Some Whys and Wherefores Andrew Guilder Frank Did the Cuban Revolution grow out of the dictatorial repression of Batista ? Yes, certainly, but the repression of Batista generated no more cause for revolt than that of Trujillo in the Dominican Republic ot Jimenez in Venezuela, Is it a movement to liberate Cuba from American domination of its economy ? Undoubt edl y, but other Carribean countries, like Guatemala and Honduras, are no less famed for American influence in their economic life. Does the Cuban Revolution represent a battle against poverty, hunger disease and illiteracy ? Cer- tainly', but poverty in Haiti is much more severe than in Cuba. Indeed per capita income in Cuba- is higher than almost anywhere else in Latin America. The absence of indigenous Indians perhaps facilitates the success of the Revolution, but Costa Rica similarly has no Indians, nor does Uruguay. The author does not attempt to describe or explain the Cuban Revolution exhaustively. He merely wants to expose for inspection the background and the sources of the developments that Cuba and the world now witness. He leaves it to the understanding and research of others to explore the many questions only raised here. CUBANS pr ocl ai m themselves the f i r st free count ry i n La t i n Amer i ca. What do they me a n? Wh y di d the r evol ut i on whi ch i s devel opi ng in Cuba take place pre- cisely there and not elsewhere? Wh y does the Cuban Revol ut i on take the f or m i t does rat her t han the f or m, for instance, of our of the Lat i n Amer i can revol ut i ons whi ch preceded it ? Several causes of the Cuban Re- vol ut i on i mmedi at el y suggest them- solves, but none of them si ngl y or in combi nat i on appear to offer a satisfactory expl anat i on of the t i me and place of the Revol ut i on. Di d the Revol ut i on grow out of the di ct at or i al repression of Batista ? Yes. cert ai nl y i t di d. But the re- pressi on of Batista generated no more cause, for revolt t han that of Tr u j i l l o i n the Domi ni can Republ i c or that of Jimenez in Venezuela ; yet the Domi ni can Republ i c has witnessed no r evol ut i on at al l , and Venezeula one whi ch has taken a f or m qui t e di fferent f r om the Cuban Revol ut i on. Is the Cuban Revol ut i on a move- ment t o l i berat e Cuba f r om Ame r i - can domi nat i on of i t s economy i n the fi el ds of sugar, publ i c ut i l i t i es, and l arge part s of commerce? Un- doubt edl y. But ot her Carri bean count ri es, l i ke Guat emal a and Hon- duras, are no less famed for Ame- r i can i nfl uence i n t hei r economic l i f e , Honduras has witnessed no r evol ut i on and Guatemala one whi ch took a different f or m. Does the Cuban Revol ut i on re- present a battle against povert y, against hunger, disease and i l l i t er a- cy ? Cer t ai nl y. But pover t y in Ha i t i is much more severe than in Cuba. Indeed, per capi t a income in Cul m is higher t han almost any- where else i n Lat i n Ameri ca. Ma r be it is this very relative weal t h whi ch has gi ven Cuba the abi l i t y and the strength to make so far- reachi ng a r evol ut i on. But such resources are avai l abl e in concen- trated f or m also i n the Mont evi deo of Ur uguay or the Ri o de Janeiro and Sao Paula regions of Br azi l . The absence of indigenous Indi ans probabl y facilitates the success of the Cuban Revol ut i on. But Cost a Rica si mi l ar l y has no Indi ans, nor does Ur uguay. Maybe it is less the absence of Indi ana than the presence of a mi ddl e class and of a pool of pot ent i al i nt el l ect ual leadership whi ch has faci l i t at ed the Cuban Revol ut i on. But Br azi l , Ar gent i na, and Chi l e have si mi l ar sources of pot ent i al l eadershi p; and there is evidence that i n Mexi co, whi ch witnessed its own r evol ut i on fi ft y years ago, it is precisely the mi d- dle class whi ch is the source of the i ncreasi ng conservatism whi c h mi l i t at e against the extension of economi c development i nt o t he Mexi can count rysi de. Thus, wi t h o u t 1101 i nvoki ng the charisma of Fi del , an exhaustive causative expl anat i on of the Cuban Revol ut i on may not be possible. At any rate. I cannot provi de one. Historical Source However a Iess ambi t i ous expl a- nat i on shoul d not be beyond our reach, Every resol ut i on is a reac- t i on to the past, and that past is cert ai nl y open to our i nspect i on. Indeed, today' s r evol ut i on is a pr o- duct as well of past reactions, t hat is. of earlier revolutionary at- tempts. By l ooki ng at the earl i er at- tempts t o deal wi t h si mi l ar probl ems, par t i cul ar l y by pr i or re- vol ut i ons i n Lat i n Amer i ca, we should be able to suggest how some al t ernat i ve f or ms of the Cuban Re- vol ut i on may have come to be excl uded. Fur t her mor e, no revol u- t i on can change ever yt hi ng. Para- doxi cal l y, a r evol ut i on must r el y on wel l -ent renched social forms, such as pat ernal i sm in Cuba, to effect a radi cal change i n ot her forms of social rel at i ons. Thus, a st udy of social and cul t ur al forms whi ch di d and di d not exist i n the Cuba of ol d shoul d yi el d some i ndi cat i ons of the r evol ut i onar y possi bi l i t i es f or the Cuba of t omor r ow. The present paper, then, is an at t empt to expl or e these three sources of expl anat i on of the Cuban Revolu- t i on : the hi st ori cal source of t he r evol ut i on, al t ernat i ve solutions- to La t i n Ame r i c a n pr obl e ms whi c h SPECIAL NUMBER JULY 1961 THE ECONOMIC WEEKLY have been f ound want i ng, and the soci o-cul tural f or ms whi ch deter- mi ne not onl y the r evol ut i onar y necessities, but also the revol ut i on- ar y possi bi l i t i es. I n pur sui ng these expl or at i ons, we shoul d not how- ever expect to fi nd i mpor t ant ans- wers as instead we find i mpor t ant new questi ons. The hi st ory of Lat i n Amer i ca mi ght be summed up by sayi ng t hat the Spani sh came to expl oi t and t hei r successors remai ned to expl oi t . The mai n social features of l arge parts of Lat i n Amer i ca wer e wel l known : the consolida- t i on of agr i cul t ur al l ands under l at i f undi sl a ownershi p, the rol e of the chur ch i n keepi ng peopl e qui et and of the ar my i f they were not, the rol e of the r i si ng mi ddl e classes based i n commerce and the profes- sions whi ch account f or the very one-sided economi c devel opment that does occur, t he al l i ance of Amer i can capi t al wi t h al l these groups, the r i ght - wi ng di ct at orshi ps t hat are the capstone whi ch ties the social f abr i c together by f orce and t error. Pr obabl y more than total mass povert y and i gnorance, i t has been the excl usi on of the vast ma- j or i t y of Lat i n Amer i cans f r om the soci al , pol i t i cal , and economi c bene- fi ts enj oyed by some peopl e i n these societies whi ch has resul ted i n the many sporadi c soci al upheaval s r angi ng f r om changes i n the pal ace guar d to f ul l scale soci al re- vol ut i ons. Structure of Latin American Society The Cuban Revol ut i on has its roots i n thi s general st r uct ur e of Lat i n Amer i can soci ety, i n t hi s same Lat i n Amer i can soci al move- ment to whi ch that social st ruct ure has gi ven risie (i ndeed, i n the t went i et h cent ury wor l d revol ut i on as a whol e) but it has i ts own hi s- t or y as wel l , i n the pecul i ar Cuban condi t i ons arid the l ong hi st or y of r evol ut i onar y and l i ber at i on move- merits whi ch have t i me and agai n at t empt ed but fai l ed to al t er sub- st ant i al l y the st ruct ure of Cuban soci ety. Near l y a cent ury ago, i n 18' 