Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 120295 June 28, 1996
JUAN G. FRIVALDO, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and RAUL R. LEE, respondents.
G.R. No. 123755 June 28, 1996
RAUL R. LEE, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JUAN G. FRIVALDO, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J .:p
The ultimate question posed before this Court in these twin cases is: Who should be declared the
rightful governor of Sorsogon -
(i) Juan G. Frivaldo, who unquestionably obtained the highest number of votes in three successive
elections but who was twice declared by this Court to be disqualified to hold such office due to his
alien citizenship, and who now claims to have re-assumed his lost Philippine citizenship thru
repatriation;
(ii) Raul R. Lee, who was the second placer in the canvass, but who claims that the votes cast in
favor of Frivaldo should be considered void; that the electorate should be deemed to have
intentionally thrown away their ballots; and that legally, he secured the most number of valid votes;
or
(iii) The incumbent Vice-Governor, Oscar G. Deri, who obviously was not voted directly to the
position of governor, but who according to prevailing jurisprudence should take over the said post
inasmuch as, by the ineligibility of Frivaldo, a "permanent vacancy in the contested office has
occurred"?
In ruling for Frivaldo, the Court lays down new doctrines on repatriation, clarifies/reiterates/amplifies
existing jurisprudence on citizenship and elections, and upholds the superiority of substantial justice
over pure legalisms.
G.R. No. 123755
This is a special civil action under Rules 65 and 58 of the Rules of Court for certiorari and
preliminary injunction to review and annul a Resolution of the respondent Commission on Elections
(Comelec), First Division,
1
promulgated on December 19, 1995
2
and another Resolution of the
Comelec en banc promulgated February 23, 1996
3
denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
The Facts
On March 20, 1995, private respondent Juan G. Frivaldo filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the
office of Governor of Sorsogon in the May 8, 1995 elections. On March 23, 1995, petitioner Raul R.
Lee, another candidate, filed a petition
4
with the Comelec docketed as SPA No. 95-028 praying that
Frivaldo "be disqualified from seeking or holding any public office or position by reason of not yet being a
citizen of the Philippines", and that his Certificate of Candidacy be canceled. On May 1, 1995, the Second
Division of the Comelec promulgated a Resolution
5
granting the petition with the following disposition
6
:
WHEREFORE, this Division resolves to GRANT the petition and declares that
respondent is DISQUALIFIED to run for the Office of Governor of Sorsogon on the
ground that he is NOT a citizen of the Philippines. Accordingly, respondent's
certificate of candidacy is canceled.
The Motion for Reconsideration filed by Frivaldo remained unacted upon until after the May 8, 1995
elections. So, his candidacy continued and he was voted for during the elections held on said date.
On May 11, 1995, the Comelec en banc
7
affirmed the aforementioned Resolution of the Second
Division.
The Provincial Board of Canvassers completed the canvass of the election returns and a Certificate
of Votes
8
dated May 27, 1995 was issued showing the following votes obtained by the candidates for the
position of Governor of Sorsogon:
Antonio H. Escudero, Jr. 51,060
Juan G. Frivaldo 73,440
Raul R. Lee 53,304
Isagani P. Ocampo 1,925
On June 9, 1995, Lee filed in said SPA No. 95-028, a (supplemental) petition
9
praying for his
proclamation as the duly-elected Governor of Sorsogon.
In an order
10
dated June 21, 1995, but promulgated according to the petition "only on June 29, 1995," the
Comelec en banc directed "the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Sorsogon to reconvene for the purpose
of proclaiming candidate Raul Lee as the winning gubernatorial candidate in the province of Sorsogon on
June 29, 1995 . . ." Accordingly, at 8:30 in the evening of June 30, 1995, Lee was proclaimed governor of
Sorsogon.
On July 6, 1995, Frivaldo filed with the Comelec a new petition,
11
docketed as SPC No. 95-317,
praying for the annulment of the June 30, 1995 proclamation of Lee and for his own proclamation. He
alleged that on June 30, 1995, at 2:00 in the afternoon, he took his oath of allegiance as a citizen of the
Philippines after "his petition for repatriation under P.D. 725 which he filed with the Special Committee on
Naturalization in September 1994 had been granted". As such, when "the said order (dated June 21,
1995) (of the Comelec) . . . was released and received by Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 at 5:30 o'clock in the
evening, there was no more legal impediment to the proclamation (of Frivaldo) as governor . . ." In the
alternative, he averred that pursuant to the two cases of Labo vs. Comelec,
12
the Vice-Governor - not Lee
- should occupy said position of governor.
On December 19, 1995, the Comelec First Division promulgated the herein assailed
Resolution
13
holding that Lee, "not having garnered the highest number of votes," was not legally entitled
to be proclaimed as duly-elected governor; and that Frivaldo, "having garnered the highest number of
votes,
and . . . having reacquired his Filipino citizenship by repatriation on June 30, 1995 under the provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 725 . . . (is) qualified to hold the office of governor of Sorsogon"; thus:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Commission (First Division), therefore RESOLVES
to GRANT the Petition.
Consistent with the decisions of the Supreme Court, the proclamation of Raul R. Lee
as Governor of Sorsogon is hereby ordered annulled, being contrary to law, he not
having garnered the highest number of votes to warrant his proclamation.
Upon the finality of the annulment of the proclamation of Raul R. Lee, the Provincial
Board of Canvassers is directed to immediately reconvene and, on the basis of the
completed canvass, proclaim petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo as the duly elected
Governor of Sorsogon having garnered the highest number of votes, and he having
reacquired his Filipino citizenship by repatriation on June 30, 1995 under the
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 725 and, thus, qualified to hold the office of
Governor of Sorsogon.
Conformably with Section 260 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), the
Clerk of the Commission is directed to notify His Excellency the President of the
Philippines, and the Secretary of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of
Sorsogon of this resolution immediately upon the due implementation thereof.
On December 26, 1995, Lee filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the Comelec en
banc in its Resolution
14
promulgated on February 23, 1996. On February 26, 1996, the present petition
was filed. Acting on the prayer for a temporary restraining order, this Court issued on February 27, 1996 a
Resolution which inter alia directed the parties "to maintain the status quo prevailing prior to the filing of
this petition."
The Issues in G.R. No. 123755
Petitioner Lee's "position on the matter at hand may briefly be capsulized in the following
propositions"
15
:
First -- The initiatory petition below was so far insufficient in form and substance to
warrant the exercise by the COMELEC of its jurisdiction with the result that, in effect,
the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of and deciding said
petition;
Second -- The judicially declared disqualification of respondent was a continuing
condition and rendered him ineligible to run for, to be elected to and to hold the
Office of Governor;
Third -- The alleged repatriation of respondent was neither valid nor is the effect
thereof retroactive as to cure his ineligibility and qualify him to hold the Office of
Governor; and
Fourth -- Correctly read and applied, the Labo Doctrine fully supports the validity of
petitioner's proclamation as duly elected Governor of Sorsogon.
G.R. No. 120295
This is a petition to annul three Resolutions of the respondent Comelec, the first two of which are
also at issue in G.R. No. 123755, as follows:
1. Resolution
16
of the Second Division, promulgated on May 1, 1995, disqualifying
Frivaldo from running for governor of Sorsogon in the May 8, 1995 elections "on the
ground that he is not a citizen of the Philippines";
2. Resolution
1
7 of the Comelec en banc, promulgated on May 11, 1995; and
3. Resolution
18
of the Comelec en banc, promulgated also on May 11, 1995 suspending
the proclamation of, among others, Frivaldo.
The Facts and the Issue
The facts of this case are essentially the same as those in G.R. No. 123755. However, Frivaldo
assails the above-mentioned resolutions on a different ground: that under Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code, which is reproduced hereinunder:
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy. -- A
verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy
may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material
representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The
petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the
filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after notice and
hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election. (Emphasis supplied.)
the Comelec had no jurisdiction to issue said Resolutions because they were not rendered
"within the period allowed by law" i.e., "not later than fifteen days before the election."
Otherwise stated, Frivaldo contends that the failure of the Comelec to act on the petition for
disqualification within the period of fifteen days prior to the election as provided by law is a
jurisdictional defect which renders the said Resolutions null and void.
By Resolution on March 12, 1996, the Court consolidated G.R. Nos. 120295 and 123755 since they
are intimately related in their factual environment and are identical in the ultimate question
raised, viz., who should occupy the position of governor of the province of Sorsogon.
On March 19, 1995, the Court heard oral argument from the parties and required them thereafter to
file simultaneously their respective memoranda.
The Consolidated Issues
From the foregoing submissions, the consolidated issues may be restated as follows:
1. Was the repatriation of Frivaldo valid and legal? If so, did it seasonably cure his lack of citizenship
as to qualify him to be proclaimed and to hold the Office of Governor? If not, may it be given
retroactive effect? If so, from when?
2. Is Frivaldo's "judicially declared" disqualification for lack of Filipino citizenship a continuing bar to
his eligibility to run for, be elected to or hold the governorship of Sorsogon?
3. Did the respondent Comelec have jurisdiction over the initiatory petition in SPC No. 95-317
considering that said petition is not "a pre-proclamation case, an election protest or a quo
warranto case"?
4. Was the proclamation of Lee, a runner-up in the election, valid and legal in light of existing
jurisprudence?
5. Did the respondent Commission on Elections exceed its jurisdiction in promulgating the assailed
Resolutions, all of which prevented Frivaldo from assuming the governorship of Sorsogon,
considering that they were not rendered within the period referred to in Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code, viz., "not later than fifteen days before the elections"?
The First Issue: Frivaldo's Repatriation
The validity and effectivity of Frivaldo's repatriation is the lis mota, the threshold legal issue in this
case. All the other matters raised are secondary to this.
The Local Government Code of 1991
19
expressly requires Philippine citizenship as a qualification for
elective local officials, including that of provincial governor, thus:
Sec. 39. Qualifications. -- (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the
Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province or, in
the case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod,
or sangguniang bayan, the district where he intends to be elected; a resident therein
for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to
read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.
(b) Candidates for the position of governor, vice governor or member
of the sangguniang panlalawigan, or mayor, vice mayor or member of
the sangguniang panlungsod of highly urbanized cities must be at
least twenty-three (23) years of age on election day.
xxx xxx xxx
Inasmuch as Frivaldo had been declared by this Court
20
as a non-citizen, it is therefore incumbent
upon him to show that he has reacquired citizenship; in fine, that he possesses the qualifications
prescribed under the said statute (R.A. 7160).
Under Philippine law,
21
citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization or by
repatriation. Frivaldo told this Court in G.R. No. 104654
22
and during the oral argument in this case that
he tried to resume his citizenship by direct act of Congress, but that the bill allowing him to do so "failed to
materialize, notwithstanding the endorsement of several members of the House of Representatives" due,
according to him, to the "maneuvers of his political rivals." In the same case, his attempt
at naturalization was rejected by this Court because of jurisdictional, substantial and procedural defects.
Despite his lack of Philippine citizenship, Frivaldo was overwhelmingly elected governor by the
electorate of Sorsogon, with a margin of 27,000 votes in the 1988 elections, 57,000 in 1992, and
20,000 in 1995 over the same opponent Raul Lee. Twice, he was judicially declared a non-Filipino
and thus twice disqualified from holding and discharging his popular mandate. Now, he comes to us
a third time, with a fresh vote from the people of Sorsogon and a favorable decision from the
Commission on Elections to boot. Moreover, he now boasts of having successfully passed through
the third and last mode of reacquiring citizenship: by repatriation under P.D. No. 725, with no less
than the Solicitor General himself, who was the prime opposing counsel in the previous cases he
lost, this time, as counsel for co-respondent Comelec, arguing the validity of his cause (in addition to
his able private counsel Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr.). That he took his oath of allegiance under the
provisions of said Decree at 2:00 p.m. on June 30, 1995 is not disputed. Hence, he insists that he --
not Lee -- should have been proclaimed as the duly-elected governor of Sorsogon when the
Provincial Board of Canvassers met at 8:30 p.m. on the said date since, clearly and unquestionably,
he garnered the highest number of votes in the elections and since at that time, he already
reacquired his citizenship.
En contrario, Lee argues that Frivaldo's repatriation is tainted with serious defects, which we shall
now discuss in seriatim.
First, Lee tells us that P.D. No. 725 had "been effectively repealed", asserting that "then President
Corazon Aquino exercising legislative powers under the Transitory Provisions of the 1987
Constitution, forbade the grant of citizenship by Presidential Decree or Executive Issuances as the
same poses a serious and contentious issue of policy which the present government, in the exercise
of prudence and sound discretion, should best leave to the judgment of the first Congress under the
1987 Constitution", adding that in her memorandum dated March 27, 1987 to the members of the
Special Committee on Naturalization constituted for purposes of Presidential Decree No. 725,
President Aquino directed them "to cease and desist from undertaking any and all proceedings
within your functional area of responsibility as defined under Letter of Instructions (LOI) No. 270
dated April 11, 1975, as amended."
23

This memorandum dated March 27, 1987
24
cannot by any stretch of legal hermeneutics be construed
as a law sanctioning or authorizing a repeal of P.D. No. 725. Laws are repealed only by subsequent
ones
25
and a repeal may be express or implied. It is obvious that no express repeal was made because
then President Aquino in her memorandum -- based on the copy furnished us by Lee -- did not
categorically and/or impliedly state that P.D. 725 was being repealed or was being rendered without any
legal effect. In fact, she did not even mention it specifically by its number or text. On the other hand, it is a
basic rule of statutory construction that repeals by implication are not favored. An implied repeal will not
be allowed "unless it is convincingly and unambiguously demonstrated that the two laws are clearly
repugnant and patently inconsistent that they cannot co-exist".
26

The memorandum of then President Aquino cannot even be regarded as a legislative enactment, for
not every pronouncement of the Chief Executive even under the Transitory Provisions of the 1987
Constitution can nor should be regarded as an exercise of her law-making powers. At best, it could
be treated as an executive policy addressed to the Special Committee to halt the acceptance and
processing of applications for repatriation pending whatever "judgment the first Congress under the
1987 Constitution" might make. In other words, the former President did not repeal P.D. 725 but left
it to the first Congress -- once created -- to deal with the matter. If she had intended to repeal such
law, she should have unequivocally said so instead of referring the matter to Congress. The fact is
she carefully couched her presidential issuance in terms that clearly indicated the intention of "the
present government, in the exercise of prudence and sound discretion" to leave the matter of repeal
to the new Congress. Any other interpretation of the said Presidential Memorandum, such as is now
being proffered to the Court by Lee, would visit unmitigated violence not only upon statutory
construction but on common sense as well.
Second, Lee also argues that "serious congenital irregularities flawed the repatriation proceedings,"
asserting that Frivaldo's application therefor was "filed on June 29, 1995 . . . (and) was approved in
just one day or on June 30, 1995 . . .", which "prevented a judicious review and evaluation of the
merits thereof." Frivaldo counters that he filed his application for repatriation with the Office of the
President in Malacaang Palace on August 17, 1994. This is confirmed by the Solicitor General.
However, the Special Committee was reactivated only on June 8, 1995, when presumably the said
Committee started processing his application. On June 29, 1995, he filled up and re-submitted the
FORM that the Committee required. Under these circumstances, it could not be said that there was
"indecent haste" in the processing of his application.
Anent Lee's charge that the "sudden reconstitution of the Special Committee on Naturalization was
intended solely for the personal interest of respondent,"
2
7 the Solicitor General explained during the
oral argument on March 19, 1996 that such allegation is simply baseless as there were many others who
applied and were considered for repatriation, a list of whom was submitted by him to this Court, through a
Manifestation
28
filed on April 3, 1996.
On the basis of the parties' submissions, we are convinced that the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty and the presumption of legality in the repatriation of Frivaldo have not
been successfully rebutted by Lee. The mere fact that the proceedings were speeded up is by itself
not a ground to conclude that such proceedings were necessarily tainted. After all, the requirements
of repatriation under P.D. No. 725 are not difficult to comply with, nor are they tedious and
cumbersome. In fact, P.D.
725
29
itself requires very little of an applicant, and even the rules and regulations to implement the said
decree were left to the Special Committee to promulgate. This is not unusual since, unlike in
naturalization where an alien covets a first-timeentry into Philippine political life, in repatriation the
applicant is a former natural-born Filipino who is merely seeking to reacquire his previous citizenship. In
the case of Frivaldo, he was undoubtedly a natural-born citizen who openly and faithfully served his
country and his province prior to his naturalization in the United States -- a naturalization he insists was
made necessary only to escape the iron clutches of a dictatorship he abhorred and could not in
conscience embrace -- and who, after the fall of the dictator and the re-establishment of democratic
space, wasted no time in returning to his country of birth to offer once more his talent and services to his
people.
So too, the fact that ten other persons, as certified to by the Solicitor General, were granted
repatriation argues convincingly and conclusively against the existence of favoritism vehemently
posited by Raul Lee. At any rate, any contest on the legality of Frivaldo's repatriation should have
been pursued before the Committee itself, and, failing there, in the Office of the President, pursuant
to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Third, Lee further contends that assuming the assailed repatriation to be valid, nevertheless it could
only be effective as at 2:00 p.m. of June 30, 1995 whereas the citizenship qualification prescribed by
the Local Government Code "must exist on the date of his election, if not when the certificate of
candidacy is filed," citing our decision in G.R. 104654
30
which held that "both the Local Government
Code and the Constitution require that only Philippine citizens can run and be elected to public office."
Obviously, however, this was a mere obiter as the only issue in said case was whether Frivaldo's
naturalization was valid or not -- and NOT the effective date thereof. Since the Court held his
naturalization to be invalid, then the issue of when an aspirant for public office should be a citizen was
NOT resolved at all by the Court. Which question we shall now directly rule on.
Under Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code, "(a)n elective local official must be:
* a citizen of the Philippines;
* a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province . . . where he
intends to be elected;
* a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the
election;
* able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.
* In addition, "candidates for the position of governor . . . must be at least twenty-
three (23) years of age on election day.
From the above, it will be noted that the law does not specify any particular date or time when the
candidate must possess citizenship, unlike that for residence (which must consist of at least one
year's residency immediately preceding the day of election) and age (at least twenty three years of
age on election day).
Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective public office,
31
and the
purpose of the citizenship qualification is none other than to ensure that no alien, i.e., no person owing
allegiance to another nation, shall govern our people and our country or a unit of territory thereof. Now, an
official begins to govern or to discharge his functions only upon his proclamation and on the day the law
mandates his term of office to begin. Since Frivaldo re-assumed his citizenship on June 30, 1995 -- the
very day
32
the term of office of governor (and other elective officials) began -- he was therefore already
qualified to be proclaimed, to hold such office and to discharge the functions and responsibilities thereof
as of said date. In short, at that time, he was already qualified to govern his native Sorsogon. This is the
liberal interpretation that should give spirit, life and meaning to our law on qualifications consistent with
the purpose for which such law was enacted. So too, even from a literal (as distinguished from liberal)
construction, it should be noted that Section 39 of the Local Government Code speaks of "Qualifications"
of "ELECTIVE OFFICIALS", not of candidates. Why then should such qualification be required at the time
of election or at the time of the filing of the certificates of candidacies, as Lee insists? Literally, such
qualifications -- unless otherwise expressly conditioned, as in the case of age and residence -- should
thus be possessed when the "elective [or elected] official" begins to govern, i.e., at the time he is
proclaimed and at the start of his term -- in this case, on June 30, 1995. Paraphrasing this Court's ruling
in Vasquez vs. Giap and Li Seng Giap & Sons,
33
if the purpose of the citizenship requirement is to ensure
that our people and country do not end up being governed by aliens,i.e., persons owing allegiance to
another nation, that aim or purpose would not be thwarted but instead achieved by construing the
citizenship qualification as applying to the time of proclamation of the elected official and at the start of his
term.
But perhaps the more difficult objection was the one raised during the oral argument
34
to the effect
that the citizenship qualification should be possessed at the time the candidate (or for that matter the
elected official) registered as a voter. After all, Section 39, apart from requiring the official to be a citizen,
also specifies as another item of qualification, that he be a "registered voter". And, under the law
35
a
"voter" must be a citizen of the Philippines. So therefore, Frivaldo could not have been a voter -- much
less a validly registered one -- if he was not a citizen at the time of such registration.
The answer to this problem again lies in discerning the purpose of the requirement. If the law
intended thecitizenship qualification to be possessed prior to election consistent with the requirement
of being a registered voter, then it would not have made citizenship a SEPARATE qualification. The
law abhors a redundancy. It therefore stands to reason that the law intended CITIZENSHIP to be a
qualification distinct from being a VOTER, even if being a voter presumes being a citizen first. It also
stands to reason that the voter requirement was included as another qualification (aside from
"citizenship"), not to reiterate the need for nationality but to require that the official be registered as a
voter IN THE AREA OR TERRITORY he seeks to govern, i.e., the law states: "a registered voter in
the barangay, municipality, city, or province . . . where he intends to be elected." It should be
emphasized that the Local Government Code requires an elective official to be a registered voter. It
does not require him to vote actually. Hence, registration -- not the actual voting -- is the core of this
"qualification". In other words, the law's purpose in this second requirement is to ensure that the
prospective official is actually registered in the area he seeks to govern -- and not anywhere else.
Before this Court, Frivaldo has repeatedly emphasized -- and Lee has not disputed -- that he "was
and is a registered voter of Sorsogon, and his registration as a voter has been sustained as valid by
judicial declaration . . . In fact, he cast his vote in his precinct on May 8, 1995."
36

So too, during the oral argument, his counsel steadfastly maintained that "Mr. Frivaldo has always
been a registered voter of Sorsogon. He has voted in 1987, 1988, 1992, then he voted again in
1995. In fact, his eligibility as a voter was questioned, but the court dismissed (sic) his eligibility as a
voter and he was allowed to vote as in fact, he voted in all the previous elections including on May 8,
1995."
3
7
It is thus clear that Frivaldo is a registered voter in the province where he intended to be elected.
There is yet another reason why the prime issue of citizenship should be reckoned from the date of
proclamation, not necessarily the date of election or date of filing of the certificate of candidacy.
Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code
38
gives any voter, presumably including the defeated
candidate, the opportunity to question the ELIGIBILITY (or the disloyalty) of a candidate. This is the only
provision of the Code that authorizes a remedy on how to contest before the Comelec an incumbent's
ineligibility arising from failure to meet the qualifications enumerated under Sec. 39 of the Local
Government Code. Such remedy of Quo Warranto can be availed of "within ten days after proclamation"
of the winning candidate. Hence, it is only at such time that the issue of ineligibility may be taken
cognizance of by the Commission. And since, at the very moment of Lee's proclamation (8:30 p.m., June
30, 1995), Juan G. Frivaldo was already and indubitably a citizen, having taken his oath of allegiance
earlier in the afternoon of the same day, then he should have been the candidate proclaimed as he
unquestionably garnered the highest number of votes in the immediately preceding elections and such
oath had already cured his previous "judicially-declared" alienage. Hence, at such time, he was no longer
ineligible.
But to remove all doubts on this important issue, we also hold that the repatriation of Frivaldo
RETROACTED to the date of the filing of his application on August 17, 1994.
It is true that under the Civil Code of the Philippines,
39
"(l)aws shall have no retroactive effect, unless
the contrary is provided." But there are settled exceptions
40
to this general rule, such as when the statute
is CURATIVE or REMEDIAL in nature or when it CREATES NEW RIGHTS.
According to Tolentino,
41
curative statutes are those which undertake to cure errors and irregularities,
thereby validating judicial or administrative proceedings, acts of public officers, or private deeds and
contracts which otherwise would not produce their intended consequences by reason of some statutory
disability or failure to comply with some technical requirement. They operate on conditions already
existing, and are necessarily retroactive in operation. Agpalo,
42
on the other hand, says that curative
statutes are
"healing acts . . . curing defects and adding to the means of enforcing existing obligations . . . (and) are
intended to supply defects, abridge superfluities in existing laws, and curb certain evils. . . . By their very
nature, curative statutes are retroactive . . . (and) reach back to past events to correct errors or
irregularities and to render valid and effective attempted acts which would be otherwise ineffective for the
purpose the parties intended."
On the other hand, remedial or procedural laws, i.e., those statutes relating to remedies or modes of
procedure, which do not create new or take away vested rights, but only operate in furtherance of
the remedy or confirmation of such rights, ordinarily do not come within the legal meaning of a
retrospective law, nor within the general rule against the retrospective operation of statutes.
43

A reading of P.D. 725 immediately shows that it creates a new right, and also provides for a new
remedy, thereby filling certain voids in our laws. Thus, in its preamble, P.D. 725 expressly
recognizes the plight of "many Filipino women (who) had lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage
to aliens" and who could not, under the existing law (C.A. No. 63, as amended) avail of repatriation
until "after the death of their husbands or the termination of their marital status" and who could
neither be benefitted by the 1973 Constitution's new provision allowing "a Filipino woman who
marries an alien to retain her Philippine citizenship . . ." because "such provision of the new
Constitution does not apply to Filipino women who had married aliens before said constitution took
effect." Thus, P.D. 725 granted a new right to these women -- the right to re-acquire Filipino
citizenship even during their marital coverture, which right did not exist prior to P.D. 725. On the
other hand, said statute also provided a new remedyand a new right in favor of other "natural born
Filipinos who (had) lost their Philippine citizenship but now desire to re-acquire Philippine
citizenship", because prior to the promulgation of P.D. 725 such former Filipinos would have had to
undergo the tedious and cumbersome process of naturalization, but with the advent of P.D. 725 they
could now re-acquire their Philippine citizenship under the simplified procedure of repatriation.
The Solicitor General
44
argues:
By their very nature, curative statutes are retroactive, (DBP vs. CA, 96 SCRA 342),
since they are intended to supply defects, abridge superfluities in existing laws (Del
Castillo vs. Securities and Exchange Commission, 96 Phil. 119) and curb certain
evils (Santos vs. Duata, 14 SCRA 1041).
In this case, P.D. No. 725 was enacted to cure the defect in the existing
naturalization law, specifically C.A. No. 63 wherein married Filipino women are
allowed to repatriate only upon the death of their husbands, and natural-born
Filipinos who lost their citizenship by naturalization and other causes faced the
difficulty of undergoing the rigid procedures of C.A. 63 for reacquisition of Filipino
citizenship by naturalization.
Presidential Decree No. 725 provided a remedy for the aforementioned legal
aberrations and thus its provisions are considered essentially remedial and curative.
In light of the foregoing, and prescinding from the wording of the preamble, it is unarguable that the
legislative intent was precisely to give the statute retroactive operation. "(A) retrospective operation
is given to a statute or amendment where the intent that it should so operate clearly appears from a
consideration of the act as a whole, or from the terms thereof."
45
It is obvious to the Court that the
statute was meant to "reach back" to those persons, events and transactions not otherwise covered by
prevailing law and jurisprudence. And inasmuch as it has been held that citizenship is a political and civil
right equally as important as the freedom of speech, liberty of abode, the right against unreasonable
searches and seizures and other guarantees enshrined in the Bill of Rights, therefore the legislative intent
to give retrospective operation to P.D. 725 must be given the fullest effect possible. "(I)t has been said
that a remedial statute must be so construed as to make it effect the evident purpose for which it was
enacted, so that if the reason of the statute extends to past transactions, as well as to those in the future,
then it will be so applied although the statute does not in terms so direct, unless to do so would impair
some vested right or violate some constitutional guaranty."
46
This is all the more true of P.D. 725, which
did not specify any restrictions on or delimit or qualify the right of repatriation granted therein.
At this point, a valid question may be raised: How can the retroactivity of P.D. 725 benefit Frivaldo
considering that said law was enacted on June 5, 1975, while Frivaldo lost his Filipino citizenship
much later, on January 20, 1983, and applied for repatriation even later, on August 17, 1994?
While it is true that the law was already in effect at the time that Frivaldo became an American
citizen, nevertheless, it is not only the law itself (P.D. 725) which is to be given retroactive effect, but
even the repatriation granted under said law to Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 is to be deemed to have
retroacted to the date of his application therefor, August 17, 1994. The reason for this is simply that
if, as in this case, it was the intent of the legislative authority that the law should apply to past events
-- i.e., situations and transactions existing even before the law came into being -- in order to benefit
the greatest number of former Filipinos possible thereby enabling them to enjoy and exercise the
constitutionally guaranteed right of citizenship, and such legislative intention is to be given the fullest
effect and expression, then there is all the more reason to have the law apply in a retroactive or
retrospective manner to situations, events and transactions subsequent to the passage of such law.
That is, the repatriation granted to Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 can and should be made to take effect
as of date of his application. As earlier mentioned, there is nothing in the law that would bar this or
would show a contrary intention on the part of the legislative authority; and there is no showing that
damage or prejudice to anyone, or anything unjust or injurious would result from giving retroactivity
to his repatriation. Neither has Lee shown that there will result the impairment of any contractual
obligation, disturbance of any vested right or breach of some constitutional guaranty.
Being a former Filipino who has served the people repeatedly, Frivaldo deserves a liberal
interpretation of Philippine laws and whatever defects there were in his nationality should now be
deemed mooted by his repatriation.
Another argument for retroactivity to the date of filing is that it would prevent prejudice to applicants.
If P.D. 725 were not to be given retroactive effect, and the Special Committee decides not to act, i.e.,
to delay the processing of applications for any substantial length of time, then the former Filipinos
who may be stateless, as Frivaldo -- having already renounced his American citizenship -- was, may
be prejudiced for causes outside their control. This should not be. In case of doubt in the
interpretation or application of laws, it is to be presumed that the law-making body intended right and
justice to prevail.
4
7
And as experience will show, the Special Committee was able to process, act upon and grant
applications for repatriation within relatively short spans of time after the same were filed.
48
The fact
that such interregna were relatively insignificant minimizes the likelihood of prejudice to the government
as a result of giving retroactivity to repatriation. Besides, to the mind of the Court, direct prejudice to the
government is possible only where a person's repatriation has the effect of wiping out a liability of his to
the government arising in connection with or as a result of his being an alien, and accruing only during the
interregnum between application and approval, a situation that is not present in the instant case.
And it is but right and just that the mandate of the people, already twice frustrated, should now
prevail. Under the circumstances, there is nothing unjust or iniquitous in treating Frivaldo's
repatriation as having become effective as of the date of his application, i.e., on August 17, 1994.
This being so, all questions about his possession of the nationality qualification -- whether at the
date of proclamation (June 30, 1995) or the date of election (May 8, 1995) or date of filing his
certificate of candidacy (March 20, 1995) would become moot.
Based on the foregoing, any question regarding Frivaldo's status as a registered voter would also be
deemed settled. Inasmuch as he is considered as having been repatriated -- i.e., his Filipino
citizenship restored -- as of August 17, 1994, his previous registration as a voter is likewise deemed
validated as of said date.
It is not disputed that on January 20, 1983 Frivaldo became an American. Would the retroactivity of
his repatriation not effectively give him dual citizenship, which under Sec. 40 of the Local
Government Code would disqualify him "from running for any elective local position?"
49
We answer
this question in the negative, as there is cogent reason to hold that Frivaldo was really STATELESS at
the time he took said oath of allegiance and even before that, when he ran for governor in 1988. In his
Comment, Frivaldo wrote that he "had long renounced and had long abandoned his American citizenship
-- long before May 8, 1995. At best, Frivaldo was stateless in the interim -- when he abandoned and
renounced his US citizenship but before he was repatriated to his Filipino citizenship."
50

On this point, we quote from the assailed Resolution dated December 19, 1995:
51

By the laws of the United States, petitioner Frivaldo lost his American citizenship
when he took his oath of allegiance to the Philippine Government when he ran for
Governor in 1988, in 1992, and in 1995. Every certificate of candidacy contains an
oath of allegiance to the Philippine Government."
These factual findings that Frivaldo has lost his foreign nationality long before the elections of 1995
have not been effectively rebutted by Lee. Furthermore, it is basic that such findings of the
Commission are conclusive upon this Court, absent any showing of capriciousness or arbitrariness
or
abuse.
52

The Second Issue: Is Lack of Citizenship
a Continuing Disqualification?
Lee contends that the May 1, 1995 Resolution
53
of the Comelec Second Division in SPA No. 95-028 as
affirmed in totoby Comelec En Banc in its Resolution of May 11, 1995 "became final and executory after
five (5) days or on May 17, 1995, no restraining order having been issued by this Honorable
Court.
54
Hence, before Lee "was proclaimed as the elected governor on June 30, 1995, there was
already a final and executory judgment disqualifying" Frivaldo. Lee adds that this Court's two rulings
(which Frivaldo now concedes were legally "correct") declaring Frivaldo an alien have also become final
and executory way before the 1995 elections, and these "judicial pronouncements of his political status as
an American citizen absolutely and for all time disqualified (him) from running for, and holding any public
office in the Philippines."
We do not agree.
It should be noted that our first ruling in G.R. No. 87193 disqualifying Frivaldo was rendered in
connection with the 1988 elections while that in G.R. No. 104654 was in connection with the 1992
elections. That he was disqualified for such elections is final and can no longer be changed. In the
words of the respondent Commission (Second Division) in its assailed Resolution:
55

