G.R. No.

L-24693 July 31, 1967

ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS ASSOCIATION, INC., HOTEL DEL MAR
INC. !" GO CHI#, petitioners-appellees,
vs.
THE HONORA$LE CIT% MA%OR O& MANILA, respondent-appellant.
'ICTOR ALA$AN(A, intervenor-appellee.
Panganiban, Abad and Associates Law Office for respondent-appellant.
J. M. Aruego, Tenchavez and Associates for intervenor-appellee.
&ERNANDO, J.:
The principal question in this appeal from a judgment of the lower court in an action for prohibition is
whether Ordinance No. 47! of the "it# of $anila is violative of the due process clause. The lower
court held that it is and adjudged it %unconstitutional, and, therefore, null and void.% &or reasons to be
more specificall# set forth, such judgment must be reversed, there being a failure of the requisite
showing to sustain an attac' against its validit#.
The petition for prohibition against Ordinance No. 47! was filed on (ul# ), *+, b# the petitioners,
-rmita-$alate .otel and $otel Operators /ssociation, one of its members, .otel del $ar 0nc., and a
certain 1o "hiu, who is %the president and general manager of the second petitioner% against the
respondent $a#or of the "it# of $anila who was sued in his capacit# as such %charged with the
general power and dut# to enforce ordinances of the "it# of $anila and to give the necessar# orders
for the faithful e2ecution and enforcement of such ordinances.% 3par. *4. 0t was alleged that the
petitioner non-stoc' corporation is dedicated to the promotion and protection of the interest of its
eighteen 3*54 members %operating hotels and motels, characteri6ed as legitimate businesses dul#
licensed b# both national and cit# authorities, regularl# pa#ing ta2es, emplo#ing and giving livelihood
to not less than 7,)!! person and representing an investment of more than 8, million.%
*
3par. 74. 0t
was then alleged that on (une *,, *+,, the $unicipal 9oard of the "it# of $anila enacted
Ordinance No. 47!, approved on (une *4, *+, b# the then :ice-$a#or .erminio /storga, who
was at the time acting as $a#or of the "it# of $anila. 3par. ,4.
/fter which the alleged grievances against the ordinance were set forth in detail. There was the
assertion of its being be#ond the powers of the $unicipal 9oard of the "it# of $anila to enact insofar
as it would regulate motels, on the ground that in the revised charter of the "it# of $anila or in an#
other law, no reference is made to motels; that <ection * of the challenged ordinance is
unconstitutional and void for being unreasonable and violative of due process insofar as it would
impose 8,!!!.!! fee per annum for first class motels and 84,)!!.!! for second class motels; that
the provision in the same section which would require the owner, manager, 'eeper or dul#
authori6ed representative of a hotel, motel, or lodging house to refrain from entertaining or accepting
an# guest or customer or letting an# room or other quarter to an# person or persons without his filling
up the prescribed form in a lobb# open to public view at all times and in his presence, wherein the
surname, given name and middle name, the date of birth, the address, the occupation, the se2, the
nationalit#, the length of sta# and the number of companions in the room, if an#, with the name,
relationship, age and se2 would be specified, with data furnished as to his residence certificate as
well as his passport number, if an#, coupled with a certification that a person signing such form has
personall# filled it up and affi2ed his signature in the presence of such owner, manager, 'eeper or
dul# authori6ed representative, with such registration forms and records 'ept and bound together, it
also being provided that the premises and facilities of such hotels, motels and lodging houses would
be open for inspection either b# the "it# $a#or, or the "hief of 8olice, or their dul# authori6ed
representatives is unconstitutional and void again on due process grounds, not onl# for being
arbitrar#, unreasonable or oppressive but also for being vague, indefinite and uncertain, and li'ewise
for the alleged invasion of the right to privac# and the guarant# against self-incrimination; that
<ection 7 of the challenged ordinance classif#ing motels into two classes and requiring the
maintenance of certain minimum facilities in first class motels such as a telephone in each room, a
dining room or, restaurant and laundr# similarl# offends against the due process clause for being
arbitrar#, unreasonable and oppressive, a conclusion which applies to the portion of the ordinance
requiring second class motels to have a dining room; that the provision of <ection 7 of the
challenged ordinance prohibiting a person less than *5 #ears old from being accepted in such
hotels, motels, lodging houses, tavern or common inn unless accompanied b# parents or a lawful
guardian and ma'ing it unlawful for the owner, manager, 'eeper or dul# authori6ed representative of
such establishments to lease an# room or portion thereof more than twice ever# 74 hours, runs
counter to the due process guarant# for lac' of certaint# and for its unreasonable, arbitrar# and
oppressive character; and that insofar as the penalt# provided for in <ection 4 of the challenged
ordinance for a subsequent conviction would, cause the automatic cancellation of the license of the
offended part#, in effect causing the destruction of the business and loss of its investments, there is
once again a transgression of the due process clause.
