Sanchez v. Demetriou [GR Nos.

111771-77 November 9, 1993]

Post under case digests, Remedial Law at Tuesday, February 21, 2012 Posted
by Schizophrenic Mind
Facts: Information was filed against several people including the petitioner in relation with
the rape-slay of Mary Eileen Sarmenta and the killing of Allan Gomez. Sanchez has brought
the petition to challenge the order of the respondent judge denying his motion to quash the
information for rape with homicide filed against him and six other persons on the ground he
is being charged with seven homicides arising from the death of only two persons. The
petitioner submits that the seven informations charging seven separate homicides are
absurd because the two victims in these cases could not have died seven times.

Issue: Whether or not the court acted properly on denying the petition of Sanchez to quash
on the grounds that he is being charged with seven homicides arising from the death of only
two persons.

Held: The court ruled that where there are two or more offenders who commit rape, the
homicide committed on the occasion or by reason of each rape, must be deemed as a
constituent of the special complex crime of rape with homicide. Therefore, there will be as
many crimes of rape with homicide as there are rapes committed. In effect, the presence of
homicide qualifies the crime of rape, thereby raising its penalty to the highest degree. Thus,
homicide committed on the occasion or by reason of rape, loses its character as an
independent offense, but assumes a new character, and functions like a qualifying
circumstance. However,by fiction of law, it merged with rape to constitute an constituent
element of a special complex crime of rape with homicide with a specific penalty which is in
the highest degree. The petitioner and his six co-accused are not charged with only one rape
committed by him in conspiracy with the other six. Each one of the seven accused is charged
with having himself raped Sarmenta instead of simply helping Sanchez in committing only
one rape. In other words, the allegation of the prosecution is that the girl was raped seven
times, with each of the seven accused taking turns in abusing her with the assistance of the
other six. Afterwards, their lust satisfied, all seven of them decided to kill and thus silence
Sarmenta. Every one of the seven accused is being charged separately for actually raping
Sarmenta and later killing her instead of merely assisting the petitioner in raping and then
slaying her. The separate informations filed against each of them allege that each of the
seven successive rapes is complexed by the subsequent slaying of Sarmenta and aggravated
by the killing of Allan Gomez by her seven attackers. The separate rapes were committed in
succession by the seven accused, culminating in the slaying of Sarmenta.



CRESPO vs MOGUL
GR No. L-53373 June 30, 1987

FACTS:
Assistant Fiscal Proceso K. Gala with the approval of the Provincial Fiscal filed an
information for estaga against Mario Crespo in the Circuit Criminal Court of Lucena City.
When the case was set for arraignment the accused filed a motion to deter arraignment on
the ground that there was a pending petition for review filed with the Secretary of Justice of
the resolution of the office of provincial Fiscal.

CARDINAL PRINCIPLE:
Criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted
under the direction and control of the fiscal. The institution of a criminal action depends
upon the sound discretion of the Fiscal. He may or he may not file the complaint or
information, follow or not follow that presented by the offended party, according to
whether the evidence in his opinion, is sufficient or not to establish the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt. The reason for placing the criminal prosecution under the
discretion and control of the fiscal is to prevent malicious or unfounded prosecution by
private persons.

It is through the conduct of preliminary investigation, that the fiscal determines the
existence of a Prima Facie case that would warrant the prosecution of a case. The Courts
cannot interfere with the fiscals discretion and control of the criminal prosecution. It is not
prudent or even permissible for a Court of compel the fiscal to prosecute a proceeding
originally initiated by him on an information.

In a clash of views between the Judge who did not investigate and the Fiscal who did, or
between the fiscal and the offended party or the defendant, those of the Fiscals should
normally prevail.

The action of fiscal or prosecutor is not without any limitation or control. The same is
subject to the approval to the Provincial or City Fiscal or the Chief of State Prosecutor as the
case maybe and it maybe elevated for review to the Secretary of Justice who has the power
to affirm, modify or reverse the action or opinion of the Fiscal.


PEREZ v HAGONOY
327 SCRA 588
DE LEON; March 9, 2000

NATURE:
Review on Certiorari

FACTS
- Private respondent Hagonoy Rural Bank, Inc. owns the Hagonoy Money Shop which
employed petitioner Cristina O. Perez as Officer-In-Charge, Cashier and Teller, Alberto S.
Fabian as Bookkeeper, and Cristina Medina and Milagros Martin as Solicitors/Field
Managers.
- For the period starting August 3, 1992 up to December 5, 1993, the Laya, Manabat, Salgado
and Company, an independent management, consultancy and accounting firm, conducted an
audit of the financial affairs of the Hagonoy Money Shop and found anomalies in more or
less twenty-eight (28) savings accounts consisting of withdrawals which were recorded in
the subsidiary ledgers of the money shop but not in the passbooks which were in the
possession of the depositors. The audit also revealed that to cover-up the anomalous
withdrawals, fake deposits were recorded in the money shop's subsidiary ledgers whenever
the remaining balance in a particular savings account went below the amount of legitimate
withdrawals made by a depositor.This prompted the private respondent to file an affidavit-
complaint for estafa against the aforementioned employees of the money shop and two
outsiders, Susan Jordan and Brigida Mangahas. Acting Provincial Prosecutor, Jesus Y.
Manarang (hereinafter "prosecutor"), issued a resolution finding prima facie evidence that
the petitioner and her co-employees had committed the crime of estafa thru falsification of
commercial documents, and recommending the filing of the corresponding information
against them with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan. The charges against
Susan Jordan and Brigida Mangahas were, however, dismissed.
- Perez filed a petition for review with the Secretary of Justice praying for the dismissal of
the charges against her. On the other hand, private respondent moved for a reconsideration
of the portion of the same resolution dismissing the complaint against Susan Jordan.
- The prosecutor granted private respondent's motion for reconsideration.8 Hence, on April
27, 1994, an information for estafa thru falsification of commercial documents was filed
against herein petitioner, Alberto Fabian, Milagros Martin, Cristina Medina and Susan
Jordan,
- On September 23, 1994, then Secretary of Justice, Franklin M. Drilon, issued Resolution No.
696, series of 1994 ordering the prosecutor to cause the dismissal of the information
against herein petitioner on the ground of insufficient evidence. The private respondent
filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of the Secretary of Justice, which motion,
however, was denied with finality by the latter.Pursuant to the said resolution, the
prosecutor filed a motion in the RTC praying for the dismissal of the case against herein
petitioner and the admission of an amended information excluding petitioner as one of the
accused which motion was granted by the RTC. Private respondent assailed the dismissal of
the case against the petitioner in a motion for reconsideration filed in the RTC which motion
was denied by the RTC after finding that the private respondent, as private complainant,
had no legal personality to question the dismissal of the criminal charges against the
petitioner.

ISSUES
1. WON Judge Masadao, presiding judge of RTC Branch 9, Malolos, Bulacan, committed
grave abuse of discretion in granting the prosecutor's motion to dismiss the criminal case
against petitioner without an independent assessment of the sufficiency or insufficiency of
the evidence against the latter
2. WON the private respondent, as private complainant, in a criminal case has the legal
personality to question the dismissal by the trial judge of the criminal charges against
herein petitioner upon the motion filed by the prosecutor

HELD
1. YES, Judge Masadao acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting the prosecutor's
motion to dismiss the criminal charges against the petitioner on the basis solely of the
recommendation of the Secretary of Justice.
Reasoning
- As aptly observed by the Office of the Solicitor General, in failing to make an independent
finding of the merits of the case and merely anchoring the dismissal on the revised position
of the prosecution, the trial judge relinquished the discretion he was duty bound to exercise.
In effect, it was the prosecution, through the Department of Justice which decided what to
do and not the court which was reduced to a mere rubber stamp in violation of the ruling in
Crespo v. Mogul..
2. YES
Ratio While it is only the Solicitor General that may bring or defend actions on behalf of the
Republic of the Philippines, or represent the People or State in criminal proceedings
pending in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, the private offended party retains
the right to bring a special civil action for certiorari in his own name in criminal proceedings
before the courts of law.
Reasoning
- In the case of Dela Rosa v. Court of Appeals,we held that:
"In a special civil action for certiorari filed under Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
wherein it is alleged that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction or on other jurisdictional grounds, the rules state that the petition may
be filed by the person aggrieved. In such case, the aggrieved parties are the State and the
private offended party or complainant. The complainant has an interest in the civil aspect of
the case so he may file such special civil action questioning the decision or action of the
respondent court on jurisdictional grounds. In so doing, the complainant should not bring
the action in the name of the People of the Philippines. The action may be prosecuted in
(the) name of the said complainant."
- Furthermore, our ruling in the case of Dee v. Court of Appeals allowing the private
offended party to file a special civil action for certiorari to assail the order of the trial judge
granting the motion to dismiss upon the directive of the Secretary of Justice is apropos. It
follows, therefore, that if the private respondent in this case may file a special civil action for
certiorari, then with more reason does it have legal personality to move for a
reconsideration of the order of the trial court dismissing the criminal charges against the
petitioner. In fact, as a general rule, a special civil action will not lie unless a motion for
reconsideration is first filed before the respondent tribunal, to allow it an opportunity to
correct its assigned errors.


STA. ROSA MINING v ZABALA
153 SCRA 367
BIDIN; August 31, 1987

NATURE
Mandamus to compel respondent Fiscal to prosecute Criminal Case No. 821 of the then
Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte until the same is terminated.

FACTS
- On March 21, 1974, petitioner filed a complaint for attempted theft of materials (scrap
iron) forming part of the installations on its mining property at Jose Panganiban, Camarines
Norte against private respondents Romeo Garrido and Gil Alapan with the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal of Camarines Norte, then headed by Provincial Fiscal Joaquin Ilustre.
- The case was assigned to third Assistant Fiscal Esteban P. Panotes for preliminary
investigation who, after conducting said investigation, issued a resolution dated August 26,
1974 recommending that an information for Attempted Theft be filed against private
respondents on a finding of prima facie case which resolution was approved by Provincial
Fiscal Joaquin Ilustre. Private respondents sought reconsideration of the resolution but the
same was denied by Fiscal Ilustre in a resolution dated October 14, 1974.
- On October 29, 1974, Fiscal Ilustre filed with the Court of First Instance of Camarines
Norte an Information dated October 17, 1987 docketed as Criminal Case No. 821, charging
private respondents with the crime of Attempted Theft.
- In a letter dated October 22, 1974, the private respondents requested the Secretary of
Justice for a review of the Resolutions of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal dated August 26,
1974 and October 14, 1974.
- On November 6, 1974, the Chief State Prosecutor ordered the Provincial Fiscal to elevate
entire records PFO Case 577 against Garrido et al.The letter-request for review was
opposed by petitioner in a letter to the Secretary of Justice dated November 23, 1974
alleging, among other things, that an information for Attempted Theft had already been filed
against private respondents for which reason the request for review has become a moot
question as the Provincial Fiscal has lost jurisdiction to dismiss the charge for attempted
theft.
- On March 6, 1975, the Secretary of Justice, after reviewing the records, reversed the
findings of prima facie case of the Provincial Fiscal and directed said prosecuting officer to
immediately move for the dismissal of the criminal case. Petitioner sought reconsideration
of the directive of the Secretary of Justice but the latter denied the same in a letter dated
June 11, 1975.
- A motion to dismiss dated September 16, 1975 was then filed by the Provincial Fiscal but
the court denied the motion on the ground that there was a prima facie evidence against
private respondents and set the case for trial on February 25, 1976.
- Private respondents sought reconsideration of the court's ruling but in an Order dated
February 13, 1976, the motion filed for said purpose was likewise denied. Trial of the case
was reset to April 23, 1976.
- Thereafter, Fiscal Ilustre was appointed a judge in the Court of First Instance of Albay and
respondent Fiscal Zabala became officer-in-charge of the Provincial Fiscal's Office of
Camarines Norte.
- On April 19, 1976, respondent Fiscal filed a Second Motion to Dismiss the case. This
second motion to dismiss was denied by the trial court in an order dated April 23, 1976.
Whereupon, respondent fiscal manifested that he would not prosecute the case and
disauthorized any private prosecutor to appear therein. Hence, this petition for mandamus.
- In this action, petitioner prays for the issuance of the writ of mandamus "commanding
respondent fiscal or any other person who may be assigned or appointed to act in his place
or stead to prosecute Criminal Case No. 821 of the Court of First Instance of Camarines
Norte" There is no question that the institution of a criminal action is addressed to the
sound discretion of the investigating fiscal. He may or he may not file the information
according to whether the evidence is in his opinion sufficient to establish the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt. (Gonzales vs. Court of First Instance, 63 Phil. 846) and
when he decides not to file the information, in the exercise of his discretion, he may not be
compelled to do so (People vs. Pineda, 20 SCRA 748). However, after the case had already
been filed in court, "fiscals are not clothed with power, without the consent of the court, to
dismiss or nolle prosequi criminal actions actually instituted and pending further
proceedings. The power to dismiss criminal actions is vested solely in the court" (U.S. vs.
Barredo, 32 Phil. 444, 450; Gonzales vs. Court of First Instance, supra).

ISSUE
WON the fiscal can be compelled to prosecute the case after his motion to dismiss has been
denied

HELD
YES
- This court is of the view that the writ prayed for should issue. Notwithstanding his
personal convictions or opinions, the fiscal must proceed with his duty of presenting
evidence to the court to enable the court to arrive at its own independent judgment as to
the culpability of the accused. The fiscal should not shirk from his responsibility much less
leave the prosecution of the case at the hands of a private prosecutor. At all times, the
criminal action shall be prosecuted under his direction and control (Sec. 4, Rule 110, Rules
of Court). Otherwise, the entire proceedings will be null and void (People vs. Beriales, 70
SCRA 361).
- "In the trial of criminal cases, it is the duty of the public prosecutor to appear for the
government since an offense is an outrage to the sovereignty of the State." (Moran,
Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. IV, 1980 Ed., p. 10). This is so because "the
prosecuting officer is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy but of a
sovereignty where obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to
govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a
case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the
servant of the law, the two-fold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence
suffer" (Suarez vs. Platon, 69 Phil. 556).
- Accordingly, if the fiscal is not at all convinced that a prima facie case exists, he simply
cannot move for the dismissal of the case and, when denied, refuse to prosecute the same.
He is obliged by law to proceed and prosecute the criminal action. He cannot impose his
opinion on the trial court. At least what he can do is to continue appearing for the
prosecution and then turn over the presentation of evidence to another fiscal or a private
prosecutor subject to his direction and control (U.S. vs. Despabiladeras, 32 Phil. 442; U.S. vs.
Gallegos, 37 Phil. 289). Where there is no other prosecutor available, he should proceed to
discharge his duty and present the evidence to the best of his ability and let the court decide
the merits of the case on the basis of the evidence adduced by both parties.
- The mere fact that the Secretary of Justice had, after reviewing the records of the case,
directed the prosecuting fiscal to move for the dismissal of the case and the motion to
dismiss filed pursuant to said directive is denied by the trial court, is no justification for the
refusal of the fiscal to prosecute the case. It is the court where the case is filed and not the
fiscal that has full control of it.
- In order therefore to avoid such a situation whereby the opinion of the Secretary of Justice
who reviewed the action of the fiscal may be disregarded by the trial court, the Secretary of
Justice should, as far as practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for review or appeal
from the action of the fiscal, when the complaint or information has already been filed in
Court. The matter should be left entirely for the determination of the Court."
DISPOSITION petition is hereby Granted Public respondent or any other person who may
be assigned or appointed to act in his place or stead, is hereby ordered to continue
prosecuting Criminal Case No. 821 until the same is terminated.


FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-46772. February 13, 1992.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
QUEZON (BRANCH VII), GODOFREDO ARROZAL AND LUIS FLORES, respondents.

MEDIALDEA, J p:

Doctrine:

When an accused invokes in a motion to quash the ground that the facts charged do not
constitute an offense (Rule 117, Sec. 2[a] Rules of Court), the sufficiency of the Information
hinges on the question of whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, meet the
essential elements of the offense defined in the law.

***The elements of the crime of qualified theft of logs are: 1) That the accused cut, gathered,
collected or removed timber or other forest products; 2) that the timber of other forest
products cut, gathered, collected or removed belongs to the government or to any private
individual; and 3) that the cutting, gathering, collecting or removing was without authority
under a license agreement, lease, license, or permit granted by the state.


Facts:

This petition seeks the annulment of the order of the CFI of Quezon dismissing the
information filed therein.

The private respondents were charged with the crime of qualified theft of logs,
defined and punished under Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, otherwise known as
the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines, in an information which read:

On March 23, 1977, the named accused filed a motion to quash the information on
two (2) grounds, to wit: (1) that the facts charged do not constitute an offense; and, (2) that
the information does not conform substantially to the prescribed form. The Trial court
dismissed the information on the grounds invoked and the reconsideration sought was
denied.

Hence this petition.

Issue:

WoN the information charged an offense.

Held:

YES. The Court agree with the petitioner that the information substantially alleged
all the elements of the crime of qualified theft of logs as described in Section 68 of P.D. 705.
While it was admitted that the information did not precisely allege that the taking of the
logs in question was "without the consent of the state," nevertheless, said information
expressly stated that the accused "illegally cut, gather, take, steal and carry away therefrom,
without the consent of said owner and without any authority under a license agreement,
lease, license or permit, sixty (60) logs of different species. . . ." Since only the state can grant
the lease, license, license agreement or permit for utilization of forest resources, including
timber, then the allegation in the information that the asportation of the logs was "without
any authority" under a license agreement, lease, license or permit, is tantamount to alleging
that the taking of the logs was without the consent of the state.

When an accused invokes in a motion to quash the ground that the facts charged do
not constitute an offense (Rule 117, Sec. 2[a] Rules of Court), the sufficiency of the
Information hinges on the question of whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted,
meet the essential elements of the offense defined in the law.

The failure of the information to allege that the logs taken were owned by the state
is not fatal. The fact that only the state can grant a license agreement, license or lease does
not make the state the owner of all the logs and timber products produced in the
Philippines including those produced in private woodlands. While it is only the state which
can grant a license or authority to cut, gather, collect or remove forest products it does not
follow that all forest products belong to the state. In the just cited case, private ownership of
forest products grown in private lands is retained under the principle in civil law that
ownership of the land includes everything found on its surface.

Ownership is not an essential element of the offense as defined in Section 60 of P.D.
No. 705. Thus, the failure of the information to allege the true owner of the forest products
is not material, it was sufficient that it alleged that the taking was without any authority or
license from the government.

Dispositive Portion:

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED. The questioned order of the trial court dismissing
the information is SET ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 1591 is reinstated.



PEOPLE v ASUNCION
161 SCRA 490
PADILLA; May 24, 1988

NATURE
Certiorari

FACTS:
-Rolando Abadilla, a former colonel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, was charged
before the QC RTC with the offense of Violation of PD No. 1866 [ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF
FIREARMS AND AMMUNITION) --The Information read that he willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously had in his possession and under his custody and control rifles, pistons,
ammunitions and magazines (see orig case for the list) without first securing the
necessary license and/or permit from the lawful authority.

-Upon motion of the accused, Asuncion dismissed the Information on the ground that it did
not allege sufficient facts to constitute an offense, since the possession of loose firearms and
explosives is not illegal per se, in view of Executive Order No. 107 which gives holders or
possessors of unlicensed firearms and ammunition a period of six months from its
effectivity, extended to 31 December 1987 by EO No. 222, within which to surrender the
same to the proper authorities, without incurring any criminal liability therefor,
except if the unlicensed firearm or ammunition is carried outside of one's residence,
not for the purpose of surrendering the same, or used in the commission of any other
offense, and there is no allegation in said information that the firearms and
ammunition enumerated therein were carried outside the accused's residence or
used in the commission of some other crime.
- In support thereof, the respondent judge cited the decision in People vs. Lopez, 79 Phil 658.

-The prosecution filed a MR of said Resolution, but the motion was denied
-Hence, the present recourse by the prosecution.
Petitioners Claims
-nothing is contained in said EOs which legalizes the possession of firearms and
ammunition without a permit;
-that said EOs merely authorized holders or possessors of unlicensed firearms and
ammunition to surrender the same within a specified filing period without incurring
criminal liability;
-that illegal possession of firearms and ammunition is still penalized under PD No. 1866
which was not repealed by said EO NO. 107 and 222.

ISSUES
1. WON J. Asuncion erred in holding that the possession of loose firearms and explosives is
not illegal per se during the period covered by EO Nos. 107 and 222
2. WON it was not necessary for the prosecution to allege in the information that the
firearms and ammunition, subject matter of this case, were brought out of the residence of
the accused or were used by him in the commission or another offense, since these
circumstances are not essential ingredients of the crime of illegal possession of firearms and
ammunition
3. WON under the allegation in the information, prosecution may prove that the accused
earned the firearms and ammunition outside of his residence

HELD
1. EO NO. 107, as amended by EO No. 222, is similar to RA Nos. 4 and 482. SC did NOT give it
a different meaning because there is no basis for such a difference.
2. NO. IT IS NECESSARY TO ALLEGE IT IN THE INFO.
3. NO. The information, in this particular charge against Abadilla, is fatally defective. It
would be fatally defective against any other accused charged with the same offense. J.
Asunction, in dismissing the information, committed no reversible error or grave abuse
of discretion.
Ratio (citing People vs. Austria) the presentation of evidence "cannot have the effect of
validating a void information, or proving an offense which does not legally exist. ... The
information was not merely defective but it does not charge any offense at all. Technically
speaking, that information does not exist in contemplation of law."
-Abadilla is regarded with unusual ease and facility as the "hit man" of the Marcos regime.
But the Court cannot be swayed by appellations for it has a duty, as a temple of justice, to
accord to every man who comes before it in appropriate proceedings the right to due
process and the equal protection of the laws.
Reasoning
1. It may be true that there is nothing in EO Nos. 107 and 222 that expressly legalizes the
unlicensed possession of firearms and ammunition, but this Court, applying statutes similar
to the executive orders in question, and which also provided for a period within which a
holder or possessor of unlicensed firearms and ammunition may surrender the same to the
proper authorities without incurring criminal liability, had ruled that a criminal liability was
temporarily LIFTED for mere possession' of unlicensed firearms and ammunition during
the period covered, although such person is not exempt from criminal liability filing within
the period provided, he carries the firearm and ammunition (unless it is for the purpose of
surrendering the same) or he commits any other offense with the use of such unlicensed
firearm and ammunition.
-People vs. Lopez~ It will be seen that sec 2 (of RA NO 4) excluded from the operation of sec
1 up to August 31, 1946, possession of firearms and ammunition so long as they were not
used for any purpose other than self-defense or carried for any purpose other than of
surrendering them to the proper authorities. The Government does not dispute this
interpretation. Although the law does not categorically state that criminal liability was
temporarily lifted for mere possession of filing firegems and ammunition, that is the only
construction compatible with the spirit and purposes of the enactment as revealed by its
context.
-People vs. Feliciano~ SC ruled that RA No. 482 legalized mere unlicensed possession of
firearms and ammunition for the limited period specified in said law, and punished only (1)
the use of unlicensed firearm or ammunition, or (2) the carrying of such firearm or
ammunition on the person, except to surrender them. The Court said:
-Feliciano ruling was reiterated in People vs. Tabunares: RA No. 482, in effect legalized mere
unlicensed on within one year from said date, and punished only (1) the use of a or
ammunition or (2) the carriage thereof on the person except for purpose of surrender.
Appellant's conviction cannot stand, since it is rested solely on unlicensed possession on or
about November 6, 1950.
2. People vs. Lopez~ the Court already ruled that, under RA No. 4, the use or the carrying of
firearms and/or ammunition was an ingredient, if not the sole ingredient, of the offense; i.e.
the very acts which were punished, subject to certain conditions, and hence, should be
alleged and proved.
-People vs. Austria~ the Court also ruled that in order that an information charging illegal
possession of firearm and ammunition, under RA No. 482, may be deemed suffident, it must
allege that the accused was using the unlicensed firearm or carrying it in his person at the
time he was apprehended by the authorities with said firearm.
Dispositive Petition is DENIED.


G.R. No. L-11241 July 26, 1960
VALENTIN ILO, ET AL., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., respondents.
Perfecto A. Tabora for petitioners.
Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Asst. Solicitor General A. A. Torres for respondents.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Valentin Ilo, et al were charge before the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur with the
crime of arson where, after trial, Valentin Ilo and Silvestre Buela were found guilty under
Article 321, paragraph 5, of the Revised Penal Code and sentenced each to an indeterminate
penalty of from 4 months and 1 day to 4 years 2 months and 1 day of prision correccional to
indemnify jointly and severally the offended party in the sum of P600.00, and to pay their
respective share of the costs. The rest of the accused were acquitted.
Ilo and Buela appealed to the Court of Appeals. The latter court, while it found appellants
guilty, held that the crime charged comes under Article 321, paragraph 1, of the Revised
Penal Code and not under the same article, paragraph 5, and as a consequence, it modified
the penalty imposed upon them. It accordingly sentenced each of appellants to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of not les than 6 years and 1 day of prision mayor nor more than 16
year and 1 day of reclusion temporal affirming the decision of the trial court in all other
respects. Appellants interposed the present petition for review.
The facts as found by the Court of Appeals are:
Zosimo Taghoy and his family lived in their house located in sitio Ligua, barrio
Salvacion, Municipality of Tinambac, Camarines Sur. It appears that prior to
December 4, 1950 Valentin Ilo had quarrelled with one Restituto Bona while they
were in the aforesaid house of Zosimo. As a result thereof Restituto filed a criminal
charge against Valentin in connection with which the latter had warned Zosimo not
to testify in favor of his accuser. This notwithstanding, however, Zosimo testified
before Sgt. Rivera when the latter investigated the incident.
The prosecution evidence show that very early in the morning of December 4, 1950,
Zosimo left for Tinambac to buy fish. Between 11 and 12, o'clock that morning as
Bruna Absin, a 60-year old woman who lived in the house aforesaid together with
her granddaughter, Salud Piania and the latter's three children, the eldest of whom
was only three years old she heard the voices of some people coming towards the
place. She went down to see who they were. The group was composed of eight
persons headed by Valentin Ilo. Salud Piania also got up and looked through the
window from where she saw them coming. All of them were well-known to both
Bruna and Salud because they had been their neighbors in the same barrio for more
than ten years.
Upon their arrival Silvestre Buela poured petroleum from a bottle into the awning of
the house, while Valentin Ilo applied a lighted match to the same place after the
petroleum had been poured upon it. Their six companions had by then surrounded
the place.
When Bruna asked Valentin why they were burning the house, the latter replied
sarcastically; "What setting fire are you talking about?" Then as the fire begun to
spread , Salud Piania took hold of her youngest child and ran out of the house
through the kitchen door while her grandmother took care of the other two children
and hurriedly lead them out of the burning house through the same door and all of
them sought refuge at the house of Salud's mother-in-law located at about one
kilometer away.
The house of the Taghoys was burned to the ground together with all its contents
consisting of furniture, clothing, house utensils, farm implements, two sacks of corn,
and six sacks of palay, with a total estimated value of more than P1,000.00. The
house itself, in the opinion of the trial court, was worth P600.00.
As stated at the beginning, the evidence shows that Zosimo Taghoy had gone to the
poblacion of Tinambac very early that same morning to buy fish. While he was there
walking with Restituto Bona towards the municipal building, they met Valentin Ilo,
Alfredo Caizo and Pacifico Carullo. Valentin threw a stone at them hitting Restituto
with it on the forehead. Zosimo and Restituto, unwilling to get into further trouble
took to their heels, pursued by Valentin and his two companions, but they
succeeded in evading them by seeking refuge in the house of Maximo Piania,
Zosimo's father-in-law.
Due to the incident above described and fearful that Valentin and his companion
might do harm to the member of his family, Zosimo requested the chief of police of
Tinambac, to have a policeman accompany his brother-in-law, Jaime Piania, to his
house at sitio Ligua to fetch his wife and children. This the chief of police did, but
when Jaime and municipal policeman named Gualberto Cantos reached Ligua they
found Zosimo's house reduced to ashes. Later on they went to the house of Zosimo's
mother where they found his wife and children.
The trial court found appellant guilty of arson under Article 321, paragraph 5, of the
Revised Penal Code because the information does not allege that the house burned was an
inhabited one or that the accused knew it to be inhabited. And in expressing the opinion
that the crime come under Article 321, paragraph 5, it surmised that, while the information
does not stated in so many words that building burned was used as a dwelling, it however
alleges that it was reduced to ashes together with all the furniture, utensils, clothing and
palay deposited therein, from which it may be inferred that the house was inhabited when it
was set on fire.
The Court of Appeals, however, is of different opinion. It expressed the view that the
defendants are guilty of the offense under paragraph 1 of the same article, which is
penalized with reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua, or from 12 years and 1 day
to reclusion perpetua, because the information alleges that they "set fire to the house of one
Zosimo Taghoy", and the evidence shows that when they burned the house they saw two
occupants therein in the persons of Bruna Absin and Salud Piania, from which, according to
said court, it may be deduced that they knew that the house was then inhabited and such
knowledge is an essential ingredient of this form of arson.
Counsel for appellants, on the other hand, disagrees with both the trial court and the Court
of Appeals, for he contends that the information does not contain any allegation that the
building burned is used as a dwelling and is located in an uninhabited place to make it come
under Article 321, Paragraph 5, of the Revised Penal Code, nor does it alleged that the
accused set fire to the house "knowing it to be occupied at the time by one or more
persons", even if it does allege that the house was that of Zosimo Taghoy and it was burned
together with the furniture, utensils, clothing and palay deposited therein. He contends that
such avernment, as well as the proof adduced that the accused saw two occupants of the
house at the time of the burning cannot convert the crime charged into a more serious one,
or one under paragraph 1 of the same article.
We find merit in this contention. In one case, where the defendant was accused of arson
upon the allegation that he set fire to the dwelling house of one Rosa Dani which was
inhabited by her, it was held that it was error to find him guilty under Article 321,
paragraph 1, because there is no allegation that he knew that the house was inhabited. This
Court said: "Knowledge on the part of the accused that the building set fire to is occupied, is
an essential element of the form of arson defines in Article 549 of the Penal Code, (now
Article 321, paragraph 1) and the information must contain allegations to that effect that
the accused had such knowledge at the time of the commission of the crime in order to
sustain a conviction under the article" (People vs. Macalma, 44 Phil., 170). On the other
hand, it is trite to say that the guilty of appellant and their subsequent conviction cannot
rest on a mere presumption, but upon clear proof, while a substantial defect in the
information cannot be cured by evidence, for that would jeopardize their right to be
informed of the true nature of the offense they are charged.
We therefore agree with counsel that the offense of which appellants may be convicted is
that defined and penalized in Article 322, paragraph 3, of the Revised Penal Code which
governs cases of arson not included in Article 321 and imposes the penalty of prision
correccional in its minimum and medium period if the damage caused is over P200.00 but
does not exceed P1,000.00.
Considering that the crime was committed with the aggravating circumstances of dwelling,
not offset by any mitigating circumstance, that penalty should be imposed in the maximum
period, or from 2 years 11 months and 11 days to 4 years and 2 month. And applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, appellants should be sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
penalty of from 4 months and 1 day of arresto mayor to 4 years and 2 months of prision
correccional.
Wherefore with the above modification, the decision appealed from is affirmed in all other
respects, without pronouncement as to costs.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Endencia,
Barrera, and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.