The records show that the Honorable Supreme Court had decided that Frivaldo was
not a Filipino citizen and thus disqualified for the purpose of the 1988 and 1992
elections. However, there is no record of any "final judgment" of the disqualification
of Frivaldo as a candidate for the May 8, 1995 elections. What the Commission said
in its Order of June 21, 1995 (implemented on June 30, 1995), directing the
proclamation of Raul R. Lee, was that Frivaldo was not a Filipino citizen "having been
declared by the Supreme Court in its Order dated March 25, 1995, not a citizen of
the Philippines." This declaration of the Supreme Court, however, was in connection
with the 1992 elections.
Indeed, decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of citizenship cannot govern a person's future
status with finality. This is because a person may subsequently reacquire, or for that matter lose, his
citizenship under any of the modes recognized by law for the purpose. Hence, in Lee
vs. Commissioner of Immigration,
56
we held:
Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or
administrative case, whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority
decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered res judicata, hence
it has to be threshed out again and again, as the occasion demands.
The Third Issue: Comelec's Jurisdiction
Over The Petition in SPC No. 95-317
Lee also avers that respondent Comelec had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition in SPC No. 95-
317 because the only "possible types of proceedings that may be entertained by the Comelec are a
pre-proclamation case, an election protest or a quo warranto case". Again, Lee reminds us that he
was proclaimed on June 30, 1995 but that Frivaldo filed SPC No. 95-317 questioning his (Lee's)
proclamation only on July 6, 1995 -- "beyond the 5-day reglementary period." Hence, according to
him, Frivaldo's "recourse was to file either an election protest or a quo warranto action."
This argument is not meritorious. The Constitution
5
7 has given the Comelec ample power to "exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of all
elective . . . provincial . . . officials." Instead of dwelling at length on the various petitions that Comelec, in
the exercise of its constitutional prerogatives, may entertain, suffice it to say that this Court has invariably
recognized the Commission's authority to hear and decide petitions for annulment of proclamations -- of
which SPC No. 95-317 obviously is one.
58
Thus, in Mentang vs. COMELEC,
59
we ruled:
The petitioner argues that after proclamation and assumption of office, a pre-
proclamation controversy is no longer viable. Indeed, we are aware of cases holding
that pre-proclamation controversies may no longer be entertained by the COMELEC
after the winning candidate has been proclaimed. (citing Gallardo vs. Rimando, 187
SCRA 463; Salvacion vs. COMELEC, 170 SCRA 513; Casimiro vs. COMELEC, 171
SCRA 468.) This rule, however, is premised on an assumption that the proclamation
is no proclamation at all and the proclaimed candidate's assumption of office cannot
deprive the COMELEC of the power to make such declaration of nullity.
(citing Aguam vs. COMELEC, 23 SCRA 883; Agbayani vs. COMELEC, 186 SCRA
484.)
The Court however cautioned that such power to annul a proclamation must "be done within ten (10)
days following the proclamation." Inasmuch as Frivaldo's petition was filed only six (6) days after
Lee's proclamation, there is no question that the Comelec correctly acquired jurisdiction over the
same.
The Fourth Issue: Was Lee's Proclamation Valid?
Frivaldo assails the validity of the Lee proclamation. We uphold him for the following reasons:
First. To paraphrase this Court in Labo vs. COMELEC,
60
"the fact remains that he (Lee) was not the
choice of the sovereign will," and in Aquino vs. COMELEC,
61
Lee is "a second placer, . . . just that, a
second placer."
In spite of this, Lee anchors his claim to the governorship on the pronouncement of this Court in the
aforesaid Labo
62
case, as follows:
The rule would have been different if the electorate fully aware in fact and in law of a
candidate's disqualification so as to bring such awareness within the realm of
notoriety, would nonetheless cast their votes in favor of the ineligible candidate. In
such case, the electorate may be said to have waived the validity and efficacy of their
votes by notoriously misapplying their franchise or throwing away their votes, in
which case, the eligible candidate obtaining the next higher number of votes may be
deemed elected.
But such holding is qualified by the next paragraph, thus:
But this is not the situation obtaining in the instant dispute. It has not been shown,
and none was alleged, that petitioner Labo was notoriously known as an ineligible
candidate, much less the electorate as having known of such fact. On the contrary,
petitioner Labo was even allowed by no less than the Comelec itself in its resolution
dated May 10, 1992 to be voted for the office of the city Payor as its resolution dated
May 9, 1992 denying due course to petitioner Labo's certificate of candidacy had not
yet become final and subject to the final outcome of this case.
The last-quoted paragraph in Labo, unfortunately for Lee, is the ruling appropriate in this case
because Frivaldo was in 1995 in an identical situation as Labo was in 1992 when the Comelec's
cancellation of his certificate of candidacy was not yet final on election day as there was in both
cases a pending motion for reconsideration, for which reason Comelec issued an (omnibus)
resolution declaring that Frivaldo (like Labo in 1992) and several others can still be voted for in the
May 8, 1995 election, as in fact, he was.
Furthermore, there has been no sufficient evidence presented to show that the electorate of
Sorsogon was "fully aware in fact and in law" of Frivaldo's alleged disqualification as to "bring such
awareness within the realm of notoriety;" in other words, that the voters intentionally wasted their
ballots knowing that, in spite of their voting for him, he was ineligible. If Labo has any relevance at
all, it is that the vice-governor -- and not Lee -- should be pro- claimed, since in losing the election,
Lee was, to paraphrase Labo again, "obviously not the choice of the people" of Sorsogon. This is the
emphatic teaching of Labo:
The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not
entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be
declared elected. A minority or defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the
office.
Second. As we have earlier declared Frivaldo to have seasonably reacquired his citizenship and
inasmuch as he obtained the highest number of votes in the 1995 elections, he -- not Lee -- should
be proclaimed. Hence, Lee's proclamation was patently erroneous and should now be corrected.
The Fifth Issue: Is Section 78 of the
Election Code Mandatory?
In G.R. No. 120295, Frivaldo claims that the assailed Resolution of the Comelec (Second Division)
dated May 1, 1995 and the confirmatory en banc Resolution of May 11, 1995 disqualifying him for
want of citizenship should be annulled because they were rendered beyond the fifteen (15) day
period prescribed by Section 78, of the Omnibus Election Code which reads as follows:
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy. -- A
verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy
may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material
representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The
petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the
filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided after notice and hearing, not
later than fifteen days before the election. (Emphasis supplied.)
This claim is now moot and academic inasmuch as these resolutions are deemed superseded by the
subsequent ones issued by the Commission (First Division) on December 19, 1995, affirmed en
banc
63
on February 23, 1996; which both upheld his election. At any rate, it is obvious that Section 78 is
merely directory as Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 authorizes the Commission to try and decide petitions for
disqualifications even after the elections, thus:
Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. -- Any candidate who has been declared by
final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him
shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment
before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning
number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the
trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and upon motion of the complainant
or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the
proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.
(emphasis supplied)
Refutation of
Mr. Justice Davide's Dissent
In his dissenting opinion, the esteemed Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. argues that President
Aquino's memorandum dated March 27, 1987 should be viewed as a suspension (not a repeal, as
urged by Lee) of P.D. 725. But whether it decrees a suspension or a repeal is a purely academic
distinction because the said issuance is not a statute that can amend or abrogate an existing law.
The existence and subsistence of P.D. 725 were recognized in the first Frivaldo case;
64
viz., "(u)nder
CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and P.D. No. 725, Philippine citizenship maybe reacquired by . . .
repatriation". He also contends that by allowing Frivaldo to register and to remain as a registered voter,
the Comelec and in effect this Court abetted a "mockery" of our two previous judgments declaring him a
non-citizen. We do not see such abetting or mockery. The retroactivity of his repatriation, as discussed
earlier, legally cured whatever defects there may have been in his registration as a voter for the purpose
of the 1995 elections. Such retroactivity did not change his disqualifications in 1988 and 1992, which were
the subjects of such previous rulings.
Mr. Justice Davide also believes that Quo Warranto is not the sole remedy to question the ineligibility
of a candidate, citing the Comelec's authority under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code
allowing the denial of a certificate of candidacy on the ground of a false material representation
therein as required by Section 74. Citing Loong, he then states his disagreement with our holding
that Section 78 is merely directory. We really have no quarrel. Our point is that Frivaldo was in error
in his claim in G.R. No. 120295 that the Comelec Resolutions promulgated on May 1, 1995 and May
11, 1995 were invalid because they were issued "not later than fifteen days before the election" as
prescribed by Section 78. In dismissing the petition in G.R. No. 120295, we hold that the Comelec
did not commit grave abuse of discretion because "Section 6 of R.A. 6646 authorizes the Comelec to
try and decide disqualifications even after the elections." In spite of his disagreement with us on this
point, i.e., that Section 78 "is merely directory", we note that just like us, Mr. Justice Davide
nonetheless votes to "DISMISS G.R. No. 120295". One other point. Loong, as quoted in the dissent,
teaches that a petition to deny due course under Section 78 must be filed within the 25-day period
prescribed therein. The present case however deals with the period during which the Comelec
may decide such petition. And we hold that it may be decided even after thefifteen day period
mentioned in Section 78. Here, we rule that a decision promulgated by the Comelec even after the
elections is valid but Loong held that a petition filed beyond the 25-day period is out of time. There is
no inconsistency nor conflict.
Mr. Justice Davide also disagrees with the Court's holding that, given the unique factual
circumstances of Frivaldo, repatriation may be given retroactive effect. He argues that such
retroactivity "dilutes" our holding in the first Frivaldo case. But the first (and even the second
Frivaldo) decision did not directly involve repatriation as a mode of acquiring citizenship. If we may
repeat, there is no question that Frivaldo was not a Filipino for purposes of determining his
qualifications in the 1988 and 1992 elections. That is settled. But his supervening repatriation has
changed his political status -- not in 1988 or 1992, but only in the 1995 elections.
Our learned colleague also disputes our holding that Frivaldo was stateless prior to his repatriation,
saying that "informal renunciation or abandonment is not a ground to lose American citizenship".
Since our courts are charged only with the duty of determining who are Philippine nationals, we
cannot rule on the legal question of who are or who are not Americans. It is basic in international law
that a State determines ONLY those who are its own citizens -- not who are the citizens of other
countries.
65
The issue here is: the Comelec made a finding of fact that Frivaldo was stateless and such
finding has not been shown by Lee to be arbitrary or whimsical. Thus, following settled case law, such
finding is binding and final.
The dissenting opinion also submits that Lee who lost by chasmic margins to Frivaldo in all three
previous elections, should be declared winner because "Frivaldo's ineligibility for being an American
was publicly known". First, there is absolutely no empirical evidence for such "public" knowledge.
Second, even if there is, such knowledge can be true post facto only of the last two previous
elections. Third, even the Comelec and now this Court were/are still deliberating on his nationality
before, during and after the 1995 elections. How then can there be such "public" knowledge?
Mr. Justice Davide submits that Section 39 of the Local Government Code refers to the qualifications
of electivelocal officials, i.e., candidates, and not elected officials, and that the citizenship
qualification [under par. (a) of that section] must be possessed by candidates, not merely at the
commencement of the term, but by election day at the latest. We see it differently. Section 39, par.
(a) thereof speaks of "elective local official" while par. (b) to (f) refer to "candidates". If the
qualifications under par. (a) were intended to apply to "candidates" and not elected officials, the
legislature would have said so, instead of differentiating par. (a) from the rest of the paragraphs.
Secondly, if Congress had meant that the citizenship qualification should be possessed at election
day or prior thereto, it would have specifically stated such detail, the same way it did in pars. (b) to (f)
far other qualifications of candidates for governor, mayor, etc.
Mr. Justice Davide also questions the giving of retroactive effect to Frivaldo's repatriation on the
ground, among others, that the law specifically provides that it is only after taking the oath of
allegiance that applicants shall be deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship. We do not
question what the provision states. We hold however that the provision should be understood
thus: that after taking the oath of allegiance the applicant is deemed to have reacquired Philippine
citizenship, which reacquisition (or repatriation) is deemed for all purposes and intents to have
retroacted to the date of his application therefor.
In any event, our "so too" argument regarding the literal meaning of the word "elective" in reference
to Section 39 of the Local Authority Code, as well as regarding Mr. Justice Davide's thesis that the
very wordings of P.D. 725 suggest non-retroactivity, were already taken up rather extensively earlier
in this Decision.
Mr. Justice Davide caps his paper with a clarion call: "This Court must be the first to uphold the Rule
of Law." We agree -- we must all follow the rule of law. But that is NOT the issue here. The issue
is how should the law be interpreted and applied in this case so it can be followed, so it can rule!
At balance, the question really boils down to a choice of philosophy and perception of how to
interpret and apply laws relating to elections: literal or liberal; the letter or the spirit, the naked
provision or its ultimate purpose; legal syllogism or substantial justice; in isolation or in the context of
social conditions; harshly against or gently in favor of the voters' obvious choice. In applying election
laws, it would be far better to err in favor of popular sovereignty than to be right in complex but little
understood legalisms. Indeed, to inflict a thrice rejected candidate upon the electorate of Sorsogon
would constitute unmitigated judicial tyranny and an unacceptable assault upon this Court's
conscience.
E P I L O G U E
In sum, we rule that the citizenship requirement in the Local Government Code is to be possessed
by an elective official at the latest as of the time he is proclaimed and at the start of the term of office
to which he has been elected. We further hold P.D. No. 725 to be in full force and effect up to the
present, not having been suspended or repealed expressly nor impliedly at any time, and Frivaldo's
repatriation by virtue thereof to have been properly granted and thus valid and effective. Moreover,
by reason of the remedial or curative nature of the law granting him a new right to resume his
political status and the legislative intent behind it, as well as his unique situation of having been
forced to give up his citizenship and political aspiration as his means of escaping a regime he
abhorred, his repatriation is to be given retroactive effect as of the date of his application therefor,
during the pendency of which he was stateless, he having given up his U.S. nationality. Thus, in
contemplation of law, he possessed the vital requirement of Filipino citizenship as of the start of the
term of office of governor, and should have been proclaimed instead of Lee. Furthermore, since his
reacquisition of citizenship retroacted to August 17, 1994, his registration as a voter of Sorsogon is
deemed to have been validated as of said date as well. The foregoing, of course, are precisely
consistent with our holding that lack of the citizenship requirement is not a continuing disability or
disqualification to run for and hold public office. And once again, we emphasize herein our previous
rulings recognizing the Comelec's authority and jurisdiction to hear and decide petitions for
annulment of proclamations.
This Court has time and again liberally and equitably construed the electoral laws of our country to
give fullest effect to the manifest will of our people,
66
for in case of doubt, political laws must be
interpreted to give life and spirit to the popular mandate freely expressed through the ballot. Otherwise
stated, legal niceties and technicalities cannot stand in the way of the sovereign will. Consistently, we
have held:
. . . (L)aws governing election contests must be liberally construed to the end that the
will of the people in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by mere
technical objections (citations omitted).
6
7
The law and the courts must accord Frivaldo every possible protection, defense and refuge, in
deference to the popular will. Indeed, this Court has repeatedly stressed the importance of giving
effect to the sovereign will in order to ensure the survival of our democracy. In any action involving
the possibility of a reversal of the popular electoral choice, this Court must exert utmost effort to
resolve the issues in a manner that would give effect to the will of the majority, for it is merely sound
public policy to cause elective offices to be filled by those who are the choice of the majority. To
successfully challenge a winning candidate's qualifications, the petitioner must clearly demonstrate
that the ineligibility is so patently antagonistic
68
to constitutional and legal principles that overriding such
ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the apparent will of the people, would ultimately create greater
prejudice to the very democratic institutions and juristic traditions that our Constitution and laws so
zealously protect and promote. In this undertaking, Lee has miserably failed.
In Frivaldo's case. it would have been technically easy to find fault with his cause. The Court could
have refused to grant retroactivity to the effects of his repatriation and hold him still ineligible due to
his failure to show his citizenship at the time he registered as a voter before the 1995 elections. Or, it
could have disputed the factual findings of the Comelec that he was stateless at the time of
repatriation and thus hold his consequent dual citizenship as a disqualification "from running for any
elective local position." But the real essence of justice does not emanate from quibblings over
patchwork legal technicality. It proceeds from the spirit's gut consciousness of the dynamic role of
law as a brick in the ultimate development of the social edifice. Thus, the Court struggled against
and eschewed the easy, legalistic, technical and sometimes harsh anachronisms of the law in order
to evoke substantial justice in the larger social context consistent with Frivaldo's unique situation
approximating venerability in Philippine political life. Concededly, he sought American citizenship
only to escape the clutches of the dictatorship. At this stage, we cannot seriously entertain any doubt
about his loyalty and dedication to this country. At the first opportunity, he returned to this land, and
sought to serve his people once more. The people of Sorsogon overwhelmingly voted for him three
times. He took an oath of allegiance to this Republic every time he filed his certificate of candidacy
and during his failed naturalization bid. And let it not be overlooked, his demonstrated tenacity and
sheer determination to re-assume his nationality of birth despite several legal set-backs speak more
loudly, in spirit, in fact and in truth than any legal technicality, of his consuming intention and burning
desire to re-embrace his native Philippines even now at the ripe old age of 81 years. Such loyalty to
and love of country as well as nobility of purpose cannot be lost on this Court of justice and equity.
Mortals of lesser mettle would have given up. After all, Frivaldo was assured of a life of ease and
plenty as a citizen of the most powerful country in the world. But he opted, nay, single-mindedly
insisted on returning to and serving once more his struggling but beloved land of birth. He therefore
deserves every liberal interpretation of the law which can be applied in his favor. And in the final
analysis, over and above Frivaldo himself, the indomitable people of Sorsogon most certainly
deserve to be governed by a leader of their overwhelming choice.
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing:
(1) The petition in G.R. No. 123755 is hereby DISMISSED. The assailed Resolutions of the
respondent Commission are AFFIRMED.
(2) The petition in G.R. No. 120295 is also DISMISSED for being moot and academic. In any event,
it has no merit.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo, Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr. and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Melo, Vitug and Kapunan, JJ., concurs in the result.
Narvasa, C.J. and Mendoza, J., took no part.






Separate Opinions

PUNO, J ., concurring:
I concur with the path-breaking ponencia of Mr. Justice Panganiban which is pro-people and pierces
the myopia of legalism. Upholding the sovereign will of the people which is the be-all and the end-all
of republicanism, it rests on a foundation that will endure time and its tempest.
The sovereignty of our people is the primary postulate of the 1987 Constitution. For this reason, it
appears as thefirst in our declaration of principles and state policies. Thus, section 1 of Article II of
our fundamental law proclaims that "[t]he Philippines is a democratic and republican State.
Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them." The same
principle served as the bedrock of our 1973 and 1935 Constitutions.
1
It is one of the few principles
whose truth has been cherished by the Americans as self-evident. Section 4, Article IV of the U.S.
Constitution makes it a duty of the Federal government to guarantee to every state a "republican form of
government." With understandable fervor, the American authorities imposed republicanism as the
cornerstone of our 1935 Constitution then being crafted by its Filipino framers.
2

Borne out of the 1986 people power EDSA revolution, our 1987 Constitution is more people-
oriented. Thus, section 4 of Article II provides as a state policy that the prime duty of the
Government is "to serve and protect the people." Section 1, Article XI also provides that ". . . public
officers . . . must at all times be accountable to the people . . ." Sections 15 and 1 of Article XIII
define the role and rights of people's organizations. Section 5(2) of Article XVI mandates that "[t]he
state shall strengthen the patriotic spirit and nationalist consciousness of the military, and respect for
people's rights in the performance of their duty." And section 2 of Article XVII provides that
"amendments to
this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative . . ." All these
provisions and more are intended to breathe more life to the sovereignty of our people.
To be sure, the sovereignty of our people is not a kabalistic principle whose dimensions are buried in
mysticism. Its metes and bounds are familiar to the framers of our Constitutions. They knew that in
its broadest sense, sovereignty is meant to be supreme, the jus summi imperu, the absolute right to
govern.
3
Former Dean Vicente Sinco
4
states that an essential quality of sovereignty is legal
omnipotence, viz.: "Legal theory establishes certain essential qualities inherent in the nature of
sovereignty. The first is legal omnipotence. This means that the sovereign is legally omnipotent and
absolute in relation to other legal institutions. It has the power to determine exclusively its legal
competence. Its powers are original, not derivative. It is the sole judge of what it should do at any given
time."
5
Citing Barker,
6
he adds that a more amplified definition of sovereignty is that of "a final power of
final legal adjustment of all legal issues." The U.S. Supreme Court expressed the same thought in the
landmark case of Yick Wo v. Hopkins,
7
where it held that ". . .sovereignty itself is, of course, not subject
to law, for it is the author and source of law; but in our system, while sovereign powers are delegated to
the agencies of government, sovereignty itself remains with the people, by whom and for whom all
government exists and acts."
In our Constitution, the people established a representative democracy as distinguished from a pure
democracy. Justice Isagani Cruz explains:
8

xxx xxx xxx
A republic is a representative government, a government run by and for the people. It
is not a pure democracy where the people govern themselves directly. The essence
of republicanism is representation and renovation, the selection by the citizenry of a
corps of public functionaries who derive their mandate from the people and act on
their behalf, serving for a limited period only, after which they are replaced or
retained, at the option of their principal. Obviously, a republican government is a
responsible government whose officials hold and discharge their position as a public
trust and shall, according to the Constitution, "at all times be accountable to the
people" they are sworn to serve. The purpose of a republican government it is almost
needless to state, is the promotion of the common welfare according to the will of the
people themselves.
I appreciate the vigorous dissent of Mr. Justice Davide. I agree that sovereignty is indivisible but it
need not always be exercised by the people together, all the time.
9
For this reason, the Constitution
and our laws provide when the entire electorate or only some of them can elect those who make our laws
and those who execute our laws. Thus, the entire electorate votes for our senators but only our district
electorates vote for our congressmen, only our provincial electorates vote for the members of our
provincial boards, only our city electorates vote for our city councilors, and only our municipal electorates
vote for our councilors. Also, the entire electorate votes for our President and Vice-President but only our
provincial electorates vote for our governors, only our city electorates vote for our mayors, and only our
municipal electorates vote for our mayors. By defining and delimiting the classes of voters who can
exercise the sovereignty of the people in a given election, it cannot be claimed that said sovereignty has
been fragmented.
It is my respectful submission that the issue in the case at bar is not whether the people of Sorsogon
should be given the right to defy the law by allowing Frivaldo to sit as their governor. Rather, the
issue is: whether the will of the voters of Sorsogon clearly choosing Frivaldo as governor ought to be
given a decisive value considering theuncertainty of the law on when a candidate ought to satisfy the
qualification of citizenship. The uncertainty of law and jurisprudence, both here and abroad, on this
legal issue cannot be denied. In the United States,
10
there are two (2) principal schools of thought on
the matter. One espouses the view that a candidate must possess the qualifications for office at the time
of his election. The other ventures the view that the candidate should satisfy the qualifications at the time
he assumes the powers of the office. I am unaware of any Philippine decision that has squarely resolved
this difficult question of law. The ponencia of Mr. Justice Panganiban adhered to the second school of
thought while Mr. Justice Davide dissents.
I emphasize the honest-to-goodness difference in interpreting our law on the matter for this is vital to
dispel the fear of Mr. Justice Davide that my opinion can bring about ill effects to the State. Mr.
Justice Davide's fear is based on the assumption that Frivaldo continues to be disqualified and we
cannot allow him to sit as governor without transgressing the law. I do not concede this assumption
for as stressed above, courts have been sharply divided by this mind boggling issue. Given this
schism, I do not see how we can derogate on the sovereignty of the people by according more
weight to the votes of the people of Sorsogon.
Mr. Justice Davide warns that should the people of Batanes stage a rebellion, we cannot prosecute
them "because of the doctrine of people's sovereignty." With due respect, the analogy is not
appropriate. In his hypothetical case, rebellion is concededly a crime, a violation of Article 134 of the
Revised Penal Code, an offense against the sovereignty of our people. In the case at bar, it cannot
be held with certitude that the people of Sorsogon violated the law by voting for Frivaldo as
governor. Frivaldo's name was in the list of candidates allowed by COMELEC to run for governor. At
that time too, Frivaldo was taking all steps to establish his Filipino citizenship. And even our
jurisprudence has not settled the issue when a candidate should possess the qualification of
citizenship. Since the meaning of the law is arguable then and now, I cannot imagine how it will be
disastrous for the State if we tilt the balance in the case at bar in favor of the people of Sorsogon.
In sum, I respectfully submit that the sovereign will of our people should be resolutory of the case at
bar which is one of its kind, unprecedented in our political history. For three (3) times, Frivaldo ran as
governor of the province of Sorsogon. For two (2) times, he was disqualified on the ground of
citizenship. The people of Sorsogon voted for him as their governor despite his disqualification. The
people never waffled in their support for Frivaldo. In 1988, they gave him a winning margin of
27,000; in 1992, they gave him a winning spread of 57,000; in 1995, he posted a margin of 20,000.
Clearly then, Frivaldo is the overwhelming choice of the people of Sorsogon. In election cases, we
should strive to align the will of the legislature as expressed in its law with the will of the sovereign
people as expressed in their ballots. For law to reign, it must respect the will of the people. For in the
eloquent prose of Mr. Justice Laurel, ". . . an enfranchised citizen is a particle of popular sovereignty
and is the ultimate source of established authority."
11
The choice of the governed on who shall be their
governor merits the highest consideration by all agencies of government. In cases where the sovereignty
of the people is at stake, we must not only be legally right but also politically correct. We cannot fail by
making the people succeed.
DAVIDE, JR., J ., dissenting:
After deliberating on the re-formulated issues and the conclusions reached by my distinguished
colleague, Mr. Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, I find myself unable to join him.
I
I agree with petitioner Lee that Frivaldo's repatriation was void, but not on the ground that President
Corazon C. Aquino's 27 March 1987 memorandum "effectively repealed" P.D. No. 725. In my view,
the said memorandum onlysuspended the implementation of the latter decree by divesting the
Special Committee on Naturalization of its authority to further act on grants of citizenship under LOI
No. 270, as amended, P.D. No. 836, as amended; P.D. No. 1379; and "any other related laws,
orders, issuances and rules and regulations." A reading of the last paragraph of the memorandum
can lead to no other conclusion, thus:
In view of the foregoing, you as Chairman and members of the Special Committee on
Naturalization, are hereby directed to cease and desist from undertaking any and all
proceedings within your functional area of responsibility, as defined in Letter of
Instruction No. 270 dated April 11, 1975, as amended, Presidential Decree No. 836
dated December 3, 1975, as amended, and Presidential Decree No. 1379 dated May
17, 1978, relative to the grant of citizenship under the said laws, and any other
related laws, orders, issuances and rules and regulations. (emphasis supplied)
It is self-evident that the underscored clause can only refer to those related to LOI No. 270, P.D. No.
836, and P.D. No. 1379. There is no doubt in my mind that P.D. No. 725 is one such "related law" as
it involves the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship by repatriation and designates the Special
Committee on Naturalization created under LOI No. 270 to receive and act on (i.e., approve or
disapprove) applications under the said decree. The power of President Aquino to suspend these
issuances by virtue of the 27 March 1987 memorandum is beyond question considering that under
Section 6, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution, she exercised legislative power until the Congress
established therein convened on the fourth Monday of July 1987.
I disagree with the view expressed in the ponencia that the memorandum of 27 March 1987 was
merely a declaration of "executive policy," and not an exercise of legislative power. LOI No. 270,
P.D. No. 836, P.D. No. 1379 and "any other related laws," such as P.D. No. 725, were issued by
President Ferdinand E. Marcos in the exercise of his legislative powers -- not executive power.
These laws relate to the acquisition (by naturalization) and reacquisition (by repatriation) of
Philippine citizenship, and in light of Sections 1(4) and 3, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution
(naturalization and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship shall be in accordance with law), it is
indubitable that these subjects are a matter of legislative prerogative. In the same vein, the creation
of the Special Committee on Naturalization by LOI No. 270 and the conferment of the power to
accept and act on applications under P.D. No. 725 are clearly legislative acts.
Accordingly, the revocation of the cease and desist order and the reactivation or revival of the
Committee can be done only by legislative fiat, i.e., by Congress, since the President had long lost
his authority to exercise "legislative power." Considering that Congress has not seen it fit to do so,
the President cannot, in the exercise of executive power, lift the cease and desist order nor
reactivate/reconstitute/revive the Committee. A multo fortiori, the Committee cannot validly accept
Frivaldo's application for repatriation and approve it.
II
Even assuming arguendo that Frivaldo's repatriation is valid, it did not "cure his lack of citizenship." I
depart from the view in the ponencia that Section 39 of the Local Government Code of 1991 does
not specify the time when the citizenship requirement must be met, and that being the case, then it
suffices that citizenship be possessed upon commencement of the term of the office involved;
therefore, since Frivaldo "re-assumed" his Philippine citizenship at 2:00 p.m. on 30 June 1995 and
the term of office of Governor commenced at 12:00 noon of that day, he had, therefore, complied
with the citizenship requirement.
In the first place, Section 39 actually prescribes the qualifications of elective local officials and not
those of anelected local official. These adjectives are not synonymous, as the ponencia seems to
suggest. The first refers to the nature of the office, which requires the process of voting by the
electorate involved; while the second refers to a victorious candidate for an elective office. The
section unquestionably refers to elective -- not elected -- local officials. It falls under Title Two
entitled ELECTIVE OFFICIALS; under Chapter 1 entitled Qualifications and Election; and paragraph
(a) thereof begins with the phrase "An elective local official," while paragraphs (b) to (f) thereof speak
of candidates. It reads as follows:
Sec. 39. Qualifications. -- (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the
Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province or, in
the case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod,
or sangguniang bayan, the district where he intends to be elected; a resident therein
for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to
read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.
(b) Candidates for the position of governor, vice governor or member of the
sangguniang panlalawigan, or mayor, vice mayor or member of the sangguniang
panlungsod of highly urbanized cities must be at least twenty-three (23) years of age
on election day.
(c) Candidates for the position of mayor or vice mayor of independent component
cities, component cities, or municipalities must be at least twenty-one (21) years of
age on election day.
(d) Candidates for the position of member of the sangguniang panlungsod or
sangguniang bayan must be at least eighteen (18) years of age on election day.
(e) Candidates for the position of punong barangay or member of the sangguniang
barangay must be at least eighteen (18) years of age on election day.
(f) Candidates for the sangguniang kabataan must be at least fifteen (15) years of
age but not more than twenty-one (21) years of age on election day (emphasis
supplied)
It is thus obvious that Section 39 refers to no other than the qualifications of candidates for
elective local offices and their election. Hence, in no way may the section be construed to
mean that possession of qualifications should be reckoned from the commencement of the
term of office of the elected candidate.
For another, it is not at all true that Section 39 does not specify the time when the citizenship
requirement must be possessed. I submit that the requirement must be satisfied, or that Philippine
citizenship must be possessed, not merely at the commencement of the term, but at an earlier time,
the latest being election day itself. Section 39 is not at all ambiguous nor uncertain that it meant this
to be, as one basic qualification of an elective local official is that he be "A REGISTERED VOTER IN
THE BARANGAY, MUNICIPALITY, CITY OR PROVINCE . . . WHERE HE INTENDS TO VOTE."
This simply means that he possesses all the qualifications to exercise the right of suffrage. The
fundamental qualification for the exercise of this sovereign right is the possession of Philippine
citizenship. No less than the Constitution makes it the first qualification, as Section 1, Article V
thereof provides:
Sec. 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise
disqualified by law, who are at least eighteen years of age, and who shall have
resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein they propose
to vote for at least six months immediately preceding the election. . . . (emphasis
supplied)
And Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines (B.P. Blg. 881) expressly
provides for the qualifications of a voter. Thus:
Sec. 117 Qualifications of a voter. -- Every citizen of the Philippines, not otherwise
disqualified by law, eighteen years of age or over, who shall have resided in the
Philippines for one year and in the city or municipality wherein he proposes to vote
for at least six months immediately preceding the election, may be a registered voter.
(emphasis supplied)
It is undisputed that this Court twice voided Frivaldo's election as Governor in the 1988 and 1992
elections on the ground that for lack of Philippine citizenship -- he being a naturalized citizen of the
United States of America -- he was DISQUALIFIED to be elected as such and to serve the position
(Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections, 174 SCRA 245 [1989]; Republic of the Philippines vs. De la
Rosa, 232 SCRA 785 [1994]). This disqualification inexorably nullified Frivaldo's registration as a
voter and declared it void ab initio. Our judgments therein were self-executory and no further
act, e.g., a COMELEC order to cancel his registration as a voter or the physical destruction of his
voter's certificate, was necessary for the ineffectivity. Thus, he was never considered a registered
voter for the elections of May 1992, and May 1995, as there is no showing that Frivaldo registered
anew as a voter for the latter elections. Even if he did -- in obvious defiance of his decreed
disqualification -- this did not make him a Filipino citizen, hence it was equally void ab initio. That he
filed his certificate of candidacy for the 1995 elections and was even allowed to vote therein were of
no moment. Neither act made him a Filipino citizen nor nullified the judgments of this Court. On the
contrary, said acts made a mockery of our judgments. For the Court now to validate Frivaldo's
registration as a voter despite the judgments of disqualification is to modify the said judgments by
making their effectivity and enforceability dependent on a COMELEC order cancelling his
registration as a voter, or on the physical destruction of his certificate of registration as a voter which,
of course, was never our intention. Moreover, to sanction Frivaldo's registration as a voter would be
to sacrifice substance in favor of form (the piece of paper that is the book of voters or list of voters or
voter's ID), and abet the COMELEC's incompetence in failing to cancel Frivaldo's registration and
allowing him to vote.
The second reason in the ponencia as to why the citizenship disqualification should be reckoned not
from the date of the election nor the filing of the certificate of candidacy, but from the date of
proclamation, is that the only available remedy to question the ineligibility (or disloyalty) of a
candidate is a petition for quo warranto which, under Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code,
may be filed only within ten days from proclamation and not earlier.
I beg to differ.
Clearly, quo warranto is not the sole remedy available to question a candidate's ineligibility for public
office. Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code allows the filing of a petition to deny due course to
or cancel the certificate of candidacy on the ground that any material representation contained
therein, as required by Section 74, is false. Section 74, in turn, requires that the person filing the
certificate of candidacy must state, inter alia, thathe is eligible for the office, which means that he has
all the qualifications (including, of course, fulfilling the citizenship requirement) and none of the
disqualifications as provided by law. The petition under Section 78 may be filed at any time not later
than 25 days from the filing of the certificate of candidacy. The section reads in full as follows:
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. -- A
verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy
may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material
representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The
petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the
filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and
hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.
This remedy was recognized in Loong vs. Commission on Elections (216 SCRA 760, 768
[1992]), where this Court held:
Thus, if a person qualified to file a petition to disqualify a certain candidate fails to file
the petition within the 25-day period Section 78 of the Code for whatever reasons,
the election laws do not leave him completely helpless as he has another chance to
raise the disqualification of the candidate by filing a petition for quo warranto within
ten (10) days from the proclamation of the results of the election, as provided under
Section 253 of the Code. Section 1, Rule 21 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure
similarly provides that any voter contesting the election of any regional, provincial or
city official on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the
Philippines may file a petition for quo warranto with the Electoral Contest
Adjudication Department. The petition may be filed within ten (10) days from the date
the respondent is proclaimed (Section 2).
Likewise, Rule 25 of the Revised COMELEC Rules of Procedure allows the filing of a petition for
disqualification on the ground of failure to possess all the qualifications of a candidate as provided by
the Constitution or by existing laws, "any day after the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy
but not later than the date of proclamation." Sections 1 and 3 thereof provide:
Rule 25 -- Disqualification of Candidates
Sec. 1. Grounds for Disqualification. Any candidate who does not possess all the
qualifications of a candidate as provided for by the Constitution or by existing law or
who commits any act declared by law to be grounds for disqualification may be
disqualified from continuing as a candidate.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 3. Period to File Petition. The petition shall be filed any day after the last day for
filing of certificates of candidacy but not later than the date of proclamation.
While the validity of this rule insofar as it concerns petitions for disqualification on the ground
of lack of all qualifications may be doubtful, its invalidity is not in issue here.
In this connection, it would seem appropriate to take up the last issue grappled within
the ponencia, viz., is Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code mandatory? The answer is provided
in Loong.
We also do not find merit in the contention of respondent Commission that in the light
of the provisions of Sections 6 and 7 of Rep. Act No. 6646, a petition to deny due
course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed even beyond the 25-day
period prescribed by Section 78 of the Code, as long as it is filed within a reasonable
time from the discovery of the ineligibility.
Sections 6 and 7 of Rep. Act No. 6646 are here re-quoted:
Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification case. Any candidate who has been
declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for,
and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a
candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be
disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of
votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with
the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion
of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency
thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate
whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.
Sec. 7. Petition to Deny Due Course To or Cancel a Certificate of
Candidacy. The procedure hereinabove provided shall apply to
petitions to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy as
provided in Section 78 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881.
It will be noted that nothing in Sections 6 or 7 modifies or alters the 25- day period
prescribed by Section 78 of the Code for filing the appropriate action to cancel a
certificate of candidacy on account of any false representation made therein. On the
contrary, said Section 7 affirms and reiterates Section 78 of the Code.
We note that Section 6 refers only to the effects of a disqualification case which may
be based on grounds other than that provided under Section 78 of the Code. But
Section 7 of Rep. Act No. 6646 also makes the effects referred to in Section 6
applicable to disqualification cases filed under Section 78 of the Code. Nowhere in
Sections 6 and 7 of Rep. Act No. 6646 is mention made of the period within which
these disqualification cases may be filed. This is because there are provisions in the
Code which supply the periods within which a petition relating to disqualification of
candidates must be filed, such as Section 78, already discussed, and Section 253 on
petitions for quo warranto.
I then disagree with the asseveration in the ponencia that Section 78 is merely directory because
Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 authorizes the COMELEC to try and decide petitions for disqualification
even after elections. I submit that Section 6 refers to disqualifications under Sections 12 and 68 of
the Omnibus Election Code and consequently modifies Section 72 thereof. As such, the proper court
or the COMELEC are granted the authority to continue hearing the case after the election, and
during the pendency of the case, suspend the proclamation of the victorious candidate, if the
evidence against him is strong. Sections 12, 68, and 72 of the Code provide:
Sec. 12. Disqualifications. Any person who has been declared by competent
authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for
subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any offense for which he has been
sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months or for a crime involving moral
turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has
been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty.
The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed
upon declaration by competent authority that said insanity or incompetence had been
removed or after the expiration of a period of five years from his service of sentence,
unless within the same period he again becomes disqualified.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 68. Disqualifications. Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a
party is declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the
Commission of having (a) given money or other material consideration to influence,
induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral functions; (b)
committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election
campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or
made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e)
violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, sub-
paragraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been
elected, from holding the office. Any person who is a permanent resident of or an
immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office
under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident or
immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement
provided for in the election laws. (Sec. 25, 1971 EC)
Sec. 72. Effects of disqualification cases and priority. The Commission and the
courts shall give priority to cases of disqualification by reason of violation of this Act
to the end that a final decision shall be rendered not later than seven days before the
election in which the disqualification is sought.
Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not
be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. Nevertheless, if for any
reason, a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be
disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such
election, his violation of the provisions of the preceding sections shall not prevent his
proclamation and assumption to office.
III
Still assuming that the repatriation is valid, I am not persuaded by the arguments in support of the
thesis that Frivaldo's repatriation may be given retroactive effect, as such goes against the spirit and
letter of P.D. No. 725. The spirit adheres to the principle that acquisition or re-acquisition of
Philippine citizenship is not a right, but a mere privilege. Before the advent of P.D. No. 725, only the
following could apply for repatriation: (a) Army, Navy, or Air Corps deserters; and (b) a woman who
lost her citizenship by reason of her marriage to an alien after the death of her spouse (Section 2[2],
C.A. No. 63). P.D. NO. 725 expanded this to include Filipino women who lost their Philippine
citizenship by marriage to aliens even before the death of their alien husbands, or the termination of
their marital status and to natural-born Filipino citizens who lost their Philippine citizenship but
subsequently desired to reacquire the latter.
Turning now to the letter of the law, P.D. No. 725 expressly provides that repatriation takes effect
only after taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, thus:
. . . may reacquire Philippine citizenship . . . by applying with the Special Committee
on Naturalization created by Letter of Instruction No. 270, and, if their applications
are approved, taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines, AFTER WHICH THEY SHALL BE DEEMED TO HAVE REACQUIRED
PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP. (emphasis and capitalization supplied)
Clearly then, the steps to reacquire Philippine citizenship by repatriation under the decree
are: (1) filing the application; (2) action by the committee; and (3) taking of the oath of
allegiance if the application is approved. It is only UPON TAKING THE OATH OF
ALLEGIANCE that the applicant is deemed ipso jure to have reacquired Philippine
citizenship. If the decree had intended the oath taking to retroact to the date of the filing of
the application, then it should not have explicitly provided otherwise.
This theory in the ponencia likewise dilutes this Court's pronouncement in the first Frivaldo case that
what reacquisition of Filipino citizenship requires is an act "formally rejecting [the] adopted state and
reaffirming . . . allegiance to the Philippines." That act meant nothing less than taking of the oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. If we now take this revision of doctrine to its logical end,
then it would also mean that if Frivaldo had chosen and reacquired Philippine citizenship by
naturalization or through Congressional action, such would retroact to the filing of the petition for
naturalization or the bill granting him Philippine citizenship. This is a proposition which both the first
and second Frivaldo cases soundly rejected.
The other reason adduced in the ponencia in support of the proposition that P.D. No. 725 can be
given retroactive effect is its alleged curative or remedial nature.
Again, I disagree. In the first place, by no stretch of legal hermeneutics may P.D. No. 725 be
characterized as a curative or remedial statute:
Curative or remedial statutes are healing acts. They are remedial by curing defects
and adding to the means of enforcing existing obligations. The rule in regard to
curative statutes is that if the thing omitted or failed to be done, and which constitutes
the defect sought to be removed or made harmless, is something the legislature
might have dispensed with by a previous statute, it may do so by a subsequent one.
Curative statutes are intended to supply defects, abridge superfluities in existing
laws, and curb certain evils. They are intended to enable a person to carry into effect
that which they have designed and intended, but has failed of expected legal
consequence by reason of some statutory disability or irregularity in their own action.
They make valid that which, before the enactment of the statute, was invalid.
(RUBEN E. AGPALO, Statutory Construction, Second ed. [1990], 270-271, citations
omitted).
P.D. No. 725 provides for the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship lost through the marriage of a
Filipina to an alien and through naturalization in a foreign country of natural-born Filipino citizens. It
involves then the substantive, nay primordial, right of citizenship. To those for whom it is intended, it
means, in reality, the acquisition of "a new right," as the ponencia cannot but concede. Therefore, it
may not be said to merely remedy or cure a defect considering that one who has lost Philippine
citizenship does not have the right to reacquire it. As earlier stated, the Constitution provides that
citizenship, once lost, may only be reacquired in the manner provided by law. Moreover, it has also
been observed that:
The idea is implicit from many of the cases that remedial statutes are statutes
relating to procedure and not substantive rights. (Sutherland, Statutory Construction,
Vol. 3, Third ed. [1943], 5704 at 74, citations omitted).
If we grant for the sake of argument, however, that P.D. No. 725 is curative or remedial statute, it
would be an inexcusable error to give it a retroactive effect since it explicitly provides the date of its
effectivity. Thus:
This Decree shall take effect immediately.
Done in the city of Manila, this 5th day of June, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen
hundred and seventy five.
Nevertheless, if the retroactivity is to relate only to the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, then
nothing therein supports such theory, for as the decree itself unequivocally provides, it is only
after taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines that the applicant is DEEMED
TO HAVE REACQUIRED PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP.
IV
Assuming yet again, for the sake of argument, that taking the oath of allegiance retroacted to the
date of Frivaldo's application for repatriation, the same could not be said insofar as it concerned the
United States of America, of which he was a citizen. For under the laws of the United States of
America, Frivaldo remained an American national until he renounced his citizenship and allegiance
thereto at 2:00 p.m. on 30 June 1995, when he took his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines. Section 401 of the Nationality Act of 1940 of the United States of America provides that
a person who is a national of the United States of America, whether by birth or naturalization, loses
his nationality by, inter alia, "(b) Taking an oath or making an affirmation or other formal declaration
of allegiance to a foreign state" (SIDNEY KANSAS, U.S. Immigration Exclusion and Deportation and
Citizenship of the United States of America, Third ed., [1948] 341-342). It follows then that on
election day and until the hour of the commencement of the term for which he was elected - noon of
30 June 1995 as per Section 43 of the Local Government Code - Frivaldo possessed dual
citizenship, viz., (a) as an American citizen; and (b) as a Filipino citizen through the adoption of the
theory that the effects of his taking the oath of allegiance were retrospective. Hence, he was
disqualified to run for Governor for yet another reason: possession of dual citizenship, in accordance
with Section 40 (d) of the Local Government Code.
V
The assertion in the ponencia that Frivaldo may be considered STATELESS on the basis of his
claim that he "had long renounced and had long abandoned his American citizenship - long before
May 8, 1985" - is untenable, for the following reasons: first, it is based on Frivaldo's unproven, self-
serving allegation; second, informal renunciation or abandonment is not a ground to lose American
citizenship; and third, simply put, never did the status of a STATELESS person attach to Frivaldo.
Statelessness may be either de jure, which is the status of individuals stripped of their nationality by
their former government without having an opportunity to acquire another; or de facto, which is the
status of individuals possessed of a nationality whose country does not give them protection outside
their own country, and who are commonly, albeit imprecisely, referred to as refugees (JORGE R.
COQUIA, et al., Conflict of Laws Cases, Materials and Comments, 1995 ed., 290).
Specifically, under Chapter 1, Article 1 of the United Nations Convention Regarding the Status of
Stateless Persons (Philippine Treaty Series, Compiled and Annotated by Haydee B. Yorac, vol. III,
363), a stateless person is defined as "a person who is not considered as a national by any State
under the operation of its law." However, it has not been shown that the United States of America
ever ceased to consider Frivaldo its national at any time before he took his oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines on 30 June 1995.
VI
Finally, I find it in order to also express my view on the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Reynato S.
Puno. I am absolutely happy to join him in his statement that "[t]he sovereignty of our people is the
primary postulate of the 1987 Constitution" and that the said Constitution is "more people-oriented,"
"borne [as it is] out of the 1986 people power EDSA revolution." I would even go further by saying
that this Constitution is pro-God (Preamble), pro-people (Article II, Sections 1, 3, 4, 5, 9, 15, 16;
Article XI, Section 1, Article XII, Sections 1, 6; Article XIII, Sections 1, 11, 15, 16, 18; Article XVI,
Sections 5(2), 6), pro-Filipino (Article XII, Sections 1, 2, 10, 11, 12, 14; Article XIV, Sections 1, 4(2),
13; Article XVI, Section 11), pro-poor (Article II, Sections 9, 10, 18, 21; Article XII, Sections 1, 2(3);
Article XIII, Sections 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 13), pro-life (Article II, Section 12), and pro-
family (Article II, Section 12; Article XV).
Nevertheless, I cannot be with him in carrying out the principle of sovereignty beyond what I
perceive to be the reasonable constitutional parameters. The doctrine of people's sovereignty is
founded on the principles of democracy and republicanism and refers exclusively to the sovereignty
of the people of the Philippines. Section 1 of Article II is quite clear on this, thus:
Sec. 1. The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in
the people and all government authority emanates from them.
And the Preamble makes it clear when it solemnly opens it with a clause "We, the sovereign
Filipino people . . ." Thus, this sovereignty is an attribute of the Filipino people as one
people, one body.
That sovereign power of the Filipino people cannot be fragmentized by looking at it as the supreme
authority of the people of any of the political subdivisions to determine their own destiny; neither can
we convert and treat every fragment as the whole. In such a case, this Court would provide the
formula for the division and destruction of the State and render the Government ineffective and
inutile. To illustrate the evil, we may consider the enforcement of laws or the pursuit of a national
policy by the executive branch of the government, or the execution of a judgment by the courts. If
these are opposed by the overwhelming majority of the people of a certain province, or even a
municipality, it would necessarily follow that the law, national policy, or judgment must not be
enforced, implemented, or executed in the said province or municipality. More concretely, if, for
instance, the vast majority of the people of Batanes rise publicly and take up arms against the
Government for the purpose of removing from the allegiance to the said Government or its laws, the
territory of the Republic of the Philippines or any part thereof, or any body of land, naval, or other
armed forces, or depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their
powers or prerogatives, then those who did so -- and which are composed of the vast majority of the
people of Batanes -- a political subdivision -- cannot be prosecuted for or be held guilty of rebellion in
violation of Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code because of the doctrine of peoples' sovereignty.
Indeed, the expansion of the doctrine of sovereignty by investing upon the people of a mere political
subdivision that which the Constitution places in the entire Filipino people, may be disastrous to the
Nation.
So it is in this case if we follow the thesis in the concurring opinion. Thus, simply because Frivaldo
had obtained a margin of 20,000 votes over his closest rival, Lee, i.e., a vast majority of the voters of
Sorsogon had expressed their sovereign will for the former, then this Court must yield to that will and
must, therefore, allow to be set aside, for Frivaldo, not just the laws on qualifications of candidates
and elective officials and naturalization and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, but even the final
and binding decisions of this Court affecting him.
This Court must be the first to uphold the Rule of Law. I vote then to DISMISS G.R. No. 120295 and
GRANT G.R. No. 123755.