There was a plea for the issuance of preliminar# injunction and for a final judgment declaring the
above ordinance null and void and unenforceable. The lower court on (ul# , *+, issued a writ of
preliminar# injunction ordering respondent $a#or to refrain from enforcing said Ordinance No. 47!
from and after (ul# 5, *+,.
0n the a answer filed on /ugust ,, *+,, there was an admission of the personal circumstances
regarding the respondent $a#or and of the fact that petitioners are licensed to engage in the hotel or
motel business in the "it# of $anila, of the provisions of the cited Ordinance but a denial of its
alleged nullit#, whether on statutor# or constitutional grounds. /fter setting forth that the petition did
fail to state a cause of action and that the challenged ordinance bears a reasonable relation, to a
proper purpose, which is to curb immoralit#, a valid and proper e2ercise of the police power and that
onl# the guests or customers not before the court could complain of the alleged invasion of the right
to privac# and the guarant# against self incrimination, with the assertion that the issuance of the
preliminar# injunction e parte was contrar# to law, respondent $a#or pra#ed for, its dissolution and
the dismissal of the petition.
0nstead of evidence being offered b# both parties, there was submitted a stipulation of facts dated
<eptember 75, *+4, which reads=
*. That the petitioners -rmita-$alate .otel and $otel Operators /ssociation, 0nc. and .otel
del $ar 0nc. are dul# organi6ed and e2isting under the laws of the 8hilippines, both with
offices in the "it# of $anila, while the petitioner 1o "hin is the president and general
manager of .otel del $ar 0nc., and the intervenor :ictor /laban6a is a resident of 9aguio
"it#, all having the capacit# to sue and be sued;
7. That the respondent $a#or is the dul# elected and incumbent "it# $a#or and chief
e2ecutive of the "it# of $anila charged with the general power and dut# to enforce
ordinances of the "it# of $anila and to give the necessar# orders for the faithful e2ecution
and enforcement of such ordinances;
,. That the petitioners are dul# licensed to engage in the business of operating hotels and
motels in $alate and -rmita districts in $anila;
4. That on (une *,, *+,, the $unicipal 9oard of the "it# of $anila enacted Ordinance No.
47!, which was approved on (une *4, *+,, b# :ice-$a#or .erminio /storga, then the
acting "it# $a#or of $anila, in the absence of the respondent regular "it# $a#or, amending
sections *, 7, 5-a, 5-b and + of the compilation of the ordinances of the "it# of
$anila besides inserting therein three new sections. This ordinance is similar to the one
vetoed b# the respondent $a#or 3/nne2 /4 for the reasons stated in its 4th 0ndorsement
dated &ebruar# *), *+, 3/nne2 94;
). That the e2planator# note signed b# then "ouncilor .erminio /storga was submitted with
the proposed ordinance 3now Ordinance 47!4 to the $unicipal 9oard, cop# of which is
attached hereto as /nne2 ";
. That the "it# of $anila derived in *+, an annual income of 8*!*,+!4.!) from license
fees paid b# the *!) hotels and motels 3including herein petitioners4 operating in the "it# of
$anila.!"wph#!.$%t
Thereafter came a memorandum for respondent on (anuar# 77, *+), wherein stress was laid on
the presumption of the validit# of the challenged ordinance, the burden of showing its lac' of
conformit# to the "onstitution resting on the part# who assails it, citing not onl# &.'. v. 'alaveria, but
li'ewise applicable /merican authorities. <uch a memorandum li'ewise refuted point b# point the
arguments advanced b# petitioners against its validit#. Then barel# two wee's later, on &ebruar# 4,
*+), the memorandum for petitioners was filed reiterating in detail what was set forth in the petition,
with citations of what the# considered to be applicable /merican authorities and pra#ing for a
judgment declaring the challenged ordinance %null and void and unenforceable% and ma'ing
permanent the writ of preliminar# injunction issued.