8, Cuba revol ts agai nst Spai n. The r evol ut i on i s i nt el l ect ual l y i n- spi r ed and l ed, t hough i t has some measure of popul ar suppor t . The revol ut i on f ai l s and Spai n ret ai ns i t s pol i t i cal supremacy. I n the years whi ch f ol l ow, Amer i can capi - t al begi ns seri ousl y t o be i nvested i n Cuban sugar. I ndeed, , a U S consul ar r epor t of 1878 notes t hat " commer ci al l y Cuba has become a dependency of the Uni t ed States al t hough pol i t i cal l y i t remai ns a dependency of Spai n. " By 1895 Cuba i s ready to wage a f ul l scale r evol ut i onar y war of i ndependence agai nst Spai n. Thr ee years l ater, i n 1808, the Uni t ed States enters the war agai nst Spai n on the si de of Cuba. Vi ewed i n the context of a hundr ed years of U S and Confe- derate designs on Cuba, combi ned wi t h mor e recent l y acqui r ed di rect economi c interests, t he Pl at t Amendment of 1902 whi ch reser- ves the r i ght to the Uni t ed States to i ntervene at its pl easure in the domesti c af f ai rs of the supposedl y soverei gn Cuba need come as no surpri se, Cuba, exhausted by i ts war of l i ber at i on agai nst Spai n, i s faced wi t h the choi ce of out r i ght annexat i on by the Uni t ed States as befel l Pi er t o Ri co and the Phi l i - ppi nes or pr esumpt i ve soverei gnt y wi t h Amer i can i nt er vent i on. I t chooses the l atter and i s vi si t ed by Amer i can mi l i t ar y i nt er vent i on t hree ti mes unt i l the repeal of the Pi at t Amendment i n 1933 and by ot her f or ms of i nt ervent i on unt i l thi s day. I n the meant i me the i nt r oduct i on of rai l roads and el ect ri ci t y i nt o Cuba r adi cal l y increases the di s- tance over whi ch sugar cane coul d bo t ransport ed and the size of the mi l l s i n whi ch i t coul d be process- ed. As a resul t, the ear l i er smal l hol di ngs of l and and l i t t l e mi l l s i n- creasi ngl y become consol i dated i n- to large-scale l at i f undi sl a hol di ngs of l and and of l arge sugar centrales whi ch r ei gn over the l andscape l i ke f eudal castles. As el sewhere i n Lat i n Amer i ca t o thi s day, thi s fer- ti l e gr ound f or r i ght - wi ng di ct at or- shi ps easily produces and support s the di ct at or shi p of Machado dur i ng the ni neteen twenti es. When t hi s di ct at orshi p i s over t hr own i n 1931, the r ef or m movement whi ch seeks to remove some of the soci al , pol i - t i cal , and economi c sources of such di ct at orshi ps f ai l s, and, let i t be not ed, f ai l s wi t h the ai d and i nt er- vent i on of the U S Depar t ment of Stat? and Embassy i n t he person of Sumner Wel l es who support s t he conservati ves, and onl y a moderate r ef or m prevai l s. When the effects of the depres- si on and the decl i ne of Cuba' s sugar f or t unes were combi ned wi t h t he subst ant i al cont i nuance of t he ol d regi me and af t er t he t empor ar y r ui n of t he second war has agai n di sappeared, the t i me i s r i pe f or a renewed di ct at or shi p of the Ma- chado t ype. Af t er years of var yi ng amount s of i nf l uence, Bati sta takes power i n the coup of Mar ch 10, 1952. I n the years of hi s power , he ki l l s and of t en t ort ures t went y thousand peopl e. As a nutshel l i n- dex of the f ort unes of Cuba dur i ng these years past, one mi ght observe that f ol l owi ng the 1895 war of l i ber- at i on the l i t eracy rat e grew mar- kedl y; dur i ng the years of Ma- chado' s di ct at orshi p the l i t eracy rate agai n decl i ned; i t rose sl owl y dur- i ng the years af t er Maehado' s exi t and bef ore Bati sta' s ent r y; and l i t eracy decl i ned agai n dur i ng the six years of Bati sta' s government . Not Made in a Day The cur r ent r evol ut i on i n Cuba was not made i n a day. It was bor n out of three hundr ed years of hi st or y and at least a hundr ed years of pr i or r evol ut i onar y act i vi t y. But even as the r evol ut i on was bor n i n the decade of the 1950s i t di d not, l i ke At hena, emerge f ul l gr own out of Fi del Castro' s head. I ndeed, the f or ms whi ch the r evol ut i on was t o take and st i l l wi l l t ake i n the f ut ur e grew out of i ts own ei ght-year hi s- t ory i n Cuba and the r evol ut i onar y experi ence elsewhere i n Lat i n Am- eri ca. To underst and even i n the most superf i ci al sense the nat ure and causes of the r adi cal i sm whi ch characteri zes the Cuban Revol ut i on t oday, i t i s necessary to exami ne the Revol ut i on i n the l i ght of t hi s recent hi st or y whi ch has made i t what i t i s. But as we do so, i t wi l l agai n he possi bl e to do no more t han rai se questi ons as to how and why cert ai n ci rcumstances l ed t o the deci si ons t hat were t aken. In a sense what the f ol l owi ng expl ora- t i on can do i s r oughl y t o map the r oad of the r evol ut i on i ndi cat i ng some of the road f or ks at whi ch choices had to be made to gui de i t one way or anot her. Much closer acquai nt ance wi t h ci rcumst ances of the ti mes woul d be neceteary to as- si gn seri ous expl anat i ons to these choices. El ecti ons were schedul ed f or the spr i ng of 1952. When i t became cl ear that the i mpendi ng vote woul d not br i ng hi m i nt o office, Bat i st a as- sumed power by a mi l i t ar y coup on Mar ch 10, 1952. Soon t hereaf t er, Fi del Castro, t hen a l awyer , fi l ed a br i ef i n t he court s changi ng Bat i st a 1102 THE ECONOMIC WEEKLY SPECIAL NUMBER JULY 1961 wi t h several count a of vi ol at i on of the Cuban Const i t ut i on of 1940. Thi s br i ef represents Fi del Castro' s first publ i c challenge. But as an attack on the i l l egal i t y of the Batista di ct at orshi p rat her t han as an at t empt to i ni t i at e a far-reachi ng social r evol ut i on, t hi s first challenge of the statua-quo was a far cry f r om the revol ut i on whi c h Fi del ' s name has become associated. Thi s revol u- t i on was to assume its present f or m onl y as a result of many events st i l l to come in the six years f ol l owi ng. Weapons for Legal Arguments The f i r st furt her development i n the di rect i on of r adi cal i sm was to substitute weapons where legal arguments had f ai l ed. On Jul y 26, 1953, Fi del led 125 men in an at- tack on For t Moncada in the hope of capt ur i ng the weapons and sup- pl i es whi ch mi ght be used in an attack on the ar my, the real source of Batista' s power. The attack was unsuccessful. Most of the attackers were ki l l ed, not so much in battle as after becomi ng prisoners. Thr ough a series of fort unat e accidents. Fi del ' s l i f e was spared and he was brought to t r i al . Act i ng as his own at t orney for defense, Fi del spoke four hours in defense of his attack against an unconst i t ut i onal govern- ment. Hi s defense ended wi t h the words, "Condemn me. I don' t care. Hi s t or y wi l l absolve me.' ' Under t hat t i t l e his defense plea has be- come famous as an i mpor t ant docu- ment of the Revol ut i on. Most of Fi del ' s discussion was devoted to the circumstances i mmedi at el y sur- r oundi ng the i l l -fat ed attack of Jul y 26. But a par t of his defense was devoted to the r ef or m pro- gr amme f or whi ch he had fought and the measures he woul d have i ni t i at ed had his rebel l i on been successful. Fi del l i st ed f i ve r evol ut i onar y laws whi c h woul d have been i mme- di at el y pr ocl ai med. They dealt wi t h the re-i nst i t ut i on of the Const i t ut i on of 1940 and the assumption of legislative, executive and j udi ci al powers by the revol ut i onary move- ment, the gr ant i ng of propert y i n l and t o those who wor k, two profi