Separate Opinions
PUNO, J ., concurring:
I concur with the path-breaking ponencia of Mr. Justice Panganiban which is pro-people and pierces
the myopia of legalism. Upholding the sovereign will of the people which is the be-all and the end-all
of republicanism, it rests on a foundation that will endure time and its tempest.
The sovereignty of our people is the primary postulate of the 1987 Constitution. For this reason, it
appears as thefirst in our declaration of principles and state policies. Thus, section 1 of Article II of
our fundamental law proclaims that "[t]he Philippines is a democratic and republican State.
Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them." The same
principle served as the bedrock of our 1973 and 1935 Constitutions.
1
It is one of the few principles
whose truth has been cherished by the Americans as self-evident. Section 4, Article IV of the U.S.
Constitution makes it a duty of the Federal government to guarantee to every state a "republican form of
government." With understandable fervor, the American authorities imposed republicanism as the
cornerstone of our 1935 Constitution then being crafted by its Filipino framers.
2

Borne out of the 1986 people power EDSA revolution, our 1987 Constitution is more people-
oriented. Thus, section 4 of Article II provides as a state policy that the prime duty of the
Government is "to serve and protect the people." Section 1, Article XI also provides that ". . . public
officers . . . must at all times be accountable to the people . . ." Sections 15 and 1 of Article XIII
define the role and rights of people's organizations. Section 5(2) of Article XVI mandates that "[t]he
state shall strengthen the patriotic spirit and nationalist consciousness of the military, and respect for
people's rights in the performance of their duty." And section 2 of Article XVII provides that
"amendments to
this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative . . ." All these
provisions and more are intended to breathe more life to the sovereignty of our people.
To be sure, the sovereignty of our people is not a kabalistic principle whose dimensions are buried in
mysticism. Its metes and bounds are familiar to the framers of our Constitutions. They knew that in
its broadest sense, sovereignty is meant to be supreme, the jus summi imperu, the absolute right to
govern.
3
Former Dean Vicente Sinco
4
states that an essential quality of sovereignty is legal
omnipotence, viz.: "Legal theory establishes certain essential qualities inherent in the nature of
sovereignty. The first is legal omnipotence. This means that the sovereign is legally omnipotent and
absolute in relation to other legal institutions. It has the power to determine exclusively its legal
competence. Its powers are original, not derivative. It is the sole judge of what it should do at any given
time."
5
Citing Barker,
6
he adds that a more amplified definition of sovereignty is that of "a final power of
final legal adjustment of all legal issues." The U.S. Supreme Court expressed the same thought in the
landmark case of Yick Wo v. Hopkins,
7
where it held that ". . .sovereignty itself is, of course, not subject
to law, for it is the author and source of law; but in our system, while sovereign powers are delegated to
the agencies of government, sovereignty itself remains with the people, by whom and for whom all
government exists and acts."
In our Constitution, the people established a representative democracy as distinguished from a pure
democracy. Justice Isagani Cruz explains:
8

xxx xxx xxx
A republic is a representative government, a government run by and for the people. It
is not a pure democracy where the people govern themselves directly. The essence
of republicanism is representation and renovation, the selection by the citizenry of a
corps of public functionaries who derive their mandate from the people and act on
their behalf, serving for a limited period only, after which they are replaced or
retained, at the option of their principal. Obviously, a republican government is a
responsible government whose officials hold and discharge their position as a public
trust and shall, according to the Constitution, "at all times be accountable to the
people" they are sworn to serve. The purpose of a republican government it is almost
needless to state, is the promotion of the common welfare according to the will of the
people themselves.
I appreciate the vigorous dissent of Mr. Justice Davide. I agree that sovereignty is indivisible but it
need not always be exercised by the people together, all the time.
9
For this reason, the Constitution
and our laws provide when the entire electorate or only some of them can elect those who make our laws
and those who execute our laws. Thus, the entire electorate votes for our senators but only our district
electorates vote for our congressmen, only our provincial electorates vote for the members of our
provincial boards, only our city electorates vote for our city councilors, and only our municipal electorates
vote for our councilors. Also, the entire electorate votes for our President and Vice-President but only our
provincial electorates vote for our governors, only our city electorates vote for our mayors, and only our
municipal electorates vote for our mayors. By defining and delimiting the classes of voters who can
exercise the sovereignty of the people in a given election, it cannot be claimed that said sovereignty has
been fragmented.
It is my respectful submission that the issue in the case at bar is not whether the people of Sorsogon
should be given the right to defy the law by allowing Frivaldo to sit as their governor. Rather, the
issue is: whether the will of the voters of Sorsogon clearly choosing Frivaldo as governor ought to be
given a decisive value considering theuncertainty of the law on when a candidate ought to satisfy the
qualification of citizenship. The uncertainty of law and jurisprudence, both here and abroad, on this
legal issue cannot be denied. In the United States,
10
there are two (2) principal schools of thought on
the matter. One espouses the view that a candidate must possess the qualifications for office at the time
of his election. The other ventures the view that the candidate should satisfy the qualifications at the time
he assumes the powers of the office. I am unaware of any Philippine decision that has squarely resolved
this difficult question of law. The ponencia of Mr. Justice Panganiban adhered to the second school of
thought while Mr. Justice Davide dissents.
I emphasize the honest-to-goodness difference in interpreting our law on the matter for this is vital to
dispel the fear of Mr. Justice Davide that my opinion can bring about ill effects to the State. Mr.
Justice Davide's fear is based on the assumption that Frivaldo continues to be disqualified and we
cannot allow him to sit as governor without transgressing the law. I do not concede this assumption
for as stressed above, courts have been sharply divided by this mind boggling issue. Given this
schism, I do not see how we can derogate on the sovereignty of the people by according more
weight to the votes of the people of Sorsogon.
Mr. Justice Davide warns that should the people of Batanes stage a rebellion, we cannot prosecute
them "because of the doctrine of people's sovereignty." With due respect, the analogy is not
appropriate. In his hypothetical case, rebellion is concededly a crime, a violation of Article 134 of the
Revised Penal Code, an offense against the sovereignty of our people. In the case at bar, it cannot
be held with certitude that the people of Sorsogon violated the law by voting for Frivaldo as
governor. Frivaldo's name was in the list of candidates allowed by COMELEC to run for governor. At
that time too, Frivaldo was taking all steps to establish his Filipino citizenship. And even our
jurisprudence has not settled the issue when a candidate should possess the qualification of
citizenship. Since the meaning of the law is arguable then and now, I cannot imagine how it will be
disastrous for the State if we tilt the balance in the case at bar in favor of the people of Sorsogon.
In sum, I respectfully submit that the sovereign will of our people should be resolutory of the case at
bar which is one of its kind, unprecedented in our political history. For three (3) times, Frivaldo ran as
governor of the province of Sorsogon. For two (2) times, he was disqualified on the ground of
citizenship. The people of Sorsogon voted for him as their governor despite his disqualification. The
people never waffled in their support for Frivaldo. In 1988, they gave him a winning margin of
27,000; in 1992, they gave him a winning spread of 57,000; in 1995, he posted a margin of 20,000.
Clearly then, Frivaldo is the overwhelming choice of the people of Sorsogon. In election cases, we
should strive to align the will of the legislature as expressed in its law with the will of the sovereign
people as expressed in their ballots. For law to reign, it must respect the will of the people. For in the
eloquent prose of Mr. Justice Laurel, ". . . an enfranchised citizen is a particle of popular sovereignty
and is the ultimate source of established authority."
11
The choice of the governed on who shall be their
governor merits the highest consideration by all agencies of government. In cases where the sovereignty
of the people is at stake, we must not only be legally right but also politically correct. We cannot fail by
making the people succeed.
DAVIDE, JR., J ., dissenting:
After deliberating on the re-formulated issues and the conclusions reached by my distinguished
colleague, Mr. Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, I find myself unable to join him.
I
I agree with petitioner Lee that Frivaldo's repatriation was void, but not on the ground that President
Corazon C. Aquino's 27 March 1987 memorandum "effectively repealed" P.D. No. 725. In my view,
the said memorandum onlysuspended the implementation of the latter decree by divesting the
Special Committee on Naturalization of its authority to further act on grants of citizenship under LOI
No. 270, as amended, P.D. No. 836, as amended; P.D. No. 1379; and "any other related laws,
orders, issuances and rules and regulations." A reading of the last paragraph of the memorandum
can lead to no other conclusion, thus:
In view of the foregoing, you as Chairman and members of the Special Committee on
Naturalization, are hereby directed to cease and desist from undertaking any and all
proceedings within your functional area of responsibility, as defined in Letter of
Instruction No. 270 dated April 11, 1975, as amended, Presidential Decree No. 836
dated December 3, 1975, as amended, and Presidential Decree No. 1379 dated May
17, 1978, relative to the grant of citizenship under the said laws, and any other
related laws, orders, issuances and rules and regulations. (emphasis supplied)
It is self-evident that the underscored clause can only refer to those related to LOI No. 270, P.D. No.
836, and P.D. No. 1379. There is no doubt in my mind that P.D. No. 725 is one such "related law" as
it involves the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship by repatriation and designates the Special
Committee on Naturalization created under LOI No. 270 to receive and act on (i.e., approve or
disapprove) applications under the said decree. The power of President Aquino to suspend these
issuances by virtue of the 27 March 1987 memorandum is beyond question considering that under
Section 6, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution, she exercised legislative power until the Congress
established therein convened on the fourth Monday of July 1987.
I disagree with the view expressed in the ponencia that the memorandum of 27 March 1987 was
merely a declaration of "executive policy," and not an exercise of legislative power. LOI No. 270,
P.D. No. 836, P.D. No. 1379 and "any other related laws," such as P.D. No. 725, were issued by
President Ferdinand E. Marcos in the exercise of his legislative powers -- not executive power.
These laws relate to the acquisition (by naturalization) and reacquisition (by repatriation) of
Philippine citizenship, and in light of Sections 1(4) and 3, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution
(naturalization and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship shall be in accordance with law), it is
indubitable that these subjects are a matter of legislative prerogative. In the same vein, the creation
of the Special Committee on Naturalization by LOI No. 270 and the conferment of the power to
accept and act on applications under P.D. No. 725 are clearly legislative acts.
Accordingly, the revocation of the cease and desist order and the reactivation or revival of the
Committee can be done only by legislative fiat, i.e., by Congress, since the President had long lost
his authority to exercise "legislative power." Considering that Congress has not seen it fit to do so,
the President cannot, in the exercise of executive power, lift the cease and desist order nor
reactivate/reconstitute/revive the Committee. A multo fortiori, the Committee cannot validly accept
Frivaldo's application for repatriation and approve it.
II
Even assuming arguendo that Frivaldo's repatriation is valid, it did not "cure his lack of citizenship." I
depart from the view in the ponencia that Section 39 of the Local Government Code of 1991 does
not specify the time when the citizenship requirement must be met, and that being the case, then it
suffices that citizenship be possessed upon commencement of the term of the office involved;
therefore, since Frivaldo "re-assumed" his Philippine citizenship at 2:00 p.m. on 30 June 1995 and
the term of office of Governor commenced at 12:00 noon of that day, he had, therefore, complied
with the citizenship requirement.
In the first place, Section 39 actually prescribes the qualifications of elective local officials and not
those of anelected local official. These adjectives are not synonymous, as the ponencia seems to
suggest. The first refers to the nature of the office, which requires the process of voting by the
electorate involved; while the second refers to a victorious candidate for an elective office. The
section unquestionably refers to elective -- not elected -- local officials. It falls under Title Two
entitled ELECTIVE OFFICIALS; under Chapter 1 entitled Qualifications and Election; and paragraph
(a) thereof begins with the phrase "An elective local official," while paragraphs (b) to (f) thereof speak
of candidates. It reads as follows:
Sec. 39. Qualifications. -- (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the
Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province or, in
the case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod,
or sangguniang bayan, the district where he intends to be elected; a resident therein
for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to
read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.
(b) Candidates for the position of governor, vice governor or member of the
sangguniang panlalawigan, or mayor, vice mayor or member of the sangguniang
panlungsod of highly urbanized cities must be at least twenty-three (23) years of age
on election day.
(c) Candidates for the position of mayor or vice mayor of independent component
cities, component cities, or municipalities must be at least twenty-one (21) years of
age on election day.
(d) Candidates for the position of member of the sangguniang panlungsod or
sangguniang bayan must be at least eighteen (18) years of age on election day.
(e) Candidates for the position of punong barangay or member of the sangguniang
barangay must be at least eighteen (18) years of age on election day.
(f) Candidates for the sangguniang kabataan must be at least fifteen (15) years of
age but not more than twenty-one (21) years of age on election day (emphasis
supplied)
It is thus obvious that Section 39 refers to no other than the qualifications of candidates for
elective local offices and their election. Hence, in no way may the section be construed to
mean that possession of qualifications should be reckoned from the commencement of the
term of office of the elected candidate.
For another, it is not at all true that Section 39 does not specify the time when the citizenship
requirement must be possessed. I submit that the requirement must be satisfied, or that Philippine
citizenship must be possessed, not merely at the commencement of the term, but at an earlier time,
the latest being election day itself. Section 39 is not at all ambiguous nor uncertain that it meant this
to be, as one basic qualification of an elective local official is that he be "A REGISTERED VOTER IN
THE BARANGAY, MUNICIPALITY, CITY OR PROVINCE . . . WHERE HE INTENDS TO VOTE."
This simply means that he possesses all the qualifications to exercise the right of suffrage. The
fundamental qualification for the exercise of this sovereign right is the possession of Philippine
citizenship. No less than the Constitution makes it the first qualification, as Section 1, Article V
thereof provides:
Sec. 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise
disqualified by law, who are at least eighteen years of age, and who shall have
resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein they propose
to vote for at least six months immediately preceding the election. . . . (emphasis
supplied)
And Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines (B.P. Blg. 881) expressly
provides for the qualifications of a voter. Thus:
Sec. 117 Qualifications of a voter. -- Every citizen of the Philippines, not otherwise
disqualified by law, eighteen years of age or over, who shall have resided in the
Philippines for one year and in the city or municipality wherein he proposes to vote
for at least six months immediately preceding the election, may be a registered voter.
(emphasis supplied)
It is undisputed that this Court twice voided Frivaldo's election as Governor in the 1988 and 1992
elections on the ground that for lack of Philippine citizenship -- he being a naturalized citizen of the
United States of America -- he was DISQUALIFIED to be elected as such and to serve the position
(Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections, 174 SCRA 245 [1989]; Republic of the Philippines vs. De la
Rosa, 232 SCRA 785 [1994]). This disqualification inexorably nullified Frivaldo's registration as a
voter and declared it void ab initio. Our judgments therein were self-executory and no further
act, e.g., a COMELEC order to cancel his registration as a voter or the physical destruction of his
voter's certificate, was necessary for the ineffectivity. Thus, he was never considered a registered
voter for the elections of May 1992, and May 1995, as there is no showing that Frivaldo registered
anew as a voter for the latter elections. Even if he did -- in obvious defiance of his decreed
disqualification -- this did not make him a Filipino citizen, hence it was equally void ab initio. That he
filed his certificate of candidacy for the 1995 elections and was even allowed to vote therein were of
no moment. Neither act made him a Filipino citizen nor nullified the judgments of this Court. On the
contrary, said acts made a mockery of our judgments. For the Court now to validate Frivaldo's
registration as a voter despite the judgments of disqualification is to modify the said judgments by
making their effectivity and enforceability dependent on a COMELEC order cancelling his
registration as a voter, or on the physical destruction of his certificate of registration as a voter which,
of course, was never our intention. Moreover, to sanction Frivaldo's registration as a voter would be
to sacrifice substance in favor of form (the piece of paper that is the book of voters or list of voters or
voter's ID), and abet the COMELEC's incompetence in failing to cancel Frivaldo's registration and
allowing him to vote.
The second reason in the ponencia as to why the citizenship disqualification should be reckoned not
from the date of the election nor the filing of the certificate of candidacy, but from the date of
proclamation, is that the only available remedy to question the ineligibility (or disloyalty) of a
candidate is a petition for quo warranto which, under Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code,
may be filed only within ten days from proclamation and not earlier.
I beg to differ.
Clearly, quo warranto is not the sole remedy available to question a candidate's ineligibility for public
office. Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code allows the filing of a petition to deny due course to
or cancel the certificate of candidacy on the ground that any material representation contained
therein, as required by Section 74, is false. Section 74, in turn, requires that the person filing the
certificate of candidacy must state, inter alia, thathe is eligible for the office, which means that he has
all the qualifications (including, of course, fulfilling the citizenship requirement) and none of the
disqualifications as provided by law. The petition under Section 78 may be filed at any time not later
than 25 days from the filing of the certificate of candidacy. The section reads in full as follows:
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. -- A
verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy
may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material
representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The
petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the
filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and
hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.
This remedy was recognized in Loong vs. Commission on Elections (216 SCRA 760, 768
[1992]), where this Court held:
Thus, if a person qualified to file a petition to disqualify a certain candidate fails to file
the petition within the 25-day period Section 78 of the Code for whatever reasons,
the election laws do not leave him completely helpless as he has another chance to
raise the disqualification of the candidate by filing a petition for quo warranto within
ten (10) days from the proclamation of the results of the election, as provided under
Section 253 of the Code. Section 1, Rule 21 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure
similarly provides that any voter contesting the election of any regional, provincial or
city official on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the
Philippines may file a petition for quo warranto with the Electoral Contest
Adjudication Department. The petition may be filed within ten (10) days from the date
the respondent is proclaimed (Section 2).
Likewise, Rule 25 of the Revised COMELEC Rules of Procedure allows the filing of a petition for
disqualification on the ground of failure to possess all the qualifications of a candidate as provided by
the Constitution or by existing laws, "any day after the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy
but not later than the date of proclamation." Sections 1 and 3 thereof provide:
Rule 25 -- Disqualification of Candidates
Sec. 1. Grounds for Disqualification. Any candidate who does not possess all the
qualifications of a candidate as provided for by the Constitution or by existing law or
who commits any act declared by law to be grounds for disqualification may be
disqualified from continuing as a candidate.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 3. Period to File Petition. The petition shall be filed any day after the last day for
filing of certificates of candidacy but not later than the date of proclamation.
While the validity of this rule insofar as it concerns petitions for disqualification on the ground
of lack of all qualifications may be doubtful, its invalidity is not in issue here.
In this connection, it would seem appropriate to take up the last issue grappled within
the ponencia, viz., is Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code mandatory? The answer is provided
in Loong.
We also do not find merit in the contention of respondent Commission that in the light
of the provisions of Sections 6 and 7 of Rep. Act No. 6646, a petition to deny due
course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed even beyond the 25-day
period prescribed by Section 78 of the Code, as long as it is filed within a reasonable
time from the discovery of the ineligibility.
Sections 6 and 7 of Rep. Act No. 6646 are here re-quoted:
Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification case. Any candidate who has been
declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for,
and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a
candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be
disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of
votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with
the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion
of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency
thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate
whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.
Sec. 7. Petition to Deny Due Course To or Cancel a Certificate of
Candidacy. The procedure hereinabove provided shall apply to
petitions to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy as
provided in Section 78 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881.
It will be noted that nothing in Sections 6 or 7 modifies or alters the 25- day period
prescribed by Section 78 of the Code for filing the appropriate action to cancel a
certificate of candidacy on account of any false representation made therein. On the
contrary, said Section 7 affirms and reiterates Section 78 of the Code.
We note that Section 6 refers only to the effects of a disqualification case which may
be based on grounds other than that provided under Section 78 of the Code. But
Section 7 of Rep. Act No. 6646 also makes the effects referred to in Section 6
applicable to disqualification cases filed under Section 78 of the Code. Nowhere in
Sections 6 and 7 of Rep. Act No. 6646 is mention made of the period within which
these disqualification cases may be filed. This is because there are provisions in the
Code which supply the periods within which a petition relating to disqualification of
candidates must be filed, such as Section 78, already discussed, and Section 253 on
petitions for quo warranto.
I then disagree with the asseveration in the ponencia that Section 78 is merely directory because
Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 authorizes the COMELEC to try and decide petitions for disqualification
even after elections. I submit that Section 6 refers to disqualifications under Sections 12 and 68 of
the Omnibus Election Code and consequently modifies Section 72 thereof. As such, the proper court
or the COMELEC are granted the authority to continue hearing the case after the election, and
during the pendency of the case, suspend the proclamation of the victorious candidate, if the
evidence against him is strong. Sections 12, 68, and 72 of the Code provide:
Sec. 12. Disqualifications. Any person who has been declared by competent
authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for
subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any offense for which he has been
sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months or for a crime involving moral
turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has
been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty.
The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed
upon declaration by competent authority that said insanity or incompetence had been
removed or after the expiration of a period of five years from his service of sentence,
unless within the same period he again becomes disqualified.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 68. Disqualifications. Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a
party is declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the
Commission of having (a) given money or other material consideration to influence,
induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral functions; (b)
committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election
campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or
made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e)
violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, sub-
paragraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been
elected, from holding the office. Any person who is a permanent resident of or an
immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office
under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident or
immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement
provided for in the election laws. (Sec. 25, 1971 EC)
Sec. 72. Effects of disqualification cases and priority. The Commission and the
courts shall give priority to cases of disqualification by reason of violation of this Act
to the end that a final decision shall be rendered not later than seven days before the
election in which the disqualification is sought.
Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not
be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. Nevertheless, if for any
reason, a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be
disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such
election, his violation of the provisions of the preceding sections shall not prevent his
proclamation and assumption to office.
III
Still assuming that the repatriation is valid, I am not persuaded by the arguments in support of the
thesis that Frivaldo's repatriation may be given retroactive effect, as such goes against the spirit and
letter of P.D. No. 725. The spirit adheres to the principle that acquisition or re-acquisition of
Philippine citizenship is not a right, but a mere privilege. Before the advent of P.D. No. 725, only the
following could apply for repatriation: (a) Army, Navy, or Air Corps deserters; and (b) a woman who
lost her citizenship by reason of her marriage to an alien after the death of her spouse (Section 2[2],
C.A. No. 63). P.D. NO. 725 expanded this to include Filipino women who lost their Philippine
citizenship by marriage to aliens even before the death of their alien husbands, or the termination of
their marital status and to natural-born Filipino citizens who lost their Philippine citizenship but
subsequently desired to reacquire the latter.
Turning now to the letter of the law, P.D. No. 725 expressly provides that repatriation takes effect
only after taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, thus:
. . . may reacquire Philippine citizenship . . . by applying with the Special Committee
on Naturalization created by Letter of Instruction No. 270, and, if their applications
are approved, taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines, AFTER WHICH THEY SHALL BE DEEMED TO HAVE REACQUIRED
PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP. (emphasis and capitalization supplied)
Clearly then, the steps to reacquire Philippine citizenship by repatriation under the decree
are: (1) filing the application; (2) action by the committee; and (3) taking of the oath of
allegiance if the application is approved. It is only UPON TAKING THE OATH OF
ALLEGIANCE that the applicant is deemed ipso jure to have reacquired Philippine
citizenship. If the decree had intended the oath taking to retroact to the date of the filing of
the application, then it should not have explicitly provided otherwise.
This theory in the ponencia likewise dilutes this Court's pronouncement in the first Frivaldo case that
what reacquisition of Filipino citizenship requires is an act "formally rejecting [the] adopted state and
reaffirming . . . allegiance to the Philippines." That act meant nothing less than taking of the oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. If we now take this revision of doctrine to its logical end,
then it would also mean that if Frivaldo had chosen and reacquired Philippine citizenship by
naturalization or through Congressional action, such would retroact to the filing of the petition for
naturalization or the bill granting him Philippine citizenship. This is a proposition which both the first
and second Frivaldo cases soundly rejected.
The other reason adduced in the ponencia in support of the proposition that P.D. No. 725 can be
given retroactive effect is its alleged curative or remedial nature.
Again, I disagree. In the first place, by no stretch of legal hermeneutics may P.D. No. 725 be
characterized as a curative or remedial statute:
Curative or remedial statutes are healing acts. They are remedial by curing defects
and adding to the means of enforcing existing obligations. The rule in regard to
curative statutes is that if the thing omitted or failed to be done, and which constitutes
the defect sought to be removed or made harmless, is something the legislature
might have dispensed with by a previous statute, it may do so by a subsequent one.
Curative statutes are intended to supply defects, abridge superfluities in existing
laws, and curb certain evils. They are intended to enable a person to carry into effect
that which they have designed and intended, but has failed of expected legal
consequence by reason of some statutory disability or irregularity in their own action.
They make valid that which, before the enactment of the statute, was invalid.
(RUBEN E. AGPALO, Statutory Construction, Second ed. [1990], 270-271, citations
omitted).
P.D. No. 725 provides for the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship lost through the marriage of a
Filipina to an alien and through naturalization in a foreign country of natural-born Filipino citizens. It
involves then the substantive, nay primordial, right of citizenship. To those for whom it is intended, it
means, in reality, the acquisition of "a new right," as the ponencia cannot but concede. Therefore, it
may not be said to merely remedy or cure a defect considering that one who has lost Philippine
citizenship does not have the right to reacquire it. As earlier stated, the Constitution provides that
citizenship, once lost, may only be reacquired in the manner provided by law. Moreover, it has also
been observed that:
The idea is implicit from many of the cases that remedial statutes are statutes
relating to procedure and not substantive rights. (Sutherland, Statutory Construction,
Vol. 3, Third ed. [1943], 5704 at 74, citations omitted).
If we grant for the sake of argument, however, that P.D. No. 725 is curative or remedial statute, it
would be an inexcusable error to give it a retroactive effect since it explicitly provides the date of its
effectivity. Thus:
This Decree shall take effect immediately.
Done in the city of Manila, this 5th day of June, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen
hundred and seventy five.
Nevertheless, if the retroactivity is to relate only to the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, then
nothing therein supports such theory, for as the decree itself unequivocally provides, it is only
after taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines that the applicant is DEEMED
TO HAVE REACQUIRED PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP.
IV
Assuming yet again, for the sake of argument, that taking the oath of allegiance retroacted to the
date of Frivaldo's application for repatriation, the same could not be said insofar as it concerned the
United States of America, of which he was a citizen. For under the laws of the United States of
America, Frivaldo remained an American national until he renounced his citizenship and allegiance
thereto at 2:00 p.m. on 30 June 1995, when he took his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines. Section 401 of the Nationality Act of 1940 of the United States of America provides that
a person who is a national of the United States of America, whether by birth or naturalization, loses
his nationality by, inter alia, "(b) Taking an oath or making an affirmation or other formal declaration
of allegiance to a foreign state" (SIDNEY KANSAS, U.S. Immigration Exclusion and Deportation and
Citizenship of the United States of America, Third ed., [1948] 341-342). It follows then that on
election day and until the hour of the commencement of the term for which he was elected - noon of
30 June 1995 as per Section 43 of the Local Government Code - Frivaldo possessed dual
citizenship, viz., (a) as an American citizen; and (b) as a Filipino citizen through the adoption of the
theory that the effects of his taking the oath of allegiance were retrospective. Hence, he was
disqualified to run for Governor for yet another reason: possession of dual citizenship, in accordance
with Section 40 (d) of the Local Government Code.
V
The assertion in the ponencia that Frivaldo may be considered STATELESS on the basis of his
claim that he "had long renounced and had long abandoned his American citizenship - long before
May 8, 1985" - is untenable, for the following reasons: first, it is based on Frivaldo's unproven, self-
serving allegation; second, informal renunciation or abandonment is not a ground to lose American
citizenship; and third, simply put, never did the status of a STATELESS person attach to Frivaldo.
Statelessness may be either de jure, which is the status of individuals stripped of their nationality by
their former government without having an opportunity to acquire another; or de facto, which is the
status of individuals possessed of a nationality whose country does not give them protection outside
their own country, and who are commonly, albeit imprecisely, referred to as refugees (JORGE R.
COQUIA, et al., Conflict of Laws Cases, Materials and Comments, 1995 ed., 290).
Specifically, under Chapter 1, Article 1 of the United Nations Convention Regarding the Status of
Stateless Persons (Philippine Treaty Series, Compiled and Annotated by Haydee B. Yorac, vol. III,
363), a stateless person is defined as "a person who is not considered as a national by any State
under the operation of its law." However, it has not been shown that the United States of America
ever ceased to consider Frivaldo its national at any time before he took his oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines on 30 June 1995.
VI
Finally, I find it in order to also express my view on the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Reynato S.
Puno. I am absolutely happy to join him in his statement that "[t]he sovereignty of our people is the
primary postulate of the 1987 Constitution" and that the said Constitution is "more people-oriented,"
"borne [as it is] out of the 1986 people power EDSA revolution." I would even go further by saying
that this Constitution is pro-God (Preamble), pro-people (Article II, Sections 1, 3, 4, 5, 9, 15, 16;
Article XI, Section 1, Article XII, Sections 1, 6; Article XIII, Sections 1, 11, 15, 16, 18; Article XVI,
Sections 5(2), 6), pro-Filipino (Article XII, Sections 1, 2, 10, 11, 12, 14; Article XIV, Sections 1, 4(2),
13; Article XVI, Section 11), pro-poor (Article II, Sections 9, 10, 18, 21; Article XII, Sections 1, 2(3);
Article XIII, Sections 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 13), pro-life (Article II, Section 12), and pro-
family (Article II, Section 12; Article XV).
Nevertheless, I cannot be with him in carrying out the principle of sovereignty beyond what I
perceive to be the reasonable constitutional parameters. The doctrine of people's sovereignty is
founded on the principles of democracy and republicanism and refers exclusively to the sovereignty
of the people of the Philippines. Section 1 of Article II is quite clear on this, thus:
Sec. 1. The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in
the people and all government authority emanates from them.
And the Preamble makes it clear when it solemnly opens it with a clause "We, the sovereign
Filipino people . . ." Thus, this sovereignty is an attribute of the Filipino people as one
people, one body.
That sovereign power of the Filipino people cannot be fragmentized by looking at it as the supreme
authority of the people of any of the political subdivisions to determine their own destiny; neither can
we convert and treat every fragment as the whole. In such a case, this Court would provide the
formula for the division and destruction of the State and render the Government ineffective and
inutile. To illustrate the evil, we may consider the enforcement of laws or the pursuit of a national
policy by the executive branch of the government, or the execution of a judgment by the courts. If
these are opposed by the overwhelming majority of the people of a certain province, or even a
municipality, it would necessarily follow that the law, national policy, or judgment must not be
enforced, implemented, or executed in the said province or municipality. More concretely, if, for
instance, the vast majority of the people of Batanes rise publicly and take up arms against the
Government for the purpose of removing from the allegiance to the said Government or its laws, the
territory of the Republic of the Philippines or any part thereof, or any body of land, naval, or other
armed forces, or depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their
powers or prerogatives, then those who did so -- and which are composed of the vast majority of the
people of Batanes -- a political subdivision -- cannot be prosecuted for or be held guilty of rebellion in
violation of Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code because of the doctrine of peoples' sovereignty.
Indeed, the expansion of the doctrine of sovereignty by investing upon the people of a mere political
subdivision that which the Constitution places in the entire Filipino people, may be disastrous to the
Nation.
So it is in this case if we follow the thesis in the concurring opinion. Thus, simply because Frivaldo
had obtained a margin of 20,000 votes over his closest rival, Lee, i.e., a vast majority of the voters of
Sorsogon had expressed their sovereign will for the former, then this Court must yield to that will and
must, therefore, allow to be set aside, for Frivaldo, not just the laws on qualifications of candidates
and elective officials and naturalization and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, but even the final
and binding decisions of this Court affecting him.
This Court must be the first to uphold the Rule of Law. I vote then to DISMISS G.R. No. 120295 and
GRANT G.R. No. 123755.






























