ATTY.

MARCIANO DELSON - 4C CIV REV 2ND SET OF DIGESTS

1. Ladera vs. Hodges TOPIC:
ISSUE: WON the house built on a land owned by another, should be regarded in law as immovable property
HELD: Yes. The civil code enumerates among the things declared by it as immovable property the following: lands, buildings,
roads and constructions of all kind adhered to the soil. The law does not make any distinction whether or not the owner of the
lot is the one who built. Also, since the principles of accession regard buildings and constructions as mere accessories to the
land on which it is built, it is logical that said accessories should partake the nature of the principal thing.
2. Mindanao Bus. Co vs Cit
!ssessor and Treasurer
TOPIC: CL!SSI"IC!TIO# O" P$OPE$TY
ISSUE: Whether the Ta !ourt erred in its interpretation of paragraph " of Art. #$" of the N!!, and holding that pursuant
thereto, the movable e%uipments are taable realties, by reason of their being intended or destined for use in an industry.
$ULI#%:
&'(. )ovable e%uipment, to be immobili*ed in contemplation of Art. #$" of the N!!, must be the essential and principal
elements of an industry or works which are carried on in a building or on a piece of land. Thus, where the business is one of
transportation , which is carried on without a repair or service shop, and it+s rolling e%uipment is repaired or serviced in a shop
belonging to another, the tools and e%uipment in its repair shop which appear movable are merely incidentals and may not be
considered immovables, and, hence, not sub,ect assessment as real estate for purposes of the real estate ta.
ATTY. MARCIANO DELSON - 4C CIV REV 2ND SET OF DIGESTS
&. Ma'ati Leasing and "inan(e
Cor) vs *earever Te+ti,es
TO-.!: !lassification of -roperty
.((/': Whether or not the machinery is a real property
0'12: NO. .t must be pointed out that the characteri*ation of the sub,ect machinery as chattel by the private respondent is
indicative of intention and impresses upon the property the character determined by the parties. As stated in (tandard Oil !o. of
New &ork v. 3aramillo, ## -hil. 456, it is undeniable that the parties to a contract may by agreement treat as personal property
that which by nature would be real property, as long as no interest of third parties would be pre,udiced thereby. The status of the
sub,ect machinery as movable or immovable was never placed in issue before the lower court and the !A. )oreover, even
granting that the charge is true, such fact alone does not render a contract void ab initio, but can only be a ground for rendering
said contract voidable, or annullable pursuant to Article $576 of the new !ivil !ode, by a proper action in court. There is nothing
on record to show that the mortgage has been annulled. Neither is it disclosed that steps were taken to nullify the same. On the
other hand, as pointed out by petitioner and again not refuted by respondent, the latter has indubitably benefited from said
contract. '%uity dictates that one should not benefit at the epense of another. -rivate respondent could not now therefore, be
allowed to impugn the efficacy of the chattel mortgage after it has benefited therefrom.
-. Santos Evange,ista vs. !,to
Suret Insuran(e
.((/':
0'12:.t is true that the parties to a deed of chattel mortgage may agree to consider a house as personal property for purposes
of said contract. 0owever, this view is good only insofar as the contracting parties are concerned. .t is based, partly, upon the
principle of estoppel. Neither this principle, nor said view, is applicable to strangers to said contract. )uch less is it in point
where there has been no contract whatsoever, with respect to the status of the house involved, as in the case at bar.
ATTY. MARCIANO DELSON - 4C CIV REV 2ND SET OF DIGESTS
.. Tsai vs C! .ssue: whether or not the machineries mortgaged by 'verte to -8!O) can be considered as immovable property9
0eld: No. While it is true that the controverted properties appear to be immobile :bolted or cemented on the real property
mortgaged;, a perusal of the contract of real and chattel )ortgage eecuted by the parties states so otherwise, as it can be
ascertained that the true intention of -8!O) and 'verte is to treat such machineries and e%uipment as chattels. An
immovable may be considered a personal property if there is a stipulation as when it is used as security in the payment of an
obligation where a chattel mortgage is eecuted over it.
/. Serg0s Produ(ts vs PCI
Leasing and "inan(e
1. Burgo2 Sr. vs. C3ie4 o4 Sta5 TOPIC: C,assi6(ation o4 Pro)ert
Issue: whether or not petitioners+ assertion that real properties were sei*ed under the disputed warrants is correct
He,d: /nder Article #$"<"= of the !ivil !ode of the -hilippines, >machinery, receptables, instruments or implements intended by
the owner of the tenement for an industry or works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land and which tend
directly to meet the needs of the said industry or works> are considered immovable property. .n 2avao (awmill !o. v. !astillo 7
where this legal provision was invoked, this !ourt ruled that machinery which is movable by nature becomes immobili*ed when
placed by the owner of the tenement, property or plant, but not so when placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or any other person
having only a temporary right, unless such person acted as the agent of the owner.
ATTY. MARCIANO DELSON - 4C CIV REV 2ND SET OF DIGESTS
7. Lo)e8 vs Orosa2 9r. IMMO:!BLE P$OPE$TY ;!$T. -1.<
Issue: Whether or not the building and the land are inseparable and whether or not petitioner can obtain a lien on the land as
well
$u,ing: 8oth no. ?or while it is true that generally, real estate connotes the land and the building constructed thereon, it is
obvious that the inclusion of the building, separate and distinct from the land, in the enumeration of what may constitute real
properties could mean only one thing @ that a building is by itself an immovable property, a doctrine already pronounced by
this !ourt in the case of 1eung &ee vs. (trong )achinery !o., 5A -hil., 4##. )oreover, and in view of the absence of any
specific provision of law to the contrary, a building is an immovable property, irrespective of whether or not said structure and
the land on which it is adhered to belong to the same owner.
=. Ya) vs. Ta>ada TOPIC: Article #$" of the !ivil !ode, -aragraph 5: 'verything attached to an immovable in a fied manner, in such a way that it
cannot be separated therefrom without breaking the material or deterioration of the ob,ect.
.ssue: Whether or not the erred in declining to annul the eecution sale of the pump and accessories sub,ect of the action
although made without the re%uisite notice prescribed for the sale of immovables9
0eld: No, the !ivil !ode considers as immovable property, among others, anything >attached to an immovable in a fied
manner, in such a way that it cannot be separated therefrom without breaking the material or deterioration of the ob,ect.> The
pump does not fit this description. .t could be, and was in fact separated from &ap+s premises without being broken or suffering
deterioration. Obviously the separation or removal of the pump involved nothing more complicated than the loosening of bolts
or dismantling of other fasteners.
ATTY. MARCIANO DELSON - 4C CIV REV 2ND SET OF DIGESTS
1?. Ma(3iner and Engineering
Su)),ies2 In( vs. C!
TOPIC: C,assi6(ation o4 Pro)ert
.((/': Whether the remedy of Beplevin may be applied to personal property
0eld: The special civil action of replevin is applicable only to personal property. When the machinery and e%uipment in %uestion
appeared to be attached to the land, particularly to the concrete foundation of said premises, in a fied manner, in such a way
that the former could not be separated from the latter without breaking the material or deterioration of the ob,ect, it had become
an immovable property under Art. #$":5;.
11. Laure, vs %ar(ia Topic: public property
ISSUE: whether or not public property intended for public use has become patrimonial property because the lot has been .dle
for some years9
HELD:
The fact that the Boppongi site has not been used for a long time for actual 'mbassy service doesnCt automatically convert it to
patrimonial property. Any such conversion happens only if the property is withdrawn from public use. A property continues to be
part of the public domain, not available for private appropriation or ownership until there is a formal declaration on the part of
the government to withdraw it from being such.
ATTY. MARCIANO DELSON - 4C CIV REV 2ND SET OF DIGESTS
12. $a@u(o vs :i,,egas Topic: property in relation to whom it belongs
.ssue: Whether Bepublic Act 5$D6 which converted the lot in %uestion >which are reserved as communal property> into
>disposable or alienable lands of the (tateE is unconstitutional for depriving the !ity of )anila of the lots and providing for their
sale in subdivided small lots to bona fide occupants or tenants without payment of ,ust compensation
Buling: BA 5$D6 is constitutional. The lots in %uestion are owned by the !ity of )anila in its public and governmental capacity
and are therefore public property over which !ongress has absolute control as distinguished from patrimonial property owned
by it which cannot be deprived from the !ity without ,ust compensation and without due process. BA 5$D6 epressly provides
that the properties are reserved for the purpose of communal property and ordered its conversion into disposable and alienable
lands of the state to be sold to its bona fide occupants. .t has been an established doctrine that the state reserves its rights to
classify its property under its legislative prerogative and the court cannot interfere on such power of the state.