t - shar i ng measures, and confiscation of i l l - got t en gai n. He went on i n five pages out of ei ght y to out l i ne the six maj or probl ems wi t h whi ch a Cuban Revol ut i on woul d have to deal : l and r ef or m, i ndust ri al i za- t i on, housi ng, unempl oyment , edu- cat i on, and health, "al ong wi t h the rest orat i on of publ i c l i bert i es and pol i t i cal democracy. " He offered solutions to onl y t wo of these l and : expr opr i at i on, redi st ri bu- t i on and agr i cul t ur al co-operatives; and housi ng : cut t i ng rents in hal f and financing new housi ng. I em- phasize this revol ut i onary docu- ment because it is today wi del y claimed i n Cuba that "Hi s t or y Wi l l Absolve Me " represents the blue- pr i nt of the revol ut i on we are now wi t nessi ng. I suggest that t hi s wi despread Cuban view is mistaken. It does not appear that the f or m the Cuban Revol ut i on takes today was conceived in 1953. Exami na- t i on of the document wi t h this ques- t i on in mi nd the emphasis on recourse to l egal i t y, the rel at i ve moderat i on of the five i mmedi at e laws, the f ai l ur e to indicate, much less to spell out. any programme of attack on the six maj or p r o b l e ms - wi l l , I believe, demonstrate that " Hi s t or y Wi l l Absolve Me " may have contained some, goals and di rect i onal signposts, but that it cer- t ai nl y was not a bl uepr i nt , plat- f or m, or pr ogr amme, wri t t en in 1953, of the revol ut i on which was to take place after 1959. To say so does not. and is not meant; to con- demn either Fidel' s 195 3 position or his I 960 act i on. It is only to say that to find the roots of today' s revol ut i on we must look a good deal furt her. Landing in Oriente The next step in the development of the r evol ut i onar y movement, whi ch by then had taken the 26t h of Jul y as its name, was st i l l fur- ther to radi cal i ze the means of revol ut i on. Fi del had, of course, been condemned by the court, but had regained his freedom shortly thereafter as a result of a general amnesty whi ch Batista declared to reduce the gr owi ng pressure against his regi me. Fi del used his free- dom to pl an a well-conceived co- ordi nat ed mi l i t ar y attack on the Batista government . On December 2, 1956, he landed wi t h ei ght y-t wo men on a beach in Oriente Pro- vi nce. The l andi ng was to have coincided wi t h an upr i si ng i n San- t i ago. Or i ent es largest ci t y. Bad weather delayed the ship' s ar r i val f r om Mexi co, the upr i si ng alerted the government, and the l andi ng force was al l but wi ped out . Twel ve men escaped death and reached the pr ot ect i on of the Si erra Maes- tre Mount ai ns. It i s pr obabl e that, 1103 had t hi s 1956 r ebel l i on succeeded, Cuba woul d not be experi enci ng the radi cal and pr of ound social revol ut i on whi ch the wor l d i s wi t - nessing today. For even then the r evol ut i onar y movement had not developed and mat ured i nt o the r adi cal i sm and pr of undi t y whi ch i t was to have more than two years later. St i l l other events had to t ranspi re, experiences had to arise, before the revol ut i on could assume its present f or m. Fi del had selected his l andi ng place in Oriente not onl y because of the tactical advantage that the mountains could afford. There are mountains as well elsewhere in Cuba. However, Ori ent e has l ong been at once the poorest and the most mi l i t ant l y rebellious provi nce in Cuba. Possibly due. in part , to the much greater prevalence of small pr i vat e hol di ngs in the coffee and tobacco count ry of Oriente, its peasants and its intellectuals at the pr ovi nci al Uni versi t y of Oriente had been more active supporters of the revol ut i onary movement of the hundred years preceding. Fi del counted on t hei r support. Ear l y in 1957 Fi del and his ele- ven companions sought to i ni t i at e gueri l l a war f ar e against Batista' s ar my from t hei r mount ai n hideouts. Batista had sometimes fifteen t hou- sand, sometimes t went y thousand men under arms: Fi del had twelve. What were the sources of the sup- port Fidel needed to fi ght such odds? The Communi st Part y, wi t h a membershi p of possibly ten thousand, mostly in Havana, offer- ed no support whatever. Not sur- pr i si ngl y, it regarded Fi del as a romant i c. latter-day version of a Lor d Byr on or Robi n Hood. Nor di d the peasants of the Si erra, on whose account Fi del had landed there, support hi m or his move- ment. If they were interested at al l . they regarded Fi del wi t h sus- pi ci on and his movement as another i nt el l ect ual and middle-class re- f or m, not unl i ke that of 1933, whi ch woul d promi se no i mprove- ment in the lives of the large pea- sant maj or i t y. Who, then, di d lend support to Fi del ? Students mostly i n Santiago, rather than Havana, and members of the middle-class i n Havana. Not unl i ke the peasants, they t hought that Fidel' s movement was one of middle-class r ef or m. The middle-class suppl i ed the money for weapons, and the students SPECIAL NUMBER JULY 1961 THE ECONOMIC WEEKLY 1104 THE ECONOMIC WEEKLY SPECIAL NUMBER JULY 1961 of Santiago suppl i ed t he com- mi t ment and courage t o smuggl e t hem i nt o the mount ai ns. Movement Rallies Support Dur i ng 1957 and 1958 Fi del ' s gr oup waged guer i l l a war f ar e i n the mount ai ns and sent an expedi- t i on across the plains of Camaugey. Wi t h the mat ur at i on and attendant repression of the Batista dictator- shi p and i t s combattal by Fi del ' s gr oup, the Movement of the 26t h of Jul y i ncreasi ngl y r al l i ed support t o its side. Seeing some peasants and Fi del ' s men fighting side by side, other peasants came to gai n confi- dence in Fi del and his cause. Havana Negroes had lent some sup- port to Batista, apparent l y because the combi nat i on of his Mul l at o bl ood wi t h his rise t o power bad appeal ed to t hem, as a symbol of t hei r own ascendance and recogni- t i on i n the society. In the mean- t i me, i n Ori ent e (t he onl y other pro- vi nce i n whi ch Negroes l i ve i n large number s) , Negroes came to sense t hat Fidel' s movement represented so t hor ough a movement t owar d social equal i t y that it augured emanci pat i on f or them as wel l . The gr owi ng popul ar support for Fidel' s movement , combi ned wi t h the com- plete f ai l ur e of the Mar ch 1959 general st ri ke whi ch represented the capstone of t hei r earl i er tactics against Batista, resulted in the sup- por t of and subsequent collabora- t i on wi t h the 26t h of Jul y move- ment of the Communi st Part y of Cuba i n Ap r i l 1959. Addi t i onal sources of support , campai gns against ur ban mi l i t a r y garri sons wi t h gun i n one hand and mi cr ophone i n the ot her ; demora- l i zi ng Batista' s ar my by di sar mi ng pri soners and t hen setting them free, that is, t r eat i ng t hem as fellow vi ct i ms of Batista rat her t han as his defenders, i ncreasi ngl y f aci l i t a- ted Castro' s mi l i t a r y campai gn. Lat e i n 1958, three hundr ed men under arms wi t hst ood and even- t ual l y destroyed the arms of twen- ty thousand men whi ch sent a sin- gl e expedi t i onar y force of twelve thousand men to crush the rebel l i on once and f or al l . Peasants Influence Movement But for the l ong r un of Cuba and of La t i n Amer i ca, possi bl y more i mpor t ant t han Castro' s i n- fluence on the peasants and others was t he influence of the peasants on Castro and hi s movement . Not- wi t hst andi ng Fi del ' s emphasis on l and r ef or m in 1953 and his selec- t i on of r ur al Ori ent e as t he place f r om whi c h to wage his war, the t wo years he and his men spent f i ght i ng and l i vi ng among the peasants in the mount ai ns undoub- tedly resulted in an empathy and a dept h of underst andi ng of the pea sants and t hei r problems whi ch they woul d have lacked had the 1956 at t empt , to say not hi ng of the 1953 attempt, been i mmedi at el y success- f ul . The events and experiences of the years 1957 and 1958 thus be- came cr uci al l y i mpor t ant i n shap- i ng the f or m that the. revol ut i on eventually was to take, and, to ant i - cipate an argument below, for the lesson that Lat i n Ameri cans have undoubt edl y learned about the di f- ference between a resol ut i on fought in ihe ci t y and a revol ut i on fought i n the count r y. No Reliance on Professional Army On New Year' s eve of 1958 Batista flees the count ry, and on January 1, 1959 Fi del Castro and his forces take cont rol of the go- vernment . The rebel l i on against the di ct at orshi p of Batisla whi ch grew out of 1952. 