G.R. No. 142840 May 7, 2001
ANTONIO BENGSON III, petitioner,
vs.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and TEODORO C. CRUZ, respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:
The citizenship of respondent Teodoro C. Cruz is at issue in this case, in view of the constitutional
requirement that no person shall be a Member of the House of Representative unless he is a natural-born
citizen.
1

Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in San Clemente, Tarlac, on
April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The fundamental law then applicable was the 1935 Constitution.
2

On November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz enlisted in the United States Marine Corps and without
the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the United States. As a
Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under Commonwealth Act No. 63, section 1(4), a Filipino
citizen may lose his citizenship by, among other, rendering service to or accepting commission in the
armed forces of a foreign country. Said provision of law reads:
SECTION 1. How citizenship may be lost. A Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship in any of the
following ways and/or events:
x x x
(4) By rendering services to, or accepting commission in, the armed of a foreign country: Provided, That
the rendering of service to, or the acceptance of such commission in, the armed forces of a foreign
country, and the taking of an oath of allegiance incident thereto, with the consent of the Republic of the
Philippines, shall not divest a Filipino of his Philippine citizenship if either of the following circumstances
is present:
(a) The Republic of the Philippines has a defensive and/or offensive pact of alliance with said foreign
country; or
(b) The said foreign country maintains armed forces on Philippine territory with the consent of the
Republic of the Philippines: Provided, That the Filipino citizen concerned, at the time of rendering said
service, or acceptance of said commission, and taking the oath of allegiance incident thereto, states that
he does so only in connection with his service to said foreign country; And provided, finally, That any
Filipino citizen who is rendering service to, or is commissioned in, the armed forces of a foreign country
under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b), shall not be Republic of the Philippines
during the period of his service to, or commission in, the armed forces of said country. Upon his discharge
from the service of the said foreign country, he shall be automatically entitled to the full enjoyment of his
civil and politically entitled to the full enjoyment of his civil political rights as a Filipino citizen x x x.
Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine citizenship was erased by his naturalization
as a U.S. citizen on June 5, 1990, in connection with his service in the U.S. Marine Corps.
On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under
Republic Act No. 2630.
3
He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the Second District of
Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections. He won by a convincing margin of 26,671 votes over petitioner
Antonio Bengson III, who was then running for reelection.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) claiming that respondent Cruz was not qualified to become a
member of the House of Representatives since he is not a natural-born citizen as required under Article
VI, section 6 of the Constitution.
4

On March 2, 2000, the HRET rendered its decision
5
dismissing the petition for quo warranto and declaring
Cruz the duly elected Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 1998 elections. The
HRET likewise denied petitioners motion for reconsideration of the decision in its resolution dated April
27, 2000.
6

Petitioner thus filed the present petition for certiorari assailing the HRETs decision on the following
grounds:
1. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess of jurisdiction,
when it ruled that private respondent is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines despite the fact that he
had ceased being such in view of the loss and renunciation of such citizenship on his part.
2. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess of jurisdiction,
when it considered private respondent as a citizen of the Philippines despite the fact he did not validly
acquire his Philippine citizenship.
3. Assuming that private respondents acquisition of Philippine citizenship was invalid, the HRET
committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess of jurisdiction, when it
dismissed the petition despite the fact that such reacquisition could not legally and constitutionally
restore his natural-born status.
7

The issue now before us is whether respondent Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American
citizen, can still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
Petitioner asserts that respondent Cruz may no longer be considered a natural-born Filipino since he lost
h is Philippine citizenship when he swore allegiance to the United States in 1995, and had to reacquire the
same by repatriation. He insists that Article citizens are those who are from birth with out having to
perform any act to acquire or perfect such citizenship.
Respondent on the other hand contends that he reacquired his status as natural-born citizen when he was
repatriated since the phrase from birth in Article IV, Section 2 refers to the innate, inherent and inborn
characteristic of being a natural-born citizen.
The petition is without merit.
The 1987 Constitution enumerates who are Filipino citizens as follow:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution;
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mother, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching
the age of majority, and
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
8

There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by birth, and (2) by naturalization. These ways of
acquiring citizenship correspond to the two kinds of citizens: the natural-born citizen, and the naturalized
citizen. A person who at the time of his birth is a citizen of a particular country, is a natural-born citizen
thereof.
9

As defined in the same Constitution, natural-born citizens are those citizens of the Philippines from birth
without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citezenship.
10

On the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who have become Filipino citizens through
naturalization, generally under Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised
Naturalization Law, which repealed the former Naturalization Law (Act No. 2927), and by Republic Act No.
530.
11
To be naturalized, an applicant has to prove that he possesses all the qualifications
12
and none of
the disqualification
13
provided by law to become a Filipino citizen. The decision granting Philippine
citizenship becomes executory only after two (2) years from its promulgation when the court is satisfied
that during the intervening period, the applicant has (1) not left the Philippines; (2) has dedicated himself
to a lawful calling or profession; (3) has not been convicted of any offense or violation of Government
promulgated rules; or (4) committed any act prejudicial to the interest of the nation or contrary to any
Government announced policies.
14

Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the manner provided
by law. Commonwealth Act. No. (C.A. No. 63), enumerates the three modes by which Philippine citizenship
may be reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2) by repatriation, and (3) by direct act of
Congress.
15

Naturalization is mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. As a mode of
initially acquiring Philippine citizenship, naturalization is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 473, as
amended. On the other hand, naturalization as a mode for reacquiring Philippine citizenship is governed
by Commonwealth Act No. 63.
16
Under this law, a former Filipino citizen who wishes to reacquire
Philippine citizenship must possess certain qualifications
17
and none of the disqualification mentioned in
Section 4 of C.A. 473.
18

Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due
to: (1) desertion of the armed forces;
19
services in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War
II;
20
(3) service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time,
21
(4) marriage of a Filipino
woman to an alien;
22
and (5) political economic necessity.
23

As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the taking of
an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippine and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry
of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided.
In Angat v. Republic,
24
we held:
xxx. Parenthetically, under these statutes [referring to RA Nos. 965 and 2630], the person desiring to
reacquire Philippine citizenship would not even be required to file a petition in court, and all that he had
to do was to take an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to register that fact with the
civil registry in the place of his residence or where he had last resided in the Philippines. [Italics in the
original.
25

Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality.
26
This means that a naturalized
Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the
other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be
restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.
In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he rendered service in the Armed Forces of
the United States. However, he subsequently reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 2630, which
provides:
Section 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting
commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or after separation from the Armed Forces of the
United States, acquired United States citizenship, may reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering the same with Local Civil Registry in the place
where he resides or last resided in the Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall contain a renunciation
of any other citizenship.
Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the same in the
Civil Registry of Mangatarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited provision, respondent Cruz is
deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth
as the son of a Filipino father.
27
It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or
return to, his original status before he lost his Philippine citizenship.
Petitioner's contention that respondent Cruz is no longer a natural-born citizen since he had to perform
an act to regain his citizenship is untenable. As correctly explained by the HRET in its decision, the term
"natural-born citizen" was first defined in Article III, Section 4 of the 1973 Constitution as follows:
Sec. 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the Philippines from birth without having to
perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship.
Two requisites must concur for a person to be considered as such: (1) a person must be a Filipino citizen
birth and (2) he does not have to perform any act to obtain or perfect his Philippine citizenship.
Under the 1973 Constitution definition, there were two categories of Filipino citizens which were not
considered natural-born: (1) those who were naturalized and (2) those born before January 17, 1973,
38
of
Filipino mothers who, upon reaching the age of majority, elected Philippine citizenship. Those "naturalized
citizens" were not considered natural-born obviously because they were not Filipino at birth and had to
perform an act to acquire Philippine citizenship. Those born of Filipino mothers before the effectively of
the 1973 Constitution were likewise not considered natural-born because they also had to perform an act
to perfect their Philippines citizenship.
The present Constitution, however, now consider those born of Filipino mothers before the effectivity of
the 1973 Constitution and who elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the majority age as natural-
born. After defining who re natural-born citizens, Section 2 of Article IV adds a sentence: "Those who elect
Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born
citizens." Consequently, only naturalized Filipinos are considered not natural-born citizens. It is apparent
from the enumeration of who are citizens under the present Constitution that there are only two classes of
citizens: (1) those who are natural-born and (2) those who are naturalized in accordance with law. A
citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not have to undergo the process of naturalization to
obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is natural-born Filipino. Noteworthy is the absence in said
enumeration of a separate category for persons who, after losing Philippine citizenship, subsequently
reacquire it. The reason therefor is clear: as to such persons, they would either be natural-born or
naturalized depending on the reasons for the loss of their citizenship and the mode prescribed by the
applicable law for the reacquisition thereof. As respondent Cruz was not required by law to go through
naturalization proceeding in order to reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce a natural-born Filipino. As
such, he possessed all the necessary qualifications to be elected as member of the House of
Representatives.
A final point. The HRET has been empowered by the Constitution to be the "sole judge" of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the House.
29
The Court's jurisdiction
over the HRET is merely to check "whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction" on the part of the latter.
30
In the absence thereof, there is no occasion for
the Court to exercise its corrective power and annul the decision of the HRET nor to substitute the Court's
judgment for that of the latter for the simple reason that it is not the office of a petition for certiorari to
inquire into the correctness of the assailed decision.
31
There is no such showing of grave abuse of
discretion in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.



















Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. Nos. 92191-92 July 30, 1991
ANTONIO Y. CO, petitioner,
vs.
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND JOSE ONG,
JR., respondents.
G.R. Nos. 92202-03 July 30, 1991
SIXTO T. BALANQUIT, JR., petitioner,
vs.
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND JOSE ONG,
JR., respondents.
Hechanova & Associates for petitioner Co.
Brillantes, Nachura, Navarro and Arcilla Law Offices for respondent Ong, Jr.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J .:p
The petitioners come to this Court asking for the setting aside and reversal of a decision of the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET).
The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born Filipino citizen and a resident of
Laoang, Northern Samar for voting purposes. The sole issue before us is whether or not, in making
that determination, the HRET acted with grave abuse of discretion.
On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the second district of Northern Samar was held.
Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in the second legislative district of
Northern Samar are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the private respondent, Jose
Ong, Jr.
Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second district of Northern
Samar.
The petitioners filed election protests against the private respondent premised on the following
grounds:
1) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines; and
2) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second district of Northern Samar.
The HRET in its decision dated November 6, 1989, found for the private respondent.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners on November 12, 1989. This was, however,
denied by the HRET in its resolution dated February 22, 1989.
Hence, these petitions for certiorari.
We treat the comments as answers and decide the issues raised in the petitions.
ON THE ISSUE OF JURISDICTION
The first question which arises refers to our jurisdiction.
The Constitution explicitly provides that the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and
the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) shall be the sole judges of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualificationsof their respective members. (See Article VI, Section 17, Constitution)
The authority conferred upon the Electoral Tribunal is full, clear and complete. The use of the
word soleemphasizes the exclusivity of the jurisdiction of these Tribunals.
The Supreme Court in the case of Lazatin v. HRET (168 SCRA 391 [1988]) stated that under the
1987 Constitution, the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal is original and exclusive, viz:
The use of the word "sole" emphasizes the exclusive character of the jurisdiction
conferred (Angara v. Electoral Commission, supra at p. 162). The exercise of power
by the Electoral Commission under the 1935 Constitution has been described as
"intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had originally remained in the
legislature." (id., at p. 175) Earlier this grant of power to the legislature was
characterized by Justice Malcolm as "full, clear and complete; (Veloso v. Board of
Canvassers of Leyte and Samar, 39 Phil. 886 [1919]) Under the amended 1935
Constitution, the power was unqualifiedly reposed upon the Electoral Tribunal and it
remained as full, clear and complete as that previously granted the Legislature and
the Electoral Commission, (Lachica v. Yap, 25 SCRA 140 [1968]) The same may be
said with regard to the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal under the 1987
Constitution. (p. 401)
The Court continued further, ". . . so long as the Constitution grants the HRET the power to be the
sole judge of all contests relating to election, returns and qualifications of members of the House of
Representatives, any final action taken by the HRET on a matter within its jurisdiction shall, as a
rule, not be reviewed by this Court . . . the power granted to the Electoral Tribunal is full, clear and
complete and excludes the exercise of any authority on the part of this Court that would in any wise
restrict it or curtail it or even affect the same." (pp. 403-404)
When may the Court inquire into acts of the Electoral Tribunals under our constitutional grants of
power?
In the later case of Robles v. HRET (181 SCRA 780 [1990]) the Supreme Court stated that the
judgments of the Tribunal are beyond judicial interference save only "in the exercise of this Court's
so-called extraordinary jurisdiction, . . . upon a determination that the Tribunal's decision or
resolution was rendered without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion or
paraphrasing Morrero, upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use by the Tribunal of
its power as constitutes a denial of due process of law, or upon a demonstration of a very clear
unmitigated ERROR, manifestly constituting such GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION that there has
to be a remedy for such abuse." (at pp. 785-786)
In the leading case of Morrero v. Bocar (66 Phil. 429 [1938]) the Court ruled that the power of the
Electoral Commission "is beyond judicial interference except, in any event, upon a clear showing of
such arbitrary and improvident use of power as will constitute a denial of due process." The Court
does not venture into the perilous area of trying to correct perceived errors of independent branches
of the Government, It comes in only when it has to vindicate a denial of due process or correct an
abuse of discretion so grave or glaring that no less than the Constitution calls for remedial action.
The Supreme Court under the 1987 Constitution, has been given an expanded jurisdiction, so to
speak, to review the decisions of the other branches and agencies of the government to determine
whether or not they have acted within the bounds of the Constitution. (See Article VIII, Section 1,
Constitution)
Yet, in the exercise thereof, the Court is to merely check whether or not the governmental branch or
agency has gone beyond the Constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different
view. In the absence of a showing that the HRET has committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power; it
will not decide a matter which by its nature is for the HRET alone to decide. (See Marcos v.
Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668 [1989]) It has no power to look into what it thinks is apparent error.
As constitutional creations invested with necessary power, the Electoral Tribunals, although not
powers in the tripartite scheme of the government, are, in the exercise of their functions independent
organs independent of Congress and the Supreme Court. The power granted to HRET by the
Constitution is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the
legislature. (Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 [1936])
In passing upon petitions, the Court with its traditional and careful regard for the balance of powers,
must permit this exclusive privilege of the Tribunals to remain where the Sovereign authority has
place it. (See Veloso v. Boards of Canvassers of Leyte and Samar, 39 Phil. 886 [1919])
It has been argued that under Article VI, Section 17 of the present Constitution, the situation may
exist as it exists today where there is an unhealthy one-sided political composition of the two
Electoral Tribunals. There is nothing in the Constitution, however, that makes the HRET because of
its composition any less independent from the Court or its constitutional functions any less exclusive.
The degree of judicial intervention should not be made to depend on how many legislative members
of the HRET belong to this party or that party. The test remains the same-manifest grave abuse of
discretion.
In the case at bar, the Court finds no improvident use of power, no denial of due process on the part
of the HRET which will necessitate the exercise of the power of judicial review by the Supreme
Court.
ON THE ISSUE OF CITIZENSHIP
The records show that in the year 1895, the private respondent's grandfather, Ong Te, arrived in the
Philippines from China. Ong Te established his residence in the municipality of Laoang, Samar on
land which he bought from the fruits of hard work.
As a resident of Laoang, Ong Te was able to obtain a certificate of residence from the then Spanish
colonial administration.
The father of the private respondent, Jose Ong Chuan was born in China in 1905. He was brought
by Ong Te to Samar in the year 1915.
Jose Ong Chuan spent his childhood in the province of Samar. In Laoang, he was able to establish
an enduring relationship with his neighbors, resulting in his easy assimilation into the community.
As Jose Ong Chuan grew older in the rural and seaside community of Laoang, he absorbed Filipino
cultural values and practices. He was baptized into Christianity. As the years passed, Jose Ong
Chuan met a natural born-Filipino, Agripina Lao. The two fell in love and, thereafter, got married in
1932 according to Catholic faith and practice.
The couple bore eight children, one of whom is the private respondent who was born in 1948.
The private respondent's father never emigrated from this country. He decided to put up a hardware
store and shared and survived the vicissitudes of life in Samar.
The business prospered. Expansion became inevitable. As a result, a branch was set-up in Binondo,
Manila. In the meantime, the father of the private respondent, unsure of his legal status and in an
unequivocal affirmation of where he cast his life and family, filed with the Court of First Instance of
Samar an application for naturalization on February 15, 1954.
On April 28, 1955, the CFI of Samar, after trial, declared Jose Ong Chuan a Filipino citizen.
On May 15, 1957, the Court of First Instance of Samar issued an order declaring the decision of
April 28, 1955 as final and executory and that Jose Ong Chuan may already take his Oath of
Allegiance.
Pursuant to said order, Jose Ong Chuan took his Oath of Allegiance; correspondingly, a certificate of
naturalization was issued to him.
At the time Jose Ong Chuan took his oath, the private respondent then a minor of nine years was
finishing his elementary education in the province of Samar. There is nothing in the records to
differentiate him from other Filipinos insofar as the customs and practices of the local populace were
concerned.
Fortunes changed. The house of the family of the private respondent in Laoang, Samar was burned
to the ground.
Undaunted by the catastrophe, the private respondent's family constructed another one in place of
their ruined house. Again, there is no showing other than that Laoang was their abode and home.
After completing his elementary education, the private respondent, in search for better education,
went to Manila in order to acquire his secondary and college education.
In the meantime, another misfortune was suffered by the family in 1975 when a fire gutted their
second house in Laoang, Samar. The respondent's family constructed still another house, this time a
16-door apartment building, two doors of which were reserved for the family.
The private respondent graduated from college, and thereafter took and passed the CPA Board
Examinations.
Since employment opportunities were better in Manila, the respondent looked for work here. He
found a job in the Central Bank of the Philippines as an examiner. Later, however, he worked in the
hardware business of his family in Manila. In 1971, his elder brother, Emil, was elected as a delegate
to the 1971 Constitutional Convention. His status as a natural born citizen was challenged.
Parenthetically, the Convention which in drafting the Constitution removed the unequal treatment
given to derived citizenship on the basis of the mother's citizenship formally and solemnly declared
Emil Ong, respondent's full brother, as a natural born Filipino. The Constitutional Convention had to
be aware of the meaning of natural born citizenship since it was precisely amending the article on
this subject.
The private respondent frequently went home to Laoang, Samar, where he grew up and spent his
childhood days.
In 1984, the private respondent married a Filipina named Desiree Lim.
For the elections of 1984 and 1986, Jose Ong, Jr. registered himself as a voter of Laoang, Samar,
and correspondingly, voted there during those elections.
The private respondent after being engaged for several years in the management of their family
business decided to be of greater service to his province and ran for public office. Hence, when the
opportunity came in 1987, he ran in the elections for representative in the second district of Northern
Samar.
Mr. Ong was overwhelmingly voted by the people of Northern Samar as their representative in
Congress. Even if the total votes of the two petitioners are combined, Ong would still lead the two by
more than 7,000 votes.
The pertinent portions of the Constitution found in Article IV read:
SECTION 1, the following are citizens of the Philippines:
1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution;
2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
3. Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and
4. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
SECTION 2, Natural-born Citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from
birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their citizenship. Those
who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph 3 hereof shall be
deemed natural-born citizens.
The Court interprets Section 1, Paragraph 3 above as applying not only to those who elect Philippine
citizenship after February 2, 1987 but also to those who, having been born of Filipino mothers,
elected citizenship before that date.
The provision in Paragraph 3 was intended to correct an unfair position which discriminates against
Filipino women. There is no ambiguity in the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, viz:
Mr. Azcuna: With respect to the provision of section 4, would this
refer only to those who elect Philippine citizenship after the effectivity
of the 1973 Constitution or would it also cover those who elected it
under the 1973 Constitution?
Fr. Bernas: It would apply to anybody who elected Philippine
citizenship by virtue of the provision of the 1935 Constitution whether
the election was done before or after January 17, 1973. (Records of
the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 228; Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. Trenas: The Committee on Citizenship, Bill of Rights, Political
Rights and Obligations and Human Rights has more or less decided
to extend the interpretation of who is a natural-born citizen as
provided in section 4 of the 1973 Constitution by adding that persons
who have elected Philippine Citizenship under the 1935 Constitution
shall be natural-born? Am I right Mr. Presiding Officer?
Fr. Bernas: yes.
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. Nolledo: And I remember very well that in the Reverend Father
Bernas' well written book, he said that the decision was designed
merely to accommodate former delegate Ernesto Ang and that the
definition on natural-born has no retroactive effect. Now it seems that
the Reverend Father Bernas is going against this intention by
supporting the amendment?
Fr. Bernas: As the Commissioner can see, there has been an
evolution in my thinking. (Records of the Constitutional Commission,
Vol. 1, p. 189)
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. Rodrigo: But this provision becomes very important because his
election of Philippine citizenship makes him not only a Filipino citizen
but a natural-born Filipino citizen entitling him to run for Congress. . .
Fr. Bernas: Correct. We are quite aware of that and for that reason
we will leave it to the body to approve that provision of section 4.
Mr. Rodrigo: I think there is a good basis for the provision because it
strikes me as unfair that the Filipino citizen who was born a day
before January 17, 1973 cannot be a Filipino citizen or a natural-born
citizen. (Records of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 231)
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. Rodrigo: The purpose of that provision is to remedy an
inequitable situation. Between 1935 and 1973 when we were under
the 1935 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers but alien mothers
were natural-born Filipinos. However, those born of Filipino mothers
but alien fathers would have to elect Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority; and if they do elect, they become
Filipino citizens but not natural-born Filipino citizens. (Records of the
Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 356)
The foregoing significantly reveals the intent of the framers. To make the provision prospective from
February 3, 1987 is to give a narrow interpretation resulting in an inequitable situation. It must also
be retroactive.
It should be noted that in construing the law, the Courts are not always to be hedged in by the literal
meaning of its language. The spirit and intendment thereof, must prevail over the letter, especially
where adherence to the latter would result in absurdity and injustice. (Casela v. Court of Appeals, 35
SCRA 279 [1970])
A Constitutional provision should be construed so as to give it effective operation and suppress the
mischief at which it is aimed, hence, it is the spirit of the provision which should prevail over the letter
thereof. (Jarrolt v. Mabberly, 103 U.S. 580)
In the words of the Court in the case of J.M. Tuason v. LTA (31 SCRA 413 [1970]:
To that primordial intent, all else is subordinated. Our Constitution, any constitution is
not to be construed narrowly or pedantically for the prescriptions therein contained,
to paraphrase Justice Holmes, are not mathematical formulas having their essence
in their form but are organic living institutions, the significance of which is vital not
formal. . . . (p. 427)
The provision in question was enacted to correct the anomalous situation where one born of a
Filipino father and an alien mother was automatically granted the status of a natural-born citizen
while one born of a Filipino mother and an alien father would still have to elect Philippine citizenship.
If one so elected, he was not, under earlier laws, conferred the status of a natural-born.
Under the 1973 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers and those born of Filipino mothers with an
alien father were placed on equal footing. They were both considered as natural-born citizens.
Hence, the bestowment of the status of "natural-born" cannot be made to depend on the fleeting
accident of time or result in two kinds of citizens made up of essentially the same similarly situated
members.
It is for this reason that the amendments were enacted, that is, in order to remedy this accidental
anomaly, and, therefore, treat equally all those born before the 1973 Constitution and who elected
Philippine citizenship either before or after the effectivity of that Constitution.
The Constitutional provision in question is, therefore curative in nature. The enactment was meant to
correct the inequitable and absurd situation which then prevailed, and thus, render those acts valid
which would have been nil at the time had it not been for the curative provisions. (See Development
Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 96 SCRA 342 [1980])
There is no dispute that the respondent's mother was a natural born Filipina at the time of her
marriage. Crucial to this case is the issue of whether or not the respondent elected or chose to be a
Filipino citizen.
Election becomes material because Section 2 of Article IV of the Constitution accords natural born
status to children born of Filipino mothers before January 17, 1973, if they elect citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority.
To expect the respondent to have formally or in writing elected citizenship when he came of age is to
ask for the unnatural and unnecessary. The reason is obvious. He was already a citizen. Not only
was his mother a natural born citizen but his father had been naturalized when the respondent was
only nine (9) years old. He could not have divined when he came of age that in 1973 and 1987 the
Constitution would be amended to require him to have filed a sworn statement in 1969 electing
citizenship inspite of his already having been a citizen since 1957. In 1969, election through a sworn
statement would have been an unusual and unnecessary procedure for one who had been a citizen
since he was nine years old.
We have jurisprudence that defines "election" as both a formal and an informal process.
In the case of In Re: Florencio Mallare (59 SCRA 45 [1974]), the Court held that the exercise of the
right of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of election of
Philippine citizenship. In the exact pronouncement of the Court, we held:
Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age, constitutes a
positive act of election of Philippine citizenship (p. 52; emphasis supplied)
The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has established his
life here in the Philippines.
For those in the peculiar situation of the respondent who cannot be expected to have elected
citizenship as they were already citizens, we apply the In Re Mallare rule.
The respondent was born in an outlying rural town of Samar where there are no alien enclaves and
no racial distinctions. The respondent has lived the life of a Filipino since birth. His father applied for
naturalization when the child was still a small boy. He is a Roman Catholic. He has worked for a
sensitive government agency. His profession requires citizenship for taking the examinations and
getting a license. He has participated in political exercises as a Filipino and has always considered
himself a Filipino citizen. There is nothing in the records to show that he does not embrace
Philippine customs and values, nothing to indicate any tinge of alien-ness no acts to show that this
country is not his natural homeland. The mass of voters of Northern Samar are frilly aware of Mr.
Ong's parentage. They should know him better than any member of this Court will ever know him.
They voted by overwhelming numbers to have him represent them in Congress. Because of his acts
since childhood, they have considered him as a Filipino.
The filing of sworn statement or formal declaration is a requirement for those who still have to elect
citizenship. For those already Filipinos when the time to elect came up, there are acts of deliberate
choice which cannot be less binding. Entering a profession open only to Filipinos, serving in public
office where citizenship is a qualification, voting during election time, running for public office, and
other categorical acts of similar nature are themselves formal manifestations of choice for these
persons.
An election of Philippine citizenship presupposes that the person electing is an alien. Or his status is
doubtful because he is a national of two countries. There is no doubt in this case about Mr. Ong's
being a Filipino when he turned twenty-one (21).
We repeat that any election of Philippine citizenship on the part of the private respondent would not
only have been superfluous but it would also have resulted in an absurdity. How can a Filipino
citizen elect Philippine citizenship?
The respondent HRET has an interesting view as to how Mr. Ong elected citizenship. It observed
that "when protestee was only nine years of age, his father, Jose Ong Chuan became a naturalized
Filipino. Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Act squarely applies its benefit to him for he was
then a minor residing in this country. Concededly, it was the law itself that had already elected
Philippine citizenship for protestee by declaring him as such." (Emphasis supplied)
The petitioners argue that the respondent's father was not, validly, a naturalized citizen because of
his premature taking of the oath of citizenship.
The Court cannot go into the collateral procedure of stripping Mr. Ong's father of his citizenship after
his death and at this very late date just so we can go after the son.
The petitioners question the citizenship of the father through a collateral approach. This can not be
done. In our jurisdiction, an attack on a person's citizenship may only be done through a direct action
for its nullity. (See Queto v. Catolico, 31 SCRA 52 [1970])
To ask the Court to declare the grant of Philippine citizenship to Jose Ong Chuan as null and void
would run against the principle of due process. Jose Ong Chuan has already been laid to rest. How
can he be given a fair opportunity to defend himself. A dead man cannot speak. To quote the words
of the HRET "Ong Chuan's lips have long been muted to perpetuity by his demise and obviously he
could not use beyond where his mortal remains now lie to defend himself were this matter to be
made a central issue in this case."
The issue before us is not the nullification of the grant of citizenship to Jose Ong Chuan. Our
function is to determine whether or not the HRET committed abuse of authority in the exercise of its
powers. Moreover, the respondent traces his natural born citizenship through his mother, not
through the citizenship of his father. The citizenship of the father is relevant only to determine
whether or not the respondent "chose" to be a Filipino when he came of age. At that time and up to
the present, both mother and father were Filipinos. Respondent Ong could not have elected any
other citizenship unless he first formally renounced Philippine citizenship in favor of a foreign
nationality. Unlike other persons faced with a problem of election, there was no foreign nationality of
his father which he could possibly have chosen.
There is another reason why we cannot declare the HRET as having committed manifest grave
abuse of discretion. The same issue of natural-born citizenship has already been decided by the
Constitutional Convention of 1971 and by the Batasang Pambansa convened by authority of the
Constitution drafted by that Convention. Emil Ong, full blood brother of the respondent, was declared
and accepted as a natural born citizen by both bodies.
Assuming that our opinion is different from that of the Constitutional Convention, the Batasang
Pambansa, and the respondent HRET, such a difference could only be characterized as error. There
would be no basis to call the HRET decision so arbitrary and whimsical as to amount to grave abuse
of discretion.
What was the basis for the Constitutional Convention's declaring Emil Ong a natural born citizen?
Under the Philippine Bill of 1902, inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish subjects on the
11th day of April 1899 and then residing in said islands and their children born subsequent thereto
were conferred the status of a Filipino citizen.
Was the grandfather of the private respondent a Spanish subject?
Article 17 of the Civil Code of Spain enumerates those who were considered Spanish Subjects, viz:
ARTICLE 17. The following are Spaniards:
1. Persons born in Spanish territory.
2. Children born of a Spanish father or mother, even though they were born out of
Spain.
3. Foreigners who may have obtained naturalization papers.
4. Those without such papers, who may have acquired domicile in any town in the
Monarchy. (Emphasis supplied)
The domicile of a natural person is the place of his habitual residence. This domicile, once
established is considered to continue and will not be deemed lost until a new one is established.
(Article 50, NCC; Article 40, Civil Code of Spain; Zuellig v. Republic, 83 Phil. 768 [1949])
As earlier stated, Ong Te became a permanent resident of Laoang, Samar around 1895.
Correspondingly, a certificate of residence was then issued to him by virtue of his being a resident of
Laoang, Samar. (Report of the Committee on Election Protests and Credentials of the 1971
Constitutional Convention, September 7, 1972, p. 3)
The domicile that Ong Te established in 1895 continued until April 11, 1899; it even went beyond the
turn of the 19th century. It is also in this place were Ong Te set-up his business and acquired his real
property.
As concluded by the Constitutional Convention, Ong Te falls within the meaning of sub-paragraph 4
of Article 17 of the Civil Code of Spain.
Although Ong Te made brief visits to China, he, nevertheless, always returned to the Philippines.
The fact that he died in China, during one of his visits in said country, was of no moment. This will
not change the fact that he already had his domicile fixed in the Philippines and pursuant to the Civil
Code of Spain, he had become a Spanish subject.
If Ong Te became a Spanish subject by virtue of having established his domicile in a town under the
Monarchy of Spain, necessarily, Ong Te was also an inhabitant of the Philippines for an inhabitant
has been defined as one who has actual fixed residence in a place; one who has a domicile in a
place. (Bouvier's Law Dictionary, Vol. II) Apriori, there can be no other logical conclusion but to
educe that Ong Te qualified as a Filipino citizen under the provisions of section 4 of the Philippine
Bill of 1902.
The HRET itself found this fact of absolute verity in concluding that the private respondent was a
natural-born Filipino.
The petitioners' sole ground in disputing this fact is that document presented to prove it were not in
compliance with the best the evidence rule. The petitioners allege that the private respondent failed
to present the original of the documentary evidence, testimonial evidence and of the transcript of the
proceedings of the body which the aforesaid resolution of the 1971 Constitutional Convention was
predicated.
On the contrary, the documents presented by the private respondent fall under the exceptions to the
best evidence rule.
It was established in the proceedings before the HRET that the originals of the Committee Report
No. 12, the minutes of the plenary session of 1971 Constitutional Convention held on November 28,
1972 cannot be found.
This was affirmed by Atty. Ricafrente, Assistant Secretary of the 1971 Constitutional Convention; by
Atty. Nolledo, Delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention; and by Atty. Antonio Santos, Chief
Librarian of the U.P Law Center, in their respective testimonies given before the HRET to the effect
that there is no governmental agency which is the official custodian of the records of the 1971
Constitutional Convention. (TSN, December 12, 1988, pp. 30-31; TSN, January 17, 1989, pp. 34-35;
TSN, February 1, 1989, p. 44; TSN, February 6, 1989, pp. 28-29)
The execution of the originals was established by Atty. Ricafrente, who as the Assistant Secretary of
the 1971 Constitutional Convention was the proper party to testify to such execution. (TSN,
December 12, 1989, pp. 11-24)
The inability to produce the originals before the HRET was also testified to as aforestated by Atty.
Ricafrente, Atty. Nolledo, and Atty. Santos. In proving the inability to produce, the law does not
require the degree of proof to be of sufficient certainty; it is enough that it be shown that after a bona
fide diligent search, the same cannot be found. (see Government of P.I. v. Martinez, 44 Phil. 817
[1918])
Since the execution of the document and the inability to produce were adequately established, the
contents of the questioned documents can be proven by a copy thereof or by the recollection of
witnesses.
Moreover, to erase all doubts as to the authenticity of the documentary evidence cited in the
Committee Report, the former member of the 1971 Constitutional Convention, Atty. Nolledo, when
he was presented as a witness in the hearing of the protest against the private respondent,
categorically stated that he saw the disputed documents presented during the hearing of the election
protest against the brother of the private respondent. (TSN, February 1, 1989, pp. 8-9)
In his concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Sarmiento, a vice-president of the Constitutional Convention,
states that he was presiding officer of the plenary session which deliberated on the report on the
election protest against Delegate Emil Ong. He cites a long list of names of delegates present.
Among them are Mr. Chief Justice Fernan, and Mr. Justice Davide, Jr. The petitioners could have
presented any one of the long list of delegates to refute Mr. Ong's having been declared a natural-
born citizen. They did not do so. Nor did they demur to the contents of the documents presented by
the private respondent. They merely relied on the procedural objections respecting the admissibility
of the evidence presented.
The Constitutional Convention was the sole judge of the qualifications of Emil Ong to be a member
of that body. The HRET by explicit mandate of the Constitution, is the sole judge of the qualifications
of Jose Ong, Jr. to be a member of Congress. Both bodies deliberated at length on the controversies
over which they were sole judges. Decisions were arrived at only after a full presentation of all
relevant factors which the parties wished to present. Even assuming that we disagree with their
conclusions, we cannot declare their acts as committed with grave abuse of discretion. We have to
keep clear the line between error and grave abuse.
ON THE ISSUE OF RESIDENCE
The petitioners question the residence qualification of respondent Ong.
The petitioners lose sight of the meaning of "residence" under the Constitution. The term "residence"
has been understood as synonymous with domicile not only under the previous Constitutions but
also under the 1987 Constitution.
The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal that the meaning of residence vis-a-
vis the qualifications of a candidate for Congress continues to remain the same as that of domicile,
to wit:
Mr. Nolledo: With respect to Section 5, I remember that in the 1971
Constitutional Convention, there was an attempt to require residence
in the place not less than one year immediately preceding the day of
the elections. So my question is: What is the Committee's concept of
residence of a candidate for the legislature? Is it actual residence or
is it the concept of domicile or constructive residence?
Mr. Davide: Madame President, in so far as the regular members of
the National Assembly are concerned, the proposed section merely
provides, among others, and a resident thereof, that is, in the district,
for a period of not less than one year preceding the day of the
election. This was in effect lifted from the 1973 Constitution, the
interpretation given to it was domicile. (Records of the 1987
Constitutional Convention, Vol. 11, July 22, 1986. p. 87)
xxx xxx xxx
Mrs. Rosario Braid: The next question is on Section 7, page 2. I think
Commissioner Nolledo has raised the same point that "resident" has
been interpreted at times as a matter of intention rather than actual
residence.
Mr. De los Reyes: Domicile.
Ms. Rosario Braid: Yes, So, would the gentlemen consider at the
proper time to go back to actual residence rather than mere intention
to reside?
Mr. De los Reyes: But we might encounter some difficulty especially
considering that a provision in the Constitution in the Article on
Suffrage says that Filipinos living abroad may vote as enacted by law.
So, we have to stick to the original concept that it should be by
domicile and not physical and actual residence. (Records of the 1987
Constitutional Commission, Vol. 11, July 22, 1986, p. 110)
The framers of the Constitution adhered to the earlier definition given to the word "residence" which
regarded it as having the same meaning as domicile.
The term "domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business or
pleasure, one intends to return. (Ong Huan Tin v. Republic, 19 SCRA 966 [1967]) The absence of a
person from said permanent residence, no matter how long, notwithstanding, it continues to be the
domicile of that person. In other words, domicile is characterized by animus revertendi (Ujano v.
Republic, 17 SCRA 147 [1966])
The domicile of origin of the private respondent, which was the domicile of his parents, is fixed at
Laoang, Samar. Contrary to the petitioners' imputation, Jose Ong, Jr. never abandoned said
domicile; it remained fixed therein even up to the present.
The private respondent, in the proceedings before the HRET sufficiently established that after the
fire that gutted their house in 1961, another one was constructed.
Likewise, after the second fire which again destroyed their house in 1975, a sixteen-door apartment
was built by their family, two doors of which were reserved as their family residence. (TSN, Jose
Ong, Jr., November 18,1988, p. 8)
The petitioners' allegation that since the private respondent owns no property in Laoang, Samar, he
cannot, therefore, be a resident of said place is misplaced.
The properties owned by the Ong Family are in the name of the private respondent's parents. Upon
the demise of his parents, necessarily, the private respondent, pursuant to the laws of succession,
became the co-owner thereof (as a co- heir), notwithstanding the fact that these were still in the
names of his parents.
Even assuming that the private respondent does not own any property in Samar, the Supreme Court
in the case ofDe los Reyes v. Solidum (61 Phil. 893 [1935]) held that it is not required that a person
should have a house in order to establish his residence and domicile. It is enough that he should live
in the municipality or in a rented house or in that of a friend or relative. (Emphasis supplied)
To require the private respondent to own property in order to be eligible to run for Congress would
be tantamount to a property qualification. The Constitution only requires that the candidate meet the
age, citizenship, voting and residence requirements. Nowhere is it required by the Constitution that
the candidate should also own property in order to be qualified to run. (see Maquera v. Borra, 122
Phil. 412 [1965])
It has also been settled that absence from residence to pursue studies or practice a profession or
registration as a voter other than in the place where one is elected, does not constitute loss of
residence. (Faypon v. Quirino, 96 Phil. 294 [1954])
As previously stated, the private respondent stayed in Manila for the purpose of finishing his studies
and later to practice his profession, There was no intention to abandon the residence in Laoang,
Samar. On the contrary, the periodical journeys made to his home province reveal that he always
had the animus revertendi.
The Philippines is made up not only of a single race; it has, rather, undergone an interracial
evolution. Throughout our history, there has been a continuing influx of Malays, Chinese, Americans,
Japanese, Spaniards and other nationalities. This racial diversity gives strength to our country.
Many great Filipinos have not been whole-blooded nationals, if there is such a person, for there is
none. To mention a few, the great Jose Rizal was part Chinese, the late Chief Justice Claudio
Teehankee was part Chinese, and of course our own President, Corazon Aquino is also part
Chinese. Verily, some Filipinos of whom we are proud were ethnically more Chinese than the private
respondent.
Our citizens no doubt constitute the country's greatest wealth. Citizenship is a special privilege which
one must forever cherish.
However, in order to truly revere this treasure of citizenship, we do not, on the basis of too harsh an
interpretation, have to unreasonably deny it to those who qualify to share in its richness.
Under the overly strict jurisprudence surrounding our antiquated naturalization laws only the very
affluent backed by influential patrons, who were willing to suffer the indignities of a lengthy,
sometimes humiliating, and often corrupt process of clearances by minor bureaucrats and whose
lawyers knew how to overcome so many technical traps of the judicial process were able to acquire
citizenship. It is time for the naturalization law to be revised to enable a more positive, affirmative,
and meaningful examination of an applicant's suitability to be a Filipino. A more humane, more
indubitable and less technical approach to citizenship problems is essential.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED. The questioned decision of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal is AFFIRMED. Respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is declared a natural-
born citizen of the Philippines and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar.
SO ORDERED.














