65
(al though one command con-
ducted operati ons on both
coasts of Korea and across the
frontl i nes), but the commands
were al so al l owed to penetrate
North Korea, Manchuri a, and
Chi na proper to the extent thei r
resources permi tted. The fi ve
commands di rected the acti vi -
ti es of 17 separate agent nets,
al l wi th radi o l i nks to the
appropri ate command head-
quarters.
No fewer than 2,100 agents
reported to the Li ai son Detach-
ment. Badger Net al one had
450 agents. Thr ee hundr ed of
these were i n North Korea,
ei ther i n permanent cel l s or as
temporary i nserts; the rest
were at headquarters, i n trai n-
i ng, or i n r eser ve.
31

I ntel l i gence Producti on
The nature of the game meant
that the structure was not per-
fect. The necessi ty of setti ng up
a cl andesti ne or gani zati on i n a
deni ed area under warti me con-
di ti ons had forced compromi ses
both i n admi ni strati on and i n
the cal i ber of recrui ted agents.
(I n l i ght of the fact that i t was
not unti l 1953 that TLO agents
recei ved the same pay as day
l aborers worki ng for the Ei ghth
Army, the l atter defi ci ency i s
parti cul arl y unsurpri si ng.)
Some nets produced onl y i ncon-
cl usi ve resul ts, and no evi dence
exi sts that any were abl e to
suppl y hi gh-l evel i ntel l i gence
on enemy pl ans.
Neverthel ess, by the end of
the war the Li ai son Detach-
ment had become the chi ef pro-
ducer of HUMI NT for the whol e
CCRAK organi zati on, furni sh-
i ng up to 1,000 i ntel l i gence
reports a month, most graded
by consumers as bei ng of si gni f-
i cant i mportance. Thi s repre-
sented a fi ve-fol d i ncrease over
the detachment's output i n
1951. The Li ai son Detach-
ments contri buti on to CCRAK
was as great as that of the Ai r
Forces cl andesti ne servi ce,
ROK Army G-2, and the CI A's
col l ecti on el ement combi ned.
32

Payi ng a Pri ce
Thi s el abor ate cl andesti ne
HUMI NT apparatus was not
bui l t wi thout a certai n pri ce.
The Kor ean agents bor e most of
the costs and ri sks, and thei r
l osses had been hi gh, espe-
ci al l y i n the fi rst stages of the
effort. But Li ai son Detachment
personnel al so met thei r deaths
tryi ng to i nsert agents. An Ai r
Force C-46 went down over
North Korea one ni ght i n Feb-
ruary 1952, carryi ng three
Detachment personnel , seven
Ai r Force crewmen, and si x
Korean agents and an i nter-
preter.
I n Apri l 1953, the i l l -omened
Fi zzl e Net, operati ng from Yodo
on the east coast under the 4th
I ntel l i gence Command, ceased
to exi st when the Ameri can
l i eutenant servi ng as project
offi cer was ambushed and
ki l l ed wi th hi s agent party i n a
l andi ng attempt that went
awry.
33

Parti san Warfare
The expansi on of the parti san
oper ati on that the Li ai son
Detachment had taken over
from the Ei ghth Army at the
end of 1951 was even more
stri ki ng. The pri vate army of
guerri l l as i nheri ted by the Li ai -
son Detachment ori gi nated i n
the vari ous groups of anti -com-
muni st refugees from North
Korea who had fl ed to the
i sl ands off the western coast of
Korea i n the wi nter of 1950-
1951. The Ei ghth Army had
taken these groups i n hand i n
ear l y 1951 and used them to
form a parti san force. So-cal l ed
donkey uni ts of parti sans were
assembl ed around a hasti l y
trai ned i ndi genous cadre and
used as a rai di ng force agai nst
the mai nl and. The i sl ands from
whi ch they operated were stra-
tegi cal l y l ocated behi nd enemy
l i nes and were protected from
enemy attack by the UN naval
bl ockade and ROK gar r i sons.
Because the parti sans requi red
onl y a few Amer i can personnel
as advi sers, they represented
an effecti ve, i nexpensi ve force
mul ti pl i er for the Ei ghth
Army.
34