1953 and 1956 had ended in 1958. But the Revol ut i on, whose antecedants were 1492. 1808, 1895 and 1933 had only just begun on that same day. In a sense, the six year rebel l i on was onl y the la- bour whi c h made possible the bi r t h of a revolution conceived in 1492. How woul d the new-born revol ut i on develop, what f or m woul d it take ? I t s per i od of pregnancy and indeed its peri od of l abour woul d deter- mi ne the f or m it woul d take, but so woul d the envi ronment i nt o whi ch i t was born and i nt o whi ch it must gr ow. The first act of the revol ut i onary movement was to establish a government headed by a president, a pr i me mi ni st er, and i mpor t ant ambassadors. What f or m mi ght the Cuban Revol ut i on take ? In a sense, any of a large vari et y of forms. Why does it take precisely the f or m that i t does ? It i s pr obabl y i mpossi bl e to say. But the foregoi ng sections have poi nt ed to the nat ure of Cuban society (i t must be left to the reader to f ami l i ar i ze hi msel f wi t h the themes and details of Cuban and La t i n Amer i can soci et y), and they have sketched the develop- ment of response to these condi- tions. We have seen t hat some reforms have been rel i ed upon i n 1105 the past and have been found want - i ng. Cubans have seen i t too, and i t shoul d not be sur pr i si ng i f t hey woul d geek not to make the same mistakes agai n. A r ough and ready classification of some other alter- native forms the revol ut i on mi ght take can be gleaned f r om the ex- perience of other Lat i n Amer i can countries in their attempts to face i n part si mi l ar problems. An out- sider cannot, of course, cl ai m that this experience elsewhere Mas steer- ed the Cuban Revol ut i on precisely i nt o the course it has taken. But it is certain that the leaders of the Cuban Revol ut i on, and in a less sophisticated way large masses of the Cuban people, have f ami l i ar i zed themselves wi t h this La t i n Ame r i - can revol ut i onary experience and that they have sought to avoi d its mistakes. We may thus bri efl y review this Lat i n Amer i can expe- rience and suggest some lessons whi ch, from the Cuban poi nt of view, this experience has to offer. It is common knowledge that in recent decades the largest par t of r api d pol i t i cal change i n Lat i n Ameri ca has taken the f or m of i nt ra-army changes in the palace guar d. It is as obvious as it is f ami l i ar that such rebellions are s t i l l bor n and i n no way further the r evol ut i onar y r ef or m movement whi ch Cuba has harboured all these years. Moreover, gi ven the rol e that the Lat i n Amer i can ar my t ypi - cal l y plays in safeguardi ng the con- servatism of the .society, keepi ng the professional army intact means that a maj or road block to social change has failed to be removed. Exiling the ol d leadership, as is so customary i n Lat i n Amer i ca, si mi - l ar l y mai nt ai ns or provi des a nu- cleus for the resurgence of the ol d regime. An al t ernat i ve, i mpor t ant i f the rebel l i on has been l ong and violent, is t hat the ol d leadership is mobbed by the angr y people, i n French Revol ut i on style. But this alternative is also costly to the peo- ple themselves. Thus reliance on r evol ut i onar y courts. even t hough they may look l i ke kangaroo courts and convi ct i on and execu- t i on hol d i mpor t ant benefits over the other t wo l i kel y alternatives. So does r ehabi l i t at i on of lower echelon leadership where i t i s possible. In this context, Cuban reliance for t he rebel l i on on mi l i t a r y forces out- side of the professional ar my, and its subsequent destruction and el i - mi nat i on of the di ct at or i al leaders SPECIAL NUMBER JULY 1961 THE ECONOMIC WEEKLY 1106 THE ECONOMIC WEEKLY SPECIAL NUMBER JULY 1961 seems a pl ausi bl e course f or the pur sui t of t he reforms al r eady i n- tended by generations of Cuban revol ut i onari es. Shift from City to Country To the extent t hat Lat i n Ame r i - can rebel l i ons have i nvol ved large- scale f i ght i ng, this f i ght i ng has, wi t h the notable except i on of the Mexi can and Bol i vi an cases, occur- red pr i nc i pa l l y i n t he maj or ci t y or ci t i ea Thi s mi l i t ar y act i on i n the cities has been at the same t i me sympt om and cause of the ur ban rebellions whi ch have so wi del y characterized the r ur al societies of Lat i n Amer i ca. These ur ban rebel- lions have i n t ur n resulted pr i ma r i - l y i n ur ban reforms. Where they have led t o changes i n the r ur al society as wel l , these changes have been l argel y br ought to, i f not for- ced on, the count rysi de. Even the most cursory acquaintance wi t h ur ban- r ur al confl i ct , deni ed t hough it may be by generations of Soviet and West ern wri t ers, wi l l forbode unhappy consequences for t hi s pr o- cess. The more intensive and ex- tensive changes i n the r ur al and r ur al - ur ban social rel at i ons whi ch have been associated wi t h the par t i - ci pat i on of Zapata' s peasants i n the Mexi can revol ut i on of 1910 and the t wo years of gueri l l a warfare by Castro' s forces i n the mount ai ns of Cuba foreshadow a shi ft in the l o- cus and nat ure of rebel l i on and r evol ut i on f r om ci t y t o count r y i n the La t i n Amer i can upheavals whi ch arc soon to come. Argentina and Venezuela An al t ernat i ve f or m for the Cu- ban Revol ut i on, more radi cal t han the cl earl y inadequate changes of the palace guar d considered and rejected above, may be represented by recent reforms i n Ar gent i na and Venezuela. Peron' s government i n Ar gent i na adopted the course of a wel fare state. I n faci ng Argent i na' s economi c probl ems, Peron sought to rely on the re-di st ri but i on of the i ncome pi e i mpl i c i t i n the welfare state, wi t h har dl y any concern f or i ncreasi ng the size of that pie. Ur - ban workers were favoured, and i n the meant i me agr i cul t ur al produc- t i v i t y decl i ned. To cont i nue t o enforce t he di s t r i but i on hi s govern- ment desired, Peron became increas- si ngl y di ct at or i al and hi s govern- ment i ncreasi ngl y repressive. I n the mean t i me f ar t her nor t h, Jimenez dealt wi t h Venezuela' s economi c probl ems by resort i ng neither to re- di st r i but i on, nor t o investment i n gr owt h, wi t h the exception of the pet r ol eum i ndust r y whi ch filled the coffers of his treasury, but whose benefits har dl y t r i ckl ed i nt o the count rysi de beyond Caracas' l uxu- r y housi ng and l uxur y hi ghways. I n bot h countries, but par t i cul ar l y i n Venezuela, socio-political