PEOPLE VS REGALA

PhilippineLaw.info Jurisprudence 1982 March
PhilippineLaw.info Jurisprudence SCRA Vol. 113
G.R. No. , 113 SCRA 613
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
DECISION
March 31, 1982
G.R. No. , ,
vs.
WHEREFORE, APPELLANT RODOLFO REGALA ALIAS RUDY REGALA IS HEREBY FOUND
GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF HOMICIDE AGGRAVATED BY
RECIDIVISM AND BY CONTEMPT FOR OR INSULT TO A PUBLIC AUTHORITY OR
DISREGARD OF THE RESPECT DUE THE OFFENDED PARTY ON ACCOUNT OF HIS RANK,
WITHOUT ANY MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE, AND HE IS HEREBY SENTENCED TO
SUFFER AN INDETERMINATE TERM OF IMPRISONMENT RANGING FROM TWELVE (12)
YEARS OF PRISON MAYOR AS MINIMUM TO TWENTY (20) YEARS OF RECLUSION
TEMPORAL AS MAXIM.
, J.:
Defendants Rudy Regala and Delfin Flores were charged with the crime of murder with
assault upon an agent of a person in authority in an information filed on June 27, 1964 by
the provincial fiscal of Masbate with the Court of First Instance of Masbate which reads:
That on or about the 13th day of June, 1964, at the Magallanes Gate in the poblacion of the
Municipality of Masbate, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused conspiring together and helping each other, with deliberate intent to
kill, with evident premeditation and treachery and taking advantage of nighttime, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack and stab with. a knife (cuchillo) one
Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr., a member of the Philippine Constabulary while he was then in the
performance of his official duty, thereby inflicting upon the latter serious stab wounds at
the mid-epigastric region penetrating abdominal cavity and perforating cordial and cardiac
regions which injury directly caused his instantaneous death.
to which defendants pleaded not guilty.
To establish its case against defendants, the prosecution initially presented five witnesses,
namely, Erlinda Tidon, Juanito Evangelista, Modesto Taleon, Dr. Orlando delos Santos and
Municipal Judge Jose M. Angustia.
Erlinda Tidon and Juanito Evangelista both testified that they were at the scene of the crime
and saw the accused Rudy Regala stab the victim, Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr. In other words, they
claimed to be eyewitnesses to the crime.
Erlinda Tidon who at the time she testified on August 7, 1964 was 22 years old, single,
housekeeper and a resident of barrio Luy-a, municipality of Aroroy province of Masbate,
declared that she knew the victim, Juan Desilos Jr., who was a sergeant of the Philippine
Constabulary; that in the evening of June 12, 1964, she was at the Magallanes Gate, Masbate,
Masbate, because she wanted to get inside to dance; that at the Magallanes Gate which was
well lighted, she saw Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr. in uniform attending to the exit door; that while
Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr. was guarding the Magallanes Gate and trying to clear the exit gate of
people, accused Rudy Regala, with co-accused Delfin Flores who had his arm on the
shoulder of the former (Rudy Regala), arrived; that thereafter, she tried her best to get
inside the Magallanes Gate and Delfin Flores and Rudy Regala "were there at the Magallanes
Gate in my front. I was at their back" ; that when accused Rudy Regala and Delfin Flores
reached the exit gate where Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr. was stationed, Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr. pushed
accused Rudy Regala and told him "not to get thru this entrance because this is for the exit"
(p. 9, t.s.n., Vol. III, rec.); that the person pushed by Sgt. Desilos was accused Delfin Flores
(id, at p. 10); that while Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr. was pushing accused Delfin Flores, accused
Rudy Regala became angry, got his knife from his waist and stabbed Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr.;
that Exhibit "A", which is a long knife with a white sharp blade, was the same knife used by
accused Rudy Regala in stabbing Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr.; that accused Delfin Flores was at the
back of accused Rudy Regala when the latter stabbed Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr.; that accused
Delfin Flores was one-half meter, more or less, from Sgt. Juan Desilos but accused Rudy
Regala was nearer to Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr.; that Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr. was hit in the abdomen
and he fell down and then accused Rudy Regala and Delfin Flores ran away, with the latter
following the former; that she was one-half meter, more or less, from Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr.,
accused Rudy Regala and Delfin Flores; that Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr. was stabbed on June 12,
1964 at twelve o'clock midnight, more or less, at the Magallanes Gate, municipality of
Masbate, province of Masbate; that Exhibit "B" is the uniform of Sgt. Juan Desilos at the time
he was stabbed by accused Rudy Regala; that she was investigated in connection with the
stabbing incident by Sgt. Balase; and that she knew Sgt. Taleon who also investigated her in
connection with the case (pp. 3-16, t.s.n., Vol. III, rec.).
On cross-examination, witness revealed that in Masbate, Masbate, she has been staying at
the house of Sgt. Dominador Balase since Tuesday, August 5, 1964, because he wanted her
to stay thereat; that she attended the town fiesta of Masbate, Masbate, on June 12, 1964 to
dance and enjoy the evening; that her religion is Roman Catholic and as such she follows its
precepts; that she was on that occasion with her sister Nenita Tidon who is also single; that
she and her sister did not have any escorts; that she arrived at the Magallanes Gate on June
12, 1964 and she was not able to enter the plaza immediately because it was then too
crowded as there were many people inside the plaza, at the gate, as well as outside the gate
of Quezon Street; that she intended to get inside the plaza through the exit gate because the
entrance gate was already closed; that she saw Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr. guarding the exit gate
which was so marked as "EXIT" where people were then milling around; that the exit gate
was lighted with three (3) electric bulbs placed thereat separately; that before this case was
filed she knew accused Rudy Regala only by appearance and she came to know his name
only after he was already accused of the crime in this case; that during the investigation, she
did not know the name of accused Rudy Regala but knew his appearance; that she executed
on June 15, 1964 an affidavit marked as Exhibit "l" for the defense, wherein she declared
that she knew Rudy Regala only by face: that she told the PC investigator all the truth she
knew about the case, but was not able to name the accused as that was the truth; that she
came to know the name of Rudy Regala only when an information or a complaint was filed
on June 15, 1961 against him by the PC authorities with the Justice of the Peace Court of
Masbate, Masbate; that on the 12th, 13th and 14th of June, 1964, she did not yet know the
name of the accused Rudy Regala: that she has known Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr. even before June
12, 1964 or since 1963; that she saw accused Rudy Regala on June 12, 1964 approach the
exit of Magallanes Gate which Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr. was regulating the flow of traffic; that she
saw at the instance Rudy Regala placing his hand on the shoulder of accused Delfin Flores,
but she cannot remember which hand: that in the evening of June 12, 1964, she did not also
know the name of accused Delfin Flores although she knew him by his appearance, because
she had not seen accused Delfin Flores and accused Rudy Regala before; that she came to
know his name only on June 15, 1964 when he was already accused of the crime in this
case; that the name of Delfin Flores was told to her by PC Sgts. Balase and Taleon who
investigated her; that Sgt. Balase and Sgt. Taleon showed her the appearance of accused
Rudy Regala; that at the Magallanes Gate, one could not move very fast because of the heavy
traffic; that even if she had wanted to run because of fright, she could not because of the
heavy traffic; that the distance between the exit gate and Quezon road is about two (2)
meters; that there is a concrete road embankment between the exit gate and Quezon road;
that the space between the exit gate and Quezon road was full of people; that she did not see
any policeman outside the Magallanes Gate; that at the time Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr. was stabbed
by the accused Rudy Regala, she was facing Sgt. Desilos Jr. and the distance between them
was 1/2 meter (demonstration made by witness in open court showed that she was oblique
to, not directly facing, Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr. that in that position Rudy Regala appeared from
the right side going towards Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr. (witness pointing to her right side which
was directly in front of Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr. and approximately the same distance (see p. 49,
t.s.n., Vol. III); that when accused Rudy Regala was in that position which was in line with
her, they were pushed by Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr. who told them "Don't get inside this gate
because this is for exit"; that it was accused Delfin Flores who was pushed by Sgt. Juan
Desilos Jr., who was then at the side of Rudy Regala, but she does not know whether accused
Delfin Flores was at the right side or at the left side of accused Rudy Regala; that accused
Delfin Flores was next to accused Rudy Regala and they were in the same line with her; and
it was in that position that Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr. pushed accused Delfin Flores; that both
accused Delfin Flores and Rudy Regala were pushed by Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr. but it was
accused Delfin Flores who was directly hit by Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr.; that because of the
pushing, accused Rudy Regala got angry and still at the same distance, he drew his knife
from the left side of his waist which was covered by his shirt and then stabbed with it Sgt.
Juan Desilos Jr. in the stomach; that at the time accused Rudy Regala stabbed Sgt. Juan
Desilos Jr., she was still at the same distance from him as before; that accused Rudy Regala
was able to pull off the knife from the body of Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr., but she was not able to
see whether blood immediately spurted from the wound because she had already left; that
accused Rudy Regala was then wearing a close-necked buttonless blue shirt with short
sleeves; that all that accused Delfin Flores did during the incident was to walk, together
with accused Rudy Regala who placed his arm on accused Delfin Flores' shoulder, towards
Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr. that no other act or acts were made by accused Delfin Flores; that when
she saw the horrible incident she went towards the road, walking naturally and slowly
because there were plenty of people; that there was no other unusual occurrence that took
place within the immediate vicinity of the place where Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr. was stabbed; that
she came to Masbate to testify of her own volition; and that she was served with a subpoena
by a policeman of Aroroy Masbate, in connection with this case (pp. 17-57, t.s.n., Vol. III,
rec.).
Witness Juanito Evangelists, then 26 years old, married, driver by profession and a resident
of Bagumbayan, Masbate, declared that in the evening of June 12, 1964, he went to the plaza
at the Magallanes Gate and there met Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr. who was in PC uniform; that Sgt.
Juan Desilos Jr. was stabbed in the abdomen by accused Rudy Regala with a sharp pointed
knife; that Exhibit "A" is the knife used by accused Rudy Regala in stabbing Sgt. Juan Desilos
Jr. at the exit of Magallanes Gate on the night of June 12, 1964; that Exhibit " B " is the
uniform of Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr. at the time he was stabbed; that he knows accused Delfin
Flores who was then by the side of accused Rudy Regala when he stabbed Sgt. Juan Desilos
Jr.; that before accused Rudy Regala stabbed Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr., he (Regala) first pushed
aside accused Delfin Flores; that Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr. fell on the ground; that he was very
near Sgt. Desilos when he was stabbed by accused Rudy Regala; that the place of the
incident was well-lighted as there was a dance going on; that after Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr. fell,
accused Rudy Regala and Delfin Flores ran outside; that he ran after them to know who they
were but was not able to catch up with them because they ran fast; that he saw accused
Rudy Regala throw away the knife (Exh. "A") on the road; that he did not pick up the knife;
that he did not know the names of the accused but knew their appearances; that he had
seen the face of accused Delfin Flores before the incident; that he now knows the name of
accused Delfin Flores; and that he did not know the reason why Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr. was
stabbed by accused Rudy Regala (pp. 70-82, t.s.n., Vol. III, rec.).
Upon cross examination, witness Evangelista stated that it was at around seven o'clock in
the evening of June 12, 1964 when he went to the Magallanes Plaza at Masbate, Masbate;
that the stabbing incident took place at around 1 o'clock in the morning (obviously referring
to June 13, 1964); that he was at the gate when the incident took place and there were many
people; that Sgt. Juan Desilos was guarding the Magallanes Gate because people were
rushing towards it. When asked whether he also then wanted to enter the gate, he answered
that he was there inside, about a distance of one meter from the gate, and when asked once
more, he affirmed his answer (pp. 82-87, t.s.n., Vol. III, rec.).
Witness Dr. Orlando delos Santos, then 35 years old, married and a resident physician of
Masbate Provincial Hospital at Masbate, Masbate, told the court that on or about midnight
of June 12, 1964, he was on duty in the hospital when the dead body of Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr.
of the Philippine Constabulary was brought in. According to him the probable cause of death
was cardiac hemorrhage; and that the stab wound at the mid-epigastric region, penetrating
the abdominal cavity and perforating the cardiac region was caused by a sharp blunt
instrument and that the injury directly caused the death of Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr. He opined
that the knife Exhibit "A" could have caused the wound on the body of Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr.
and he Identified Exhibit "B" as the uniform of Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr. and Exhibit "B-1" as the
cut on the front right side of said uniform. He further Identified Exhibit "C", the death
certificate he issued, and Exhibit "C-1", his signature thereon (pp. 58-65, t.s.n., Vol. III, rec.).
When cross-examined, witness admitted that it was his first time to see the knife Exhibit "A"
and that he did not examine the same as it was not brought to the hospital for chemical
examination. He opined that Exhibit "A" is stained with blood but he cannot distinguish
whether it is human blood or animal blood (pp. 65-67, t.s.n., Vol. III, rec.).
Questioned by the Court, he ventured the opinion that the stain in the uniform of Sgt. Juan
Desilos Jr. could be the blood that came from the wound inflicted on him. He further
declared that he probed the wound of Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr. with an instrument to find out the
extent of the entrance and penetration of the wound and found that the wound was midway
umbilicus, the point of entrance of the stab wound was one-half inch to the right, which is at
the epigastric region; and that the wound was directed a little upward and in a lateral way,
about 7 to 8 inches deep. He was certain that the cause of death was the stab wound which
was caused by a sharp pointed instrument (pp. 67-69, t.s.n., Vol. III, rec.).
Technical Sergeant Modesto Taleon, assigned as investigator and platoon sergeant of the
60th PC Company, Masbate, Masbate, testified that he has been connected with the
Philippine Constabulary since May 27, 1941; that he knew Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr. who was one
of their platoon sergeants and who relieved him as security on June 12, 1964 at the
Magallanes Gate, where there was then a coronation dance. Their designation as security in
charge was in writing; marked as Exhibit "D", signed by their Commanding Officer, Capt.
Eugenio. In said Exhibit "D", the name of Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr. appears, with seven enlisted
men, whose time of duty started as therein specified at 1900 hours. On the night of June 12,
1964, he was at the Magallanes Gate and Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr., who was in uniform and with a
sidearm, was also there as he was performing security duties at the coronation dance and
maintaining peace and order thereat. When he (witness) was near the stage and while
looking at the crooner he saw Chief Salvacion take the microphone from the singer and call
for a doctor as the soldier assigned at the Magallanes Gate had been stabbed. When he
heard the announcement, he immediately rushed to the scene of the crime and found that
there were already many men in uniform at the scene, and Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr. was no
longer there as he had already been brought to the Masbate Provincial Hospital. So he,
together with his commanding officer, investigated the incident and they were able to
recover the fatal weapon which was then dripping with blood; he Identified said weapon in
open court, which was marked as Exhibit "A" and the blood stains thereon as Exhibit "A-1 ".
He found the knife, Exhibit "A ", on the road facing the Magallanes Gate around five meters
away from the scene of the crime, wrapped it and presented it to the commanding officer
for safekeeping. Then they proceeded to the Masbate Provincial Hospital where they saw
Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr. in the operating room already dead; Sgt. Desilos uniform which was
already removed, was stained with blood with a cut at the last button of the uniform (Exh.
"B-1 ") which appeared to have been pierced by a blunt instrument and coincided with the
wound of the deceased, Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr. The uniform, including the pants, Exhibit "B",
was full of blood. He Identified the patch on the uniform as that of the P.C. (Exh. "B-2" and
the chevron of a staff sergeant (pp. 87105, t.s.n., Vol. III, rec.).
The cross-examination elicited from witness the fact that he studied criminal investigation
and he specialized on the subject as he was sent in 1958 by the Government to Camp Crame
to take up criminal investigation and he likewise trained in 1963 in a seminar held in Cebu.
He applied what he had learned in his investigations at Masbate, including the investigation
of this stabbing incident. He affirmed that he, together with two companions, recovered the
fatal knife. Exhibit "A", on the road five meters away from the scene of the crime but outside
of the area cordoned off by the PC and admitted that he did not actually measure the
distance but merely calculated it; although he advanced the opinion that where an incident
took place in a crowded place, a trained investigator gets the actual distance. According to
him, the place of the incident was cordoned off or surrounded by soldiers who did not
tamper with anything thereat. As other people and peace officers arrived ahead of him at
the scene of the incident, he did not know the investigating officer who arrived first. When
they found the knife, he just grabbed it and presented it to his commanding officer, because
he already knew that it was the fatal knife as it was then dripping with blood and lying flat
on the ground. But when he picked it up, it was no longer dripping with blood but it was wet
with blood. The route where the blood came from and where the knife was found was
marked with blood stains. He admitted that per investigation procedure, important
evidence like Exhibit "A" should not be touched with the (bare) hands; but he explained and
demonstrated that he handed Exhibit "A" with care, with his thumb in the inner blade, and
his two fingers on the outer blade, near the foot of the wooden handle, without touching its
blade. He revealed that after the said Exhibit "A" was presented to his commanding officer
nothing more was done. Exhibit "A" was not sent to the PC laboratory to test its blood
stains; neither was the same examined for fingerprints. In fact, the suspects were never
fingerprinted. He just concluded that Exhibit "A" was the fatal weapon (pp. 106-118, t.s.n.,
Vol. III, rec.).
Judge Jose M. Angustia then 63 years old, married, municipal judge of Masbate, Masbate,
resident of Masbate, Masbate, declared that he knew Rodolfo Regala, alias Rudy Regala, as
he was brought several times before his court as accused in cases involving peace and
order. Lately, he convicted him of the crime of malicious mischief. He could not recall having
convicted him of the crime of physical injuries; but he Identified Exhibit "E" as the original
duplicate copy of a decision in criminal case No. 2794 of the Municipal Court of Masbate,
convicting accused Rodolfo Regala of the crime of slight physical injuries and Exhibit "E-1"
as his signature affixed thereon (pp. 123-127, t.s.n. Vol. III, rec.).
Immediately after aforesaid witness had testified, counsel for accused moved to strike out
the testimony on the ground that the same is impertinent and immaterial but said motion
was denied as without merit by the court (pp. 128-131, t.s.n., Vol. III, rec.).
Thereafter, counsel for accused asked the court for the recall of prosecution witness Juanito
Evangelista for further cross-examination on the ground that there were vital matters
overlooked by said defense counsel who earlier, in obedience to the order of the court, had
to enter trial without having first consulted the accused. The prosecuting fiscal objected on
the ground that prosecution witness Juanito Evangelista who had earlier informed him of
his fears of reprisal, was not in the courtroom. Defense counsel, in insisting on the recall of
said witness, informed the court that it has come to his knowledge that "... the first suspect
of the PC was Evangelists. His clothes were found with blood stains as well as his hands ..."
Nevertheless, the court denied the motion to recall but advised defense counsel to establish
that fact as a defense of the accused (pp. 131-135, t.s.n., Vol. III, rec.).
After the evidence for the prosecution was admitted by the court, defense counsel moved,
by way of demurrer, for the dismissal of the case on the grounds that the prosecution
miserably failed to establish the guilt of accused Delfin Flores and second, that there was
variance between the date of the commission of the crime as alleged in the information and
that proved by the evidence (pp. 138-151, t.s.n., Vol. III, rec.).
The prosecuting fiscal interposed his objection on the main ground that the alleged variance
was not substantial as the events leading to the stabbing incident began in the late hour of
June 12, 1964 culminating at around midnight or immediately thereafter. Hence, the
information alleged the time of the crime as "... on or about the 13th of June, 1964 ..." (pp.
151-162, t.s.n., Vol. III, rec.).
Defense counsel prayed for time to file his memorandum in support of his motion to dismiss
and he was granted by the court up to August 21, 1964 to file the same and the provincial
fiscal was required to reply thereto up to August 29, 1964 (p. 166, t.s.n., Vol. III, rec.).
On August 14, 1964, defense counsel filed his memorandum in support of his motion to
dismiss and prayed for the dismissal of the case against both accused (pp. 34-44, Vol. II,
rec.), and thereafter or on August 25, 1964, he filed a supplementary Page memorandum
(pp. 45-54, Vol. II, rec.).
On August 25, 1964, without waiting for the reply memorandum of the prosecuting fiscal,
winch was filed only on September 7, 1964 (pp. 59-60, Vol. II, rec.), the trial court denied
the motion to dismiss (pp. 55-58, Vol. II, rec.).
Consequently, the case was set for the reception of the evidence of the defense. Eight
witnesses were presented by the defense, including accused Rudy Regala and Delfin Flores.
Three of these witnesses ? Alberto Abayon, Eladio Mendoza and Noemi Almirol ? claimed to
have been at the scene of the crime and seen the stabbing of Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr..
Alberto Abayon, then 19 years old, single, and a student of Osme?a College, Masbate,
testified that on June 12, 1964, he was at the Magallanes Gate, arriving thereat at about 9:30
o'clock in the evening, together with Shirley Letada Rogelio Ora-a and Violets Sorsogon.
They could not immediately enter the auditorium because of so many people crowding the
place. They were able to enter at about 10:00 o'clock in the evening. He was not aware
whether there were movie actresses inside. He stayed in the plaza for a long time and went
home at around 12:30 in the morning (June 13, 1964), with Noemi Almirol. Upon reaching
Magallanes Gate on his way home, he saw a person whom he did not know, stab Sgt. Juan
Desilos Jr.. He was then behind Sgt. Desilos Jr. and around one meter away from him. He saw
blood dripping from Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr.'s abdomen. His companion, Noemi Almirol who
was then at his left side, fainted upon seeing the blood flowing from Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr..
Then he heard Sgt. Desilos say "Noy please accompany me but he does not know the person
requested by Sgt. Desilos Jr.. Witness described the man who stabbed Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr. as
tall, with long hair, quite black in complexion and wearing a short-sleeved polo shirt with
red stripes (pp. 168-170, t.s.n., Vol. III, rec.).
He saw Rudy Regala at around 12:20 in the morning (June 13, 1964) drinking beer with
companions inside the canteen at the Magallanes Gate, a place beside the Liceo School. He
does not know the companions of Rudy Regala. Said accused was at that time wearing a
white polo shirt. Shortly thereafter, he (witness) left for home at which time Rudy Regala
was standing inside the canteen (p. 171, t.s.n., Vol. III. rec.).
After Noemi Almirol had recovered, he brought her home alone and as they passed by the
gate, Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr. was no longer there (p. 172, t.s.n., Vol. III, rec.).
Claiming that he is familiar with Magallanes Gate, witness affirmed that it is enclosed with
concrete walls on its sides except at its back which is enclosed with wire. Its side facing
Quezon street is walled with hollow blocks. According to him, if one were inside the Plaza
Magallanes and looked towards Quezon street, he would not be able to see the persons
outside who are facing the wall; and if one were outside at Quezon street and looked
towards the plaza, he would not be able to see the people inside (pp. 171-172, t.s.n., Vol. III,
rec.).
On cross-examination, witness disclosed that he went to the plaza that evening of June 12,
1964 to dance; that before he entered Osme?a College, he studied in Masbate High School
but Rudy Regala was not one of his classmates there; that he did not report what he saw to
and he was not interviewed by, the police, but the following morning, he was interviewed by
a PC man whom he did not know and they had an exchange of opinions and he was asked by
the PC man whether he knew the man who stabbed Sgt. Desilos and he answered that he did
not. He affirmed and he was sure that he saw Rudy Regala drinking in the canteen inside the
Magallanes Gate and that said canteen is far from the Magallanes Gate but he could not
calculate the distance; and that Sgt. Desilos was stabbed right at the gate marked as EXIT of
Magallanes Gate at which precise moment he was a meter behind Sgt. Desilos He saw Rudy
Regala at about 12:20 in the morning and this was before the stabbing incident. He does not
know whether the gate was closed at the time of the stabbing incident but knew for a fact
that there were many persons milling around the gate marked EXIT. He did not see the fatal
weapon used by the culprit (pp. 172-174, t.s.n., Vol. III, rec.).
In re-direct, he affirmed that he was a meter behind Sgt. Desilos when the latter was
stabbed and Noemi Almirol was beside him and there were many people outside (p. 174,
t.s.n., Vol. III, rec.).
Questioned by the Court, he revealed that Noemi Almirol is a young girl; that he brought her
alone to her home at 12:30 in the morning, that he does not know her age; that he had
known her for a long time as they were once neighbors;, that the residence of Noemi
Almirol is at Quezon Street, far from Magallanes Gate, somewhere near the Medinas, in front
of the residence of Dr. Sta. Cruz; that he is 16 years old but does not know who is older
between him and Noemi Almirol; that Noemi Almirol is a third year high school student at
Masbate High School; that he is a high school graduate as of June 13, 1964; and that he did
not use to go out with Noemi Almirol and he had not gone to her house (pp. 174-175, t.s.n.,
Vol. III, rec.).
Noemi Almirol, then 18 years old, single, a resident of Masbate, Masbate and a student of
Masbate High School, testified that on June 12, 1964, she was at the Plaza Magallanes Gate,
arriving there at 10:00 o'clock in the evening, with Amparo de Paz, Luningning Bonan and
Elena Esparaguerra They were able to enter the plaza immediately and stayed thereat up to
12:00 o'clock midnight. At about 12:00 o'clock midnight, she met Alberto Abayon and they
went home together at around 2:00 o'clock the following morning of June 13, 1964; that at
the gate of Plaza Magallanes, she observed something unusual which was the killing of a PC
soldier, and she fainted when she saw blood flowing from the body of Sgt. Desilos who was
about one meter from her. She has known accused Rudy Regala for a long time and before
she fainted she did not see Rudy Regala at the place where the PC man was bleeding (pp.
186-187, t.s.n., Vol. III, rec.).
Cross-examined, she affirmed that in going home, she was with Alberto Abayon and it was
then about 2:00 o'clock in the morning of June 13, 1964, although she is not sure of the
time; and that she was behind the victim who was about a meter away from her. She did not
know what happened after she fainted nor did she hear the announcement made by Police
Chief Salvacion about the stabbing incident. She further declared that Rudy Regala was not
her classmate at Masbate High School; nor did she ever see him there as she had just
transferred to that school. She did not know that Rudy Regala was also studying in the
Masbate High School (pp. 188-189, t.s.n., Vol. III, rec.).
Upon redirect examination, she revealed that she had a time piece on that night of the
incident but she did not check it before leaving for home (p. 189, t.s.n., Vol. III, rec.)
Questioned by the Court, she insisted that she did not see Rudy Regala that evening. She
stated however that she was not alone in going home with Alberto Abayon as there were
many girls with them and that it was not true that Alberto Abayon brought her home alone
(p. 189, t.s.n., Vol. III, rec.).
Witness Eladio Mendoza, then 21 years old, single, third year high school student of
Masbate College, Masbate, Masbate, told the Court that he resides at Domingo Street,
Masbate, Masbate; that he knows the accused Rudy Regala; that on the evening of June 12,
1964, he was at the Plaza Magallanes gate which is in the poblacion of Masbate, Masbate;
that he arrived there at 9:00 o'clock in the evening; that his companions that night were
Rudy Regala, Rudy Espinas and Pedro Verga and they were not able to enter the gate
immediately because it was crowded by many people but were able to enter at around 9:00
o'clock in the evening; that once inside he went around and then together with his