1&. Ma(asiano vs Dio'no .ssue:
Whether or not an ordinance or resolution issued by the municipal council of -araFa%ue authori*ing the lease and use of public
streets or thoroughfares as sites for flea markets is valid.
0eld:
Not valid. -roperties of the local government which are devoted to public service are deemed public and are under the absolute
control of !ongress. 0ence, local governments have no authority whatsoever to control or regulate the use of public properties
unless specific authority is vested upon them by !ongress.
ATTY. MARCIANO DELSON - 4C CIV REV 2ND SET OF DIGESTS
1-. $e)u@,i( vs. C! Topic: -roperty in Belation to whom it belongs :Articles #$7G#D";
Issues:
$. Whether or not lease andHor mortgage of a portion of a realty ac%uired through free patent constitute sufficient ground
for the nullification of such land grant9
D. Whether or not such property should revert to the (tate once it is invaded by the sea and thus becomes foreshore
land9
He,d:
$. 8y epress provision of (ection $$I of !ommonwealth Act $#$ and in conformity with the policy of the law, any
transfer or alienation of a free patent or homestead within five years from the issuance of the patent is
proscribed. (uch transfer nullifies said alienation and constitutes a cause for the reversion of the property to the (tate.
The prohibition against any alienation or encumbrance of the land grant is a proviso attached to the approval of every
application. -rior to the fulfillment of the re%uirements of law, Bespondent )orato had only an inchoate right to the
propertyJ such property remained part of the public domain and, therefore, not susceptible to alienation or
encumbrance. !onversely, when a Khomesteader has complied with all the terms and conditions which entitled him to
a patent for <a= particular tract of public land, he ac%uires a vested interest therein and has to be regarded an e%uitable
owner thereof. 0owever, for Bespondent )oratoCs title of ownership over the patented land to be perfected, she should
have complied with the re%uirements of the law, one of which was to keep the property for herself and her family within
the prescribed period of five :"; years. -rior to the fulfillment of all re%uirements of the law, Bespondent )oratoCs title
over the property was incomplete. Accordingly, if the re%uirements are not complied with, the (tate as the grantor
could petition for the annulment of the patent and the cancellation of the title.
D. Befer to Art.#D6
When the sea moved towards the estate and the tide invaded it, the invaded property became foreshore land and passed to the
realm of the public domain. .n fact, the !ourt in Lovernment vs. !abangis annulled the registration of land sub,ect of cadastral
proceedings when the parcel subse%uently became foreshore land. .n another case, the !ourt voided the registration decree of
a trial court and held that said court had no ,urisdiction to award foreshore land to any private person or entity. The sub,ect land
in this case, being foreshore land, should therefore be returned to the public domain.
ATTY. MARCIANO DELSON - 4C CIV REV 2ND SET OF DIGESTS
1.. Provin(e o4 AaB@uanga de,
#orte vs Cit o4 AaB@oanga
TO-.!: -roperty of -ublic 2ominion
ISSUE: What is the nature of the 50 lots and building in question. (For the purpose of determining whih among these
properties shall be owned b! the "ro#ine of $amboanga% and whih shall be owned b! the &it! of $amboanga.'
(E)*:
The principle is this: If the property is owned by the municipal corporation or municipality in its
public and governmental capacity, the property is public and Congress has absolute control over it;
if the property is owned in its private or proprietary capacity, then it is patrimonial and Congress
has no absolute control, in which case, the municipality cannot be deprived of it without due
process and payment of just compensation.
The !ivil !ode classification is found in articles #D5 and #D# of the same !ode. /nder Art. #D#, property for public, use,
consists of provincial roads, city streets, municipal streets, the s%uares, fountains, public waters, promenades and public works
for public service paid for by said municipal corporations. All other property possessed by any of them is patrimonial and is
governed by the !ode without pre,udice to provisions of special laws. /nder this classification, all the properties in %uestion
save two lots used as 0igh (chool playgrounds are patrimonial properties of Mamboanga -rovinceJ this includes the capitol
site, the hospital and leprosarium sites, and the school sites which are patrimonial as they are not for public use. They fall
outside the phrase >public works for public service> because under the e,usdem generis rule, such public works must be for free
and for the indiscriminate use by anyone.
Bepublic Act 5657 :Act authori*ing transfer of buildings, properties, and assets of -rov. Of Mamboanga to !ity of Mamboanga;
is valid insofar as it affects the lots used as capitol site, school sites and its grounds, hospital and leprosarium sites and the high
school playground sites @ a total of D# lots @ since these were held by the former Mamboanga province in its governmental
capacity and therefore are sub,ect to the absolute control of !ongress.
$4. !haves vs -ublio 'states
$A. Nillarico vs. (armiento
ATTY. MARCIANO DELSON - 4C CIV REV 2ND SET OF DIGESTS
17. 9avier vs. :eriadiano TOPIC: Con(e)t o4 OCners3i)
ISSUE: Whether or not a (oB),aint 4or Duieting o4 tit,e and re(over o4 )ossession Cit3 daBages should be
dismissed based on the ground of res ,udicata, citing an earlier decision of dismissal of a (oB),aint 4or 4or(i@,e entr
HELD:
#O. There being no identity of causes of action between !ivil !ase No. 7D4 :complaint for forcible entry; and !ivil !ase No.
DD65G6 :complaint for %uieting of title and recovery of possession with damages;, the prior complaint cannot bar the subse%uent
complaint. !ivil !ase No. 7D4 is a complaint for forcible entry, where what is at issue is prior possession, regardless of who
has lawful title over the disputed property. A ,udgment rendered in a case for recovery of possession is conclusive only on the
%uestion of possession and not on the ownership. .t does not in any way bind the title or affect the ownership of the land or
building. On the other hand, !ivil !ase No. DD65G6 while inaccurately captioned as an action for >Ouieting of Title and
Becovery of -ossession with 2amages> is in reality an action to recover a parcel of land or an accion reivindicatoria under Art.
#5# of the !ivil !ode, and should be distinguished from !ivil !ase No. 7D4, which is an accion interdictal. Accion reivindicatoria
or accion de reivindicacion is an action whereby plaintiff alleges ownership over a parcel of land and seeks recovery of its full
possession. .t is different from accion interdictal or accion publiciana where plaintiff merely alleges proof of a better right to
possess without claim of title. Thus, this !ourt has ruled that a ,udgment in forcible entry or detainer case disposes of no other
issue than possession and declares only who has the right of possession, but by no means constitute a bar to an action for
determination of who has the right or title of ownership. There being no identity of causes of action between !ivil !ase No. 7D4
and !ivil !ase No. DD65G6, the prior complaint for e,ectment cannot bar the subse%uent action for recovery, or petition to %uiet
title.
ATTY. MARCIANO DELSON - 4C CIV REV 2ND SET OF DIGESTS
1=. Bustos vs C! TO-.!: Bights included in ownership
.((/': Whether or not spouses 8ustos can be e,ected from the land
B/1.NL: No. The stay of eecution is warranted by the fact that petitioners are now legal owners of the land in %uestion and
are occupants thereof. To eecute the ,udgment by e,ecting petitioners from the land that they owned would certainly result in
grave in,ustice. 8esides, the issue of possession was rendered moot when the court ad,udicated ownership to the spouses
8ustos by virtue of a valid deed of sale. -lacing petitioners in possession of the land in %uestion is the necessary and logical
conse%uence of the decision declaring them as the rightful owners of the property. One of the essential attributes of ownership
is possession. .t follows that as owners of the sub,ect property, petitioners are entitled to possession of the same. >An owner
who cannot eercise the seven >+,uses> or attributes of ownership @ the right to possess, to use and en,oy, to abuse or
consume, to accessories, to dispose or alienate, to recover or vindicate and to the fruits @ is a crippled owner.>
ATTY. MARCIANO DELSON - 4C CIV REV 2ND SET OF DIGESTS
2?. Heirs o4 $oBan Soriano vs
C!