i n- equal i t y was felt us repression by the r ur al maj ori t i es. Both dictators were over t hr own after the mi d- 1950's. Bot h dictatorships were re- placed by substantially middle-class based hol ders of power whi ch have, par t i cul ar l y i n the Uni t ed States, been wi del y hailed as "Democr at i c Ref or m Government s. " "Free elec- tions" and par l i ament ar y coal i t i ons have accompanied the Fr ondi zi go- vernment i n Ar gent i na and the Bentacourt government i n Venezuela. Note that the first step of the Cu- ban Revol ut i on also resulted in filling the hi gh government offices wi t h si mi l ar hi ghl y respectable middle-class personnel. In several years of office, neither the Fr ondi zi nor the Bentacourt government have brought any notable r ef or m to the count rysi de, neither socially, pol i t i - cal l y, nor economi cal l y; not l and r ef or m, not education, not invest- ment, nor, in the case of Venezuela, channel l i ng the large income f r om its pet rol eum i ndust ry i nt o di versi - fied economic development. Fr om where the Cubans sit, havi ng fai l ed to i nt roduce any re- f or m i n the st ruct ure, par t i cul ar l y i n the r ur al structure of these societies, the pressures whi ch Lat i n Amer i can .social st ruct ure exerts on governments to become i ncreasi ngl y r i ght - wi ng di ct at orshi ps ( or t o put it the other way around, the condi - tions whi ch per mi t these di ct at or- ships to flower have reasserted themselves), and bot h countries al - ready find themselves again threa- tened wi t h i mmi nent ret urn t o Peron-Jimenez type di ct at orshi ps j ust as Batista i nevi t abl y grew out of the undi st urbed roots of the Machado regi me i n Cuba. Fr om the Cuban poi nt of view and f r om that of t hi s wr i t er , the fact that as these pages are bei ng wr i t t en, Bentacourt i s pat r ol l i ng the ci t y wi t h tanks and shoot i ng students i n the streets is not an accident. Such are the f r ui t s of r el yi ng on the out war d t r appi ngs of democracy wi t hout any at t empt t o r ef or m, never mi nd democratize, t he society. It shoul d come as l i t t l e surpri se to discover that the Fr ondi zi Bent acourt f or m of revol ut i on or t ype of r ef or m i s what the Uni t ed States and, i ndeed, the mi ddl e and upper class ele- ments i n Cuba and La t i n Amer i ca woul d l i ke to have seen as the f or m of the Cuban Revol ut i on. But i t should come as no less of a surpri se that the leaders of the Movement of the 26t h of Jul y should have i nt erpret ed Ar gent i ne and Vene- zuelan experience as a sign that more radi cal and more wide-spread social change must be wr ought in Cuba if the sacrifices of the rebel- l i on and the past are not to have been made in vai n. Guatemala and Bolivia A model of the f or m more r adi - cal than that discussed above may be found in the revolutions of (Guatemala i n 1944 and Bol i vi a i n 1952. Both revolutions were in part r ur al i n character, i n socio-political and economic change in the coun- t rysi de. Yet, as is well known, both revol ut i ons fai l ed. The Bol i vi an one never even real l y got off the gr ound. The governments of Are- valo and later Arbenz i n Guatemala di d i nt roduce social change to the countryside. but they di d so gra- dual l y and on a catch-as-catch-can basis. The revol ut i on di d call for some popul ar par t i ci pat i on, t hough not i n the f or m of mi l i t a r y defense by the armed popul ace; and when the count er-revol ut i on attacked in 1954. the r ef or m governments and wi t h them ten years of work were an easy pushover. (As a sidelight, some Cubans have observed that the presence at the time of the re- vol ut i ons of the Ameri can ambassa- dor Bonsial i n Bol i vi a and i n Guatemala and then agai n in Cuba may not have been altogether coin- ci dent al . ) Fi nal l y, i f none of the foregoi ng models for a La t i n Amer i can revo- l ut i on appear to promi se the results whi ch r evol ut i onar y Cubans desire and requi re, the exampl e of Mexi co, wi t h the oldest, longest, and most far-reachi ng r evol ut i on whi ch Lat i n Amer i ca has- witnessed, st i l l remains avai l abl e f or exami nat i on. . The Mexi can Revol ut i on of 1910 came on the heels of the Diaz dictator- shi p of the precedi ng cent ury whi ch has uni versal l y been charac- terized as an alliance between p r i - vate l and owners, the Chur ch, and Amer i can investment interests i n Mexi co. The rebel l i on was fought 1107 SPECIAL NUMBER JULY 1961 THE ECONOMIC WEEKLY l ong and ha r d by vari ous factions, some of whi c h represented the pea- sants; it resulted in a revol ut i on whi ch made sweepi ng l and r ef or ms; event ual l y, t hough not unt i l decades l at er, conduct ed a wi despread and successful l i t er acy campai gn; i n- creased educat i on; expr opr i at ed al l pr i vat e and f or ei gn hol di ngs of subterranean mi ner al and petro- l eum resources i n 1936; began the i ndust r i al i zat i on of the count r y; and, has raised the i nvest ment rate to a respectable 10 per cent per annum. Yet , per capi t a i ncome i n Mexi co remai ned one-haIf of what i t i s i n Cuba, the peasantry seems to have been al l but bypassed by economic development, and every government since t hat of Cardenas i n the mi d- t hi rt i es have moved i ncreasi ngl y to the r i ght unt i l the middle-class i n- dust ri al and commer ci al govern- ment of Lopez Mateos is today regarded as excessively conserva- t i ve, even by Time magazine. Forced into More Radical Forms Wi t hout goi ng i nt o the details of the r ef or m measures undert aken by the revol ut i ons revi ewed above and the r evol ut i on now unf ol di ng i n Cuba, it appears clear to this wr i t er t hat , i f the Cuban Revol ut i on i s no also to be either st i l l bor n or to die i n i nf ancy, Cuba i s forced i nt o st i l l more r adi cal f or ms of r evol ut i on t han any of those yet seen in La t h Amer i ca. The haste wi t h whi ch re- vol ut i onar y reforms are bei ng under t aken; the expr opr i at i on of l at i fundi st a ownershi p of sugar am grazi ng l ands; the di st r i but i on of l and and agr i cul t ur al credi t t o smal l hol ders; f or mat i on of agr i cul t ur al co-operatives f or di versi fi cat i on of crops and empl oyment of the. eight t o t wel ve mont h unempl oyed r ur al pr ol et ar i at whi ch characterize Cuba' s popul at i on as it does no those of many of the countries exa mi ned above; the i mmedi at e dr i ve for i ndust r i al i zat i on, small and large, l i ght and heavy, the establish- ment of I NRA ( Nat i onal Institute of Agr a r i a n Ref or m) as a sort of super T V A ; 64 per cent increase of pr i ml ar y school enrol ment and the t hree-fol d increase of first-grade enr ol ment i n the very fi rst year of the r evol ut i on; t he di st r i but i on of fi re-arms t o the near l y one mi l l i on mi l i t i a ( nat i onal guar d) members; the asceticism of those active in t he r evol ut i on f r om the smallest r ur a l communi t y to the office of the pr i me mi ni s t er ; al l these di st i n- guished the Cuban Revol ut i on as one more radi cal , mor e serious, more active, t han any pr i or Lat i n Amer i can r evol ut i on whi ch Cuba mi ght use as its mode). Thus, t he very experience of so r i al r ef or m movements elsewhere i n Lat i n Amer i ca and i n Cuba' s own hi st ory itself, whi ch has led Cuba to adopt revol ut i onary forms more radi cal t han those for whi ch models are avai l abl e also leaves Cuba in the posi t i on of havi ng to make and find her way i n r evol ut i onar