companions, Rudy Regala, Pedro Verga and Rudy Espinas, went to the canteen which was
managed by a priest, at the left side of the Magallanes Gate (as one enters the same) near
the Liceo College; they drank beer in the said canteen and stayed there for a long time; that
he did not dance, but Rudy Regala did at around 11:30 P.M. with the queen, Carol Bataga
and this lasted for about 2 minutes, and at the next piece, with one of the princesses whose
name he (witness) did not know and after this dance with the princess, Rudy Regala went
back to the canteen and drank beer; that at about midnight, he (witness) was still at the
canteen and at that time, more or less, something unusual happened, which was the
stabbing of a PC man at the gate which he learned about through the announcement made
by Chief Salvacion on the stage at around 12:30 in the morning of June 13, 1964; that at that
time, accused Rudy Regala was at his side drinking beer; that he did not do anything after
the said announcement; neither did accused Rudy Regala do anything; that accused was at
that time wearing a short-sleeved white polo shirt; that he cannot remember how many
bottles of beer he drank that evening but the whole gang finished one case of beer; that he
knows Sgt. Desilos although he did not see him that night; that he went home at around 2:00
o'clock of the morning of June 13, 1964 at which time accused Rudy Regala was still seated
inside the other canteen located at the right side of Magallanes Gate, belonging to Mayor
Ben Magallanes (pp. 175-178, t.s.n., Vol. III, rec.).
He testified during the cross-examination that he studied at Liceo de Masbate, not at the
Masbate High School, before he transferred to Masbate College; that on June 12, 1964 when
he went inside the gate, there were many people; and that he went inside the auditorium
together with Rudy Regala, Espinas, and Verga and they drank beer in the canteen owned
by a priest (p. 179, t.s.n., Vol. III, rec.).
Questioning by the Court extracted from him the fact that he is a very good friend of Rudy
Regala as they have been friends since childhood; that they were 'not together too often as
they are studying in different schools, Regala in Masbate High School while he, at Liceo; and
that they go out together and drink once in a while (p. 179, t.s.n., Vol. III, rec.).
Thereafter, defense counsel manifested in open court that the testimonies of the other
defense witnesses, Pedro Verga and Rudy Espinas, will corroborate the testimony of
defense witness Eladio Mendoza in all its material aspects or that they will testify as Eladio
Mendoza did. Prosecuting Fiscal did not interpose any objection; hence, such fact was made
of record.
Witness Eddie Zaragoza, then 34 years old, married, a municipal policeman of Masbate,
Masbate (since July 1, 1961) testified that in the evening of June 12, 1964, he was detailed
as guard at the Magallanes Gate, at Quezon Street, near the church of Masbate, Masbate and
he stayed there until the dance which started at around 8:00 o'clock in the evening, was
over at past 1:00 o'clock of the following morning; that on that midnight of June 12, 1964,
when he was the guard, nothing unusual happened, but the next night, June 13, 1964, at
around 11 o'clock an incident happened near the Exit gate of the plaza around 75 meters
from his post; that he went to the scene of the incident to investigate and saw Sgt. Desilos
being carried by Sgt. Hilario to the jeep of the vice-governor, Moises Espinosa, to be brought
to the hospital,; that while investigating the people around the scene of the incident, he
heard Dick Avinas driver of the vice-governor, shouting "Here is a knife that was dropped";
that Dick Avinas was then inside when he shouted; that he (witness), together with chief of
police Salvacion, went to the spot of the incident and saw a knife near the bumper of the
jeep; that he got a piece of paper and with it held the knife's blade and delivered it to chief of
police Salvacion, who told him that the blade should be held but not the handle; that
thereafter, he continued with his investigation by gathering information from the people
present but the result of his investigation was negative (pp. 5-12, t.s.n., Vol. IV rec.).
On cross-examination, he declared that it was coronation night when the incident,
happened but it was not before midnight of June 12, 1964; that there were two nights for
coronation, June 12, 1964 for Baby Queen and June 13, 1964 for Lady Queen; that the
incident took place during the coronation of the Lady Queen; that he could not remember
whether the coronation of the baby queen was held prior to June 12, 1964, but it was the
night previous to the coronation of the lady queen; that on June 12, 1964, he was on duty as
guard at the Magallanes Gate from 8:00 o'clock in the evening up to after midnight (pp. 12-
17, t.s.n., Vol. IV, rec.).
Clarificatory questions were propounded by the prosecuting fiscal and the trial judge with
respect to the actual date and time of the incident, thus:
Butalid
Q ? And on the night of June 12, 1964, past midnight, the incident occurred?
WITNESS
A ? No, sir.
Q ? But it was after your duty on June 12, 1964 at about 8 o'clock that the incident occurred?
BLANCA
Misleading, your Honor. We object.
COURT
Q ? You were a guard on June 12, 1964 from 8 o'clock to past midnight ?
A ? Yes, your Honor.
Q ? And when you said that on June 12, up to midnight there was no incident about Sgt.
Desilos?
A ? Yes, your Honor.
Q ? After midnight of June 12, it is already June 13, 1964?
A ? Yes, your Honor.
Q ? After midnight of June 12, which is June 13, 1964, that was the time when Sgt. Desilos
according to you, met an accident
BLANCA
If your Honor, please, with due respect to the question of the Honorable Court, we would
like to make it of record our objection, on the ground that it is misleading.
COURT
Put it on record.
WITNESS
A ? No, your Honor
Q ? In other words, from one minute after 12:00 o'clock of June 12, 1964 until 6:00 o'clock
of that morning, which is June 12, Desilos was still alive? No incident happened to Sgt.
Desilos
A ? Nothing happened.
Q ? According to you, Desilos was killed on June 14, 1964?
BLANCA
If your Honor, please, we shall again, with due respect to the question of the Honorable
Court, we are constrained again to make our objection on the ground that it is misleading.
The testimony of the witness said that the incident took place about past 11:00 o'clock in
the evening of June 13, 1964.
COURT
Past 11:00 o'clock. Let the witness answer because he does not clarify.
WITNESS
A ? Not yet.
COURT
Q ? When was it? Tell us the definite date?
A ? More or less, at 11:00 o'clock in the evening of June 13, 1964 when the incident took
place.
Q ? So it was on June 13, 1964 at 11:00 o'clock?
A ? More or less, your Honor.
Q ? You are sure about that?
A ? Yes, your Honor.
xxx xxx xxx
(pp. 14-16, t.s.n., Vol. IV, rec.).
Defendants Rudy Regala and Delfin Flores testified in their defense and both claimed that
they were not present at the spot of the commission of the crime and that they are strangers
to each other.
Rudy Regala declared that he is 21 years old, single, a student at Masbate High School at
Masbate, Masbate; that he was at the Magallanes Gate, Masbate, Masbate in the evening of
June 12, 1964, together with Rudy Espinas, Pedro Verga and Eladio Mendoza, and they were
not able to immediately enter the gate; that as soon as they had entered the gate, they
looked around the auditorium and afterwards at around 10:00 o'clock they proceeded to
the canteen near the Liceo College; that the canteen is at the right side of, if one is facing, the
grandstand; that they drank beer in the canteen which is owned by a priest; that at around
11: 30 in the evening, he danced with the queen, Carol Bataga for about 2 minutes and then
with the princess whose name he does not know, which dance also lasted for about two
minutes; that after his dance with the princess, he went back to the canteen; that thereafter,
or at around 12:40 in the evening, and while still in the canteen, he heard Chief Salvacion
announce that a PC man was stabbed; that after the announcement he did not do anything;
that he went home around 2:30 to, 3:00 o'clock in the morning of June 13, 1964; and that
except to dance, he did not leave the canteen (pp. 189-192, t.s.n., Vol. III, rec.).
He further informed the, Court that he knew Sgt. Desilos but did not see him that night when
he (deceased) entered the gate; neither did he see him in the morning or afternoon of that
day; that he has no grudge against him nor any motive to kill him; that his family has no
grudge against Sgt. Desilos and that his family, however, has a quarrel with the PC (p. 182,
t.s.n., Vol. III, rec.).
Moreover, he testified that he does not know prosecution witness Erlinda Tidon and it was
only on the witness stand that he first saw her and he denied as true her declarations; that
he knows prosecution witness Juanito Evangelista but denied as true his declarations; that
he did not know his co-accused Delfin Flores either before or on that night of June 12, 1964;
that he came to know him only at the PC headquarters on June 16, 1964 when they returned
to the municipal building and it was only on June 14, 1964 that he saw for the first time
Delfin Flores at the PC compound; that his attire at the Magallanes Gate that evening of June
12, 1964 was a short-sleeved shirt which appears yellow at daytime but blue during
nighttime; that said shirt which he Identified in court (Exh. "2") is now in the possession of
his lawyer (pp. 192-193, t.s.n., Vol. III, rec.).
Testifying further, he told the court that he was arrested with Roger Ampuan by Sgt. Gotis at
around 10:3'0 to 11:00 o'clock in the morning of June 13, 1964 at the market and they were
brought to the PC compound where they stayed up to 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon; that St.
Gotis investigated him that same day and pointed to him as the companion of Roger
Ampuan in stabbing Sgt. Desilos but he told Sgt. Gotis that this was not true; that after 5:00
o'clock in the afternoon, he and Roger Ampuan were allowed by Capt. Eugenio to go home;
that he was again arrested by Sgt. Gotis and his companion on June 14, 1964 at about 12:30
to 1:00 in the afternoon in the market area; that this time, he was arrested with Rudy
Espinas and they were brought to the PC compound where they were immediately placed in
separate rooms; that inside the room, he was maltreated by a person whom he knows only
by appearance; that he was ordered to admit the crime because according to the
investigators, Rudy Espinas had already told them that he (accused) was the one stabbed
Sgt. Desilos Jr., but he told them that that was not true, that he was boxed, then kicked and
made to squat; one pulled him by his buckle and he was made to look upward with the
man's fingers pointed towards his (accused) nose; that it was a PC soldier named Formalejo
and two others, whose faces he could recognize, who did the maltreatment and that Peroy
Merillo kicked him at the side of his body while inside the toilet; that he was given only ten
minutes to rest and he was continuously maltreated that day of June 14, 1964, from 12:00
or 1:00 o'clock to 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon; that in the evening nothing was done to him
at the PC compound where he slept although he was investigated by Sgt. Taleon who did not
reduce into writing his investigation; that on June 15, 1964, nothing happened to him as he
was not investigated that day; that he stayed in the PC compound from the 14th to the 6th
of June, 1964; that there were seven persons investigated at the PC compound, namely,
Rudy Espinas, Pedro Verga Eladio Mendoza, Miller Gaton, Roger Ampuan Delfin Flores and
himself; that on June 16, 1964, he and Delfin Flores were brought to the municipal building;
then they were taken on June 23, 1964 to the provincial jail and they passed by the PC
barracks where he got his eyeglasses and hat; that he was at that time accompanied by
Patrolman Natural; that in the PC barracks, he was called by Sgt. Balase and, leaving behind
Pat. Natural, he approached Sgt. Balase who told him that now that he is being pointed to as
the killer, it would be better for him to tell the truth as to who was the real author of the
crime so that he (accused) would be utilized as witness, but he told Sgt. Balase that he was
very innocent of and did not know anything about the crime; that before the body of Sgt.
Desilos was brought to the cemetery it was shown to him by Sgt. Balase and the coffin was
placed in front of him; and that on that occasion, PC Formalejo who was then with Sgt.
Balase attempted to box him (accused) but Formalejo was cautioned by Sgt. Balase (pp.
194-197, t.s.n., Vol. III, rec.).
Accused Rudy Regala further revealed that when he saw on June 3, 1964 witness Juanito
Evangelista at the PC barracks, the latter asked him why he and Roger Ampuan were at the
PC compound and he replied that they were taken by the PC because of the incident the
night before and Evangelista told him "You were not present there that evening"; that their
conversation took place in the presence of a PC officer whom he can recognize by
appearance only; that he met Capt. Eugenio on June 13 to the 16th; that on June 14, Capt.
Eugenio told him that there was another suspect who wore a blue shirt with stripes; that
another PC officer asked him who was the owner of that blue shirt with stripes and he
answered that he saw somebody wearing that; that during his maltreatment by the PC, a PC
soldier who was posted as guard went inside the room and hit and kicked him; that he had
not seen Exhibit "A", the knife used in the stabbing, before, as it was only in court that he
first saw that knife; that he does not use that kind of knife; and that when he went to the
Magallanes Gate that evening of June 12, 1964, he had no weapon or knife with him (pp.
197-198, t.s.n., Vol. III, rec.).
In the course of his cross-examination, accused Rudy Regala was caught smiling by the trial
judge who warned him of his act and behavior and not to take the trial lightly as the trial is
not a joke, nor was there anything funny, and advised him to be serious as he is fighting for
his life (p. 198, t.s.n., Vol. III, rec.). He confirmed that he studied for two years at Masbate
High School, but denied breaking the crystal (glass) of the bulletin board of the school; that
he was arrested on June 13, 1964 by Sgt. Gotis at the market place between 10:30 and 11:00
o'clock in the morning; that at the time of his arrest no knife was taken from him by Sgt.
Gotis that he was maltreated but not investigated by Formalejo that he does not remember
any incident he had with Formalejo that he does not remember and it was not true that a
knife was confiscated from him by Laguerta when he (accused) was about to stab PC
Formalejo that he stays at the market place; that it is not true that during vacation time, he
worked as part time butcher in the market; that he knows Patrolman Perez; that he knows
former policeman Cornal that he has a tattoo in his shoulder (which he showed to the court)
and the tattoo consists of the words "Black Jack No. 3"; that Black Jack is not a gang but a
club to put up recreational facilities in the market and the president of the club, of which he
is a member, is Tony Aguilar; that Rudy Espinas is also a member but not Pedro Verga
Floresta and Alberto Abayon; that every member of the club must have to be tattooed with
Black Jack. According to him, his body was battered because of the maltreatment he
suffered from the PC that he was confined in the provincial jail for the first time on June 23,
1964 at around 9:30 to 10:00 o'clock and that until now he is still confined there; that he
was maltreated only on the 14th of June, 1964; that at the provincial jail, he was not able to
ask somebody to examine his battered body because he was not even allowed to
communicate with the persons he knows as he was isolated in the provincial jail; that in a
room in the provincial jail, he was with one named Julian Bartido who was the same person
who was convicted in the shooting of Moises Espinas and the wounding of Marcial Tamares;
that he was not therefore examined by a physician; that the purpose of the PC in maltreating
him is to force him to admit his guilt but he did not admit; that there were seven other
persons investigated in the PC compound; that he, Delfin Flores, and the seven other
persons were lined up in the PC compound and he was the one called by Sgt. Balase and that
at the time he was called by Sgt. Balase he did not see Juanito Evangelista (pp. 198-204,
t.s.n., Vol. III, rec.).
Defense witness Romeo Floresta, who was then 16 years old, single, a first year high school
student of the Masbate College and a resident of Masbate, Masbate, corroborated
defendant's defense of denial and alibi and thus declared that on the evening of June 12,
1964, he went to the Magallanes Gate and returned home at 2:30 in the morning of the
following day, June 13, 1964; that at around 12:00 midnight, he saw Rudy Regala drinking
beer in the canteen inside the plaza (Magallanes Gate); that from the time he met Rudy
Regala at 10:00 up to the time he went home, he saw Rudy Regala drinking in the canteen;
that the plaza was crowded that evening of June 12, 1964; and that he went home together
with Rudy Regala (pp. 183-184, t.s.n. Vol. III, rec.).
He revealed on cross-examination that he saw Rudy Regala that evening dance twice; that
the canteen where he stayed the whole night was the one located at the left side, if entering
the gate; that he never left that canteen from the time he entered the same up to the time he
left for home; that Rudy Regala likewise did not leave the canteen except to dance after
which he returned to the canteen; that from the time he entered the plaza at 8:00 o'clock of
June 12, 1964 up to the time he and Rudy Regala went home together, he was always with
Rudy Regala and that he saw Rudy Regala at the canteen situated at the left side of
Magallanes Gate (pp. 184-185, t.s.n., Vol. III, rec.).
Defendant Rudy Regala's father, Cleto Regala, then 52 years old, married, a merchant and
residing since 1947 at the market site, Masbate, Masbate, testified that as a merchant he
sells vegetables and sari-sari; that he does not sell coffee; that in the evening of June 12,
1964, he was at the pingpong game site and he was selling coffee because it was the town
fiesta; that he knows that his son Rudy Regala went to the dance at the Magallanes Gate that
evening; that at around 3:00 o'clock of the following morning of June 13, 1964, his son Rudy
Regala arrived at the pingpong site where he was selling coffee; that his son did not talk to
him, neither did he talk to his son; that his son drank coffee and thereafter he slept on the
bench; that he had not seen Exhibit "A" (knife), as among those in his household; that his
son had not used that kind of weapon; that at around 10:30 to 11:00 o'clock in the morning
of June 13, 1964, PC Sgt. Gotis picked up his son at his residence and brought him to a car;
that in the evening of June 14, 1964, Sgt. Gotis arrived at his (witness) residence and asked
for the blue banlon shirt of Rudy Regala as according to him (Sgt. Gotis Rudy Regala needed
it as he was feeling cold; that he gave Sgt. Gotis a newly ironed shirt but Sgt. Gotis told him
that that was not the one because he (Sgt. Gotis was looking for a blue banlon shirt with
stripes; that the shirt of Rudy Regala when he came home from the plaza was one which
appeared to be yellow during daytime but white during nighttime; that Exhibit "2" is the
shirt he was referring to as worn by Rudy Regala that morning; that this was the very shirt
he showed Sgt. Gotis but Sgt. Gotis told him that that was not the one; and that Rudy Regala
does not have a blue shirt with red stripes (pp. 180-183, t.s.n., Vol. III, rec.).
The other accused Delfin Flores who was then 24 years old, single, a farmer and a resident
of Cawayan Interior, Masbate, Masbate, testified in his defense that in the evening of June
12, 1964, he arrived at around 9:00 o'clock without any companion at the dance at Plaza
Magallanes and he was able to enter immediately; that he stayed there up to 1:00 o'clock of
the following morning, June 13, 1964; that at 1:00 o'clock nothing happened to him; that
before 1:00 o'clock in the morning of June 13, 1964, while he was dancing, Chief of Police
Salvacion announced on the stage that a PC man had been stabbed; that after that
announcement, he was boxed by one Bacalano from the Island by reason of which he fell
and when he stood up he drew his double-bladed knife but policeman David Natural
approached and told him to surrender the knife, which he did, and then he was arrested and
taken to the municipal building of Masbate, Masbate, where he was lodged in jail until the
next (whole) morning; that on or before June 12, 1964, he did not yet know his co-
defendant Rudy Regala; that he came to know Rudy Regala for the first time in the PC camp
on June 16, 1964 when they were brought to the municipal building of Masbate, Masbate;
that on June 13, 1964 at 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon he was taken by a PC man whom he
did not know, from the municipal building to the PC camp; that at the PC compound, he was
investigated by persons whom he does not know; that in the investigation he was told to
admit the crime because according to them Rudy Regala had already admitted and pointed
to him (accused) as one of Rudy Regala's companions but he told them that he could not
admit because Rudy Regala was not his companion; that because of his denial, he was boxed
by them in the abdomen and he fell down with his buttocks on the ground; then he was
boxed again on the left side of his buttocks by reason of which he rolled on the ground; that
he does not know the names of those who boxed him; that the maltreatment was done
inside the room without the presence of PC officers, as only the PC man who boxed him was
present; that there were two PC men who boxed him but he does not know their names;
that he stayed up to 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon of June 13, 1964 in the PC compound; that
on that day, June 13, 1964, there were six other suspects who were investigated but he does
not know their names; that he was returned to the municipal jail on June 13, 1964 and on
June 14, 1964, at around 8:00 o'clock in the morning, 2 PC soldiers, whose names he does
not know, took him from the municipal jail and brought him back to the PC compound and,
again, he was told by a PC captain who investigated him, to admit the crime because
according to them, Rudy Regala had already admitted and pointed to him as his companion
when he (Rudy Regala) stabbed Sgt. Desilos but he told them that he could not admit as
Rudy Regala was not his companion; that while he was being investigated by the PC captain,
another PC soldier got hold of his abdomen and boxed him; that he does not know this PC
soldier but he can recognize his face, Chat the investigation results were not reduced into
writing; that he did not sign anything nor was he ever subjected to fingerprinting; that he
was brought to the PC compound four times in all; that every time he was brought to the PC
compound he was being told to admit the crime as Rudy Regala had already admitted and
pointed to him as his companion who stabbed Sgt. Desilos but in all such occasions, he
answered them that he could not admit because Rudy Regala was not his companion; that
the second time that he was brought back to the PC compound, there were six other
suspects in the compound who were investigated but he does not know them; Chat he was
mixed with the other six suspects and lined up inside the PC compound; that when they
were lined up, the PC did not do anything but only left them there lined up; that they were
fined up only once.
He further testified that he does not know either Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr. or Erlinda Tidon that
the declarations of Erlinda Tidon in the witness stand regarding his participation in the
stabbing of Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr. are not true; that it was only while Erlinda Tidon was on the
witness stand that he first saw her; that he did not see Erlinda Tidon at the Plaza Magallanes
in the evening of June 12, 1964; that neither does he know witness Juanito Evangelists; that
the declarations of Juanito Evangelista with respect to his participation in the stabbing of
Sgt. Desilos are not true; that he saw Juanito Evangelista for the first time only when the
case was being tried by the court; and that he did not see witness Juanito Evangelista in the
evening of June 12, 1964 at Plaza Magallanes (pp. 17-36, t.s.n., Vol. IV, rec.).
Cross-examined, he revealed that his educational attainment is Grade VI. Over the objection
of his counsel the Court allowed a question propounded to him about his previous criminal
conviction and he declared that he was convicted of the crime of murder in Masbate,
Masbate by Judge Benedicto; that the victim in that crime of murder was Ricardo Cuyos that
by reason of his conviction he served sentence in Muntinglupa and thereafter he was
paroled; that on the night of June 12, 1964 at 9:00 o'clock in the evening, he went to the
dance at Magallanes Gate; that at that time, there were so many people trying to get in that
there was no PC soldier at the gate but there were many people around the vicinity going to
the entrance; that he went inside the auditorium and saw the coronation of the queen; that
he was not at Magallanes Gate the night previous to June 12, 1964 as it was only that
evening of June 12, 1964 that he went there; that he was dancing when Chief Salvacion
made the announcement; that he does not know the name of the person with whom he was
dancing; that the music being played previous to the announcement was sweet; that when
Chief Salvacion made the announcement, the music stopped and so everybody stopped
dancing; that he was at a distance of 15 meters from the gate when the dance was stopped;
that he was no longer dancing with his unknown partner when Chief Salvacion announced
the stabbing of the PC soldier; that he does not know witnesses Erlinda Tidon and Juanito
Evangelista and does not know of any grievance or trouble with them; that he knows
Balacano who boxed him several times after the announcement made by Chief Salvacion;
that he was arrested only after Chief Salvacion had finished his announcement; that before
his arrest, he was no longer dancing; that he was not dancing when Balacano boxed him;
that David Natural, a policeman, of Masbate, Masbate arrested him that night inside the
Magallanes Gate 15 meters from the gate; that after his arrest, he was brought to the
municipal building of Masbate, Masbate; that policeman Natural was with PC soldiers who
escorted him to the municipal building where they arrived at past 1:00 o'clock; and he
stayed there until that time that the PC soldiers got him from the municipal jail at around
8:00 o'clock in the morning of June 13, 1964; and that from 1:00 o'clock to 8:00 o'clock of
June 13, 1964, he was detained in the municipal jail of Masbate, Masbate. Cross-examined
by the Court, accused Delfin Flores affirmed that the only time he attended the dance at the
Magallanes Gate was on the evening of June 12, 1964; that he entered the gate at about 8:00
o'clock in the evening that he did not have a watch at that time; that per his calculation,
Chief Salvacion made the announcement on the stage at about 11:00 o'clock in the evening
of June 12, 1964; that because he had no watch it was possible that the time when Chief
Salvacion made the announcement was midnight of June 12, 1964 or one minute thereafter,
which was already June 13, 1964; that he was no longer dancing at the time Chief Salvacion
made the announcement as he was then conversing with a lady at a place around 15 meters
from the Magallanes Gate; that on that night he had in his possession a double-bladed knife
which he brought with him to the dance hall because he was alone when he left his house;
that he hid the knife in his body so that nobody could see it; that at the time he was dancing
with his unknown partner, the knife was in his body; that he knew that he was a suspect not
because he had a conversation with the PC but because he was placed in a line-up; that
when he was being placed in the line-up, he did not know that he was being scrutinized by
certain individuals from somewhere, but there were people in the PC barracks; that he did
not know whether these Miss Ridon and Mr. Evangelists were looking at him while he was
placed in the line-up; that he was placed in the line-up only once; that he did not come to
know that on that evening after the line-up there were persons who have Identified him and
Rudy Regala as the persons seen at the Magallanes Gate near the exit gate; neither did he
come to know that after the line-up that evening, Miss Tidon and Mr. Evangelista had
pinpointed him and Rudy Regala as the persons they saw in front of Sgt. Desilos
immediately before he fell down wounded by a knife; that the PC soldiers maltreated him;
that he was not made to sign anything; neither was he forced by the PC to sign anything;
that Rudy Regala was not also forced to sign anything nor obliged to declare anything; that
he did not know that Sgt. Desilos was a PC soldier; that at the time he was arrested that
evening he already knew that a PC soldier had been stabbed but did not know yet that it
was Sgt. Desilos that he only came to know the victim as Sgt. Desilos in the morning of June
13, 1964; that he was charged with concealment of a deadly weapon by the police force of
Masbate; and that he pleaded guilty to the charge and was consequently sentenced to two
months' imprisonment which he had served out already (pp. 45-60, t.s.n., Vol. IV, rec.).
On re-direct he revealed that in the criminal case of People versus Delfin Flores for the
murder of Cuyos, he pleaded guilty to the crime charged, and affirmed that in the case of
illegal possession of deadly weapon, he also pleaded guilty (pp. 60-61, t.s.n., Vol. IV, rec.).
By way of rebuttal evidence, prosecution presented witnesses Felixberto Laguerta and
Gerardo Gotis.
Felixberto Laguerta who was then 43 years old, married, and a policeman of Masbate,
Masbate, testified that the testimony of Rudy Regala that the Black Jack organization is a
club and not a gang, is not true because it is called the Black Jack gang; that he knows that it
is a gang and not a club because the members have tattoos on their shoulders; that it is also
not true that Pedro Verga Eladio Mendoza, Rudy Espinas, Romeo Floresta and Alberto
Abayon are not members of the Black Jack gang; that all of them were arrested for being
members of the said gang; that it is also not true as testified by Rudy Regala that he was not
arrested by him at the cockpit when he (Rudy) was about to stab PC Formalejo for the truth
was that on December 22, 1963 he arrested him and confiscated from him a knife; that
Exhibit "F" is the same knife he confiscated from Rudy Regala, but no case was filed against
Rudy Regala in connection therewith because Formalejo refused to file a complaint against
Regala (pp, 6367, t.s.n., Vol. IV, rec.).
Cross-examined, he testified that he has been a policeman for 19 years; that he was told by
Fiscal Butalid to testify in this case that he did not execute any affidavit in connection with
his arrest of Rudy Regala and confiscation from him of a knife, Exhibit "F"; that he reported
the matter to the chief of police of Masbate, Masbate, Chief Salvacion; that he does not know
whether the arrest and confiscation were recorded in the police blotter as it was the police
sergeant who was in charge of recording the same; that the basis of his testimony that Rudy
Espinas, Pedro Verga Romeo Floresta are members of the Black Jack gang is the tattoo on
their shoulders which is in the form of cards and that all of them were arrested by reason of
the fact that they are all members of said gang; that membership in the Black Jack gang is a
crime; that because they are members of a gang, he suspected them of doing something bad;
and that they were arrested because they were doing something wrong in the poblacion
(pp. 68-72, t.s.n., Vol. IV, rec.).
Cross-examined by the trial judge, witness confirmed that Rudy Regala is a relative of a very
high ranking municipal official of the town of Masbate, Masbate, as the mother of Rudy
Regala is the cousin of the town mayor-Mayor Magallanes. However, he does not know
whether it was by reason of this relationship that Rudy Regala's father and mother are
