VALENZUELA VS UNSON

32 PHIL 19 OCTOBER 20, 1915

PONENTE: Johnson, J.:

FACTS: On December 11, 1912, the plaintiffs presented a petition in the
Court of Land Registration for the registration of 34 parcels of land in
Pagsanjan, Province of Laguna. With such, respondents Pedro Unson and
Felix Unson presented their opposition to the registration of a portion of lot
No. 1 which portion is known as lot No. 1-A, representing a stone wall,
simply, constructed between lot No. 1 and the lot belonging to the said
objectors. This wall extends from the street running in front of the lots
owned by the plaintiffs and defendants, between said lots, for a distance of
about thirty meters. It is about 38 centimeters wide and separates the lots
claimed by the parties. At intervals along the wall, there are buttresses,
which are constructed on both sides of the wall. About midway between the
street and the rear end of the lots, resting on the wall, there is a kitchen
belonging to the defendants which is about forty years old. About 8 meters
from the street there is a cross wall, on the property of the plaintiff, which is
joined to the wall in question. Along the street and in front of the lots, there
is a sidewalk which is in front of the properties wherein it divides on the
plaintiffs side of the wall. The wall appears to have been built as one wall.
The plaintiffs attempt to show, in support of their claim of ownership of the
wall that the kitchen referred to above was built so as to rest upon the wall,
by the express permission given by them to the objectors, or their
predecessors. That fact is strongly denied by the objectors. They claim that
the kitchen was built without permission and without the objection on the
part of the plaintiffs. Later a motion for a rehearing was made by the
petitioners. Upon a consideration of said motion, the lower court, on the
15th day of December, 1913, modified that part of its first decision relating
to lot No. 1-A, and declared that the same was a party wall. The lower court
did not decree the registration of the wall. From the decision the objectors
appealed to this court. The petitioners did not appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the said wall belongs to the petitioners and
registrable in their name.

HELD: No. Article 572 of the civil code states that When there is no title or
exterior marks or proofs to the contrary, there is a presumption that a
dividing wall between two adjoining properties is a party wall. Considering
the fact that both parties have used the wall for the purpose of supporting
the structures on their respective lots, that the plaintiffs have a wall joined
to the wall in question and that they and the defendants have used as a
partial support for the kitchen, and considering the conflicting character of
the testimony with respect to ownership of the wall, we are of opinion that
the said wall is a party wall that it belongs to the petitioners and objectors
jointly. One of two or more joint owners of land cannot have the same
registered against the opposition of the other joint owners.

DECISION: The judgment of lower court be affirmed without any finding as
to costs, so ordered.






































ACEBEDO V. ABESAMIS
217 SCRA 186 GR NO. 102380 JANUARY 18, 1993

PONENTE: CAMPOS, Jr., J

FACTS: The late Felix Acebedo left an estate consisting of several real estate
properties located in QC and Caloocan. Said estate allegedly has unsettled
claims. The decedent was succeeded by eight heirs, two of whom are the
petitioners, and the others are the private respondents. Due to prolonged
pendency of the case, respondents-heirs filed a motion for approval of sale.
The said sale involved properties covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos.
155569, 120145, 9145, and 18709, all of which are registered in Quezon
City. It was further stated in said motion that respondents-heirs have
already received their proportionate share of the P6 million paid by the
buyer, Yu Hwa Ping, as earnest money and the balance of P6 million more
than enough to pay the unsettled claims against the estate. Thus, they
prayed for the Court to direct Administrator Herodotus to sell the properties
mentioned in the motion. Petitioner-administrator interposed an Opposition
to Approval of Sale to alleging that some of the heirs have sold some real
estate property of the Estate located at Balintawak without his knowledge,
approval of this court, and of some heirs. Petitioners moved to be given a
period of 45 days within which to look for a buyer who will be willing to buy
the properties at a price higher than P12 million. The case was set for
hearing. Petitioners have not found any buyer so they asked the court for an
in extendible period of 30 days to look for a buyer. Petitioner filed a criminal
complaint for falsification of a public document against Yu Hwa Ping and
notary public Eugenio Obon upon learning that it was Yu Hwa Ping who
caused the notarization of the Deed of Conditional Sale wherein allegedly his
signature was made to appear. After he confronted the notary public he
revoked his notarial act on it. Petitioner filed civil action to secure the
declaration by the court of the nullity of the Deed of Conditional Sale and
Absolute Sale. The period lapsed without having found a buyer and
petitioner Demosthenes sought to nullify the orders granting them several
periods. After seven long months, petitioner-administrator filed another
Opposition to Approval of Sale, maintaining that the sale should wait for the
country to recover from the effects of the coup detat attempts, otherwise,
the properties should be divided among the heirs. Petitioners filed a Motion
for Leave of Court to Mortgage and Lease some of the Properties and the
court ruled in favor of petitioners. Respondent Judge issued an order
resolving to call the parties to a conference but still the parties were unable
to arrive at an agreement. So the parties agreed that the heirs be allowed to
sell their shares of the properties to Yu Hwa Ping while petitioners negotiate
for higher price. Petitioners filed a supplemental opposition to the approval
of the Deed. Respondent Court issued the challenged order approving the
conditional sale in favor of Yu Hwa Ping, pertaining to their respective shares
in the said properties and ordered administrator Herodotus to sell the
remaining portions of the said properties also to Yu Hwa Ping at the same
price as the sale executed by the heirs. Petitioners filed a Motion for
Reconsideration and private respondents filed their Opposition. Instead of
making a reply, petitioners herein filed a Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration. The motions for reconsideration of petitioners were denied.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration but the respondent
Court denied it for lack of merit. Heirs filed a Motion for Execution of the
Order. Petitioners then filed this petition for certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not it is within the jurisdiction of the lower court, acting
as a probate court, to issue an order approving the Deed of Conditional Sale
executed by respondents-heirs without prior court approval and to order
administrator to sell the remaining portion of said properties.

HELD: Yes. In the case of Dillena vs. CA, this court made a pronouncement
that it is within the jurisdiction of the probate court to approve the sale of
properties of a deceased person by his prospective heirs before final
adjudication. The Court further elaborated that although the Rules of Court
do not specifically state that the sale of an immovable property belonging to
an estate of a decedent, in a special proceeding, should be made with the
approval of the court, this authority is necessarily included in its capacity as
a probate court. Therefore, it is clear that the probate court in the case at
bar, acted within its jurisdiction in issuing the Order approving the Deed of
Conditional Sale. The right of an heir to dispose of the decedents property,
even if the same is under administration, is based on the Civil Code
provision stating that the possession of hereditary property is deemed
transmitted to the heir without interruption and from the moment of the
death of the decedent, in case the inheritance is accepted. Where there are
however, two or more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is, before its
partition, owned in common by such heirs.

DECISION: Petition is hereby DISMISSED.









SALAS VS. JARENCIO
46 SCRA 734 AUGUST 30, 1972

PONENTE: ESGUERRA, J.

FACTS: On February 24 1919, the Court of First Instance of Manila, acting
as a land registration court, rendered judgement declaring the City of Manila
the owner of in fee simple of a parcel of land in the Cadastral Survey of the
City of Manila. Pursuant to said judgment, the Register of Deeds of Manila
issued in favour of the said City, Original Certificate of Title covering the
abovementioned parcel of land. On various dates in 1924, the City of Manila
sold portions of the aforementioned parcel of land in favour of Pura
Villanueva. The Municipal Board of Manila, presided by the then Vice- Mayor
Antonio Villegas adopted a resolution requesting His Excellency, the
President of the Philippines to consider the feasibility of declaring the City
Proper as Bounded by Florida, San Andres, and Nebraska streets as a
patrimonial property of the City of Manila for the purpose of reselling these
lots to the actual occupants thereof. Later, a bill was filed in the House of
Representatives but was then revised by Representatives Cases, Raquiza
and Yiguez.The bill was passed by the Senate, approved by the president
and became Republic Act No. 4118. Hence, this petition for review by
certiorari of a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila.

ISSUE: Is the property involved private or patrimonial property of the City
of Manila?

HELD: The conclusion of the respondent court that Republic Act No. 4118
converted a patrimonial property of the City of Manila into a parcel of
disposable land of the State and took it away from the City without
compensation is, therefore, unfounded. In the last analysis the land in
question pertains to the State and the City of Manila merely acted as trustee
for the benefit of the people therein for whom the State can legislate in the
exercise of its legitimate powers. If it is a patrimonial property, why should
the City of Manila be requesting the President to make the representation
to the legislature to declare it as such so it can be disposed of in favor of the
actual occupants? There could be no more blatant recognition of the fact
that said land belongs to the State and was simply granted in usufruct to the
City of Manila for municipal purposes.

DECISION:The appealed decision is hereby reversed, and petitioners shall
proceed with free and untrameled implementation of Republic Act No. 4118.



EDU VS. GOMEZ
G.R NO. L-33397 JUNE 22, 1984

PONENTE: Relova, J.

FACTS: This case involves a model Volkswagen, bantam car owned by Lt.
Walter A. Bala of Clark Airbase, Angeles City,and registered at the Angeles
City Land Transportation Commission Agency. The Office of the Commission
on Land Transportation received a report on August 25, 1970 from the
Manila Adjustment Company that the abovementioned car was stolen.
Petitioners Eduardo Domingo, Carlos Rodriguez, and Patricio Yambao, agents
of Anti-Carnapping Unit (ANCAR) of the Philippine Constabulary, with the
Land Transportation Commission, recognized subject car in the possession of
private respondent Lucila Abello and immediately seized and impounded the
car as stolen property. Likewise, petitioner Romeo F. Edu, then
Commissioner of Land Transportation, seized the car pursuant to Section 60
of Republic Act 4136 which empowers him to seize the motor vehicle for
delinquent registration aside from his implicit power deducible from Sec.
4(5), Sec. 5 and 31 of said Code, "to seize motor vehicles fraudulently or
otherwise not properly registered." Lucila Abello filed a complaint for
replevin with damages in respondent court, impleading petitioners, praying
for judgment, among others, to order the sheriff or other proper officer of
the court to take the said property into his custody and to dispose of it in
accordance with law. On February 18, 1971, respondent judge of the then
Court of First Instance of Manila issued the order for the seizure of the
personal property. With respect to the replevin filed by private respondent
Lucila Abello, respondent Court of First Instance Judge found that the car in
question was acquired by Lucila Abello by purchase from its registered
owner, Marcelino Guansing, for the valuable consideration of P9,000.00,
under the notarial deed of absolute sale, dated August 11, 1970; that she
has been in possession thereof since then until February 3, 1971 when the
car was seized from her by the petitioners who acted in the belief that it is
the car which was originally registered in the name of Lt. Walter A. Bala and
from whom it was allegedly stolen. Finding for the private respondent,
respondent judge held the replevin case in favor of her.

ISSUE: Whether or not the claim of petitioners that the Commission has the
right to seize and impound the car under Section 60 of Republic Act 4136 is
tenable.

HELD: No. Section 60 of Republic Act 4136 which reads: Sec. 60. The lien
upon motor vehicles, any balance of fees for registration,re-registration or
delinquent registration of a motor vehicle, remaining unpaid and all fines
imposed upon any vehicle owner, shall constitute a first lien upon the motor
vehicle concerned. It is clear from the provision of said Section 60 of
Republic Act 4136 that the Commissioner's right to seize and impound
subject property is only good for the proper enforcement of lien upon motor
vehicles. The Land Transportation Commission may issue a warrant of
constructive or actual distraint against motor vehicle for collection of unpaid
fees for registration, re-registration or delinquent registration of vehicles.

DECISION: The petition is hereby DENIED.



































CRUZ VS CA
G.R. NO. 122904. APRIL 15, 2005

PONENTE: Tinga, J.