y t er r i - t or y unchart ered by earl i er exper- ience i n Lat i n Amer i ca. The r adi - calisrn of the Cuban Revol ut i on, i n- duced par t l y by necessity and par t l y by desi gn, has already set Cuba on a pat h for whi ch hi st ory can no l onger serve as a guide. It is i m- pl i ci t in the preceding discussion that the Cuban Revol ut i on finds it- self at this poi nt wi t hout a pre-for- mulated procedure whi ch mi ght gui de the r evol ut i on al ong its way Moreover beyond the design for re- bel l i on against the ol d di ct at or shi p and the general intent for l and re- f or m and other reforms announced i n " Hi s t or y Wi l l Absolve Me ' , the r evol ut i on lacked these guides as wel l dur i ng the recent years that it has al ready traversed. Finds its Own Way Not. unl i ke other social move ments. and pr obabl y more than many, the Cuban Revol ut i on mus and does find its way subst ant i al l y in the dark as it goes al ong its way. Under the circumstances, i shoul d not be sur pr i si ng i f many Cubans seek, and some yearn, for a model t hat mi ght serve them as a gui de. Qui t e obviously the West, and par t i cul ar l y the Uni t ed Slates, can offer it no such model. Even where some Amer i can experience mi ght serve as a gui de, the Uni t ed States has sought to close the chan- nels of t r ansmi t t al of such exper- ience by wi t hdr awi ng technical and mat eri al ai d and trade, whi l e part i - cul ar Amer i can measures whi ch mi ght of themselves be inoffensive have come to be associated wi t h the offensiveness of Amer i can i mper- i al i sm in Lat i n Amer i ca as a whol e. In the meant i me, the Uni t ed States, far f r om maki ng an effort to isolate the acceptable f r om the offensive, insists on cont i nui ng to sell the Amer i can way as a package deal. Looki ng between East and West, i t i s possible t o fi nd a " Th i r d 1109 For ce" or a t hi r d or f our t h way. But ; t o the extent t o whi c h t hey exist, these models and sources of possible al i gnment are l argel y i n the f i el d of i nt er nat i onal pol i t i cs. I ndi a , Bur ma, the Uni t ed Ar a b Republ i c, the new Af r i can states may offer alternatives i n the Uni t ed Nat i ons, but they have no economi c pr o- gramme that Cuba mi ght make its own. To this observer, among coun- tries whi ch are not al i gned on ei t her side of the cold war, onl y Yugo- sl avi a appears as a source of any pot ent i al guide to a count ry l i ke Cuba. The presence of a substan- t i al number of Yugosl avi an techni- cians in Cuba suggests that Cuba may yet come to look in t hat direc- t i on. West Offers No Guide There remai n, then, only t wo other places for Cuba to look f or gui d- ance to its f ut ur e; one is t oward Russia-China, and the ot her is at home. The model of the Socialist camp, of course, holds pr of ound at t ract i on for any count ry or people who, l i ke Cuba, have onl y just be- come det ermi ned to shape t hei r own fut ure. Even i f the West were not so i nt i mat el y associated wi t h I m- peri al i sm, be it of the Br i t i sh- French or the Ameri can vari et y, the Western and par t i cul ar l y Ameri can pr ogr ammer woul d suffer seriously f r om their heavy emphasis on eco- nomi c problems alone, But f r om the Cuban, and in genera] the Lat i n Amercian-African-Southeast-A s i a n point of view, the probl ems they fare are in the first instance and pr obabl y most i mpor t ant l y prob- lems of social and pol i t i cal change. But it is to precisely these prob- lems that the West offers no gui de and Western support ed elements in the "emergent" societies offer no programme. It is commonpl ace among West ern economists to miss the boat even on economic probl ems. Though they r i ght l y poi nt out that onl y increa- ses and not changes in the di st r i bu- t i on of the economic pie can ul t i - mately serve to meet the probl ems of economic development, they are f r om this led to conclude and ad- vise that the wor l d- wi de attempts at r e- di st r i but i on are mi spl aced. But f r om the poi nt of view of Cuba, or any other semi-Feudal count ry, i t i s clear that r e- di st r i but i on of weal t h and t her ewi t h power are necessary t o render possibly the increase i n THE ECONOMIC WEEKLY SPECIAL NUMBER JULY 1961 SPECIAL NUMBER JULY 1961 THE ECONOMIC WEEKLY out put whi ch West ern economises prescribe. I t i s thus not sur pr i si ng i f Cubans look t owar d Russia and Chi na as the onl y sources of model s for f ur t her i ng soci al , pol i t i cal and economic change. Most Important Solutions Home Grown Though the Cubans may l ook i n par t t owar d Russia and Chi na, t hey wor k at home and the largest and most i mpor t ant solutions t o t hei r r evol ut i onar y probl ems are met wi t h solutions home- gr own on the spot . Even a casual observer can r eadi l y note how Cuba i s r el yi ng on var i ed solutions t o the probl ems of gui di ng t hei r r evol ut i on t hr ough unchart ered t er r i t or y, and how these solutions i n t ur n gi ve rise t o var i ed new pro- blems. That i s t hei r revol ut i onary pro- gramme, and its procedure is large- l y devised where and when occasion demands. Vi ewed f r om the perspec- t i ve of a place of st abi l i t y, the Cu- ban Revol ut i on appears as a tangle of confusi on, of peopl e r unni ng off i n al l di fferent di rect i ons, of many proj ect s started and few concl uded of changes i n di r ect i on. But viewed f r om the st andpoi nt of the revol u- t i onar y, these are the very marks of vi t a l i t y; they are the marks not of weakness, but of st rengt h. Yet , not ever yt hi ng can be changed. In his analysis of the Anat omy of Revolu- t i on, Crane Br i nt on suggested t hat no r evol ut i on can change ever yt hi ng, t hat the new must be bui l t upon the ol d. But f or a r evol ut i on, the ol d is not onl y a legacy and a base, it is also an i ns t r ument Par adoxi cal l y, it is the very radicalness of change t o be i nt r oduced i n Cuba whi ch necessitates reliance on the ol d wel l - entrenched and thus r el i abl e social arid cul t ur al forms as vehicles f or the i nt r oduct i on of that change. An at t empt at wholesale subst i t ut i on of a new society and cul t ure f or the ol d woul d surely result i n no society, new or ol d. Thus, st i l l another source of underst andi ng of the Cu- ban Revol ut i on lies i n an exami na- t i on of the old and exi st i ng socio- cul t ur al f or ms whi ch serve as vehi - c l e f or the Revol ut i on, and whi ch thereby help to define the possi bi l i - ties and l i mi t at i ons of social change t hr ough t he Cuban Revol ut i on. Family and Kinship Now, as before, i n Cuba as i n most ot her part s of the wor l d, f ami l y and ki nshi p relations serve as the most i mpor t ant bond and channel of communi cat i on between people. Many t hi ngs are necessary to wor k a far-reachi ng change in a so- ci et y, but one of t hem surely is to communi cat e the new, the changes in social rel at i onshi p t hat have al ready occurred, the new opport uni t i es and responsi bi l i t i es, t he s pi r i t of the r evol ut i on to the people. An y vi si t t o Cuba' s count rysi de, t o its villages and t owns, and i f one looks more closely, t o its cities, wi l l show t hat t el evi si on and ot her mass me- di a, commerci al and wor k relations not wi t hst andi ng, the extended f ami l y serves as the Revol ut i on' s most i m- por t ant medi um of communi cat i on. It is the f ami l y whi ch reaches f r om the count rysi de t o the t own, f r om one r egi on t o another, f r om the provinces to the capi t