living inside the market site of Masbate, Masbate. He further revealed that he delivered the
knife "Exhibit "F" to Chief Salvacion but no action was taken by Chief Salvacion against Rudy
Regala in connection therewith (pp. 72- 73, t.s.n., Vol. IV, rec.).
The other rebuttal witness, Gerardo Gotis, then 47 years old, married, and sergeant of the
PC at Masbate, Masbate, testified that Rudy Regala's assertion on the witness stand that he
was maltreated at the PC barracks was a he as Rudy Regala was never maltreated; that
when he arrested Rudy Regala on June 13, 1964 at the market place, he was able to
confiscate from Mm a knife (identified as Exh. "G") [pp. 74-76, t.s.n., Vol. IV, rec.].
Cross-examined by defense counsel, he affirmed that he got the knife, Exhibit "G" from Rudy
Regala last June 13, 1964; that he did not file any case against Rudy Regala in connection
with Exhibit "G" as he merely indorsed the same to the 1st PC sergeant and because his
commanding officer, Capt. Eugenio ordered him not to file any case as there was already a
case against Rudy Regala. However, he retracted his testimony that the non-filing of the case
was the order of Capt. Eugenio. The reason for the non-filing was because it was merely
overlooked as they were then busy investigating suspects in this murder case (pp. 76-78,
t.s.n., Vol. IV, rec.). The trial Judge gave more weight and credence to the testimonies of the
witnesses of the People than that of the accused, resulting thus, as aforestated, in the
conviction of accused Rudy Regala for the complex crime of murder with assault upon an
agent of a person in authority, and the imposition on him of the supreme penalty of death.
However, with respect to the other accused, Delfin Flores, the trial Judge found him guilty
only as an accessory after the fact. Consequently, the trial Judge imposed upon accused
Delfin Flores the penalty of eight months and 21 days as minimum, to six years and 1 day
of prision mayor as maximum with the recommendation that his parole be immediately
cancelled. Before Us therefore by way of review is only the death penalty imposed on
accused Rudy Regala; because Delfin Flores did not interpose any appeal from his
conviction as an accessory after the fact, and was accordingly released on June 11, 1973
after the expiration of his sentence as certified by the Director of the NBP (p. 198, Vol. I,
rec.). Counsel de officio contends that the trial court erred in failing to give the two accused
a fair trial; in holding Rudy Regala responsible for the killing of Juan Desilos Jr.; in convicting
Rudy Regala, assuming arguendo that he was the man who stabbed the victim, of the crime
of murder with assault upon an agent of a person of authority; and in holding Delfin Flores,
under the alleged facts of the case, liable as accessory after the fact of the crime of murder
with assault against an agent of a person in authority. I Counsel de officio claims in support
of the first assigned error that the indignation and revulsion of the trial Judge at the
commission of the monstrous crime herein involved as can be gleaned from the decision
under review, thus:
Murder as a crime is indeed heinous. But when the crime had to be committed in a public
place, where people were enjoying the spirit of the fiesta, and amidst the sound of the
drums and the trumpets and the tantalizing sweetness of the dance music, the deviltry of
the perpetrator is compounded. The perversity of the perpetrator is even made more ugly
and ugliest indeed because the victim was in the uniform of an agent of the law and was
performing his duty as he saw fit. He was there foregoing the pleasure of the evening so that
others may enjoy. He was there as a symbol of authority so that peace may be maintained
for those many who love peace and tranquility. He was there, distant from his home, his
wife and his children who would want him near them during those happy and festive
moments in answer to the call of duty, only to be treacherously killed by an assassin with
the blackest soul. He died almost in the spot where duty demanded of him. He died so that
others may enjoy and live. His was a fruitful life with a duty well done and his was a heroic
death. He died in the altar of public service and his was a death of a hero. The Court would
be recreant of its duty if it should fail to notice this splendid performance of a lowly but
loyal public servant (p. 44, Vol. I, rec.).
directly caused undue prejudice against the accused because of his previous criminal record
as manifested by the following portions of the decision of the trial Judge ?
Who is Rudy Regala? He is a convict, although in the crime of slight physical injuries.
According to Municipal Judge Jose Angustia. of Masbate, he has been brought very often to
his Court for several mischiefs he has committed. And who is Delfin Flores? He is a
convicted murderer and a parolee. Birds of the same feather, flock together (p. 32, Vol. I,
rec.). Is there a possibility that Rudy Regala could perpetrate the crime in company of Delfin
Flores, a parolee, moments before midnight and/or moments after midnight? The distance
of the canteen from the exit gate is not considerable. Rudy Regala could have been at the
canteen early that evening and could have gone out with Delfin Flores and then returned at
the exit door, committed the crime and then returned to the canteen to prepare for his alibi?
This may be conjectural, but the possibility would not be farfetched. To a man with criminal
mind and criminal tendencies, anything could be possible (p. 25, Vol. I, rec.). ... So that after
the incident, he could have disappeared among the crowd and he and Rudy Regala could
have returned inside in order to establish an alibi. It should be remembered that Delfin
Flores and Rudy Regala are convicts and are dangerously mischievous. Although it may be
argued that criminals would not at times return to the scene of their adventures,
nevertheless, there are those who, to prepare an alibi, would do so, accustomed as they have
been in committing acts of deviltry Is this possible and/or probable? While witnesses of the
defense, because of their ages, their being acquaintances close and tight, have every reason
to help their friend Rudy Regala in his terrible predicament, Rudy Regala, a member of an
organization with tatoos on their right arm, could have certain moral ascendancy over
Abayon, Mendoza and Florista and even with Noemi Almirol, that in the spirit of friendship
they are coming to the rescue of criminal friend Rudy Regala (pp. 25-26, Vol. I, rec.). The
defense of the accused is alibi. Rudy Regala claimed that he was inside the canteen, which
was a few members from the exit door of the Magallanes auditorium on the night Sgt.
Desilos was stabbed. Rudy Regala is a convict and a notorious young man and the Court will
take the same into account (p. 29, Vol. I, rec.).
In essence, therefore, counsel de officio's first assigned error boils down to the delicate
question of whether appellant Rudy Regala was denied due process of law. It must be
emphasized that the jurisprudence under the 1935 Constitution treated the right of an
accused to impartial trial as an aspect of the guarantee of due process. Under the present
Constitution, that right to impartial trial is now expressly declared as one of the cardinal
rights of an accused. Thus its Section 19, Article IV (Bill of Rights), provides that "(I)n all
criminal prosecutions, the accused ... shall enjoy the right ... to have a speedy, impartial and
public trial ..." (emphasis supplied). WE have declared that "... It is a fundamental right
enshrined in the Constitution that no one is to be deprived of his liberty without due
process of law. Moreover, there is a specific reference to its indispensability in a criminal
prosecution. Thus is emphasized its importance for an accused. He can rely on the
guarantee of fairness according to the fundamental law, which moreover provides
additional safeguards at the stage of trial. Our Constitution does indeed go far in throwing
the mantle of its protection on the one who is caught in the meshes of criminal law. The
proceeding must neither be arbitrary nor unjust. It is to underscore the importance of a trial
judge being detached and objective, free from bias either for or against the prosecution or
for the person indicted. As was so aptly put by Justice Dizon: 'It has been said, in fact, that
due process of law requires a hearing before an impartial and disinterested tribunal and
that every litigant is entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge ...'
Earlier in People vs. Casta?eda, Justice Laurel made clear the necessity for a 'trial before an
impartial judge.' If it were otherwise, the pledge of due process becomes a myth. The trial is
reduced to nothing but a useless formality, and Idle ceremony. If a judge had made up his
mind to convict, even innocence would not suffice as a defense" (People vs. Angcap, 43
SCRA 437, 441-442 [1972]). The thrust of appellant's posture is that the trial Judge,
considering "his fully justified indignation and revulsion at the commission of such a
monstrous crime" of murder, became prejudiced against appellant (as well as his co-
defendant) after his previous criminal conviction was brought forth during the trial, to the
extent that the trial Judge no longer gave due consideration to the evidence of the defense
(pp. 73-78, Vol. I, rec.). On the other hand, the Solicitor General submits that the above
argument of counsel de oficio does not properly fit the assigned error, because it assails the
decision of the trial court and its appreciation of the evidence submitted therein rather than
the conduct of the trial itself (pp. 607, Appellant's Brief, p. 184, Vol. I, rec.). An impartial trial
necessarily requires an impartial judge to conduct the same. In other words, absent an
impartial judge, there can be no fair and impartial trial. Appellant impugns the impartiality
of the trial judge, who was allegedly prejudiced against the appellant. WE do not agree with
counsel de officio that the trial court failed to accord appellant Rudy Regala a fair trial.
Appellant has not pointed, and We have found none, to any part or stage of the trial
betraying the trial Judge's hostility, bias and prejudice against the appellant after the
prosecution had brought forth the fact of appellant's previous criminal conviction. As a
matter of fact, appellant's previous conviction of the crimes of malicious mischief and slight
physical injuries was testified to only by the witness last presented by the prosecution in its
evidence in chief. And the trial Judge, contrary to the claim of the appellant, gave due
consideration to his evidence as shown by the fact that in the decision of conviction, the trial
Judge examined extensively the testimonies of all the eight witnesses for the defense.
Consequently, while the quoted portions of the judgment of conviction are interspersed
with statements and phrases which properly should not have been made as they may be
wrongly interpreted as indicative of bias and prejudice, such aforestated statements and
phrases in the judgment of conviction do not per se constitute evidence of bias and
impartiality in the conduct of the trial by the trial Judge as to violate appellant's right to an
impartial trial. WE view the trial Judge's aforequoted statements and phrases as merely an
expression, in the very words of appellant's counsel de officio herself, of the Judge's " ... fully
justified indignation and revulsion at the commission of such a monstrous crime ..." II 1. The
trial court correctly rejected appellant Regala's defense of alibi and denial. Indeed such
defenses cannot prevail over the affirmative testimonies of Erlinda Tidon and Juanito
Evangelista who positively Identified appellant Rudy Regala as the one who inflicted the
single but fatal wound on the deceased Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr. (People vs. Cabiling 74 SCRA 285
[1976]; People vs. Roxas, 73 SCRA 583, 591 [1976]. And the exit gate where the stabbing
took place was just in the vicinity of ? about 15 meters from ? the canteen where appellant
was allegedly drinking beer during the night of June 12 until the early morning of the
13th. Alibi, to be convincing must preclude any possibility that the accused could have been
physically present at the place of the crime nor its immediate vicinity at the time of its
commission (People vs. Roxas, supra). While the crime took place at midnight or a little past
thereafter, such circumstance does not vitiate witnesses' Identification of appellant Rudy
Regala as the person who stabbed to death Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr.; because the place at that
time was well lighted by reason of the affair being celebrated (pp. 16, 78, Vol. III, rec.).
Furthermore, the two witnesses were close to the exact spot of the incident as witness
Tidon was barely one-half meter from the victim (p. 14, Vol. III, rec.), while witness
Evangelista was about a meter from the exit gate where the victim was stabbed (p. 84, Vol.
III, rec.). Hence, the possibility of erroneous Identification is remote. Despite the fact that
both witnesses before the stabbing incident did not know appellant by name, they both
declared that they knew him by face or appearance (pp. 31, 81, Vol. III, rec.). Furthermore,
appellant has not shown by evidence of any evil motive on the part of prosecution witnesses
Tidon and Evangelista to testify in the manner they did. The absence of any such improper
motive enhances the credibility of said witnesses (People vs. Roxas, supra). 2. It is a
recognized principle that on the matter of credibility of witnesses, the observation of the
trial court must be accorded respect and great weight in view of its special opportunity to
observe closely the demeanor of the individual witnesses. As a matter of fact, the trial court
gave its observations on the witnesses' conduct and candor on the witness stand, thus:
Because of the seriousness of the offense not only because of the challenge that the
perpetrator has poised upon the community the people and all citizenry because of the
brazen manner of its commission, which was made before several people and in the midst
of the festive mood of the occasion but because of the grave penalty which the crime carries,
the Court took special interest in the two witnesses for the prosecution. It was carefully
observed by the Court that both witnesses were curt on their declaration they were
straightforward in their reply and their voice carry the ring of sincerity and truth. Their
manner of replying on (sic) the question of the prosecution were those (sic) of serene
honest and truthful individuals, who wanted to impart clearly what they saw. Their answer
to the cross examination were (sic) given with a clear and convincing manner. They were
men who sat on the witness stand merely to convey what they have seen and noticed then,
without hesitation. The Court cannot help but be convinced of the trustworthiness of their
revelation. Under the searching barrage of cross-examination, they were never ruffled but
they withstood the fire with simple dignity, speaking with a voice full of candor and truth.
That is the impression these two witnesses have created in the mind of the Court. The
clearness and simplicity of their assertion and their direct and positive Identification of the
accused Rodolfo Regala alias Rudy Regala and Delfin Flores have convinced this Court
(emphasis supplied).
Because the trial Judge had spoken on a matter, which he indisputedly is in a much better
position to appreciate, this Court can do no less than to place its imprimature thereon.
Indeed, it has been aptly observed that
... the judge who tries a case in the court below has vastly superior advantages for the
ascertainment of truth and the decision of falsehood over an appellate court sitting as a
court of review. The appellate court can merely follow with the eye the cold words of the
witness transcribed upon the record, knowing at the same time, from actual experience,
that more or less of what the witness actually did say is always lost in the process of
transcribing. But the main difficulty does not lie here. There is an inherent impossibility of
determining with any degree of accuracy what credit is justly due to a witness from merely
reading the words spoken by him, even if there were no doubt as to the Identity of the
words. However artful a corrupt witness may be, there is generally, under the pressure of a
skillfull cross-examination, something in his manner or bearing on the stand that betrays
him, and thereby destroys the force of his testimony. Many of the real tests of truth by
which the artful witness is exposed in the very nature of things cannot be transcribed upon
the record, and hence they can never be considered by the appellate court. For this reason
the rule is firmly established that where there is an irreconcilable conflict in the testimony,
the appellate court will not reverse the judgment of the trial court, where the evidence of
the successful party, when considered by itself, is clearly sufficient to sustain the verdict
(several cases cited) or unless some conclusion established from the fact is inconsistent
with the court findings or there is some inherent weakness in the evidence upon which the
conclusion is based, or unless there appears in the record some fact or circumstance of
weight and influence which has been overlooked or the significance of which has been
misinterpreted, as where the trial court in the valuation of testimony misinterpreted a
supposed inherent weakness thereof not arising from the behaviour of the witness on the
stand ... (People vs. Alto, 26 SCRA 342, 365 [1968]).
3. Consequently, the inconsistencies and incredibilities in the testimonies of the material
witnesses of the prosecution as pointed out by the appellant are better left to the
appreciation of the trial court, which has not found the same sufficient to destroy the
probity of said witnesses. Appellant contends that prosecution witness Erlinda Tidon's
testimony to the effect that appellant Rudy Regala and accused Delfin Flores ran away after
appellant Rudy Regala had stabbed Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr., is improbable considering that,
according to Tidon herself, the scene of the crime was crowded or overflowing with people
and consequently one cannot move fast or run (pp. 15, 16, 43, Vol. III, rec.). Such
inconsistency or improbability is more apparent than real. It may be true that under normal
condition, that is, absent any unusual incident such as the killing of a peace officer, such
assertion may be characterized as improbable. This is not so, however, in the instant case;
because the commotion created by the stabbing incident enabled the culprits to easily
disappear among the milling throng. Again, the testimony of Erlinda Tidon to the effect that
no other unusual incident occurred after the stabbing incident may not be characterized as
false; because witness Tidon may have treated the stabbing incident and the consequent
commotion engendered by the same as one continuing incident, instead of treating them as
two separate incidents. Hence, she answered that aside from the stabbing incident no other
unusual incident took place. Moreover, We have noted in People vs. Resayaga (54 SCRA 350
[1973]) that it is a common phenomenon to find inconsistencies, even improbabilities, in
the testimony of a witness, especially on minor details or collateral matters. That the
accounts of witnesses regarding the same occurrence are contradictory on certain details is
not unusual. There is no perfect or omniscient witness because there is no person with
perfect faculties or senses or a perfect control of his emotions. An adroit cross- examiner
may trap a witness into making statements contradicting his testimony on direct
examination. By intensive cross- examination on points not anticipated by the witness and
his lawyer, a witness may be misled or trapped into making Statements that do not dovetail
with the testimonies of other witnesses on the same points. Yet, if it appears that the
witness has not wilfully perverted the truth, as may be gleaned from the tenor of his
testimony and as appreciated by the trial Judge from his demeanor and behaviour on the
witness stand, his credibility on material points may be accepted. III The killing of Sgt. Juan
Desilor Jr., according to the trial court, was qualified as murder by the circumstances of
treachery and evident premeditation and hence, appellant was convicted of the complex
crime of murder with assault upon an agent of a person in authority. Neither treachery nor
evident premeditation can be properly appreciated and considered in tills instance case so
as to characterize the killing as murder. So appellant contends and the Solicitor General
agrees. WE find the aforesaid common stand correct as the evidence supports the same.
Treachery is never presumed; it must be proven as conclusively as the act itself. It must be
shown that the accused employed "... means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof
which tend directly and specially to insure its execution without risks to himself arising
from the defense which the offended party might make. " By prosecution's own evidence,
appellant was enraged because the deceased (Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr.) pushed his companion
Delfin Flores and admonished him not to get in through the exit gate, then pulled out his
knife and stabbed the victim in the abdomen. Treachery cannot therefore be appreciated as
the attack made by appellant Rudy Regala was merely an immediate retaliation for the
pushing made by the deceased, which act placed him on his guard. Moreover, deceased Juan
Desilos Jr. at the time had a sidearm (p. 97, Vol. III, rec.) and was free to defend himself with
it. If appellant's design was to be safe from a possible defense that the victim might make, he
could have disarmed the victim first before stabbing him. This he did not do. Certainly, these
circumstances negate treachery. With respect to the qualifying circumstance of evident
premeditation, it is well-settled that the essence of premeditation is that the execution of
the criminal act must be preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to
carry out the criminal intent during the space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment.
Consequently, it must be clearly established by evidence the time when the offender
determined to commit the crime, and a sufficient interval of time between the
determination and the execution of the crime to allow him to reflect upon the consequences
of his act. Neither the record nor the appealed decision intimates the existence of the
foregoing circumstances which are essential for a positive finding of evident premeditation.
On the contrary, the circumstances of the case rule out premeditation. The principle
enunciated in the Manalinde (14 Phil. 77[1909]), Butag (38 Phil. 746 [1918]), Binayon (35
Phil. 23 [1916]) and Zalzos (40 Phil. 96[1919]) to the effect that premeditation may exist
even if there was no predetermined victim, does not apply in the instance case In all these
cases it was sufficiently established that the accused deliberately planned to kill although
without a definite person as intended victim. In the present case, there is no evidence
pointing to the fact that appellant planned to kill any person who ma cross his path. His act
of bringing with him a knife in going to the plaza is not an indication that he did plan to kill
anybody. Consequently, the killing of Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr. by appellant cannot be qualified as
murder. It was simple homicide. But the appellant cannot be convicted of the complex crime
of homicide with assault upon an agent of a person in authority because the information
filed against appellant did not allege the essential elements of assault that the accused then
knew that, before or at the time of the assault, the victim was an agent of a person in
authority. (People of the Philippines vs. Rodil, L-35156; Nov. 20, 1981; People vs. CFI of
Quezon, Branch V, 68 SCRA 305, Nov. 28, 1975). The information in this case barely alleged
that the accused "... with deliberate intent to kill, with evident premeditation and treachery
and taking advantage of nighttime, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack and stab with a knife (cuchillo) one Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr., a member of the Philippine
Constabulary while he was then in the performance of his official duty thereby inflicting
upon the latter serious stab wounds at the mid-epigastric region penetrating abdominal
cavity and perforating cardial and cardiac region which injury directly caused his
instantaneous death," which is similar to the information in the aforesaid Rodil case ?
"appellant 'attack and stab PC Lt. Guillermo Masana while the latter was in the performance
of his official duties, ..." in which We ruled that "[S]uch an allegation cannot be an adequate
substitute for the essential averment to justify a conviction of the complex crime, which
necessarily requires the imposition of the maximum period of the penalty prescribed for the
graver offense ... " Furthermore, as in the Rodil case, the subject information cannot be
cured or validated by the doctrine enunciated in People vs. Balbar (21 SCRA 1119, Nov. 29,
1967), because unlike in the latter case, there are no allegations of facts from which it can
be implied that the accused then knew that, before or at the time of the assault, the victim
was an agent of a person in authority. Moreover, the fact that the crime of assault was
established by the evidence of the prosecution without any objection on the part of the
accused cannot likewise cure the aforestated defect in the information so as to validly
convict the accused thereof; because to do so would be convicting the accused of a crime not
properly alleged in the body of the information in violation of his constitutional right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. As already stated, the crime
of assault was definitely demonstrated by the evidence of the People because it showed that
the victim (Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr.) while maintaining peace and order at the exit gate of the
Plaza Magallanes where the crime took place, was in complete PC uniform at the time the
accused attacked him by reason of the latter's act of pushing the accused and his co-accused
so as to prevent them from entering the plaza through its exit gate. In the aforesaid Rodil
case, it was stated that "[L]ike a qualifying circumstance, such knowledge must be expressly
and specifically averred in the information; otherwise, in the absence of such allegation, the
required knowledge, like a qualifying circumstance, although proven, would only be
appreciated as aggravating circumstance. Applying this principle, the attack on the victim,
who was known to the appellant as a peace officer, could be considered only as aggravated
by being 'in contempt or with insult to the public authorities' (par. 2, Art. XIV, Revised Penal
Code) or as an insult or in disregard of the respect due the offended party on account of his
rank ..." (par. 3, Art. XIV, Revised Penal Code). Appellant can therefore be convicted only of
the crime of homicide, aggravated by the circumstance of "in contempt or with insult to the
public authorities" (par. 2, Art. XIV, Revised Penal Code), or as an "insult or in disregard of
the respect due to the offended party on account of his rank ..." (par. 3, Revised Penal Code).
WE stated in the Rodil case, thus:
The term "rank" should be given its plain, ordinary meaning, and as suck refers to a high
social position or standing as a grade in the armed forces (Webster's Third New
International Dictionary of the English Language Unabridged, p. 1881); or to a graded
official standing or social position or station (75 CJS 458); xxx xxx xxx or to a grade or
official standing, relative position in civil or social life, or in any scale of comparison, status,
grade, including its grade, status or scale of comparison within a position (Vol. 36, Words
and Phrases, Permanent Edition, p. 100). xxx xxx xxx As explained by Mr. Justice Mariano
Albert, then of the Court of Appeals, those "generally considered of high station in life, on
account of their rank (as well as age or sex), deserve to be respected. Therefore, whenever
there is a difference in social condition between the offender and the offended party, this
aggravating circumstance sometimes is present" (Albert M.A.? The Revised Penal
Code Annotated, 1946 Ed., p. 109). xxx xxx xxx The aggravating circumstance of contempt
of, or insult to, public authority under paragraph 2 of Article 14 of the Revised Penal
Code can likewise be appreciated in the case at bar. xxx xxx xxx While it is true that in the
case of U.S. vs. Rodriguez, et al. (19 Phil. 150, 157-158), People vs. Siojo (61 Phil. 307, 317),
and People vs. Verzo (21 SCRA 1403), this Court ruled that the term public authority refers
to a person in authority and that a PC lieutenant or town chief of police is not a public
authority but merely an agent of a person in authority; there is need of re-examining such a
ruling since it is not justified by the employment of the term public authority in aforesaid
paragraph 2 of Article 14 instead of the term person in authority which is specifically used
in Articles 148 and 152 of the Revised Penal Code. There is no extended reasoning of the
doctrine enunciated in the aforesaid three (3) cases why the phrase public authority should
comprehend only persons in authority. The lawmaker could have easily utilized the term
"persons in authority" in the aforesaid paragraph 2 of Article 14 in much the same way that
it employed the said phrase in Articles 148 and 152. The lawmaker must have intended a
different meaning for the term public authority, which may however include, but not limited
to, persons in authority. Under the decided cases, a municipal
mayor barrio captain, barrio lieutenant or barangay captain is a person in authority or a
public authority. Even a public school teacher is now considered a person in authority
under CA 578 amending Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code (Sarcepudes vs. People,90
Phil. 228). So is the town municipal health officer (People vs. Quebral, et al., 73 Phil. 640), as
well as a nurse, a municipal councilor or an agent of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (People
vs. Yosoya, CA-G.R. No. 8522-R, May 26, 1955; People vs. Reyes, et al., O.G.S. 11 p. 24). The
chief of police should therefore be considered a public authority or a person in authority;
for he is vested with jurisdiction or authority to maintain peace and order and is specifically
duty bound to prosecute and to apprehend violators of the laws and municipal ordinances,
more than the aforementioned officials who cannot prosecute and who are not even
enjoined to arrest malefactors although specifically mentioned as persons in authority by
the decided cases and by Article 152 of theRevised Penal Code as amended by R.A. 1978 of
June 22, 1957, The town chief of police heads and supervises the entire police force in the
municipality as well as exercises his authority over the entire territory of the municipality,
which is patently greater than and includes the school premises or the town clinic or barrio,
to which small area the authority or jurisdiction of the teacher, nurse, or barrio lieutenant,
respectively, is limited.
Likewise, the guilt of appellant is aggravated by recidivism as he was previously sentenced
by final judgment for slight physical injuries. WHEREFORE, APPELLANT RODOLFO REGALA
ALIAS RUDY REGALA IS HEREBY FOUND GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE
CRIME OF HOMICIDE AGGRAVATED BY RECIDIVISM AND BY CONTEMPT FOR OR INSULT
TO A PUBLIC AUTHORITY OR DISREGARD OF THE RESPECT DUE THE OFFENDED PARTY
ON ACCOUNT OF HIS RANK, WITHOUT ANY MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE, AND HE IS
HEREBY SENTENCED TO SUFFER AN INDETERMINATE TERM OF IMPRISONMENT
RANGING FROM TWELVE (12) YEARS OF PRISON MAYOR AS MINIMUM TO TWENTY (20)
YEARS OF RECLUSION TEMPORAL AS MAXIMUM: THUS MODIFIED, THE JUDGMENT
APPEALED FROM HIS HEREBY AFFIRMED IN ALL OTHER RESPECTS. Fernando, C.J.,
Barredo, Fernandez, Guerrero, De Castro, Melencio-Herrera, Ericta, Plana and Escolin, JJ.,
concur. Teehankee, J., took no part. Aquino, J., concur in the result. Concepcion, Jr., and Abad
Santos, JJ., are on leave