FACTS: Petitioner Adoracion Cruz is the mother of her co-petitioners Thelma
Cruz, Gerry Cruz and Nerissa Cruz Tamayo, as well as Arnel Cruz. Petitioners
filed said case on February 11, 1983 against Arnel Cruz and herein private
respondents Summit Financing Corporation (Summit'), Victor S. Sta. Ana
and Maximo C. Contreras, the last two in their capacities as deputy sheriff
and ex-officio sheriff of Rizal, respectively, and Ramon G. Manalastas in his
capacity as Acting Register of Deeds of Rizal. In the Complaint alleged that
petitioners and Arnel Cruz were co-owners of a parcel of land situated in
Taytay, Rizal. Yet the property, which was then covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 495225, was registered only in the name of
Arnel Cruz. According to petitioners, the property was among the properties
they and Arnel Cruz inherited upon the death of Delfin Cruz, husband of
Adoracion Cruz. consequently, the same parties to the Deed of Partial
Partition agreed in writing to share equally in the proceeds of the sale of the
properties although they had been subdivided and individually titled in the
names of the former co-owners pursuant to the Deed of Partial Partition.
This arrangement was embodied in a Memorandum of Agreement executed
on August 23, 1977 or a day after the partition. On June 4, 1980, a Real
Estate Mortgage was constituted on the disputed property then covered by
TCT No. 495225 to secure the loan obtained by Arnel Cruz thru Nelson
Tamayo from respondent Summit. Then in their complaint before the RTC,
petitioners asserted that they co-owned the properties with Arnel Cruz, as
evidenced by the Memorandum of Agreement. Hence, they argued that the
mortgage was void since they did not consent to it. In ruling in favor of
petitioners, the trial court declared that with the execution of the
Memorandum of Agreement, petitioners and Arnel Cruz had intended to keep
the inherited properties in a state of co-ownership. The trial court stated that
respondent Summit should suffer the consequences of incorrectly assuming
that Arnel Cruz was the exclusive owner of the mortgaged property. It found
respondent Summit negligent in its failure to inquire further into the
limitations of defendant Cruz's title. Thus, the trial court declared that only
the undivided share of Cruz in the mortgaged property was validly
transferred to respondent Summit although it granted petitioners' prayer for
nullification, per the dispositive portion of its Decision. reconsideration of the
decision. Petitioners insist that the Memorandum of Agreement 'expressly
created a pro-indiviso co-ownership over the property. Thus, petitioners
argue that the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the validity of the
mortgage considering that it was executed without their knowledge and
consent.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is still common-ownership between the parties
over the property?

HELD: Yes, the parties hereto are common co-owners pro-indiviso in equal
shares of the following registered real properties and That as a result of
said partial partition, the properties affected were actually partitioned and
the respective shares of each party, adjudicated to him/her. That despite the
execution of this Deed of Partial Partition and the eventual disposal or sale of
their respective shares, the contracting parties herein covenanted and
agreed among themselves and by these presents do hereby bind themselves
to one another that they shall share alike and receive equal shares from the
proceeds of the sale of any lot or lots allotted to and adjudicated in their
individual names by virtue of this deed of partial partition. Furthermore the
Agreement shall continue to be valid and enforceable among the contracting
parties herein up to and until the last lot is covered by the deed of partial
partition above adverted to shall have been disposed of or sold and the
proceeds thereof equally divided and their respective shares received by
each of them. As correctly held by the Court of Appeals, the parties only
bound themselves to share in the proceeds of the sale of the properties. The
agreement does not direct reconveyance of the properties to reinstate the
common ownership of the parties. To insist that the parties also intended to
re-establish co-ownership after the properties had been partitioned is to
read beyond the clear import of the agreement and to render nugatory the
effects of partition, which is not the obvious or implied intent of the parties.

DECISION: WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 41298 are
hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.














FRANCISCO VS. PAEZ
54 PHIL 239 JANUARY 14, 1930

PONENTE: Romualdez, J.

FACTS: In the complaint of Marcelo Francisco, plaintiff, he claims a right of
way, upon payment of indemnity, across defendant Paezs land; that the
latter recognize the plaintiffs ownership of a piece of land of 23.46 square
meters, that he vacate it, and that the defendant indemnify him for the
damages arising from said occupation. Respondents Timoteo Paez and
Ricardo Jabson answered with general denial and further claims that his
right has already prescribed and plaintiff has no right since there is another
possible way, which is shorter and less prejudicial respectively. The Court of
First Instance of Manila held that the plaintiff is the absolute owner of the
land and house built by Paez upon payment of its value or to compel Paez to
buy the land which is P20 per square meter. The plaintiff appealed this
judgment questioning the court in not holding the issue on right of way. The
trial court held that the plaintiff can no longer obtain the reliefs he sougt his
action is barred by the statute of limitations. Under Section 40 of the Code
of Civil Procedure, the action to recover ownership or possession of real
property, or an interest therein may only be exercised within ten years after
the cause of said action arises. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the plaintiffs right of way over defendants Paezs
land has prescribed or imprescriptible.

HELD: Although it is true that easements are extinguished by non-user for
twenty years (art. 546, No. 1, Civil Code), the case at bar, does not deal
with an easement which has been in use, and the legal provision just cited is
only applicable to easements which being in use are later abandoned. Legal
easements may be extinguished by non-user, but only with respect to the
actual form or manner in which they have been exercised; and the right or
the power to claim the exercise of the legal easement does not prescribe, as
happens especially in the right of way and the easement of waters. In the
case of intermittent easements, such as the right of way, the waiver must
be, if not formal and solemn, at least such as may be obviously gathered
from positive acts; and therefore, the mere fact that the plaintiff and his
predecessors refrained from claiming the easement, without any positive act
to imply a real waiver, does not bring the case within the purview of article
546, No. 5, of the Civil Code.




DE LA CRUZ VS. RAMISCAL
450 SCRA 449 FEBRUARY 4, 2005

PONENTE: Chico-Nazario, J.

FACTS: Respondent Olga Ramiscal owned a property located at 18th avenue
and Boni Serrano Avenue, Murphy, Quezon City while Petitioners Elizabeth
De la Cruz and Alfredo De la Cruz owned a property with an area of 85
square meters registered in the name of the latters mother at the back of
the respondents property. Petitoners enclosed with a gate, fence, and roof a
1.10-meter wide by 12.60-meter long strip of land owned by respondent as
their pathway to and from 18th avenue, the nearest public highway from
their property. The respondent leased her proper to Phil. Orient Motors
which owned a property adjacent to that of the respondent. The Phil. Motors
later on sold its property to San Benito Realty. Thereafter, it was found out
that respondent owned the pathway used by the petitioners through an
engineer who surveyed the properties. When there was no settlement
between the parties in Barangay proceedings, the respondent filed a civil
case seeking for the demolition of the structure and further asserted that
there is an existing right of way other than his property as evidenced by the
subdivision plan presented by the respondent. The petitioners admitted that
they used his property but with his knowledge and consent. It was on 1976,
that respondent constructed on her property of a motor shop but petitioners
opposed the building of perimeter wall as it would render their property
without any adequate ingress and egress and so they asked respondent to
give them a pathway on the eastern side of her property but offered them
the northern side which is the subject of the case. The petitioners were
made to sign a document waiving their right to ask for an easement along
the eastern side of the said property and it was submitted to the person in
charge of the construction of the motor shop. The Regional Trial Court ruled
in favor of the plaintiff. The Court of Appeals denied the appeal of the
petitioners for it was beyond the reglementary period. Hence, this petition.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not petitioners are entitled to a voluntary or legal easement
of right of way

(2) Whether or not respondent is barred by laches from closing the right of
way being used by petitioners.

HELD:
(1) No. An easement or servitude is a real right, constituted on the corporeal
immovable property of another, by virtue of which the owner has to refrain
from doing, or must allow someone to do, something on his property, for the
benefit of another thing or person. The statutory basis for this right is Article
613, in connection with Article 619, of the Civil Code. In this case,
Petitioners failed to show competent evidence other than their bare claim.
The hands of this Court are tied from giving evidence to petitioners self-
serving claim that such right of way was voluntarily given them by
respondent for the following reasons: First, petitioners didnt produce
evidence as to the agreement. Second, the head of the construction has no
authority. Moreover, the conferment of a legal easement of right of way
under article 649 is subject to proof of the following requisites: (1) it is
surrounded by other immovable and has no adequate outlet to a public
highway; (2) payment of proper indemnity; (3) the isolation is not the result
of its own acts; (4) the right of way claimed is at the point least prejudicial
to the servient state; and (5) to the extent consistent with the foregoing
rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may
be the shortest. The first three requisites are not obtaining in the instant
case.

( 2) No. the essential elements of laches are: (a) conduct on the part of the
defendant, or of one under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation
complained of; (b) delay in asserting complainants rights after he had
knowledge of defedants acts and after he has had the opportunity to sue;
(c) lack of knowledge or notice by defendant that the complainant will assert
the right on which he bases his suit; and (d) injury or prejudice to the
defendant in the event the relief is acceded to the complainant. The second
and third elements are certainly lacking here. As borne by the records, it
was only in 1995 that respondent found out that the pathway being used by
petitioners was part of her property.

DECISION: WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED.














PALERO-TAN VS. URDANETA JR.
A.M. NO. P-07-2399/558 SCRA 28 JUNE 18, 2008

Ponente: Chico-Nazario, J.:

FACTS: On July 8, 2005, complainant Edna Palero-Tan, Court Stenographer
III discovered that her ring and bracelet worth fifteen thousand pesos (Php
15,000), which she kept in the locked drawer of her table at her RTC office
were missing. She informed her officemates about it, but nobody claimed to
have seen it. Complainant claimed that the only person who was present and
saw her take out the jewelry from her table drawer was respondent Ciriaco
Urdaneta Jr., utility worker of the same court. On July 28, 2005, an
officemate, Altone, confided to her that he heard from his landlady, Nable,
that respondent and his wife Milagros had a quarrel because the latter
discovered a ring and a bracelet in respondents coin purse. Milagros
suspected that respondent bought the jewelry for his mistress. Complainant
approached the RTC judge, Judge Faluche and relayed to him the
information she gathered. Milagros confirmed the information to Judge
Faluche. Respondent in his answer denied that he stole the jewelry. He
claimed that he found a small plastic sachet containing a ring and a bracelet
on June 29, 2005, and took it for safekeeping with the intention of returning
them to whoever was the owner. However, his wife, on June 30, 2005 found
them and accused him of having an affair. To stop the wifes nagging, he
threw the pieces of jewelry at a grassy lot beside their house. On the day
that the complainant is asking about them, respondent did not speak out not
until Judge Faluche confronted him and after his wife had already disclosed
the evident facts.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondents bare denial of any personal interest in
the pieces of jewelry can be given credence.

HELD: No. When a person who finds a thing that has been lost or mislaid by
the owner takes the thing into his hands, he acquires physical custody only
and does not become vested with legal possession. In assuming such
custody, the finder is charged with the obligation of restoring the thing to its
owner. It is thus respondents duty to report to his superior or his
officemates that he found something. Article 719 of the Civil Code, explicitly
requires the finder of a lost property to report it to the proper authorities.






QUEVADA VS. COURT OF APPEALS
502 SCRA 233 / G.R NO. 140798 SEPTEMBER 19, 2006

PONENTE: Azcuna, J.

FACTS: Before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), the plaintiff/respondent
said that he is the lessor of a parcel of land with a residential house in
Sampaloc, Manila. Sometime in 1994, he and defendant/petitioner entered
into a Contract of Lease for the period from August 15, 1994 to August 15,
1995, at a monthly rental of 2,500.00. After expiration of the lease, they
entered into another Contract of Lease, commencing from August 15, 1995
to April 15, 1996. After the expiration of the extended Lease, the petitioner
continued possessing the premises, but without payment of any reasonable
compensation. Because of the petitioners refusal to vacate the premises,
private respondent referred the matter to the barangay court for conciliation.
On January 20, 1998, private respondent served upon the petitioner a notice
to vacate the leased property within a period of fifteen (15) days, to pay
5,000 rental starting May, 1996, and every month thereafter until the
premises shall have been vacated. On the other hand, petitioner answered
that as early as November 1985, he built a house on the lot which was
finished in 1986 and occupied the house as his residence. A Lease of
Contract was executed for him to pay the rentals at 2,500.00 a month, but
only with respect to the land and as an assurance that as soon as petitioner
would be in financial position to do payment, the former will transfer the title
to the latter. The private respondent did not give him a chance to pay the
purchase price and refused to accept the monthly rental of the lot. Because
of his refusal, petitioner opened an account in trust for the private
respondent where the monthly rentals could be deposited. Petitioner added
that there was an implied trust by virtue of the true agreement whereby
the purchase price of the lot would be paid by the private respondent and for
the latter, later on, to transfer the title after he shall have paid the purchase
price. The MeTC of Manila, Branch 30, ruled in favor private respondent.
Petitioner appealed, but the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch VII,
affirmed the decision of MeTCs Decision. Petitioner then went on appeal
again asking for reversal of the RTC Decision. The CA rendered its assailed
Decision affirming the appealed decision. Petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration was denied. Hence, this petition for review by Marcelito D.
Quevada, assailing the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the action for ejectment is proper

2. Whether such action can be brought by private respondent who is not the
titled owner of the property
3. Whether petitioner can be reimbursed for the value of the house on the
property

4. Whether there is an implied trust

HELD:
1. The action for ejectment or, more specifically, unlawful detainer or
desahucio is under the proper jurisdiction of the MeTC. The Lease Contract
was not extended again after its expiration on April 15, 1996. Petitioners
continued use and occupancy of the premises without any contract between
him and private respondent was by mere tolerance or permission of the
latter. Possession by tolerance is lawful, but such possession becomes
unlawful when the possessor by tolerance refuses to vacate upon demand
made by the owner.

