RODRIGUEZ v.

DE BORJA
GR No.L-21993, June 21, 1966
17 SCRA 418
FACTS:
Private respondents Apolonia Pangilinan and Adelaida Jacalan delivered to the Clerk of Court of Bulacan a purported last
will and testament of Fr. Rodriguez,
meanwhile the petitioners(RODRIGUEZ) filed a petition before the court to examine the purported will but which was later
withdrawn, and a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of Fr. Rodriguez was subsequently field in a another court
in Rizal.
The petitioners(RODRIGUEZ) now sought the dismissal of the special proceeding on the settlement of the decedent's
estate based on the purported will, questioning therefore the jurisdiction of CFI Bulacan.
ISSUE: Does CFI Bulacan have jurisdiction to proceed with the testate proceedings?
HELD: Yes. The jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan became vested upon the delivery thereto of the will of
the late Father Rodriguez, even if no petition for its allowance was filed until later, because upon the will being deposited
the court could, motu proprio, have taken steps to fix the time and place for proving the will, and issued the corresponding
notices conformably to what is prescribed by section 3, Rule 76, of the Revised Rules of Court. Moreover, aside from the
rule that the Court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent shall exercise jurisdiction to the
exclusion of all other courts, intestate succession is only subsidiary or subordinate to the testate, since intestacy only takes
place in the absence of a valid operative will.
BALANAY, JR. vs. MARTINEZ
64 SCRA 452
FACTS:
Leodegaria Julian died. She was survived by her husband, Felix Balanay, Sr., and six legitimate children.
Felix Balanay, Jr. filed a petition for the probate of his mothers notarial will, which was written in English. In thatwill,
Leodegaria declared that it was her desire her properties should not be divided among her heirs during her husband's
lifetime and that their legitimes should be satisfied out of the fruits of her properties. She devised andpartitioned the
conjugal lands as if they were all owned by her. She disposed of in the will her husband's one-half share of the conjugal
assets.
Felix Balanay, Sr. and Avelina B. Antonio opposed the probate of the will.There after, Felix Balanay, Sr. signed an
instrument waiving and renouncing his right in Leodegarias estate in favor of their 6 children.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the probate court erred in passing upon the intrinsic validity of the will, before ruling on itsallowance or
formal validity, and in declaring it void.
RULING:
The trial court acted correctly in passing upon the will's intrinsic validity even before its formalvalidity had been
established. The probate of a will might become an idle ceremony if on its face it appears tobe intrinsically void .But the
probate court erred in declaring that the will was void and in converting the testate proceeding into anintestate
proceeding.The will is intrinsically valid and the partition therein may be given effect if it does not prejudice the creditors
andimpair the legitimes. The distribution and partition would become effective upon the death of Felix Balanay, Sr. In
themeantime, the net income should be equitably divided among the children and the surviving spouse.( Relate to Articles
779 and 780 : In this case, there is testamentary succession because it resulted from the designation of heirs by the testatrix,
made in a will executed in the form prescribed by law. It can be considered as a mixed succession because there is partly by
will (execution of the will and execution of the waiver) and by operation of law (as to the share of the husband of the
conjugal party of which he eventually waived
JHELD: NO. The conveyance in question is not, first of all, one of mortis causa, which should be embodied in a will. A will
has been defined as a personal, solemn, revocable and free act by which a capacitated person disposes of his property and
rights and declares or complies with duties to take effect after his death. In other words, the bequest or device must pertain
to the testator. In this case, the monies subject of savings account No. 35342-038 were in the nature of conjugal funds In the
case relied on, Rivera v. Peoples Bank and Trust Co., we rejected claims that a survivorship agreement purports to deliver
one partys separate properties in favor of the other, but simply, their joint holdings.