Topic: !oncept of Ownership :Bights included in ownership;
.ssue: )ay a winning party in a land registration case effectively e,ect the possessor thereof, whose security of tenure rights are
still pending determination before the 2ABA89
0eld: No. A person may be declared owner but he may not be entitled to possession. The possession may be in the hands of
another either as a lessee or a tenant. A person may have improvements thereon of which he may not be deprived without due
hearing. 0e may have other valid defenses to resist surrender of possession. A ,udgment for ownership, therefore, does not
necessarily include possession as a necessary incident.
.t is important to note that although private respondents have been declared titled owners of the sub,ect land, the eercise of
their rights of ownership are sub,ect to limitations that may be imposed by law.<A= The Tenancy Act provides one such limitation.
Agricultural lessees are entitled to security of tenure and they have the right to work on their respective landholdings once the
leasehold relationship is established. (ecurity of tenure is a legal concession to agricultural lessees which they value as life
itself and deprivation of their landholdings is tantamount to deprivation of their only means of livelihood.<I= The eercise of the
right of ownership, then, yields to the eercise of the rights of an agricultural tenant.
21. %ar(ia vs. C!
ATTY. MARCIANO DELSON - 4C CIV REV 2ND SET OF DIGESTS
22. $odi, Enter)rises2 In( vs C! Topic: OWN'B(0.-
.ssue:
WON the Bepublic has the right to e,ect usurpers of the sub,ect leased property.
Buling:
The owner has the right to en,oy and dispose of a thing, without other limitations than those established by law. 'very owner
has the freedom of disposition over his property. .t is an attribute of ownership, and this rule has no eception. The B'-/81.!
being the owner of the disputed property en,oys the prerogative to enter into a lease contract with BO2.1 in the eercise of
its ,us disponendi. 0ence, as lessor, the B'-/81.! has the right to e,ect usurpers of the leased property where the factual
elements re%uired for relief in an action for unlawful detainer are present.PPP
ATTY. MARCIANO DELSON - 4C CIV REV 2ND SET OF DIGESTS
2&. Isaguirre vs De Lara Topic: Ownership
.((/'(:
:a; whether or not the mortgagee in an e%uitable mortgage has the right to retain possession of the property pending
actual payment to him of the amount of indebtedness by the mortgagorJ and
:b; whether or not petitioner can be considered a builder in good faith with respect to the improvements he made on the
property before the transaction was declared to be an e%uitable mortgage.
He,d:
:a; A mortgage is a contract entered into in order to secure the fulfillment of a principal obligation. .t is constituted by
recording the document in which it appears with the proper Begistry of -roperty, although, even if it is not recorded, the
mortgage is nevertheless binding between the parties. Thus, the only right granted by law in favor of the mortgagee is
to demand the eecution and the recording of the document in which the mortgage is formali*ed. As a general rule, the
mortgagor retains possession of the mortgaged property since a mortgage is merely a lien and title to the property does
not pass to the mortgagee. 0owever, even though a mortgagee does not have possession of the property, there is no
impairment of his security since the mortgage directly and immediately sub,ects the property upon which it is imposed,
whoever the possessor may be, to the fulfillment of the obligation for whose security it was constituted.
:b; With regard to the improvements made on the mortgaged property, we confirm the !ourt of AppealsC characteri*ation of
petitioner as a possessor in bad faith. 8ased on the factual findings of the appellate court, it is evident that petitioner
knew from the very beginning that there was really no sale and that he held respondentCs property as mere security for
the payment of the loan obligation. Therefore, petitioner may claim reimbursement only for necessary epensesJ
however, he is not entitled to reimbursement for any useful epenses which he may have incurred.
ATTY. MARCIANO DELSON - 4C CIV REV 2ND SET OF DIGESTS
2-. Custodio vs C! Topic: Ownership
.ssue:
Whether the the spouses are liable for damages for enclosing their property
0eld:
'very owner has an absolute right over his property and his act of fencing and enclosing the same was an act which he
may lawfully perform in the employment and eercise of said right. Whatever in,ury or damage that may have been sustained
by others by reason of the rightful use of the said land by the owner is daBnuB a@sDue inEuria.
2.. !@eEaron vs #a@asa
ATTY. MARCIANO DELSON - 4C CIV REV 2ND SET OF DIGESTS
2/. %erBan ManageBent and
Servi(es vs C!
TOPIC: DOCT$I#E O" SEL" HELP
.ssue:
WON the doctrine of self help applies.
0eld:
No. 8oth the )unicipal Trial !ourt and the Begional Trial !ourt have rationali*ed petitioner+s drastic action of bulldo*ing and
destroying the crops of private respondents on the basis of the doctrine of selfGhelp enunciated in Article #D7 of the New !ivil
!ode. <-etitioner allegedly already has title over the land= (uch ,ustification is unavailing because the doctrine of selfGhelp can
only be eercised at the time of actual or threatened dispossession which is absent in the case at bar. <(ince it was actually
private respondents who were occupying the land for almost $" years already= When possession has already been lost, the
owner must resort to ,udicial process for the recovery of property. This is clear from Article "54 of the !ivil !ode which states,
>:.;n no case may possession be ac%uired through force or intimidation as long as there is a possessor who ob,ects thereto. 0e
who believes that he has an action or right to deprive another of the holding of a thing, must invoke the aid of the competent
court, if the holder should refuse to deliver the thing.>
21. Caisi) vs Peo),e
TOPIC: Art. 429
Issue: WON acts of appellants are justifed under Art. 429
Held: Art 429, upon which appellants rely is obviously inapplicable to the case at bar, for, having been given D6 days from 3une
4, $7"7, within which to vacate 1ot $6"GA, complainant did not, on 3une $A, $7"7 @ or within said period @ invade or usurp
said lot. (he had merely reBained in possession thereof, even though the hacienda owner may have become its coG
possessor. Appellants did not >re)e, or )revent in actual or t3reatened ... physical invasion or usurpation.> They e+)e,,ed
Lloria from a property of which she and her husband were in possession even before the action for forcible entry was filed
against them on )ay $A, $7"I, despite the fact that the (heriff had eplicitly authori*ed them to stay in said property up to 3une
D4, $7"7, and had epressed the view that he could not oust them therefrom on 3une $A, $7"7, without a ,udicial order therefor.
ATTY. MARCIANO DELSON - 4C CIV REV 2ND SET OF DIGESTS
27. Peo),e sv P,et(3a
2=. !ndaBo vs I!C ;2 issues:
inEuring rig3ts and sur4a(e
rig3ts<
TOPIC: Use inEuring rig3ts o4 t3ird )ersonsF Sur4a(e $ig3ts
Issue:
Whether or not a corporation, which has built through its agents, waterpaths, water conductors and contrivances within its land,
thereby causing inundation and damage to an ad,acent land, can be held civilly liable for damages.
He,d:
&es. .t must be stressed that the use of one+s property is not without limitations. Article #5$ of the !ivil !ode provides that >the
owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such a manner as to in,ure the rights of a third person.> (.! /T'B' T/O /T
A1.'N/) NON 1A'2A(. )oreover, ad,oining landowners have mutual and reciprocal duties which re%uire that each must use
his own land in a reasonable manner so as not to infringe upon the rights and interests of others. Although we recogni*e the
right of an owner to build structures on his land, such structures must be so constructed and maintained using all reasonable
care so that they cannot be dangerous to ad,oining landowners and can withstand the usual and epected forces of nature. .f
the structures cause in,ury or damage to an ad,oining landowner or a third person, the latter can claim indemnification for the
in,ury or damage suffered.
&?. Ba(3ra(3 Motor Co vs
Ta,isaGSi,a Mi,,ing
TOPIC:
ISSUE: *O# LedesBa0s @onus is a (ivi, 4ruit
HELD:
T3e Court ru,ed t3at !rti(,e &.. o4 t3e Civi, Code;ta'e note t3at t3is (ase Cas de(ided in 1=&1 so t3e )rovisions
are di5erent noC< (onsiders t3ree t3ings as (ivi, 4ruits: 1< $ents o4 @ui,dings2 2< Pro(eeds 4roB ,eases o4 ,ands2
and &< in(oBe 4roB )er)etua, or ,i4e annuities or ot3er siBi,ar sour(es o4 revenue. It 3e,d t3at LedesBaHs @onus
Cas not (onsidered a (ivi, 4ruit. T3e aBount o4 t3e @onus Cas @ased u)on t3e tota, va,ue o4 t3e de@t se(ured2
C3i(3 is not (onsidered an in(oBe o4 t3e ,and.