2. Private respondent may bring the action for unlawful detainer, even
though he is not the titled owner of the leased property. Such action has for
its object the recovery of the physical possession or determination of who
is entitled to possession de facto of the leased premises, not the ownership
of the lot and not its legal possession, in the sense contemplated in civil
law.

3. Petitioner should be paid for the value of the portion of the house covered
by the lease, to be offset against rentals due. The parties shall agree upon
the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the
terms thereof.

4. There is no implied trust. Petitioner fails to support his assertion that such
has been created in his favor and that the purchase of the land by private
respondent is for and in his behalf.

DECISION: The petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution of
the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 53209, dated September 16, 1999 and November
11, 1999, are hereby AFFIRMED BUT WITH THE MODIFICATION that the
case is REMANDED to the court a qou.








CEBU OXYGEN AND ACETYLENE VS. BERCILLES
G.R. NO. L-40474 AUGUST 29, 1975

Ponente: Concepcion, JR., J.

FACTS: The parcel of land sought to be registered was originally a portion of
M. Borces Street, Mabolo, Cebu City. The City Council of Cebu, through
Resolution 2193 , declared the terminal portion of M.Borces Street, Mabolo,
Cebu City, as an abandoned road, the same not being included in the City
Development Plan. The City Council of Cebu passed Resolution 2755,
authorizing the Acting City Mayor to sell the land through a public bidding.
The lot was awarded to the herein petitioner being the highest bidder. The
City of Cebu, through the Acting City Mayor, executed a deed of absolute
sale to the petitioner for a total consideration of P10,800.00.By virtue of the
aforesaid deed of absolute sale, the petitioner filed an application with the
CFI Cebu to have its title to the land registered (LRC N-948; LRC Record N-
44531). The Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Cebu filed a motion to dismiss the
application on the ground that the property sought to be registered being a
public road intended for public use is considered part of the public domain
and therefore outside the commerce of man. After hearing the parties, trial
court issued an order dismissing the petitioner's application for registration
of title. Hence, the instant petition for review.

ISSUE: Does the declaration of the road, as abandoned, make it the
patrimonial property of the City of Cebu which maybe the object of a
common contract?

HELD: YES. When a portion of the city street was withdrawn from public use,
such withdrawn portion becomes patrimonial property which can be the
object of an ordinary contract. As expressly provided by Article 422 of the
Civil Code, "property of public dominion, when no longer intended for public
use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the
State." Further, the Revised Charter of the City of Cebu, in very clear and
unequivocal terms, states that "property thus withdrawn from public
servitude may be used or conveyed for any purpose for which other real
property belonging to the City may be lawfully used or conveyed." Thus, the
withdrawal of the property in question from public use and its subsequent
sale to the petitioner is valid.

DECISION: The order dated October 11, 1974, rendered by the respondent
court in Land Reg. Case No. N-948, LRC Rec. No. N-44531 is hereby set
aside.


SANTOS VS. BERNABE
54 PHIL 19 NOVEMBER 6, 1929
PONENTE: Villa-Real, J.

FACTS: Urbano Santos, plaintiff, deposited 778 cavans and 38 kilos of palay
in the warehouse of Jose Bernabe. At the same time, Pablo Tiongson also
deposited 1,026 cavans and 9 kilos of palay. The share of Tiongson and
Santos were mixed together and cannot be separated. Later on, Tiongson
filed with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan a complaint against Bernabe
to recover the 1,026 cavans and 9 kilos of palay deposited in Bernabes
warehouse. So Tiongson files for a petition for a writ of attachment and the
Court granted it. Bernabes properties were attached, including only 924
cavans of rice and 31 kilos of palay. These were sold at a public auction
and the proceeds were delivered to Tiongson. Santos tried to intervene in
the attachment of the palay but then the sheriff had already proceeded with
the attachment, so Santos files a complaint. Santos contends that Tiongson
cannot claim the 924 cavans of palay attached by the sheriff as part of those
deposited in the warehouse, because, in asking for the attachment thereof,
Tiongson claimed that the cavans of rice all belonged to Bernabe and not to
him.

ISSUE: Whether or not Tiongson can claim the 924 cavans of rice as his
own.

HELD: No, both Tiongson and Santos must divide the cavans and palay
proportionately. Ther being no means to separate out of the palay attached
and sold, the following rule prescribed is Article 381 of the Civil Code: If, by
will of one of their owners, two things of identical or dissimilar nature are
mixed, or if the mixture occurs accidentally, if in the latter case, the things
cannot be separated without injury, each owner shall acquire a right in the
mixture proportionate to the part belonging to him, according to the value of
the things mixed or comingled.

The number of kilos in a cavan not having been determined, the Court took
the proportion only of the 924 cavans of palay which were attached andsold,
therby giving Santos, who deposited 778 cavans, 398.49 and Tiongson, who
deposited 1,026 cavans, 525.51, or the value thereof at the rate of 3php per
cavan.

DECISION: The judgement appealed from is hereby modified. Pablo
Tiongson is ordered to pay the plaintiff Urbano Santos.



ALDOVINO V. ALUNAN III
GR NO. 102232 MARCH 9, 1994

PONENTE: Bellosillo, J.

FACTS: Due to the execution of Executive Order No. 120 (particularly
Section 29), which provided for the reorganization of the Ministry of
Tourism, several incumbents who were not assigned to new positions lost
their employment. Now petitioners seek the relief provided to their co-
workers as adjudged by the several preceding cases of Mandani, Abogar and
Arnaldo. The Solicitor General who contends that unlike the petitioners in the
above mentioned cases, the petitioners in the case before the bench have
slept on their rights for it had taken them four years to present an action-
hence laches has set in. Petitioners contend that such was the case for upon
loss of employment, many had to return to far flung provinces where the
only news they could receive was from the slow, and often unreliable word
of mouth.

ISSUES:
1. Whether Laches has set in.

2. Whether Petitioners have slept on their rights.

3. Whether public respondents may raise prescription.

HELD:
1. NO. Laches should not be seen as mere ordinary prescription. While
prescription is concerned with the fact of delay, laches concerned with
the effect of delay. Laches in a question of inequity being founded on
some change in the condition of the property or in relation to the
property. I the case at bar, if ever invoked, (laches) must rule in favor
of the petitioners and the intervenors who were unjustly injured y
public respondents unlawful acts . The prejudice from the high-landed
violation of the rights of the petitioners and intervenors resulting in
their loss of employment is far more serious than the inconvenience to
public respondents in rectifying their own mistakes.

2. NO. Picketing with placards demanding immediate reinstatement could
not be any less than written demands sufficient to interrupt the period
of prescription. Incidentally, even the picketing of the premises and
the placed placards demanding their reinstatement could not be any
less than written demands sufficient to interrupt the period of
prescription.
3. NO, for prescription must yield to the higher interests of justice. At the
late stage, the court refused to consider prescription not only because
it was never raised and therefore foreclosed, but incidentally,
prescription must also give way to the higher interests of justice.

DECISION: Petition GRANTED





































VITUG VS. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. NO. 82027 MARCH 29, 1990

PONENTE: Sarmiento, J.

FACTS: This is a chapter in an earlier suit decided by this Court involving the
probate of the two wills of the late Dolores Luchangco Vitug, who died in
New York, U.S.A., on November 10, 1980, naming private respondent
Rowena Faustino-Corona executrix. In our said decision, we upheld the
appointment of Nenita Alonte co-special administrator of Mrs. Vitugs estate
with her (Mrs. Vitug) widower, petitioner Romarico G. Vitug, pending
probate. On January 13, 1985, Romarico G. Vitug filed a motion asking
authority from the probate court to sell certain shares of stock and real
properties velonging to the estate to cover allegedly his advances to the
estate in the sum of P667,731.66, plus interest, which he claimed were
personal funds. As found by the Court of Appeals, the allged advances
consisted of P58,147.40 spent for the payment estate tax, P518,834.27 as
deficiency estate tax, and P90,749.99 as increment thereto. According to
Mr. Vitug, he withdrew the sums of P518,834.27 and P90,749.99 from the
savings account No. 35342-038 of the Bank of America, Makati, Metro
Manila. On April 22, 1985, Rowena Corona opposed the motion to sell on
the ground that the same funds withdrawn from savings account no.35342-
038 were conjugal partnership properties and part of the estate, and hence,
there was allgedly no ground for reimbersment. She also sought his ouster
for failure to include the sums in question for inventory and for concealment
of funds belonging to the estate. Vitug insists that the said funds are his
exclusive property having acquired the same through a survivorhip
agreement executed with his late wife and the bank on June 19, 1970.

ISSUE: Whether or not the survivorship agreement between spouses
Romarico Vitug and Dolores Vitug is valid?

HELD: There is no demonstration here that the survivorhip agreement had
been executed for such unlawful purposes, or, as held by tyhe respondent
court in order to frustrate our laws on wills, donations, and conjugal
partnership. The conclusion is accordingly unavoidable that Mrs. Vitug
having predeceased her husband, the latter has acquired upon her death a
vested right over the amounts under savings account no. 35342-038 of the
Bank of America. Insofar as the respondent court ordered their inclusion in
the inventory of assets of Mrs. Vitug, we hold that the court was in error.
Being the separate property of petitioner, it forms no more part of the estate
of the deceased.

DECISION: Decision and resolution set aside.
REPUBLIC VS. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. NO. 108926 JULY 12, 1996

PONENTE: Torres, Jr., J.

FACTS: Subject property situated at Liwanag, Talon (formerly Pamplona),
Las Pias, Rizal, now Metro Manila with an area of 45, 295 sq. m. was first
owned by Santos dela Cruz. Said subject property was subsequently bought
by Pedro Cristobal, Regino Gervacio, Diego Calugdan and Gil Alhambra.
When Gil Alhambra died, an extrajudicial partitioning was made by his heirs
and registered said property under their names. On 5 July 1966, they
executed a Deed of Sale with Mortgage deeding the subject property to
Democrito O. Plaza (Plaza, for brevity). Upon receipt of the full payment,
they executed a Release of Mortgage on 1 August 1968. After the sale, he
took possession of the property and paid the taxes due thereon for the years
1966 up to 1986, and declared it in his name on 1985. He appointed
Mauricio Plaza and Jesus Magcanlas as the caretaker and administrator
thereof. On 14 November 1986, Plaza filed a petition which was amended on
17 July 1987 for the registration and confirmation of his title over the
subject property. On 14 June 1991, the Regional Trial Court of Makati
confirmed Plazas title over the property which was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals on February 8, 1993. On 24 February 1988, the Republic of the
Philippines (Republic, for brevity) filed its opposition to said registration
alleging among others that: a) Plaza and his predecessors in interest have
not been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the land in question since 12 June 1945 or prior to that, b) the
muniments of title and tax declarations as well as tax payments relied upon
do not constitute sufficient evidence of a bona fide acquisition of the land by
Plaza, and c) the subject property pertains to the public domain and is not
subject to private appropriation. Hence, this petition for certiorari.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Plaza has established actual possession of the property

2. Whether or not said property being the subject of a housing project of
the government may hinder ones claim over it

HELD:
1. After Plaza has taken possession of the subject property, he paid the
taxes due thereon and declared the same in his name under Tax Declaration
Nos. B-013-01392 and B-013-01391. The existence of such are not
conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of
possession in the concept of the owner for no one in his right mind would be
paying taxes for property that is not in his actual or at least constructive
possession. They constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title
over the property.

2. The existence of Presidential Proclamation No. 679 did not prohibit the
registration of title of one who claims, and proves to be the owner of the
said property since property covered under such law is only withdrawn from
sale or any settlement for it is reserved for the purpose intended by the law.
Thus, the Plazas ownership over the property must be respected and he
cannot be barred from having the land titled under his name.


