[G.R. No. 135083. May 26, 1999]
ERNESTO S. MERCADO, petitioner, vs. EDUARDO BARRIOS MANZANO
and the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
MENDOZA, J .:
Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and private respondent Eduardo B. Manzano were candidates
for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. The other one was Gabriel
V. Daza III. The results of the election were as follows:
Eduardo B. Manzano 103,853
Ernesto S. Mercado 100,894
Gabriel V. Daza III 54,275
[1]

The proclamation of private respondent was suspended in view of a pending petition for
disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that private respondent was not a
citizen of the Philippines but of the United States.
In its resolution, dated May 7, 1998,
[2]
the Second Division of the COMELEC granted the
petition of Mamaril and ordered the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of private
respondent on the ground that he is a dual citizen and, under 40(d) of the Local Government
Code, persons with dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective position. The
COMELECs Second Division said:
What is presented before the Commission is a petition for disqualification of Eduardo
Barrios Manzano as candidate for the office of Vice-Mayor of Makati City in the May
11, 1998 elections. The petition is based on the ground that the respondent is an
American citizen based on the record of the Bureau of Immigration and
misrepresented himself as a natural-born Filipino citizen.
In his answer to the petition filed on April 27, 1998, the respondent admitted that he is
registered as a foreigner with the Bureau of Immigration under Alien Certificate of
Registration No. B-31632 and alleged that he is a Filipino citizen because he was born
in 1955 of a Filipino father and a Filipino mother. He was born in the United States,
San Francisco, California, on September 14, 1955, and is considered an American
citizen under US Laws. But notwithstanding his registration as an American citizen,
he did not lose his Filipino citizenship.
Judging from the foregoing facts, it would appear that respondent Manzano is both a
Filipino and a US citizen. In other words, he holds dual citizenship.
The question presented is whether under our laws, he is disqualified from the position
for which he filed his certificate of candidacy. Is he eligible for the office he seeks to
be elected?
Under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code, those holding dual citizenship
are disqualified from running for any elective local position.
WHEREFORE, the Commission hereby declares the respondent Eduardo Barrios
Manzano DISQUALIFIED as candidate for Vice-Mayor of Makati City.
On May 8, 1998, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration.
[3]
The motion
remained pending even until after the election held on May 11, 1998.
Accordingly, pursuant to Omnibus Resolution No. 3044, dated May 10, 1998, of the
COMELEC, the board of canvassers tabulated the votes cast for vice mayor of Makati City but
suspended the proclamation of the winner.
On May 19, 1998, petitioner sought to intervene in the case for
disqualification.
[4]
Petitioners motion was opposed by private respondent.
The motion was not resolved. Instead, on August 31, 1998, the COMELEC en banc
rendered its resolution. Voting 4 to 1, with one commissioner abstaining, the COMELEC en
banc reversed the ruling of its Second Division and declared private respondent qualified to run
for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections.
[5]
The pertinent portions of
the resolution of the COMELEC en banc read:
As aforesaid, respondent Eduardo Barrios Manzano was born in San Francisco,
California, U.S.A. He acquired US citizenship by operation of the United States
Constitution and laws under the principle of jus soli.
He was also a natural born Filipino citizen by operation of the 1935 Philippine
Constitution, as his father and mother were Filipinos at the time of his birth. At the
age of six (6), his parents brought him to the Philippines using an American passport
as travel document. His parents also registered him as an alien with the Philippine
Bureau of Immigration. He was issued an alien certificate of registration. This,
however, did not result in the loss of his Philippine citizenship, as he did not renounce
Philippine citizenship and did not take an oath of allegiance to the United States.
It is an undisputed fact that when respondent attained the age of majority, he
registered himself as a voter, and voted in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998,
which effectively renounced his US citizenship under American law. Under
Philippine law, he no longer had U.S. citizenship.
At the time of the May 11, 1998 elections, the resolution of the Second Division,
adopted on May 7, 1998, was not yet final. Respondent Manzano obtained the highest
number of votes among the candidates for vice-mayor of Makati City, garnering one
hundred three thousand eight hundred fifty three (103,853) votes over his closest rival,
Ernesto S. Mercado, who obtained one hundred thousand eight hundred ninety four
(100,894) votes, or a margin of two thousand nine hundred fifty nine (2,959)
votes. Gabriel Daza III obtained third place with fifty four thousand two hundred
seventy five (54,275) votes. In applying election laws, it would be far better to err in
favor of the popular choice than be embroiled in complex legal issues involving
private international law which may well be settled before the highest court
(Cf. Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections, 257 SCRA 727).
WHEREFORE, the Commission en banc hereby REVERSES the resolution of the
Second Division, adopted on May 7, 1998, ordering the cancellation of the
respondents certificate of candidacy.
We declare respondent Eduardo Luis Barrios Manzano to be QUALIFIED as a
candidate for the position of vice-mayor of Makati City in the May 11, 1998,
elections.
ACCORDINGLY, the Commission directs the Makati City Board of Canvassers,
upon proper notice to the parties, to reconvene and proclaim the respondent Eduardo
Luis Barrios Manzano as the winning candidate for vice-mayor of Makati City.
Pursuant to the resolution of the COMELEC en banc, the board of canvassers, on the
evening of August 31, 1998, proclaimed private respondent as vice mayor of the City of Makati.
This is a petition for certiorari seeking to set aside the aforesaid resolution of the
COMELEC en banc and to declare private respondent disqualified to hold the office of vice
mayor of Makati City. Petitioner contends that
[T]he COMELEC en banc ERRED in holding that:
A. Under Philippine law, Manzano was no longer a U.S. citizen when he:
1. He renounced his U.S. citizenship when he attained the age of majority when he
was already 37 years old; and,
2. He renounced his U.S. citizenship when he (merely) registered himself as a
voter and voted in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998.
B. Manzano is qualified to run for and or hold the elective office of Vice-Mayor of the
City of Makati;
C. At the time of the May 11, 1998 elections, the resolution of the Second Division
adopted on 7 May 1998 was not yet final so that, effectively, petitioner may not be
declared the winner even assuming that Manzano is disqualified to run for and hold
the elective office of Vice-Mayor of the City of Makati.
We first consider the threshold procedural issue raised by private respondent
Manzano whether petitioner Mercado has personality to bring this suit considering that he
was not an original party in the case for disqualification filed by Ernesto Mamaril nor was
petitioners motion for leave to intervene granted.
I. PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO BRING THIS SUIT

Private respondent cites the following provisions of Rule 8 of the Rules of Procedure of the
COMELEC in support of his claim that petitioner has no right to intervene and, therefore, cannot
bring this suit to set aside the ruling denying his motion for intervention:
Section 1. When proper and when may be permitted to intervene. Any person
allowed to initiate an action or proceeding may, before or during the trial of an action
or proceeding, be permitted by the Commission, in its discretion to intervene in such
action or proceeding, if he has legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the
success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or when he is so situated as
to be adversely affected by such action or proceeding.
. . . .
Section 3. Discretion of Commission. In allowing or disallowing a motion for
intervention, the Commission or the Division, in the exercise of its discretion, shall
consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the
adjudication of the rights of the original parties and whether or not the intervenors
rights may be fully protected in a separate action or proceeding.
Private respondent argues that petitioner has neither legal interest in the matter in litigation nor
an interest to protect because he is a defeated candidate for the vice-mayoralty post of Makati
City [who] cannot be proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Makati City even if the private
respondent be ultimately disqualified by final and executory judgment.
The flaw in this argument is it assumes that, at the time petitioner sought to intervene in the
proceedings before the COMELEC, there had already been a proclamation of the results of the
election for the vice mayoralty contest for Makati City, on the basis of which petitioner came out
only second to private respondent. The fact, however, is that there had been no proclamation at
that time. Certainly, petitioner had, and still has, an interest in ousting private respondent from
the race at the time he sought to intervene. The rule in Labo v. COMELEC,
[6]
reiterated in
several cases,
[7]
only applies to cases in which the election of the respondent is contested, and the
question is whether one who placed second to the disqualified candidate may be declared the
winner. In the present case, at the time petitioner filed a Motion for Leave to File Intervention
on May 20, 1998, there had been no proclamation of the winner, and petitioners purpose was
precisely to have private respondent disqualified from running for [an] elective local position
under 40(d) of R.A. No. 7160. If Ernesto Mamaril (who originally instituted the
disqualification proceedings), a registered voter of Makati City, was competent to bring the
action, so was petitioner since the latter was a rival candidate for vice mayor of Makati City.
Nor is petitioners interest in the matter in litigation any less because he filed a motion for
intervention only on May 20, 1998, after private respondent had been shown to have garnered
the highest number of votes among the candidates for vice mayor. That petitioner had a right to
intervene at that stage of the proceedings for the disqualification against private respondent is
clear from 6 of R.A. No. 6646, otherwise known as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, which
provides:
Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be
voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a
candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and
he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or
Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest
and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency
thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the
evidence of guilt is strong.
Under this provision, intervention may be allowed in proceedings for disqualification even
after election if there has yet been no final judgment rendered.
The failure of the COMELEC en banc to resolve petitioners motion for intervention was
tantamount to a denial of the motion, justifying petitioner in filing the instant petition for
certiorari. As the COMELEC en banc instead decided the merits of the case, the present petition
properly deals not only with the denial of petitioners motion for intervention but also with the
substantive issues respecting private respondents alleged disqualification on the ground of dual
citizenship.
This brings us to the next question, namely, whether private respondent Manzano possesses
dual citizenship and, if so, whether he is disqualified from being a candidate for vice mayor of
Makati City.
II. DUAL CITIZENSHIP AS A GROUND FOR DISQUALIFICATION

The disqualification of private respondent Manzano is being sought under 40 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), which declares as disqualified from running for
any elective local position: . . . (d) Those with dual citizenship. This provision is incorporated
in the Charter of the City of Makati.
[8]

Invoking the maxim dura lex sed lex, petitioner, as well as the Solicitor General, who sides
with him in this case, contends that through 40(d) of the Local Government Code, Congress has
command[ed] in explicit terms the ineligibility of persons possessing dual allegiance to hold
local elective office.
To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as
a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is
simultaneously considered a national by the said states.
[9]
For instance, such a situation may arise
when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus
sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and
without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both
states. Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is possible for the
following classes of citizens of the Philippines to possess dual citizenship:
(1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the
principle of jus soli;
(2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their
fathers country such children are citizens of that country;
(3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latters country the former are considered
citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine
citizenship.
There may be other situations in which a citizen of the Philippines may, without performing
any act, be also a citizen of another state; but the above cases are clearly possible given the
constitutional provisions on citizenship.
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously
owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary,
dual allegiance is the result of an individuals volition.
With respect to dual allegiance, Article IV, 5 of the Constitution provides: Dual allegiance
of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law. This provision was
included in the 1987 Constitution at the instance of Commissioner Blas F. Ople who explained
its necessity as follows:
[10]

. . . I want to draw attention to the fact that dual allegiance is not dual citizenship. I
have circulated a memorandum to the Bernas Committee according to which a dual
allegiance and I reiterate a dual allegiance is larger and more threatening than that
of mere double citizenship which is seldom intentional and, perhaps, never
insidious. That is often a function of the accident of mixed marriages or of birth on
foreign soil. And so, I do not question double citizenship at all.
What we would like the Committee to consider is to take constitutional cognizance of
the problem of dual allegiance. For example, we all know what happens in the
triennial elections of the Federation of Filipino-Chinese Chambers of Commerce
which consists of about 600 chapters all over the country. There is a Peking ticket, as
well as a Taipei ticket. Not widely known is the fact that the Filipino-Chinese
community is represented in the Legislative Yuan of the Republic of China in
Taiwan. And until recently, the sponsor might recall, in Mainland China in the
Peoples Republic of China, they have the Associated Legislative Council for
overseas Chinese wherein all of Southeast Asia including some European and Latin
countries were represented, which was dissolved after several years because of
diplomatic friction. At that time, the Filipino-Chinese were also represented in that
Overseas Council.
When I speak of double allegiance, therefore, I speak of this unsettled kind of
allegiance of Filipinos, of citizens who are already Filipinos but who, by their acts,
may be said to be bound by a second allegiance, either to Peking or Taiwan. I also
took close note of the concern expressed by some Commissioners yesterday, including
Commissioner Villacorta, who were concerned about the lack of guarantees of
thorough assimilation, and especially Commissioner Concepcion who has always
been worried about minority claims on our natural resources.
Dual allegiance can actually siphon scarce national capital to Taiwan, Singapore,
China or Malaysia, and this is already happening. Some of the great commercial
places in downtown Taipei are Filipino-owned, owned by Filipino-Chinese it is of
common knowledge in Manila. It can mean a tragic capital outflow when we have to
endure a capital famine which also means economic stagnation, worsening
unemployment and social unrest.
And so, this is exactly what we ask that the Committee kindly consider
incorporating a new section, probably Section 5, in the article on Citizenship which
will read as follows: DUAL ALLEGIANCE IS INIMICAL TO CITIZENSHIP AND
SHALL BE DEALT WITH ACCORDING TO LAW.
In another session of the Commission, Ople spoke on the problem of these citizens with dual
allegiance, thus:
[11]

. . . A significant number of Commissioners expressed their concern about dual
citizenship in the sense that it implies a double allegiance under a double sovereignty
which some of us who spoke then in a freewheeling debate thought would be
repugnant to the sovereignty which pervades the Constitution and to citizenship itself
which implies a uniqueness and which elsewhere in the Constitution is defined in
terms of rights and obligations exclusive to that citizenship including, of course, the
obligation to rise to the defense of the State when it is threatened, and back of this,
Commissioner Bernas, is, of course, the concern for national security. In the course of
those debates, I think some noted the fact that as a result of the wave of
naturalizations since the decision to establish diplomatic relations with the Peoples
Republic of China was made in 1975, a good number of these naturalized Filipinos
still routinely go to Taipei every October 10; and it is asserted that some of them do
renew their oath of allegiance to a foreign government maybe just to enter into the
spirit of the occasion when the anniversary of the Sun Yat-Sen Republic is
commemorated. And so, I have detected a genuine and deep concern about double
citizenship, with its attendant risk of double allegiance which is repugnant to our
sovereignty and national security. I appreciate what the Committee said that this
could be left to the determination of a future legislature. But considering the scale of
the problem, the real impact on the security of this country, arising from, let us say,
potentially great numbers of double citizens professing double allegiance, will the
Committee entertain a proposed amendment at the proper time that will prohibit, in
effect, or regulate double citizenship?
Clearly, in including 5 in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of the Constitutional
Commission was not with dual citizens per se but with naturalized citizens who maintain their
allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization. Hence, the phrase dual
citizenship in R.A. No. 7160, 40(d) and in R.A. No. 7854, 20 must be understood as referring
to dual allegiance. Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this
disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict
process with respect to the termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it
should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine
citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their
condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states. As Joaquin G.
Bernas, one of the most perceptive members of the Constitutional Commission, pointed out:
[D]ual citizenship is just a reality imposed on us because we have no control of the laws on
citizenship of other countries. We recognize a child of a Filipino mother. But whether or not she
is considered a citizen of another country is something completely beyond our control.
[12]

By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to
the other country of which they are also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual
citizens. It may be that, from the point of view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an
individual has not effectively renounced his foreign citizenship. That is of no moment as the
following discussion on 40(d) between Senators Enrile and Pimentel clearly shows:
[13]

SENATOR ENRILE. Mr. President, I would like to ask clarification of line 41, page 17: Any person
with dual citizenship is disqualified to run for any elective local position. Under the present
Constitution, Mr. President, someone whose mother is a citizen of the Philippines but his father is
a foreigner is a natural-born citizen of the Republic. There is no requirement that such a natural
born citizen, upon reaching the age of majority, must elect or give up Philippine citizenship.
On the assumption that this person would carry two passports, one belonging to the country of his or
her father and one belonging to the Republic of the Philippines, may such a situation disqualify
the person to run for a local government position?
SENATOR PIMENTEL. To my mind, Mr. President, it only means that at the moment when he
would want to run for public office, he has to repudiate one of his citizenships.
SENATOR ENRILE. Suppose he carries only a Philippine passport but the country of origin or the
country of the father claims that person, nevertheless, as a citizen? No one can renounce. There
are such countries in the world.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Well, the very fact that he is running for public office would, in effect, be an
election for him of his desire to be considered as a Filipino citizen.
SENATOR ENRILE. But, precisely, Mr. President, the Constitution does not require an
election. Under the Constitution, a person whose mother is a citizen of the Philippines is, at birth,
a citizen without any overt act to claim the citizenship.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Yes. What we are saying, Mr. President, is: Under the Gentlemans
example, if he does not renounce his other citizenship, then he is opening himself to
question. So, if he is really interested to run, the first thing he should do is to say in the
Certificate of Candidacy that: I am a Filipino citizen, and I have only one citizenship.
SENATOR ENRILE. But we are talking from the viewpoint of Philippine law, Mr. President. He
will always have one citizenship, and that is the citizenship invested upon him or her in the
Constitution of the Republic.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. That is true, Mr. President. But if he exercises acts that will prove that he
also acknowledges other citizenships, then he will probably fall under this disqualification.
This is similar to the requirement that an applicant for naturalization must renounce all
allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty
[14]
of which at the
time he is a subject or citizen before he can be issued a certificate of naturalization as a citizen of
the Philippines. In Parado v. Republic,
[15]
it was held:
[W]hen a person applying for citizenship by naturalization takes an oath that he
renounces his loyalty to any other country or government and solemnly declares that
he owes his allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, the condition imposed by
law is satisfied and complied with. The determination whether such renunciation is
valid or fully complies with the provisions of our Naturalization Law lies within the
province and is an exclusive prerogative of our courts. The latter should apply the law
duly enacted by the legislative department of the Republic. No foreign law may or
should interfere with its operation and application. If the requirement of the Chinese
Law of Nationality were to be read into our Naturalization Law, we would be
applying not what our legislative department has deemed it wise to require, but what a
foreign government has thought or intended to exact. That, of course, is absurd. It
must be resisted by all means and at all cost. It would be a brazen encroachment upon
the sovereign will and power of the people of this Republic.
III. PETITIONER'S ELECTION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP

The record shows that private respondent was born in San Francisco, California on
September 4, 1955, of Filipino parents. Since the Philippines adheres to the principle of jus
sanguinis, while the United States follows the doctrine of jus soli, the parties agree that, at birth
at least, he was a national both of the Philippines and of the United States. However, the
COMELEC en banc held that, by participating in Philippine elections in 1992, 1995, and 1998,
private respondent effectively renounced his U.S. citizenship under American law, so that now
he is solely a Philippine national.
Petitioner challenges this ruling. He argues that merely taking part in Philippine elections is
not sufficient evidence of renunciation and that, in any event, as the alleged renunciation was
made when private respondent was already 37 years old, it was ineffective as it should have been
made when he reached the age of majority.
In holding that by voting in Philippine elections private respondent renounced his American
citizenship, the COMELEC must have in mind 349 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of
the United States, which provided that A person who is a national of the United States, whether
by birth or naturalization, shall lose his nationality by: . . . (e) Voting in a political election in a
foreign state or participating in an election or plebiscite to determine the sovereignty over foreign
territory. To be sure this provision was declared unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court
in Afroyim v. Rusk
[16]
as beyond the power given to the U.S. Congress to regulate foreign
relations. However, by filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his present post, private
respondent elected Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced his American
citizenship. Private respondents certificate of candidacy, filed on March 27, 1998, contained the
following statements made under oath:
6. I AM A FILIPINO CITIZEN (STATE IF NATURAL-BORN OR
NATURALIZED) NATURAL-BORN
. . . .
10. I AM A REGISTERED VOTER OF PRECINCT NO. 747-A, BARANGAY SAN
LORENZO, CITY/MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, PROVINCE OF NCR .
11. I AM NOT A PERMANENT RESIDENT OF, OR IMMIGRANT TO, A FOREIGN
COUNTRY.
12. I AM ELIGIBLE FOR THE OFFICE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED. I WILL
SUPPORT AND DEFEND THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES AND WILL
MAINTAIN TRUE FAITH AND ALLEGIANCE THERETO; THAT I WILL OBEY THE
LAWS, LEGAL ORDERS AND DECREES PROMULGATED BY THE DULY
CONSTITUTED AUTHORITIES OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES; AND
THAT I IMPOSE THIS OBLIGATION UPON MYSELF VOLUNTARILY, WITHOUT
MENTAL RESERVATION OR PURPOSE OF EVASION. I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT
THE FACTS STATED HEREIN ARE TRUE AND CORRECT OF MY OWN PERSONAL
KNOWLEDGE.
The filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce his American citizenship,
effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen. Thus, in Frivaldo v.
COMELEC it was held:
[17]

It is not disputed that on January 20, 1983 Frivaldo became an American. Would the
retroactivity of his repatriation not effectively give him dual citizenship, which under
Sec. 40 of the Local Government Code would disqualify him from running for any
elective local position? We answer this question in the negative, as there is cogent
reason to hold that Frivaldo was really STATELESS at the time he took said oath of
allegiance and even before that, when he ran for governor in 1988. In his Comment,
Frivaldo wrote that he had long renounced and had long abandoned his American
citizenshiplong before May 8, 1995. At best, Frivaldo was stateless in the
interimwhen he abandoned and renounced his US citizenship but before he was
repatriated to his Filipino citizenship.
On this point, we quote from the assailed Resolution dated December 19, 1995:
By the laws of the United States, petitioner Frivaldo lost his American citizenship
when he took his oath of allegiance to the Philippine Government when he ran for
Governor in 1988, in 1992, and in 1995. Every certificate of candidacy contains an
oath of allegiance to the Philippine Government.
These factual findings that Frivaldo has lost his foreign nationality long before the
elections of 1995 have not been effectively rebutted by Lee. Furthermore, it is basic
that such findings of the Commission are conclusive upon this Court, absent any
showing of capriciousness or arbitrariness or abuse.
There is, therefore, no merit in petitioners contention that the oath of allegiance contained
in private respondents certificate of candidacy is insufficient to constitute renunciation of his
American citizenship. Equally without merit is petitioners contention that, to be effective, such
renunciation should have been made upon private respondent reaching the age of majority since
no law requires the election of Philippine citizenship to be made upon majority age.
Finally, much is made of the fact that private respondent admitted that he is registered as an
American citizen in the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation and that he holds an American
passport which he used in his last travel to the United States on April 22, 1997. There is no merit
in this. Until the filing of his certificate of candidacy on March 21, 1998, he had dual
citizenship. The acts attributed to him can be considered simply as the assertion of his American
nationality before the termination of his American citizenship. What this Court said in Aznar v.
COMELEC
[18]
applies mutatis mutandis to private respondent in the case at bar:
. . . Considering the fact that admittedly Osmea was both a Filipino and an
American, the mere fact that he has a Certificate stating he is an American does not
mean that he is not still a Filipino. . . . [T]he Certification that he is an American does
not mean that he is not still a Filipino, possessed as he is, of both nationalities or
citizenships. Indeed, there is no express renunciation here of Philippine citizenship;
truth to tell, there is even no implied renunciation of said citizenship. When We
consider that the renunciation needed to lose Philippine citizenship must be express,
it stands to reason that there can be no such loss of Philippine citizenship when there
is no renunciation, either express or implied.
To recapitulate, by declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that
he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support
the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so
without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are
concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have said
before as a dual citizen.
On the other hand, private respondents oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when
considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education,
practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no
doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship.
His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made under
oath. Should he betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his
Philippine citizenship through expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-
Santiago,
[19]
we sustained the denial of entry into the country of petitioner on the ground that,
after taking his oath as a naturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese
passport and declared in commercial documents executed abroad that he was a Portuguese
national. A similar sanction can be taken against any one who, in electing Philippine citizenship,
renounces his foreign nationality, but subsequently does some act constituting renunciation of his
Philippine citizenship.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.























Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 119976 September 18, 1995
IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and CIRILO ROY MONTEJO, respondents.

KAPUNAN, J .:
A constitutional provision should be construed as to give it effective operation and suppress the
mischief at which it is aimed.
1
The 1987 Constitution mandates that an aspirant for election to the
House of Representatives be "a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident
thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the election."
2
The mischief which
this provision reproduced verbatim from the 1973 Constitution seeks to prevent is the possibility of a
"stranger or newcomer unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a community and not identified
with the latter, from an elective office to serve that community."
3

Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of
Representative of the First District of Leyte with the Provincial Election Supervisor on March 8, 1995,
providing the following information in item no. 8:
4

RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED
IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION: __________ Years
and seven Months.
On March 23, 1995, private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the
First District of Leyte and a candidate for the same position, filed a "Petition for Cancellation and
Disqualification"
5
with the Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional
requirement for residency. In his petition, private respondent contended that Mrs. Marcos lacked the
Constitution's one year residency requirement for candidates for the House of Representatives on the
evidence of declarations made by her in Voter Registration Record 94-No. 3349772
6
and in her Certificate
of Candidacy. He prayed that "an order be issued declaring (petitioner) disqualified and canceling the
certificate of candidacy."
7

On March 29, 1995, petitioner filed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, changing the
entry "seven" months to "since childhood" in item no. 8 of the amended certificate.
8
On the same day,
the Provincial Election Supervisor of Leyte informed petitioner that:
[T]his office cannot receive or accept the aforementioned Certificate of Candidacy on
the ground that it is filed out of time, the deadline for the filing of the same having
already lapsed on March 20, 1995. The Corrected/Amended Certificate of Candidacy
should have been filed on or before the March 20, 1995 deadline.
9

Consequently, petitioner filed the Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy with the COMELEC's
Head Office in Intramuros, Manila on
March 31, 1995. Her Answer to private respondent's petition in SPA No. 95-009 was likewise filed
with the head office on the same day. In said Answer, petitioner averred that the entry of the word
"seven" in her original Certificate of Candidacy was the result of an "honest
misinterpretation"
10
which she sought to rectify by adding the words "since childhood" in her
Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy and that "she has always maintained Tacloban City as her
domicile or residence.
11
Impugning respondent's motive in filing the petition seeking her disqualification,
she noted that:
When respondent (petitioner herein) announced that she was intending to register as
a voter in Tacloban City and run for Congress in the First District of Leyte, petitioner
immediately opposed her intended registration by writing a letter stating that "she is
not a resident of said city but of Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. After respondent had
registered as a voter in Tolosa following completion of her six month actual residence
therein, petitioner filed a petition with the COMELEC to transfer the town of Tolosa
from the First District to the Second District and pursued such a move up to the
Supreme Court, his purpose being to remove respondent as petitioner's opponent in
the congressional election in the First District. He also filed a bill, along with other
Leyte Congressmen, seeking the creation of another legislative district to remove the
town of Tolosa out of the First District, to achieve his purpose. However, such bill did
not pass the Senate. Having failed on such moves, petitioner now filed the instant
petition for the same objective, as it is obvious that he is afraid to submit along with
respondent for the judgment and verdict of the electorate of the First District of Leyte
in an honest, orderly, peaceful, free and clean elections on May 8, 1995.
12

On April 24, 1995, the Second Division of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), by a vote of 2
to 1,
13
came up with a Resolution 1) finding private respondent's Petition for Disqualification in SPA 95-
009 meritorious; 2) striking off petitioner's Corrected/Amended Certificate of Candidacy of March 31,
1995; and 3) canceling her original Certificate of Candidacy.
14
Dealing with two primary issues, namely,
the validity of amending the original Certificate of Candidacy after the lapse of the deadline for filing
certificates of candidacy, and petitioner's compliance with the one year residency requirement, the
Second Division held:
Respondent raised the affirmative defense in her Answer that the printed word
"Seven" (months) was a result of an "honest misinterpretation or honest mistake" on
her part and, therefore, an amendment should subsequently be allowed. She averred
that she thought that what was asked was her "actual and physical" presence in
Tolosa and not residence of origin or domicile in the First Legislative District, to which
she could have responded "since childhood." In an accompanying affidavit, she
stated that her domicile is Tacloban City, a component of the First District, to which
she always intended to return whenever absent and which she has never
abandoned. Furthermore, in her memorandum, she tried to discredit petitioner's
theory of disqualification by alleging that she has been a resident of the First
Legislative District of Leyte since childhood, although she only became a resident of
the Municipality of Tolosa for seven months. She asserts that she has always been a
resident of Tacloban City, a component of the First District, before coming to the
Municipality of Tolosa.
Along this point, it is interesting to note that prior to her registration in Tolosa,
respondent announced that she would be registering in Tacloban City so that she
can be a candidate for the District. However, this intention was rebuffed when
petitioner wrote the Election Officer of Tacloban not to allow respondent since she is
a resident of Tolosa and not Tacloban. She never disputed this claim and instead
implicitly acceded to it by registering in Tolosa.
This incident belies respondent's claim of "honest misinterpretation or honest
mistake." Besides, the Certificate of Candidacy only asks for RESIDENCE. Since on
the basis of her Answer, she was quite aware of "residence of origin" which she
interprets to be Tacloban City, it is curious why she did not cite Tacloban City in her
Certificate of Candidacy. Her explanation that she thought what was asked was her
actual and physical presence in Tolosa is not easy to believe because there is none
in the question that insinuates about Tolosa. In fact, item no. 8 in the Certificate of
Candidacy speaks clearly of "Residency in the CONSTITUENCY where I seek to be
elected immediately preceding the election." Thus, the explanation of respondent
fails to be persuasive.
From the foregoing, respondent's defense of an honest mistake or misinterpretation,
therefore, is devoid of merit.
To further buttress respondent's contention that an amendment may be made, she
cited the case ofAlialy v. COMELEC (2 SCRA 957). The reliance of respondent on
the case of Alialy is misplaced. The case only applies to the "inconsequential
deviations which cannot affect the result of the election, or deviations from provisions
intended primarily to secure timely and orderly conduct of elections." The Supreme
Court in that case considered the amendment only as a matter of form. But in the
instant case, the amendment cannot be considered as a matter of form or an
inconsequential deviation. The change in the number of years of residence in the
place where respondent seeks to be elected is a substantial matter which determines
her qualification as a candidacy, specially those intended to suppress, accurate
material representation in the original certificate which adversely affects the filer. To
admit the amended certificate is to condone the evils brought by the shifting minds of
manipulating candidate, of the detriment of the integrity of the election.
Moreover, to allow respondent to change the seven (7) month period of her
residency in order to prolong it by claiming it was "since childhood" is to allow an
untruthfulness to be committed before this Commission. The arithmetical accuracy of
the 7 months residency the respondent indicated in her certificate of candidacy can
be gleaned from her entry in her Voter's Registration Record accomplished on
January 28, 1995 which reflects that she is a resident of Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte for
6 months at the time of the said registration (Annex A, Petition). Said accuracy is
further buttressed by her letter to the election officer of San Juan, Metro Manila,
dated August 24, 1994, requesting for the cancellation of her registration in the
Permanent List of Voters thereat so that she can be re-registered or transferred to
Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. The dates of these three (3) different documents show the
respondent's consistent conviction that she has transferred her residence to Olot,
Tolosa, Leyte from Metro Manila only for such limited period of time, starting in the
last week of August 1994 which on March 8, 1995 will only sum up to 7 months. The
Commission, therefore, cannot be persuaded to believe in the respondent's
contention that it was an error.
xxx xxx xxx
Based on these reasons the Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy cannot be
admitted by this Commission.
xxx xxx xxx
Anent the second issue, and based on the foregoing discussion, it is clear that
respondent has not complied with the one year residency requirement of the
Constitution.
In election cases, the term "residence" has always been considered as synonymous
with "domicile" which imports not only the intention to reside in a fixed place but also
personal presence in-that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.
Domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business or
pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return. (Perfecto Faypon vs. Eliseo
Quirino, 96 Phil 294; Romualdez vs. RTC-Tacloban, 226 SCRA 408). In respondent's
case, when she returned to the Philippines in 1991, the residence she chose was not
Tacloban but San Juan, Metro Manila. Thus, her animus revertendi is pointed to
Metro Manila and not Tacloban.
This Division is aware that her claim that she has been a resident of the First District
since childhood is nothing more than to give her a color of qualification where she is
otherwise constitutionally disqualified. It cannot hold ground in the face of the facts
admitted by the respondent in her affidavit. Except for the time that she studied and
worked for some years after graduation in Tacloban City, she continuously lived in
Manila. In 1959, after her husband was elected Senator, she lived and resided in San
Juan, Metro Manila where she was a registered voter. In 1965, she lived in San
Miguel, Manila where she was again a registered voter. In 1978, she served as
member of the Batasang Pambansa as the representative of the City of Manila and
later on served as the Governor of Metro Manila. She could not have served these
positions if she had not been a resident of the City of Manila. Furthermore, when she
filed her certificate of candidacy for the office of the President in 1992, she claimed to
be a resident of San Juan, Metro Manila. As a matter of fact on August 24, 1994,
respondent wrote a letter with the election officer of San Juan, Metro Manila
requesting for the cancellation of her registration in the permanent list of voters that
she may be re-registered or transferred to Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. These facts
manifest that she could not have been a resident of Tacloban City since childhood up
to the time she filed her certificate of candidacy because she became a resident of
many places, including Metro Manila. This debunks her claim that prior to her
residence in Tolosa, Leyte, she was a resident of the First Legislative District of
Leyte since childhood.
In this case, respondent's conduct reveals her lack of intention to make Tacloban her
domicile. She registered as a voter in different places and on several occasions
declared that she was a resident of Manila. Although she spent her school days in
Tacloban, she is considered to have abandoned such place when she chose to stay
and reside in other different places. In the case of Romualdez vs. RTC(226 SCRA
408) the Court explained how one acquires a new domicile by choice. There must
concur: (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality; (2) intention to remain
there; and (3) intention to abandon the old domicile. In other words there must
basically be animus manendi with animus non revertendi. When respondent chose to
stay in Ilocos and later on in Manila, coupled with her intention to stay there by
registering as a voter there and expressly declaring that she is a resident of that
place, she is deemed to have abandoned Tacloban City, where she spent her
childhood and school days, as her place of domicile.
Pure intention to reside in that place is not sufficient, there must likewise be conduct
indicative of such intention. Respondent's statements to the effect that she has
always intended to return to Tacloban, without the accompanying conduct to prove
that intention, is not conclusive of her choice of residence. Respondent has not
presented any evidence to show that her conduct, one year prior the election,
showed intention to reside in Tacloban. Worse, what was evident was that prior to
her residence in Tolosa, she had been a resident of Manila.
It is evident from these circumstances that she was not a resident of the First District
of Leyte "since childhood."
To further support the assertion that she could have not been a resident of the First
District of Leyte for more than one year, petitioner correctly pointed out that on
January 28, 1995 respondent registered as a voter at precinct No. 18-A of Olot,
Tolosa, Leyte. In doing so, she placed in her Voter Registration Record that she
resided in the municipality of Tolosa for a period of six months. This may be
inconsequential as argued by the respondent since it refers only to her residence in
Tolosa, Leyte. But her failure to prove that she was a resident of the First District of
Leyte prior to her residence in Tolosa leaves nothing but a convincing proof that she
had been a resident of the district for six months only.
15

In a Resolution promulgated a day before the May 8, 1995 elections, the COMELEC en banc denied
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration
16
of the April 24, 1995 Resolution declaring her not qualified to
run for the position of Member of the House of Representatives for the First Legislative District of
Leyte.
17
The Resolution tersely stated:
After deliberating on the Motion for Reconsideration, the Commission RESOLVED to
DENY it, no new substantial matters having been raised therein to warrant re-
examination of the resolution granting the petition for disqualification.
18

On May 11, 1995, the COMELEC issued a Resolution allowing petitioner's proclamation should the
results of the canvass show that she obtained the highest number of votes in the congressional
elections in the First District of Leyte. On the same day, however, the COMELEC reversed itself and
issued a second Resolution directing that the proclamation of petitioner be suspended in the event
that she obtains the highest number of votes.
19