/fter referring to the motels and hotels, which are members of the petitioners association, and
referring to the alleged constitutional questions raised b# the part#, the lower court observed= %The
onl# remaining issue here being purel# a question of law, the parties, with the nod of the "ourt,
agreed to file memoranda and thereafter, to submit the case for decision of the "ourt.% 0t does
appear obvious then that without an# evidence submitted b# the parties, the decision passed upon
the alleged infirmit# on constitutional grounds of the challenged ordinance, dismissing as is
undoubtedl# right and proper the untenable objection on the alleged lac' of authorit# of the "it# of
$anila to regulate motels, and came to the conclusion that %the challenged Ordinance No. 47! of
the "it# of $anila, would be unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void.% 0t made permanent the
preliminar# injunction issued against respondent $a#or and his agents %to restrain him from
enforcing the ordinance in question.% .ence this appeal.
/s noted at the outset, the judgment must be reversed. / decent regard for constitutional doctrines
of a fundamental character ought to have admonished the lower court against such a sweeping
condemnation of the challenged ordinance. 0ts decision cannot be allowed to stand, consistentl# with
what has hitherto been the accepted standards of constitutional adjudication, in both procedural and
substantive aspects.
8rimaril# what calls for a reversal of such a decision is the absence of an# evidence to offset the
presumption of validit# that attaches to a challenged statute or ordinance. /s was e2pressed
categoricall# b# (ustice $alcolm= %The presumption is all in favor of validit# 2 2 2 . The action of the
elected representatives of the people cannot be lightl# set aside. The councilors must, in the ver#
nature of things, be familiar with the necessities of their particular municipalit# and with all the facts
and circumstances which surround the subject and necessitate action. The local legislative bod#, b#
enacting the ordinance, has in effect given notice that the regulations are essential to the well being
of the people 2 2 2 . The (udiciar# should not lightl# set aside legislative action when there is not a
clear invasion of personal or propert# rights under the guise of police regulation.
7
0t admits of no doubt therefore that there being a presumption of validit#, the necessit# for evidence
to rebut it is unavoidable, unless the statute or ordinance is void on its face which is not the case
here. The principle has been nowhere better e2pressed than in the leading case of O()or*an +
,oung v. -artford .ire /nsurance 0o.,
,
where the /merican <upreme "ourt through (ustice 9randeis
tersel# and succinctl# summed up the matter thus= The statute here questioned deals with a subject
clearl# within the scope of the police power. >e are as'ed to declare it void on the ground that the
specific method of regulation prescribed is unreasonable and hence deprives the plaintiff of due
process of law. /s underl#ing questions of fact ma# condition the constitutionalit# of legislation of this
character, the resumption of constitutionalit# must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation
of record for overthrowing the statute.% No such factual foundation being laid in the present case, the
lower court deciding the matter on the pleadings and the stipulation of facts, the presumption of
validit# must prevail and the judgment against the ordinance set aside.
Nor ma# petitioners assert with plausibilit# that on its face the ordinance is fatall# defective as being
repugnant to the due process clause of the "onstitution. The mantle of protection associated with
the due process guarant# does not cover petitioners. This particular manifestation of a police power
measure being specificall# aimed to safeguard public morals is immune from such imputation of
nullit# resting purel# on conjecture and unsupported b# an#thing of substance. To hold otherwise
would be to undul# restrict and narrow the scope of police power which has been properl#
characteri6ed as the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers,
4
e2tending as it does
%to all the great public needs.%
)
0t would be, to paraphrase another leading decision, to destro# the
ver# purpose of the state if it could be deprived or allowed itself to be deprived of its competence to
promote public health, public morals, public safet# and the genera welfare.

Negativel# put, police

power is %that inherent and plenar# power in the <tate which enables it to prohibit all that is hurt full
to the comfort, safet#, and welfare of societ#.