ATTY. MARCIANO DELSON - 4C CIV REV 2ND SET OF DIGESTS
&1. EDuatoria, $ea,t vs
Ma4air T3eater
TO-.!:
.((/': Whether or not '%uatorial was the owner of the sub,ect property and could thus en,oy the fruits or rentals therefrom
0'12: NO. Bent is a civil fruit that belongs to the owner of the property producing it by right of accession. !onse%uently and
ordinarily, the rentals that fell due from the time of the perfection of the sale to petitioner until its rescission by final ,udgment
should belong to the owner of the property during that period. .n the case, there was no right of ownership transferred from
!armelo to '%uatorial in view of a patent failure to deliver the property to the buyer.
&2. Igna(io vs. Hi,ario To)i(: $ig3t o4 !((ession
Issue:
Whether or not 0ilario, the owner in good faith, may e,ect a builder in good faith without choosing either to appropriate the
building for himself after payment of its value or to sell his land to the builder in good faith.
He,d:
No. The owner of the building erected in good faith on a land owned by another, is entitled to retain the possession of the land
until he is paid the value of his building, under article #"5. The owner of the land, upon the other hand, has the option, under
article 54$, either to pay for the building or to sell his land to the owner of the building. 8ut he cannot, as respondents here did,
refuse both to pay for the building and to sell the land and compel the owner of the building to remove it from the land where it
is erected. 0e is entitled to such remotion only when, after having chosen to sell his land, the other party fails to pay for the
same. 8ut this is not the case before us.
ATTY. MARCIANO DELSON - 4C CIV REV 2ND SET OF DIGESTS
&&. Ignao vs InterBediate
!))e,,ate Court
TOPIC: !CCESSIO# I#DUST$I!L
ISSUE:
WON Art. ##I of the !ivil !ode should be applied in order to settle the dispute in this case.
HELD:
&es. .t is to be noted that the land in dispute used to be owned in common by the contending parties. Article ##I of the !ivil
!ode cannot apply where a coGowner builds, plants or sows on the land owned in common for then he did not build, plant or
sow upon land that eclusively belongs to another but of which he is a coGowner. The coGowner is not a third person under the
circumstances, and the situation is governed by the rules of coGownership. 0owever, when the coGownership is terminated by a
partition and it appears that the house of an erstwhile coGowner has encroached upon a portion pertaining to another coGowner
which was however made in good faith, then the provisions of Article ##I should apply to determine the respective rights of the
parties.PP
8oth the trial court and the Appellate !ourt erred when they peremptorily adopted the >workable solution> and ordered the
owner of the land, petitioner ?lorencio, to sell to private respondents, 3uan and .sidro, the part of the land they intruded upon,
thereby depriving petitioner of his right to choose. (uch ruling contravened the eplicit provisions of Article ##I to the effect that
>the owner of the land . . . shall have the right to appropriate . . . or to oblige the one who built . . . to pay the price of the
land . . .> The law is clear and unambiguous when it confers the right of choice upon the landowner and not upon the builder
and the courts.PPP
ATTY. MARCIANO DELSON - 4C CIV REV 2ND SET OF DIGESTS
&-. "i,i)inas Co,,ege In(. vs
%ar(ia TiB@ang2 et. a,
TO-.!: Accession .ndustrial
.((/'(:
$. WON the owner of the land could automatically ac%uire the improvements made by the builder in good faith when
the latter failed to pay for the land used when demanded by the landowner.
D. WON the landowner has recourse when the builder in good faith fails to comply with the chosen demand by the
landowner.
0'12:
$. The (upreme !ourt ruled in the negative. /nder the terms of Articles ##I and "#4 of the !ivil !ode, it is true that the
owner of the land has the right to choose between appropriating the building by reimbursing the builder of the value
thereof or compelling the builder in good faith to pay for his land. 'ven this second right cannot be eercised if the
value of the land is considerably more than that of the building. .n addition to the right of the builder to be paid the value
of his improvement, Article "#4 gives him the corollary right of retention of the property until he is indemnified by the
owner of the land. There is nothing in the language of these two articles which would ,ustify the conclusion that, upon
the failure of the builder to pay the value of the land, when such is demanded by the landowner, the latter becomes
automatically the owner of the improvement under Article ##" of the !ivil !ode.PP
D. The (upreme !ourt ruled in the affirmative. Where, as in the present case, the builder in good faith fails to pay the
value of the land when such is demanded by the landowner, the parties may resort to the following remedies: :$; The
parties may decide to leave things as they are and assume the retention of lessor and lessee, and should they disagree
as to the amount of rental, then they can go to the court to fi that amount J :D; (hould the parties not agree to assume
the relation of lessor and lessee, the owner of the land is entitled to have the improvement removedJ and :5; The land
and the improvement may be sold at public auction, applying the proceeds thereof first to the payment of the value of
the land and the ecess, if any to be delivered to the owner of the improvement in payment thereof.
ATTY. MARCIANO DELSON - 4C CIV REV 2ND SET OF DIGESTS
&.. Manoto' $ea,t vs Te(son TOPIC: !rt.--7
Issue: *O# t3e res)ondent is a @ui,der in good 4ait3I
$u,ing: #o2 To @e deeBed a @ui,der in good 4ait32 it is essentia, t3at a )erson assert tit,e to t3e ,and on C3i(3 3e
@ui,dsF i.e.2 t3at 3e @e a )ossessor in (on(e)t o4 oCner and t3at 3e @e unaCare Ht3at t3ere e+ists in 3is tit,e or
Bode o4 a(Duisition an JaC C3i(3 inva,idates it.H It is su(3 a @ui,der in good 4ait3 C3o is given t3e $ig3t to
retain t3e t3ing2 even as against t3e rea, oCner2 unti, 3e 3as @een reiB@ursed in 4u,, not on, 4or t3e ne(essar
e+)enses @ut a,so 4or use4u, e+)enses
ATTY. MARCIANO DELSON - 4C CIV REV 2ND SET OF DIGESTS
&/. Bernardo vs Bata(,an Topic: Accession !ontinuaJ Accession .ndustrial :Article ##I;
.ssue:
whether or not defendant 8aticlan still has the right of retention over the parcel of land
0eld:
No. The !ivil !ode confirms certain timeGhonored principles of the law of property. One of these is the principle of accession
whereby the owner of property ac%uires not only that which it produces but that which is united to it either naturally or artificially.
:Art. 5"5.; Whatever is built, planted or sown on the land of another, and the improvements or repairs made thereon, belong to
the owner of the land :art. 5"I;. Where, however, the planter, builder, or sower has acted in good faith, a conflict of rights arises
between the owners and it becomes necessary to protect the owner of the improvements without causing in,ustice to the owner
of the land. .n view of the impracticability of creating what )anresa calls a state of >forced coownership> :vol. 5, #th ed., p. D$5;,
the law has provided a ,ust and e%uitable solution by giving the owner of the land the option to ac%uire the improvements after
payment of the proper indemnity or to oblige the builder or planter to pay for the land and the sower to pay the proper rent :art.
54$;. .t is the owner of the land who is allowed to eercise the option because his right is older and because, by the principle of
accession, he is entitled to the ownership of the accessory thing :5 )anresa, #th ed., p. D$5;. .n the case before us, the plaintiff
8ernardo, as owner of the land, chose to re%uire the defendant, as owner of the improvements, to pay for the land. The law, as
we have already said, re%uires no more than that the owner of the land should choose between indemnifying the owner of the
improvements or re%uiring the latter to pay for the land. When he failed to pay for the land, the defendant 8aticlan herein lost
his right of retention.
ATTY. MARCIANO DELSON - 4C CIV REV 2ND SET OF DIGESTS
&1. Heirs o4 $aBon Durano2 Sr.
vs U
TO-.!:
.((/': WON T0' 0'.B( O? 2/BANO W'B' 8/.12'B( .N 8A2 ?A.T0.