In a Supplemental Petition dated 25 May 1995, petitioner averred that she was the overwhelming
winner of the elections for the congressional seat in the First District of Leyte held May 8, 1995
based on the canvass completed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers on May 14, 1995. Petitioner
alleged that the canvass showed that she obtained a total of 70,471 votes compared to the 36,833
votes received by Respondent Montejo. A copy of said Certificate of Canvass was annexed to the
Supplemental Petition.
On account of the Resolutions disqualifying petitioner from running for the congressional seat of the
First District of Leyte and the public respondent's Resolution suspending her proclamation, petitioner
comes to this court for relief.
Petitioner raises several issues in her Original and Supplemental Petitions. The principal issues may
be classified into two general areas:
I. The issue of Petitioner's qualifications
Whether or not petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of the First District of
Leyte for a period of one year at the time of the May 9, 1995 elections.
II. The Jurisdictional Issue
a) Prior to the elections
Whether or not the COMELEC properly exercised its jurisdiction in disqualifying
petitioner outside the period mandated by the Omnibus Election Code for
disqualification cases under Article 78 of the said Code.
b) After the Elections
Whether or not the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal assumed exclusive
jurisdiction over the question of petitioner's qualifications after the May 8, 1995
elections.
I. Petitioner's qualification
A perusal of the Resolution of the COMELEC's Second Division reveals a startling confusion in the
application of settled concepts of "Domicile" and "Residence" in election law. While the COMELEC
seems to be in agreement with the general proposition that for the purposes of election law,
residence is synonymous with domicile, the Resolution reveals a tendency to substitute or mistake
the concept of domicile for actual residence, a conception not intended for the purpose of
determining a candidate's qualifications for election to the House of Representatives as required by
the 1987 Constitution. As it were, residence, for the purpose of meeting the qualification for an
elective position, has a settled meaning in our jurisdiction.
Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that "[f]or the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil
obligations, the domicile of natural persons is their place of habitual residence." In Ong
vs. Republic
20
this court took the concept of domicile to mean an individual's "permanent home", "a place
to which, whenever absent for business or for pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on facts and
circumstances in the sense that they disclose intent."
21
Based on the foregoing, domicile includes the
twin elements of "the fact of residing or physical presence in a fixed place" and animus manendi, or the
intention of returning there permanently.
Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual relationship of an individual to a certain
place. It is the physical presence of a person in a given area, community or country. The essential
distinction between residence and domicile in law is that residence involves the intent to leave when
the purpose for which the resident has taken up his abode ends. One may seek a place for purposes
such as pleasure, business, or health. If a person's intent be to remain, it becomes his domicile; if his
intent is to leave as soon as his purpose is established it is residence.
22
It is thus, quite perfectly
normal for an individual to have different residences in various places. However, a person can only have
a single domicile, unless, for various reasons, he successfully abandons his domicile in favor of another
domicile of choice. In Uytengsu vs. Republic,
23
we laid this distinction quite clearly:
There is a difference between domicile and residence. "Residence" is used to
indicate a place of abode, whether permanent or temporary; "domicile" denotes a
fixed permanent residence to which, when absent, one has the intention of returning.
A man may have a residence in one place and a domicile in another. Residence is
not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with the intention to remain for an
unlimited time. A man can have but one domicile for the same purpose at any time,
but he may have numerous places of residence. His place of residence is generally
his place of domicile, but it is not by any means necessarily so since no length of
residence without intention of remaining will constitute domicile.
For political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are dictated by the peculiar criteria of
political laws. As these concepts have evolved in our election law, what has clearly and
unequivocally emerged is the fact that residence for election purposes is used synonymously with
domicile.
In Nuval vs. Guray,
24
the Court held that "the term residence. . . is synonymous with domicile which
imports not only intention to reside in a fixed place, but also personal presence in that place, coupled with
conduct indicative of such intention."
25
Larena vs. Teves
26
reiterated the same doctrine in a case
involving the qualifications of the respondent therein to the post of Municipal President of Dumaguete,
Negros Oriental. Faypon vs. Quirino,
27
held that the absence from residence to pursue studies or practice
a profession or registration as a voter other than in the place where one is elected does not constitute
loss of residence.
28
So settled is the concept (of domicile) in our election law that in these and other
election law cases, this Court has stated that the mere absence of an individual from his permanent
residence without the intention to abandon it does not result in a loss or change of domicile.
The deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the residence qualification for certain elective positions
have placed beyond doubt the principle that when the Constitution speaks of "residence" in election
law, it actually means only "domicile" to wit:
Mr. Nolledo: With respect to Section 5, I remember that in the 1971 Constitutional
Convention, there was an attempt to require residence in the place not less than one
year immediately preceding the day of the elections. So my question is: What is the
Committee's concept of residence of a candidate for the legislature? Is it actual
residence or is it the concept of domicile or constructive residence?
Mr. Davide: Madame President, insofar as the regular members of the National
Assembly are concerned, the proposed section merely provides, among others, "and
a resident thereof", that is, in the district for a period of not less than one year
preceding the day of the election. This was in effect lifted from the 1973 Constitution,
the interpretation given to it was domicile.
29

xxx xxx xxx
Mrs. Rosario Braid: The next question is on Section 7, page 2. I think Commissioner
Nolledo has raised the same point that "resident" has been interpreted at times as a
matter of intention rather than actual residence.
Mr. De los Reyes: Domicile.
Ms. Rosario Braid: Yes, So, would the gentleman consider at the proper time to go
back to actual residence rather than mere intention to reside?
Mr. De los Reyes: But we might encounter some difficulty especially considering that
a provision in the Constitution in the Article on Suffrage says that Filipinos living
abroad may vote as enacted by law. So, we have to stick to the original concept that
it should be by domicile and not physical residence.
30

In Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives,
31
this Court concluded that the framers
of the 1987 Constitution obviously adhered to the definition given to the term residence in election law,
regarding it as having the same meaning as domicile.
32

In the light of the principles just discussed, has petitioner Imelda Romualdez Marcos satisfied the
residency requirement mandated by Article VI, Sec. 6 of the 1987 Constitution? Of what significance
is the questioned entry in petitioner's Certificate of Candidacy stating her residence in the First
Legislative District of Leyte as seven (7) months?
It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought to be decisive in
determining whether or not and individual has satisfied the constitution's residency qualification
requirement. The said statement becomes material only when there is or appears to be a deliberate
attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. It
would be plainly ridiculous for a candidate to deliberately and knowingly make a statement in a
certificate of candidacy which would lead to his or her disqualification.
It stands to reason therefore, that petitioner merely committed an honest mistake in jotting the word
"seven" in the space provided for the residency qualification requirement. The circumstances leading
to her filing the questioned entry obviously resulted in the subsequent confusion which prompted
petitioner to write down the period of her actual stay in Tolosa, Leyte instead of her period of
residence in the First district, which was "since childhood" in the space provided. These
circumstances and events are amply detailed in the COMELEC's Second Division's questioned
resolution, albeit with a different interpretation. For instance, when herein petitioner announced that
she would be registering in Tacloban City to make her eligible to run in the First District, private
respondent Montejo opposed the same, claiming that petitioner was a resident of Tolosa, not
Tacloban City. Petitioner then registered in her place of actual residence in the First District, which is
Tolosa, Leyte, a fact which she subsequently noted down in her Certificate of Candidacy. A close
look at said certificate would reveal the possible source of the confusion: the entry for residence
(Item No. 7) is followed immediately by the entry for residence in the constituency where a candidate
seeks election thus:
7. RESIDENCE (complete Address): Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte
POST OFFICE ADDRESS FOR ELECTION PURPOSES: Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte
8. RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO
BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION:_________ Years
and Seven Months.
Having been forced by private respondent to register in her place of actual residence in Leyte
instead of petitioner's claimed domicile, it appears that petitioner had jotted down her period of stay
in her legal residence or domicile. The juxtaposition of entries in Item 7 and Item 8 the first
requiring actual residence and the second requiring domicile coupled with the circumstances
surrounding petitioner's registration as a voter in Tolosa obviously led to her writing down an
unintended entry for which she could be disqualified. This honest mistake should not, however, be
allowed to negate the fact of residence in the First District if such fact were established by means
more convincing than a mere entry on a piece of paper.
We now proceed to the matter of petitioner's domicile.
In support of its asseveration that petitioner's domicile could not possibly be in the First District of
Leyte, the Second Division of the COMELEC, in its assailed Resolution of April 24,1995 maintains
that "except for the time when (petitioner) studied and worked for some years after graduation in
Tacloban City, she continuously lived in Manila." The Resolution additionally cites certain facts as
indicative of the fact that petitioner's domicile ought to be any place where she lived in the last few
decades except Tacloban, Leyte. First, according to the Resolution, petitioner, in 1959, resided in
San Juan, Metro Manila where she was also registered voter. Then, in 1965, following the election of
her husband to the Philippine presidency, she lived in San Miguel, Manila where she as a voter. In
1978 and thereafter, she served as a member of the Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro
Manila. "She could not, have served these positions if she had not been a resident of Metro Manila,"
the COMELEC stressed. Here is where the confusion lies.
We have stated, many times in the past, that an individual does not lose his domicile even if he has
lived and maintained residences in different places. Residence, it bears repeating, implies a factual
relationship to a given place for various purposes. The absence from legal residence or domicile to
pursue a profession, to study or to do other things of a temporary or semi-permanent nature does
not constitute loss of residence. Thus, the assertion by the COMELEC that "she could not have been
a resident of Tacloban City since childhood up to the time she filed her certificate of candidacy
because she became a resident of many places" flies in the face of settled jurisprudence in which
this Court carefully made distinctions between (actual) residence and domicile for election law
purposes. In Larena vs. Teves,
33
supra, we stressed:
[T]his court is of the opinion and so holds that a person who has his own house
wherein he lives with his family in a municipality without having ever had the intention
of abandoning it, and without having lived either alone or with his family in another
municipality, has his residence in the former municipality, notwithstanding his having
registered as an elector in the other municipality in question and having been a
candidate for various insular and provincial positions, stating every time that he is a
resident of the latter municipality.
More significantly, in Faypon vs. Quirino,
34
We explained that:
A citizen may leave the place of his birth to look for "greener pastures," as the saying
goes, to improve his lot, and that, of course includes study in other places, practice of
his avocation, or engaging in business. When an election is to be held, the citizen
who left his birthplace to improve his lot may desire to return to his native town to
cast his ballot but for professional or business reasons, or for any other reason, he
may not absent himself from his professional or business activities; so there he
registers himself as voter as he has the qualifications to be one and is not willing to
give up or lose the opportunity to choose the officials who are to run the government
especially in national elections. Despite such registration, the animus revertendi to
his home, to his domicile or residence of origin has not forsaken him. This may be
the explanation why the registration of a voter in a place other than his residence of
origin has not been deemed sufficient to constitute abandonment or loss of such
residence. It finds justification in the natural desire and longing of every person to
return to his place of birth. This strong feeling of attachment to the place of one's
birth must be overcome by positive proof of abandonment for another.
From the foregoing, it can be concluded that in its above-cited statements supporting its proposition
that petitioner was ineligible to run for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte, the
COMELEC was obviously referring to petitioner's various places of (actual) residence, not her
domicile. In doing so, it not only ignored settled jurisprudence on residence in election law and the
deliberations of the constitutional commission but also the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code
(B.P. 881).
35

What is undeniable, however, are the following set of facts which establish the fact of petitioner's
domicile, which we lift verbatim from the COMELEC's Second Division's assailed Resolution:
36

In or about 1938 when respondent was a little over 8 years old, she established her
domicile in Tacloban, Leyte (Tacloban City). She studied in the Holy Infant Academy
in Tacloban from 1938 to 1949 when she graduated from high school. She pursued
her college studies in St. Paul's College, now Divine Word University in Tacloban,
where she earned her degree in Education. Thereafter, she taught in the Leyte
Chinese School, still in Tacloban City. In 1952 she went to Manila to work with her
cousin, the late speaker Daniel Z. Romualdez in his office in the House of
Representatives. In 1954, she married ex-President Ferdinand E. Marcos when he
was still a congressman of Ilocos Norte and registered there as a voter. When her
husband was elected Senator of the Republic in 1959, she and her husband lived
together in San Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter. In 1965, when her
husband was elected President of the Republic of the Philippines, she lived with him
in Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel, Manila.
[I]n February 1986 (she claimed that) she and her family were abducted and
kidnapped to Honolulu, Hawaii. In November 1991, she came home to Manila. In
1992, respondent ran for election as President of the Philippines and filed her
Certificate of Candidacy wherein she indicated that she is a resident and registered
voter of San Juan, Metro Manila.
Applying the principles discussed to the facts found by COMELEC, what is inescapable is that
petitioner held various residences for different purposes during the last four decades. None of these
purposes unequivocally point to an intention to abandon her domicile of origin in Tacloban, Leyte.
Moreover, while petitioner was born in Manila, as a minor she naturally followed the domicile of her
parents. She grew up in Tacloban, reached her adulthood there and eventually established
residence in different parts of the country for various reasons. Even during her husband's
presidency, at the height of the Marcos Regime's powers, petitioner kept her close ties to her
domicile of origin by establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other
important personal milestones in her home province, instituting well-publicized projects for the
benefit of her province and hometown, and establishing a political power base where her siblings
and close relatives held positions of power either through the ballot or by appointment, always with
either her influence or consent. These well-publicized ties to her domicile of origin are part of the
history and lore of the quarter century of Marcos power in our country. Either they were entirely
ignored in the COMELEC'S Resolutions, or the majority of the COMELEC did not know what the rest
of the country always knew: the fact of petitioner's domicile in Tacloban, Leyte.
Private respondent in his Comment, contends that Tacloban was not petitioner's domicile of origin
because she did not live there until she was eight years old. He avers that after leaving the place in
1952, she "abandoned her residency (sic) therein for many years and . . . (could not) re-establish her
domicile in said place by merely expressing her intention to live there again." We do not agree.
First, minor follows the domicile of his parents. As domicile, once acquired is retained until a new
one is gained, it follows that in spite of the fact of petitioner's being born in Manila, Tacloban, Leyte
was her domicile of origin by operation of law. This domicile was not established only when her
father brought his family back to Leyte contrary to private respondent's averments.
Second, domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must
demonstrate:
37

1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;
2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing
a new one; and
3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.
In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of origin should be
deemed to continue. Only with evidence showing concurrence of all three requirements can the
presumption of continuity or residence be rebutted, for a change of residence requires an actual and
deliberate abandonment, and one cannot have two legal residences at the same time.
38
In the case
at bench, the evidence adduced by private respondent plainly lacks the degree of persuasiveness
required to convince this court that an abandonment of domicile of origin in favor of a domicile of choice
indeed occurred. To effect an abandonment requires the voluntary act of relinquishing petitioner's former
domicile with an intent to supplant the former domicile with one of her own choosing (domicilium
voluntarium).
In this connection, it cannot be correctly argued that petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation
of law as a result of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952. For there is a
clearly established distinction between the Civil Code concepts of "domicile" and "residence."
39
The
presumption that the wife automatically gains the husband's domicile by operation of law upon marriage
cannot be inferred from the use of the term "residence" in Article 110 of the Civil Code because the Civil
Code is one area where the two concepts are well delineated. Dr. Arturo Tolentino, writing on this specific
area explains:
In the Civil Code, there is an obvious difference between domicile and residence.
Both terms imply relations between a person and a place; but in residence, the
relation is one of fact while in domicile it is legal or juridical, independent of the
necessity of physical presence.
40

Article 110 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 110. The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the court may
exempt the wife from living with the husband if he should live abroad unless in the
service of the Republic.
A survey of jurisprudence relating to Article 110 or to the concepts of domicile or residence as they
affect the female spouse upon marriage yields nothing which would suggest that the female spouse
automatically loses her domicile of origin in favor of the husband's choice of residence upon
marriage.
Article 110 is a virtual restatement of Article 58 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 which states:
La mujer esta obligada a seguir a su marido donde quiera que fije su residencia. Los
Tribunales, sin embargo, podran con justa causa eximirla de esta obligacion cuando
el marido transende su residencia a ultramar o' a pais extranjero.
Note the use of the phrase "donde quiera su fije de residencia" in the aforequoted article, which
means wherever (the husband) wishes to establish residence. This part of the article clearly
contemplates only actual residence because it refers to a positive act of fixing a family home or
residence. Moreover, this interpretation is further strengthened by the phrase "cuando el marido
translade su residencia" in the same provision which means, "when the husband shall transfer his
residence," referring to another positive act of relocating the family to another home or place of
actual residence. The article obviously cannot be understood to refer to domicile which is a fixed,
fairly-permanent concept when it plainly connotes the possibility of transferring from one place to
another not only once, but as often as the husband may deem fit to move his family, a circumstance
more consistent with the concept of actual residence.
The right of the husband to fix the actual residence is in harmony with the intention of the law to
strengthen and unify the family, recognizing the fact that the husband and the wife bring into the
marriage different domiciles (of origin). This difference could, for the sake of family unity, be
reconciled only by allowing the husband to fix a single place of actual residence.
Very significantly, Article 110 of the Civil Code is found under Title V under the heading: RIGHTS
AND OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE. Immediately preceding Article 110 is Article
109 which obliges the husband and wife to live together, thus:
Art. 109. The husband and wife are obligated to live together, observe mutual
respect and fidelity and render mutual help and support.
The duty to live together can only be fulfilled if the husband and wife are physically together. This
takes into account the situations where the couple has many residences (as in the case of the
petitioner). If the husband has to stay in or transfer to any one of their residences, the wife should
necessarily be with him in order that they may "live together." Hence, it is illogical to conclude that
Art. 110 refers to "domicile" and not to "residence." Otherwise, we shall be faced with a situation
where the wife is left in the domicile while the husband, for professional or other reasons, stays in
one of their (various) residences. As Dr. Tolentino further explains:
Residence and Domicile Whether the word "residence" as used with reference to
particular matters is synonymous with "domicile" is a question of some difficulty, and
the ultimate decision must be made from a consideration of the purpose and intent
with which the word is used. Sometimes they are used synonymously, at other times
they are distinguished from one another.
xxx xxx xxx
Residence in the civil law is a material fact, referring to the physical presence of a
person in a place. A person can have two or more residences, such as a country
residence and a city residence. Residence is acquired by living in place; on the other
hand, domicile can exist without actually living in the place. The important thing for
domicile is that, once residence has been established in one place, there be an
intention to stay there permanently, even if residence is also established in some
other
place.
41

In fact, even the matter of a common residence between the husband and the wife during the
marriage is not an iron-clad principle; In cases applying the Civil Code on the question of a common
matrimonial residence, our jurisprudence has recognized certain situations
42
where the spouses
could not be compelled to live with each other such that the wife is either allowed to maintain a residence
different from that of her husband or, for obviously practical reasons, revert to her original domicile (apart
from being allowed to opt for a new one). In De la Vina vs. Villareal
43
this Court held that "[a] married
woman may acquire a residence or domicile separate from that of her husband during the existence of
the marriage where the husband has given cause for divorce."
44
Note that the Court allowed the wife
either to obtain new residence or to choose a new domicile in such an event. In instances where the wife
actually opts, .under the Civil Code, to live separately from her husband either by taking new residence or
reverting to her domicile of origin, the Court has held that the wife could not be compelled to live with her
husband on pain of contempt. In Arroyo vs. Vasques de Arroyo
45
the Court held that:
Upon examination of the authorities, we are convinced that it is not within the
province of the courts of this country to attempt to compel one of the spouses to
cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to, the other. Of course where the property
rights of one of the pair are invaded, an action for restitution of such rights can be
maintained. But we are disinclined to sanction the doctrine that an order, enforcible
(sic) by process of contempt, may be entered to compel the restitution of the purely
personal right of consortium. At best such an order can be effective for no other
purpose than to compel the spouses to live under the same roof; and he experience
of those countries where the courts of justice have assumed to compel the
cohabitation of married people shows that the policy of the practice is extremely
questionable. Thus in England, formerly the Ecclesiastical Court entertained suits for
the restitution of conjugal rights at the instance of either husband or wife; and if the
facts were found to warrant it, that court would make a mandatory decree,
enforceable by process of contempt in case of disobedience, requiring the delinquent
party to live with the other and render conjugal rights. Yet this practice was
sometimes criticized even by the judges who felt bound to enforce such orders, and
in Weldon v. Weldon (9 P.D. 52), decided in 1883, Sir James Hannen, President in
the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division of the High Court of Justice, expressed
his regret that the English law on the subject was not the same as that which
prevailed in Scotland, where a decree of adherence, equivalent to the decree for the
restitution of conjugal rights in England, could be obtained by the injured spouse, but
could not be enforced by imprisonment. Accordingly, in obedience to the growing
sentiment against the practice, the Matrimonial Causes Act (1884) abolished the
remedy of imprisonment; though a decree for the restitution of conjugal rights can still
be procured, and in case of disobedience may serve in appropriate cases as the
basis of an order for the periodical payment of a stipend in the character of alimony.
In the voluminous jurisprudence of the United States, only one court, so far as we
can discover, has ever attempted to make a preemptory order requiring one of the
spouses to live with the other; and that was in a case where a wife was ordered to
follow and live with her husband, who had changed his domicile to the City of New
Orleans. The decision referred to (Bahn v. Darby, 36 La. Ann., 70) was based on a
provision of the Civil Code of Louisiana similar to article 56 of the Spanish Civil Code.
It was decided many years ago, and the doctrine evidently has not been fruitful even
in the State of Louisiana. In other states of the American Union the idea of enforcing
cohabitation by process of contempt is rejected. (21 Cyc., 1148).
In a decision of January 2, 1909, the Supreme Court of Spain appears to have
affirmed an order of the Audiencia Territorial de Valladolid requiring a wife to return
to the marital domicile, and in the alternative, upon her failure to do so, to make a
particular disposition of certain money and effects then in her possession and to
deliver to her husband, as administrator of the ganancial property, all income, rents,
and interest which might accrue to her from the property which she had brought to
the marriage. (113 Jur. Civ., pp. 1, 11) But it does not appear that this order for the
return of the wife to the marital domicile was sanctioned by any other penalty than
the consequences that would be visited upon her in respect to the use and control of
her property; and it does not appear that her disobedience to that order would
necessarily have been followed by imprisonment for contempt.
Parenthetically when Petitioner was married to then Congressman Marcos, in 1954, petitioner was
obliged by virtue of Article 110 of the Civil Code to follow her husband's actual place of
residence fixed by him. The problem here is that at that time, Mr. Marcos had several places of
residence, among which were San Juan, Rizal and Batac, Ilocos Norte. There is no showing which
of these places Mr. Marcos did fix as his family's residence. But assuming that Mr. Marcos had fixed
any of these places as the conjugal residence, what petitioner gained upon marriage was actual
residence. She did not lose her domicile of origin.
On the other hand, the common law concept of "matrimonial domicile" appears to have been
incorporated, as a result of our jurisprudential experiences after the drafting of the Civil Code of
1950, into the New Family Code. To underscore the difference between the intentions of the Civil
Code and the Family Code drafters, the term residence has been supplanted by the term domicile in
an entirely new provision (Art. 69) distinctly different in meaning and spirit from that found in Article
110. The provision recognizes revolutionary changes in the concept of women's rights in the
intervening years by making the choice of domicile a product of mutual agreement between the
spouses.
46

Without as much belaboring the point, the term residence may mean one thing in civil law (or under
the Civil Code) and quite another thing in political law. What stands clear is that insofar as the Civil
Code is concerned-affecting the rights and obligations of husband and wife the term residence
should only be interpreted to mean "actual residence." The inescapable conclusion derived from this
unambiguous civil law delineation therefore, is that when petitioner married the former President in
1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home, not a domicilium necessarium.
Even assuming for the sake of argument that petitioner gained a new "domicile" after her marriage
and only acquired a right to choose a new one after her husband died, petitioner's acts following her
return to the country clearly indicate that she not only impliedly but expressly chose her domicile of
origin (assuming this was lost by operation of law) as her domicile. This "choice" was unequivocally
expressed in her letters to the Chairman of the PCGG when petitioner sought the PCGG's
permission to "rehabilitate (our) ancestral house in Tacloban and Farm in Olot, Leyte. . . to make
them livable for the Marcos family to have a home in our homeland."
47
Furthermore, petitioner
obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte, while living in her brother's house, an act
which supports the domiciliary intention clearly manifested in her letters to the PCGG Chairman. She
could not have gone straight to her home in San Juan, as it was in a state of disrepair, having been
previously looted by vandals. Her "homes" and "residences" following her arrival in various parts of Metro
Manila merely qualified as temporary or "actual residences," not domicile. Moreover, and proceeding from
our discussion pointing out specific situations where the female spouse either reverts to her domicile of
origin or chooses a new one during the subsistence of the marriage, it would be highly illogical for us to
assume that she cannot regain her original domicile upon the death of her husband absent a positive act
of selecting a new one where situations exist within the subsistence of the marriage itself where the wife
gains a domicile different from her husband.
In the light of all the principles relating to residence and domicile enunciated by this court up to this
point, we are persuaded that the facts established by the parties weigh heavily in favor of a
conclusion supporting petitioner's claim of legal residence or domicile in the First District of Leyte.
II. The jurisdictional issue
Petitioner alleges that the jurisdiction of the COMELEC had already lapsed considering that the
assailed resolutions were rendered on April 24, 1995, fourteen (14) days before the election in
violation of Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code.
48
Moreover, petitioner contends that it is the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and not the COMELEC which has jurisdiction over the
election of members of the House of Representatives in accordance with Article VI Sec. 17 of the
Constitution. This is untenable.
It is a settled doctrine that a statute requiring rendition of judgment within a specified time is
generally construed to be merely directory,
49
"so that non-compliance with them does not invalidate the
judgment on the theory that if the statute had intended such result it would have clearly indicated
it."
50
The difference between a mandatory and a directory provision is often made on grounds of
necessity. Adopting the same view held by several American authorities, this court in Marcelino
vs. Cruz held that:
51

The difference between a mandatory and directory provision is often determined on
grounds of expediency, the reason being that less injury results to the general public
by disregarding than enforcing the letter of the law.
In Trapp v. Mc Cormick, a case calling for the interpretation of a statute containing a
limitation of thirty (30) days within which a decree may be entered without the
consent of counsel, it was held that "the statutory provisions which may be thus
departed from with impunity, without affecting the validity of statutory proceedings,
are usually those which relate to the mode or time of doing that which is essential to
effect the aim and purpose of the Legislature or some incident of the essential act."
Thus, in said case, the statute under examination was construed merely to be
directory.
The mischief in petitioner's contending that the COMELEC should have abstained from rendering a
decision after the period stated in the Omnibus Election Code because it lacked jurisdiction, lies in
the fact that our courts and other quasi-judicial bodies would then refuse to render judgments merely
on the ground of having failed to reach a decision within a given or prescribed period.
In any event, with the enactment of Sections 6 and 7 of R.A. 6646 in relation to Section 78 of B.P.
881,
52
it is evident that the respondent Commission does not lose jurisdiction to hear and decide a
pending disqualification case under Section 78 of B.P. 881 even after the elections.
As to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal's supposed assumption of jurisdiction over the
issue of petitioner's qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections, suffice it to say that HRET's
jurisdiction as the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of
members of Congress begins only after a candidate has become a member of the House of
Representatives.
53
Petitioner not being a member of the House of Representatives, it is obvious that the
HRET at this point has no jurisdiction over the question.
It would be an abdication of many of the ideals enshrined in the 1987 Constitution for us to either to
ignore or deliberately make distinctions in law solely on the basis of the personality of a petitioner in
a case. Obviously a distinction was made on such a ground here. Surely, many established
principles of law, even of election laws were flouted for the sake perpetuating power during the pre-
EDSA regime. We renege on these sacred ideals, including the meaning and spirit of EDSA
ourselves bending established principles of principles of law to deny an individual what he or she
justly deserves in law. Moreover, in doing so, we condemn ourselves to repeat the mistakes of the
past.
WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualifications
to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's
questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE.
Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim
petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.
SO ORDERED.











































Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 86564 August 1, 1989
RAMON L. LABO, JR., petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC) EN BANC AND LUIS L.
LARDIZABAL, respondents
Estelito P. Mendoza for petitioner.
Rillera and Quintana for private respondent.

CRUZ, J .:
The petitioner asks this Court to restrain the Commission on Elections from looking into the question
of his citizenship as a qualification for his office as Mayor of Baguio City. The allegation that he is a
foreigner, he says, is not the issue. The issue is whether or not the public respondent has jurisdiction
to conduct any inquiry into this matter, considering that the petition for quo warranto against him was
not filed on time.
It is noteworthy that this argument is based on the alleged tardiness not of the petition itself but of
the payment of the filing fee, which the petitioner contends was an indispensable requirement. The
fee is, curiously enough, all of P300.00 only. This brings to mind the popular verse that for want of a
horse the kingdom was lost. Still, if it is shown that the petition was indeed filed beyond the
reglementary period, there is no question that this petition must be granted and the challenge
abated.
The petitioner's position is simple. He was proclaimed mayor-elect of Baguio City, on January 20,
1988. The petition for quo warranto was filed by the private respondent on January 26, 1988, but no
filing fee was paid on that date. This fee was finally paid on February 10, 1988, or twenty-one days
after his proclamation. As the petition by itself alone was ineffectual without the filing fee, it should be
deemed filed only when the fee was paid. This was done beyond the reglementary period provided
for under Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code reading as follows:
SEC. 253. Petition for quo warranto. Any voter contesting the election of a
Member of the Batasang Pambansa, regional, provincial, or city officer on the ground
of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines shall file a sworn
petition for quo warranto with the Commission within ten days after the proclamation
of the result of the election.
The petitioner adds that the payment of the filing fee is required under Rule 36, Section 5, of the
Procedural Rules of the COMELEC providing that
Sec. 5. No petition for quo warranto shall be given due course without the payment of
a filing fee in the amount of Three Hundred Pesos (P300.00) and the legal research
fee as required by law.
and stresses that there is abundant jurisprudence holding that the payment of the filing fee is
essential to the timeliness of the filling of the petition itself. He cites many rulings of the Court to this
effect, specifically Manchester v. Court of Appeals.
1

For his part, the private respondent denies that the filing fee was paid out of time. In fact he says, it
was fliedahead of time. His point is that when he filed his "Petition for Quo Warranto with Prayer for
Immediate Annulment of Proclamation and Restraining Order or Injunction" on January 26, 1988, the
COMELEC treated it as a pre-proclamation controversy and docketed it as SPC Case No. 88-288.
No docket fee was collected although it was offered. It was only on February 8, 1988, that the
COMELEC decided to treat his petition as solely for quo warranto and re-docketed it as EPC Case
No. 88-19, serving him notice on February 10, 1988. He immediately paid the filing fee on that date.
The private respondent argues further that during the period when the COMELEC regarded his
petition as a pre-proclamation controversy, the time for filing an election protest or quo
warranto proceeding was deemed suspended under Section 248 of the Omnibus Election Code.
2
At
any rate, he says, Rule 36, Section 5, of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure cited by the petitioner,
became effective only on November 15, 1988, seven days after publication of the said Rules in the
Official Gazette pursuant to Section 4, Rule 44 thereof.
3
These rules could not retroact to January
26,1988, when he filed his petition with the COMELEC.
In his Reply, the petitioner argues that even if the Omnibus Election Code did not require it, the
payment of filing fees was still necessary under Res. No. 1996 and, before that, Res. No. 1450 of
the respondent COMELEC, promulgated on January 12, 1988, and February 26, 1980, respectively.
To this, the private respondent counters that the latter resolution was intended for the local elections
held on January 30, 1980, and did not apply to the 1988 local elections, which were supposed to be
governed by the first-mentioned resolution. However, Res. No. 1996 took effect only on March 3,
1988, following the lapse of seven days after its publication as required by RA No. 6646, otherwise
known as the Electoral Reform Law of 1987, which became effective on January 5, 1988. Its Section
30 provides in part:
Sec. 30. Effectivity of Regulations and Orders of the Commission. The rules and
regulations promulgated by the Commission shall take effect on the seventh day
after their publication in the Official Gazette or in at least (2) daily newspapers of
general circulation in the Philippines.
The Court has considered the arguments of the parties and holds that the petition for quo
warranto was filed on time. We agree with the respondents that the fee was paid during the ten-day
period as extended by the pendency of the petition when it was treated by the COMELEC as a pre-
proclamation proceeding which did not require the payment of a filing fee. At that, we reach this
conclusion only on the assumption that the requirement for the payment of the fees in quo
warranto proceedings was already effective. There is no record that Res. No. 1450 was even
published; and as for Res. No. 1996, this took effect only on March 3, 1988, seven days after its
publication in the February 25, 1988 issues of the Manila Chronicle and the Philippine Daily Inquirer,
or after the petition was filed.
The petitioner forgets Ta;ada v. Tuvera
4
when he argues that the resolutions became effective
"immediately upon approval" simply because it was so provided therein. We held in that case that
publication was still necessary under the due process clause despite such effectivity clause.
In any event, what is important is that the filing fee was paid, and whatever delay there may have
been is not imputable to the private respondent's fault or neglect. It is true that in
the Manchester Case, we required the timely payment of the filing fee as a precondition for the
timeliness of the filing of the case itself. In Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Asuncion,
5
however this
Court, taking into account the special circumstances of that case, declared:
This Court reiterates the rule that the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a case only
upon the payment of the prescribed filing fee. However, the court may allow the
payment of the said fee within a reasonable time. In the event of non-compliance
therewith, the case shall be dismissed.
The same idea is expressed in Rule 42, Section 18, of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure adopted
on June 20, 1988, thus:
Sec. 18. Non-payment of prescribed fees. If the fees above prescribed are not
paid, theCommission may refuse to take action thereon until they are paid and may
dismiss the action or the proceeding. (Emphasis supplied.)
The Court notes that while arguing the technical point that the petition for quo warranto should be
dismissed for failure to pay the filing fee on time, the petitioner would at the same time minimize his
alleged lack of citizenship as "a futile technicality," It is regrettable, to say the least, that the
requirement of citizenship as a qualification for public office can be so demeaned. What is worse is
that it is regarded as an even less important consideration than the reglementary period the
petitioner insists upon.
This matter should normally end here as the sole issue originally raised by the petitioner is the
timeliness of thequo warranto proceedings against him. However, as his citizenship is the subject of
that proceeding, and considering the necessity for an early resolution of that more important
question clearly and urgently affecting the public interest, we shall directly address it now in this
same action.
The Court has similarly acted in a notable number of cases, thus:
From the foregoing brief statement of the nature of the instant case, it would appear
that our sole function in this proceeding should be to resolve the single issue of
whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the motion for new trial of the
GSIS in question should indeed be deemedpro forma. But going over the extended
pleadings of both parties, the Court is immediately impressed that substantial justice
may not be timely achieved, if we should decide this case upon such a technical
ground alone. We have carefully read all the allegations and arguments of the
parties, very ably and comprehensively expounded by evidently knowledgeable and
unusually competent counsel, and we feel we can better serve the interests of justice
by broadening the scope of our inquiry, for as the record before us stands, we see
that there is enough basis for us to end the basic controversy between the parties
here and now, dispensing, however, with procedural steps which would not anyway
affect substantially the merits of their respective claims.
6

x x x
While it is the fault of the petitioner for appealing to the wrong court and thereby
allowing the period for appeal to lapse, the more correct procedure was for the
respondent court to forward the case to the proper court which was the Court of
Appeals for appropriate action. Considering, however, the length of time that this
case has been pending, we apply the rule in the case of Del Castillo v. Jaymalin,
(112 SCRA 629) and follow the principle enunciated in Alger Electric, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, (135 SCRA 37) which states:
... it is a cherished rule of procedure for this Court to always strive to
settle the entire controversy in a single proceeding leaving no root or
branch to bear the seeds of future litigation. No useful purpose will be
served if this case is remanded to the trial court only to have its
decision raised again to the Intermediate Appellate Court and from
there to this Court. (p. 43)
Only recently in the case of Beautifont, Inc., et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al. (G.R.
No. 50141, January 29, 1988), we stated that:
... But all those relevant facts are now before this Court. And those facts dictate the
rendition of a verdict in the petitioner's favor. There is therefore no point in referring
the case back to the Court of Appeals. The facts and the legal propositions involved
will not change, nor should the ultimate judgment. Considerable time has already
elapsed and, to serve the ends of justice, it is time that the controversy is finally laid
to rest. (See Sotto v. Samson, 5 SCRA 733; Republic v. Paredes, 108 Phil. 57;
Lianga Lumber Co. v. Lianga Timber Co., Inc., 76 SCRA 197; Erico v. Heirs of
Chigas, 98 SCRA 575; Francisco v. City of Davao, 12 SCRA 628; Valencia v.
Mabilangan, 105 Phil. 162).lwph1. t Sound practice seeks to accommodate the theory which
avoids waste of time, effort and expense, both to the parties and the government, not
to speak of delay in the disposal of the case (cf. Fernandez v. Garcia, 92 Phil. 592,
597). A marked characteristic of our judicial set-up is that where the dictates of
justice so demand ... the Supreme Court should act, and act with finality.' (Li Siu Liat
v. Republic, 21 SCRA 1039, 1046, citing Samal v. CA, 99 Phil. 230 and U.S. v.
Gimenez, 34 Phil. 74). In this case, the dictates of justice do demand that this Court
act, and act with finality.
7

x x x
Remand of the case to the lower court for further reception of evidence is not
necessary where the court is in a position to resolve the dispute based on the
records before it. On many occasions, the Court, in the public interest and the
expeditious administration of justice, has resolved actions on the merits instead of
remanding them to the trial court for further proceedings, such as where the ends of
justice would not be subserved by the remand of the case or when public interest
demands an early disposition of the case or where the trial court had already
received all the evidence of the parties.
8

This course of action becomes all the more justified in the present case where, to repeat for stress, it
is claimed that a foreigner is holding a public office.
We also note in his Reply, the petitioner says:
In adopting private respondent's comment, respondent COMELEC implicitly adopted
as "its own" private respondent's repeated assertion that petitioner is no longer a
Filipino citizen. In so doing, has not respondent COMELEC effectively disqualified
itself, by reason of prejudgment, from resolving the petition for quo warranto filed by
private respondent still pending before it?
9

This is still another reason why the Court has seen fit to rule directly on the merits of this case.
Going over the record, we find that there are two administrative decisions on the question of the
petitioner's citizenship. The first was rendered by the Commission on Elections on May 12, 1982,
and found the petitioner to be a citizen of the Philippines.
10
The second was rendered by the
Commission on Immigration and Deportation on September 13, 1988, and held that the petitioner was not
a citizen of the Philippines.
11