OO VS. LIM
GR NO. 154270 MARCH 19, 2010

PONENTE: Bersamin, J;

FACTS: On October 23, 1992, Lim filed in the RTC in Cebu City a petition for
the reconstitution of the owners duplicate copy of the OCT No. RO-9969-(O-
20449), alleging that said OCT had been lost during World War II by his
mother, Luisa; that Lot No. 943 of the Balambang Cadastre in Cebu City
covered by said OCT had been sold in 1937 to Louisa by Spouse Diego Oo
and Estefania Apas (Spouses Oo), the lots registered owners; and that
although the deed evidencing the sale had been lost without being
registered, Antonio Oo (Antonio), the only legitimate heir of spouses Oo,
had executed on April 23, 1961 in favor of Louisa a notarized document
denominated as confirmation of sale, which was duly filed in the Provincial
Assessors Office of Cebu. Zosimo Oo and the petitioner Teofisto Oo
(Oos) opposed Lims petition, contending that they had the certificate of
title in their possession as the successors-in-interest of Spouses Oo. On
account of the Oos opposition, and upon order of the RTC, Lim converted
the petition for reconstitution into a compliant for quieting of title, averring
additionally that he and his predecessor-in-interest had been in actual
possession of the property since 1937, cultivating and developing it,
enjoying its fruits, and paying the taxes corresponding to it. He prayed, inter
alia, that the Oos be ordered to surrender the reconstituted owners
duplicate copy of OCT No. RO-9969-(O-20449), and that said OCT be
cancelled and new certificate of title be issued in the name of Louisa in lieu
of said OCT. In their answer, the Oos claimed that their predecessors-in-
interest, Spouses Oo, never sold Lot No. 943 to Louisa; and that the
confirmation of sale purportedly executed by Antonio was fabricated, his
signature thereon not being authentic. In its decision dated July 30, 1996,
the RTC favored Lim, and ordered the cancellation of OCT No. RO-9969-(O-
20449) and the issuance of a new certificate of title in the name of Louisa
Narvios-Lim (Louisa), Lims deceased mother and predecessor-in-interest.
Appeal (CA-GR CV No. 57823), the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC
on January 28, 2002. Petitioners motion for reconsideration through the
resolution dated June 17, 2002.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the validity of the OCT could be collaterally attacked
through an ordinary civil action to quiet title;

2. Whether or not the ownership over registered land could be lost by
prescription, laches, or adverse possession.

HELD:
1. Quieting of Title is a common law remedy for the removal of any cloud,
doubt, uncertainty-affecting title to real property. The petitioners
contention is not well taken. An action or proceeding is deemed an
attack on a title when its objective is to nullify the title, thereby
challenging the judgement pursuant to which the title was declared.
The avertment readily show that the action was neither a direct or
collateral attack on the OCT for Lim only asserting only that the
existing title registered in the name of the petitioners predecessors
had become inoperative due to the conveyance in favor of Lims
mother, and resultantly should be cancelled.

2. Prescription, in general, is a mode of acquiring or losing ownership and
other real rights through the lapse of time in the manner and under
the conditions laid down by law. However prescription was not
relevant to determination of the dispute herein, considering that Lim
did not base his right of ownership on an adverse possession over a
certain period. He insisted herein, instead, that title to the land had
been voluntarily transferred by the registered owners themselves to
Luisa, his predecessor-in-interest.























PHILIPPINE FISHERIES DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY VS COURT OF
APPEALS
G.R. NO. 150301 OCTOBER 2, 2007

PONENTE: Azcuna, J.

FACTS: The controversy arose when respondent Municipality of Navotas
assessed the real estate taxes allegedly due from petitioner Philippine
Fisheries Development Authority (PFDA) for the period 1981-1990 on
properties under its jurisdiction, management and operation located inside
the Navotas Fishing Port Complex (NFPC). The assessed taxes had remained
unpaid despite the demands made by the municipality which prompted it,
through Municipal Treasurer Florante M. Barredo, to give notice to petitioner
on October 29, 1990 that the NFPC will be sold at public auction on
November 30, 1990 in order that the municipality will be able to collect on
petitioners delinquent realty taxes which, as of June 30, 1990, amounted to
P23,128,304.51, inclusive of penalties. Petitioner sought the deferment of
the auction sale claiming that the NFPC is owned by the Republic of the
Philippines, and pursuant to Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 977, it (PFDA) is
not a taxable entity.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is liable to pay real property tax.

HELD: Local government units, pursuant to the fiscal autonomy granted by
the provisions of Republic Act No. 7160 or the 1991 Local Government Code,
can impose realty taxes on juridical persons19 subject to the limitations
enumerated in Section 133 of the Code:

SEC. 133. Common Limitations on the Taxing Power of Local Government
Units. Unless otherwise provided herein, the exercise of the taxing powers
of provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays shall not extend to the
levy of the following: taxes, fees, charges of any kind on the national
government, its agencies and instrumentalities, and local government units.

Nonetheless, the above exemption does not apply when the beneficial use of
the government property has been granted to a taxable person. Section 234
(a) of the Code states that real property owned by the Republic of the
Philippines or any of its political subdivisions is exempted from payment of
the real property tax "except when the beneficial use thereof has been
granted, for consideration or otherwise, to a taxable person."

Thus, as a rule, petitioner PFDA, being an instrumentality of the national
government, is exempt from real property tax but the exemption does not
extend to the portions of the NFPC that were leased to taxable or private
persons and entities for their beneficial use.

In light of the above, petitioner is only liable to pay the amount of
P62,841,947.79 representing the total taxes due as of December 31, 2001
from PFDA-owned properties that were leased, as shown in the Summary of
Realty Taxes Due Properties Owned and/or Managed by PFDA as per Realty
Tax Order of Payment dated September 16, 2002.





































LAUREL VS GARCIA
G.R. NOS. 92013 & 92047 25 JULY 1990

PONENTE: Guitierrez, Jr., J.

FACTS: As part of the indemnification to the Filipino people of their losses
during the second World War, a Reparations Agreement was entered into by
the Philippines and Japan. The agreement stipulated that reparations valued
at $550 million will be paid to the Filip[inos within 20 years. As a result, the
Philippines was able to acquire four properties in Japan including the lot in
question, known as the Roponggi property which consists of the land and the
building for the Chancery of the Philippine Embassy having an area of 3179
sq. m. and located at 306, Roponggi, 5-Chome Minato-ku, Tokyo, Japan. The
other properties that were acquired were the Nampeidai Property, the Kobe
Commercial Property and the Kobe Residential Property. The Roponggi
property became the site of the Philippine Embassy but was transferred to
Nampeidai on July 22, 1976 to facilitate repairs. The repairs never
materialized for lack of funds. Thereafter, a proposal was made to then
President Corazon Aquino to lease the Roponggi property to the Kajima
Corporation, however, the Aquino administration failed to act favorably on
this proposal. Instead, President Aquino issued Administrative Order No. 3
on August 11, 1986 creating a committee which would study the
disposition/utilization of properties in Japan. Adminstrative Orders 3-A, B, C
and D also followed afterwards. On July 25, 1987, President Aquino issued
Executive Order No. 296 which allowed non-Filipi9no citizens to benefit from
the reparation goods in the event of sale, lease or disposition. The Philippine
properties in Japan were specifically named in the Order. This was met by
public opposition; however, the Roponggi property was twice put into
bidding. The first bidding was a failure and the second one did not
materialize. A third bidding was to be conducted; however, the Court
restrained it through the issuance of a temporary restraining order.
Thereafter, petitioners Salvador H. Laurel and Dionisio S. Ojeda filed
separately petitions for prohibition before the Supreme Court. Petitioner
Ojeda's petition contained also a prayer for the issuance of a writ of
mandamus to compel respondents to disclose to the public the sale of the
Roponggi property. Petitioners contend that the Roponggi property is of the
public domain and is incapable of appropriation. Respondents, on the other
hand, contend that the Roponggi property has ceased to be a property of the
public domain and the disposition of such property is governed by Japanese
law and not Philippine law.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Roponggi property and others of its kind can be
alienated by the Philippine Government.
2. Whether or not the Chief Executive, her officers and agents, have the
authority and jurisdiction, to sell the Roponggi property.

HELD:
1. No. The Roponggi property is a property of the public domain; hence it is
not capable of being appropriated. The said property is outside the
commerce of man and cannot be alienated. The Ropoongi property is
classified under paragraph 2 of Article 420of the Civil Code as a property of
the State intended for some public service. Indeed, respondents' contention
that the property has ceased to become a property of the public domain is
untenable since no formal declaration was made by the government
regarding such matter. The abandonment of the Roponggi property to
supposedly make it a patrimonial property is not a definite way of converting
the public character of the property to a private one. It is true that the
Philippine Embassy was transferred to Nampeidei but this does not relinquish
the Roponggi property's original purpose. As such, the Roponggi property
remains as property of public dominion and is unappropriable.

2. No. The concurrence of both the executive and legislative branches is
needed in the sale of the said property. The president cannot convey
valuable real property of the government on his or her own sole will;
conveyance must be authorized and approved by a law enacted by
Congress. Respondents' contention that the CARP Law withdrew the public
character of the Roponggi property is untenable since the said law only
enumerates possible sources of funding to augment agrarian reform. It does
not divest the Roponggi property of its public character. Moreover, the
Senate's Resolution No. 55 asking for the deferment of the sale of the
Roponggi property does not withdraw the property from puiblic domain
much less authorizes its sale. It is merely a resolution.

DECISION: Petitions granted. Temporary Restraining Order made
Permanent.











PEARL & DEAN (PHIL.) INCORPORATED VS. SHOEMART
INCORPORATED
G.R. NO. 148222 AUGUST 15, 2003 409 SCRA 231

PONENTE: CORONA, J.

FACTS: Pearl and Dean Phil. Inc. (PDI) Is a corporation engaged in the
manufacture of advertising display units simply referred to as light boxes
and was able to secure a Certificate of Copyright Registration. Sometime in
1985 PDI negotiated with Shoemart, Inc. (SMI) for the lease and installation
of the light boxes in SM City North Edsa. Since the latter was under
construction, SMI offered SM Makati and SM Cubao, to which PDI agreed.
PDIs General Manager submitted for signature the contracts to SMIs
Advertising Promotions and Publicity Division Manager; however only the
contract for SM Makati was returned signed. PDI General Manager wrote to
SMI inquiring about the contract for SM Cubao but the latter did not bother
to reply. Instead, SMIs Counsel informed PDI that it was rescinding the
contract for SM Makati due to non-performance of the terms. PDI said it was
without basis and pushed for the signing of the contract for SM Cubao.Two
years later, Metro Industrial Services, the company formerly contracted by
PDI to fabricate its display units, offered to contract light boxes for
Shoemarts chain of stores, to which SMI approved. After the contract was
terminated, SMI engaged the services of EYD Rainbow Advertising
Corporation to make 300 units of light boxes.Sometime in 1989, PDI
received reports that exact copies of its light boxes were installed at SM City
and in the fastfood section of SM Cubao. Upon investigation, PDI found out
that North Edsa Marketing Incorporated (NEMI) was set up primarily to sell
advertising space in lighted display units. PDI sent a letter to SMI and NEMI
enjoining them to cease using the subject light boxes and to remove the
same from SMIs establishments. It also demanded for the discontinued use
of the trademark Poster Ads and the payment of compensatory damages in
the amount of Twenty Million Pesos (P20,000,000.00). Upon receipt of the
demand letter, SMI suspended the leasing of 224 light boxes and NEMI took
down its advertisements for Poster Ads from the lighted display units.
Claiming that both SMI and NEMI failed to meet all its demands, PDI filed
the instant case for infringement of trademark and copyright, unfair
competition and damages. The RTC of Makati decided in favour of PDI. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court. Dissatisfied, PDI filed
the instant petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of
Appeal before the Supreme Court.

ISSUES:
1) Whether or not there was copyright infringement.

2) Whether or not there was patent infringement.

3) Whether or not there was trademark infringement.

4) Whether or not unfair competition was performed by SMI.

HELD:
1) No. Copyright was limited to the drawings alone and not to the box
itself. Being a mere statutory grant, the rights are limited to what the
statute confers. It can cover only the works falling within the statutory
enumeration or description.

2) No. There can be no infringement of a patent until a patent has been
issued since whatever right one has to the invention covered by the
patent arises alone from the grant of patent. Petitioner never secured
a patent which could have protected its invention. To be able to
effectively and legally preclude others from copying and profiting from
the invention, a patent is a primordial requirement.

3) No. The failure of PDI to secure a trademark registration for specific
use on the light boxes meant that there could not have been any
trademark infringement since registration was an essential element
thereof.

4) No. There can be no unfair competition on the law on copyrights.
Poster Ads is a generic term.

DECISION: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals is affirmed in toto. SO ORDERED.