7
There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisel# enacted to minimi6e certain
practices hurtful to public morals. The e2planator# note of the "ouncilor .erminio /storga included
as anne2 to the stipulation of facts, spea's of the alarming increase in the rate of prostitution,
adulter# and fornication in $anila traceable in great part to the e2istence of motels, which %provide a
necessar# atmosphere for clandestine entr#, presence and e2it% and thus become the %ideal haven
for prostitutes and thrill-see'ers.% The challenged ordinance then proposes to chec' the clandestine
harboring of transients and guests of these establishments b# requiring these transients and guests
to fill up a registration form, prepared for the purpose, in a lobb# open to public view at all times, and
b# introducing several other amendator# provisions calculated to shatter the privac# that
characteri6es the registration of transients and guests.% $oreover, the increase in the licensed fees
was intended to discourage %establishments of the 'ind from operating for purpose other than legal%
and at the same time, to increase %the income of the cit# government.% 0t would appear therefore that
the stipulation of facts, far from sustaining an# attac' against the validit# of the ordinance, argues
eloquentl# for it.
0t is a fact worth noting that this "ourt has invariabl# stamped with the seal of its approval,
ordinances punishing vagranc# and classif#ing a pimp or procurer as a vagrant;
5
provide a license
ta2 for and regulating the maintenance or operation of public dance halls;
+
prohibiting
gambling;
*!
prohibiting jueteng;
**
and monte;
*7
prohibiting pla#ing of panguingui on da#s other than
<unda#s or legal holida#s;
*,
prohibiting the operation of pinball machines;
*4
and prohibiting an#
person from 'eeping, conducting or maintaining an opium joint or visiting a place where opium is
smo'ed or otherwise used,
*)
all of which are intended to protect public morals.
On the legislative organs of the government, whether national or local, primaril# rest the e2ercise of
the police power, which, it cannot be too often emphasi6ed, is the power to prescribe regulations to
promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safet# and general welfare of the people. 0n view of
the requirements of due process, equal protection and other applicable constitutional guaranties
however, the e2ercise of such police power insofar as it ma# affect the life, libert# or propert# of an#
person is subject to judicial inquir#. >here such e2ercise of police power ma# be considered as
either capricious, whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, a denial of due process or a violation of an#
other applicable constitutional guarant# ma# call for correction b# the courts.
>e are thus led to considering the insistent, almost shrill tone, in which the objection is raised to the
question of due process.
*
There is no controlling and precise definition of due process. 0t furnishes
though a standard to which the governmental action should conform in order that deprivation of life,
libert# or propert#, in each appropriate case, be valid. >hat then is the standard of due process
which must e2ist both as a procedural and a substantive requisite to free the challenged ordinance,
or an# governmental action for that matter, from the imputation of legal infirmit# sufficient to spell its
doom? 0t is responsiveness to the supremac# of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice.
Negativel# put, arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness avoided. To satisf# the due process
requirement, official action, to paraphrase "ardo6o, must not outrun the bounds of reason and result
in sheer oppression. @ue process is thus hostile to an# official action marred b# lac' of
reasonableness. "orrectl# it has been identified as freedom from arbitrariness. 0t is the embodiment
of the sporting idea of fair pla#.
*7
0t e2acts fealt# %to those strivings for justice% and judges the act of
officialdom of whatever branch %in the light of reason drawn from considerations of fairness that
reflect AdemocraticB traditions of legal and political thought.%
*5
0t is not a narrow or %technical
conception with fi2ed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances,%
*+
decisions based on such
a clause requiring a %close and perceptive inquir# into fundamental principles of our
societ#.%
7!
Cuestions of due process are not to be treated narrowl# or pedanticall# in slaver# to form
or phrases.
7*
0t would thus be an affront to reason to stigmati6e an ordinance enacted precisel# to meet what a
municipal lawma'ing bod# considers an evil of rather serious proportion an arbitrar# and capricious
e2ercise of authorit#. 0t would seem that what should be deemed unreasonable and what would
amount to an abdication of the power to govern is inaction in the face of an admitted deterioration of
the state of public morals. To be more specific, the $unicipal 9oard of the "it# of $anila felt the need
for a remedial measure. 0t provided it with the enactment of the challenged ordinance. / strong case
must be found in the records, and, as has been set forth, none is even attempted here to attach to
an ordinance of such character the taint of nullit# for an alleged failure to meet the due process
requirement. Nor does it lend an# semblance even of deceptive plausibilit# to petitionersD indictment
of Ordinance No. 47! on due process grounds to single out such features as the increased fees for
motels and hotels, the curtailment of the area of freedom to contract, and, in certain particulars, its
alleged vagueness.