The Korean agents bore most of the costs and risks, and their
losses had been high, especially in the first stages of the effort.
US Army HUMINT in Korean War
66 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2011)
By September 1951, the don-
key uni ts on the Korean west
coast had been grouped i nto
two regi ments named Leopard
and Wol fpack. I n addi ti on, a
company assi gned the desi gna-
ti on Ki rkl and had been orga-
ni zed on Yodo I sl and off the
east coast of Korea. At thi s
poi nt, the i ncreased acti vi ty
and vi si bi l i ty of the parti sans
began to provoke a vi ol ent
North Korean reacti on. Some of
the more vul nerabl e i sl ands on
the west coast came under
enemy attack. Thi s posed a
threat to the parti sans and to
the SALAMANDER HUMI NT
operati ons of the Li ai son
Detachment. The end resul t
was that the guerri l l as had
come under Li ai son Detach-
ment contr ol .
35

Duri ng the course of 1952, the
Li ai son Detachment expanded
the i ni ti al l y smal l Ki rkl and
force on Yodo to r egi mental
strength. The Leopard and
Wol fpack organi zati ons on the
west coast wer e al so bui l t up.
Operati ng from thei r i sl and
safehavens and assi sted by a
spr i nkl i ng of Amer i can advi s-
ers and US l ogi sti c support, the
parti sans waged a l i vel y l i ttl e
war of thei r own. That year, the
parti sans opti mi sti cal l y cl ai med
to have i nfl i cted 51,000 casual -
ti es on enemy forces. Parti san
casual ti es, however, were not
l i ght: the parti sans had to
defend thei r own i sl and bases
i n addi ti on to mounti ng offen-
si ve rai ds, and some i sl ands
changed hands two or three
ti mes. Mor e than 2,000 par ti -
sans became casual ti es i n 1952,
and more than hal f of these
wer e ki l l ed or l i sted as mi ssi ng
i n acti on.
36

PAI R
The Army vi ewed thi s ki nd of
amphi bi ous warfare as a suc-
cess. I n the Korean Wars wi der
context, however, the parti sans
were more of a nui sance to the
enemy than a r eal thr eat. They
were never abl e to establ i sh
any bases on the mai nl and or
conduct operati ons l arger than
rai ds. Moreover, l andi ng opera-
ti ons were hampered by the
har sh Kor ean wi nters and, on
the west coast, by the enor-
mous ti dal fl uctuati ons that
regul arl y turned beaches i nto
vast and i mpassabl e mudfl ats.
Meanwhi l e, even mor e ambi -
ti ous schemes were under way.
I n Apri l 1952, FECOM pro-
duced a Guerri l l a Operati ons
Outl i ne, 1952. Thi s proposed
addi ng an ai rborne di mensi on
to the exi sti ng parti san
amphi bi ous operati ons.
FECOM decreed that al l com-
mands wi l l qual i fy paratroops.
Accordi ngl y, paratroop trai nees
were taken from the exi sti ng
Leopard, Wol fpack, and Ki r k-
l and formati ons and grouped i n
a uni t that offi ci al l y became the
1st Parti san Ai rborne I nfantry
Regi ment (PAI R) i n November
1952. At the same ti me, the
Leopard, Wol fpack, and Ki rk-
l and uni ts were redesi gnated
r especti vel y as the 1st, 2d, and
3d Par ti san I nfantry
Regi ments.
37

The fi rst conti ngent of the 1st
PAI Rs new ai rborne troops was
commi tted to acti on i n earl y
1953. On the ni ght of 23 Janu-
ary, a fl i ght of three Ai r Force
C-119s gui ded by a B-26 Path-
fi nder ai rcraft ai rdropped a spe-
ci al 97-man Green Dr agon
uni t behi nd enemy l i nes to set
up an oper ati onal base for guer-
ri l l a acti vi ti es. The fate of thi s
fi rst (and, as i t turned out,
onl y) major empl oyment of par-
ti sans i n an ai rborne rol e was
not a happy one. After a l ong
del ay, the party made radi o con-
tact wi th headquar ter s and
reported taki ng heavy casual -
ti es. Rei nforcements and sup-
pl i es were promptl y fl own i n to
sustai n the Green Dragon force.
But when the fi nal cease-fi re
was concl uded i n June 1953,
the l ast radi o message to reach
the Li ai son Di vi si on from
Green Dragon was a curse. The
operati on had been compr o-
mi sed and was under enemy
control .
38