BENITEZ VS. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. NO. 104828 JANUARY 16, 1997 266 SCRA 242

PONENTE: PANGANIBAN, J.

FACTS: Petitioners Rafael and Avelina Benitez purchased a 303-square-
meter parcel of land with improvement from the Cavite Development Bank.
Subsequently, private respondents Renato and Elizabeth Macapagal bought a
361-square-meter lot. They filed with the Regional Trial Court against
petitioners for the recovery of possession of an encroached portion of the lot
they purchased. The parties were able to reach a compromise in which
private respondents sold the encroached portion to petitioners at the
acquisition cost of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) per square meter.
Private respondents purchased still another property, a 285.70 square-
meter-lot, adjacent to that of petitioners. After a relocation survey was
conducted, private respondents discovered that some 46.50 square meters
of their property was occupied by petitioners house. Despite verbal and
written demands, petitioners refused to vacate. Private respondents filed
with the Metropolitan Trial Court for ejectment against petitioners. The MeTC
of San Juan decided in favour of the former. On appeal, the Regional Trial
Court affirmed said decision. On further appeal, the respondent court found
no merit in petitioners plea. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari of a
decision of the Court of Appeals was filed before the Supreme Court.

ISSUES:
(1)Whether or not prior possession is a condition in an action for ejectment.

(2)Who has the option to sell the land?

HELD:
(1)No. Prior possession is not always a condition sine qua non in ejectment.
That petitioners occupied the land prior to private respondents purchase
does not negate the latters case for ejectment.

(2)The option to sell the land on which another in good faith builds, plants,
or sows on, belongs to the landowner.








TAN VS DE LA VEGA
G. R. NO. 168809 10 MARCH 2006

PONENTE: Ynares-Santiago, J.:

FACTS: The respondents are co-owers of a parcel of land measuring 159,
576 sq. m. located in Marikina, Rizal, Metro Manila and covered by TCT No.
257152, issued on June 20, 1969. The said property contained the lot in
dispute, Lot 89, having an area of 54, 197 sq. m. On a 29, 945 sq. m.
portion of Lot 89, Macario Mencias was able to obtain Free Patent No.
495269 on July 31, 1971 and OCT No. 711 on August 11, 1971. Upon his
death, OCT No. 711 was canceled and TCT No. 186516 was issued to his
heirs namely Aquilina Mencias, Aurora M. Gabat, Merlyn M. Cadete and
Myrna M. Quirante (defendant heirs). Sometime in April 1992, the defendant
heirs caused the ejectment of the occupants of the said poriton of land of Lot
89. The defendant heirs then sold the said property to the New Atlantis Real
Estate and Development, Inc. (Corporation) which was represented by its
President, Victor C. Salvador thereby cancelling TCT No. 186516 and issuing
TCT No. 271604 on Novemebr 14, 1994. Thereafter, the Corporation sold
the questioned lot to petitioners on Novemebr 17, 1994 cancelling out TCT
No. 271604 and giving rise to TCT No. 272191. On August 3, 1992, a
complaint was then filed by respondents before the RTC of Pasig City for
quieting of title and for the declaration of nullity of Free Patent No. 495269,
OCT No. 711 and TCT No. 186516 against the defendant heirs, the Secretary
of the DENR, the Director of thge Land Management Bureau and the Register
of Deeds of Marikina. The complaint was later amended to implead the
petitioners herein. The respondents contend that the free patent of Macario
Mencias and the derivative titles from it are void since the lot covered by
said patent and derivative titles are well within Lot 89 of the respondents. As
such, the lot is already of private ownership and is incapable of acquisition
through a free patent. In their Answer, the defendant heris contend that Lot
89 was never part of respondents' TCT No. 257152. The respondents' title
was said to be a derivative of OCT No. 730 and not OCT No. 734 which
covered Lot 89. Defendant heirs further contended that the respondents'
title is a mere reconstitution of TCT No. 45046 which covers a parcel of land
in San Juan, Rizal measuring about 356 sq. m. only. They also raised the
defense of laches and prescription. On the other hand, petitioners raised the
defense of good faith as they were not aware of the existence of such a
cloud on the title. They said that their title had no annotations that the
property was still in lis pendens. On March 4, 2003, respondents filed a
motion for judgment on the pleadings which the trial court granted. Hence,
on March 21, 2003, the trial court rendered an order in favor of respondents.
Petitioners appealed to the Court of appeals but the trial court's order was
affirmed. A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioners but was
denied. Hence, petitioners filed a petition for review on certiorari before the
Supreme Court.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not a judgment on the pleadings is proper in the instant
case.

2. Whether or not a void title may be the source of a valid title.

HELD:
1. No. In a proper case for judgment on the pleadings, there is no
ostensible issue at all because of the failure of the defending party's
answer to raise an issue. If an answer, therefore, denies specifically
the material averments of the complaint, then a judgment on the
pleadings would be naturally improper. In this case, the trial court
erred in rendering judgment on the pleadings because the pleadings
filed by the parties generated ostensible issues that necessitate the
presentation of evidence. What the trial court has done is not a
judgment on the pleadings but a summary judgment. However, a
summary judgment is not warranted in this case as there are issues
which call for a full blown trial.

2. Yes. The rule is that a void title may be the source of a valid title in the
hands of an innocent purchaser for value. Since good faith is always
presumed, it was premature for the trial court to conclude that
petitioners were not purchasers in good faith. In the absence of
evidence showing the contrary, bad faith, which is never presumed,
cannot be charged against petitioners. Hence, the circumstances
warrant that petitioners' title is valid although it may be subsequently
declared void.

DECISION: Petition granted. Case remanded to the RTC of Pasig City.












CHAVEZ V. PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY
GR NO. 133250 JULY 9, 2002

PONENTE: Carpio, J.

FACTS: During the time of then President Marcos, the Commissioner of
Public Highways entered into a contract with the Construction and
Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP) to reclaim foreshore and
off-shore areas of the Manila Bay. Among the stipulations was the
construction of certain phases of a Manila-Cavite Coastal Road. For the
construction, the CDCP would be paid with fifty percent of the reclaimed
lands from the sea. In 1995, the Public Estates Authority (PEA) entered into
a JVA (Joint Venture Agreement) with AMARI Coastal Bay Development
Corporations for the exploration and development of the Freedom Islands. It
is noteworthy, however, that the JVA did not undergo public bidding. The
Senate Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises, and
the Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations
conducted an investigation of the said contract and came up with the finding
that the lands sought to be transferred to AMARI are lands of public domain
which are not classified as alienable. Hence the certificate of title covering
the Freedom Islands and the JVA were illegal. Then President Ramos would
create a legal task force impressed with the duty of determining the legality
of the JVA. The body would uphold its validity. In 1998, petitioner in his
capacity as a taxpayer filed for an instant for mandamus with the issuance of
a writ of preliminary injunction and TRO. Petitioner so avers that the
government and the people are to lose billions of pesos from the sale of the
reclaimed lands, and that such a sale or agreement would be in violation of
the Constitution which prohibits the sale of inalienable lands of the public
domain to corporations.

ISSUE: Whether the government can sell such a property to a private party.

HELD: NO. Until now, the only way the government can sell to private
parties government reclaimed and marshy disposable lands of public domain
are for the legislature to pass law authorizing such a sale. Since then and
now, the president has not been granted authority to reclassify government
reclaimed and marshy lands into non-agricultural lands.

DECISION: Petition GRANTED.





BENIN V. TUASON
57 SCRA 531

PONENTE: ZALDIVAR, J.

FACTS: On May 19, 1955 three sets of plaintiffs filed three separate
complaints containing the same allegations. In Civil case number 3621, they
alleged that they were the owners and possessors of three parcels of lands
located in La Loma, Caloocan. That they inherited the said land and their
predecessors in interest had possessed these three parcels of land openly,
adversely and peacefully, cultivated it, and exclusively enjoyed the fruits
harvested there from. That in 1933, herein plaintiffs registered their claims
of ownership over said lands; that they declared said lands for taxation
purposes in 1940 under Tax Dec. No. 2429 and sometime in 1942, evacuees
from Manila during the World War II, with the permission of plaintiffs,
constructed their houses thereon and paid monthly rentals to plaintiffs. The
plaintiffs in these three civil cases uniformly alleged that sometime in the
year 1951 while they were enjoying the peaceful possession of their lands,
the defendants, particularly J.M. Tuason and Co. Inc., with the aid of armed
men, by force and intimidation, using bulldozers and other demolishing
equipment, illegally entered and started demolishing and destroying the
dwellings and constructions of plaintiffs' lessees as well as the improvements
and permanent improvements therein. In 1953 they discovered for the first
time that their lands had either been fraudulently or erroneously included,
by direct or constructive fraud, in what appears as Parcel No. 1 (known as
Santa Mesa Estate) in Original Certificate of Title No. 735 of the Land
Records of the province of Rizal in the names of the original applicants for
registration/defendants. The plaintiffs also alleged that the registered
owners mentioned in OCT No. 735 had applied for the registration of two
parcels of land (known as the Santa Mesa Estate and the Diliman Estate),
located in the municipalities of Caloocan and San Juan del Monte, province of
Rizal, of which parcel No. 1 (Santa Mesa Estate) contained an area of
8,798,617 square meters; that the registration proceedings were docketed
as LRC No. 7681 of the Court of Land Registration; that the application for
registration in LRC No. 7681, containing the boundaries, technical
descriptions and areas of parcel No. 1 (Santa Mesa Estate) and parcel No. 2
(Diliman Estate) was published in the Official Gazette; that before the
decision was handed down in LRC No. 7681, the area, boundaries and
technical descriptions of parcel No. 1 were altered and amended; that the
amendments and alterations, which were made after the publication of the
original application, were never published. And that the decision dated March
7, 1914 in LRC No. 7681 is null and void because the Land Registration
Court had no jurisdiction to render the decision for lack of publication; that
Decree No. 17431 issued pursuant to the decision of March 7, 1914 in LRC
No. 7681 is likewise null and void from the beginning, because it was issued
pursuant to a void decision and because the boundaries, technical
descriptions and areas appearing in the decree are different and not identical
with the boundaries, technical descriptions and areas in the application for
registration as published in the Official Gazette; that the plaintiffs had not
been notified of the proceedings in LRC No. 7681 although the applicants
knew, or could have known, by the exercise of necessary diligence, the
names and addresses of the plaintiffs and their predecessors in interest who
were then, and up to the time the complaints were filed, in possession and
were cultivating the lands; and that during, before, and even after the
issuance of OCT No. 735 the defendants had tacitly recognized the
ownership of the plaintiffs over their respective lands because said
defendants had never disturbed the possession and cultivation of the lands
by the plaintiffs until the year 1951; and that all transfer certificates of title
issued subsequently, based on Original Certificate of Title No. 735, are also
null and void.

ISSUE: If a buyer knows at the time of purchase that the lot he is acquiring,
is in the possession o a person other than the seller, is he necessarily a
buyer in bad faith?

HELD: He is not necessarily a buyer in bad faith. After all, a possessor is not
necessarily the owner of the property possessed. Besides, he may possess
only a portion of the land involved, or his possession may be with the
knowledge and tolerance of the owner. The rights of a mere possessor are
unavailing as against a seller who is armed with Torrens Title over the
property involved.

















FARRALES VS. CITY MAYOR OF BAGUIO
G.R. NO. L-24245 APRIL 11, 1972 44 SCRA 239

PONENTE: MAKALINTAL, J.

FACTS: Leonor Farrales, plaintiff, was the holder of a municipal license to
sell liquor and sari-sari goods. When the temporary building where she had
her stall was demolished in order that the city might construct a permanent
building, Plaintiff was ordered to move her goods to another temporary place
until the permanent building was completed. Instead, Plaintiff built a
temporary shack on the cement passageway at the end of the Rice Section,
Baguio City Market, without seeking prior permit or permission from any city
official. When the police threatened to demolish this shack, Plaintiff sought
injunction before the Court of First Instance (CFI) which asked her to show
proper permit. Upon failure of Plaintiff to comply with the order, the police
demolished the shack. Plaintiff cited the police for contempt but this Court,
in an order dated September 19, 1956, denied Plaintiff's petition. Plaintiff
amended her complaint so as to include as Defendants the policemen whom
she claims did the demolishing but was dismissed. Hence, plaintiff appealed
from the decision of the CFI to the Court of Appeals and subsequently
certified by the latter to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
1) Whether or not the shack or temporary stall was a nuisance.
2) Whether or not the police officers are liable for damages in
extrajudicially abating the nuisance.