/dmittedl# there was a decided increase of the annual license fees provided for b# the challenged
ordinance for hotels and motels, *)!E for the former and over 7!!E for the latter, first-class motels
being required to pa# a 8,!!! annual fee and second-class motels, 84,)!! #earl#. 0t has been the
settled law however, as far bac' as *+77 that municipal license fees could be classified into those
imposed for regulating occupations or regular enterprises, for the regulation or restriction of non-
useful occupations or enterprises and for revenue purposes onl#.
77
/s was e2plained more in detail
in the above "u Fnjieng case= 374 Gicenses for non-useful occupations are also incidental to the
police power and the right to e2act a fee ma# be implied from the power to license and regulate, but
in fi2ing amount of the license fees the municipal corporations are allowed a much wider discretion in
this class of cases than in the former, and aside from appl#ing the well-'nown legal principle that
municipal ordinances must not be unreasonable, oppressive, or t#rannical, courts have, as a general
rule, declined to interfere with such discretion. The desirabilit# of imposing restraint upon the number
of persons who might otherwise engage in non-useful enterprises is, of course, generall# an
important factor in the determination of the amount of this 'ind of license fee. .ence license fees
clearl# in the nature of privilege ta2es for revenue have frequentl# been upheld, especiall# in of
licenses for the sale of liquors. 0n fact, in the latter cases the fees have rarel# been declared
unreasonable.
7,
$oreover in the equall# leading case of Lutz v. Araneta
74
this "ourt affirmed the doctrine earlier
announced b# the /merican <upreme "ourt that ta2ation ma# be made to implement the stateDs
police power. Onl# the other da#, this "ourt had occasion to affirm that the broad ta2ing authorit#
conferred b# the Gocal /utonom# /ct of *+)+ to cities and municipalities is sufficientl# plenar# to
cover a wide range of subjects with the onl# limitation that the ta2 so levied is for public purposes,
just and uniform.
7)
/s a matter of fact, even without reference to the wide latitude enjo#ed b# the "it# of $anila in
imposing licenses for revenue, it has been e2plicitl# held in one case that %much discretion is given
to municipal corporations in determining the amount,% here the license fee of the operator of a
massage clinic, even if it were viewed purel# as a police power measure.
7
The discussion of this
particular matter ma# fitl# close with this pertinent citation from another decision of significance= %0t is
urged on behalf of the plaintiffs-appellees that the enforcement of the ordinance could deprive them
of their lawful occupation and means of livelihood because the# can not rent stalls in the public
mar'ets. 9ut it appears that plaintiffs are also dealers in refrigerated or cold storage meat, the sale of
which outside the cit# mar'ets under certain conditions is permitted 2 2 2 . /nd surel#, the mere fact,
that some individuals in the communit# ma# be deprived of their present business or a particular
mode of earning a living cannot prevent the e2ercise of the police power. /s was said in a case,
persons licensed to pursue occupations which ma# in the public need and interest be affected b# the
e2ercise of the police power embar' in these occupations subject to the disadvantages which ma#
result from the legal e2ercise of that power.%
77
Nor does the restriction on the freedom to contract, insofar as the challenged ordinance ma'es it
unlawful for the owner, manager, 'eeper or dul# authori6ed representative of an# hotel, motel,
lodging house, tavern, common inn or the li'e, to lease or rent room or portion thereof more than
twice ever# 74 hours, with a proviso that in all cases full pa#ment shall be charged, call for a different
conclusion. /gain, such a limitation cannot be viewed as a transgression against the command of
due process. 0t is neither unreasonable nor arbitrar#. 8recisel# it was intended to curb the
opportunit# for the immoral or illegitimate use to which such premises could be, and, according to
the e2planator# note, are being devoted. .ow could it then be arbitrar# or oppressive when there
appears a correspondence between the undeniable e2istence of an undesirable situation and the
legislative attempt at correction. $oreover, petitioners cannot be unaware that ever# regulation of
conduct amounts to curtailment of libert# which as pointed out b# (ustice $alcolm cannot be
absolute. Thus= %One thought which runs through all these different conceptions of libert# is plainl#
apparent. 0t is this= DGibert#D as understood in democracies, is not license; it is Dlibert# regulated b#
law.D 0mplied in the term is restraint b# law for the good of the individual and for the greater good of
the peace and order of societ# and the general well-being. No man can do e2actl# as he pleases.