The whol e epi sode became
just another part of the gener-
al l y mel anchol y story of ai r-
bor ne speci al oper ati ons duri ng
the Korean War. The 8240th
Army Uni t and i ts Ai r Force
counterpart repeatedl y
l aunched behi nd-the-l i nes sabo-
tage mi ssi ons. Hundreds of
Koreans fl oated down on ni ght
drops i nto the bl ack hol e of
But when the final cease-fire was concluded in June 1953, the
last radio message to reach the Liaison Division from Green
Dragon was a curse.
US Army HUMINT in Korean War
Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2011) 67
North Korea and were never
heard from agai n. I n 1952, the
8240th had paradropped Mus-
tang Ranger teams of parti -
sans behi nd enemy l i nes on
hal f-a-dozen occasi ons to attack
enemy r ai l r oad l i nes. The
teams vari ed i n si ze from fi ve to
20 men. They al l met the same
fate. After the Green Dragon
operati on had commenced,
addi ti onal l arge sabotage teams
drawn from the ranks of the 1st
PAI R wer e sent i n. None
survi ved.
39

I n 1951 and 1952, the Far
East Ai r Force had dropped
some 200 sabotage agents of i ts
own on 19 separate mi ssi ons
di rected agai nst North Korean
faci l i ti es. The agents accom-
pl i shed practi cal l y nothi ng, and
onl y one party ever returned
safel y to UN l i nes. Despi te
these unpromi si ng precedents,
the Li ai son Detachments Guer-
ri l l a Di vi si on had l ai d pl ans i n
the spri ng of 1953 to use the 1st
PAI R's Southwi nd el ement i n
yet another attempt at mount-
i ng sabotage operati ons. I t pro-
posed to parachute i n 48 two-
man teams to bl ow up North
Korean rai l roads. Perhaps for-
tunatel y for al l concerned, the
mi ssi on was never
i mpl emented.
40

The fai l ure of the Green
Dragon operati on di d not
become apparent unti l the
fi ghti ng had ended. Thus, dur-
i ng the fi rst part of 1953, the
Li ai son Detachment was
encouraged to l ay down pl ans
for an ambi ti ous and greatl y
expanded program of guerri l l a
warfare. I n addi ti on to bui l di ng
up the 1st PAI R, the Detach-
ment expanded two of i ts ori gi -
nal regi ments to provi de
addi ti onal for ces for seabor ne
rai ds and assaul ts. The over-
strength 1st Parti san I nfantry
Regi ment was spl i t up, al l ow-
i ng the formati on of a new 6th
Parti san I nfantry Regi ment. I n
si mi l ar fashi on, the 2d Par ti -
san I nfantry Regi ment contri b-
uted personnel to for m a new
5th Par ti san I nfantr y Regi -
ment. The r egi ment based on
the Korean east coast, the 3d
Parti san I nfantry, was too smal l
to break up i n thi s way, but i ts
members were gi ven ai rborne
trai ni ng. (There was no 4th
Parti san I nfantry Regi ment,
because Kor eans al l egedl y asso-
ci ated the number four wi th
bad l uck.)
41

A Smal l Army
As a resul t of these prepara-
ti ons, the Li ai son Detachment
had fi el ded what amounted to
i ts own Korean Ar my by the
ti me of the Jul y 1953 ceasefi re.
The si x-regi ment force had a
str ength of mor e than 17,000
troops. The smal l Ameri can
cadre assi gned to the parti sans
i ncl uded 55 personnel from the
Army's newl y organi zed 10th
Speci al Forces Group.
Thi s guer r i l l a army possessed
300 trucks and trai l er s; was
equi pped wi th i ts own frei ght-
er s, crash boats, and fi shi ng
vessel s; and consumed 7,500
tons of suppl i es a month. Ri ce
accounted for the bul k of the
suppl y al l otment; each parti -
san was i ssued 100 pounds a
month, some for personal con-
sumpti on, the rest for barter.
The parti sans al so had thei r
own chapl ai ns, band, and trav-
el l i ng entertai nment troupe.
The Li ai son Detachment even
publ i shed a house magazi ne for
them, The Parachute.
42