HELD:
1) The Supreme Court held that the shack was in fact a nuisance. In the
first place she had no permit to put up the temporary stall in question
in the precise place where she did so. In the second place, its location
on the cement passageway at the end of the Rice Section building was
such that it constituted an obstruction to the free movement of people.
2) According to Article 707 of the same Code, a public official
extrajudicially abating a nuisance shall be liable for damages in only
two cases:

(1) if he causes unnecessary injury, or

(2) if an alleged nuisance is later declared by the courts to be not a
real nuisance. In the present case, no unnecessary injury was caused
to the appellant, and not only was there no judicial declaration that the
alleged nuisance was not really so but the trial court found that it was
in fact a nuisance. Indeed it may be said that the abatement thereof
was not summary, but through a judicial proceeding. Under the
circumstances there is absolutely no ground to award damages in
favor of the appellant.

DECISION: Judgment appealed from is affirmed.






































JOAQUINO VS REYES
G.R. NO. 154645 JULY 13, 2004

PONENTE: PANGANIBAN, J.:

FACTS: Lourdes Reyes was legally married to Rodolfo Reyes on January 3,
1947 in Manila. They have four children, namely: Mercedes, Manuel, Miriam
and Rodolfo Jr., all surnamed Reyes and co-respondents in this case. Rodolfo
Reyes died on September 12, 1981.At the time of his death, Rodolfo Reyes
was living with his common-law wife, Milagros Joaquino, with whom she
begot three (3) children namely: Jose Romillo, Imelda May and Charina, all
surnamed Reyes. During the common-law relationship of Rodolfo Reyes and
Milagros Joaquino and while living together, they decided to buy the house
and lot situated at No. 12 Baghdad Street, Phase 3, BF Homes, Paraaque,
Metro Manila. A Deed of Absolute Sale dated July 12, 1979 was executed in
favor of Milagros Joaquino and Transfer Certificate of Title No. S-90293
covering the said property was issued in the name of petitioner only on July
20, 1979. Thus respondents filed a Complaint for reconveyance and
damages, dated January 23, 1982, before the Court of First Instance of Rizal
alleging that Rodolfo A. Reyes was Vice President and Comptroller of Warner
Barnes and Company with an income of P15, 000.00 a month and, after
retirement on September 30, 1980, received from said company benefits
and emoluments in the amount of P315, 011 in which respondent wife was
not the recipient of any portion of the said amount. Respondent further
alleges that the house and lot at BF Homes, Paraaque, Metro Manila was
executed by the spouses Ramiro Golez and Corazon Golez in favor of
[petitioner] Milagros B. Joaquino and that the funds used to purchase this
property were conjugal funds and earnings of the deceased Rodolfo A. Reyes
as executive of Warner Barnes and Company as Joaquino was without the
means to pay for the same. That petitioner executed a Special Power of
Attorney in favor of Rodolfo A. Reyes to mortgage the property to
Commonwealth Insurance Corporation in order to pay the balance of the
purchase price. Rodolfo A. Reyes executed a mortgage in favor of
Commonwealth Insurance Corporation for P140,000.00 and to guaranty
payment thereof, he secured a life insurance policy with Philam Life
Insurance Corporation for the said amount, assigning the proceeds thereof
to Commonwealth Insurance Corporation and that the monthly amortizations
of the mortgage were paid by said Rodolfo A. Reyes before his death and at
the time of his death, the outstanding balance of P110,000.00 was to be
paid out of his Philam Life Insurance policy. The RTC held that the property
had been paid out of the conjugal funds of Rodolfo and Lourdes because the
monthly amortizations for the loan, as well as the premiums for the life
insurance policy that paid for the balance thereof, came from his salaries
and earnings. Like the trial court, it found no sufficient proof that petitioner
was financially capable of buying the disputed property, or that she had
actually contributed her own exclusive funds to pay for it. Hence, it ordered
her to surrender possession of the property to the respective estates of the
spouses. This was affirmed by the CA.

ISSUE:
1) Whether the property, the house and lot on Baghdad Street (BF
Homes Paraaque, Metro Manila), is conjugal (owned by Rodolfo and
Lourdes) or exclusive (owned by Milagros) or co-owned by Rodolfo and
Milagros.
2) Whether or not the purchase and the subsequent registration of the
realty in petitioners name was tantamount to a donation by Rodolfo to
Milagros.

HELD:
1. Under Article 145 thereof, a conjugal partnership of gains (CPG) is
created upon marriage and lasts until the legal union is dissolved by
death, annulment, legal separation or judicial separation of property.
Conjugal properties are by law owned in common by the husband and
wife. As to what constitutes such properties are laid out in Article 153
of the Code, which we quote:
(1) That which is acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the
expense of the common fund, whether the acquisition be for the partnership,
or for only one of the spouses; (2) That which is obtained by the industry, or
work, or as salary of the spouses, or of either of them; (3) The fruits, rents
or interests received or due during the marriage, coming from the common
property or from the exclusive property of each spouse.
Moreover, under Article 160 of the Code, all properties of the marriage,
unless proven to pertain to the husband or the wife exclusively, are
presumed to belong to the CPG.For the rebuttable presumption to arise,
however, the properties must first be proven to have been acquired during
the existence of the marriage. All told, respondents have shown that the
property was bought during the marriage of Rodolfo and Lourdes, a fact that
gives rise to the presumption that it is conjugal.More important, they have
established that the proceeds of the loan obtained by Rodolfo were used to
pay for the property; and that the loan was, in turn, paid from his salaries
and earnings, which were conjugal funds under the Civil Code.

2. By express provision of Article 739(1) of the Civil Code, such donation
was void, because it was made between persons who were guilty of
adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation.The prohibition
against donations between spouses must likewise apply to donations
between persons living together in illicit relations; otherwise, the latter
would be better situated than the former. Article 87 of the Family Code
now expressly provides thus:
Art. 87.Every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage, direct or indirect,
between the spouses during the marriage shall be void, except moderate
gifts which the spouses may give each other on the occasion of any family
rejoicing.The prohibition shall also apply to persons living together as
husband and wife without a valid marriage.

DECISION: WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED, and the assailed
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED.

































FABIE VS. GUTIERREZ DAVID
NO. L-123. DECEMBER 12,1945

PONENTE: OZAETA, J.:

FACTS: The petitioner Josefa Fabie is the usufructuary of the income of
certain houses located at 372-376 Santo Cristo, Binondo, a property owned
by private respondent Juan Grey, and 950-956 Ongpin, Santa Cruz Manila,
under the ninth clause of the will of the deceased Rosario Fabie Grey. In
June 1945, Josefa Fabie commenced an action of unlawful detainer against
herein respondent Ngo Boo Soo(Ngo Soo), alleging in her amended
complaint that the defendant is occupying the premises located at 372-376
Santo Cristo on a month-to-month rental payable in advance not later than
the 5th of each month; that the defendant offered to pay Php300.00
monthly rent payable in advance not later than the 5th of every month,
beginning the month of April 1915, for the said premises including the one
door which said defendant, without plaintiff's consent and contrary to their
agreement, had subleased to another Chinese, but plaintiff refused, based
on the fact that the plaintiff badly needs the saidhpuse to live in, as her
house was burned by the Japanese during the entry of American liberators in
the City which was located at No. 38 Flores, Dominga, Pasay; that defendant
was duly notified on March 24 and April 14, 1915, to leave the said
premises, but he refused. Plaintiff then prayed for judgment of eviction and
for unpaid rentals. However, the defendant answered alleging that he was
and since 1908 had been a tenant of the premises in question; that he was
renting it from its owner and administrator Juan Grey; and that plaintiff is
merely a usufructuary whose only right is to receive the whole of such
income. Such contention by the defendant was affirmed by Juan Grey and
added that Fabie, as a usufructuary, she has no right or authority to
administer the said premises nor to lease them nor to evict tenants, which
right and authority are vested in the intervener as owner of the premises.
Thus, the complaint in intervention was dismissed. Upon appeal to the Court
of First Instance of Manila the latter dismissed the case; and the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by the plaintiff was denied by Judge Jose Gutierrez
David, who sustained the opinion of the Court of First Instance of Manila.

ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioner has the right to select the tenants of the
property to which she is the usufructuary.

HELD: Yes. Petitioner, Josefa Fabie, has such right because a usufructuary is
allowed to administer and manage the property, to collect rents and to make
the necessary repairs. Included in this right to administer is the right to
select the tenant over the premises, presently held by the petitioner in
usufruct.
CALTEX PHILS. INC. VS. BOARD OF ASSESSMENT APPEALS
G.R. NO. L-50466 MAY 31, 1982

PONENTE: Aquino, J.

FACTS: This case is about the realty tax on machinery and equipment
installed by Caltex (Philippines) Inc. in its gas stations located on
leased land. The machines and equipment consists of underground
tanks, elevated tank, elevated water tanks, water tanks, gasoline
pumps, computing pumps, water pumps, car washer, car hoists,
truck hoists, air compressors and tireflators. The city assessor of
Pasay City characterized the said items of gas station equipment and
machinery as taxable realty. The realty tax on said equipment
amounts to P4,541.10 annually (p. 52, Rollo). The city board of tax
appeals ruled that they are personalty. The assessor appealed to the
Central Board of Assessment Appeals. The Board, which was in its
decision of June 3, 1977 that the said machines and equipment are
real property under the Real Property Tax Code, Presidential Decree
No. 464, which took effect on June 1, 1974. The decision was
reiterated by the Board in its resolution of January 12, 1978,
denying Caltex's motion for reconsideration, a copy of which was
received by its lawyer on April 2, 1979.On May 2, 1979 Caltex filed
this certiorari petition wherein it prayed for the setting aside of the
Board's decision and for a declaration that t he said machines and
equipment are personal property not subject to realty tax. We hold
that the said equipment and machinery, as appurtenances to the gas
station building or shed owned by Caltex (as to which it is subject to
realty tax) and which fixtures are necessary to the operation of the
gas station, for without them the gas station would be useless, and
which have been attached or affixed permanently to the gas station
site or embedded therein, are taxable improvements and machinery
within the meaning of the Assessment Law and the Real Property
Tax Code. Caltex invokes the rule that machinery which is movable
in its nature only becomes immobilized when placed in a plant by the
owner of the property or plant but not when so placed by a tenant, a
usufructuary, or any person having only a temporary right, unless
such person acted as the agent of the owner (Davao Saw Mill Co. vs.
Castillo, 61 Phil 709).

ISSUE: Whether or not the pieces of gas station equipment and
machinery already enumerated are subject to realty tax.

Held: Yes. This issue has to be resolved primarily under the
provisions of the Assessment Law and the Real Property Tax Code.
Under, Sec. 38 of the said law: Machinery shall embrace machines,
mechanical contrivances, instruments, appliances and apparatus
attached to the real estate. It includes the physical facilities
available for production, as well as the installations and appurtenant
service facilities, together with all other equipment designed for or
essential to its manufacturing, industrial or agricultural purposes.
The equipment and machinery, are considered as appurtenances to
the gas station building or shed owned by Caltex (as to which it is
subject to realty tax) and which fixtures are necessary to the
operation of the gas station, for without them the gas station would
be useless, and which have been attached or affixed permanently to
the gas station site or embedded therein, are taxable improvements
and machinery within the meaning of the Assessment Law and the
Real Property Tax Code. Improvements on land are commonly taxed
as realty even though for some purposes they might be considered
personalty. "It is a familiar phenomenon to see things classed as
real property for purposes of taxation which on general principle
might be considered personal property."

The questioned decision and resolution of the Central Board of
Assessment Appeals are affirmed. The petition for certiorari is
dismissed for lack of merit.




