0'12: &'(. A purchaser of a parcel of land, cannot close his eyes to facts which should put a reasonable man upon his guard,
such as when the property sub,ect of the purchase is in possession of persons other than the seller. A buyer who could not
have failed to know or discover the land sold to him was in adverse possession of another is a buyer in bad faith. .n the same
manner the purchase of the property of 2urano ... from 2urano !o. could not have to be in good faith. 8ecause it is not
disputed tat 2urano ... had ac%uired the property with full knowledge of spouses uy occupancy thereon. ?urther there even
appears to be undue haste in the conveyance of the property to 2urano ..., as bulldo*ing operations by 2urano and !o. were
still underway when the deed of sale to 2urano ... was eecuted on sept. $", $7A6H there was not even an indication 2urano
!o. attempted to transfer theregistration in its name before it conveyed to 2urano ...
&7. Ba,,atan vs C! TO-.!: Article ##I
.((/': WON the respondent !ourt of Appeals erred in a %uestion of law and gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack of
,urisdiction when it did not dismiss the thirdGparty complaint due to nonGpayment of any filing of docket fee.
0'12: !ourt of Appeals correctly dismissed the thirdGparty complaint against A.A. The claim that the discrepancy in the lot
areas was due to A.A+s fault was not proved. The appellate court, however, found that it was the erroneous survey by 'ngineer
Ouedding that triggered these discrepancies. And it was this survey that respondent Winston Lo relied upon in constructing his
house on his father+s land. 0e built his house in the belief that it was entirely within the parameters of his father+s land. .n short,
respondents Lo had no knowledge that they encroached on petitioners+ lot. They are deemed builders in good faith until the
time petitioner 8allatan informed them of their encroachment on her property. All the parties are presumed to have acted in
good faith. Their rights must, therefore, be determined in accordance with the appropriate provisions of the !ivil !ode on
property.
ATTY. MARCIANO DELSON - 4C CIV REV 2ND SET OF DIGESTS
&=. S)ouses De, CaB)o vs
!@iesa
TOPIC: !rt.--7
.ssue: Whether or Not Article ##I of the !ivil !ode is applicable to a builder in good faith when the property involved is owned
in common.
0eld: Article ##I of the !ivil !ode cannot apply where a coGowner builds, plants or sows on the land owned in common for then
he did not build, plant or sow upon land that eclusively belongs to another but of which he is a coGowner. The coGowner is not a
third person under the circumstances, and the situation is governed by the rules of coGownership.
When, as in this case, the coGownership is terminated by the partition and it appears that the house of defendants overlaps or
occupies a portion of " s%uare meters of the land pertaining to plaintiffs which the defendants obviously built in good faith, then
the provisions of Article ##I of the new !ivil !ode should apply. )anresa and Navarro Amandi agree that the said provision of
the !ivil !ode may apply even when there was coGownership if good faith has been established.
ATTY. MARCIANO DELSON - 4C CIV REV 2ND SET OF DIGESTS
-?. Pa(i6( "orBs2 In(. vs
Esguerra
TOPIC: !$TICLE --7 K --1 !PPLIED BY !#!LO%Y
ISSUE: WON the appellant has the right to recover the value of the unpaid lumber and construction materials that were used to
construct si buildings owned by the appellee.
HELD: &'(. Article ##A of the !ivil !ode contemplates a principal and an accessory, the land being considered the principal,
and the plantings, constructions or works, the accessory. The owner of the land who in good faith @ whether personally or
through another @ makes constructions or works thereon, using materials belonging to somebody else, becomes the owner of
the said materials with the obligation however of paying for their value. The owner of the materials, on the other hand, is entitled
to remove them, provided no substantial in,ury is caused to the landowner. Otherwise, he has the right only to reimbursement
for the value of his materials. Although it does not appear from the records of this case that the land upon which the si
buildings were built is owned by the appellee, nevertheless, that the appellee claims that it owns the si buildings constructed
out of the lumber and construction materials furnished by the appellant, is indubitable. Therefore, applying article ##A by
analogy, we perforce consider the buildings as the principal and the lumber and construction materials that went into their
construction as the accessory. Thus the appellee, if it does own the si buildings, must bear the obligation to pay for the value
of the said materialsJ the appellant @ which apparently has no desire to remove the materials, and even if it were minded to do
so, cannot remove them without necessarily damaging the buildings @ has the corresponding right to recover the value of the
unpaid lumber and construction materials. WellGestablished in ,urisprudence is the rule that compensation should be borne by
the person who has been benefited by the accession. No doubt, the appellee benefited from the accession, i.e., from the
lumber and materials that went into the construction of the si buildings. .t should therefore shoulder the compensation due to
the appellant as unpaid furnisher of materials.
ATTY. MARCIANO DELSON - 4C CIV REV 2ND SET OF DIGESTS
-1. Pe(son vs C! To)i(: Article ##I applied by analogy
ISSUE: Whether or not Article ##I shall be applied in determing whether -ecson is a builder in good faith when he built the
apartment on the land he formerly owned.
$ULI#%: NO.
8y its clear language, Article ##I refers to a land whose ownership is claimed by two or more parties, one of whom has
built some works, or sown or planted something. The building, sowing or planting may have been made in good faith or in bad
faith. The rule on good faith laid down in Article "D4 of the !ivil !ode shall be applied in determining whether a builder, sower or
planter had acted in good faith. Article ##I does not apply to a case where the owner of the land is the builder, sower, or planter
who then later loses ownership of the land by sale or donation.'lsewise stated, where the true owner himself is the builder of
works on his own land, the issue of good faith or bad faith is entirely irrelevant. Thus in strict point of law, Article ##I is not
apposite to the case at bar. Nevertheless, we believe that the provision therein on indemnity may be applied by analogy
considering that the primary intent of Article ##I is to avoid a state of forced coGownership and that the parties, including the two
courts below, in the main agree that Articles ##I and "#4 of the !ivil !ode are applicable and indemnity for the improvements
may be paid although they differ as to the basis of the indemnity. The (! also ruled that the trial court also erred in ordering the
petitioner to pay monthly rentals e%ual to the aggregate rentals paid by the lessees of the apartment building. (ince the private
respondents have opted to appropriate the apartment building, the petitioner is thus entitled to the possession and en,oyment of
the apartment building, until he is paid the proper indemnity, as well as of the portion of the lot where the building has been
constructed. This is so because the right to retain the improvements while the corresponding indemnity is not paid implies the
tenancy or possession in fact of the land on which it is built, planted or sown. The petitioner not having been so paid, he was
entitled to retain ownership of the building and, necessarily, the income therefrom.
ATTY. MARCIANO DELSON - 4C CIV REV 2ND SET OF DIGESTS
-2. Te(3nogas P3i,i))ines vs
C!
TOPIC: Right of Accession; Immovable Property; Accession Continua; Accession Industrial; Good Faith
ISSUE: Is petitioner considered a builder in bad faith because, as held by respondent Court, he is "presumed to know
the metes and bounds of his property as described in his certifcate of title"?
RULING:
When petitioner purchased the land from Pariz Industries, the buildings and other structures were already in
existence. The record is not clear as to who actually built those structures, but it may well be assumed that petitioner's
predecessor-in-interest, Pariz Industries, did so. Article 527 of the Civil Code presumes good faith, and since no proof
exists to show that the encroachment over a narrow, needle-shaped portion of private respondent's land was done in
bad faith by the builder of the encroaching structures, the latter should be presumed to have built them in good faith. It
is presumed that possession continues to be enjoyed in the same character in which it was acquired, until the contrary
is proved. Good faith consists in the belief of the builder that the land he is building on is his, and his ignorance
of any defect or faw in his title. Hence, such good faith, by law passed on to Pariz's successor, petitioner in
this case|||
Petitioner did not lose its rights under Article 448 of the Civil Code on the basis merely of the fact that some
years after acquiring the property in good faith, it learned about and aptly recognized the right of private
respondent to a portion of the land occupied by its building. The supervening awareness of the encroachment by
petitioner does not militate against its right to claim the status of a builder in good faith. In fact, a judicious
reading of said Article 448 will readily show that the landowner's exercise of his option can only take place
after the builder shall have come to know of the intrusion in short, when both parties shall have become
aware of it. Only then will the occasion for exercising the option arise, for it is only then that both parties will have been
aware that a problem exists in regard to their property rights.
ATTY. MARCIANO DELSON - 4C CIV REV 2ND SET OF DIGESTS
-&. Peasantvi,,e Dev0t Cor). vs
C!