Al l thi s was somethi ng of a
tri umph for Ameri can-styl e
organi zati on. There were, how-
ever, some l i abi l i ti es. Under-
standabl y, there was a cer tai n
ri val ry between the Ameri can-
control l ed parti sans and the
regul ar ROK forces. Al so, the
par ti san oper ati on had swol l en
to such a si ze that some now
questi oned i ts effecti veness.
Whi l e par ti san rai ders had
served as a useful adjunct to
UN forces, thei r val ue when
used i n l arge conventi onal uni ts
was open to di spute, especi al l y
because of the nature of thei r
trai ni ng and equi pment.
The questi on was never ful l y
resol ved. A ceasefi re occurred
before the new parti san struc-
ture coul d be commi tted to bat-
tl e, the guerri l l as were forced to
evacuate thei r i sl and bases,
whi ch l ay north of the Demi l i ta-
ri zed Zone now demarcati ng
The KLO and its successor organizations, the 442d CIC De-
tachment and the Far East Command Liaison Detachment, Ko-
rea, occupy a unique place in the history of Army intelligence.
US Army HUMINT in Korean War
68 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2011)
North and South Korea, and
most of the parti san uni ts were
di sbanded.
a 43

Psywar Acti vi ty
I n 1953, the Detachment al so
expanded i ts responsi bi l i ti es to
i ncl ude psychol ogi cal warfare,
or psywar. Thi s mi ght seem to
be an odd area of i nvol vement
for what began as an i ntel l i -
gence organi zati on, but there
were precedents. The OSS had
conducted psychol ogi cal war-
fare oper ati ons i n Wor l d War I I ,
and Army doctri ne cl osel y
l i nked covert operati ons and
psychol ogi cal warfare. By mi d-
1953, the Li ai son Detachment
was provi di ng cl assroom trai n-
i ng to Koreans i n psychol ogi cal
warfare and prepari ng propa-
ganda l eafl ets for di str i buti on
i n the enemy rear. I n addi ti on,
i t was usi ng propaganda to sus-
tai n the moral e of i ts own
parti sans.
44

Eval uati on
The KLO and i ts successor
organi zati ons, the 442d CI C
Detachment and the Far East
Command Li ai son Detach-
ment, Korea, occupy a uni que
pl ace i n the hi story of Army
i ntel l i gence. The KLO started
out as a smal l r esi dual FECOM
i ntel l i gence presence i n Korea,
i ncr eased i n scope as a r esul t of
the North Korean i nvasi on, and
then was redesi gnated and fur-
ther expanded duri ng the dark-
est days of the war. Ul ti matel y,
i t was redesi gnated once more
and gi ven responsi bi l i ty for the
whol e Army covert and cl andes-
ti ne effort i n Korea. I ts parti cu-
l ar pattern of organi zati on,
however, woul d not provi de an
operati onal model for Army
i ntel l i gence i n the future. The
Li ai son Detachments structure
was r evamped al most as soon
as the fi ghti ng i n Korea ended.
Essenti al l y, the Li ai son
Detachment was a creature of
the Korean war. I ts efforts pro-
duced a certai n l ong-term
i mpact: the Army was made
aware of the potenti al i ti es for
conducti ng posi ti ve human
i ntel l i gence col l ecti on i n peace
as wel l as war. Moreover, cer-
tai n Speci al Forces operati ons
i n Vi etnam woul d l ater paral -
l el , but not repl i cate, Li ai son
Detachment acti vi ti es i n Korea.
General l y, however, the organi -
zati ons accompl i shments and
the l essons l earned from them
went down a hi stori cal memory
hol e and passed i nto obl i vi on
al ong wi th other aspects of
Ameri cas forgotten war i n
Korea.
45