The first decision was penned by then COMELEC Chigas, Vicente Santiago, Jr., with
Commissioners Pabalate Savellano and Opinion concurring in full and Commissioner Bacungan
concurring in the dismissal of the petition "without prejudice to the issue of the respondent's
citizenship being raised anew in a proper case." Commissioner Sagadraca reserved his vote, while
Commissioner Felipe was for deferring decision until representations shall have been made with the
Australian Embassy for official verification of the petitioner's alleged naturalization as an Australian.
The second decision was unanimously rendered by Chairman Miriam Defensor-Santiago and
Commissioners Alano and Geraldez of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation. It is
important to observe that in the proceeding before the COMELEC, there was no direct proof that the
herein petitioner had been formally naturalized as a citizen of Australia. This conjecture, which was
eventually rejected, was merely inferred from the fact that he had married an Australian citizen,
obtained an Australian passport, and registered as an alien with the CID upon his return to this
country in 1980.
On the other hand, the decision of the CID took into account the official statement of the Australian
Government dated August 12, 1984, through its Consul in the Philippines, that the petitioner was still
an Australian citizen as of that date by reason of his naturalization in 1976. That statement
12
is
reproduced in full as follows:
I, GRAHAM COLIN WEST, Consul of Australia in the Philippines, by virtue of a certificate of
appointment signed and sealed by the Australian Minister of State for Foreign Affairs on 19 October
1983, and recognized as such by Letter of Patent signed and sealed by the Philippines Acting
Minister of Foreign Affairs on 23 November 1983, do hereby provide the following statement in
response to the subpoena Testificandum dated 9 April 1984 in regard to the Petition for
disqualification against RAMON LABO, JR. Y LOZANO (SPC No. 84-73), and do hereby certify that
the statement is true and correct.
STATEMENT
A) RAMON LABO, JR. Y LOZANO, date of birth 23 December 1934, was married in
the Philippines to an Australian citizen. As the spouse of an Australian citizen, he
was not required to meet normal requirements for the grant of citizenship and was
granted Australian citizenship by Sydney on 28 July 1976.
B) Any person over the age of 16 years who is granted Australian citizenship must
take an oath of allegiance or make an affirmation of allegiance. The wording of the
oath of affirmation is: "I ..., renouncing all other allegiance ..." etc. This need not
necessarily have any effect on his former nationality as this would depend on the
citizenship laws of his former country.
C) The marriage was declared void in the Australian Federal Court in Sydney on 27
June 1980 on the ground that the marriage had been bigamous.
D) According to our records LABO is still an Australian citizen.
E) Should he return to Australia, LABO may face court action in respect of Section 50
of Australian Citizenship Act 1948 which relates to the giving of false or misleading
information of a material nature in respect of an application for Australian citizenship.
If such a prosecution was successful, he could be deprived of Australian citizenship
under Section 21 of the Act.
F) There are two further ways in which LABO could divest himself of Australian
citizenship:
(i) He could make a declaration of Renunciation of Australian citizenship under
Section 18 of the Australian Citizenship Act, or
(ii) If he acquired another nationality, (for example, Filipino) by a formal and voluntary
act other than marriage, then he would automatically lose as Australian citizenship
under Section 17 of the Act.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I HAVE HEREUNTO SET MAY HAND AND SEAL OF
THE AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY, MANILA, THIS 12th DAY OF APRIL 1984. DONE AT
MANILA IN THE PHILIPPINES.
(Signed) GRAHAM C. WEST Consul
This was affirmed later by the letter of February 1, 1988, addressed to the private
respondent by the Department of Foreign Affairs reading as follows:
13

Sir:
With reference to your letter dated 1 February 1988, I wish to inform you that inquiry
made with the Australian Government through the Embassy of the Philippines in
Canberra has elicited the following information:
1) That Mr. Ramon L. Labo, Jr. acquired Australian citizenship on 28 July 1976.
2) That prior to 17 July 1986, a candidate for Australian citizenship had to either
swear an oath of allegiance or make an affirmation of allegiance which carries a
renunciation of "all other allegiance.
Very truly yours, For the Secretary of Foreign Affairs: (SGD) RODOLFO SEVERINO,
JR. Assistant Secretary
The decision also noted the oath of allegiance taken by every naturalized Australian reading as
follows:
OATH OF ALLEGIANCE
I, A.B., renouncing all other allegiance, swear by Almighty God that I will be faithful
and bear true allegiance to Her Majesty Elizabeth the Second, Queen of Australia,
Her heirs and successors according to law, and that I will faithfully observe the laws
of Australia and fulfill my duties as an Australian citizen.
14

and the Affirmation of Allegiance, which declares:
AFFIRMATION OF ALLEGIANCE
I, A.B., renouncing all other allegiance, solemnly and sincerely promise and declare
that I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to Her Majesty Elizabeth the Second,
Queen of Australia, Her heirs and successors according to law, and that I will
faithfully observe the Laws of Australia and fulfill my duties as an Australian citizen.
15

The petitioner does not question the authenticity of the above evidence. Neither does he deny that
he obtained Australian Passport No. 754705, which he used in coming back to the Philippines in
1980, when he declared before the immigration authorities that he was an alien and registered as
such under Alien Certificate of Registration No. B-323985.
16
He later asked for the change of his
status from immigrant to a returning former Philippine citizen and was granted Immigrant Certificate of
Residence No. 223809.
17
He also categorically declared that he was a citizen of Australia in a number of
sworn statements voluntarily made by him and. even sought to avoid the jurisdiction of the barangay court
on the ground that he was a foreigner.
18

The decision of the COMELEC in 1982 quaintly dismisses all these acts as "mistakes" that did not
divest the petitioner of his citizenship, although, as earlier noted, not all the members joined in this
finding. We reject this ruling as totally baseless. The petitioner is not an unlettered person who was
not aware of the consequences of his acts, let alone the fact that he was assisted by counsel when
he performed these acts.
The private respondent questions the motives of the COMELEC at that time and stresses Labo's
political affiliation with the party in power then, but we need not go into that now.
There is also the claim that the decision can no longer be reversed because of the doctrine of res
judicata, but this too must be dismissed. This doctrine does not apply to questions of citizenship, as
the Court has ruled in several cases.
19
Moreover, it does not appear that it was properly and
seasonably pleaded, in a motion to dismiss or in the answer, having been invoked only when the
petitioner filed his reply
20
to the private respondent's comment. Besides, one of the requisites of res
judicata, to wit, identity of parties, is not present in this case.
The petitioner's contention that his marriage to an Australian national in 1976 did not automatically
divest him of Philippine citizenship is irrelevant. There is no claim or finding that he automatically
ceased to be a Filipino because of that marriage. He became a citizen of Australia because he was
naturalized as such through a formal and positive process, simplified in his case because he was
married to an Australian citizen. As a condition for such naturalization, he formally took the Oath of
Allegiance and/or made the Affirmation of Allegiance, both quoted above. Renouncing all other
allegiance, he swore "to be faithful and bear true allegiance to Her Majesty Elizabeth the Second,
Queen of Australia ..." and to fulfill his duties "as an Australian citizen."
The petitioner now claims that his naturalization in Australia made him at worst only a dual national
and did not divest him of his Philippine citizenship. Such a specious argument cannot stand against
the clear provisions of CA No. 63, which enumerates the modes by which Philippine citizenship may
be lost. Among these are: (1) naturalization in a foreign country; (2) express renunciation of
citizenship; and (3) subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a
foreign country, all of which are applicable to the petitioner. It is also worth mentioning in this
connection that under Article IV, Section 5, of the present Constitution, "Dual allegiance of citizens is
inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law."
Even if it be assumed that, as the petitioner asserts, his naturalization in Australia was annulled after
it was found that his marriage to the Australian citizen was bigamous, that circumstance alone did
not automatically restore his Philippine citizenship. His divestiture of Australian citizenship does not
concern us here. That is a matter between him and his adopted country. What we must consider is
the fact that he voluntarily and freely rejected Philippine citizenship and willingly and knowingly
embraced the citizenship of a foreign country. The possibility that he may have been subsequently
rejected by Australia, as he claims, does not mean that he has been automatically reinstated as a
citizen of the Philippines.
Under CA No. 63 as amended by PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act
of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation. It does not appear in the record, nor does the
petitioner claim, that he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by any of these methods. He does not
point to any judicial decree of naturalization as to any statute directly conferring Philippine citizenship
upon him. Neither has he shown that he has complied with PD No. 725, providing that:
... (2) natural-born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship may reacquire
Philippine citizenship through repatriation by applying with the Special Committee on
Naturalization created by Letter of Instruction No. 270, and, if their applications are
approved, taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines,
after which they shall be deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship. The
Commission on Immigration and Deportation shall thereupon cancel their certificate
of registration. (Emphasis supplied.)
That is why the Commission on Immigration and Deportation rejected his application for the
cancellation of his alien certificate of registration. And that is also the reason we must deny his
present claim for recognition as a citizen of the Philippines.
The petitioner is not now, nor was he on the day of the local elections on January 18, 1988, a citizen
of the Philippines. In fact, he was not even a qualified voter under the Constitution itself because of
his alienage.
21
He was therefore ineligible as a candidate for mayor of Baguio City, under Section 42 of
the Local Government Code providing in material part as follows:
Sec. 42. Qualifications. An elective local official must be a citizen of the
Philippines, at least twenty-three years of age on election day, a qualified voter
registered as such in the barangay, municipality, city or province where he proposes
to be elected, a resident therein for at least one year at the time of the filing of his
certificate of candidacy, and able to read and write English, Filipino, or any other
local language or dialect.
The petitioner argues that his alleged lack of citizenship is a "futile technicality" that should not
frustrate the will of the electorate of Baguio City, who elected him by a "resonant and thunderous
majority." To be accurate, it was not as loud as all that, for his lead over the second-placer was only
about 2,100 votes. In any event, the people of that locality could not have, even unanimously,
changed the requirements of the Local Government Code and the Constitution. The electorate had
no power to permit a foreigner owing his total allegiance to the Queen of Australia, or at least a
stateless individual owing no allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, to preside over them as
mayor of their city. Only citizens of the Philippines have that privilege over their countrymen.
The probability that many of those who voted for the petitioner may have done so in the belief that
he was qualified only strengthens the conclusion that the results of the election cannot nullify the
qualifications for the office now held by him. These qualifications are continuing requirements; once
any of them is lost during incumbency, title to the office itself is deemed forfeited. In the case at bar,
the citizenship and voting requirements were not subsequently lost but were not possessed at all in
the first place on the day of the election. The petitioner was disqualified from running as mayor and,
although elected, is not now qualified to serve as such.
Finally, there is the question of whether or not the private respondent, who filed the quo
warranto petition, can replace the petitioner as mayor. He cannot. The simple reason is that as he
obtained only the second highest number of votes in the election, he was obviously not the choice of
the people of Baguio city.
The latest ruling of the Court on this issue is Santos v. Commission on Elections
22
decided in 1985.
In that case, the candidate who placed second was proclaimed elected after the votes for his winning
rival, who was disqualified as a turncoat and considered a non-candidate, were all disregarded as stray.
In effect, the second placer won by default. That decision was supported by eight members of the Court
then
23
with three dissenting
24
and another two reserving their vote.
25
One was on official leave.
26

Re-examining that decision, the Court finds, and so holds, that it should be reversed in favor of the
earlier case ofGeronimo v. Ramos,
27
Which represents the more logical and democratic rule. That
case, which reiterated the doctrine first announced in 1912 in Topacio vs. Paredes
28
was supported by
ten members of the Court
29
without any dissent, although one reserved his vote,
30
another took no
part
31
and two others were on leave.
32
There the Court held:
... it would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally
guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who has not acquired the majority or
plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner and imposed as the representative of a
constituency, the majority of which have positively declared through their ballots that
they do not choose him.
Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who have
received the highest number of votes cast in the election for that office, and it is a
fundamental Idea in all republican forms of government that no one can be declared
elected and no measure can be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority
or plurality of the legal votes cast in the election. (20 Corpus Juris 2nd, S 243, p.
676.)
The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later
declared to be disqualified or not eligible for the office to which he was elected does
not necessarily entitle the candidate who obtained the second highest number of
votes to be declared the winner of the elective office. The votes cast for a dead,
disqualified, or non-eligible person may not be valid to vote the winner into office or
maintain him there. However, in the absence of a statute which clearly asserts a
contrary political and legislative policy on the matter, if the votes were cast in the
sincere belief that the candidate was alive, qualified, or eligible, they should not be
treated as stray, void or meaningless.
It remains to stress that the citizen of the Philippines must take pride in his status as such and
cherish this priceless gift that, out of more than a hundred other nationalities, God has seen fit to
grant him. Having been so endowed, he must not lightly yield this precious advantage, rejecting it for
another land that may offer him material and other attractions that he may not find in his own
country. To be sure, he has the right to renounce the Philippines if he sees fit and transfer his
allegiance to a state with more allurements for him.
33
But having done so, he cannot expect to be
welcomed back with open arms once his taste for his adopted country turns sour or he is himself
disowned by it as an undesirable alien.
Philippine citizenship is not a cheap commodity that can be easily recovered after its renunciation. It
may be restored only after the returning renegade makes a formal act of re-dedication to the country
he has abjured and he solemnly affirms once again his total and exclusive loyalty to the Republic of
the Philippines. This may not be accomplished by election to public office.
WHEREFORE, petitioner Ramon J. Labo, Jr. is hereby declared NOT a citizen of the Philippines and
therefore DISQUALIFIED from continuing to serve as Mayor of Baguio City. He is ordered to
VACATE his office and surrender the same to the Vice-Mayor of Baguio City, once this decision
becomes final and executory. The temporary restraining order dated January 31, 1989, is LIFTED


































Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-83882 January 24, 1989
IN RE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF WILLIE YU, petitioner,
vs.
MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, BIENVENIDO P. ALANO, JR., MAJOR PABALAN, DELEO
HERNANDEZ, BLODDY HERNANDEZ, BENNY REYES and JUN ESPIRITU SANTO, respondent.
Pelaez, Adriano and Gregorio and Bonifacio A. Alentajan for petitioner.
Chavez, Hechanova & Lim Law Offices collaborating counsel for petitioner.
Augusto Jose y. Arreza for respondents.

PADILLA, J .:
The present controversy originated with a petition for habeas corpus filed with the Court on 4 July
1988 seeking the release from detention of herein petitioner.
1
After manifestation and motion of the
Solicitor General of his decision to refrain from filing a return of the writ on behalf of the CID, respondent
Commissioner thru counsel filed the return.
2
Counsel for the parties were heard in oral argument on 20
July 1988. The parties were allowed to submit marked exhibits, and to file memoranda.
3
An internal
resolution of 7 November 1988 referred the case to the Court en banc. In its 10 November 1988
resolution, denying the petition for habeas corpus, the Court disposed of the pending issues of (1)
jurisdiction of the CID over a naturalized Filipino citizen and (2) validity of warrantless arrest and detention
of the same person.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration with prayer for restraining order dated 24 November
1988.
4
On 29 November 1988, the Court resolved to deny with finality the aforesaid motion for
reconsideration, and further resolved to deny the urgent motion for issuance of a restraining order dated
28 November 1988.
5

Undaunted, petitioner filed a motion for clarification with prayer for restraining order on 5 December
1988.
Acting on said motion, a temporary restraining order was issued by the Court on 7 December
1988.
6
Respondent Commissioner filed a motion to lift TRO on 13 December 1988, the basis of which is
a summary judgment of deportation against Yu issued by the CID Board of Commissioners on 2
December 1988.
7
Petitioner also filed a motion to set case for oral argument on 8 December 1988.
In the meantime, an urgent motion for release from arbitrary detention
8
was filed by petitioner on 13
December 1988. A memorandum in furtherance of said motion for release dated 14 December 1988 was
filed on 15 December 1988 together with a vigorous opposition to the lifting of the TRO.
The lifting of the Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Court on 7 December 1988 is urgently
sought by respondent Commissioner who was ordered to cease and desist from immediately
deporting petitioner Yu pending the conclusion of hearings before the Board of Special Inquiry, CID.
To finally dispose of the case, the Court will likewise rule on petitioner's motion for clarification with
prayer for restraining order dated 5 December 1988,
9
urgent motion for release from arbitrary detention
dated 13 December 1988,
10
the memorandum in furtherance of said motion for release dated 14
December 1988,
11
motion to set case for oral argument dated 8 December 1988.
12

Acting on the motion to lift the temporary restraining order (issued on 7 December 1988) dated 9
December 1988,
13
and the vigorous opposition to lift restraining order dated 15 December 1988,
14
the
Court resolved to give petitioner Yu a non-extendible period of three (3) days from notice within which to
explain and prove why he should still be considered a citizen of the Philippines despite his acquisition and
use of a Portuguese passport.
15

Petitioner filed his compliance with the resolution of 15 December 1988 on 20 December
1988
16
followed by an earnest request for temporary release on 22 December 1988. Respondent filed on
2 January 1989 her comment reiterating her previous motion to lift temporary restraining order. Petitioner
filed a reply thereto on 6 January 1989.
Petitioner's own compliance reveals that he was originally issued a Portuguese passport in
1971,
17
valid for five (5) years and renewed for the same period upon presentment before the proper
Portuguese consular officer. Despite his naturalization as a Philippine citizen on 10 February 1978, on 21
July 1981, petitioner applied for and was issued Portuguese Passport No. 35/81 serial N. 1517410 by the
Consular Section of the Portuguese Embassy in Tokyo. Said Consular Office certifies that his Portuguese
passport expired on 20 July 1986.
18
While still a citizen of the Philippines who had renounced, upon his
naturalization, "absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or
sovereignty" and pledged to "maintain true faith and allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines,"
19
he
declared his nationality as Portuguese in commercial documents he signed, specifically, the Companies
registry of Tai Shun Estate Ltd.
20
filed in Hongkong sometime in April 1980.
To the mind of the Court, the foregoing acts considered together constitute an express renunciation
of petitioner's Philippine citizenship acquired through naturalization. In Board of Immigration
Commissioners us, Go Gallano,
21
express renunciation was held to mean a renunciation that is made
known distinctly and explicitly and not left to inference or implication. Petitioner, with full knowledge, and
legal capacity, after having renounced Portuguese citizenship upon naturalization as a Philippine
citizen
22
resumed or reacquired his prior status as a Portuguese citizen, applied for a renewal of his
Portuguese passport
23
and represented himself as such in official documents even after he had become
a naturalized Philippine citizen. Such resumption or reacquisition of Portuguese citizenship is grossly
inconsistent with his maintenance of Philippine citizenship.
This Court issued the aforementioned TRO pending hearings with the Board of Special Inquiry, CID.
However, pleadings submitted before this Court after the issuance of said TRO have unequivocally
shown that petitioner has expressly renounced his Philippine citizenship. The material facts are not
only established by the pleadings they are not disputed by petitioner. A rehearing on this point
with the CID would be unnecessary and superfluous. Denial, if any, of due process was obviated
when petitioner was given by the Court the opportunity to show proof of continued Philippine
citizenship, but he has failed.
While normally the question of whether or not a person has renounced his Philippine citizenship
should be heard before a trial court of law in adversary proceedings, this has become unnecessary
as this Court, no less, upon the insistence of petitioner, had to look into the facts and satisfy itself on
whether or not petitioner's claim to continued Philippine citizenship is meritorious.
Philippine citizenship, it must be stressed, is not a commodity or were to be displayed when required
and suppressed when convenient. This then resolves adverse to the petitioner his motion for
clarification and other motions mentioned in the second paragraph, page 3 of this Decision.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, petitioner's motion for release from detention is DENIED.
Respondent's motion to lift the temporary restraining order is GRANTED. This Decision is
immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.






































EN BANC
[G.R. No. 157013. July 10, 2003]
ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, HON. ALBERTO ROMULO, in his official capacity
as Executive Secretary, and HON. EMILIA T. BONCODIN,
Secretary of the Department of Budget and
Management, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J .:
Before the Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Romulo
B. Macalintal, a member of the Philippine Bar, seeking a declaration that
certain provisions of Republic Act No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting
Act of 2003)
[1]
suffer from constitutional infirmity. Claiming that he has actual
and material legal interest in the subject matter of this case in seeing to it that
public funds are properly and lawfully used and appropriated, petitioner filed
the instant petition as a taxpayer and as a lawyer.
The Court upholds the right of petitioner to file the present petition.
R.A. No. 9189, entitled, An Act Providing for A System of Overseas
Absentee Voting by Qualified Citizens of the Philippines Abroad, Appropriating
Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes, appropriates funds under Section
29 thereof which provides that a supplemental budget on the General
Appropriations Act of the year of its enactment into law shall provide for the
necessary amount to carry out its provisions. Taxpayers, such as herein
petitioner, have the right to restrain officials from wasting public funds through
the enforcement of an unconstitutional statute.
[2]
The Court has held that they
may assail the validity of a law appropriating public funds
[3]
because
expenditure of public funds by an officer of the State for the purpose of
executing an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds.
[4]

The challenged provision of law involves a public right that affects a great
number of citizens. The Court has adopted the policy of taking jurisdiction
over cases whenever the petitioner has seriously and convincingly presented
an issue of transcendental significance to the Filipino people. This has been
explicitly pronounced in Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng
Pilipinas, Inc. vs. Tan,
[5]
where the Court held:
Objections to taxpayers suit for lack of sufficient personality standing, or interest are,
however, in the main procedural matters. Considering the importance to the public of
the cases at bar, and in keeping with the Courts duty, under the 1987 Constitution, to
determine whether or not the other branches of government have kept themselves
within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and that they have not abused the
discretion given to them, the Court has brushed aside technicalities of procedure and
has taken cognizance of these petitions.
[6]

Indeed, in this case, the Court may set aside procedural rules as the
constitutional right of suffrage of a considerable number of Filipinos is
involved.
The question of propriety of the instant petition which may appear to be
visited by the vice of prematurity as there are no ongoing proceedings in any
tribunal, board or before a government official exercising judicial, quasi-judicial
or ministerial functions as required by Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, dims in
light of the importance of the constitutional issues raised by the
petitioner. InTaada vs. Angara,
[7]
the Court held:
In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes
the Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an
action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution,
it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute.
The question thus posed is judicial rather than political. The duty (to adjudicate)
remains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld. Once a
controversy as to the application or interpretation of constitutional provision is raised
before this Court (as in the instant case), it becomes a legal issue which the Court is
bound by constitutional mandate to decide.
In another case of paramount impact to the Filipino people, it has been
expressed that it is illogical to await the adverse consequences of the law in
order to consider the controversy actual and ripe for judicial resolution.
[8]
In yet
another case, the Court said that:
. . . despite the inhibitions pressing upon the Court when confronted with
constitutional issues, it will not hesitate to declare a law or act invalid when it is
convinced that this must be done. In arriving at this conclusion, its only criterion will
be the Constitution and God as its conscience gives it in the light to probe its meaning
and discover its purpose. Personal motives and political considerations are
irrelevancies that cannot influence its decisions. Blandishment is as ineffectual as
intimidation, for all the awesome power of the Congress and Executive, the Court will
not hesitate to make the hammer fall heavily, where the acts of these departments,
or of any official, betray the peoples will as expressed in the Constitution . . .
[9]

The need to consider the constitutional issues raised before the Court is
further buttressed by the fact that it is now more than fifteen years since the
ratification of the 1987 Constitution requiring Congress to provide a system for
absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad. Thus, strong reasons of public
policy demand that the Court resolves the instant petition
[10]
and determine
whether Congress has acted within the limits of the Constitution or if it had
gravely abused the discretion entrusted to it.
[11]

The petitioner raises three principal questions:
A. Does Section 5(d) of Rep. Act No. 9189 allowing the registration of
voters who are immigrants or permanent residents in other countries by their
mere act of executing an affidavit expressing their intention to return to the
Philippines, violate the residency requirement in Section 1 of Article V of the
Constitution?
B. Does Section 18.5 of the same law empowering the COMELEC to
proclaim the winning candidates for national offices and party list
representatives including the President and the Vice-President violate the
constitutional mandate under Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution that
the winning candidates for President and the Vice-President shall be
proclaimed as winners by Congress?
C. May Congress, through the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee
created in Section 25 of Rep. Act No. 9189, exercise the power to review,
revise, amend, and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations that the
Commission on Elections shall promulgate without violating the
independence of the COMELEC under Section 1, Article IX-A of the
Constitution?
The Court will resolve the questions in seriatim.
A. Does Section 5(d) of Rep. Act No. 9189 violate Section 1, Article V
of the 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines?
Section 5(d) provides:
Sec. 5. Disqualifications. The following shall be disqualified from voting under this
Act:
. . . . . . . . .
d) An immigrant or a permanent resident who is recognized as such in the host
country, unless he/she executes, upon registration, an affidavit prepared for the
purpose by the Commission declaring that he/she shall resume actual physical
permanent residence in the Philippines not later than three (3) years from approval of
his/her registration under this Act. Such affidavit shall also state that he/she has not
applied for citizenship in another country. Failure to return shall be cause for the
removal of the name of the immigrant or permanent resident from the National
Registry of Absentee Voters and his/her permanent disqualification to vote in
absentia.
Petitioner posits that Section 5(d) is unconstitutional because it violates
Section 1, Article V of the 1987 Constitution which requires that the voter must
be a resident in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place where he
proposes to vote for at least six months immediately preceding an election.
Petitioner cites the ruling of the Court in Caasi vs. Court of Appeals
[12]
to
support his claim. In that case, the Court held that a green card holder
immigrant to the United States is deemed to have abandoned his domicile and
residence in the Philippines.
Petitioner further argues that Section 1, Article V of the Constitution does
not allow provisional registration or a promise by a voter to perform a
condition to be qualified to vote in a political exercise;
[13]
that the legislature
should not be allowed to circumvent the requirement of the Constitution on the
right of suffrage by providing a condition thereon which in effect amends or
alters the aforesaid residence requirement to qualify a Filipino abroad to
vote.
[14]
He claims that the right of suffrage should not be granted to anyone
who, on the date of the election, does not possess the qualifications provided
for by Section 1, Article V of the Constitution.
Respondent COMELEC refrained from commenting on this issue.
[15]


In compliance with the Resolution of the Court, the Solicitor General filed
his comment for all public respondents. He contraposes that the constitutional
challenge to Section 5(d) must fail because of the absence of clear and
unmistakable showing that said provision of law is repugnant to the
Constitution. He stresses: All laws are presumed to be constitutional; by the
doctrine of separation of powers, a department of government owes a
becoming respect for the acts of the other two departments; all laws are
presumed to have adhered to constitutional limitations; the legislature
intended to enact a valid, sensible, and just law.
In addition, the Solicitor General points out that Section 1, Article V of the
Constitution is a verbatim reproduction of those provided for in the 1935 and
the 1973 Constitutions. Thus, he citesCo vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House
of Representatives
[16]
wherein the Court held that the term residence has
been understood to be synonymous with domicile under both
Constitutions. He further argues that a person can have only one domicile
but he can have two residences, one permanent (the domicile) and the other
temporary;
[17]
and that the definition and meaning given to the
term residence likewise applies to absentee voters. Invoking Romualdez-
Marcos vs. COMELEC
[18]
which reiterates the Courts ruling in Faypon vs.
Quirino,
[19]
the Solicitor General maintains that Filipinos who are immigrants or
permanent residents abroad may have in fact never abandoned their
Philippine domicile.
[20]

Taking issue with the petitioners contention that green card holders are
considered to have abandoned their Philippine domicile, the Solicitor General
suggests that the Court may have to discard its ruling in Caasi vs. Court of
Appeals
[21]
in so far as it relates to immigrants and permanent residents in
foreign countries who have executed and submitted their affidavits
conformably with Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189. He maintains that through
the execution of the requisite affidavits, the Congress of the Philippines with
the concurrence of the President of the Republic had in fact given these
immigrants and permanent residents the opportunity, pursuant to Section 2,
Article V of the Constitution, to manifest that they had in fact never abandoned
their Philippine domicile; that indubitably, they would have formally and
categorically expressed the requisite intentions, i.e., animus
manendi and animus revertendi; that Filipino immigrants and permanent
residents abroad possess the unquestionable right to exercise the right of
suffrage under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution upon approval of their
registration, conformably with R.A. No. 9189.
[22]

The seed of the present controversy is the interpretation that is given to
the phrase, qualified citizens of the Philippines abroad as it appears in R.A.
No. 9189, to wit:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. It is the prime duty of the State to provide a system
of honest and orderly overseas absentee voting that upholds the secrecy and sanctity
of the ballot. Towards this end, the State ensures equal opportunity to all qualified
citizens of the Philippines abroad in the exercise of this fundamental right.
SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. For purposes of this Act:
a) Absentee Voting refers to the process by which qualified citizens of the
Philippines abroad, exercise their right to vote;
. . . (Emphasis supplied)
f) Overseas Absentee Voter refers to a citizen of the Philippines who is
qualified to register and vote under this Act, not otherwise disqualified by law, who
is abroad on the day of elections. (Emphasis supplied)
SEC. 4. Coverage. All citizens of the Philippines abroad, who are not otherwise
disqualified by law, at least eighteen (18) years of age on the day of elections, may
vote for president, vice-president, senators and party-list representatives. (Emphasis
supplied)
in relation to Sections 1 and 2, Article V of the Constitution which read:
SEC. 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise
disqualified by law, who are at least eighteen years of age, and who shall have resided
in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein they propose to vote
for at least six months immediately preceding the election. No literacy, property, or
other substantive requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of suffrage.
SEC. 2. The Congress shall provide a system for securing the secrecy and sanctity
of the ballot as well as a system for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad.
. . . . . . . . . (Emphasis supplied)
Section 1, Article V of the Constitution specifically provides that suffrage
may be exercised by (1) all citizens of the Philippines, (2) not otherwise
disqualified by law, (3) at least eighteen years of age, (4) who are residents in
the Philippines for at least one year and in the place where they propose to
vote for at least six months immediately preceding the election. Under
Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189, one of those disqualified from voting is an
immigrant or permanent resident who is recognized as such in the host
country unless he/she executes an affidavit declaring that he/she shall resume
actual physical permanent residence in the Philippines not later than three
years from approval of his/her registration under said Act.
Petitioner questions the rightness of the mere act of execution of an
affidavit to qualify the Filipinos abroad who are immigrants or permanent
residents, to vote. He focuses solely on Section 1, Article V of the
Constitution in ascribing constitutional infirmity to Section 5(d) of R.A. No.
9189, totally ignoring the provisions of Section 2 empowering Congress to
provide a system for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad.
A simple, cursory reading of Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 may indeed
give the impression that it contravenes Section 1, Article V of the Constitution.
Filipino immigrants and permanent residents overseas are perceived as
having left and abandoned the Philippines to live permanently in their host
countries and therefore, a provision in the law enfranchising those who do not
possess the residency requirement of the Constitution by the mere act of
executing an affidavit expressing their intent to return to the Philippines within
a given period, risks a declaration of unconstitutionality. However, the risk is
more apparent than real.
The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to
which all other laws must conform and in accordance with which all private
rights must be determined and all public authority administered.
[23]
Laws that do
not conform to the Constitution shall be stricken down for being
unconstitutional.
Generally, however, all laws are presumed to be constitutional. In Peralta
vs. COMELEC, the Court said:
. . . An act of the legislature, approved by the executive, is presumed to be within
constitutional limitations. The responsibility of upholding the Constitution rests not on
the courts alone but on the legislature as well. The question of the validity of every
statute is first determined by the legislative department of the government itself.
[24]

Thus, presumption of constitutionality of a law must be overcome
convincingly:
. . . To declare a law unconstitutional, the repugnancy of that law to the Constitution
must be clear and unequivocal, for even if a law is aimed at the attainment of some
public good, no infringement of constitutional rights is allowed. To strike down a law
there must be a clear showing that what the fundamental law condemns or prohibits,
the statute allows it to be done.
[25]

As the essence of R.A. No. 9189 is to enfranchise overseas qualified
Filipinos, it behooves the Court to take a holistic view of the pertinent
provisions of both the Constitution and R.A. No. 9189. It is a basic rule in
constitutional construction that the Constitution should be construed as a
whole. In Chiongbian vs. De Leon,
[26]
the Court held that a constitutional
provision should function to the full extent of its substance and its terms, not
by itself alone, but in conjunction with all other provisions of that great
document. Constitutional provisions are mandatory in character unless, either
by express statement or by necessary implication, a different intention is
manifest.
[27]
The intent of the Constitution may be drawn primarily from the
language of the document itself. Should it be ambiguous, the Court may
consider the intent of its framers through their debates in the constitutional
convention.
[28]

R.A. No. 9189 was enacted in obeisance to the mandate of the first
paragraph of Section 2, Article V of the Constitution that Congress shall
provide a system for voting by qualified Filipinos abroad. It must be stressed
that Section 2 does not provide for the parameters of the exercise of
legislative authority in enacting said law. Hence, in the absence of
restrictions, Congress is presumed to have duly exercised its function as
defined in Article VI (The Legislative Department) of the Constitution.
To put matters in their right perspective, it is necessary to dwell first on the
significance of absentee voting. The concept of absentee voting is relatively
new. It is viewed thus:
The method of absentee voting has been said to be completely separable and distinct
from the regular system of voting, and to be a new and different manner of voting
from that previously known, and an exception to the customary and usual manner of
voting. The right of absentee and disabled voters to cast their ballots at an election
is purely statutory; absentee voting was unknown to, and not recognized at, the
common law.
Absentee voting is an outgrowth of modern social and economic conditions devised to
accommodate those engaged in military or civil life whose duties make it
impracticable for them to attend their polling places on the day of election, and the
privilege of absentee voting may flow from constitutional provisions or be conferred
by statutes, existing in some jurisdictions, which provide in varying terms for the
casting and reception of ballots by soldiers and sailors or other qualified voters absent
on election day from the district or precinct of their residence.
Such statutes are regarded as conferring a privilege and not a right, or an absolute
right. When the legislature chooses to grant the right by statute, it must operate
with equality among all the class to which it is granted; but statutes of this nature
may be limited in their application to particular types of elections. The statutes
should be construed in the light of any constitutional provisions affecting
registration and elections, and with due regard to their texts prior to amendment and
to predecessor statutes and the decisions thereunder; they should also be construed in
the light of the circumstances under which they were enacted; and so as to carry out
the objects thereof, if this can be done without doing violence to their provisions and
mandates. Further, in passing on statutes regulating absentee voting, the court
should look to the whole and every part of the election laws, the intent of the entire
plan, and reasons and spirit of their adoption, and try to give effect to every portion
thereof.
[29]
(Emphasis supplied)
Ordinarily, an absentee is not a resident and vice versa; a person cannot
be at the same time, both a resident and an absentee.
[30]
However, under our
election laws and the countless pronouncements of the Court pertaining to
elections, an absentee remains attached to his residence in the Philippines as
residence is considered synonymous with domicile.
In Romualdez-Marcos,
[31]
the Court enunciated:
Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that [f]or the exercise of civil rights and the
fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of natural persons is their place of
habitual residence. In Ong vs. Republic, this court took the concept of domicile to
mean an individuals permanent home, a place to which, whenever absent for
business or for pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on facts and
circumstances in the sense that they disclose intent. Based on the foregoing,
domicile includes the twin elements of the fact of residing or physical presence in a
fixed place and animus manendi, or the intention of returning there permanently.
Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual relationship of an individual
to a certain place. It is the physical presence of a person in a given area, community
or country. The essential distinction between residence and domicile in law is that
residence involves the intent to leave when the purpose for which the resident has
taken up his abode ends. One may seek a place for purposes such as pleasure,
business, or health. If a persons intent be to remain, it becomes his domicile; if his
intent is to leave as soon as his purpose is established it is residence. It is thus, quite
perfectly normal for an individual to have different residences in various
places. However, a person can only have a single domicile, unless, for various
reasons, he successfully abandons his domicile in favor of another domicile of
choice. In Uytengsu vs. Republic, we laid this distinction quite clearly:
There is a difference between domicile and residence. Residence is used to
indicate a place of abode, whether permanent or temporary; domicile denotes a fixed
permanent residence to which, when absent, one has the intention of returning. A
man may have a residence in one place and a domicile in another. Residence is not
domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with the intention to remain for an
unlimited time. A man can have but one domicile for the same purpose at any time,
but he may have numerous places of residence. His place of residence is generally his
place of domicile, but it is not by any means necessarily so since no length of
residence without intention of remaining will constitute domicile.
For political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are dictated by the
peculiar criteria of political laws. As these concepts have evolved in our election law,
what has clearly and unequivocally emerged is the fact that residence for election
purposes is used synonymously with domicile.
[32]
(Emphasis supplied)
Aware of the domiciliary legal tie that links an overseas Filipino to his
residence in this country, the framers of the Constitution considered the
circumstances that impelled them to require Congress to establish a system
for overseas absentee voting, thus:
MR. OPLE. With respect to Section 1, it is not clear whether the right of suffrage,
which here has a residential restriction, is not denied to citizens temporarily residing
or working abroad. Based on the statistics of several government agencies, there ought
to be about two million such Filipinos at this time. Commissioner Bernas had earlier
pointed out that these provisions are really lifted from the two previous Constitutions
of 1935 and 1973, with the exception of the last paragraph. They could not therefore
have foreseen at that time the phenomenon now described as the Filipino labor force
explosion overseas.
According to government data, there are now about 600,000 contract workers and
employees, and although the major portions of these expatriate communities of
workers are to be found in the Middle East, they are scattered in 177 countries in the
world.
In a previous hearing of the Committee on Constitutional Commissions and Agencies,
the Chairman of the Commission on Elections, Ramon Felipe, said that there was no
insuperable obstacle to making effective the right of suffrage for Filipinos
overseas. Those who have adhered to their Filipino citizenship notwithstanding
strong temptations are exposed to embrace a more convenient foreign citizenship. And
those who on their own or under pressure of economic necessity here, find that they
have to detach themselves from their families to work in other countries with definite
tenures of employment. Many of them are on contract employment for one, two, or
three years. They have no intention of changing their residence on a permanent basis,
but are technically disqualified from exercising the right of suffrage in their countries
of destination by the residential requirement in Section 1 which says:
Suffrage shall be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified
by law, who are eighteen years of age or over, and who shall have resided in the
Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein they propose to vote for at
least six months preceding the election.
I, therefore, ask the Committee whether at the proper time they might entertain an
amendment that will make this exercise of the right to vote abroad for Filipino citizens
an effective, rather than merely a nominal right under this proposed Constitution.
FR. BERNAS. Certainly, the Committee will consider that. But more than just saying
that, I would like to make a comment on the meaning of residence in the
Constitution because I think it is a concept that has been discussed in various
decisions of the Supreme Court, particularly in the case of Faypon vs. Quirino, a 1954
case which dealt precisely with the meaning of residence in the Election
Law. Allow me to quote:
A citizen may leave the place of his birth to look for greener pastures, as the saying
goes, to improve his lot and that, of course, includes study in other places, practice of
his avocation, reengaging in business. When an election is to be held, the citizen who
left his birthplace to improve his lot may decide to return to his native town, to cast
his ballot, but for professional or business reasons, or for any other reason, he may not
absent himself from the place of his professional or business activities.
So, they are here registered as voters as he has the qualifications to be one, and is not
willing to give up or lose the opportunity to choose the officials who are to run the
government especially in national elections. Despite such registration, the animus
revertendi to his home, to his domicile or residence of origin has not forsaken him.
This may be the explanation why the registration of a voter in a place other than his
residence of origin has not been deemed sufficient to consider abandonment or loss of
such residence of origin.
In other words, residence in this provision refers to two residence qualifications:
residence in the Philippines and residence in the place where he will vote. As far
as residence in the Philippines is concerned, the word residence means domicile, but
as far as residence in the place where he will actually cast his ballot is concerned, the
meaning seems to be different. He could have a domicile somewhere else and yet he
is a resident of a place for six months and he is allowed to vote there. So that there
may be serious constitutional obstacles to absentee voting, unless the vote of the
person who is absent is a vote which will be considered as cast in the place of his
domicile.
MR. OPLE. Thank you for citing the jurisprudence.
It gives me scant comfort thinking of about two million Filipinos who should enjoy
the right of suffrage, at least a substantial segment of these overseas Filipino
communities. The Committee, of course, is aware that when this Article of the
Constitution explicitly and unequivocally extends the right of effective suffrage to
Filipinos abroad, this will call for a logistical exercise of global proportions. In effect,
this will require budgetary and administrative commitments on the part of the
Philippine government, mainly through the COMELEC and the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, and perhaps, a more extensive elaboration of this mechanism that will be put
in place to make effective the right to vote. Therefore, seeking shelter in some wise
jurisprudence of the past may not be sufficient to meet the demands of the right of
suffrage for Filipinos abroad that I have mentioned. But I want to thank the
Committee for saying that an amendment to this effect may be entertained at the
proper time. . . . . . . . . .