-ver# man must renounce unbridled license. The right of the individual is necessaril# subject to
reasonable restraint b# general law for the common good 2 2 2 The libert# of the citi6en ma# be
restrained in the interest of the public health, or of the public order and safet#, or otherwise within the
proper scope of the police power.%
75
/ similar observation was made b# (ustice Gaurel= %8ublic welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the
enactment of said law, and the state in order to promote the general welfare ma# interfere with
personal libert#, with propert#, and with business and occupations. 8ersons and propert# ma# be
subjected to all 'inds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health, and
prosperit# of the state 2 2 2 To this fundamental aim of our 1overnment the rights of the individual
are subordinated. Gibert# is a blessing without which life is a miser#, but libert# should not be made
to prevail over authorit# because then societ# will fall into anarch#. Neither should authorit# be made
to prevail over libert# because then the individual will fall into slaver#. The citi6en should achieve the
required balance of libert# and authorit# in his mind through education and personal discipline, so
that there ma# be established the resultant equilibrium, which means peace and order and
happiness for all.
7+
0t is noteworth# that the onl# decision of this "ourt nullif#ing legislation because of undue deprivation
of freedom to contract, People v. Po*ar,
,!
no longer %retains its virtualit# as a living principle. The
polic# of laissez faire has to some e2tent given wa# to the assumption b# the government of the right
of intervention even in contractual relations affected with public interest.
,*
>hat ma# be stressed
sufficientl# is that if the libert# involved were freedom of the mind or the person, the standard for the
validit# of governmental acts is much more rigorous and e2acting, but where the libert# curtailed
affects at the most rights of propert#, the permissible scope of regulator# measure is wider.
,7
.ow
justif# then the allegation of a denial of due process?
Gastl#, there is the attempt to impugn the ordinance on another due process ground b# invo'ing the
principles of vagueness or uncertaint#. 0t would appear from a recital in the petition itself that what
seems to be the gravamen of the alleged grievance is that the provisions are too detailed and
specific rather than vague or uncertain. 8etitioners, however, point to the requirement that a guest
should give the name, relationship, age and se2 of the companion or companions as indefinite and
uncertain in view of the necessit# for determining whether the companion or companions referred to
are those arriving with the customer or guest at the time of the registr# or entering the room >ith him
at about the same time or coming at an# indefinite time later to join him; a proviso in one of its
sections which cast doubt as to whether the maintenance of a restaurant in a motel is dependent
upon the discretion of its owners or operators; another proviso which from their standpoint would
require a guess as to whether the %full rate of pa#ment% to be charged for ever# such lease thereof
means a full da#Ds or merel# a half-da#Ds rate. 0t ma# be as'ed, do these allegations suffice to render
the ordinance void on its face for alleged vagueness or uncertaint#? To as' the question is to answer
it. &rom 0onnall1 v. )eneral 0onstruction 0o.
,,
toAdderle1 v. .lorida,
,4
the principle has been
consistentl# upheld that what ma'es a statute susceptible to such a charge is an enactment either
forbidding or requiring the doing of an act that men of common intelligence must necessaril# guess
at its meaning and differ as to its application. 0s this the situation before us? / citation from (ustice
.olmes would prove illuminating= %>e agree to all the generalities about not suppl#ing criminal laws
with what the# omit but there is no canon against using common sense in construing laws as sa#ing
what the# obviousl# mean.%
,)
That is all then that this case presents. /s it stands, with all due allowance for the arguments
pressed with such vigor and determination, the attac' against the validit# of the challenged
ordinance cannot be considered a success. &ar from it. Hespect for constitutional law principles so
uniforml# held and so uninterruptedl# adhered to b# this "ourt compels a reversal of the appealed
decision.
>herefore, the judgment of the lower court is reversed and the injunction issued lifted forthwith. >ith
costs.
2e1es, J.3.L., Ma4alintal, 3engzon, J.P., 5aldivar, 'anchez, 0astro and Angeles, JJ., concur.
0oncepcion, 0.J. and 6izon, J., are on leave.
&oo)!o)*+
*
The eighteen members are >aldorf .otel, .otel $onte "arlo, 1olden 1ate $otel, $iami
.otel, 8alm <pring .otel, &lamingo $otel, .olida# $otel, Hainbow $otel, 8alo /lto .otel,
8aradise .otel, $a#fair .otel, <iesta "ourt, <un :alle# .otel, <pringfield .otel, New 8alace
.otel, .otel del $ar Gongbeach .otel and Hit6 $otel.