al , in short f r om one poi nt of contact wi t h re- vol ut i onar y experience t o another. An d the experience wi t h the revol u- t i on whi ch i s meani ngf ul and i m- por t ant , whi ch permi t s a sense of par t i ci pat i on and produces a feel i ng of empat hy, that experience is the one whi ch is communi cat ed between one member of a f ami l y and another. The Patron Relationship It is the experience of the son in a new school, the cousin in a new co- operat i ve f ar m, the uncle i n Hava- na, much more t han Fi del ' s TV speeches, newspapers, mass ral l i es, or even cracker-barrel discussions whi ch l end meani ng t o the revol u- t i on. At the same t i me i t i s exist- i ng f a mi l y relations whi ch continue in many instances to serve as the vehicles for the di s t r i but i on of the new oppor t uni t i es and responsi bi l i - ties ar i si ng out of the r evol ut i on i n l and ownershi p, educat i on, and out of the new tasks created in the revo- l ut i on i n general . Thus an acquai n- tance wi t h the Cuban f a mi l y can afford much underst andi ng of the points at whi ch change is or must be i nt r oduced, how it can be com- muni cat ed and accepted or rejected, i n short, of t he possibilities f or re- vol ut i on and the l i mi t at i ons on change whi ch Cuba' s most i mpor - t ant i nst i t ut i on bodes f or the Revo- l ut i on. Pr obabl y the most i mpor t ant social rel at i onshi p i n La t i n Ame r i - can and Cuban society, bot h i nsi de the f ami l y and out i s the aut hor i t y of the father, pat ernal i sm or the "pat - r o n " rel at i onshi p. I n the absence of t hi s time-tested f o r m of soci al i n- 1110 tercourse, i t woul d be i mpossi bl e for Cuba to organize the construc- t i on of the new schools, roads, fac- tories, and most i mpor t ant , t o i n- troduce any new f or ms of ent erpri se l i ke agr i cul t ur al cooperatives. Des- pi t e, may be because of, the less "i ndi genous" nat ure of Cuba com- par ed wi t h other Carri bean society, pat ernal i sm has in Cuba pl ayed an even more pervasive role t han else- where. However, a colleague of mi ne suggests that Cuban pat ernal rel at i ons have been less regu- l ari zed and reci procal than those of feudal i sm or heavi l y I ndi an popu- lated societies l i ke Bol i vi a. Thus, Cubans have often had to approach t hei r pat r on wi t h requests rat her than r el yi ng onl y on his ful fi l ment of already specified r eci pr ocal obl i - gations. Administrators Run Cooperative Farms Consider agr i cul t ur e. As one strolls t hr ough cities and towns al - most anywhere i n the wor l d, Amer i - ca, Russia, Europe, Af r i ca, other Carri bean countries, one encounters out door markets i n whi ch ' nearby farmers sell vegetables and often meat of t hei r own pr oduct i on. Not so in Cuba. And the reason is si mpl e: much less than other r ur al countries does Cuba have smal l holders who are In a posi t i on to raise and market such produce on t hei r own. Such small holders as there are t end to be isolated in the mount ai ns, where they raise coffee and tobacco as cash crops and pro- duce f or subsistence. Most other Cuban peasants, if one may even cal l t hem t hat . have l ong been landless agr i cul t ur al labourers, a ver i t abl e r ur al prol et ari at . They wor ked ( onl y par t of the year) on large and medi um size l andhol di ngs, and the rel at i onshi p between t hem and employers and supervi sory per- sonnel was subst ant i al l y paterna- l i st i c. But i n large part many pea- sants were not therefore aut omat i - cally t ot al l y cared f or . The t erm "guaj er o", now generalized to refer to al l peasants, developed as the name of peasants who bui l t t hei r shacks al ong the roadside, for lack of any other l and on whi ch t o l i ve. When Castro moved to establish cooperat i ve farms, f or sugar and ot her produce as wel l , the wor l d expected a repet i t i on of the collec- t i vi zat i on problems whi ch had pl a- gued Russia, Eastern Eur ope and THE ECONOMIC WEEKLY SPECIAL NUMBER JULY 1961 Chi na, They need have had nei t her fear nor del i ght . I NRA ( Na- t i onal I nst i t ut e of Agr i a r i a n Re- f or m) appoi nt ed admi ni st r at or s f or each cooperat i ve f a r m, and i n i m- por t ant ways Cuba proceeded wi t h business as usual. The communi t y elders who poi nt ed t o the pi ct ur e of ex-sugar mi l l admi ni st r at or hangi ng i n t hei r company- pr ovi ded cl ub house and who noted wi t h salisfac l i on that, t hough the pi ct ur e i s lar- ger than t hat of Fi del Castro on the other wa l l , they have no reason to remove i t , were sayi ng j ust t hat . I n many ways, the Revol ut i on has, at least for the present, passed much of the i ni t i at i ve i n the pat ernal i st i c r el at i onshi p t o the pat r on. In sugar lands al ready i n pr oduct i on, the co-op members elect a "coor di nat or " f r om among t hei r members, but the aut hor i t y i s vested i n the I NR A- appoi nt ed, non-member, "admi ni s- t r at or " for the fi rst l i ve years or unt i l the membershi p has learned itself t o assume responsi bi l i t y. In the new agr i cul t ur al co-ops, whi c h are largely br eaki ng new lands and onl y j ust begi nni ng const ruct i on, membershi p has general l y not been established yet. Continued Paternalism The est abl i shment of the f ar m is under the aut hor i t y of the admi ni s t r at or , who i n t ur n i s under the di r ect i on of the chi ef of his agr i - cul t ur al zone; and the wor k is done by agr i cul t ur al labourers hi r ed by the day. Indeed, some of these farms, the largest, wi l l never be t r ansf or med i nt o cooperatives but wi l l be mai nt ai ned as "Gr anj as del Puel bo" wi t h empl oyed workers re- mi ni scent of Soviet state farms. For the t i me bei ng, none of these f ar ms are real l y cooperatives in the sense t hai responsi bi l i t y, and t her ewi t h benefits and costs resi dual l y rest wi t h the part i ci pant s. Even casual conversat i on wi t h either the pea- sants or the supervi sory personnel easily demonstrates that t hei r ex- perience in the past has been of pat ernal i sm and that they cont i nue t o r el y on i t f or the present. The government has not t r i ed to substi- tute cooperatives for small pr i vat e l andhol di ngs where it does exist, and it is no accident t hat Cuba is pr obabl y the onl y count ry i n the wor l d i n whi ch serious l and r ef or m has not resul t ed i n an i ni t i al decline i n agr i cul t ur al out put . The cont i nued pat ernal i sm exhi bi t s i t s el f i n the rel at i on between i ndi vi dual peasants and the new agr i cul t ur al extension and credi t agencies, the new "stores of the peopl e" whi ch suppl ement and re- place the pri vat e and company stores i n r ur al areas. Pat ernal i sm and conversely lack of i ndi vi dual responsi bi l i t y remai n evident i n stu- dent-teacher rel at i onshi ps i n the many new schools. But at the same t i me the yout h and non-professional- ism of many of the new teachers and the i ndi vi dual i ni t i at i ve whi ch underlies the very school attendance on the par t of many teenagers and young adults, undoubt edl y attenuate the pat ernal i sm in the student-tea- cher rel at i onshi p. The 20-hour t r i p by three friends of mi ne, 18, 19, and 20 years of age. f r om isolated Sagua de Tanamo to previ ousl y strange and distant Havana to see the Mi ni st er of Educat i on and ask hi m to bui l d a technical hi gh school in t hei r t own was undoubt edl y visualized by bot h parties in the cont ext of pat er nal i sm, but the same event woul