G.R. No. L-63971 May 9, 1989
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RICARDO ELESTERIO y CARPENTERS, defendant-appellant.
FE CRUZ, petitioner,
vs.
EX-JUDGE ENRIQUE AGANA, THE CHIEF, NEW BILIBID PRISON, MUNTINLUPA, METRO
MANILA, respondents.
Carreon & Associates Law Office for defendant-appellant and Fe Cruz.

CRUZ, J.:
At two o'clock in the morning of 8 June 1981, a police car sighted a group of three men and
one woman on the sidewalk of Libertad street in Pasay City and stopped to investigate.
Patrolmen Joseph Nepomuceno and Ernesto Maneja alighted. While they were frisking two
of the men, the third male made a run for it but was caught after a brief pursuit. A search of
his person yielded a .32 caliber revolver and two rounds of live ammunition. The holster he
had dropped while attempting to escape was also recovered. Ricardo Elesterio for that was
his name admitted that he had no permit or authority to carry the firearm.
1

In due time an information was flied against him in the Court of First Instance of Pasay City
reading as follows:
The undersigned Assistant City Fiscal accuses RICARDO ELESTERIO Y CARPENTERS of the
crime of VIOLATION OF GENERAL ORDER NO. 6 in rel. to PAR. 2, PRESIDENTIAL DECREE
NO. 9, as amended, committed as follows:
That on or about the 8th day of June, 1981, in Pasay City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, RICARDO
ELESTERIO yCARPENTERS, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession and carry
outside of his residence a .32 caliber revolver with SN-23271
and (2) two rounds live ammunitions, without having been
permitted or authorized by law.
General Order No. 6, dated September 22,1972, reads in material part as follows:
WHEREAS, in order to restore the tranquility and stability of the nation and
secure the people from violence, injuries and loss of lives in the quickest
possible manner and time, it is necessary to prohibit the inhabitants of the
country from keeping any firearm without a permit duly and legally issued
for that purpose as well as to prohibit the carrying of such firearm outside
the residence of the duly licensed holder thereof;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, Commander-in-Chief of all
the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081
dated September 21, 1972, do hereby order that henceforth and until
otherwise ordered by me or lay my duly designated representative, no
person shall keep, possess or carry outside of his residence any firearm
unless such person is duly authorized to keep possess or carry any such
firearm and any person violating this order shall forthwith be arrested and
taken into custody and held for the duration of the emergency unless
ordered released by me or by my duly designated representative.
Presidential Decree No. 9, promulgated on October 2, 1972, reads partly as follows:
WHEREAS, by virtue of said Proclamation No. 1081, General Order No. 6
dated September 22, 1972 and General Order No. 7 dated September 23,
1972, have been promulgated by me;
WHEREAS, subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminality,
chaos and public disorder mentioned in the aforesaid Proclamation No.
1081 are committed and abetted by the use of firearms, explosives and other
deadly weapons;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS Commander-in-Chief of all the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, in order to attain the desired result of the
aforesaid Proclamation No. 1081 and General Order Nos. 6 and 7, do hereby
order and decree that:
1. Any violation of the aforesaid General Order Nos. 6 and 7 is unlawful and
the violator shall, upon conviction suffer:
x x x
(b) The penalty of imprisonment ranging from twenty years to life
imprisonment as a Military Court/Tribunal/Commission may direct, when
the violation is not attended by any of the circumstances enumerated under
the preceding paragraph.
The accused pleaded not guilty when arraigned on 15 July 1981.
2
Trial was held on 14
August 1981.
3
Patrolman Nepomuceno testified for the prosecution and narrated the arrest
and search of the accused. The accused, testifying for himself, said the firearm did no belong
to him but was passed to him by one Ray Arong minutes before the patrol car passed by
them. The judge then asked if the defense had any more witnesses to present. The defense
counsel said he had, to corroborate the testimony of the accused that he had earlier gone to
several discotheques. The judge said this would only be cumulative, whereupon the counsel
said, "Well, if that is the case, Your Honor, we rest our case with the testimony of our lone
witness."
4
The judge thereupon dictated his decision in open court finding the accused
guilty and sentencing him to life imprisonment.
5
The defense counsel manifested his
intention to appeal, to which the judge replied: "The appeal is automatic. In the meantime
he has to be held in custody. I am cancelling the bailbond."
6

Elesterio was committed to the national penitentiary on 17 August 1981. He escaped on 21
October 1981, and filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied on 18 November
1981. He was recaptured on 30 March 1983. On 12 May 1983, his aunt, Fe Cruz, filed a
petition for habeas corpus on his behalf, alleging that: a) the sentence imposed upon him
was unlawful and excessive; b) he was denied due process because the trial was held only in
one sitting and the defense was not allowed to present additional witnesses; and c) the
person who represented him at the trial was not a lawyer.
In its resolution dated 3 December 1984, the Court dismissed the petition for habeas
corpus after considering the same with the return to the writ submitted by the Solicitor
General. However, it resolved "to consider the said accused to have filed a timely notice of
appeal; to REQUIRE the court a quo to elevate the records of Criminal Case No. 81-913-P to
this Court within ten (10) days from notice; and to ALLOW the accused to post a bail bond
of P5,000.00 for his provisional release.
7
The parties subsequently submitted their
respective briefs.
In dispensing with the testimony of the other defense witnesses who were only intended to
corroborate the averment of the accused that he had been to several discotheques before
his apprehension, the trial court was not acting arbitrarily. The trial judge had the right to
control the conduct of the trial and to bar unnecessary testimony, such as that intended
merely to corroborate relatively unimportant matters, that would only unnecessarily delay
the case. In People v. Barabasa,
8
we held that suppression of that kind of evidence "did not
deprive the accused of any substantial right" as "the evidence was merely cumulative and
unnecessary because it would not have affected the result of the case in the least."
The mere fact that the trial was concluded in one sitting only is not necessarily indicative of
irregularity or inordinate haste. If all the evidence needed by both parties could be
presented by them in that single session, there is no reason why any reseting had to be
made.
As for the circumstance that the defense counsel turned out later to be a non-lawyer, it is
observed that he was chosen by the accused himself and that his representation does not
change the fact that Elesterio was undeniably carrying an unlicensed firearm when he was
arrested. At any rate, he has since been represented by a member of the Philippine bar, who
prepared the petition for habeas corpus and the appellant's brief.
9

The Court agrees, however, that Judge Enrique Agana was exceptionally careless, if not
deliberately high-handed, when he immediately after the trial dictated his decision in open
court. One may well suspect that he had prejudged the case and had a prepared decision to
foist upon the accused even before the submission of the case. And what is worse is that the
decision was wrong.
The elements of the offense punished by General Order No. 6 in relation to Par. 2,
Presidential Decree No. 9, as amended, are first, the carrying of a firearm outside one's
residence, and second, the motive for such act, which is "in furtherance of or to abet, or in
connection with subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos or
public disorder."
A reading of the information filed against the accused will readily show that the second
element of the imputed crime is not alleged at all. All that is averred is that Elesterio on the
date and place indicated, had in his possession and was carrying outside his residence a
firearm and two live bullets without the proper permit or authorization. That is only the
first element. There is no allegation in the information that the accused was carrying the
weapon outside his residence for the purposes mentioned in the laws supposedly violated.
This omission was all too obvious, and it is a wonder that the trial judge did not see it at all.
Perhaps he did not choose to see it. In any event, it is clear that the accused could not have
been convicted of a violation of General Order No. 6 in relation to P.D. No. 9, par. 2, and so
should not have been sentenced to the severe penalty of life imprisonment.
But all this notwithstanding, the accused-appellant is not entirely guiltless. For, although his
act is not punishable under the laws invoked by the prosecution, it is undeniable that it
comes under the provision of Section 2692 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended
by Rep. Act No. 4, for illegal possession of firearms.
This provision reads as follows:
SEC. 2692. Unlawful manufacture, dealing in, acquisition, disposition, or
possession of firearms, or ammunitions therefor, or instrument used or
intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms or ammunition. Any
person who manufactures, deals in, acquires poses, or possesses, any
firearm, parts of firearms, or ammunition therefor, or instrument or
implement used or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms or
ammunition in violation of any provision of sections eight hundred and
seventy-seven to nine hundred and six, inclusive, of this Code, as amended,
shall, upon conviction, be punished by imprisonment for a period of not less
than one year and one day nor more than five years, or both such
imprisonment and a fine of not less than one thousand pesos nor more than
five thousand pesos, in the discretion of the court. If the article illegally
possessed is a rifle, carbine, grease gun, bazooka, machine gun, submachine
gun, hand grenade, bomb, artillery of any kind or ammunition exclusively
intended for such weapons, such period of imprisonment shall not be iless
than five years nor more than ten years. A conviction under this section shall
carry with it the forfeiture the prohibited article or articles to the Philippine
Government.
The possession of any instrument or implement which is directly useful in
the manufacture of firearms or ammunition on the part of any person whose
business or employment does not deal with such instrument or implement
shall be "prima facie" proof that such article is intended to be used in the
manufacture of firearms or ammunition.
Under this provision, mere possession of an unlicensed firearm is malum prohibitum and is
punishable regardless of lack of criminal intent or proof of the ownership of the firearm by
another person. Even if it were not, the accused in the case at bar still has not been able to
explain his possession of the revolver short of the unsupported statement that it had been
handed to him by one Ray Arong who, by his own testimony, was a casual acquaintance he
had met only two days earlier. He does not even explain why he received the gun when it
was for no apparent reason shoved on him by the said Arong.
It is well-settled that the nature and cause of the accusation are determined not by the name
given to the offense but by the description of the manner and circumstances in which it was
committed. The designation of the offense or of the law violated is a conclusion of law made
by the prosecuting officer but this is not binding on the court. That conclusion must
ultimately be made only by the court itself after the trial and following its own
ascertainment of the facts needed to constitute the elements of the crime attributed to the
accused. If an essential element is not alleged to prove a graver crime, no conviction
therefore may be rendered. Conversely, if the elements proved constitute a less serious
offense, conviction therefor is justified although it is the higher offense that is alleged. In
other words, it is the recitals of the facts of the commission of the offense, and not the
nomenclature of the offense, that should determine the crime being charged in the
information.
10

Of particular relevance is the case of People v. Mamogay,
11
where the failure of the
information to allege that the murder had been committed with the use of an illegally
possessed firearm removed it from the coverage of P.D. No. 9 in relation to G.O. No. 6.
Nevertheless, the recitals in the information were specific enough to justify the conviction of
the accused under Section 2692 of the Revised Administrative Code for illegal possession of
firearms.
The information in the case at bar contained allegations (later established at the trial) which
were sufficient to warrant the conclusion that the offense committed by the accused was
violation of Section 2692 of the Revised Administrative Code as amended. He should
therefore have been meted the penalty prescribed therein, not the sentence of life
imprisonment for violation of the presidential decree.
The prescribed penalty is imprisonment for a period of not less than one year nor more
than five years and a fine of not less than P1,000.00 nor more than P5,000.00 in the
discretion of the court. The recommendation of the Solicitor General, considering the facts
and circumstances of this case, is "an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from three
years and one day as minimum to five years as maximum and a fine of P3,000.00, deducting
from the sentence such period of detention, if any, to which the accused may be entitled."
But since the records show that he has been under detention since 1983, or for more than
the maximum sentence imposable on him, there is no question that he is entitled to be
released immediately upon payment of the fine, as an indispensable part of the penalty,
which we hereby fix at P1,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the accused is declared guilty of Illegal Possession of Firearms under Section
2692 of the Revised Administrative Code as amended. Inasmuch as he has been detained for
more than the maximum period of imprisonment imposable for the offense, he is hereby
ordered released immediately upon payment of the fine of P1,000.00.
SO ORDERED.

MATILDE v JABSON
68 SCRA 456
ANTONIO; December 29, 1975.

NATURE
Certiorari to nullify the judgment of respondent Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch
XXVI, in Criminal Cases Nos. 9552, 9553 and 9554, imposing upon the accused Crisanto
Matilde, Jr. y Cruz, for the crime of simple theft, the penalty prescribed in Presidential
Decree No. 133 (which imposes a heavier penalty) instead of that imposed by Article 309,
paragraph 3, of the Revised Penal Code.

FACTS
- An Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Rizal filed three informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 9552,
9553 and 9554 against Crisanto Matilde, Jr. y Cruz, Patricio Guiruela y Luna, Ricardo Abener
y San Pascual, Edgardo Cape y Atienza, Servando Calpo y Caballero, and Ireneo Belver y
Bale.
In three criminal cases, respondent court imposed upon petitioner, for the crime of simple
theft, the penalty prescribed in Presidential Decree No. 133, instead of that imposed by
Article 309, paragraph 3, of the Revised Penal Code. The information charged that petitioner
and his co-accused, being then laborers, conspired and confederated with, and mutually
aided one another, with intent of gain and without knowledge and consent of their
employer, in stealing the articles mentioned therein belonging to their employer. Although
the preamble of said informations stated that petitioner was charged with the crime of
simple theft "in relation to Presidential Decree No. 133," nowhere was it alleged in the body
of said information that the articles stolen were materials or products which petitioner was
"working on, or using or producing" as employee or laborer of the complainant, as provided
for in Presidential Decree No. 133. Except for the dates of commission and the amounts
involved, the aforesaid three (3) informations uniformly stated that said accused were
charged with the crime of qualified theft, in relation to Presidential Decree No. 133,
committed as follows:
"That on or about the 14th day of November, 1973 in the Municipality of Pasig, Province
of Rizal, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, being then laborers working at the Markes Agro-Chemical Enterprises,
conspiring and confederating together with one Renato Matuto y Ann, who is still at large,
all of them mutually helping and aiding one another, with intent of gain, grave abuse of
confidence, and without the knowledge and consent of the said firm, its President and
General Manager, Marciano K. Espiritu, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take, steal and carry away the following, to wit: . . ."
- When the informations were amended from Qualified Theft to Simple theft and deleting
from the body of Information the phrase Grave abuse of confidence, Matilde pleaded
GUILTY but the Court imposed the penalty under PD 133 and not those by Article 309 (3) of
the RPC. From this decision, Matilde sought from the Court a quo a reconsideration
contending that in the absence of any allegation in the body of information alleging
specifically all the elements of the offense defined and penalized under PD. 133, he cannot
be conviceted and penalized under the aforesaid decree.

ISSUE
WON the information that the accused is charged with the crime of simple theft in relation
to PD 133 suffices

HELD
NO
- The Supreme Court granted the writ of certiorari and set aside the judgment, and directed
that another one be rendered. It held that since the objective of Presidential Decree No. 133
is to place a strong deterrent on workers from sabotaging the productive efforts of the
industry where they are employed, it is essential, to qualify the offense and to justify the
imposition of the heavier penalty prescribed by said Decree, that the information should
aver that the articles stolen were materials or products which the accused was "working on
or using or producing," and that a statement in the preamble of the information that the
accused is charged with the crime of simple theft "in relation to Presidential Decree No.
133," does not suffice for the purpose envisioned by the constitutional guarantee that the
accused should be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. The
Supreme Court said that the appropriate penalty is that under Article 309 (3) of the RPC-
prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods if value of property stolen is more
than 200 pesos but does not exceed 6,000 pesos. But with the mitigating plea of guilty,
penalty is in its minimum period.


BALITAAN v CFI (DE LOS REYES)
115 SCRA 729.
GUERRERO; July 30, 1982


FACTS
- Luz Balitaan owns a baby dresses mending shop. Rita de los Reyes is the manager of her
business.
- Luz, thru Special Counsel Aguila, filed with the MTC of Bauan, Batangas an Information
charging Rita of the crime of estafa. The information contains that Rita misappropriated
P127.58, through grave abuse of confidence, despite of repeated demands of Luz. (See
original for exact wording of Information.)
- During trial at the MTC, Luz testified that Rita delivered the baby dresses to Uniware, and
for this she (Rita) obtained 3 checks totaling P1,632.97. A cash voucher evidencing the
receipt of said amount was entered into evidence. The lawyer for the defense moved:
(1) to strike the testimonies with regard to the voucher evidence on the ground that said
testimonies are at variance with the allegations in the information, that there is no
allegation in the information whatsoever regarding these checks and this cash voucher; and
(2) in the nature of an objection to any other question or questions regarding these checks
that were allegedly received by the herein accused from the Uniware Incorporated because
there is no allegation in the information.
The court overruled such objections as the lawyer of the complainant told the judge that
the evidence was presented to prove that the P127.58 was misappropriated from the
P1,632.97. The testimony thus continued. [It turns out that Rita told Luz that P127.58 was
due a Cesar Dalangin for some of the dresses he made. Luz then instructed Rita to encash
the checks and pay Cesar. Rita gave Luz the encashed amount minus the P127.58. Three
weeks later, when she noticed that many baby dresses were lost, she verified the receipts of
the payments. Cesar said he did not make the baby dresses Rita said he did, and he didnt
receive the amount (he didnt even know Rita). Luz then demanded from Rita the said
amount; but Rita kept the money.]
- The defense then filed a petition for certiorari in the CFI of Batangas against the MTC
judge for denying the motions to strike out the testimonies relating to the evidence. CFI
granted the petition and ordered the testimonies stricken out of the record.

ISSUE
WON the testimonies are at variance with the allegations in the information.

HELD
NO
- It is fundamental that every element of which the offense is composed must be alleged in
the complaint or information. What facts and circumstances are necessary to be stated must
be determined by reference to the definitions and the essentials of the specific crimes. The
main purpose of requiring the various elements of a crime to be set out in an information is
to enable the accused to suitably prepare his defense. He is presumed to have no
independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.
- Inasmuch as the crime of estafa through misappropriation or with grave abuse of
confidence is charged, the information must contain these elements:
(a) that personal property is received in trust, on commission, for administration or under
any other circumstance involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same, even
though the obligation is guaranteed by a bond;
(b) that there is conversion or diversion of such property by the person who has so received
it;
(c) that such conversion, diversion or denial is to the injury of another and
(d) that there be demand for the return of the property.
- The position of the defense is that the testimonies tend to prove another kind of estafa ---
using false pretenses or fraudulent acts (Art 315 par 2a RPC)--- and not thru abuse of
confidence (Art 315 par 1b RPC). The elements of these two are different. Under par 2a,
demand is not necessary and deceit or false representation must be shown. But this doesnt
mean that proof of deceit is not allowed for par 1b. Abuse of confidence and deceit may co-
exist. Even if deceit may be present, the abuse of confidence will characterize the estafa as
the deceit will be merely incidental or, is absorbed by abuse of confidence.
- As long as there is a relation of trust and confidence between the complainant and the
accused and even though such relationship has been induced by the accused thru false
representations and pretense and which is continued by active deceit without truthfully
disclosing the facts to the complainant, the estafa committed is by abuse of confidence
although deceit co-exists in its commission.
- The presence of deceit would not change the whole theory of the prosecution that estafa
with abuse of confidence was committed.
Dispositive CFI decision to strike out testimonies is reversed and set aside.





PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Pedro Perreras @ Pepot and BOY
FERNANDEZ (at large), accused.
PEDRO PERRERAS @ PEPOT accused-appellant.
D E C I S I O N
BELLOSILLO, J.:
ACCUSED-APPELLANT PEDRO PERRERAS alias "Pepot" was found guilty by the court a
quo of murder for the killing of Estanislao Salo and sentenced to death. He was ordered to
pay the heirs of the victim P75,000.00 for civil indemnity, P91,803.59 for actual and
compensatory damages, P1,728,000.00 for lost earnings and P100,000.00 for moral
damages. His conviction is now the subject of this automatic review.
[1]

Meanwhile, his co-accused BOY FERNANDEZ has remained at large, hence is not
included in this Decision.
On the night of 21 July 1998 in Bacayao Norte, Dagupan City, accused-appellant Pedro
Perreras, a former resident of the barangay, and Boy Fernandez, his nephew, approached
Leonardo Salazar who was engaged in idle banter with some barriomates at the
neighborhood waiting shed. Pedro asked Leonardo if Manoling Pastoral was home. When
Leonardo nodded, Pedro asked for directions to go to Manoling's house. Feeling almost
suffocated in the crowded waiting shed, Leonardo excused himself and walked towards the
house of Estanislao Salo ten (10) meters away for some refreshing air.
[2]
Soon after Pedro
and Boy followed, each holding a bottle of beer. The two (2) approached the son of
Estanislao by the name of Joel and asked him also for Manoling's house.
Accused-appellant then stopped by the window of the Estanislao's house which was
just adjacent to the house of Manoling. The place was lighted by a mercury lamp about
twelve (12) meters from the house of Estanislao. As soon as accused-appellant saw
Estanislao, he rolled up his sleeves, drew a gun from his waist, and fired at Estanislao,
hitting him on the head.
[3]
Leonardo had a clear view of Estanislao sitting on a chair and
watching TV when fired upon as he was only about ten (10) meters away from the shooter
and the victim. Fearing for his life, Leonardo hid behind a chair.
Leonora Salo, Estanislao's wife, was washing dishes in the kitchen when she heard the
gunshot. She rushed to the living room and saw her husband slumped on the floor. She
looked out the window and saw accused-appellant Pedro Perreras alias "Pepot" holding a
gun staring at her husband's body.
[4]
Upon seeing Leonora, Pedro fled with Boy trailing him
some twenty (20) meters behind. Shocked and senseless, Leonora cradled her dying
husband in her arms and shouted his name as if to will him back into consciousness. After
Pedro and Boy left, Leonardo Salazar ran to the house of Saturnino Maramba, a barangay
councilor, and reported to him, in between gasps, the shooting and narrated the details of
what he had witnessed. Both then went to the house of SPO2 Dacanay for assistance.
Estanislao was rushed to the Villaflor Hospital for treatment but it was too late. He
died at 5:30 the following morning, 22 July 1998.
Dr. Benjamin Bautista, Rural Health Physician of Dagupan City, conducted the autopsy
on the cadaver of Estanislao. It was in a state of rigor mortis, with "gunshot wound, POE, 2
cm., left, Parietal area, penetrating, perforating, gunpowder tattooing marking, less dense,
collar abrasion, depress fracture skull." Internal findings showed "intercranial
hemorrhage, moderate; skull depress fracture; penetrating and perforating brain tissue
damage." Cause of death was "Hypovolemic shock, Hemorrhage, moderate, due to gunshot
wound POE (L) parietal area, brain tissue damage."
[5]
Dr. Bautista explained in court that
the victim was shot in the left side of the top portion of the head but there was no exit
wound; the shot was fired at close range, from four (4) to six (6) feet, and from a low caliber
pistol; and, from the position of the bullet wound, the victim could have been shot while
seated.
[6]

On 22 August 1998 accused-appellant was arrested while in hiding in Echague,
Isabela. According to SPO4 Alfredo Flores, accused-appellant admitted to him that he killed
Estanislao Salo and voluntarily signed the warrant of arrest
[7]
on the left margin
thereof.
[8]
But, Boy Fernandez was nowhere to be found.
Accused-appellant however subsequently denied the charges against him. He claimed
that he had been in Isabela since 11 July 1998 and returned to Dagupan only upon his
arrest. He also denied that he admitted to SPO4 Flores that he murdered Estanislao Salo,
claiming that did not know how to write and his captors forced him to affix his signature on
the warrant. He also testified that he was mauled by Estanislao Salo's two (2) sons and
nephew while he was detained in the Dagupan police station. Furthermore, he asserted that
Boy Fernandez, his alleged companion during the murder, had been dead for three (3)
years, and even presented a Death Certificate
[9]
of one Rodolfo Geminiano Fernandez who
died on 23 May 1994.
On rebuttal, the prosecution presented two (2) other witnesses, Orlando and Pepito
Capua, both residents of Bacayao Norte, to testify that they knew Boy Fernandez and that he
was still alive. They further testified that the Rodolfo Geminiano Fernandez who died in
1994 was the father of Boy Fernandez.
Accused-appellant now maintains that the lower court committed a grievous error in
lending weight to the testimony of prosecution witness Leonardo Salazar. He pointed out
supposed "inconsistencies" in Salazar's testimony in an attempt to impugn his
credibility. First, the ocular inspection of the area which revealed that the victim's house
was east of the shed was inconsistent with Salazar's testimony that he was facing west
when the incident transpired. Second, the location of the electric post which illuminated
the vicinity was not twenty (20) meters in front of the house, as Salazar claimed, but on its
southern direction 100 meters away. Third, it was impossible for him to have asked
directions to the house of Manoling Pastoral because he personally knew Pastoral as well as
the location of his house.
As regards the first perceived "inconsistency," accused-appellant argues -
From the testimony of the said witness itself it was well established that he was at that shed
near the electric post where the improvised basketball court was located, and the said shed
was facing the three (3) meters concrete road. On this point alone it was already very clear
that witness Leonardo Salazar, assuming arguendo to be present, could never see the house
of the victim because he was then at the time facing the three (3) meters concrete road,
hence, facing west but the house of the victim during the ocular inspection was found to be
located in the eastern direction in relation to the said shed or electric post and improvised
basketball court was located.
A close scrutiny of the records reveals that nowhere in Leonardo's testimony did he
ever state that he was facing west when the shooting occurred. He only said that the
waiting shed where he was standing before he went to breath some fresh air was facing the
newly constructed concrete road. The map of the area drawn by the court
researcher
[10]
reveals that this road was indeed to the west of the shed. However, Leonardo
did not claim to have witnessed the shooting from there. He left that shed to go to the front
of the victim's house for some fresh air. It was from there, and not from the shed, that he
saw the killing. As the lower court correctly pointed out -
It was counsel for the defense who was apparently confused when he predicated almost all
his questions during the cross-examination of Leonardo Salazar on the place where the
witness was refreshing himself when actually counsel for the defense wanted to refer to the
waiting shed where the witness was conversing with the people around and where the
accused asked him where the house of Manoling Pastoral is and if the latter was in his
house. The place where the waiting shed is located is actually different from the place
where the witness went to refresh himself near the house of the victim as borne out by the
transcript of the testimony of the witness.
[11]

We agree with the trial court and the Solicitor General that considering that accused-
appellant had been in Isabela from 1975 to 1997, it would not be far-fetched that he lost his
familiarity with the barangay so that it was not unlikely that he had to ask for directions to
the house of Manoling Pastoral, or at least verify his recollection with someone more
familiar with the place.
Also, we agree with the court a quo that the discrepancy as to the distance between the
electric post and the victim's house is a minor inconsistency that cannot affect the
credibility of the witness' testimony. As it is oft-repeated, inconsistencies in the
testimonies of witnesses which refer only to minor details and collateral matters do not
affect the veracity and weight of their testimonies where there is consistency in relating the
principal occurrence and the positive identification of the assailants. Slight contradictions
in fact even serve to strengthen the credibility of the witnesses and prove that their
testimonies are not rehearsed. Nor are such inconsistencies, and even improbabilities,
unusual for there is no person with perfect faculties or senses.
[12]

At any rate, all doubts regarding the relative positions of the houses, electric lights and
basketball court have been soundly put to rest, and aptly so, by the trial court -
During the ocular inspection it was learned that there was a vacant space in front of the
house of Salo as the area was not yet fenced at the time of the incident with a hollow block
wall on the southwestern side of the vacant lot was a mercury lamp x x x which could very
well light the house of Estanislao Salo, including that portion where a window existed
through which Estanislao Salo was shot x x x x Although the electric post was not located
immediately on the side of the road as it was inside the kitchen wall of a house under it,
same was of a height sufficient enough to make the electric bulb attached to it to light the
front of the house of Estanislao Salo without any obstruction and when the witness said that
he went in front of the house of Salo he was within the vicinity of the said electric post, not
on the waiting shed near which another electric post was located where the defense argued
the witness was at the time of the incident. From any place in front of the house of Salo,
anyone could see the place where the accused was supposed to be standing when Estanislao
Salo was shot.
[13]