7
F.<. :. <alaveria 3*+*54, ,+ 8hil. *!7, at p. ***. There was an affirmation of the
presumption of validit# of municipal ordinance as announced in the leading <alaveria
decision in -boIa v. @aet, 3*+)!4 5) 8hil. ,+.
,
757 F< 7)*, ,75, (anuar# ), *+,*.
4
0f. 0chong v. .ernande6, 3*+)74 *!* 8hil. **)), at p. **,. /lso= %To &ran'furter the police
power, true to its et#molog# is the power to shape polic#. 0t defies legal definition; as a
response to the d#namic aspects of societ#, it cannot be reduced to a constitutional formula.
The law must be sensitive to life; in resolving cases, it must not fall bac' upon sterile clai*s;
its judgments are not derived from an abstract duel between libert# and the police power.
0nstead, in a world of trusts and unions and large-scale industr#, it must meet the challenge
of drastic social change. &or him as for .olmes, Dsociet# is more than bargain and businessD
and the juristDs art rises to no higher pea' than in vindicating interests not represented b# the
items in a balance-sheet. 0n a progressive societ#, new interests emerge, new attitudes
appeal, social consciousness quic'ens. 0n the face of the un'nown one cannot choose with
certaint#. Nor as #et, has the whole of truth been brought up from its bottomless well and
how fragile in scientific proof is the ultimate validit# of an# particular economic adjustment.
<ocial development is a process of trial and error; in the ma'ing of polic# the fullest possible
opportunit# must be given for the pla# of the human mind. 0f "ongress or legislature does not
regulate, laissez faire 7 not the individual J must be the regulator. 3.amilton, 8review of a
(ustice 3*+,+4 45 Kale Gaw (ournal, 5*+4.
)
Noble state 9an' v. .as'ell, 7*+ F.<. 4*7.

F.<. v. 1ome6-(esus, 3*+*)4 ,* 8hil. 7*5.

7
Hubi v. 8rovincial 9oard, 3*+*54 ,+ 8hil. !.
5
F.<. vs. 1iner "ru6, 3*+*54 ,5 8hil. 77.
+
F.<. vs. Hodrigue6, 3*+*54 ,5 8hil. 7)+. <ee also <armiento v. 9elderol, G-*)7*+, $a# ,*,
*+*; Gapera v. :icente, G-*5*!7, (une ,!, *+7.
*!
F.<. v. 8acis, 3*+*)4 ,* 8hil. )74.
**
F.<. vs. -spiritu-<anto, 3*+*74 7, 8hil. *!; F.<. vs. (oson, 3*+*,4 7 8hil. *; 8eople vs.
"han .ong, 3*+,54 ) 8hil. 7).
*7
F.<. v. Tamparong, 3*+*)4 ,* 8hil. ,7*.
*,
F.<. v. <alaveria, 3*+*54 ,+ 8hil. *!7.
*4
F# .a v. The "it# $a#or, G-*4*4+, $a# ,!, *++; $iranda v. "it# of $anila, G-*77)7, $a#
,*, *+*.
*)
F.<. v. Ten Ku, 3*+*74 74 8hil. *.
*
There is no occasion to consider even cursoril# the alleged invasion of the right of privac#
or the prohibition against self-incrimination. 8etitioners obviousl# are not the proper parties to
do so. Nor ma# such an incurable defect be remedied b# an accommodating intervenor %who
has alwa#s ta'en advantage of as he e2clusivel# relies on, the facilities, services and
accommodations offered b# petitioner-motels. / general merchant, doing business not onl#
in 9aguio "it# but in the "it# of $anila, has no legitimate cause for complaint. /t least, not
according to the case as it has been developed.
*7
&ran'furter, $r. (ustice .olmes and the <upreme "ourt, 3*+,54 pp. ,7- ,,.
*5
&ran'furter, .annah v. Garche, 3*+!4 ,, F.<. 47!, at 457.
*+
"afeteria >or'ers v. $c-lro#, 3*+*4 ,7 F.<. *7,!.
7!
9art'us v. 0llinois, 3*+)+4 ,)+ F.<. *7*.
7*
8earson v. $c1raw, 3*+,+4 ,!5 F.<. ,*,.
77
"u Fnjieng v. 8ostpone, 3*+774 47 8hil. 5*5, 575.
7,
"iting <warth v. 8eople, *!+ 0ll. 7*; @enneh# v. "it# of "hicago, *7! 0ll. 77; *7 N.-., 777;
Fnited <tates @istilling "o. v. "it# of "hicago, **7 0ll. *+= @rew "ount# v. 9ennet, 4, /r'.