VILLANUEVA VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. NO. 105607 JUNE 21, 1993

PONENTE: GRIO-AQUINO, J.:

FACTS: Milagros Donio-Teves was the owner of Jumils Octagonal Garden
Cockpit (Jumils cockpit) constructed in Bais City, in the 1960's. Under
Zoning Ordinance No. 62 passed in 1977, the cockpit was within a prohibited
district. For this reason, the then Mayor Genar Goi refused to renew the
mayor's permit applied for by Teves for 1981. Instead, he issued it in favor
of William L. Fleischer, the owner of the newly built Bais City Cockers Cockpit
(Bais cockpit). The controversy that ensued reached the Philippine Gamefowl
Commission (PGC for short) which ruled in January 1983, that Teves had the
right to relocate Jumils cockpit to an allowable site and, accordingly, gave
her a "reasonable time" to do so. The PGC also cancelled the mayor's permit
of Fleischer and the Certificate of Registration of Bais cockpit. And further
held that no mayor's permit shall be issued until the petitioner [Teves] shall
have completed the construction of a new cockpit within an allowable zone
In January 1985 The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the PGC and
on July 1985, the PGC fixed the "reasonable time" within which Teves was to
relocate Jumils cockpit to one year from February 8, 1985. Teves failed to
relocate the cockpit. She was the considered to have waived her
right.Fleisher the applied for and was granted by Mayor Goi on February
10,1986, a mayor's permit for 1986. On May 2, 1986, accused Hector C.
Villanueva became the OIC Mayor of Bais City, replacing Goi. May 30,
1986, the Bais City fiscal informed the accused that the case involving the
two cockpits in the city. the accused wrote on August 1, 1986, advising
Fleischer in turn "to desist" from holding cockpits in Bais cockpit until he
could secure the proper registration certificate from PGC. In response,
Fleischer, furnished a copy of the registration certificate of Bais cockpit
issued on August 18, 1986. On January 2, 1987, Teves applied for a
mayor's permit to operate it in 1987. On January 21, 1987, the accused
granted Teves a permit to engage in business as "Cockpit
Operator. Criminal Case No. 14192 entitled "the People of the Philippines
vs. Hector C. Villanueva," was the filed which convicted the petitioner of
violation of Section 3 (e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Hence
this petition for review on certiorari of the decision dated March 25, 1992 of
the Sandiganbayan.

ISSUE: Whether or not Respondent Honorable Court had wrongly made the
crucial finding against petitioner that he has committed the act charged.

HELD: YES. In view of the foregoing circumstances, the SC find the petition
to be impressed with merit. Section 3(e) of Republic Act. No. 3019, as
amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
penalizes any public officer for causing any undue injury to any party,
including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official
administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad
faith, or gross inexcusable negligence. Teves has been the owner of the
Jumils Octagonal Garden Cockpit which she has operated since 1962. If
other parties, such as Santiago Goi and William Fleischer, were able to
secure a license to operate and maintain a cockpit, it was as lessees of the
cockpit in question. Without the lease, they would not be entitled to a
license, as the City of Bais is permitted under the law only one cockpit. After
the expiration of their leases, Goi and Fleischer could not apply for a license
to operate a cockpit. Petitioner did not act inadvisedly on Teves application
for a license. He sought the counsel of the City Fiscal of Bais on the matter.
The City Fiscal opined that Teves application may be granted subject to
certain conditions imposed by the PGC and the decision of Court of Appeals.
In fact, the petitioners grant of a mayors permit to Fleischer was
conditioned on Teves failure to comply with the legal requirements. It may
not be said therefore that he acted with manifest partiality and evident bad
faith in granting a permit to Teves.We are persuaded from a study of the
evidence that he was not actuated by a dishonest purpose or ill will
partaking of a fraud or some furtive design or ulterior purpose to do wrong
and cause damage. The SC find that the guilt of the petitioner was not
proven beyond reasonable doubt, hence, he should be acquitted of the crime
charged.

DECISION: The petition for review is GRANTED. The challenged decision of
the Sandiganbayan is REVERSED and the petitioner, Hector C. Villanueva, is
ACQUITTED of the crime charged. Costs de oficio.















LOGRONIO VS. TALESEO
G.R. 134602 AUGUST 6, 1999

PONENTE: PANGANIBAN, J.

FACTS: On May 3, 1992, respondent's predecessor Lucio Taleseo executed a
document denominated as "Sale with Right of Repurchase" conveying the
lots in litigation to petitioners' predecessor Basilio Tia, subject to the right
of Lucio Taleseo to repurchase withing four (4) years or up to 1926. As soon
as said document was executed, Basilio Tia took over possession of the lots
and used them to cultivate rice. Lucio Taleseo failed to repurchase the
property in 1926 and so Basilio Tia continued to possess the property, had
the same declared in his name, and paid the taxes thereon. In 1957, for the
first time since 1922 (execution of the pacto de retro), the children of Lucio
Taleseo laid claim on, and forcibly entered, the property and drove away the
tenants of Leoncia Tia, wife of Basilio Tia. The Tias filed a replevin and
forcible entry cases in the Municipal Court of Bayawan against the Taleseos.
The Municipal Court of Bayawan decided in favor of the Tias on March 15,
1960 and ordered the Taleseos to vacated the property. The Taleseos
appealed to the RTC of Negros Oriental, but said court dismissed the appeal
for failure to prosecute on March 26, 1979. The decree of ejectment was
never executed. Neither was an action for execution of judgment ever filed.
The Taleseos filed the present case for quieting of title on January 15, 1985.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not CA may consider laches although it was not pleaded or
raised by the parties

2. Whether or not the CA Misappreciate the Facts of the case.

HELD:
1. Yes. It is well-settled that appellate courts have ample authority to
rule on matters not assigned as errors in an appeal, if these are
indispensable or necessary to the just resolution of the pleaded issues.

2. No. It is clear that petitioners have made no move to enforce the
March 15, 1960 Decision of the inferior court ejecting the Taleseos
from the property in dispute. In fact, the present case was commenced
by the respondents in order to have their title to said lot quieted. In
this light, the CA did not err in holding that the rights of petitioners
were barred by laches.

Clearly, the thirty-nine-year inaction of the Tias to enforce the 1960
Decision amounts to laches. Indeed, from the time the said Decision was
handed down until respondents filed a case for the quieting of title,
petitioners did not do anything to implement the judgment. They did not file
a motion to enforce the Decision within the prescribed period of 5 years from
notice of entry of judgment; neither did they institute a complaint to revive
the said ruling within 10 years. For having slept on their rights for thirty-nine
years, petitioners, through laches, have lost their right to lay claim on land.

DECISION: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioners.




































GABOYA V. CUI
G.R. NO. L-19614MARCH 27, 1971

PONENTE: REYES, J.B.L., J.:

FACTS: Don Mariano, widower, as owner of three commercial lots situated in
Cebu, sold these three lots to three of his children named Rosario C. de
Encarnacion, Mercedes C. de Ramas and Antonio Cui. Because Rosario C. de
Encarnacion lacks funds, the sale to her was cancelled and the one-third of
property was returned to the vendor. So, he and his two children (Mercedes
and Antonio) became co-owners of the property. Sometime after the sale to
Mercedes and Antonio the two applied for a loan with which to construct a
12-door commercial building presumably on a portion of the entire parcel
corresponding to their share. In order to facilitate the granting of the loan,
Don Mariano executed an authority to mortgage authorizing his two children
co-owners to mortgage his share with a stipulation reserving his right to the
fruits of the land. The children then constructed a 12-door commercial
building on the land and collected rent from the lessee thereof. When Don
Mariano died, Jesus M. Gaboya, was claiming the fruits of the building
through Don Marianos guardian, Victorino Reynes, to Mercedes and Antonio
as his payment as the Judicial Administrator of the Estate of Don Mariano.
The complaint alleges that the usufructuary right reserved of Don Mariano
extends to the rentals of the building constructed by the children on the land
sold to them by their father. The amended answer, while admitting the
reserved usufruct and the collection of rentals of the buildings, denied the
rights extended to said rentals. The Court declared that the reserved right of
usufruct in favor of the vendor did not include the rentals of the building but
he is entitled receive a reasonable rentalsfor the portion of the land occupied
by the building. Both parties appealed in the decision of the Court.

ISSUE: Whether Don Mariano had a right to fruits of the building?

HELD: NO. The deed expressly reserved only to his right to the fruits of the
land. He only owned the rent for the portion of land occupied by the
building; thus, the estate could only claim the rent on that piece of land and
not on the entire parcel of land. The children are entitled to the rents of the
building. A usufruct on the land may be separate from the building. Thus,
Summing up, the court find and hold:(1) That the usufructuary rights of the
late Don Mariano Cui was over the land alone and did not entitle him to the
rents of the building later constructed.(2) That said usufructuary was
entitled only to the reasonable rental value of the land occupied by the
building aforementioned.(5) That pursuant to Articles 2208 (No. 11), 2210
and 2213 of the Civil Code, the trial court had discretion to equitably award
legal interest upon said sum of P100,088.80, as well as P5,000.00 attorney's
fees, considering that defendants Cui have enjoyed the said rental value of
the land during all those years.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the appealed decision, the same
is hereby affirmed.

































TRINIDAD VS. RC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA
G.R. NO. L-33769
MARCH 11, 1931

PONENTE: Malcolm, J.:

FACTS: About a century ago, there lived in Manila two sisters and a brother
by the names of Marcelina Bonifacio Alonso, Valentina Teodoro, and Basilio
de la Trinidad. Marcelina Bonifacio Alonso was the first to pass on. Valentina
Teodoro died on April 22, 1838, leaving as her sole heir her brother Basilio
de la Trinidad. Two days before her death, Valentina Teodoro executed a will
leaving the same at the disposal of her elder brother Don Basilio de la
Trinidad and her nephews for the establishment of a chaplaincy. Another two
properties also to be established as chaplaincies and each of them obtain a
chaplain, for she expressly prohibit the union of two of these chaplaincies in
one person unless no other relative of her can be found entitled to it and in
the event that she has absolutely no relative qualified for appointment, a
chaplain, or three of them, may be temporarily appointed as administrator
or administrators, without the right of ownership or possession. She appoint
as my executors, first Don Basilio de la Trinidad, second, Don Teodoro
Pantoja, and third, Don Gregorio Alonso, to comply strictly in that capacity
with the provisions of this her will, in accordance with the inventory of real
and personal properties. It was not until September 25, 1841, that the
executor Basilio de la Trinidad requested the Archbishop of Manila to
approve the creation of three chaplaincies. As the rents received from the
properties were considered insufficient for the maintenance of three
chaplaincies, the petition, on recommendation of the promotor fiscal, was
denied. The executor filed a new petition in which it was prayed that the
three chaplaincies be united in one. This petition met with a favorable
response from the Archbishop of Manila who, on July 12, 1843, approved the
creation of one chaplaincy, and named to the same Telesforo Trinidad, the
son of the executor Basilio de la Trinidad. Telesforo Trinidad acted as
chaplain until his death on April 3, 1878. The chaplaincy was again filled on
June 6, 1879, when Rosauro Trinidad was declared entitled to the chaplaincy
and to its income, the capital to be administered by the representative of the
Sacred Mitra in like manner as the properties of the same kind are
administered. The matter stood in this way up to December 12, 1914, when
Rosauro Trinidad died. From that date to the present time, the chaplaincy
has remained vacant.The properties which originally were assigned for the
chaplaincy had no great value. At the present time, however, they are
assessed for purposes of taxation at P165, 987. The properties have Torrens
titles standing in the name of the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila. In
1929, an action was begun by the surviving heirs of Valentina Teodoro, that
is, by Nicolas Trinidad, Atilano Trinidad, and the estate of Alejandro Trinidad,
against the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, to annul the chaplaincy, to
recover the title and possession of the properties pertaining thereto, and to
obtain an accounting of the fruits of these properties received since 1878.

ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court erred in not ordering the transfer of
the certificates of title Nos. 5027, 16950 and 4546 of the register of deeds of
Manila in the names of the plaintiffs with the charge of the chaplaincy.

HELD: The disposition of the defendant's appeal presents no difficulties. It is
true that the complaint did not ask specifically for the notation of the
foundation, but this was naturally included in the larger questions submitted
by the plaintiffs. Moreover, it was a chaplaincy or chaplaincies which the
testatrix had in mind to create. It never occurred to the deceased to donate
absolutely these properties to the church. Whether the proper indorsement
of the encumbrance be made by an order in this case or by an order in
another proceeding instituted for that particular purpose is unimportant, for
in so far as the equities are concerned, they all move in the direction of the
action so appropriately taken by the trial judge.


























MONTEROSO VS. CA
G.R. NO. 113199 APRIL 30, 2008

PONENTE: Velasco, Jr.