It is a hornbook doctrine that findings of fact of the trial court are entitled to great
weight on appeal and should not be disturbed except for strong and valid reasons because
of the trial courts unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and to note their
demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grilling examination.
[14]
In the same vein, questions
regarding the locus criminis, the distances and positions of the landmarks, and the
credibility of the witnesses relative thereto, are best left to the trial court, especially when it
had conducted an ocular inspection. No amount of textual description, recitation of
measurements, and diagrams could even approximate the actual subjection of the crime
scene to the trial judge's acute senses.
Moreover, Leonardo Salazar's testimony was corroborated by Leonora Salo, the wife of
the victim, and Dr. Benjamin Bautista, the examining physician. Leonora's testimony that
she saw accused-appellant holding a gun and staring at her unconscious husband through
the window confirms the gunman's identity. Dr. Bautista's findings that the victim was shot
at close range with a small firearm while sitting down
[15]
are also consistent with
Leonardo's account.
In the face of the prosecution's mounting evidence, accused-appellant invokes alibi for
his defense. But positive identification, if categorical and consistent, without any showing
of ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter, prevails over alibi and
denial which, if not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative and self-
serving evidence not worthy of weight in law.
[16]
For alibi to prosper, it is not enough to
prove that accused-appellant was somewhere else when the crime was committed but it
must likewise be demonstrated that he was far away that he could not have been physically
present at the place of the crime or its immediate vicinity at the time of its
commission.
[17]
The lower court took judicial notice of the fact that a trip from Isabela to
Dagupan City takes a mere eight (8) to nine (9) hours and therefore it was not impossible
for accused-appellant to have been in Dagupan City on the night in question and returned to
Isabela immediately after. For this reason, the defense of alibi must fall.
In qualifying the crime to murder, the trial court correctly appreciated the
circumstance of treachery.
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons,
employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and
specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the
offended party might make.
[18]
For treachery to be considered, two (2) elements must
concur: (a) the employment of means of execution that give the person attacked no
opportunity to defend himself or retaliate; and, (b) the means of execution were
deliberately or consciously adopted.
[19]
In this case, the victim was in the comforts of his
own home, enjoying a televised basketball game. He was shot in the head from the back,
with the gunman even having all the time in the world to roll up his sleeves and take careful
aim. The victim was unaware of the attempt on his life, and was not in the position to
defend himself. Clearly, treachery was present in this killing.
In imposing the death penalty, the trial court ruled that the murder was aggravated by
dwelling. We agree, but not to the imposition of the supreme penalty as shown hereunder.
Dwelling aggravates a felony where the crime was committed in the dwelling of the
offended party if the latter has not given provocation or if the victim was killed inside his
house.
[20]
Dwelling is considered aggravating primarily because of the sanctity of privacy
the law accords to human abode. He who goes to another's house to hurt him or do him
wrong is more guilty than he who offends him elsewhere.
[21]
Although accused-appellant
was outside of the house when he fired, the victim was inside his house. For the
circumstance of dwelling to be considered, it is not necessary that the accused should have
actually entered the dwelling of the victim to commit the offense; it is enough that the
victim was attacked inside his own house, although the assailant might have devised means
to perpetrate the assault from the outside.
[22]

However, the death penalty cannot be imposed on accused-appellant in light of our
recent rulings in People v. Arrojado
[23]
and People v. Gano
[24]
where Secs. 8 and 9 of The
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure
[25]
were given retroactive application where favorable
to the accused. The Rules now require that every complaint or information state not only
the qualifying but also the aggravating circumstances, otherwise the same cannot be
properly appreciated. Since dwelling was not alleged in the Information, it cannot be
considered to raise the penalty to death. Consequently, there being no more modifying
circumstances to be appreciated, the penalty for this murder is reclusion perpetua, pursuant
to Art. 63 in relation to Art. 248 of The Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659.
Of the amount of P91,803.59 awarded for actual damages, only P61,813.15 may be
granted as only so much for medical and burial expenses are supported by the evidence on
record.
[26]
Actual damages must be substantiated by documentary evidence, such as
receipts, in order to prove expenses incurred as a result of the death of the victim.
[27]

The heirs of the deceased may recover damages for loss of earning capacity. Although
the prosecution did not present documentary evidence to support this claim, testimonial
evidence is sufficient to establish a basis for which the court can make a fair and reasonable
estimate of damages for loss of earning capacity,
[28]
and the unrebutted testimony of
Leonora Salo is sufficient basis for the award. She testified that the victim was fifty (50)
years old at the time of his death and earned a basic salary of P130.00 a day but including
tips as waiter in a restaurant he was earning a total average of P9,000.00 per month. Under
the American Expectancy Table of Mortality adopted by this Court in several cases,
[29]
loss of
earning capacity is computed according to the following formula:
Net Earning Capacity (X) = Life Expectancy x Gross
Annual Income - Living Expenses
(50% of Gross Annual Income)
where life expectancy = 2/3 x (80 - [age of deceased]);
and
Gross Annual Income = Monthly Earnings x number of
months (12)
Therefore,
X = 2/3 (80-50) x [(P9,000.00 x 12) -
[P9,000.00 x 12) 50%]
X = 2/3 (30) x [P108,000.00 - P54,000.00]
X = 20 x P54,000.00
X = P1,080,000.00
The award of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity is reduced to P50,000.00 since murder was
not qualified by any circumstance under which the death penalty is authorized. The
testimony of Leonora that she suffered sleepless nights and mental anxiety as a result of her
husband's murder sufficiently justifies moral damages,
[30]
although the award
of P100,000.00 may be considered excessive hence must be lowered to P50,000.00 to
conform with current jurisprudence.
[31]

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court in Crim. Case No. 98-02303-D
finding accused-appellant PEDRO PERRERAS alias "Pepot" guilty of murder, imposing on
him the death penalty and ordering him to pay the heirs of ESTANISLAO SALO P75,000.00
as civil indemnity, P91,803.59 in actual and compensatory damages, P1,728,000.00 in lost
earnings, andP100,000.00 in moral damages is MODIFIED. Accused-appellant PEDRO
PERRERAS is found guilty of murder and sentenced instead to reclusion perpetua and to pay
the heirs of ESTANISLAO SALO P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P61,813.15 as actual
damages, P1,080,000.00 in lost earnings and P50,000.00 as moral damages. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Quisumbing, Pardo, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-
Santiago, and De Leon, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Melo, Panganiban, Buena, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., abroad, on official
business.


PEOPLE v ALAGAO
16 SCRA 879
ZALDIVAR; April 30, 1966

NATURE
This is an appeal by the City Fiscal of Manila from an order of the Court of First Instance of
Manila sustaining the motion to quash the information

FACTS
-City Fiscal of Manila filed an information against the defendants-appellees charging them of
the complex crime of incriminatory machinations thru unlawful arrest, as follows:
"That on or about the 28th day of February, 1961, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused, being then members of the Manila Police Department, conspiring and
confederating together and helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously incriminate or impute to one Marcial Apolonio y Santos the commission of the
crime by bribery thru unlawful arrest, in the following manner, to wit: the said accused, on
the aforesaid date, without reasonable ground therefor and for the purpose of delivering
said Marcial Apolonio y Santos to the proper authorities, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously arrest said Marcial Apolonio y Santos; that after the said Marcial
Apolonio y Santos had been arrested in the manner aforestated, and while the latter was
supposedly being investigated by the said accused, the said accused did then and there
place on commingle a marked P1.00 bill together with the money taken from said Marcial
Apolonio y Santos, supposedly given to the latter by one Emerita Calupas de Aresa, so that
he (Marcial Apolonio y Santos), then an employee of the Local Civil Registrar's Office of
Manila, would appear to have agreed to perform an act not constituting a crime, in
connection with the performance of his (Marcial Apolonio y Santos) duties, which was to
expedite the issuance of a birth certificate, thereby directly incriminating or imputing to
said Marcial Apolonio y Santos the commission of the crime of bribery."
-defendants filed a motion to quash saying that (1) the facts charged in the information do
not constitute an offense (because the two crimes cannot be complexed); and (2) the court
trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged
-CFI granted motion to dismiss agreeing with defendants
-MFR was denied
-appeal by fiscal before SC

ISSUE
WON the CFI erred in granting motion to quash

HELD
YES
- It is very apparent that by the use of the phrase "thru unlawful arrest" in the information
an idea is conveyed that the unlawful arrest was resorted to as a necessary means to plant
evidence in the person of the offended party, thereby incriminating him. From a reading of
the info the SC finds a close connection between the act of the accused in first unlawfully
arresting the offended party and then investigating him; and it was during that investigation
that they plated incriminatory evidence against him. SC agrees with the Solicitor General in
his contention that the accused first had to resort to unlawful arrest in order to be able to
plant the P1.00 bill among the money taken from the offended party. Also the court a quo
has jurisdiction to try the accused of the offense charged in the information. The crime of
unlawful arrest is punishable with arresto mayor or imprisonment of from one month and
one day to six months, and a fine not exceeding P500.00; 5 and the crime of incriminatory
machinations is punishable with arresto mayor, or imprisonment of from one month and
one day to six months.
Dispositive The order appealed from is reversed and set aside


PhilippineLaw.info Jurisprudence 1983 May
PhilippineLaw.info Jurisprudence SCRA Vol. 123
G.R. No. , 123 SCRA 253
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
DECISION
May 31, 1983
G.R. No. , ,
vs.
, .
, J.:
The Court resolved to give due course to the petition as well as to consider as answer the
Comment of the Solicitor General and the case submitted for decision.
Petitioners seek to set aside the order of respondent Judge dated June 30, 1982 denying the
verbal motion of the City Fiscal of Mandaue City to amend the information for grave
coercion against private respondent Joaquin Borromeo by changing the date of the
commission of the crime from "on or about the 24th day of June, 1981 " to "on or about
August 28, 1981, " after the accused had been arraigned and entered a plea of not guilty and
during the testimony of the complainant, as well as the order of July 28, 1982 denying the
motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order.
The original information dated February 18, 1982 as well as the first amended information
dated March 19, 1982, for grave coercion alleges that "the crime was committed on or about
the 24th day of June, 1981." The first amended information was admitted in an order dated
March 24, 1982.
After the accused pleaded not guilty, at the trial on or about June 30, 1982 and during the
testimony of the complainant who testified that the crime of grave coercion was committed
on or about August 28, 1981, the prosecution orally moved to further amend the amended
information by changing the date of the commission of the offense from June 24, 1981 to
August 28,1981.
In an order dated June 30, 1982, the respondent Judge denied the verbal motion to amend
on the ground that the proposed amendment would impair the substantial rights of the
accused as guaranteed by the Constitution, invoking the case of People vs. Hon. Reyes (G.R.
No. L-32557, Oct. 23, 1981, 108 SCRA 23). The motion for reconsideration was likewise
denied in an order dated July 28, 1982. The petition is meritorious. The respondent Judge
erred in relying on the case of People vs. Reyes,supra.
As opined by the Solicitor General in his comment dated May 9, 1982, the change of the date
of the commission of the crime from June 24, 1981 to August 28, 1981 is more formal than
substantial and would not prejudice the rights of the accused, as the said proposed
amendment would not alter the nature of the offense of grave coercion (Arevalo vs.
Nepomuceno, 63 Phil. 627). In said Arevalo case, the amendment which was allowed was
the allegation in the information that B carried the revolver and C, the knife, instead of C
carrying the revolver and B, the knife.
The difference in the dates is only about two (2) months and five (5) days, which disparity is
amply comprehended within the allegation that the crime was committed "on or about."
Nor will the amendment or correction cause any surprise on the accused, who has been
furnished the affidavits of prosecution witnesses, all of which uniformly state that the date
of the commission was August 28, 1981. In U.S. vs. dela Cruz (3 Phil. 331), the amendment
in the information for brigandage sought to be made was to eliminate the words "led by one
Silverio" and to substitute therefor the words "under the command of Luciano San Miguel"
after the prosecution rested but before the presentation of the evidence of the defense. The
Supreme Court allowed the said amendment holding that it did not prejudice in any sense
the right of the accused as "it did not affect the essence of the crime charged, but merely an
accidental detail of the same" and "it did not deprive the accused of an opportunity to
produce evidence for their defense, if they had desired, in relation to the said amendment;
...". Consequently, the accused is not thereby denied any opportunity to present evidence in
his defense.
In the case of Vega vs. Panis (Sept. 30, 1981, 117 SCRA 269, 277), after arraignment, the
Fiscal sought to amend the information so as to include the aggravating circumstances of
dwelling and nighttime. The Court ruled that such an amendment is a matter of form and
may be allowed, stating that:
An amendment which neither adversely affects any substantial right of the accused (e.g.
does not deprive him of the right to invoke prescription nor affects and/or alters the nature
of the offense originally charged nor involves a change in the basic theory of the prosecution
so as to require the accused to undergo any material change or modification in his defense)
is an amendment as to matter of form."
In the earlier case of People vs. Joseph Casey (Feb. 24, 1981, 103 SCRA 21, 31), where after
arraignment the information was amended to include as one of the accused Ricardo Felix
alias "Carding Tuwad" who was then armed with a firearm, which amendment was allowed
by the Supreme Court, We ruled thus:
The test as to whether a defendant is prejudiced by the amendment of an information has
been said to be whether a defense under the information, as it originally stood would be
available after the amendment is made, and whether any evidence defendant might have
would be equally applicable to the information in the one form as in the other. A look into
Our jurisprudence on the matter shows that an amendment to an information introduced
after the accused has pleaded not guilty thereto, which does not expose the accused to a
charge which could call for a higher penalty, does not affect the essence of the offense or
cause surprise or deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet the new averment had each
been held to be one of form and not of substance-not prejudicial to the accused and,
therefore, not prohibited by Section 13, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Section 10 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court states that "it is not necessary to state in the
complaint or information the precise time at which the offense was committed except when
time is a material ingredient of the offense, but the act may be alleged to have been
committed at any time as near to the actual date at which date the offense was committed as
the information or complaint will permit."
The precise time is not an essential ingredient of the offense of grave coercion.
In the case of People vs. Rivera (1970, 33 SCRA 746), We ruled that the amendment of the
information as to the date of the commission of the offense from March 2, 1964 to March 2,
1965, a difference of one (1) year or twelve (12) months, was merely a matter of form and
does not prejudice the rights of the accused, reiterating the ruling in the case of U.S. vs.
Ramos (1912, 23 Phil. 300) where the Fiscal was permitted to amend the date of the
commission of the offense from June 16, 1910 to June, 1911.
The phrase "on or about" employed in the information does riot require the prosecution "to
prove any precise date but may prove any date which is not so remote as to surprise and
prejudice the defendant. In case of surprise, the Court may allow an amendment of the
information as to time and an adjournment to the accused, if necessary, to meet the
amendment" (U.S. vs. Dichao, 27 Phil. 420, 423 [1914]).
In the case of People vs. Reyes, supra, on which the respondent Judge relies, the change
sought was from 1964 to 1969, a difference of five (5) years, which gap of five years "is so
great as to defy approximation in the commission of one and the same offense."
This is not so in the case at bar where the difference is only, as aforestated, two months and
five days, which disparity allows approximation as to the date of the commission of the
offense of grave coercion.
Moreover, as stressed by the Solicitor General, the error as to the date of the commission of
the offense was discovered early and the motion to amend or correct the same was as
immediate as to preclude any surprise or prejudice on the part of the accused.
WHEREFORE, THE PETITION IS HEREBY GRANTED, THE ORDERS OF RESPONDENT JUDGE
DATED JUNE 30,1982 AND JULY 28,1982 ARE HEREBY SET ASIDE, AND THE RESPONDENT
JUDGE IS HEREBY DIRECTED TO ADMIT THE ADDITIONAL AMENDMENT TO THE
AMENDED INFORMATION FROM "JUNE 24,1981 TO AUGUST 28,1981. " NO COSTS.
SO ORDERED.
Guerrero, De Castro and Escolin JJ., concur.
Aquino, J., is in the result.
Separate Opinions
CONCEPCION, J., concurring :
I concur to let a copy of this decision be furnished the Minister of Justice.
ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:
I concur and express the hope that fiscals should be meticulous in preparing informations.
In this case the affidavits of prosecution witnesses uniformly mentioned August 28, 1981, as
the date when the crime was committed. But the sloppy fiscal who wrote the informations
still managed to state the wrong date twice both in the original as well as the first amended
information. A slap on the wrist is well deserved.
Separate Opinions
CONCEPCION, J., concurring :
I concur to let a copy of this decision be furnished the Minister of Justice.
ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:
I concur and express the hope that fiscals should be meticulous in preparing informations.
In this case the affidavits of prosecution witnesses uniformly mentioned August 28, 1981, as
the date when the crime was committed. But the sloppy fiscal who wrote the informations
still managed to state the wrong date twice both in the original as well as the first amended
information. A slap on the wrist is well deserved.

G.R. No. L-46079 April 17, 1989
ESTEBAN C. MANUEL, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. ERNANI CRUZ PAO as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Br.
XVIII, Q.C., ANTONIO A. BARANDA, EDSEL LABAYEN and ROLANDO
GATMAITAN, respondents.

CRUZ, J.:
One wonders why the respondent judge did not immediately grant the petitioner's motion
to quash the information on the obvious and valid ground that the facts charged did not
constitute an offense. This decisive act could have avoided the needless molestation of one
more citizen and cleared the clogged dockets of this Court of still another of the
prosecutions big and small so rampant during those days of martial law. More importantly,
it would have affirmed once again the freedom of expression guaranteed in the Bill of Rights
to which every one was entitled even under the 1973 Constitution.
This case goes back to April 21, 1976, when a raid was conducted by the agents of the now
defunct Anti-Smuggling Action Center on two rooms in the Tokyo Hotel in Binondo, Manila,
pursuant to a warrant of seizure and detention issued by the Acting Collector of Customs of
Manila on April 20, 1976. 1 The raid resulted in the seizure of several articles allegedly
smuggled into the country by their owners, three of whom were tourists from Hongkong.
These articles subsequently became the subject of seizure proceedings in the Bureau of
Customs but most of them were ordered released upon proof that the customs duties and
other charges thereon had been duly paid as evidenced by the corresponding official
receipts. Only a few items "of no commercial value" were ordered confiscated. 2
While the seizure proceedings were pending, the petitioner, as counsel for the owners of the
seized articles, sent a letter dated April 19,1976, to the Chairman of the ASAC in which he
complained about the conduct of the raid and demanded that the persons responsible
therefore be investigated. The letter follows in full: 3
ESTEBAN C. MANUEL
Attorney at Law
643 Carvajal Street
Binondo, Manila
A
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2
9
,
1
9
7
6
The Chairman
ASAC, Camp Aguinaldo
Quezon City
Sir:
This is in behalf of my clients, Mrs. Ng Woo Hay and her son, Mr. Lee Kee
Ming, who sought my help in reporting to your goodself their I complaint
about certain acts committed by ASAC men which, from all appearances,
constitute criminal offenses. I am referring to the raid they conducted on
April 21, 1976 at about 4:30 in the afternoon at Tokyo Hotel, Ongpin Street,
Binondo, Manila, pursuant to a "Warrant of Seizure and Detention" (seizure
Identification No. 14922) issued by the Acting Collector of Customs on April
20, 1976. The raiding team, about 10 in number and headed by one Amado
enrol, took advantage of the fact that Mrs. Ng Woo Hay was alone in her
hotel room. The ASAC agents, despite Mrs. Ng's protest and claim of
innocence, forced their way into the room and ransacked the place for
alleged untaxed goods. Not only did they take everything they could find in
the room, but also forcibly took from her person the wrist watch and jade
bracelet (gold plated she was wearing at the time. They also forced open her
handbag and divested her of her wallet containing 70 Hongkong dollars, as
well as her necklace and her son's wrist watch which she had placed in said
handbag. Mrs. Ng was also subjected to the indignities of being searched by a
male person. After emptying the room of its contents, the raiding team
presented to her a carbon copy of a list purporting to show the goods seized.
The list, however, appears not only illegible but does not reflect all the goods
that were taken away by the ASAC agents. What is more, said men, likewise
taking advantage of the absence of Mrs. Ng's son, owner of some of the
articles, falsified the signature of the latter by writing his name on the space
designated as "owner", making it appear that he (Lee Kee Ming) had
acknowledged that the list covers all the items seized.
The documents and other papers presented to me by my clients reveal that
the articles seized were declared at the Manila International Airport upon
arrival, and were properly appraised. The corresponding customs charges
were likewise paid. It is evident, therefore, that my clients were victims of
foul play masterminded by no less than law enforcers who prey on tourists,
particularly Chinese, for obvious reasons.
I examined the records in the Bureau of Customs and found out that it was
on the basis of an affidavit executed by ASAC Agent Rolando Gatmaitan and
the letter-request sent by the Vice-Chairman of ASAC Brig. Gen. Ramon Z.
Aguirre, to the Collector of Customs that prompted the latter to issue the
warrant in question. In this connection, I must state, with all frankness, that
there was undue haste in the request for the issuance of the warrant,
because it is discernible from a mere reading of the affidavit that its contents
are mere pro-forma and hearsay statements of the abovenamed ASAC agent.
It could not have, as it now appears, justified the drastic action sought to be
accomplished.
Needless to state, the incident complained of not only has caused
considerable damage to my clients but to our country as well. It is for this
reason that we demand for an immediate and full dress investigation of the
ASAC officers and men who took part in or caused the issuance of the
warrant, as well as those who participated in the raid, with the view of
purging the government of undesirables; and that pending such
investigation the said officers and men be suspended from further
performing their duties.
V
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The Chairman of the ASAC ordered the investigation as demanded, but the agents charged
were all exonerated in a decision dated August 25, 1976. 4 Not satisfied with what he later
described as a "home town decision," the petitioner, on behalf of his clients, filed a
complaint for robbery against the same agents with the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila.
This was later withdrawn, however, on advice of the inquest fiscal who said that the case
might come under the jurisdiction of the military tribunal. 5 The petitioner says he then
went to Camp Aguinaldo but was discouraged from filing the complaint there when lie was
told that it would take about a year to complete the preliminary investigation alone.6 The
owners of the seized articles then instituted a civil complaint for damages which the
petitioner filed for them in the Court of First Instance of Manila on June 7,1976. 7
Three days later, there appeared in the June 10, 1976 issue of the Bulletin Today the
following report: 8
TOURISTS SUE AGENTS, OFFICIAL
Four Chinese, three of whom were tourists from Hongkong, have filed a case
for damages against a customs official and 11 agents of the government's
anti-smuggling action center ASAC in connection with a raid conducted in
their hotel rooms, more than a month ago.
The case was docketed in Manila's court of first instance (CFI) as Civil Case
No. 102694.
The complaints also alleged they lost assorted materials amounting to
P46,003.40.
Named respondents in the case were acting customs collector Ramon Z.
Aguirre, Rolando Gatmaitan, Antonio Baranda, Amado M. Tirol, Francisco C.
Santos, Edsel Labayen, Jose Robles, Nestor Eusebio, Freddie Ocnila, Renato
Quiroz, Pedro Cunanan, Jr., and Enrique Perez, all of ASAC
The acting customs collector was impleaded in the case in his official
capacity for having issued the warrant that led to the criminal offenses
complained of.
Aquirre, ASAC vice-chairman, was named as defendant for soliciting the
issuance of a warrant of seizure and detention reportedly on the basis of
charges contained in an affidavit executed by Gatmaitan, another ASAC
agent.
Esteban Manuel filed the case in behalf of the plaintiffs composed of Manila
resident Ng Tee, and Hong Kong visitors Ng Woo Hay, Cheng Pik Ying and
Lee Kee Ming who came to the Philippines to visit their relatives and friends.
The agents allegedly subjected Ng Woo Hay to indignities and took her
necklace, bracelet and wrist watch. They allegedly seized many articles
valued at P27,000 which have remained unaccounted for in the list
submitted by the defendants as the inventory of the items confiscated.
On the basis of these antecedent facts, an information for libel was filed against the
petitioner, Lee Kee Ming and Ng Woo Hay in the Court of First Instance of Rizal. 9 A reading
of the information does not show why the two Chinese were included in the charge; all it
said was that they were the clients of the petitioner. As for the petitioner himself, it was
alleged that he had committed the crime of libel by writing the letter of April 29, 1976
(which was quoted in full) and by causing the publication of the news item in the Bulletin
Today.
The subject of this petition is the order of the respondent judge dated March 23,
1977, 10 denying the motion to quash filed by the petitioner, who had claimed that his
letter to the ASAC Chairman was not actionable because it was a privileged communication;
that the news report in the Bulletin Today was not based on the letter-complaint; and that
in any case it was a fair and true report of a judicial proceeding and therefore also
privileged. 11 His motion for reconsideration having been also denied in the order dated
April 27,1977,12 he now seeks relief from this Court against what he claims as the grave
abuse of discretion committed by the respondent judge in sustaining the information.
It is perhaps indicative of the weakness of the respondents' position that when asked to
comment on the petitioner's motion to quash, the city fiscal never did so during a period of
more than ninety days. 13 It was left to a private prosecutor to enter his own appearance
thereafter, presumably because the fiscal did not seem to be very enthusiastic about the
case, and to file the comment for the private respondents himself 14 Later, when the
petitioner came to this Court and we required a comment from the Solicitor General, this
official complied only after asking for (and getting) twenty-six extensions for a total of nine
months and seven days, and at that the comment was only a half-hearted defense of the
challenged orders. 15Despite the petitioner's effective rebuttal in his reply, the Solicitor
General did not ask for leave to file a rejoinder as if he had lost all taste for combat
notwithstanding the many points raised by the petitioner that had to be refuted.
Perhaps it was just as well. Like a good general, the Solicitor General probably understood
that the battle was lost.
Indeed it was. In fact, it should never have commenced.
From the purely procedural perspective, there is much to fault about the information. The
two Chinese clients who were impleaded with the petitioner were charged with
absolutely nothing, prompting the respondent judge to peremptorily dismiss the
information as to them. 16 Worse, the information imputed to the remaining accused two
different offenses, to wit, writing the allegedly libelous letter and causing the publication of
the allegedly libelous news report. This was not allowed under Rule 110, Section 12, of the
Rules of Court, providing that "a complaint or information must charge but one offense,
except only in those cases in which existing laws prescribe a single punishment for various
offenses." 17 If libelous the letter and the news report constituted separate offenses that
should have been charged in separate informations. (However, not having been raised in
the motion to quash, that ground was deemed waived under Rule 15, Section 8, of the Rules
of Court.) 18
From the viewpoint of substantive law, the charge is even more defective, if not ridiculous.
Any one with an elementary I knowledge of constitutional law and criminal law would have
known that neither the letter nor the news account was libelous.
The applicable provision in the Revised Penal Code reads as follows:
Article 354. Requirement for publicity. Every defamatory imputation is
presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and
justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in the following cases:
1. A private communication made by any person to another in the
performance of any legal, moral or social duty; and
2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without comments or remarks,
of any judicial, legislative or other official proceedings which are not of
confidential nature, or of any statement, report or speech delivered in said
proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the exercise
of their functions.
The letter comes under Item 1 as it was addressed by the petitioner to the ASAC Chairman
to complain against the conduct of his men when they raided the Chinese tourists' rooms in
the Tokyo Hotel. It was sent by the petitioner mainly in his capacity as a lawyer in the
discharge of his legal duty to protect his clients. While his principal purpose was to
vindicate his clients' interests against the abuses committed by the ASAC agents, he could
also invoke his civic duty as a private individual to expose anomalies in the public service.
The complaint was addressed to the official who had authority over them and could impose
the proper disciplinary sanctions. Significantly, as an index of good faith, the letter was sent
privately directly to the addressee, without any fanfare or publicity.
As for the news report, it is difficult to believe that the petitioner, an ordinary citizen
without any known ties to the newspapers, could have by himself caused the publication of
such an explosive item. There is no prima facie showing that, by some kind of influence he
had over the periodical, he succeeded in having it published to defame the ASAC agents. It
does not appear either that the report was paid for like an advertisement. This looks instead
to be the result of the resourcefulness of the newspaper in discovering matters of public
interest for dutiful disclosure to its readers. It should be presumed that the report was
included in the issue as part of the newspaper's coverage of important current events as
selected by its editorial staff.
At any rate, the news item comes under Item 2 of the abovequoted article as it is a true and
fair report of a judicial proceeding, made in good faith and without comments or remarks.
This is also privileged. Moreover, it is not correct to say, as the Solicitor General does, that
Article 354 is not applicable because the complaint reported as filed would not by itself
alone constitute a judicial proceeding even before the issues are joined and trial is begun.
The doctrine he invokes is no longer controlling. The case of Choa Tek Hee v. Philippine
Publishing Co., 19 which he dies, has been superseded by Cuenco v. Cuenco, 20 where the
Court categorically held:
We are firmly convinced that the correct rule on the matter should be that a
fair and true report of a complaint filed in court without remarks nor
comments even before an answer is filed or a decision promulgated should
be covered by the privilege. (Emphasis provided)
It may also be argued that the complaint, standing by itself, is a public record and may be
published as such under Rule 135, Section 2 of the Rules of Court unless the court directs
otherwise in the interest of morality or decency.
It is true that the matters mentioned in Article 354 as exceptions to the general rule are not
absolutely privileged and are still actionable. However, since what is presumed is not malice
but in fact lack of malice, it is for the prosecution to overcome that presumption by proof
that the accused was actually motivated by malice. Absent such proof, the charge must fail.
We are not unmindful of the contention that the information should not be dismissed
outright because the prosecution must first be given a chance to introduce evidence to
overcome the presumption. This is indeed the normal procedure. However, where it
appears from the allegations in the information itself that the accused acted in good faith
and for justifiable ends in making the allegedly libelous imputations, and in pertinent
pleadings, there is no need to prolong the proceedings to the i prejudice of the defendant.
The Court can and should dismiss the charge without further ado, as we held in People v.
Andres: 21
The prosecution claims that the trial court erred in dismissing the case on a
mere motion to quash, contending that the trial judge's conclusion on the
face of the information that defendant- appellee was prompted only by good
motives assumes a fact to be proved, and that the alleged privileged nature
of defendant- appellee's publication is a matter of defense and is not a
proper ground for dismissal of the complaint for libel (Lu Chu Sing, et al. vs.
Lu Tiong Gui 76 Phil. 669).
When in the information itself it appears that the communication alleged to
be libelous is contained in an appropriate pleading in a court proceeding, the
privilege becomes at once apparent and defendant need not wait until the trial
and produce evidence before he can raise the question of privilege. And if,
added to this, the questioned imputations appear to be really pertinent and
relevant to defendant's plea for reconsideration based on complainant's
supposed partiality and abuse of power from which defendant has a right to
seek relief in vindication of his client's interest as a litigant in complainant's
court, it would become evident that the facts thus alleged in the information
would not constitute an offense of libel.
As has already been said by this Court: As to the degree of relevancy or
pertinency necessary to make alleged defamatory matter privileged, the
courts are inclined to be liberal. The matter to which the privilege does not
extend must be so palpably wanting in relation to the subject matter of the
controversy that no reasonable man can doubt its irrelevancy and
impropriety. Having this in mind, it can not be said that the trial court
committed a reversible error in this case of finding that the allegations in the
information itself present a case of an absolutely privileged communication
justifying the dismissal of the case.
The two exceptions provided for under Article 354 are based on the wider guarantee of
freedom of expression as an institution of all republican societies. This in turn is predicated
on the proposition that the ordinary citizen has a right and a duty to involve himself in
matters that affect the public welfare and, for this purpose, to inform himself of such
matters.
The vitality of republicanism derives from an alert citizenry that is always ready to
participate in the discussion and resolution of public issues. These issues include the
conduct of government functionaries who are accountable to the people in the performance
of their assigned powers, which after all come from the people themselves. Ever citizen has
a right to expect from all public servants utmost fidelity to the trust reposed in them and the
maximum of efficiency and integrity in the discharge of their functions. Every citizen has a
right to complain and criticize if this hope is betrayed.
It is no less important to observe that this vigilance is not only a right but a responsibility of
the highest order that should not be shirked for fear of official reprisal or because of mere
civic lethargy. Whenever the citizen discovers official anomaly, it is his duty to expose and
denounce it, that the culprits may be punished and the public service cleansed even as the
rights violated are vindicated or redressed. It can never be overstressed that indifference to
ineptness will breed more ineptness and that toleration of corruption will breed more
corruption. The sins of the public service are imputable not only to those who actually
commit them but also to those who by their silence or inaction permit and encourage their
commission.
The responsibility to review the conduct of the government functionaries is especially
addressed to the lawyer because his training enables him, better than most citizens, to
determine if the law has been violated or irregularities have been committed, and to take
the needed steps to remedy the wrong and punish the guilty.
The respondents contend that the letter was written by the petitioner to influence the
seizure proceedings which were then pending. Even assuming that to be true, such purpose
did not necessarily make the letter malicious, especially if it is considered that the
complaint against the ASAC agents could not be raised in the said proceedings. The ASAC
Chairman, not the Collector of Customs, had jurisdiction to discipline the agents.
It should also be noted, as further evidence of lack of malice, that even after the seizure
proceedings had been concluded in favor of the petitioner's clients, he pursued their
complaint against the ASAC agents in the fiscal's office in Manila and then with the military
authorities in Camp Aguinaldo, ending with the filing of the civil case for damages in the
court of first instance of Manila.
It would be a sad day indeed if for denouncing venality in government, the citizen could be
called to task and be himself punished on the ground of malicious defamation. If every
accuser were himself to be accused for discharging his duty as he sees it, then will the
wrong-doer have been granted in effect, and by this Court no less, an undeserved immunity
for his misdeeds or omissions. The private individual would be barred from complaining
about public misconduct. Every criticism he makes would be tainted with malice and
pronounced as criminal. The next step may well be a conspiracy among those in the
government to cover up each other's faults and to insulate themselves from the legitimate
efforts of the people to question their conduct.
The second exception is justified under the right of every citizen to be informed on matters
of public interest, which, significantly, was first recognized in the 1973 Constitution. Even if
it were not, the right would still be embraced in the broader safeguard of freedom of
expression, for the simple reason that the right to speak intelligently on "matters that touch
the existing order" necessarily imports the availability of adequate official information on
such matters. Surely, the exercise of such right cannot inspire belief if based only on
conjectures and rumors and half-truths because direct access to the facts is not allowed to
the ordinary citizen.
This right is now effectively enjoyed with the help of the mass media, which have
fortunately resumed their roles as an independent conduit of information between the
government and the people. It is the recognized duty of the media to report to the public
what is going on in the government, including the proceedings in any of its departments or
agencies, save only in exceptional cases involving decency or confidentiality when
disclosure may be prohibited.To protect them in the discharge of this mission, the law says
that as long as the account is a fair and true report of such proceedings, and made without
any remarks or comment, it is considered privileged and malice is not presumed. Its
publication is encouraged rather than suppressed or punished.
This is one reason why the Court looks with disapproval on censorship in general as an
unconstitutional abridgment of freedom of expression, Censorship presumes malice at the
outset, It prevents inquiry into public affairs and curtails their disclosure and discussion,
leaving the people in the dark as to what is happening in the public service. By locking the
public portals to the citizen, who can only guess at the goings on in the forbidden precints,
censorship separates the people from their government. This certainly should not be
permitted. "A free press stands as one of the great interpreters between the government
and the people," declared Justice Sutherland of the U.S. Supreme Court. "To allow it to be
fettered is to fetter ourselves."
It is curious that the ones most obviously responsible for the publication of the allegedly
offensive news report, namely, the editorial staff and the periodical itself, were not at all
impleaded. The charge was leveled against the petitioner and, "curiouser" still, his clients
who had nothing to do with the editorial policies of the newspaper. There is here a manifest
effort to persecute and intimidate the petitioner for his temerity in accusing the ASAC
agents who apparently enjoyed special privileges and perhaps also immunities during
those oppressive times. The non-inclusion of the periodicals was a transparent hypocrisy,
an ostensibly pious if not at all convincing pretense of respect for freedom of expression
that was in fact one of the most desecrated liberties during the past despotism.
We are convinced that the information against the petitioner should never have been filed
at all and that the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the
motion to quash the information on the ground that the allegation petitions therein did not
constitute an offense. The petitioner is entitled to the relief he seeks from those who in the
guise of law and through the instrumentality of the trial court would impose upon him this
warrant tyranny.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED. The orders of the respondent judge dated March
23, 1977, and April 27, 1977, are SET ASIDE and Criminal Case No. Q-7045, in his court, is
DISMISSED. Costs against the respondents.
SO ORDERED.