,4; $erced "ount# v. &leming, 0ll "al. 4; 4, 8ac. ,+7; >illiams v. "it# "ouncil of >est
8oint, 5 1a. 5*; "hen# v. <hellb#ville, *+ 0nd. 54; >ile# #. Owens, ,+ 0nd. 47+; <weet v.
"it# of >abash, 4* 0nd. 7; (ones v. 1rad#, 7) Ga. /nn. )5; 1oldsmith v. "it# of New
Orleans, ,* Ga. /nn. 4; 8eople e rel., "ramer v. $edberr#, ,+ N.K.<. 7!7; *7 $isc. Hep.,
5 ; $c1uigan v. Town of 9elmont, 5+ >is. ,7; 7 N.>., 47*; 8 parte 9urnett ,! /la. 4*;
"raig v. 9urnett ,7 /la., 775, and $uhlenbrinc' v. Gong 9ranch "ommissioner, 47 N.(.G.
,4; , /m. Hep., )*5. /t pp. 57+-5,!.
74
+5 8hil. *45 3*+))4, citing 1reat /tl L 8ac. Tea "o. v 1rosjean, ,!* F.<. 4*7, 5* G. -d.
**+,; F.<. v. 9utler, 7+7 F< *, 5! G. -d 477; $D"ulloch v. $ar#land, 4 >heat ,*, 4 G. -d
)7+. The Gut6 decision was followed in Hepublic v. 9acolod $urcia $illing, G-*+574, (ul# +,
*+.
7)
Ormoc <ugar "o. v. $unicipal 9oard of Ormoc "it#, G-74,77, (ul# 7*, *+7.
7
8h#sical Therap# Organi6ation v. $unicipal 9oard, 3*+)74 *!* 8hil. **47.
77
"o Mian L Gee 9an v. "it# of $anila, 3*+))4 + 8hil. 4+, )4, citing "it# of New Orleans v.
<tafford, 77 G. /nn. 4*7.
75
Hubi v. 8rovincial 9oard, 3*+*+4 ,+ 8hil. !, at 7!, citing .all v. 1eiger-(ones 3*+*4, 747
F.<. ),+; .ardie-T#nes $anufacturing "o. vs. "ru6 3*+*44, *5+ /la. .
7+
"alalang v. >illiams 3*+4!4, 7! 8hil. 77, at 7,,-7,4.
,!
4 8hil. 44! 3*+744. The 8hilippines was then under /merican sovereignt#, /merican
<upreme "ourt decisions having thus an obligator# effect. No alternative was left to this
"ourt e2cept to follow the then controlling decision in /d'ins v. "hildrenDs .ospital 3*+744,
7* F.<. )7), which subsequentl# was overruled in >est "oast .otel v. 8arrish 3*+,74, ,!!
F.<. ,7+.
,*
/ntamo' 1oldfields $ining "o. v. "ourt 3*+4!4, 7! 8hil. ,4!, at ,!, quoting a concurring
opinion of (ustice Gaurel in /ng Tiba# v. "ourt, 1.H. No. 44+.
,7
0f. %0n weighing arguments of the parties it is important to distinguish between the due
process clause of the &ourteenth /mendment as an instrument for transmitting the principles
of the &irst /mendment and those cases in which it is applied for its own sa'e. The test of
legislation which collides with the &ourteenth /mendment because it also collides with the
principles of the &irst, is much more definite than the test when onl# the &ourteen is involved.
$uch of the vagueness of the due process clause disappears when the specific prohibition
of the &irst become its standard. The right of a <tate to regulate, for e2ample, a public utilit#
ma# well include, so far as the due process test is concerned, power to impose all of the
restrictions which a legislature ma# have a Drational basisD for adopting. 9ut freedoms of
speech and of press, of assembl#, and of worship ma# well be infringed on such slender
grounds. The# are susceptible of restriction onl# to prevent an immediate danger to interests
which the state ma# lawfull# protect.% 3>est :irginia <tate 9d. of -du v. 9arnette, 3*+474, ,*+
F.<. 74, at ,+4.
,,
7+ F.<. ,5) 3*+74.
,4
*7 G. ed. 7d *4+, Nov. *4, *+.
,)
Hoschen v. >ard 3*+7+4, 77+ F. <. ,,7,,,+.