d not have occurred before the Revol ut i on. There is. thus, a difference in the qual i t y of the pat er nal i sm then and now. Though the aut hor i t y and mut ual responsi bi l i t y and respect l argel y remai n the basis of organiz- i ng the tasks of the Kevol ut i on as t hey di d the tasks of ol d, bot h "f at her " and "son" appear to sense a difference in the source of that aut hor i t y and respect. Thi s change in source or base may be traceable i n part t o the very deep and wi de- spread sense of par t i ci pat i on i n the Revol ut i on and the new Cuba, and it mi ght be due in par t to the un- usual yout h of al l at the t op of much of the local l eadershi p in the Revo- l ut i on. The new Cuban paterna- l i sm has a qual i t y of frat ernal i sm. And this already represents and forebodes a pr of ound social revol u- t i on. Obligations Particular and Personal Thus, a closer exami nat i on of pat ernal i sm i n Cuban society can increase our underst andi ng of how the new can come to be i nt r oduced and accepted, how real cooperatives wi t h the i ndi vi dual and collective responsi bi l i t y they i mp l y can come i nt o bei ng, wi t h wor ker par t i ci pa- t i on i n management, maybe on the Yugosl avi an style, can and wi l l be i nt r oduced, what f r ui t s the educa- t i onal r ef or m wi l l bear. Anot her qual i t y of Lat i n and Cuban social rel at i ons, not unrel a- t ed t o pat er nal i sm, i s t hei r pa r t i - cul ar i sm and personal i sm. I n Catho- l i c societies mor e t han i n Protestant ones, obl i gat i ons are par t i cul ar and t o persons rat her t han uni versal and to pr i nci pl es. Glance at any news- paper phot ogr aph of the r evol ut i on- ary leadership, l i st en to any state- ment by "defectors who were close to Cast r o' , and the intense personal qual i t y of the r ecr ui t ment i nt o posi - t i ons of leadership and aut hor i t y and of the cont i nui ng rel at i ons among those so recrui t ed is i mme- di at el y evident. The same personal- ism is the source as wel l of many of the social contacts between t op leaders and other r evol ut i onar y actives and among the l at t er t hem- selves. In the absence of such st rong personal ties and t hei r i m- portance, how woul d people in en- t i r el y new and often cont i nual l y changi ng r evol ut i onar y roles and incumbencies relate to each other, how coul d the r evol ut i onar y leader- ship coordi nat e its act i vi t i es at al l ? An d yet, at least i n pract i ce i f not in design, the l eadershi p of the Cuban Revol ut i on scrupul ousl y practices the dictates of t wo ul t ra- uni versal i st i c val ues: honesty and asceticism; no charges of f r aud or financial self-aggrandizement have come to my ears even f r om t he l i ps of those most unf r i endl y to the government, and the spartan exist- ence and hard wor k of those active in the Revol ut i on is common know- ledge. What the source and appeal of this behaviour i n Lat i n Amer i ca is, I do not know. Possibly, and par adoxi cal l y, it is to be t raced in part to the much stronger influence that Nor t h Amer i can cul t ure has exerted in Cuba t han anywhere else i n La t i n Amer i ca. Cer t ai nl y the early days of the Mexi can revol u- t i on were not famed for honesty or asceticism. Nort herners have l ong regarded Lat i ns as aut hor i t ar i an and yet as i ndi vi dual i st i c, free-wheeling and rebellious as we l l . No r evol ut i on can change nat i onal character, i f that is what the above represents, over ni ght ; and i f the r evol ut i on i s t o i nt r oduce and change, i t must r el y on exi st i ng cul t ur al forms as vehicles of t hat change. An d so one may encounter cooperat i ve f ar m admi ni st r at or s who wi l l tell you that he wi l l pl ant where and how the agronomi st (t here he sits, fresh out of school ) tells hi m to. because onl y he has the necessary knowl edge, 1111 SPECIAL NUMBER JULY 1961 THE ECONOMIC WEEKLY whi l e another admi ni st r at or , or i n- deed the same one, wi l l poi nt wi t h pr i de t o the new br i ckwor ks or new f ur ni t ur e fact ory he has established ent i rel y on his own i ni t i at i ve and wi t hout the advice or consent of anybody; and i f someone doesn't l i ke i t . they can go to hel l . So much of the ol d serves to shape, and also t o br i ng f or t h, the new. Pragmatic and Personalised The pr agmat i sm of the Cuban Revol ut i on in its devel opment and the var i et y of its current forms sug- gests t hat , as I argued earlier, the Revol ut i on has no i deol ogy. But as the past gives way to the f ut ur e, as the focus of attention and as the vari et y of at t empt ed r evol ut i onar y f or ms seems i ncreasi ngl y to dissi pate the revol ut i onary force, pres sures wi l l surely f or m to create and adopt an ideology for the Cuban Revol ut i on. Maybe that t i me is al - ready here. To serve its purpose, that i deol ogy must be wi del y com- muni cat ed, and to be communi cat ed i t must be r eadi l y symbol i zed. Wha then are the exi st i ng forms of sym- bol i ci sm and i magery whi ch can serve to carry the i deol ogy and there- wi t h the Revol ut i on? One answer, but onl y one, is personalism agai n. Si gni f i cant La t i n images, as wel l as social relations, tend to be hi ghl y personal. Thus, pr obabl y more t han the social movements of nort hern countries whi ch tend to be more i deal i st i cal l y symbol i zed, the Cuban Revol ut i on may become i ncreasi ngl y associated wi t h the leadership and personal i t y of Fi del . " We are al l Fidelistas, " Cubans say. If the Re- vol ut i on is so personalized, how woul d Fidel' s death affect the Revo- Iut i on' s course? The foregoi ng discussion has not been an at t empt to describe or ex- pl ai n t he Cuban Revol ut i on exhaus- t i vel y. Its intent has been onl y to expose f or i nspect i on three sources of background and expl anat i on for the developments that Cuba and the wor l d now witness: The Cuban ancien regi me and the development of the r evol ut i onar y movement wi t h- i n i t , the experience elsewhere i n La t i n Amer i ca wi t h attempts t o handle si mi l ar probl ems, and some soci o-cul t ural factors i n Cuban l i f e whi ch i nevi t abl y must influence the course of t he Revol ut i on. It must be l eft to the underst andi ng and re- search of others t o expl ore the many questions onl y raised here. Tu b e Fa c t o r y T H E Commonweal t h Devel opment Finance Company wi l l pr ovi de a l oan of 175,000 for the manu- fact ure of non-ferrous tubes, pipes, rods, and sections i n I ndi a. The loan wi l l pr ovi de the for- eign-exchange requi rement s for a fact ory bei ng erected in Bombay by Kamani Tubes Pri vat e Lt d, i n col- l aborat i on wi t h Yor kshi r e I mper i al Metals Lt d. an associate of I mper i al Chemi cal Indust ri es, whi ch has arranged the procurement of pl ant i n the Uni t ed Ki ngdom, and wi l l assist in the earl y per i od of run- ni ng, under a 10- year technical col l aborat i on agreement. The Yor kshi r e I mper i al Met al s' part in the scheme is l argel y one of suppl yi ng know-how. They also hope to pr ovi de assistance, f r om t i me to t i me by means of short visits t o I ndi a by technicians f r om Leeds. 1112
(2004) André Gunder Frank & William Thompson. Early Iron Age Economic Expansion and Contraction Revisited (In: American Institute of Archaeology, January)
[1994] André Gunder Frank. Confusion Worse Confounded, Through the Looking Glass of Matt Melko in Wonderland & Comments on Faustian Delusion II (In: Comparative Civilizations Review n° 30, Spring, pp. 22-29)