TEEHANKEE JR.vs. MADAYAG
March 6, 1992

FACTS: Here, Claudio Teehankee, Jr. was originally charged for the crime of frustrated
murder for shooting Hultman who was comatosed some time. In the course of the trial,
Hultman died. The prosecution sought to change the information from frustrated murder to
consummated murder. Teehankee Jr. questioned the new charge for lack of preliminary
investigation thereon .

There are three (3) questions to be answered here:

ISSUE #1: Was there an amend ment of the information or substitut ion when the
information was changed from frustrated murder to consummated murder?

HELD: There is an amendment. There is an identity of offenses charged in both the original
and the amended information [murder pa rin!]. What is involved here is not a variance of
the nature of different offenses charge, but only a change in the stage of execution of the
same offense from frustrated to consummated murder. This being the case, we hold that an
amendment of the original information will suffice and, consequent thereto, the filing of the
amended information for murder is proper.

ISSUE #2: What kind of amendment? Formal or substantial?

HELD: Formal. An objective appraisal of the amended information for murder filed against
herein petitioner will readily show that the nature of the offense originally charged was not
actually changed. Instead, an additional allegation, that is, the supervening fact of the death
of the victim was merely supplied to aid the trial court in determining the proper penalty
for the crime. That the accused committed a felonious act with intent to kill the victim
continues to be the prosecution's theory. There is no question that whatever defense herein
petitioner may adduce under the original information for frustrated murder equally applies
to the amended information for murder. So halimbawa sabihin ng prosecutor: You shot
Hultman who almost died. Teehankee Jr.:W ala man ako dun ba! I was at home asleep!
Alibi ang defense niya ba. Now, namatay si Hultman. Ano man ang depensa mo? Mao man
gihapon: Wala man ako dun! The accused is not prejudiced since the same defense is still
available to him.

SSUE #3: Is there a need of a preliminary investigation on the new charge?

HELD: No need because you have not changed the crime. If you change the crime or when
there is substitution, kailangan ng preliminary investigation. Since it is only a formal
amendment, preliminary investigation is not necessary. The amended information could
not conceivably have come as a surprise to petitioner for the simple and obvious reason
that it charges essentially the same offense as that charged under the original information.
Furthermore, as we have heretofore held, if the crime originally charged is related to the
amended charge such that an inquiry into one would elicit substantially the same facts that
an inquiry into the other would reveal, a new preliminary investigation is not necessary.

Nota Bene: A substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts constituting the offense
charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are merely of
form. Thus, the following have been held to be merely formal amendments, viz: (1) new
allegations which relate only to the range of the penalty that the court might impose in the
event of conviction; (2) an amendment which does not charge another offense different or
distinct from that charged in the original one; (3) additional allegations which do not alter
the prosecution's theory of the case so as to cause surprise to the accused and affect the
form of defense he has or will assume; and (4) an amendment which does not adversely
affect any substantial right of the accused, such as his right to invoke prescription.

PEOPLE v CASEY and FELIX
103 SCRA 21
GUERRERO; February 24, 1981

NATURE
Automatic review of the judgment of the Circuit Criminal Court imposing upon Casey and
Felix the capital c\punishment for the death of Alfredo Valdez.

FACTS
- On May 22, 1968, Assistant Fiscal Herminio I. Benito filed an Information for Murder
against accused-appellant Joseph Casey alias "Burl", alleging:
That on or about the 31st day of March, 1968, in the municipality of San Juan, province
of Rizal, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above- named
accused, being then armed with a knife, together with one Ricardo Felix alias "Carding
Tuwad" who is then armed with a firearm and who was (sic) still at large, and the two of
them conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping and aiding one
another, with intent to kill, evident premeditation and treachery and taking advantage
of superior strength, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and shoot and stab with the said firearm and knife one Alfredo Valdez, thereby
inflicting upon the latter fatal wounds which directly caused his death.
- In June, 1968, upon arraignment, Casey pleaded not guilty to the crime charged in the said
complaint.
- September, 1968, accused ' appellant Ricardo Felix alias "Carding Tuwad" was arrested.
Accordingly, an Amended Information was filed by the same fiscal to include Ricardo Felix
as an accused, stating:
That on or about the 31st day of March, 1968, in the municipality of San Juan, province
of Rizal, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named
accused Joseph Casey alias "Burl" being then armed with a knife, together with the
accused Ricardo Felix alias "Carding Tuwad" who was then armed with a firearm, and the
two of them conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping and aiding one
another, with intent to kill, evident premeditation and treachery and taking advantage
of superior strength, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and shoot and stab with the said firearm and knife one Alfredo Valdez, thereby
inflicting upon the latter fatal wounds which directly
- The court a quo rendered the aforementioned judgment of conviction. It found that two
aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the crime, namely: employing or
taking advantage of superior strength and evident premeditation, one of which qualified the
killing to murder.

ISSUES
1. WON the Court a quo erred in illegally trying appellant Casey on the amended
information without arraignment
2. WON the Court a quo erred in holding that appellants acted with evident premeditation
and abuse o of superior strength, and in qualifying the crime committed as aggravated
murder
3. WON whether or not there is conspiracy between the two accused in the commission of
the crime
4. WON the Court erred in discounting Caseys defense that he acted in legitimate self-
defense

HELD
1. NO
Reasoning
- The lack of arraignment under the amended information is objected to by accused-
appellant Joseph Casey allegedly on the ground that there is a violation of his constitutional
right to be informed of the charge against him. There can be a violation of such right,
however, only when the amendment pertains to matters of substance. In the case at bar, the
alterations introduced in the information refer to the inclusion of accused appellant Ricardo
Felix to the same charge of murder. They do not change the nature of the crime against
accused-appellant Casey. Conspiracy, evident premeditation, treachery and taking
advantage of superior strength are similarly alleged in both informations. No extenuating
circumstance is likewise alleged in both. Thus the amendment of the information as far as
accused-appellant Casey is concerned is one of form and not of substance as it is not
prejudicial to his rights.
- The test as to whether a defendant is prejudiced by the amendment of an information has
been said to be whether a defense under the information as it originally stood would be
available after the amendment is made, and whether any evidence defendant might have
would be equally applicable to the information in the one form as in the other. A look into
Our jurisprudence on the matter shows that an amendment to an information introduced
after the accused has pleaded not guilty thereto, which does not change the nature of the
crime alleged therein, does not expose the accused to a charge which could call for a higher
penalty, does not affect the essence of the offense or cause surprise or deprive the accused
of an opportunity to meet the new averment had each been held to be one of form and not
of substance not prejudicial to the accused and, therefore, not prohibited by Section 13,
Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court.

2. YES
Reasoning
- Indeed, accused-appellant Joseph Casey gave an extrajudicial sworn statement that he met
accused-appellant Ricardo Felix and another person named Rudy in Cubao, Quezon City on
that fateful day. However, there is no showing that this meeting was purposely arranged to
plan the killing of the victim. In fact, the following questions and answers in the said sworn
statement show that there was no preconceived design to kill the victim.
- There is evident premeditation when the killing had been carefully planned by the
offender or when he had previously prepared the means which he had considered adequate
to carry it out, when he had prepared beforehand the means suitable for carrying it into
execution, when he has had sufficient time to consider and accept the final consequences,
and when there had been a concerted plan.
16
It has also been held that to appreciate the
circumstances of evident premeditation, it is necessary to establish the following; (1) the
time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (2) the act manifestly indicating
that the culprit has clung to his determination; and (3) a sufficient lapse of time between the
determination and execution to snow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act and to
allow his conscience to overcome the resolution of his will had he desired to hearken to its
warning.
- From the answers of accused-appellant Casey in said sworn statement, it can be gleaned
that the killing was not a preconceived plan. It was not preceded by any reflection or deep
thought. It was just a spontaneous decision reached when the victim started to run away
upon being approached by accused-appellant Ricardo Felix.
- There are indeed two accused-appellants in this case charged with the murder of not one
victim but superiority in number does not necessarily mean superiority in strength. It is
necessary to show that the aggressors "cooperated in such a way as to secure advantage
from their superiority in strength."
3. YES
Reasoning
- Although there is no direct showing that the accused had conspired together, but their acts
and the attendant circumstances disclose that common motive that would make accused
Ricardo Felix as a co-principal with the actual slayer, Joseph Casey. Without doubt, he
performed overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy.
- Ricardo Felix's overt acts consist in instigating the pursuit of the deceased, in firing a shot
at him and in giving Joseph Casey encouragement by his armed presence while the latter
inflicted the fatal wounds on the deceased. From the extrajudicial confession of the accused-
appellant Joseph Casey, it can also be inferred that Ricardo Felix was the moving factor of
the evil act perpetrated by the former against the victim. While it was Joseph Casey who
inflicted the mortal wounds that caused the death of the victim, he did so out of his
perverted sense of friendship or companionship with Ricardo Felix.
4. YES
Reasoning
- claim is uncorroborated and contrary to the testimony of the eyewitness, Mercedes
Palomo.
- The fact that the victim sustained four stab wounds while the accused complained merely
of abrasions on his back indicates the falsity of the claim.
Dispositive the judgment of the trial court under automatic review is MODIFIED in that the
accused-appellants Joseph Casey and Ricardo Felix are found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of homicide without any attending circumstances and should be
sentenced to reclusion temporal in its medium period. But applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, each of the accused is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of ten years of
prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen years and four months of reclusion temporal, as
maximum. The accused are likewise sentenced to indemnify the heirs of the deceased
Alfredo Valdez in the amount of TWELVE THOUSAND PESOS jointly and severally, and to
pay the costs.


112

GO v CA (PELAYO)
206 SCRA 138
FELICIANO; February 11, 1992

NATURE
Petition for review on certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals

FACTS
- July 2, 1991 Eldon Maguan entered a one-way street (Wilson St.) from the opposite
direction (counterflow), heading towards P. Guevarra St. In so doing, he nearly collided
with the car of accused Rolito Go. Go got out of his car and shot Maguan.
- A security guard of a nearby bake shop witnessed the event and was able to note the plate
number of the petitioner. The car was eventually traced to an Elisa Ang Go, wife of the
accused.
- The police were informed that the petitioner had a meal at the bake shop where his credit
card was used to pay for the transaction. Police were able to identify the card owner as the
accused Go and when his picture was shown to the security guard who positively identified
him as the supposed assailant. Police then launched a manhunt for Go.
- July 8, 1991 Go presented himself in the San Juan police station with his two lawyers in
tow to verify reports that he was being hunted down by the police.
1. The police detained Go and a COMPLAINT for FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE was filed
against him.
2. Asst. Prov. Prosecutor Villa Ignacio informed Go, in the presence of his lawyers, of his
right to avail of preliminary investigation but in so doing, Go had to waive the provisions
in Art. 125, RPC. Go refused.
- July 9, 1991 Maguan died as a result of his gunshot wounds before an INFORMATION
could be filed.
- July 11, 1991:
3. The prosecutor filed an INFORMATION for murder, instead of an information for
frustrated homicide. The prosecutor stated that no preliminary investigation was
conducted because Go refused to waive provisions of Art. 125, RPC.
4. Gos counsel filed an OMNIBUS MOTION FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE AND PROPER
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION with the allegations that an illegal warrantless arrest had
been effected and that no preliminary investigation had been conducted and prayed that
Go be released on bail.
- July 12, 1991:
5. Go filed an urgent EX-PARTE MOTION FOR SPECIAL RAFFLE in order to expedite action
on the bail recommendation. The cash bond was approved and Go was released from jail.
- July 16, 1991:
6. Prosecutor filed a MOTION FOR LEAVE TO CONDUCT PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION
and prayed that the court proceedings be suspended momentarily.
7. The trial court granted LEAVE to conduct preliminary investigation and cancelled the
arraignment scheduled on August 15, 1991.
- July 19, 1991:
8. Go contended through a PETITION FOR CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION AND MANDAMUS
that the information was null and void because no preliminary investigation had been
conducted.
- July 23, 1991 Go surrendered to the police and the judge set the arraignment on August
23.
- August 23, 1991:
9. Respondent judge issued a commitment order for Go. Upon arraignment, a plea of not
guilty was entered because Go refused to enter a plea.
10. Go filed a PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS and the CA issued the writ. The petition for
habeas corpus was consolidated with the petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus.
- September 19, 1991 The trial started and the prosecution presented its first witness.
This was followed by three more witnesses on October 3, 1991.
- September 23, 1991 The CA dismissed the petition for habeas corpus and the petition for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus on the following grounds, among others:
a) Validity of the warrantless arrest because the crime had been freshly committed. He
was positively identified by the witness and his identity had been established when he
came to the police station.
b) Waiver of the right to preliminary investigation when he did not invoke it properly and
waiver of any irregularity in his arrest when accused posted bail.
c) Validity of the information against the accused precluded the grant of the petition for
habeas corpus
Petitioners Claim: Go contends that the crime had not been just committed because of
the 6-day disparity.
- None of the police officers who arrested him had any personal knowledge of the crime.
Respondents Comments: Go had been validly arrested because the crime had been
committed 6 days before he was arrested.
- Invoking Umali vs. Ramos where the Court upheld that a warrantless arrest was valid 14
days after the crime was committed.
- The prosecutor proceeded under the erroneous supposition that Section 7 of Rule 112 was
applicable and required petitioner to waive the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised
Penal Code as a condition for carrying out a preliminary investigation. Go was entitled to a
preliminary investigation and that right should have been accorded him without any
conditions.

ISSUES
1. WON the warrantless arrest was lawful
2. WON the accused Go had waived his right to preliminary investigation

HELD
1. NO, the warrantless arrest was not lawful
Ratio Rule 112, Sec. 7 states that a complaint for information can be filed sans preliminary
investigation when a person has been lawfully arrested without a warrant except than an
affidavit should be executed by the person who was responsible for the arrest. But the
person arrested can ask for preliminary investigation by the proper officer before the
complaint or information can be filed. In this case, the person arrested must waive the
provisions of A125, RPC with the assistance of counsel (a lawyer or another person of his
choice if a lawyer is not available). He may also apply for bail despite the waiver and the
investigation must terminate within 15 days.
Reasoning
- Umil vs. Ramos only applies to continuing crimes so it does not apply in the case at bar.
Murder is not a continuing crime because it happens in one place at a particular point in
time and ends there as well.
- The warrantless arrest does not follow the requisites in Rule 113, Sec. 5 because:
>The arrest took place 6 days after Maguan was shot whereas the RoC provide that the
crime should have been just committed, is about to be committed or is being committed.
>None of the arresting officers had personal knowledge of the facts indicating that Go was
the gunman as required in the RoC. The information that the police had was derived from
eyewitness accounts.
- When Go walked into the police station 6 days after Maguan was shot, he did not
surrender (so as not to imply that he committed the crime) nor was he arrested but he
placed himself in the disposal of the police authorities.
2. NO, Go had not waived his right to preliminary investigation.
Ratio The rule is that the right to preliminary investigation is waived when the accused fails
to invoke it before or at the time of entering a plea at arraignment.
Reasoning
- The right to have a preliminary investigation conducted before being bound over to trial
for a criminal offense and hence formally at risk of incarceration or some other penalty, is
not a mere formal or technical right; it is a substantive right.
- The nature of the crime demanded that a preliminary investigation be conducted. Go did
ask for a preliminary investigation from the start. On the day the information for murder
was filed, he also filed an OMNIBUS MOTION for IMMEDIATE RELEASE and PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION. The Court is not ready to ignore that act by Go and consider it as a waiver
based simply on the contention of the SolGen that the motion should have been filed with
the trial court and not the prosecutor.
- According to Crespo vs. Mogul: The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for
the purpose of determining whether a prima facie case exists warranting the prosecution of
the accused is terminated upon the filing of the information in the proper court. Should the
fiscal find it proper to conduct a reinvestigation of the case, at such stage, the permission of
the Court must be secured. After such reinvestigation the finding and recommendations of
the fiscal should be submitted to the Court for appropriate action.
- However, in the case at bar, Gos omnibus motion asked for a PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION not REINVESTIGATION as discussed in Crespo vs. Mogul. The Prosecutor
also filed a MOTION for LEAVE TO CONDUCT PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION so the
omnibus motion of Go was, in effect, filed in the trial court. Go did ask for a preliminary
investigation on the very day that the information was filed without such preliminary
investigation, and that the trial court was 5 days later apprised of the desire of the
petitioner for such preliminary investigation.
- There was no waiver of the right to preliminary investigation because Go had vigorously
insisted on his right to preliminary investigation before his arraignment. At the time of his
arraignment, petitioner was already before the Court of Appeals on certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus precisely asking for a preliminary investigation before being forced to stand
trial.
- Gos act of posting bail cannot be deemed to be a waiver of his right to preliminary
investigation. Go asked for release on recognizance or on bail and for preliminary
investigation in one omnibus motion. He had thus claimed his right to preliminary
investigation before respondent Judge approved the cash bond posted by petitioner and
ordered his release.
Obiter
- However, contrary to petitioner's contention, the failure to accord preliminary
investigation, while constituting a denial of the appropriate and full measure of the
statutory process of criminal justice, did not impair the validity of the information for
murder nor affect the jurisdiction of the trial court.
- In the case at bar, a trial for merits had already commenced and the prosecution had
already presented 4 witnesses.
> This, however, still entitles the accused to preliminary investigation. Trial on the merits
should be suspended or held in abeyance and a preliminary investigation should accorded
to petitioner, even if eventually, the prosecutor may or may not find probable cause. The
point is that Go was not accorded his proper rights.
> As for bail, Go is still entitled to be released on bail as a matter of right. Should the
evidence against the accused be strong, the bail can then be cancelled.
> To hold that the rights of Go were obliterated by the presentation of evidence in the
proceedings in the trial court would be to legitimize the deprivation of due process.
Dispositive ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to GRANT the Petition for Review on
Certiorari. The Order of the trial court dated 17 July 1991 is hereby SET ASIDE and
NULLIFIED, and the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 23 September 1991 hereby
REVERSED.
- The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor is hereby ORDERED to conduct forthwith a
preliminary investigation of the charge of murder against petitioner Go, and to complete
such preliminary investigation within a period of fifteen (15) days from commencement
thereof. The trial on the merits of the criminal case in the Regional Trial Court shall be
SUSPENDED to await the conclusion of the preliminary investigation.
- Meantime, petitioner is hereby ORDERED released forthwith upon posting of a cash bail
bond of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00). This release shall be without
prejudice to issue, should the any lawful order that the trial court Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor move for cancellation of all at the conclusion of the preliminary investigation.

SEPARATE OPINION

CRUZ [concurring]
- There was no waiver of the right to preliminary investigation even if Go freely participated
in his trial and his counsel even cross-examined the prosecution witnesses.
- Go had from the start demanded a preliminary investigation and that his counsel had
reluctantly participated in the trial only because the court threatened to replace him with a
counsel de oficio if he did not. The petitioner was virtually compelled to go to trial. Such
compulsion and the unjustified denial of a clear statutory right of the petitioner vitiated the
proceedings as violative of procedural due process.
- It appears that the trial court has been moved by a desire to cater to public opinion to the
detriment of the impartial administration of justice. The petitioner as portrayed by the
media is not exactly a popular person. Nevertheless, the trial court should not have been
influenced by this irrelevant consideration, remembering instead that its only guide was the
mandate of the law.

GUTIERREZ [concurring]
- The need for a trial court to follow the Rules and to be fair, impartial, and persistent in
getting the true facts of a case is present in all cases but it is particularly important if the
accused is indigent; more so, if he is one of those unfortunates who seem to spend more
time behind bars than outside.