[33]
(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the Constitutional Commission recognized the fact that while
millions of Filipinos reside abroad principally for economic reasons and hence
they contribute in no small measure to the economic uplift of this country, their
voices are marginal insofar as the choice of this countrys leaders is
concerned.
The Constitutional Commission realized that under the laws then existing
and considering the novelty of the system of absentee voting in this
jurisdiction, vesting overseas Filipinos with the right to vote would spawn
constitutional problems especially because the Constitution itself provides for
the residency requirement of voters:
MR. REGALADO. Before I act on that, may I inquire from Commissioner Monsod if
the term absentee voting also includes transient voting; meaning, those who are, let
us say, studying in Manila need not go back to their places of registration, for
instance, in Mindanao, to cast their votes.
MR. MONSOD. I think our provision is for absentee voting by Filipinos abroad.
MR. REGALADO. How about those people who cannot go back to the places where
they are registered?
MR. MONSOD. Under the present Election Code, there are provisions for allowing
students and military people who are temporarily in another place to register and vote.
I believe that those situations can be covered by the Omnibus Election Code. The
reason we want absentee voting to be in the Constitution as a mandate to the
legislature is that there could be inconsistency on the residence rule if it is just a
question of legislation by Congress. So, by allowing it and saying that this is
possible, then legislation can take care of the rest.
[34]
(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, Section 2, Article V of the Constitution came into being to remove any
doubt as to the inapplicability of the residency requirement in Section 1. It is
precisely to avoid any problems that could impede the implementation of its
pursuit to enfranchise the largest number of qualified Filipinos who are not in
the Philippines that the Constitutional Commission explicitly mandated
Congress to provide a system for overseas absentee voting.
The discussion of the Constitutional Commission on the effect of the
residency requirement prescribed by Section 1, Article V of the Constitution on
the proposed system of absentee voting for qualified Filipinos abroad is
enlightening:
MR. SUAREZ. May I just be recognized for a clarification. There are certain
qualifications for the exercise of the right of suffrage like having resided in the
Philippines for at least one year and in the place where they propose to vote for at
least six months preceding the elections. What is the effect of these mandatory
requirements on the matter of the exercise of the right of suffrage by the absentee
voters like Filipinos abroad?
THE PRESIDENT. Would Commissioner Monsod care to answer?
MR. MONSOD. I believe the answer was already given by Commissioner Bernas,
that the domicile requirements as well as the qualifications and disqualifications
would be the same.
THE PRESIDENT. Are we leaving it to the legislature to devise the system?
FR. BERNAS. I think there is a very legitimate problem raised there.
THE PRESIDENT. Yes.
MR. BENGZON. I believe Commissioner Suarez is clarified.
FR. BERNAS. But I think it should be further clarified with regard to the residence
requirement or the place where they vote in practice; the understanding is that it is
flexible. For instance, one might be a resident of Naga or domiciled therein, but he
satisfies the requirement of residence in Manila, so he is able to vote in Manila.
MR. TINGSON. Madam President, may I then suggest to the Committee to change
the word Filipinos to QUALIFIED FILIPINO VOTERS. Instead of VOTING BY
FILIPINOS ABROAD, it should be QUALIFIED FILIPINO VOTERS. If the
Committee wants QUALIFIED VOTERS LIVING ABROAD, would that not satisfy
the requirement?
THE PRESIDENT. What does Commissioner Monsod say?
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I think I would accept the phrase QUALIFIED
FILIPINOS ABROAD because QUALIFIED would assume that he has the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications to vote.
MR. TINGSON. That is right. So does the Committee accept?
FR. BERNAS. QUALIFIED FILIPINOS ABROAD?
THE PRESIDENT. Does the Committee accept the amendment?
MR. REGALADO. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Regalado is recognized.
MR. REGALADO. When Commissioner Bengzon asked me to read my proposed
amendment, I specifically stated that the National Assembly shall prescribe a system
which will enable qualified citizens, temporarily absent from the Philippines, to vote.
According to Commissioner Monsod, the use of the phrase absentee voting already
took that into account as its meaning. That is referring to qualified Filipino citizens
temporarily abroad.
MR. MONSOD. Yes, we accepted that. I would like to say that with respect to
registration we will leave it up to the legislative assembly, for example, to require
where the registration is. If it is, say, members of the diplomatic corps who may be
continuously abroad for a long time, perhaps, there can be a system of registration in
the embassies. However, we do not like to preempt the legislative assembly.
THE PRESIDENT. Just to clarify, Commissioner Monsods amendment is only to
provide a system.
MR. MONSOD. Yes.
THE PRESIDENT. The Commissioner is not stating here that he wants new
qualifications for these absentee voters.
MR. MONSOD. That is right. They must have the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications.
THE PRESIDENT. It is just to devise a system by which they can vote.
MR. MONSOD. That is right, Madam President.
[35]
(Emphasis supplied)
Clearly therefrom, the intent of the Constitutional Commission is to entrust
to Congress the responsibility of devising a system of absentee voting. The
qualifications of voters as stated in Section 1 shall remain except for the
residency requirement. This is in fact the reason why the Constitutional
Commission opted for the term qualified Filipinos abroad with respect to the
system of absentee voting that Congress should draw up. As stressed by
Commissioner Monsod, by the use of the adjective qualified with respect to
Filipinos abroad, the assumption is that they have the qualifications and none
of the disqualifications to vote. In fine-tuning the provision on absentee
voting, the Constitutional Commission discussed how the system should work:
MR. SUAREZ. For clarification purposes, we just want to state for the record that in
the case of qualified Filipino citizens residing abroad and exercising their right of
suffrage, they can cast their votes for the candidates in the place where they were
registered to vote in the Philippines. So as to avoid any complications, for example, if
they are registered in Angeles City, they could not vote for a mayor in Naga City.
In other words, if that qualified voter is registered in Angeles City, then he can vote
only for the local and national candidates in Angeles City. I just want to make that
clear for the record.
MR. REGALADO. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. What does Commissioner Regalado say?
MR. REGALADO. I just want to make a note on the statement of Commissioner
Suarez that this envisions Filipinos residing abroad. The understanding in the
amendment is that the Filipino is temporarily abroad. He may not be actually
residing abroad; he may just be there on a business trip. It just so happens that
the day before the elections he has to fly to the United States, so he could not cast
his vote. He is temporarily abroad, but not residing there. He stays in a hotel for
two days and comes back. This is not limited only to Filipinos temporarily
residing abroad. But as long as he is temporarily abroad on the date of the
elections, then he can fall within the prescription of Congress in that
situation.
MR. SUAREZ. I thank the Commissioner for his further clarification. Precisely, we need
this clarification on record.
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, to clarify what we mean by temporarily
abroad, it need not be on very short trips. One can be abroad on a treaty
traders visa. Therefore, when we talk about registration, it is possible that his
residence is in Angeles and he would be able to vote for the candidates in
Angeles, but Congress or the Assembly may provide the procedure for
registration, like listing ones name, in a registry list in the embassy
abroad. That is still possible under the system.
FR. BERNAS. Madam President, just one clarification if Commissioner Monsod agrees
with this.
Suppose we have a situation of a child of a diplomatic officer who reaches the voting
age while living abroad and he has never registered here. Where will he register?
Will he be a registered voter of a certain locality in the Philippines?
MR. MONSOD. Yes, it is possible that the system will enable that child to comply with
the registration requirements in an embassy in the United States and his name is
then entered in the official registration book in Angeles City, for instance.
FR. BERNAS. In other words, he is not a registered voter of Los Angeles, but a
registered voter of a locality here.
MR. MONSOD. That is right. He does not have to come home to the Philippines to
comply with the registration procedure here.
FR. BERNAS. So, he does not have to come home.
MR. BENGZON. Madam President, the Floor Leader wishes to inquire if there are
more clarifications needed from the body.
Also, the Floor Leader is happy to announce that there are no more
registered Commissioners to propose amendments. So I move that we close
the period of amendments.

[36]
(Emphasis supplied)
It is clear from these discussions of the members of the Constitutional
Commission that they intended to enfranchise as much as possible all Filipino
citizens abroad who have not abandoned their domicile of origin. The
Commission even intended to extend to young Filipinos who reach voting age
abroad whose parents domicile of origin is in the Philippines, and consider
them qualified as voters for the first time.
It is in pursuance of that intention that the Commission provided for
Section 2 immediately after the residency requirement of Section 1. By the
doctrine of necessary implication in statutory construction, which may be
applied in construing constitutional provisions,
[37]
the strategic location of
Section 2 indicates that the Constitutional Commission provided for an
exception to the actual residency requirement of Section 1 with respect to
qualified Filipinos abroad. The same Commission has in effect declared that
qualified Filipinos who are not in the Philippines may be allowed to vote even
though they do not satisfy the residency requirement in Section 1, Article V of
the Constitution.
That Section 2 of Article V of the Constitution is an exception to the
residency requirement found in Section 1 of the same Article was in fact the
subject of debate when Senate Bill No. 2104, which became R.A. No. 9189,
was deliberated upon on the Senate floor, thus:
Senator Arroyo. Mr. President, this bill should be looked into in relation to the
constitutional provisions. I think the sponsor and I would agree that the
Constitution is supreme in any statute that we may enact.
Let me read Section 1, Article V, of the Constitution entitled, Suffrage. It says:
Section 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise
disqualified by law, who are at least eighteen years of age, and who shall have resided
in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein they propose to vote
for at least six months immediately preceding the election.
Now, Mr. President, the Constitution says, who shall have resided in the
Philippines. They are permanent immigrants. They have changed residence so
they are barred under the Constitution. This is why I asked whether this committee
amendment which in fact does not alter the original text of the bill will have any
effect on this?
Senator Angara. Good question, Mr. President. And this has been asked in various
fora. This is in compliance with the Constitution. One, the interpretation here of
residence is synonymous with domicile.
As the gentleman and I know, Mr. President, domicile is the intent to return to ones
home. And the fact that a Filipino may have been physically absent from the
Philippines and may be physically a resident of the United States, for
example, but has a clear intent to return to the Philippines, will make him
qualified as a resident of the Philippines under this law.
This is consistent, Mr. President, with the constitutional mandate that we that
Congress must provide a franchise to overseas Filipinos.
If we read the Constitution and the suffrage principle literally as demanding
physical presence, then there is no way we can provide for offshore voting
to our offshore kababayan, Mr. President.
Senator Arroyo. Mr. President, when the Constitution says, in Section 2 of Article V, it
reads: The Congress shall provide a system for securing the secrecy and sanctity
of the ballot as well as a system for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad.
The key to this whole exercise, Mr. President, is qualified. In other words,
anything that we may do or say in granting our compatriots abroad must be
anchored on the proposition that they are qualified. Absent the qualification,
they cannot vote. And residents (sic) is a qualification.
I will lose votes here from permanent residents so-called green-card holders, but the
Constitution is the Constitution. We cannot compromise on this. The Senate
cannot be a party to something that would affect or impair the Constitution.
Look at what the Constitution says In the place wherein they propose to vote for at
least six months immediately preceding the election.
Mr. President, all of us here have run (sic) for office.
I live in Makati. My neighbor is Pateros where Senator Cayetano lives. We are
separated only by a creek. But one who votes in Makati cannot vote in Pateros
unless he resides in Pateros for six months. That is how restrictive our Constitution
is. I am not talking even about the Election Code. I am talking about the
Constitution.
As I have said, if a voter in Makati would want to vote in Pateros, yes, he may do so.
But he must do so, make the transfer six months before the election, otherwise, he
is not qualified to vote.
That is why I am raising this point because I think we have a fundamental difference
here.
Senator Angara. It is a good point to raise, Mr. President. But it is a point already
well-debated even in the constitutional commission of 1986. And the reason
Section 2 of Article V was placed immediately after the six-month/one-year
residency requirement is to demonstrate unmistakably that Section 2 which
authorizes absentee voting is an exception to the six-month/one-year
residency requirement. That is the first principle, Mr. President, that one must
remember.
The second reason, Mr. President, is that under our jurisprudence and I think this is
so well-entrenched that one need not argue about it residency has been
interpreted as synonymous with domicile.
But the third more practical reason, Mr. President, is, if we follow the
interpretation of the gentleman, then it is legally and constitutionally
impossible to give a franchise to vote to overseas Filipinos who do not
physically live in the country, which is quite ridiculous because that is
exactly the whole point of this exercise to enfranchise them and empower
them to vote.

[38]
(Emphasis supplied)
Accordingly, Section 4 of R.A. No. 9189 provides for the coverage of the
absentee voting process, to wit:
SEC. 4. Coverage. All citizens of the Philippines abroad, who are not otherwise
disqualified by law, at least eighteen (18) years of age on the day of elections, may
vote for president, vice-president, senators and party-list representatives.
which does not require physical residency in the Philippines; and Section 5 of
the assailed law which enumerates those who are disqualified, to wit:
SEC. 5. Disqualifications. The following shall be disqualified from voting under
this Act:
a) Those who have lost their Filipino citizenship in accordance with Philippine
laws;
b) Those who have expressly renounced their Philippine citizenship and who have
pledged allegiance to a foreign country;
c) Those who have committed and are convicted in a final judgment by a court or
tribunal of an offense punishable by imprisonment of not less than one (1) year,
including those who have committed and been found guilty of Disloyalty as defined
under Article 137 of the Revised Penal Code, such disability not having been removed
by plenary pardon or amnesty: Provided, however, That any person disqualified to
vote under this subsection shall automatically acquire the right to vote upon expiration
of five (5) years after service of sentence; Provided, further, That the Commission
may take cognizance of final judgments issued by foreign courts or tribunals only on
the basis of reciprocity and subject to the formalities and processes prescribed by
the Rules of Court on execution of judgments;
d) An immigrant or a permanent resident who is recognized as such in the host
country, unless he/she executes, upon registration, an affidavit prepared for the
purpose by the Commission declaring that he/she shall resume actual physical
permanent residence in the Philippines not later than three (3) years from approval of
his/her registration under this Act. Such affidavit shall also state that he/she has not
applied for citizenship in another country. Failure to return shall be cause for the
removal of the name of the immigrant or permanent resident from the National
Registry of Absentee Voters and his/her permanent disqualification to vote in
absentia.
e) Any citizen of the Philippines abroad previously declared insane or incompetent
by competent authority in the Philippines or abroad, as verified by the Philippine
embassies, consulates or foreign service establishments concerned, unless such
competent authority subsequently certifies that such person is no longer insane or
incompetent.
As finally approved into law, Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 specifically
disqualifies an immigrant or permanent resident who is recognized as such in
the host country because immigration or permanent residence in another
country implies renunciation of ones residence in his country of origin.
However, same Section allows an immigrant and permanent resident abroad
to register as voter for as long as he/she executes an affidavit to show that
he/she has not abandoned his domicile in pursuance of the constitutional
intent expressed in Sections 1 and 2 of Article V that allcitizens of the
Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law must be entitled to exercise the
right of suffrage and, that Congress must establish a system for absentee
voting; for otherwise, if actual, physical residence in the Philippines is
required, there is no sense for the framers of the Constitution to mandate
Congress to establish a system for absentee voting.
Contrary to the claim of petitioner, the execution of the affidavit itself is not
the enabling or enfranchising act. The affidavit required in Section 5(d) is not
only proof of the intention of the immigrant or permanent resident to go back
and resume residency in the Philippines, but more significantly, it serves as an
explicit expression that he had not in fact abandoned his domicile of origin.
Thus, it is not correct to say that the execution of the affidavit under Section
5(d) violates the Constitution that proscribes provisional registration or a
promise by a voter to perform a condition to be qualified to vote in a political
exercise.
To repeat, the affidavit is required of immigrants and permanent residents
abroad because by their status in their host countries, they are presumed to
have relinquished their intent to return to this country; thus, without the
affidavit, the presumption of abandonment of Philippine domicile shall remain.
Further perusal of the transcripts of the Senate proceedings discloses
another reason why the Senate required the execution of said affidavit. It
wanted the affiant to exercise the option to return or to express his intention to
return to his domicile of origin and not to preempt that choice by
legislation. Thus:
Senator Villar. Yes, we are going back.
It states that: For Filipino immigrants and those who have acquired permanent
resident status abroad, a requirement for the registration is the submission of a
Sworn Declaration of Intent to Return duly sworn before any Philippine embassy or
consulate official authorized to administer oath
Mr. President, may we know the rationale of this provision? Is the purpose of this
Sworn Declaration to include only those who have the intention of returning to be
qualified to exercise the right of suffrage? What if the Filipino immigrant has no
purpose of returning? Is he automatically disbarred from exercising this right to
suffrage?
Senator Angara. The rationale for this, Mr. President, is that we want to be
expansive and all-inclusive in this law. That as long as he is a Filipino, no
matter whether he is a green-card holder in the U.S. or not, he will be
authorized to vote. But if he is already a green-card holder, that means he
has acquired permanent residency in the United States, then he must
indicate an intention to return. This is what makes for the definition of
domicile. And to acquire the vote, we thought that we would require the
immigrants and the green-card holders . . . Mr. President, the three administration
senators are leaving, maybe we may ask for a vote [Laughter].
Senator Villar. For a merienda, Mr. President.
Senator Angara. Mr. President, going back to the business at hand. The rationale for
the requirement that an immigrant or a green-card holder should file an affidavit
that he will go back to the Philippines is that, if he is already an immigrant or a
green-card holder, that means he may not return to the country any more and that
contradicts the definition of domicile under the law.
But what we are trying to do here, Mr. President, is really provide the choice to
the voter. The voter, after consulting his lawyer or after deliberation within the
family, may decide No, I think we are risking our permanent status in the United
States if we file an affidavit that we want to go back. But we want to give him
the opportunity to make that decision. We do not want to make that decision
for him.
[39]
(Emphasis supplied)
The jurisprudential declaration in Caasi vs. Court of Appeals that green
card holders are disqualified to run for any elective office finds no application
to the present case because the Caasicase did not, for obvious reasons,
consider the absentee voting rights of Filipinos who are immigrants and
permanent residents in their host countries.
In the advent of The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 or R.A. 9189,
they may still be considered as a qualified citizen of the Philippines abroad
upon fulfillment of the requirements of registration under the new law for the
purpose of exercising their right of suffrage.
It must be emphasized that Section 5(d) does not only require an affidavit
or a promise to resume actual physical permanent residence in the
Philippines not later than three years from approval of his/her registration, the
Filipinos abroad must also declare that they have not applied for citizenship in
another country. Thus, they must return to the Philippines; otherwise, their
failure to return shall be cause for the removal of their names from the
National Registry of Absentee Voters and his/her permanent disqualification to
vote in absentia.
Thus, Congress crafted a process of registration by which a Filipino voter
permanently residing abroad who is at least eighteen years old, not otherwise
disqualified by law, who has not relinquished Philippine citizenship and who
has not actually abandoned his/her intentions to return to his/her domicile of
origin, the Philippines, is allowed to register and vote in the Philippine
embassy, consulate or other foreign service establishments of the place which
has jurisdiction over the country where he/she has indicated his/her address
for purposes of the elections, while providing for safeguards to a clean
election.
Thus, Section 11 of R.A. No. 9189 provides:
SEC. 11. Procedure for Application to Vote in Absentia.
11.1. Every qualified citizen of the Philippines abroad whose application for
registration has been approved, including those previously registered under Republic
Act No. 8189, shall, in every national election, file with the officer of the embassy,
consulate or other foreign service establishment authorized by the Commission, a
sworn written application to vote in a form prescribed by the Commission. The
authorized officer of such embassy, consulate or other foreign service establishment
shall transmit to the Commission the said application to vote within five (5) days from
receipt thereof. The application form shall be accomplished in triplicate and
submitted together with the photocopy of his/her overseas absentee voter certificate of
registration.
11.2. Every application to vote in absentia may be done personally at, or by mail to,
the embassy, consulate or foreign service establishment, which has jurisdiction over
the country where he/she has indicated his/her address for purposes of the elections.
11.3. Consular and diplomatic services rendered in connection with the overseas
absentee voting processes shall be made available at no cost to the overseas absentee
voter.
Contrary to petitioners claim that Section 5(d) circumvents the
Constitution, Congress enacted the law prescribing a system of overseas
absentee voting in compliance with the constitutional mandate. Such
mandate expressly requires that Congress provide a system
of absentee voting that necessarily presupposes that the qualified citizen of
the Philippines abroad is not physically present in the country. The
provisions of Sections 5(d) and 11 are components of the system of overseas
absentee voting established by R.A. No. 9189. The qualified Filipino abroad
who executed the affidavit is deemed to have retained his domicile in the
Philippines. He is presumed not to have lost his domicile by his physical
absence from this country. His having become an immigrant or permanent
resident of his host country does not necessarily imply an abandonment of his
intention to return to his domicile of origin, the Philippines. Therefore, under
the law, he must be given the opportunity to express that he has not actually
abandoned his domicile in the Philippines by executing the affidavit required
by Sections 5(d) and 8(c) of the law.
Petitioners speculative apprehension that the implementation of Section
5(d) would affect the credibility of the elections is insignificant as what is
important is to ensure that all those who possess the qualifications to vote on
the date of the election are given the opportunity and permitted to freely do
so. The COMELEC and the Department of Foreign Affairs have enough
resources and talents to ensure the integrity and credibility of any election
conducted pursuant to R.A. No. 9189.
As to the eventuality that the Filipino abroad would renege on his
undertaking to return to the Philippines, the penalty of perpetual
disenfranchisement provided for by Section 5(d) would suffice to serve as
deterrence to non-compliance with his/her undertaking under the affidavit.
Petitioner argues that should a sizable number of immigrants renege on
their promise to return, the result of the elections would be affected and could
even be a ground to contest the proclamation of the winning candidates and
cause further confusion and doubt on the integrity of the results of the
election. Indeed, the probability that after an immigrant has exercised the
right to vote, he shall opt to remain in his host country beyond the third year
from the execution of the affidavit, is not farfetched. However, it is not for this
Court to determine the wisdom of a legislative exercise. As expressed
in Taada vs. Tuvera,
[40]
the Court is not called upon to rule on the wisdom of
the law or to repeal it or modify it if we find it impractical.
Congress itself was conscious of said probability and in fact, it has
addressed the expected problem. Section 5(d) itself provides for a deterrence
which is that the Filipino who fails to return as promised stands to lose his
right of suffrage. Under Section 9, should a registered overseas absentee
voter fail to vote for two consecutive national elections, his name may be
ordered removed from the National Registry of Overseas Absentee Voters.
Other serious legal questions that may be raised would be: what happens
to the votes cast by the qualified voters abroad who were not able to return
within three years as promised? What is the effect on the votes cast by the
non-returnees in favor of the winning candidates? The votes cast by qualified
Filipinos abroad who failed to return within three years shall not be invalidated
because they were qualified to vote on the date of the elections, but their
failure to return shall be cause for the removal of the names of the immigrants
or permanent residents from the National Registry of Absentee Voters and
their permanent disqualification to vote in absentia.
In fine, considering the underlying intent of the Constitution, the Court
does not find Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 as constitutionally defective.
B. Is Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 in relation to Section 4 of the
same Act in contravention of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution?
Section 4 of R.A. No. 9189 provides that the overseas absentee voter may
vote for president, vice-president, senators and party-list representatives.
Section 18.5 of the same Act provides:
SEC. 18. On-Site Counting and Canvassing.
. . . . . . . . .
18. 5 The canvass of votes shall not cause the delay of the proclamation of a winning
candidate if the outcome of the election will not be affected by the results
thereof. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Commission is empowered to order the
proclamation of winning candidates despite the fact that the scheduled election has
not taken place in a particular country or countries, if the holding of elections therein
has been rendered impossible by events, factors and circumstances peculiar to such
country or countries, in which events, factors and circumstances are beyond the
control or influence of the Commission. (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner claims that the provision of Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189
empowering the COMELEC to order the proclamation of winning candidates
insofar as it affects the canvass of votes and proclamation of winning
candidates for president and vice-president, is unconstitutional because it
violates the following provisions of paragraph 4, Section 4 of Article VII of the
Constitution:
SEC. 4 . . .
The returns of every election for President and Vice-President, duly certified by the
board of canvassers of each province or city, shall be transmitted to the Congress,
directed to the President of the Senate. Upon receipt of the certificates of canvass, the
President of the Senate shall, not later than thirty days after the day of the election,
open all the certificates in the presence of the Senate and the House of Representatives
in joint public session, and the Congress, upon determination of the authenticity and
due execution thereof in the manner provided by law, canvass the votes.
The person having the highest number of votes shall be proclaimed elected, but in
case two or more shall have an equal and highest number of votes, one of them shall
forthwith be chosen by the vote of a majority of all the Members of both Houses of
the Congress, voting separately.
The Congress shall promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the certificates.
. . .
which gives to Congress the duty to canvass the votes and proclaim the
winning candidates for president and vice-president.
The Solicitor General asserts that this provision must be harmonized with
paragraph 4, Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution and should be taken to
mean that COMELEC can only proclaim the winning Senators and party-list
representatives but not the President and Vice-President.
[41]

Respondent COMELEC has no comment on the matter.
Indeed, the phrase, proclamation of winning candidates, in Section 18.5 of
R.A. No. 9189 is far too sweeping that it necessarily includes the proclamation
of the winning candidates for the presidency and the vice-presidency.
Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 appears to be repugnant to Section 4,
Article VII of the Constitution only insofar as said Section totally disregarded
the authority given to Congress by the Constitution to proclaim the winning
candidates for the positions of president and vice-president.
In addition, the Court notes that Section 18.4 of the law, to wit:
18.4. . . . Immediately upon the completion of the canvass, the chairman of the
Special Board of Canvassers shall transmit via facsimile, electronic mail, or any other
means of transmission equally safe and reliable the Certificates of Canvass and the
Statements of Votes to the Commission, . . . [Emphasis supplied]
clashes with paragraph 4, Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution which
provides that the returns of every election for President and Vice-President
shall be certified by the board of canvassers to Congress.
Congress could not have allowed the COMELEC to usurp a power that
constitutionally belongs to it or, as aptly stated by petitioner, to encroach on
the power of Congress to canvass the votes for president and vice-president
and the power to proclaim the winners for the said positions. The provisions
of the Constitution as the fundamental law of the land should be read as part
ofThe Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 and hence, the canvassing of
the votes and the proclamation of the winning candidates for president and
vice-president for the entire nation must remain in the hands of Congress.
C. Are Sections 19 and 25 of R.A. No. 9189 in violation of Section 1,
Article IX-A of the Constitution?
Petitioner avers that Sections 19 and 25 of R.A. No. 9189 violate Article
IX-A (Common Provisions) of the Constitution, to wit:
Section 1. The Constitutional Commissions, which shall be independent, are the Civil
Service Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the Commission on
Audit. (Emphasis supplied)
He submits that the creation of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee
with the power to review, revise, amend and approve the Implementing Rules
and Regulations promulgated by the COMELEC, R.A. No. 9189 intrudes into
the independence of the COMELEC which, as a constitutional body, is not
under the control of either the executive or legislative departments of
government; that only the COMELEC itself can promulgate rules and
regulations which may be changed or revised only by the majority of its
members; and that should the rules promulgated by the COMELEC violate
any law, it is the Court that has the power to review the same via the petition
of any interested party, including the legislators.
It is only on this question that respondent COMELEC submitted its
Comment. It agrees with the petitioner that Sections 19 and 25 of R.A. No.
9189 are unconstitutional. Like the petitioner, respondent COMELEC anchors
its claim of unconstitutionality of said Sections upon Section 1, Article IX-A of
the Constitution providing for the independence of the constitutional
commissions such as the COMELEC. It asserts that its power to formulate
rules and regulations has been upheld in Gallardo vs. Tabamo, Jr.
[42]
where
this Court held that the power of the COMELEC to formulate rules and
regulations is implicit in its power to implement regulations under Section 2(1)
of Article IX-C
[43]
of the Constitution. COMELEC joins the petitioner in
asserting that as an independent constitutional body, it may not be subject to
interference by any government instrumentality and that only this Court may
review COMELEC rules and only in cases of grave abuse of discretion.
The COMELEC adds, however, that another provision, vis--vis its rule-
making power, to wit:
SEC. 17. Voting by Mail.
17.1. For the May, 2004 elections, the Commission shall authorize voting by mail in
not more than three (3) countries, subject to the approval of the Congressional
Oversight Committee. Voting by mail may be allowed in countries that satisfy the
following conditions:
a) Where the mailing system is fairly well-developed and secure to prevent
occasion for fraud;
b) Where there exists a technically established identification system that would
preclude multiple or proxy voting; and
c) Where the system of reception and custody of mailed ballots in the
embassies, consulates and other foreign service establishments concerned are
adequate and well-secured.
Thereafter, voting by mail in any country shall be allowed only upon review and
approval of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee.
. . . . . . . . . (Emphasis supplied)
is likewise unconstitutional as it violates Section 1, Article IX-A mandating the
independence of constitutional commissions.
The Solicitor General takes exception to his prefatory statement that the
constitutional challenge must fail and agrees with the petitioner that Sections
19 and 25 are invalid and unconstitutional on the ground that there is nothing
in Article VI of the Constitution on Legislative Department that would as much
as imply that Congress has concurrent power to enforce and administer
election laws with the COMELEC; and by the principles of exclusio unius est
exclusio alterius and expressum facit cessare tacitum, the constitutionally
enumerated powers of Congress circumscribe its authority to the exclusion of
all others.
The parties are unanimous in claiming that Sections 19, 25 and portions of
Section 17.1 are unconstitutional. Thus, there is no actual issue forged on
this question raised by petitioner.
However, the Court finds it expedient to expound on the role of Congress
through the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee (JCOC) vis--vis the
independence of the COMELEC, as a constitutional body.
R.A. No. 9189 created the JCOC, as follows:
SEC. 25. Joint Congressional Oversight Committee. A Joint Congressional
Oversight Committee is hereby created, composed of the Chairman of the Senate
Committee on Constitutional Amendments, Revision of Codes and Laws, and seven
(7) other Senators designated by the Senate President, and the Chairman of the House
Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms, and seven (7) other Members of the
House of Representatives designated by the Speaker of the House of
Representatives: Provided, That, of the seven (7) members to be designated by each
House of Congress, four (4) should come from the majority and the remaining three
(3) from the minority.
The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee shall have the power to monitor
and evaluate the implementation of this Act. It shall review, revise, amend and
approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations promulgated by the
Commission. (Emphasis supplied)
SEC. 19. Authority of the Commission to Promulgate Rules. The Commission shall
issue the necessary rules and regulations to effectively implement the provisions of
this Act within sixty (60) days from the effectivity of this Act. The Implementing
Rules and Regulations shall be submitted to the Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee created by virtue of this Act for prior approval.
. . . . . . . . . (Emphasis supplied)
Composed of Senators and Members of the House of Representatives, the
Joint Congressional Oversight Committee (JCOC) is a purely legislative
body. There is no question that the authority of Congress to monitor and
evaluate the implementation of R.A. No. 9189 is geared towards possible
amendments or revision of the law itself and thus, may be performed in aid of
its legislation.
However, aside from its monitoring and evaluation functions, R.A. No.
9189 gives to the JCOC the following functions: (a) to review, revise, amend
and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) promulgated by
the COMELEC [Sections 25 and 19]; and (b) subject to the approval of the
JCOC [Section 17.1], the voting by mail in not more than three countries for
the May 2004 elections and in any country determined by COMELEC.
The ambit of legislative power under Article VI of the Constitution is
circumscribed by other constitutional provisions. One such provision is
Section 1 of Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution ordaining that constitutional
commissions such as the COMELEC shall be independent.
Interpreting Section 1, Article X of the 1935 Constitution providing that
there shall be an independent COMELEC, the Court has held that [w]hatever
may be the nature of the functions of the Commission on Elections, the fact is
that the framers of the Constitution wanted it to be independent from the other
departments of the Government.
[44]
In an earlier case, the Court elucidated:
The Commission on Elections is a constitutional body. It is intended to play a distinct
and important part in our scheme of government. In the discharge of its functions, it
should not be hampered with restrictions that would be fully warranted in the case of a
less responsible organization. The Commission may err, so may this court also. It
should be allowed considerable latitude in devising means and methods that will
insure the accomplishment of the great objective for which it was created free,
orderly and honest elections. We may not agree fully with its choice of means, but
unless these are clearly illegal or constitute gross abuse of discretion, this court should
not interfere. Politics is a practical matter, and political questions must be dealt with
realistically not from the standpoint of pure theory. The Commission on Elections,
because of its fact-finding facilities, its contacts with political strategists, and its
knowledge derived from actual experience in dealing with political controversies, is in
a peculiarly advantageous position to decide complex political questions.

[45]
(Emphasis supplied)
The Court has no general powers of supervision over COMELEC which is
an independent body except those specifically granted by the Constitution,
that is, to review its decisions, orders and rulings.
[46]
In the same vein, it is not
correct to hold that because of its recognized extensive legislative power to
enact election laws, Congress may intrude into the independence of the
COMELEC by exercising supervisory powers over its rule-making authority.
By virtue of Section 19 of R.A. No. 9189, Congress has empowered the
COMELEC to issue the necessary rules and regulations to effectively
implement the provisions of this Act within sixty days from the effectivity of this
Act. This provision of law follows the usual procedure in drafting rules and
regulations to implement a law the legislature grants an administrative
agency the authority to craft the rules and regulations implementing the law it
has enacted, in recognition of the administrative expertise of that agency in its
particular field of operation.
[47]
Once a law is enacted and approved, the
legislative function is deemed accomplished and complete. The legislative
function may spring back to Congress relative to the same law only if that
body deems it proper to review, amend and revise the law, but certainly not to
approve, review, revise and amend the IRR of the COMELEC.
By vesting itself with the powers to approve, review, amend, and revise
the IRR for The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003, Congress went
beyond the scope of its constitutional authority. Congress trampled upon the
constitutional mandate of independence of the COMELEC. Under such a
situation, the Court is left with no option but to withdraw from its usual
reticence in declaring a provision of law unconstitutional.
The second sentence of the first paragraph of Section 19 stating that [t]he
Implementing Rules and Regulations shall be submitted to the Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee created by virtue of this Act for prior
approval, and the second sentence of the second paragraph of Section 25
stating that [i]t shall review, revise, amend and approve the Implementing
Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Commission, whereby Congress,
in both provisions, arrogates unto itself a function not specifically vested by
the Constitution, should be stricken out of the subject statute for constitutional
infirmity. Both provisions brazenly violate the mandate on the independence
of the COMELEC.
Similarly, the phrase, subject to the approval of the Congressional
Oversight Committee in the first sentence of Section 17.1 which empowers
the Commission to authorize voting by mail in not more than three countries
for the May, 2004 elections; and the phrase, only upon review and approval
of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee found in the second
paragraph of the same section are unconstitutional as they require review and
approval of voting by mail in any country after the 2004 elections. Congress
may not confer upon itself the authority to approve or disapprove the countries
wherein voting by mail shall be allowed, as determined by the COMELEC
pursuant to the conditions provided for in Section 17.1 of R.A. No.
9189.
[48]
Otherwise, Congress would overstep the bounds of its constitutional
mandate and intrude into the independence of the COMELEC.
During the deliberations, all the members of the Court agreed to adopt the
separate opinion of Justice Reynato S. Puno as part of the ponencia on the
unconstitutionality of Sections 17.1, 19 and 25 of R.A. No. 9189 insofar as
they relate to the creation of and the powers given to the Joint Congressional
Oversight Committee.
WHEREFORE, the petition is partly GRANTED. The following portions of
R.A. No. 9189 are declared VOID for being UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
a) The phrase in the first sentence of the first paragraph of Section 17.1, to
wit: subject to the approval of the Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee;
b) The portion of the last paragraph of Section 17.1, to wit: only upon
review and approval of the J oint Congressional Oversight Committee;
c) The second sentence of the first paragraph of Section 19, to wit: The
Implementing Rules and Regulations shall be submitted to the J oint
Congressional Oversight Committee created by virtue of this Act for prior
approval; and
d) The second sentence in the second paragraph of Section 25, to wit: It shall
review, revise, amend and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations
promulgated by the Commission of the same law;
for being repugnant to Section 1, Article IX-A of the Constitution
mandating the independence of constitutional commission, such as
COMELEC.
The constitutionality of Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189
is UPHELD with respect only to the authority given to the COMELEC to
proclaim the winning candidates for the Senators and party-list
representatives but not as to the power to canvass the votes and proclaim the
winning candidates for President and Vice-President which is lodged with
Congress under Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution.
The constitutionality of Section 5(d) is UPHELD.
Pursuant to Section 30 of R.A. No. 9189, the rest of the provisions of said
law continues to be in full force and effect.
SO ORDERED.