There is no showing that the funds exclusively belonged to one party, and hence it must be presumed to be conjugal, having
been acquired during the existence of the marital relations.
Neither is the survivorship agreement a donation inter vivos, for obvious reasons, because it was to take effect after the
death of one party. Secondly, it is not a donation between the spouses because it involved no conveyance of a spouses own
properties to the other.
It is also our opinion that the agreement involves no modification petition of the conjugal partnership, as held by the Court
of Appeals, by mere stipulation and that it is no cloak to circumvent the law on conjugal property relations. Certainly,
the spouses are not prohibited by law to invest conjugal property, say, by way of a joint and several bank account, more
commonly denominated in banking parlance as an and/or account. In the case at bar, when the spouses Vitug opened
savings account No. 35342-038, they merely put what rightfully belonged to them in a money-making venture. They did not
dispose of it in favor of the other, which would have arguably been sanctionable as a prohibited donation.
The conclusion is accordingly unavoidable that Mrs. Vitug having predeceased her husband, the latter has acquired upon her
death a vested right over the amounts under savings account No. 35342-038 of the Bank of America. Insofar as the
respondent court ordered their inclusion in the inventory of assets left by Mrs. Vitug, we hold that the court was in error.
Being the separate property of petitioner, it forms no more part of the estate of the deceased.
SEANGIO VS REYES
PRs, Alfredo Seangio et. al filed for the settlement of the intestate estate of the late Segundo Seangio.
Petitioners opposed said petition, contending that Segundo left a holographic will disinheriting Alfredo for cause. The
reason for the disinheritance was due to Alfredo's maltreatment to his father Segundo.
In view of the purported holographic will, petitioners averred that in the event thedecedent is found to have a will, the
intestate proceedings are to be automatically suspended and replaced by the proceedings of the will.
PRs moved for the dismissal of the probate proceedings contending that the alleged will of Segundo does not contain any
disposition of the estate of the deceased and that all other compulsory heirs were not named nor instituted as heir. Devisee
or legatee hence there is preterition which would result to intestacy.
Petitioners countered that the rule on preterition does not apply because Segundo's will does not constitute a universal heir
or heirs to the exclusion of one or more compulsory heirs. They argued that the testator intended all his compulsory
heirs,petitioners and PRs alike, with the sole exception of Alfredo, to inherit his estate
.ISSUE: WON THE COMPULSORY HEIRS IN THE DIRECT LINE WERE PRETERITED IN THE WILL.
HELD:No. The compulsory heirs in the direct line were not preterited in the will. According to the SC, it was Segundos last
expression to bequeath his estate to all his compulsory heirs with the sole exception of Alfredo. Also, Segundo did not
institute an heir to the exclusion of his other compulsory heirs. The mere mention of the name of one of the
petitioners,Virginia, in the document did not operate to institute her as the universal heir. Her name was included only as a
witness to the altercation between Segundo and his son, Alfredo.
CASTAEDA v. ALEMANY
GR No.1439, March 19, 1904
3 PHIL 426
FACTS: Appellant constested the validity of the will of Doa Juana Moreno upon the ground that although the attestation
clause in the will states that the testator signed the will in the presence of three witnesses who also each signed in each
presence, the will was not actually written by the testator.
ISSUE: Is it necessary that a will be written by the testator herself?
HELD: No. Section 618 of the Civil Code requires (1) that the will be in writing and (2) either that the testator sign it
himself or, if he does not sign it, that it be signed by some one in his presence and by his express direction. Who does the
mechanical work of writing the will is a matter of indifference. The fact, therefore, that in this case the will was typewritten
in the office of the lawyer for the testratrix is of no consequence.
VDA. DE VILLANUEVA vs. JUICO
4 SCRA 550
FACTS:

Don Nicolas Villaflor executed a will in Spanish in his own handwriting, devising and bequeathing in favor of his wife,
Dona Faustina of all his real and personal properties giving the other half to his brother Don Fausto.
Petitioner filed an action against the administrator contending that upon the widows death, she became vested with the
ownership of the properties bequeathed under clause 7 pursuant to its 8th clause of the will.
ISSUE:
WON the petitioner is entitled to the ownership of the properties upon the death of Dona Faustina.
HELD:
The intention of the testator here was to merely give usufructuary right to his wife Doa Fausta because in his will he
provided that Doa Fausta shall forfeit the properties if she fails to bear a child and because she died without having
begotten any children with the deceased then it means that Doa Fausta never acquired ownership over the property. Upon
her death, because she never acquired ownership over the property, the said properties are not included in her estate. Those
properties actually belong to Villaflor. That was the intention of the testator. Otherwise, if the testator wanted to give the
properties to Doa Fausta then he should have specifically stated in his will that ownership should belong to Doa Fausta
without mentioning any condition.