TOPIC:
Issue:
:$; Was Qee a builder in good faith9
He,d:
Lood faith consists in the belief of the builder that the land he is building on is his and his ignorance of any
defect or flaw in his title.<7= And as good faith is presumed, petitioner has the burden of proving bad faith on the part of Qee.<$6=
At the time he built improvements on 1ot I, Qee believed that said lot was what he bought from petitioner. 0e was not aware
that the lot delivered to him was not 1ot I. Thus, QeeCs good faith. -etitioner failed to prove otherwise.
##. Leminiano vs !A
ATTY. MARCIANO DELSON - 4C CIV REV 2ND SET OF DIGESTS
-.. !gustin vs I!C To)i(: Alluvium or Alluvion :Arts. #"AG#"I;
Issue: Whether or not private respondents own the accretion and such ownership is not affected by the sudden and abrupt
change in the course of the !agayan Biver when it reverted to its old bed9
He,d: &es. Art. #"A states that the owner of the lands ad,oining river banks own the accretion which they gradually receive from
the effects of the currents of the waters. Accretion benefits a riparian owner provided that these elements are present: $;
deposit be gradual and imperceptible D; it resulted from the effects of the current of the water and 5; the land is ad,acent to the
river bank. When the Biver moved from $7$7 to $74I, there was alluvium deposited and it was gradual and imperceptible.
Accretion benefits the riparian owner because these lands are eposed to floods and other damage due to the destructive force
of the waters, and if by virtue of law they are sub,ect to encumbrances and various kinds of easements, it is only ,ust that such
risks or dangers should in some way be compensated by the right of accretion. Also, respondentCs ownership over said lots was
not removed when due to the sudden and abrupt change in the course of the riverJ their accretions were transferred to the other
side. Art. #"7 states when the current of a river segregates from an estate on its bank a known portion of land and
transfers it to another estate, the owner of segregated portion retains ownership provided he removes the same wHin D years.
And Art. #45 states that whenever the current of a river divides itself into branches, leaving a piece of land or part thereof
isolated, the owner of the land retains ownership. 0e also retains it if a portion of land is separated from the estate by the
current.
ATTY. MARCIANO DELSON - 4C CIV REV 2ND SET OF DIGESTS
-/. Cureg vs I!C
TOPIC:
Issue:
T3e o@Ee(t o4 t3e (ontrovers in t3is (ase is t3e a,,eged LBot3er,andL o4 )rivate res)ondents toget3er Cit3 t3e
a((retion o4 a@out &.. 3e(tares2 t3e tota,it o4 C3i(3 is re4erred to in t3is de(ision as t3e Lsu@Ee(t ,and.L In t3is
(ase2 )etitioners (,aiBed to @e ri)arian oCners C3o are entit,ed to t3e Lsu@Ee(t ,andL C3i(3 is an a((retion to
t3e registered ,and C3i,e )rivate res)ondents (,aiBed to @e entit,ed to t3e &.. 3e(tares a((retion atta(3ed to
t3eir LBot3er,and.L
He,d:
T3e a,,egation o4 )rivate res)ondents t3at t3e Cere in )ossession o4 t3e LBot3er,andL t3roug3 t3eir
)rede(essorsG inGinterest 3ad not @een )roved @ su@stantia, eviden(e. T3e assai,ed de(ision o4 t3e res)ondent
(ourt2 C3i(3 aMrBed t3e de(ision o4 t3e tria, (ourt2 stated t3at sin(e t3e LBot3er,andL e+ists2 it is a,so
)resuBed t3at )rivate res)ondents Cere in )ossession o4 t3e Lsu@Ee(t ,andL t3roug3 t3eir )rede(essorsG inG
interest sin(e )rior to 9u, 2/2 17=-. T3e tria, (ourt re,ied on t3e testiBon o4 So,edad %erardo2 one o4 t3e
)rivate res)ondents in t3is (ase2 an interested and @iased Citness2 regarding t3eir )ossession o4 t3e
LBot3er,and.L "roB 3er testiBon on )edigree2 t3e tria, (ourt )resuBed t3at t3e sour(e o4 t3e )ro)ert2 t3e
,ate "ran(is(o %erardo2 Cas in )ossession o4 t3e saBe sin(e )rior to 9u, 2/2 17=- ;)). 1&1G1-?2 $o,,o<.
T3e 4oregoing (onsiderations indu@ita@, s3oC t3at t3e a,,eged LBot3er,andL (,aiBed @ )rivate res)ondents is
none+istent. T3e Lsu@Ee(t ,andL is an a,,uvia, de)osit ,e4t @ t3e nort3Card BoveBent o4 t3e Cagaan $iver and
)ursuant to !rti(,e -.1 o4 t3e #eC Civi, Code:
To t3e oCners o4 ,and adEoining t3e @an's o4 river @e,ong t3e a((retion C3i(3 t3e gradua,,
re(eive 4roB t3e e5e(ts o4 t3e (urrent o4 t3e Caters.
ATTY. MARCIANO DELSON - 4C CIV REV 2ND SET OF DIGESTS
-1. :iaEar vs C! To)i(: Begistration of the land does not protect the owner against accretion.
Issue:
He,d: The rule that registration under the Torrens (ystem does not protect the riparian owner against the diminution of the area
of his registered land through gradual changes in the course of an ad,oining stream is well settled. >The controversy in the
present cases seems to be due to the erroneous conception that Art. 544 of the !ivil !ode does not apply to Torrens registered
land. That article provides that +any accretions which the banks of rivers may gradually receive from the effects of the current
belong to the owners of the estates bordering thereon.+ Accretions of that character are natural incidents to land bordering on
running streams and are not affected by the registration laws. .t follows that registration does not protect the riparian owner
against diminution of the area of his land through gradual changes in the course of the ad,oining stream.E Begistration does not
protect the riparian owner against the diminution of the area of his land through gradual changes in the course of the ad,oining
stream. Accretions which the banks of rivers may gradually receive from the effect of the current become the property of the
owners of the banks. (uch accretions are natural incidents to land bordering on running streams and the provisions of the !ivil
!ode in that respect are not affected by the Begistration Act. We find no valid reason to review and abandon the aforecited
rulings.
ATTY. MARCIANO DELSON - 4C CIV REV 2ND SET OF DIGESTS
-7. :da de #a8areno vs I!C TOIC: !CC"##IO$ $!T%&!'
I##%": *3et3er or not t3e su@Ee(t ,and is )u@,i( ,andI
("'): YES. T3e a((retion Cas BanGBade or arti6(ia,. !((retion2 as a Bode o4 a(Duiring )ro)ert under !rt. -.1
o4 t3e Civi, Code2 reDuires t3e (on(urren(e o4 t3ese reDuisites: ;1< t3at t3e de)osition o4 soi, or sediBent @e
gradua, and iB)er(e)ti@,eF ;2< t3at it @e t3e resu,t o4 t3e a(tion o4 t3e Caters o4 t3e river ;or sea<F and ;&< t3at
t3e ,and C3ere a((retion ta'es ),a(e is adEa(ent to t3e @an's or rivers ;or t3e sea (oast<. T3ese are (a,,ed t3e
ru,es on a,,uvion C3i(3 i4 )resent in a (ase2 give to t3e oCners o4 ,ands adEoining t3e @an's o4 rivers or streaBs
an a((retion gradua,, re(eived 4roB t3e e5e(ts o4 t3e (urrent o4 Caters.
"or )etitioners to insist on t3e a)),i(ation o4 t3ese ru,es on a,,uvion to t3eir (ase2 t3e a@oveGBentioned
reDuisites Bust @e )resent. HoCever2 t3e adBit t3at t3e a((retion Cas 4orBed @ t3e duB)ing o4 @ou,ders2
soi, and ot3er 6,,ing Bateria,s on )ortions o4 t3e Ba,a(anas Cree' and t3e Cagaan $iver @ounding t3eir ,and.
ATTY. MARCIANO DELSON - 4C CIV REV 2ND SET OF DIGESTS
-=. Heirs o4 #avarro vs I!C To)i(: Accession Natural
.((/': WON respondent appellate court palpably erred in appreciating the fact of the case and to have gravely misapplied
statutory and case law relating to accretion, specifically, Article #"A of the !ivil !ode.