a
Evanhoe fel t that exacerbati ng thi s
ri val r y was the l arge i nfl ux of South
Korean ci ti zens i nto par ti san r anks whose
onl y r eason for vol unteeri ng was to escape
bei ng dr afted i nto the South Kor ean
Army, as wel l as the fact that Many of
those r ecrui ted wer e pi mps, thi eves, and
other undesi r abl es who were hi di ng fr om
South Korean authori ti es and wanted to
use duty wi th the par ti sans to escape.
Endnotes
1. John K. Si ngl aub, Hazardous Duty: An American Soldier in the Twentieth
Century (New York: Summi t Books, 1991), 15666.
2. Bruce W. Bi dwel l , Hi story of the Mi l i tary I ntel l i gence Di vi si on, War
Department General Staff, (US Army Center of Mi l i tary Hi story unpubl i shed
ms., Vol . VI I , Chapter I I I ), 22.
3. On the overal l unreadi ness of the Ei ghth Army i n the summer of 1950, see
Cl ay Bl ai r, The Forgotten War: America in Korea, 19501953 (New York: Ti mes
Books, 1987), 4850.
4. US Army I ntel l i gence Center, Hi story of the Counter I ntel l i gence Corps,
Vol ume I : I ntroducti on and Background, (Unpubl i shed ms., 1959), 101.
5. Offi ce of the Assi stant Chi ef of Staff, G-2, GHQ FEC, Hi stori cal Report, 1
January-30 October 1950, 103, RG 338, NARA; Assi stant Chi ef of Staff, G-2,
Summary of Major Acti vi ti es Rel ati ng to the Korean Confl i ct, 25 June 1950-8
US Army HUMINT in Korean War
69 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2011)
September 1951, US Army Center of Mi l i tary Hi story; S.L.A. Marshal l , The
River and the Gauntlet: Defeat of the Eighth Army by the Chinese Communist
Forces, November 1950, in the Battle of the Chongchon River, Korea (Nashvi l l e:
Battery Press, 1987), 5.
6. S.L.A. Marshal l , The River and the Gauntlet, 34, and authors i ntervi ew
wi th Russel l K. Lei ck, 20 January 1985.
7. S.L.A. Marshal l , The River and the Gauntlet, 5; 442d Counter I ntel l i gence
Corps Detachment, Hi stori cal Report, 1 March 1951, RG 319, NARA; and Ed
Evanhoe, Darkmoon: Eighth Army Special Operations in the Korean War
(Annapol i s: Naval I nsti tute Press, 1995), 13.
8. Roy E. Appl eman, United States Army in the Korean War: South to the Nak-
tong, North to the Yalu (Washi ngton, DC: Offi ce of the Chi ef of Mi l i tary Hi s-
tory, 1961), 761.
9. I bi d., 753, 76164.
10. I bi d., 76970; Hi stori cal Report, 442d CI C Detachment, 1 March 1951, RG
319, NARA.
11. James F. Schnabel , United States Army in the Korean War: Policy and
Direction: The First Year (Washi ngton, DC: Offi ce of the Chi ef of Mi l i tary Hi s-
tory, 1972), 278.
12. Soldier: The Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway, as told to Harold H. Martin
(Westport: Greenwood Pr ess, 1974), 205; Roy E. Appl eman, Ridgway Duels for
Korea (Col l ege Stati on: Texas A&M Press, 1990), 312.
13. Memorandum for Record, Far East Command Li ai son Group, 17 December
1950; Command Report, 442d CI C Detachment,1 January 1951, RG 319,
NARA.
14. GO 86, GHQ FEC, 8 December 50-AMENDED by GO 87, GHQ FEC, 11
December 50; Foreword, Hi stori cal Report, 442d CI C Detachment,1 March
1951, RG 319, NARA.
15. Command Report-December 1950, 442d CI C Detachment.
16. I bi d. and authors i ntervi ew wi th Wi nston J. Morgan, 30 January 1985.
17. Hi stori cal Report, 442d CI C Detachment, 1 March 1951.