FACTS: Acrimonious litigation between and among siblings and immediate
relatives over inheritance does occur. It is unfortunate when the decedent
had, while still alive, taken steps to precisely avoid a bruising squabble over
inheritance. In a sense, Don Fabian B. Monteroso, Sr., a former justice of
the peace and municipal mayor of Cabadbaran, Agusan del Norte, started it
all. During his lifetime, Don Fabian married twice and sired eight children,
four from each union. In 1906, Don Fabian married Soledad Doldol. Out of
this marriage were born Soledad, Reygula, Benjamin, and Tirso. On April 8,
1927, Soledad Doldol Monteroso passed away. A little over a year later, Don
Fabian contracted a second marriage with Sofia Pendejito. From this union
were born Florenda, Reynato, Alberto, and Fabian, Jr. After the death of his
first wife, but during the early part of his second marriage, Don Fabian filed
before the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Agusan an intestate proceeding
for the estate of his deceased first wife, Soledad D. Monteroso, apparently to
obviate any dispute over the inheritance of his children from his first
marriage. Subsequently, the CFI received--and later approved per an Order
dated March 11, 1936 Project of Partition dated February 21, 1935. The
intestate estate of Soledad D. Monteroso was partitioned and distributed to
her four children in equal shares. A year and a half later, or on October 26,
1948, Don Fabian also passed away. This brings us to the objects of the
squabble: the conjugal patrimonies of Don Fabian from his two successive
marriages. On July 28, 1969, the children of the late Benjamin D.
Monteroso, namely: Ruby Monteroso, Marlene M. Pospos, Henrieto
Monteroso, and Adelita Monteroso-Berenguel, filed with the RTC a Complaint
for Recovery of Property with Damages against their uncle, Tirso D.
Monteroso, docketed as Civil Case No. 1292. As the heirs of Benjamin
alleged in their complaint, their uncle, Tirso, was entrusted with described
one-fourth portion of Parcel F-4 as part of the share from the estate of
Soledad D. Monteroso allotted to their father. However, their uncle refused
to surrender and deliver the same when they demanded such delivery upon
their reaching the majority age. Tirso countered that the portion pertaining
to Benjamin was never entrusted to him; it was in the possession of their
sister, Soledad Monteroso-Cagampang, who was not entitled to any share in
Parcel F-4, having previously opted to exchange her share in said property
for another parcel of land, i.e., Parcel F-7, then being occupied by her.
On April 14, 1970, Tirso, in turn, filed a Complaint for Partition and Damages
with Receivership docketed as Civil Case No. 1332, involving 12 parcels of
land.

In Civil Case No. 1332, Tirso, inter alia, alleged the aforementioned 12
parcels of land belong to the conjugal partnerships of the first and second
marriages contracted by Don Fabian; Answering, the defendants in Civil
Case No. 1332 contended that Don Fabian acquired Parcel F-6 during the
second marriage, while Parcels F-7 and F-8 were Don Fabian's exclusive
properties having been acquired through a donation from the heirs of one
Benito Tinosa. There goes the initial ruling of the RTC where it dismissed the
Civil Case No. 1292. Another subsequent ruling of RTC was rendered where
it the earlier decision were set aside and gave due course to both Civil cases.
As regards Civil Case No. 1292, the RTC found that the heirs of Benjamin
have indeed been deprived of their inheritance which corresponds to one-
fourth share due their father from the intestate estate of their grandmother,
Soledad D. Monteroso. The case was appealed to the Court of Appeals where
they said that from the above June 9, 1987 Decision, Tirso, defendant in
Civil Case No. 1292, appealed to the CA, so did the Cagampang spouses,
defendants in Civil Case No. 1332. The other defendants in Civil Case No.
1332, namely: Sofia Pendejito Vda. de Monteroso, Florenda Monteroso,
Alberto Monteroso, Heirs of Fabian Monteroso, Jr., Reynato Monteroso, and
Reygula Monteroso-Bayan, also interposed their own appeal. On March 31,
1992, the CA rendered the assailed decision, affirming with modification the
June 9, 1987 RTC Decision. Thus this petition for review.

ISSUE: Whether the CA committed reversible error in upholding partition as
the proper remedy of private respondent Tirso Monteroso to recover the
properties sold by Fabian Monteroso, Sr. to Soledad D. Monteroso de
Cagampang when co-ownership is not pleaded as theory in the Complaint.

HELD: Being inextricably intertwined, we tackle both issues together.
Petitioners, citing Article 494 of the Civil Code and Article 1965 of the
Spanish Civil Code, aver that the right to ask partition is proper only where
co-ownership is recognized. They also suggest that no co-ownership obtains
in this case considering that no less than Tirso avers in his complaint in Civil
Case No. 1332 that from the time of Don Fabian's death in 1948, the lots in
question have been in the exclusive, adverse, and public possession of the
Cagampang spouses. Assayed against this perspective, petitioners submit
that partition is not proper, ergo unavailing, but an action for reconveyance
which is subject to the rules on extinctive prescription.

As a final point, petitioners alleged that the exclusion of Tirso from the
enjoyment of the fruits of the subject properties since after the death of Don
Fabian in 1948 is consistent with Soledad Monteroso-Cagampang's claim of
exclusive ownership and dominion.

The fact that nobody objected to the donation is of little consequence, for as
the CA aptly observed, "The circumstance that parties to a void contract
choose to ignore its nullity can in no way enhance the invalid character of
such contract. It is axiomatic that void contracts cannot be the subject of
ratification, either express or implied."

DECISION: The petition in G.R. No. 113199 is DENIED for lack of merit.





































SPOUSES PO LAM VS. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. NO. 116220 DECEMBER 6, 2000

PONENTE: MELO, J.

FACTS: On October 13, 1999, this Division, under the ponencia of Mr. Justice
Purisima handed down a decision declaring petitioners, the spouses Roy Po
Lam and Josefina Ong Po Lam, as transferees pendente lite and not
purchasers in good faith of Lots No. 1557 and 1558 and ordering them to
reconvene said lots to private respondent Jose Lee.
Lots No. 1557 and 1558 are prime commercial lots located in the heart of
Legaspi Citys commercial district. Lim Kok Chiong sold these to the Legaspi
Avenue Hardware Company (hereafter referred to as LAHCO) sometime in
the early 60s. On December 4, 1964, however, Felix Lim, Lim Kok Chiongs
brother, filed a complaint with the then Court of First Instance of Albay
against his brother and LAHCO to annul the deeds of sale covering said lots
on the ground that the sale covering said lots on the ground that the sale
included the 3/12 pro-indiviso portion of the lots which Felix Lim had
inherited from his foster parents. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case
No. 2953 of the Court of First Instance of Albay.
On January 27, 1965, Felix Lim filed with the Register of Deeds of Albay a
notice of lis pendens over the two lots. The same was inscribed on Transfer
Certificates of Title No. 2580 and 2581, covering Lots No. 1557 and 1558,
respectively. Later, the trial court, on motion of Felix Lim, dropped the case
against Lim Kok Chiong. On March 15, 1969, the trial court rendered a
decision declaring LAHCO to be the absolute owner of the two above-
mentioned lots. AS a consequence of its decision, the trial court rendered a
decision declaring LAHCO to be the absolute owner of the two above-
mentioned lots. As a consequence of its decision, the trial court ordered the
cancellation of the notice of lis pendens inscribed on the titles of the two
lots. Pursuant to this order, the notice of lis pendens inscribed on TCT No.
2580 was cancelled. However, the notice of lis pendens annotated on TCT
No. 2580 remained unconcealed, allegedly because the duplicate owners
copy of said TCT was with the Continental Bank, Lot No. 1558 having been
mortgaged by LAHCO to said bank.
Aggrieved, Felix Lim appealed to the Court of Appeals. On May 28, 1970,
and during the pendency of the appeal, CA-G.R. No. 44770-R, LAHCO sold
the two lots to herein petitioners, the spouses Roy Po Lam and Josefa Ong
Po Lam. On May 20, 1974, petitioners, by virtue of the court order adverted
to earlier, had the notice of lis pendens on TCT No. 2580 and 2581.
Thereafter, said certificates of title were themselves cancelled and replaced
by TCT No. 8102 and 13711, respectively, in the name of petitioners.
On April 29, 1980, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial
court in Civil Case No. 2953, appellant Felix Lims counsel receiving a copy of
thereof on May 16, 1980. On May 23, 1980 counsel for Felix Lim filed a
motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration. The
appellate court gave Felix Lim up to June 20, 1980 to file one. On June 17,
1980, he filed a motion for reconsideration, which was, however, denied.
Without leave of court, Felix Lime filed, on July 14, 1980, a second motion
for reconsideration. This was acted upon favorably by the Court of Appeals
on March 11, 1981, with the appellate court declaring that Felix Lim, by
returning P20,000.00 to LAHCO, could exercise the right of redemption over
the two lots sold by Lim Kok Chiong to LAHCO. Although LAHCO asked this
Court for an extension of time to file a petition for review, none was ever
filed, for which reason the Court remanded the case to the trial court for
execution.
On November 12, 1981, Felix Lim moved, in Civil Case No. 2953, to have
the March 11, 1981 resolution of the Court of Appeals annotated on TCT No.
8102 and 13711. He also moved for the issuance of a writ of execution to
enforce said resolution. Likewise, he filed a motion praying that the Clerk of
Court execute a deed of conveyance over the disputed lots in his favor. All
these motions were denied by the trial court on the ground that the Po Lam
spouses could not be bound thereby since they were not imploded as party-
litigants in Civil Case No. 2953 or CA-G.R. No. 44770-R.

ISSUE: Whether or not the acquisition of the properties in question by
spouses Roy Po Lam and Josefa Ong Po Lam were made in bad faith.

HELD: The lis pendens annotation, although considered a general notice to
all the world, it is not correct to speak of it as part of the doctrine of
notice; the purchaser pendente lit is affected, not by notice, but because the
law does not allow litigating parties to give to others, pending the litigation,
rights to the property in dispute as to prejudice the opposite party. The
doctrine rests upon public policy, not notice". "The doctrine of lis pendens,
as generally understood and applied by the courts of this country, is not
founded on any idea of constructive notice, since its true foundation rests, as
has already been stated, on principles of public policy and necessity. The lis
pendens annotation, although considered a general notice to all the world ,
it is not correct to speak of it as part of the doctrine of notice; the
purchaser pendente lite is affected, not allow litigating parties to give to
others, pending the litigation, rights to the property in dispute as to
prejudice the opposite party. The doctrine rests upon public policy, not
notice". "The doctrine of lis pendens, as generally understood and applied by
the courts of this country, is not based upon presumption of notice, but upon
a public policy, imperatively demanded by a necessity which can be met and
overcome in no other way. It is careless 'use of language which has led
judges to speak of it as notice, because it happens to have in some instance
similar effect with notice'."
And since the doctrine rests on public policy, not notice, upon the
cancellation of the notice of lis pendens, the Po Lam spouses cannot then be
considered as having constructive notice of any defect in the title of LAHCO
as to make them transferees pendente lite and purchasers in bad faith of
Lots No. 1557 and 1558. To hold otherwise would render nugatory the
cancellation of the notices of lis pendens inscribed on TCT No. 2581 despite
its subsequent cancellation on May 20, 1974, would render said cancellation
an empty, unavailing, and purposeless act, which could not have been the
intent of the law. Lex neminem cogit ad van seu inutilia peragenda. The law
will not compel one to do useless things.
As adverted to earlier, while the notice of lis pendens is duly recorded and as
long as it remains uncancelled, he litigant can rest secure that he would not
lose the property or any part of it during litigation. Conversely, cancellation
of the notice of pendency terminates the effects of such notice. Therefore,
with the cancellation of the notices of lis pendens on TCT No. 2580 and
2580, the effects of such notice were terminated, resulting in the Po Lam
spouses not being bound thereby. In fine, they cannot be considered
transferee pendente lite and purchasers in bad faith of the property.
Moreover, since its operation is arbitrary and it may be harsh in particular
instances, the doctrine of lis pendens are to be strictly construed and
applied. It should not be extended without strict necessity. At consider the
Po Lam spouses still bound by the notice of lis pendens even after the same
had been cancelled would be extending the doctrine when there is no reason
therefor.
Lastly, Felix Lim's claim is barred by the equitable principle of laches. At the
time notices of lis pendens were cancelled in 1969 and 1974, Felix Lim did
not move to reinstate the same. Nor did he act when TCT No. 2580 and
2581 were replaced by TCT No. 8102 and 13711. Instead, he waited seven
years, or until 1981, to have his claim on the disputed pieces of property
recognized. Felix Lim's long inaction and passivity in asserting his rights over
the disputed property precludes him from recovering them from petitioners-
spouses.

DECISION: Motion for Reconsideration of petitioners-spouses Roy Po Lam
and Josefa Ong Po Lam is hereby GRANTED. Consequently, the decision
dated October 13, 1991, is VACATED and SET ASIDE. A new judgement is
hereby entered declaring petitioners-spouses to be PURCHASERS IN GOOD
FAUTH and Transfer Certificates of Title No. 8102 and 13711 in their name
valid, without prejudice on the part of private respondent Jose Lee to file of
private respondent Jose Lee to file a separate action for reimbursement for
the value of said property from the Legaspi Avenue Hardware Company.