B/1.NL: The disputed land, thus, is an accretion not on a river bank but on a sea bank, or on what used to be the foreshore of
)anila 8ay which ad,oined petitioners+ own tract of land on the northern side. As such, the applicable law is not Article #"A of to
!ivil !ode but Article # of the (panish 1aw of Waters of $I44. Article # of the (panish 1aw of Waters of August 5, $I44
provides as follows: K1ands added to the shores by accretions and alluvial deposits caused by the action of the sea, form part of
the public domain. When they are no longer washed by the waters of the sea and are not necessary for purposes of public
utility, or for the establishment of special industries, or for the coastGguard service, the Lovernment shall declare them to be the
property of the owners of the estates ad,acent thereto and as increment thereof.E.n the light of the aforecited vintage but still
valid law, une%uivocal is the public nature of the disputed land in this controversy, the same being an accretion on a sea bank
which, for all legal purposes, the foreshore of )anila 8ay is. As part of the public domain, the herein disputed land is intended
for public uses, and >so long as the land in litigation belongs to the national domain and is reserved for public uses, it is not
capable of being appropriated by any private person, ecept through epress authori*ation granted in due form by a competent
authority.>Only the eecutive and possibly the legislative departments have the right and the power to make the declaration that
the lands so gained by action of the sea is no longer necessary for purposes of public utility or for the cause of establishment of
special industries or for coast guard services.
ATTY. MARCIANO DELSON - 4C CIV REV 2ND SET OF DIGESTS
"6. 2el 8anco vs .A! To)i(:!oGownership :rights of each coGowner;
Issue:
whether or not !agbalite .sland is still undivided property owned in common by the heirs and successorsGinGinterest of the
brothers, 8enedicto, 3ose and )anuel -ansacola
He,d:
&es. .t is not disputed that some of the private respondents and some of the petitioners at the time the action for partition was
filed in the trial court have been in actual possession and en,oyment of several portions of the property in %uestion. This does
not provide any proof that the .sland in %uestion has already been actually partitioned and coGownership terminated. A coGowner
cannot, without the conformity of the other coGowners or a ,udicial decree of partition issued pursuant to the provision of Bule 47
of the Bules of !ourt, ad,udicate to himself in fee simple a determinate portion of the lot owned in common, as his share
therein, to the eclusion of other coGowners. .t is a basic principle in the law of coGownership both under the present !ivil !ode
as in the !ode of $II7 that no individual coG owner can claim any definite portion thereof. lt is therefore of no moment that
some of the coGowners have succeeded in securing cadastral titles in their names to some portions of the .sland occupied by
them. .t is not enough that the coGowners agree to subdivide the property. They must have a subdivision plan drawn in
accordance with which they take actual and eclusive possession of their respective portions in the plan and titles issued to
each of them accordingly.
"$. -ardell vs 8artolome
ATTY. MARCIANO DELSON - 4C CIV REV 2ND SET OF DIGESTS
.2. Caro vs C! To)i(: !oGowner+s right of legal redemption
Issue: WON the right of redemption still eists when the property sought to be redeemed is not coGowned anymore.
He,d:
Once the property is subdivided and distributed among coGowners, the community has terminated and there is no right to
sustain any right of legal redemption.
Also, while the coGowner+s right of legal redemption is a substantive right, it is eceptional in nature, limited in it+s duration and
sub,ects to strict compliance with the legal re%uirements. One of these is that the redemptioner should tender payment of the
redemption money within 56 days from written notice of the sale by the coGowner. The (upreme !ourt ruled that this 56 day
period is peremptory because the policy of the law is not to leave the purchaser+s title in uncertainty beyond the established 56G
day period. .t is not a prescriptive period but more of a re%uisite or condition precedent to the eercise of the right of legal
redemption by the coGowner.
ATTY. MARCIANO DELSON - 4C CIV REV 2ND SET OF DIGESTS
.&. Bai,onGCasi,ao vs C! TOPIC:
ISSUE: Whether or not the sale of the property is valid
HELD: &es but only with respect to their proportionate shares. The rights of a coGowner of a certain property are clearly
specified in Article #75 of the !ivil !ode. Thus: Art. #75.'ach coGowner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits
and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it and even substitute another person in its
en,oyment, ecept when personal rights are involved. 8ut the effect of the alienation or mortgage, with respect to the coG
owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the coGownership.
<'mphasis supplied.= 'ven if a coGowner sells the whole property as his, the sale will affect only his own share but not
those of the other coGowners who did not consent to the sale. !onse%uently, by virtue of the sales made by Bosalia and
Laudencio 8ailon which are valid with respect to their proportionate shares, and the subse%uent transfers which culminated in
the sale to private respondent !elestino Afable, the said Afable thereby became a coGowner of the disputed parcel of land as
correctly held by the lower court since the sales produced the effect of substituting the buyers in the en,oyment thereof. ?rom
the foregoing, it may be deduced that since a coGowner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale of the entire property by
one coGowner without the consent of the other coGowners is not null and void. 0owever, only the rights of the coGownerGseller
are transferred, thereby making the buyer a coGowner of the property.
"#. Bo%ue vs .A!
ATTY. MARCIANO DELSON - 4C CIV REV 2ND SET OF DIGESTS
... De,iBa vs C! Topic:
Issue: Is t3e )etitionersH a(tion 4or )artition is a,read @arredI
He,d: YES.
T3e iB)res(ri)ti@i,it o4 t3e a(tion 4or )artition (an no ,onger @e invo'ed or a)),ied C3en one o4 t3e (oG
oCners 3as adverse, )ossessed t3e )ro)ert as e+(,usive oCner 4or a )eriod suM(ient to vest oCners3i) @
)res(ri)tion. In order t3at su(3 )ossession is (onsidered adverse to t3e (estui Due trust aBounting to a
re)udiation o4 t3e (oGoCners3i)2 t3e 4o,,oCing e,eBents Bust (on(ur: 1< t3at t3e trustee 3as )er4orBed
uneDuivo(a, a(ts aBounting to an ouster o4 t3e (estui Due trustF 2< t3at su(3 )ositive a(ts o4 re)udiation 3ad
@een Bade 'noCn to t3e (estui Due trustF and &< t3at t3e eviden(e t3ereon s3ou,d @e (,ear and (on(,usive.
T3e issuan(e o4 t3is neC tit,e (onstituted an o)en and (,ear re)udiation o4 t3e trust or (oGoCners3i)2 and t3e
,a)se o4 ten ;1?< ears o4 adverse )ossession @ %a,i,eo De,iBa 4roB "e@ruar -2 1=.- Cas suM(ient to vest
tit,e in 3iB @ )res(ri)tion. !s t3e (erti6(ate o4 tit,e Cas noti(e to t3e C3o,e Cor,d o4 3is e+(,usive tit,e to t3e
,and2 su(3 reEe(tion Cas @inding on t3e ot3er 3eirs and started as against t3eB t3e )eriod o4 )res(ri)tion.
ATTY. MARCIANO DELSON - 4C CIV REV 2ND SET OF DIGESTS
./. !gui,ar vs C! TOPIC: TerBination o4 CoGoCners3i)
ISSUES:
1. whether the trial court correctly declared respondent as in default for his failure to appear at the preGtrial and in allowing
petitioner to present his evidence e+G)arte
2. whether the trial court correctly rendered the default ,udgment against respondent
$ULI#%:
$. The court affirmed the decision of the trial court, as regards the first issue, the law is clear that the appearance of
parties at the preGtrial is mandatory.

A party who fails to appear at a preGtrial conference may be nonGsuited or
considered as in default.

.n the case at bar, where private respondent and counsel failed to appear at the scheduled
preGtrial, the trial, court has authority to declare respondent in default.
D. With regard to the merits of the ,udgment of the trial court by default, which respondent appellate court did not touch
upon in resolving the appeal, the !ourt holds that on the basis of the pleadings of the parties and the evidence
presented e+ )arte, petitioner and respondents are coGowners of sub,ect house and lot in e%ual sharesJ either one of
them may demand the sale of the house and lot at any time and the other cannot ob,ect to such demandJ thereafter the
proceeds of the sale shall be divided e%ually according to their respective interests. The court upheld the default
,udgment of the trial court
Article #7# of the !ivil !ode provides that no coGowner shall be obliged to remain in the coGownership, and that each
coGowner may demand at any time partition of the thing owned in common insofar as his share is concerned. !orollary
to this rule, Art. #7I of the !ode states that whenever the thing is essentially, indivisible and the coGowners cannot
agree that it be, allotted to one of them who shall indemnify the others, it shall be sold and its proceeds accordingly
distributed. This is resorted to :$; when the right to partition the property is invoked by any of the coGowners but
because of the nature of the property it cannot be subdivided or its subdivision would pre,udice the interests of the coG
owners, and :b; the coGowners are not in agreement as to who among them shall be allotted or assigned the entire
property upon proper reimbursement of the coGowners. .n one case,

this !ourt upheld the order of the trial court
directing the holding of a public sale of the properties owned in common pursuant to Art. #7I of the !ivil !ode.