18. I bi d.; Hi stori cal Reports, 442d CI C Detachment, Apri l 1951, May 1951,
June 1951, RG 319, NARA.
19. Memorandum for Record, Far East Command Li ai son Group, 17 December
1950; Command Report-December 1950, 442d CI C Detachment; Hi stori cal
Report, 442d CI C Detachment, June 1951, RG 319, NARA; and Hi stori cal
Report, 442d CI C Detachment, Apri l 1951, RG 319, NARA.
20. Hi stori cal Reports, 442d CI C Detachment, Apri l 1951, May 1951, Jul y
1951, RG 319, NARA.
21. Schnabel , United States Army in the Korean War.
22. GO 53, GHQ FEC, 24 Jul y 1951; Hi stori cal Report, Far East Command
Li ai son Detachment, Korea (FEC/LD(K)), 8240th Army Uni t, 1 August 1951.
Ei ght Navy personnel were assi gned to the uni t i n a temporary duty status.
23. Hi stori cal Reports, FEC/LD (K), 1 September 1951, 1
24. Hi stori cal Report, FEC/LD (K), l November 1951.
25. I bi d.
Endnotes (cont.)
US Army HUMINT in Korean War
70 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2011)
26. Hi stori cal Reports, FEC/LD (K), 1 August 1951, 1 November 1951.
27. Guerilla Warfare and Airpower in Korea, 19501953 (Maxwel l Ai r Force Base,
Aerospace Studi es I nsti tute, 1964), 6472; Al fred H. Paddock, Jr., US Army Spe-
cial Warfare: I ts Origins: Psychological and Unconventional Warfare, 19411952
(Washi ngton, DC: Nati onal Defense Uni versi ty Press, 1982), 103.
28. Guerrilla Warfare and Airpower in Korea, 86; Paddock, US Army Special War-
fare, 103. One knowl edgeabl e Army offi cer di smi ssed CCRAK as a hodgepodge
i ntel l i gence operati on. Si ngl aub, Hazardous Duty, 18182.
29. Guerrilla Warfare and Airpower in Korea, 86.
30. Hi stori cal Report, FEC/LD (K), 1 Apri l 1953, RG 319, NARA.
31. I bi d.
32. I bi d.
33. Hi stori cal Report, FEC/LD (K), 1 March 1952; Combat Command Report,
Summary of Operati ons, I ntel l i gence Di vi si on, FEC/LD (K), 1 June 1953, RG 319,
NARA.
34. Guerrilla Warfare and Airpower in Korea, 6465, 7071, 8084.
35. I bi d., 89; Hi stori cal Reports, FEC/LD (K), 1 November 1951, 1 March 1952, RG
319, NARA.
36. Hi stori cal Report, FEC/LD(K), 1 March 1952; Monthl y Command Report, HQ,
Parti san Command, FEC/LD (K), 4 Apri l 1953, RG 319, NARA.
37. Guerrilla Warfare and Airpower in Korea, 9699.
38. I bi d., 148150.
39. Evanhoe, Darkmoon, 15760.
40. Guerrilla Warfare and Airpower in Korea, 14650.
41. Monthl y Command Report, HQ Parti san Command, FEC/LD (K), 4 Apri l 1953.
42. I bi d.; Combat Command Report, Summary of Operati ons, I ntel l i gence Di vi -
si on, FEC/LD (K), 1 June 1953; Command Report No. 7, FEC/LD (K), 6 August
1953, RG 319, NARA.
43. Evanhoe, Darkmoon, 163. Combat Command Report, Summary of Operati ons,
I ntel l i gence Di vi si on, FEC/LD (K), 1 June 1953; Paddock, US Army Speci al War-
fare, p. 103; Command Report No. 7, FEC/LD (K), 6 August 1953.
44. Monthl y Command Report, HQ Parti san Command, FEC/LD (K), 4 Apri l 1953.
45. Command Report, FEC/LD (K), September 1953, 1 October 1953, RG 319,
NARA; GO 269, HQ USAFE, 27 September 53; Ri chard H. Shul tz, Jr., The Secret
War Against Hanoi: Kennedy's and J ohnson's Use of Spies, Saboteurs, and Covert
Warriors in North Vietnam (New York: HarperCol l i ns, 1999), passi m; John P.
Fi nnegan, The Army Lineage Series: Military I ntelligence (Washi ngton, DC: US
Army Center of Mi l i tary Hi story, 1998), 12427.

Endnotes (cont.)