ATTY. MARCIANO DELSON - 4C CIV REV 2ND SET OF DIGESTS
.1. ToBas Ca,udio MeBoria,
Co,,ege2 In(. vs C!
.7. $o@,es vs C! Topic: Ouieting of Title
.ssue:
0eld: 8ased on Art.#A4, an action to %uiet title is a commonGlaw remedy for the removal of any cloud or doubt or uncertainty on
the title to real property.<7= .t is essential for the plaintiff or complainant to have a legal or an e%uitable title to or interest in the
real property which is the sub,ect matter of the action.<$6= Also, the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding that is being
alleged as a cloud on plaintiffCs title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of
validity or legal efficacy.<$$=
That there is an instrument or a document which, on its face, is valid and efficacious is clear in the present case. -etitioners
allege that their title as owners and possessors of the disputed property is clouded by the ta declaration and, subse%uently, the
free patent thereto granted to (pouses Nergel and Buth (antos. The more important %uestion to be resolved, however, is
whether the petitioners have the appropriate title that will entitle them to avail themselves of the remedy of %uieting of title.
.=. $i8a, CeBent Co2 In( vs
:i,,area,
TO-.!:
.((/': Whether respondents have been in actual possession of the land in %uestion
0'12: Bespondent possess the property in the concept of owner. -ossession is ac%uired by the material occupation of a thing
or the eercise of a right or by the fact it is sub,ect to the action of our will, or by the proper acts and legal formalities
established for ac%uiring such right.
/?. *ong vs Car)io TOPIC: CO#CEPT O" POSSESSIO#
ISSUE: Whether Wong acted in bad faith and is liable to pay rentals.
HELD: &es. -ossession in good faith ceases from the moment defects in the title are made known to the possessors, by
etraneous evidence or by suit for recovery of the property by the true owner. Whatever may be the cause or the fact from
which it can be deduced that the possessor has knowledge of the defects of his title or mode of ac%uisition, it must be
considered sufficient to show bad faith.
A perusal of the records of the case shows that petitioner received private respondent+s complaint for forcible entry with
summons on November D7, $7A4 :Bollo, p. #4;. 0is good faith therefore ceased on November D7,$7A4. Accordingly, the
computation of the payment of monthly rental should start from 2ecember, $7A4, instead of August, $7A4.
ATTY. MARCIANO DELSON - 4C CIV REV 2ND SET OF DIGESTS
/1. SoBodio vs C! To)i(: !oncept of -ossession
ISSUE: Whether or not -etition has established possession over the land
HELD: &'(. .n e,ectment cases, the only issue for resolution is who is entitled to the physical or material possession of the
property involved, independent of any claim of ownership set forth by any of the partyGlitigants. Anyone of them who can prove
prior possession de facto may recover such possession even from the owner himself. This rule holds true regardless of the
character of a party+s possession, provided that he has in his favor priority of time which entitles him to stay on the property until
he is lawfully e,ected by a person having a better right by either accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria :2e 1una v. !ourt of
Appeals, D$D (!BA DA4 <$77D=;.
/2. Ma,u(ogG!C vs Mag,u(ot
/&. CeDuena vs Bo,ante
/-. !ragon vs. Insu,ar
%overnBent
/.. Cat3o,i( :i(ar !)osto,i( o4
t3e Mountain Provin(e vs C!
//. EDC! Pu@,is3ing K
Distri@uting Cor) vs Santos
TOPIC: THEO$Y O" I$$E:I#DIC!BILITY ;!$T. ..=<
Issue: Whether the petitioner has been unlawfully deprived of the books because the check issued by the impostor in payment
therefor was dishonored
$u,ing: No. .n its etended memorandum, '2!A cites numerous cases holding that the owner who has been unlawfully
deprived of personal property is entitled to its recovery ecept only where the property was purchased at a public sale, in which
event its return is sub,ect to reimbursement of the purchase price. The petitioner is begging the %uestion. .t is putting the cart
before the horse. /nlike in the cases invoked, it has yet to be established in the case at bar that '2!A has been unlawfully
deprived of the books.
Actual delivery of the books having been made, !ru* ac%uired ownership over the books which he could then validly transfer to
the private respondents. The fact that he had not yet paid for them to '2!A was a matter between him and '2!A and did not
impair the title ac%uired by the private respondents to the books.
/1. De %ar(ia vs C!
ATTY. MARCIANO DELSON - 4C CIV REV 2ND SET OF DIGESTS
/7. Di8on vs Sunta TOPIC: Theory of .rrevindicability
.((/': What is the applicable law in this case
B/1.NL: Thus: >The controlling provision is Article ""7 of the !ivil !ode. .t reads thus: +The possession of movable
property ac%uired in good faith is e%uivalent to a title. Nevertheless, one who has lost any movable or has been unlawfully
deprived thereof may recover it from the person in possession of the same. .f the possessor of a movable lost of which the
owner has been unlawfully deprived, has ac%uired it in good faith at a public sale, the owner cannot obtain its return without
reimbursing the price paid therefor.+
An owner of a movable unlawfully pledged by another is not estopped from recovering possession. Where the owner
delivered the diamond ring solely for sale on commission but the seller instead pawned it without authority, the owner is not
stopped form pursuing an action against the pawnshop.
/=. LedesBa vs. C!
ATTY. MARCIANO DELSON - 4C CIV REV 2ND SET OF DIGESTS
1?. !8ar(on and !@o@o vs
Euse@io
TOPIC: !rt..-.
Issue: Whether or not the person in possession of the land in %uestion but ordered to leave certain premises is not allowed to
harvest hisHher crops pending courts resolution9
HELD: /nder the law a person who is in possession and who is being ordered to leave a parcel of land while products
thereon are pending harvest, has the right to a part of the net harvest, as epressly provided by Article "#" of the !ivil !ode.
Their act in harvesting the pending fruits was not only ,ustified by law but was not epressly prohibited by the court+s order,
and was even ratified when the court ordered the suspension of the eecution. There was, therefore, no open, clear and
contumacious refusal to obey a definite order of the court such as would constitute contempt.
?urthermore, a person who has been ordered to leave certain premises is ordinarily not prohibited from taking with
him his own effects and possession, unless there is an epress prohibition to this effect.
11. Cordero vs Ca@ra, TOPIC: "$UITS
ISSUE: Whether or not defendants shall also account for the fruits of the disputed land.
HELD: The defendants, by their own admission, are in possession of the disputed land. There is no evidence that they were
possessors in bad faith. 0owever, their good faith ceased when they were served with summons to answer the complaint.
As possessors in bad faith from the service of the summons they >shall reimburse the fruits received and those which the
legitimate possessor could have received, ... :Art. "#7, !ivil !ode.;
12. Mendo8a and EnriDue8 vs
De %u8Ban
ATTY. MARCIANO DELSON - 4C CIV REV 2ND SET OF DIGESTS
1&. $o@,es and Martin vs
Li88araga HerBanos
TOPIC:
ISSUE:
Whether or not she has any right to retain the building until the said value is paid to her.
HELD:
&es. .t is a fact that the value of the improvements in %uestion has not as yet been paid by 1i*arraga 0ermanos. Wherefore, if
'varista Bobles and her husband are entitled to retain the building until the value of such improvements is paid them, 1i*arraga
0ermanos have not yet any right to oust them from the building, nor, therefore, to be indemnified for any damages caused by
the refusal of the plaintiffs found on their legitimate rights. 0ence, due to the nonGreimbursement of the aforesaid useful
ependitures, the possessor in good faith has the right of retention until she has been fully reimbursed with the same.
1-. Metro)o,itan *aterCor's
and SeCerage SsteB vs C!