GRIO-AQUINO [dissenting]
- After 4 witnesses have already testified, among them an eyewitness who identified the
accused as the gunman and a security guard who identified the plate number of the
gunman's car, there is no need to conduct a preliminary investigation the sole purpose of
which would be to ascertain if there is sufficient ground to believe that a crime was
committed (which the petitioner does not dispute) and that he (the petitioner) is probably
guilty thereof (which the prosecutor, by filing the information against him, presumably
believed to be so).
- This case did not suffer from a lack of previous investigation. Diligent police work, with
ample media coverage, led to the identification of the suspect who, 7 days after the shooting,
appeared at the San Juan police station to verify news reports that he was the object of a
police manhunt. There witnesses identified him to be the assailant.
- It should be remembered that as important as is the right of the accused to a preliminary
investigation, it is not a constitutional right. Its absence is not a ground to quash the
information. It does not affect the court's jurisdiction, nor impair the validity of the
information, nor constitute an infringement of the right of the accused to confront
witnesses.
- The petitioner's motion for a preliminary investigation is not more important than his
application for release on bail, just as the conduct of such preliminary investigation is not
more important than the hearing of the application for bail. The court's hearing of the
application for bail should not be subordinated to the preliminary investigation of the
charge. The hearing should not be suspended, but should be allowed to proceed because the
parties will have an opportunity to show not only: (a) whether or not there is probable
cause to believe that the petitioner killed Eldon Maguan, but more importantly (b) whether
or not the evidence of his guilt is strong. The judge's determination that the evidence of his
guilt is strong would naturally foreclose the need for a preliminary investigation to
ascertain the probability of his guilt.
- Go was indeed arrested by the police. Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order
that he may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense. An arrest is made by an
actual restraint of the person to be arrested, or by his submission to the custody of the
person making the arrest


FILADAMS PHARMA, INC., petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and
ANTONIO FERIA, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
CORONA, J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to annul and
set aside the resolution
[1]
dated May 29, 1997 of the Court of Appeals denying petitioner's
petition for certiorari and its resolution
[2]
dated January 23, 1998 denying petitioner's
motion for reconsideration.
The antecedent facts follow.
Petitioner Filadams Pharma, Inc. (Filadams) was a corporation engaged in the business
of selling medicines to wholesalers. Private respondent Antonio Feria was its sales
representative from November 3, 1993 until his dismissal on March 9, 1994. In an audit
conducted sometime between March 10 to 26, 1994, respondent Feria was found
accountable for P41,733.01 representing unsold but unreturned stocks and samples,
unremitted collections and unliquidated cash advances. Filadams alleged that these
shortages and accountabilities were admitted by respondent through his wife and counsel
in a conference held at its office but despite repeated demands, respondent failed to settle
them to its damage and prejudice.
[3]

In his defense, respondent denied the charge. He averred that, although he was an
agent of the corporation, he was not the trustee of its products. The cash advances were
spent, as intended, for promoting the products of the company and it was only the
unexpended amount that was supposed to be returned by way of liquidation. The cash
rebates were properly given to the customers concerned although the same were given in
kind, as requested by the customers. In a spot check conducted in his area in January and
February of 1994, the stock overages in his possession were segregated and returned to the
company but he was not given the returned goods slip (RGS). He also returned various
items or medicines on March 14, 1994 amounting to P19,615.49 but what was reflected in
the inventory report was only P8,185.30. He maintained that he neither misappropriated
nor converted the subject sums of money for his personal use or benefit. If ever, his
obligation was purely civil in nature and the company in fact accepted his partial payment
of P3,000 through his wife in a conference held at petitioners office on September 13,
1994.
[4]

In a reply-affidavit, the internal auditor of Filadams asserted that respondent occupied
a position of trust and confidence. He was not given a new cash advance but merely a
replenishment of the used revolving fund. The cash rebates were never received by the
customer as confirmed by the customer himself.
Respondent signed the physical inventory report so he could not claim that he made
returns that were not recorded. Paying back the amount of P3,000 to the company was an
acknowledgment of his stock shortages and proof of his breach of trust and confidence
resulting in the company's damage and prejudice.
[5]

The Assistant City Prosecutor of Quezon City dismissed the complaint-affidavit for lack
of cause of action:
A careful examination of the affidavit complaint plus the reply affidavit of complainant
failed to state the ultimate facts constituting the cause of action.
While complainant states that their audit resulted in Feria's misappropriation of the
company's products, unremitted collections, unreturned advances and unsubmitted sales
proceeds in the total amount of P41,733.01, the specifics of the misappropriation, (i.e.,
[ineligible]. . . when committed, where committed, how much per act of misappropriation or
was the misappropriation a one-act deal[ineligible]) were all conclusions a general
recitals (sic) of the fact of commission/omission followed by the personal conclusion of guilt
by the complainant which are not sustained by admissible evidence.
[6]

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but this was denied by 1
st
Assistant City
Prosecutor Gerona who ruled that there was no manifest error or grave abuse of discretion
to justify reversal, alteration or modification of the challenged resolution.
[7]

Petitioner appealed to the Secretary of Justice under the 1993 Revised Rules on
Appeals from Resolutions in Preliminary Investigations or Reinvestigations.
[8]

But the Department of Justice (DOJ), through the Office of the Chief State
Prosecutor,
[9]
also dismissed the appeal:
While it is an undisputed fact that respondent incurred some accountabilities with Filadams
during the duration of his employment, as shown by respondent's payment of the amount
of P3,000.00 on September 13, 1994, mere acknowledgment by respondent of these
accountabilities does not of itself establish that estafa under par. 1 (b) was committed. What
is apparent from the evidence adduced is the necessity for the parties to sit down together
and make an accounting of the alleged accountability. Complainant failed to present any
evidence of conversion of the property to the benefit of the respondent or of some other
person. Respondent's failure to return the goods or cash advances in this case is not
sufficient proof of conversion. If at all, respondent's liability to the company is purely civil in
nature as the acts complained of do not constitute the crime of estafa.
[10]

On the ground of grave abuse of discretion, Filadams filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to annul the above-quoted
decision of the DOJ dismissing its appeal and affirming the resolution of the Assistant City
Prosecutor of Quezon City. The Court of Appeals denied the petition on two grounds: (1)
the proper remedy for the petitioner was a petition for review under Rule 45 and not a
petition for certiorari inasmuch as certiorari was available only if there was no appeal or
any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, and (2) assuming that
a petition for certiorari was proper, the DOJ decision was not marked by grave abuse of
discretion.
[11]

Hence, the petitioner filed the instant petition seeking to annul the decision of the
Court of Appeals and raising the following issues:
I
WHETHER OR NOT APPEAL AND NOT CERTIORARI IS THE PROPER REMEDY
IN ASSAILING THE TWO RESOLUTIONS OF THE CHIEF STATE PROSECUTOR
FINDING THE ABSENCE OF PROBABLE CAUSE.
II
WHETHER OR NOT BOTH THE CHIEF STATE PROSECUTOR AND THE COURT
OF APPEALS HAVE COMMITTED A (SIC) GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
DISREGARDING THE GUIDELINES SET BY THIS HON. SUPREME COURT IN
DETERMINING THE EXISTENCE OF A PROBABLE CAUSE TO WARRANT THE
FILING OF AN INFORMATION IN COURT.
[12]

Before anything else, we need to clarify some ground rules. This case was elevated to
the Court of Appeals by way of a petition on certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari on the ground
that the proper remedy was petition for review under Revised Circular No. 1-91, now
embodied in Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 43 applies to appeals from
judgments or final orders of the Court of Tax Appeals and from awards, judgments, final
orders or resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of quasi-
judicial functions to the Court of Appeals.
[13]
The question is: was the Office of the
Prosecutor of Quezon City a quasi-judicial agency whose resolutions were appealable to the
Court of Appeals under Rule 43? In Bautista vs. Court of Appeals,
[14]
we ruled:
Petitioner submits that a prosecutor conducting a preliminary investigation performs a
quasi-judicial function, citing Cojuangco v. PCGG, Koh v. Court of Appeals, Andaya v. Provincial
Fiscal of Surigao del Norte and Crespo v. Mogul. In these cases this Court held that the power
to conduct preliminary investigation is quasi-judicial in nature. But this statement holds
true only in the sense that, like quasi-judicial bodies, the prosecutor is an office in the
executive department exercising powers akin to those of a court. Here is where the
similarity ends.
A closer scrutiny will show that preliminary investigation is very different from other quasi-
judicial proceedings. A quasi-judicial body has been defined as "an organ of government
other than a court and other than a legislature which affects the rights of private parties
through either adjudication or rule-making."
In Luzon Development Bank v. Luzon Development Bank Employees, we held that a voluntary
arbitrator, whether acting solely or in a panel, enjoys in law the status of a quasi-judicial
agency, hence his decisions and awards are appealable to the Court of Appeals. This is so
because the awards of voluntary arbitrators become final and executory upon the lapse of
the period to appeal; and since their awards determine the rights of parties, their decisions
have the same effect as judgments of a court. Therefore, the proper remedy from an award
of a voluntary arbitrator is a petition for review to the Court of Appeals, following Revised
Administrative Circular No. 1-95, which provided for a uniform procedure for appellate
review of all adjudications of quasi-judicial entities, which is now embodied in Rule 43 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
On the other hand, the prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does not determine the
guilt or innocence of the accused. He does not exercise adjudication nor rule-making
functions. Preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and is often the only means of
discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime and to enable the
fiscal to prepare his complaint or information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and
has no purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been committed and
whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof. While the fiscal
makes that determination, he cannot be said to be acting as a quasi-court, for it is the courts,
ultimately, that pass judgment on the accused, not the fiscal.
Hence, the Office of the Prosecutor is not a quasi-judicial body; necessarily, its decisions
approving the filing of a criminal complaint are not appealable to the Court of Appeals
under Rule 43. Since the ORSP (Office of the Regional State Prosecutor) has the power to
resolve appeals with finality only where the penalty prescribed for the offense does not
exceed prision correccional, regardless of the imposable fine, the only remedy of
petitioner, in the absence of grave abuse of discretion, is to present her defense in the trial of
the case.
With our ruling in Bautista that the Office of the Prosecutor was not covered by the
appellate process under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, what then was petitioner's remedy
from the resolution of the Assistant Prosecutor dismissing his complaint? Based on the
1993 Revised Rules on Appeals from Resolutions in Preliminary Investigations or
Reinvestigations now the 2000 NPS
[15]
Rule on Appeals the petitioner could appeal to
the Secretary of Justice. In this case, the petitioner did appeal to the Secretary of Justice but
his appeal was dismissed. His motion for reconsideration was also dismissed. Since there
was no more appeal or other remedy available in the ordinary course of law, the petitioner
correctly filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals on the ground of grave
abuse of discretion.
The next question now arises: was the Court of Appeals correct in dismissing the
petition for certiorari on the ground that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the DOJ (in dismissing the petitioner's appeal, thus affirming the resolution of the
Assistant City Prosecutor)? The Court of Appeals cryptic ruling on this matter read:
His ruling that "in the crime of estafa under Art. 315 par. 1 (b), it is an essential element that
there be proof of misappropriation or conversion", is not inconsistent with the ruling of the
Supreme Court in Ilagan vs. Court of Appeals, 239 SCRA 575, on which petitioner relies that
the operative act in the perpetration of estafa under the said article and paragraph is the
failure of the agent to turn over or deliver to his principal the amounts he collected despite
the duty to do so.
[16]

To determine whether there was probable cause warranting the filing of the
information for estafa through misappropriation or with abuse of confidence
[17]
, the
presence of the following elements assumes critical importance:
1. that money, goods, or other personal property is received by the offender in
trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation
involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return, the same;
2. that there is a misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by
the offender or denial on his part of such receipt;
3. that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of
another; and,
4. that there is a demand made by the offended party on the offender.
[18]

The first, third and fourth elements were duly established by the complaint-affidavits
and were not disputed by the parties. What was disputed was whether the element of
misappropriation, the most important element of the crime charged, was shown by the
affidavits to engender a well-founded belief that a crime was committed and the respondent
was probably guilty thereof.
[19]
Invoking Ilagan vs. Court of Appeals,
[20]
petitioner contends
that it is the mere failure to turn over or to deliver to the principal the amounts collected,
despite the duty to do so, that constitutes the operative fact in the crime of estafa through
unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence. In short, the mere failure of respondent Feria to turn
over the stock shortages, money collections, cash advances and unused cash rebates,
despite demand and the duty to do so, constituted prima facie evidence of misappropriation.
The essence of estafa under Article 315 (1)(b) of the Revised Penal Code is the
appropriation or conversion of money or property received, to the prejudice of the owner
thereof. It takes place when a person actually appropriates the property of another for his
own benefit, use and enjoyment. The failure to account, upon demand, for funds or property
held in trust is circumstantial evidence of misappropriation.
[21]
For example, in an agency
for the sale of jewelry, it is the agent's duty to return the jewelry upon demand of the owner
and the failure to do so is evidence of conversion of the property by the agent.
[22]
In other
words, the demand for the return of the thing delivered in trust and the failure of the
accused to account for it are circumstantial evidence of misappropriation. However, this
presumption is rebuttable. If the accused is able to satisfactorily explain his failure to
produce the thing delivered in trust, he may not be held liable for estafa.
[23]

Did private respondent Feria satisfactorily explain his failure to produce the goods
delivered to him in trust as well as turn over his collections upon demand by the petitioner?
His own counter-affidavit showed that he did not. He claimed that he returned various
items sometime in March, 1994 amounting to P19,615.49. He, however, neither presented
any supporting evidence nor clarified why he failed to account for his collections. His
explanations, on the other hand, regarding his unliquidated cash advances and unused cash
rebates were also inadequate inasmuch they were self-serving and unsubstantiated.
[24]

In its reply-affidavit, petitioner was able to controvert the explanations of respondent.
The unrecorded returns claimed by respondent were belied by the physical inventory
report prepared and signed by both the warehouseman and respondent himself.
Respondent admitted that he was given checks for cash rebates to particular customers.
Since the rebates given to customers were in the form of goods, as admitted by the
respondent himself, why did he therefore not return the checks given to him? With respect
to the unliquidated cash advances, petitioner clarified that it was incorrect for respondent
to allege that he had already liquidated his cash advances when he was given
another P1,500 after his first cash advance of P2,500. The truth was that he was given
another P1,500 not because he had already liquidated his first cash advance of P2,500 but
because it was the company's practice to replenish the revolving fund to its original
amount. Therefore, the release of a new cash advance was not proof of liquidation of his
previous cash advances. The inventory clearly showed in fact that he still had not liquidated
his cash advances.
[25]

In the face of petitioners fully documented evidence (inventory reports, receipts,
balances of accountabilities, computations of short/over samples, job description and
demand letter addressed to respondent), all respondent Feria could offer were a lame
denial and an unsubstantiated, off-tangent explanation. He offered absolutely no
clarification concerning the unremitted collections and unreturned, unused check rebates.
The rule that the failure to account, upon demand, for funds or property held in trust is
circumstantial evidence of misappropriation applies without doubt in the present case.
Since a preliminary investigation is merely a determination of whether there is a sufficient
ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the
respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial,
[26]
we find the
documented allegations in the complaint-affidavit and reply-affidavit of petitioner Filadams
sufficient to generate such well-founded belief.
While it is this Courts general policy not to interfere in the conduct of preliminary
investigations, leaving the investigating officers sufficient discretion to determine probable
cause,
[27]
we have nonetheless made some exceptions to the general rule, such as:
1. when necessary to afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the
accused;
2. when necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression
or multiplicity of actions;
3. when there is a prejudicial question which is sub judice;
4. when the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority;
5. where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation;
6. when double jeopardy is clearly apparent;
7. where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense;
8. where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution;
9. where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance;
10. when there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a
motion to quash on that ground has been denied.
[28]
(emphasis ours)
From the records, it is clear to us that a prima facie case for estafa exists. The dismissal
of petitioners complaint-affidavit and the DOJ's affirmance thereof on appeal was apatent
error constituting grave abuse of discretion within the ambit of exception no. 4 above.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The resolution of the Court of Appeals
dated May 29, 1997 finding no grave abuse of discretion and its resolution dated January
23, 1998 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE; and the resolution of the Department of Justice through the Chief State Prosecutor
dated January 8, 1997 dismissing the appeal of the petitioner and affirming the resolution of
the Assistant City Prosecutor of Quezon City dated February 28, 1995 dismissing
petitioner's complaint for estafa against private respondent Antonio Feria is
hereby ANNULLED for grave abuse of discretion.
SO ORDERED.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, (Acting Chair), and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.
Vitug, (Chairman), J., on official business leave.


DR. BENITA F. OSORIO, petitioner,
Versus
HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, G.R. No. 156652
Promulgated October 13, 2005

Facts:
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the 13 December 2002 Decision[1]
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67511 dated December 13, 2002 which affirmed
in toto the 12 January 2001 Resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas in, as well as
the order dated 17 July 2001 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration, suspending
the petitioner from her position as principal of Dr. Cecilio Putong National High School
(formerly Bohol National High School).
The petition originated from a letter complaint from Beatriz L. Tenorio to the
Ombudsman alleging that the petitioner committed the following acts:
1. Failure to account for the rentals of the school facilities;

2. Non-remittance to the school trust funds of money from the sale of old newspapers to
the school and appropriation of the said amount to herself;

3. Ready-made bidding with supplier of school-needed materials;

4. Double mandatory collection supposedly for the Boy and Girl Scouts of the Philippines,
from all students of Bohol National High School and non-remittance of all the contributions
to BSP and GSP;

5. Treatment of money from the school canteen as her personal money;

6. Conspiracy with treasure hunters in digging under the main ground of the school
building for Yamashita treasures;

7. Falsification of travel document to claim bigger representation allowances; and

8. Other improper acts.

Acting on the complaint, the Office of the Ombudsman-Manila, on 29 January 1998,
requested the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to conduct an investigation to verify
the alleged anomalies at the Dr. Cecilio Putong National High School. In the course of that
investigation, the NBI found:

a) that petitioner Osorio authorized the sale of newspapers, but did not remit the proceeds
thereof to the school; and
b) that she issued a memorandum through which students were charged more than the
allowable fees for their membership with Boy and Girl Scouts of the Philippines.

On 17 February 1998, the Office of the Ombudsman-Manila requested audit specialists
from the COA to conduct a thorough investigation on the alleged anomalies at the Dr. Cecilio
Putong National High School.

After evaluating the report of the COA auditors, the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas
was convinced that allegations no. 1 to no. 4 were duly substantiated while the rest of the
allegations were not. It found prima facie case of five (5) counts of Malversation of Public
Funds against petitioner on the proceeds of the sale of the schools old newspapers on five
occasions.


On 17 December 1998, the investigating auditors submitted a sworn affidavit. In an
order dated 27 January 1999, the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas issued an order placing
petitioner and Mr. Nestor Robles under preventive suspension. On 05 February 1999, the
Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas ordered petitioner and Mr. Nestor Robles to file their
respective counter-affidavits to the complaint. Later, on 15 March 1999, petitioner and co-
respondent Robles submitted their respective counter-affidavits, denying participation in
the alleged irregularities.

In a resolution dated 12 January 2001, the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas found
probable cause against petitioner for five (5) counts of Malversation of Public Funds and
five (5) counts of violations of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019, as amended.

The Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas denied petitioners motion for reconsideration
in its order dated 17 July 2001.

Issues:

1. Whether the Court of Appeals is correct in ruling that the Honorable Office of the
Ombudsman did not commit any grave abuse of discretion when it opted not to conduct a
clarificatory hearing in the case of the petitioner.

2. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the other issues raised by the
petitioner on certiorari are purely questions of evidence and not of law.

Decision:
On the first issue raised by petitioner, she bewails respondent courts ruling decreeing
that a clarificatory hearing in the instant criminal case is optional on the part of the
investigating prosecutor. Petitioner believes that without a clarificatory hearing, it is
impossible for the investigating prosecutor to resolve numerous irreconcilable issues and
arrive at a lawful indictment.
Section 1 of Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
Preliminary investigation is an inquiry or proceeding to determine whether there is
sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and
the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial.

The foregoing provision sets forth the purpose of preliminary investigation which is to
determine whether there is a sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a
crime has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof.
Subsection (e) of Section 3 and of the same rule provides:
(e) The investigating officer may set a hearing if there are facts and issues to be
clarified from a party or a witness. The parties can be present at the hearing but without
the right to examine or cross-examine. They may, however, submit to the investigating
officer questions which may be asked to the party or witness concerned.

It is the call of the investigating prosecutor, in the exercise of his sound discretion, whether
to conduct a clarificatory hearing or not. If he believes that the evidence before him is
sufficient to support a finding of probable cause, he may not hold a clarificatory hearing.
As held in Webb v. De Leon:
. . . The decision to call witnesses for clarificatory questions is addressed to the sound
discretion of the investigator and the investigator alone. If the evidence on hand already
yields a probable cause, the investigator need not hold a clarificatory hearing.

The consistent and general policy of the Court is not to interfere with the Office of the
Ombudsmans exercise of its investigatory and prosecutory powers. The rule is based not
only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution
to the Office of the Ombudsman but upon practicality as well.

The instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67511 dated 13 December 2002 affirming in toto the resolution
dated 12 January 2001 and the order dated 17 July 2001 issued by the Office of the
Ombudsman-Visayas is AFFIRMED.



CASTILLO v VILLALUZ
171 SCRA 39
NARVASA; March 8, 1989

NATURE
Petition for certiorari and prohibition

FACTS
- In July 1971, a complaint and a Joint Affidavit were filed directly by Renato Montes and
Jose de Silva against Manuel Laconico. The complaint charged the latter with estafa in the
amount of P1K. Preliminary investigation (now in question) was conducted by respondent
Judge of the Circuit Criminal Court, and thereafter issued a warrant of arrest. He ordered
Provincial Fiscal to file the corresponding information against the respondent before the
court of competent jurisdiction within 24 hours from receipt of said order.
- Provincial Fiscal failed to file the information required within the time appointed, or at any
time thereafter. Consequently, he was directed by His Honor to explain within 10 days "why
he should not be punished for contempt of court for delaying the speedy administration of
justice for disobeying a lawful order of the Court." Fiscal filed a MFR, but was denied. Hence,
this petition for certiorari and prohibition was presented by petitioner Fiscal, seeking
annulment of the aforesaid orders.

ISSUES
1.WON respondent judge had no jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigations, because
the law creating Circuit Criminal Courts, R.A. 5179, did not confer on said courts the power
to conduct preliminary investigations
2. WON judge erred in compelling fiscal under sanction of contempt, to file an information
in court without conducting his own preliminary investigation

HELD
1. YES
Ratio: The conduct of a preliminary investigation is not a judicial function but part of the
fiscals job, a function of the executive. Wherever there are enough fiscals or prosecutors to
conduct preliminary investigations, courts are counseled to leave this job which is
essentially executive to them, and the fact that a certain power is granted does not
necessarily mean that it should be indiscriminately exercised.
Reasoning: [a] Sec. 37 of BP. 129 reiterated the removal from Judges of Metropolitan Trial
Courts in the National Capital Region of the authority to conduct preliminary investigations
and Sec 2 of Rule 112 of 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure no longer authorizes RTC Judges
to conduct PIs. [b] The assignment of PI function to judges of inferior courts and to a very
limited extent to courts of first instance was dictated by necessity and practical
considerations, and the consequent policy, was that wherever there were enough fiscals or
prosecutors to conduct preliminary investigations, courts were to leave that job which is
essentially executive to them. It follows that the conclusions derived by a judge from his
own investigation cannot be superior to and conclusively binding on the fiscal or public
prosecutor, in whom that function is principally and more logically lodged.
2. YES
The power to conduct PI is lodged in the fiscal. It is grave abuse of discretion on a judge to
seek to foreclose the fiscal's prerogative to conduct his own preliminary investigation to
determine for himself the existence or non-existence of probable cause, and to require him
to show cause for not filing the information within 24 hours, on the sole basis of the Judge's
conclusions. The fiscal has the duty to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause, and
could not shirk or be made to evade it by an unreasoning and indiscriminate reliance on the
judge's investigation.
Dispositive: Petition GRANTED. Challenged Orders annulled and set aside.

SEPARATE OPINION

CRUZ [concurring]
- The fiscal prevails over the judge only in the determination of the existence of a prima
facie case to justify the filing of a complaint or information. This task is executive.
- But the determination of probable cause to justify the issuance of a search warrant or a
warrant of arrest is the constitutional prerogative of the judge and may not be withdrawn
from him or even only limited by statute or ROC. This task is judicial. The findings of fiscal in
the PI do not control or foreclose the exercise of the power conferred personally on the
judge under Sec. 2 the Bill of Rights. That power is his alone.


PEOPLE vs. INTING
187 SCRA 788

Facts: Mrs. Editha Barba filed a letter-complaint against OIC-Mayor Dominador Regalado of
Tanjay, Negros Oriental with the COMELEC for allegedly transferring her, a permanent
Nursing Attendant, Grade I, in the office of the Municipal Mayor to a very remote barangay
and without obtaining prior permission or clearance from COMELEC as required by law.
After a preliminary investigation of Barbas complaint, Atty. Lituanas found a prima facie
case. Hence, on September 26, 1988, he filed with the respondent trial court a criminal case
for violation of section 261, Par. (h), Omnibus Election Code against the OIC-Mayor. In an
Order dated September 30, 1988, the respondent court issued a warrant of arrest against
the accused OIC Mayor.

However, in an order dated October 3, 1988 and before the accused could be arrested, the
trial court set aside its September 30, 1988 order on the ground that Atty. Lituanas is not
authorized to determine probable cause pursuant to Section 2, Article III of the 1987
Constitution. The trial court later on quashed the information. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Does a preliminary investigation conducted by a Provincial Election Supervisor
involving election offenses have to be coursed through the Provincial Prosecutor, before the
Regional Trial Court may take cognizance of the investigation and determine whether or not
probable cause exists?

Held: The 1987 Constitution empowers the COMELEC to conduct preliminary
investigations in cases involving election offenses for the purpose of helping the Judge
determine probable cause and for filing an information in court. This power is exclusive
with COMELEC. The evident constitutional intendment in bestowing this power to the
COMELEC is to insure the free, orderly and honest conduct of elections, failure of which
would result in the frustration of the true will of the people and make a mere idle ceremony
of the sacred right and duty of every qualified citizen to vote. To divest the COMELEC of the
authority to investigate and prosecute offenses committed by public officials in relation to
their office would thus seriously impair its effectiveness in achieving this clear
constitutional mandate. Bearing these principles in mind, it is apparent that the respondent
trial court misconstrued the constitutional provision when it quashed the information filed
by the Provincial Election Supervisor.


HON. FRANKLIN DRILON, HON. RAMON ESGUERRA, STATE PROSECUTOR REYNALDO
LUGTU, ALL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, MANILA, petitioners, v. THE
COURT OF APPEALS and DR. RODOLFO V. AGUILA, JR. respondents.
D E C I S I O N
ROMERO, J.:
In this petition, respondent Court of Appeals is alleged to have erred in finding
petitioner State Prosecutor Reynaldo Lugtu as having committed grave abuse of discretion
and after effectively discharging private respondent Dr. Rodolfo Aguila, Jr. from the
information for Kidnapping with Frustrated Murder.
On January 2, 1993, Godofredo Aonuevo was allegedly shot in the back by Manolo
Ramos. Aonuevo was reportedly seized form Lipa City, mauled and then taken to a
hospital for head injuries. He was then brought before Marcia Reyes who asked him why he
revealed her secrets concerning her indebtedness. Later he was taken to a poultry farm in
Concepcion, Batangas where he was shot and subsequently brought to the Batangas
Regional Hospital in Batangas City. The following day Aonuevo was transferred to St.
Patricks's Hospital in the same city allegedly because he was intentionally not being treated
at the previous hospital.
The victim gave three statements on different days in order to fully narrate the events
relating to the crime.
[1]
In a letter dated February 13, 1993, counsel for private respondent
Aonuevo requested herein petitioner, then Justice Secretary Franklin Drilon, to order the
transfer of preliminary investigations in the case from Batangas to the Office of the State
Prosecutor at the Department of Justice in Manila. The Secretary of Justice granted the
request and issued Department Order No. 72 designating State Prosecutor Reynaldo Lugtu,
also a petitioner in this case, as Acting Prosecutor of Batangas City in the investigation of the
case.
After the preliminary investigation was conducted, State Prosecutor Lugtu rendered a
Resolution on October 20, 1993, finding that a prima facie case for kidnapping with
frustrated murder exist against Manolo Ramos, Agapito Reyes, Marcia M. Reyes, Egay Perez,
Ariel Hubilla, Dr. Rodolfo V. Aguila, Jr. and Adoracion Moraleja and recommending that an
information be filed against them.
On November 11, 1993, the State Prosecutor filed an Information with the Regional
Trial Court of Batangas City, charging the aforenamed persons with Kidnapping with
Frustrated Murder. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 6878.
Subsequently, the petition for review and/or reinvestigation filed by the aforenamed
accused, was denied by Undersecretary Ramon Esguerra on January 10, 1994. The latter,
who is also petitioner in instant case, likewise denied their motion for reconsideration on
February 3, 1994.
On February 8, 1994, the Supreme Court ordered the records in Criminal Case No. 6878
transmitted to the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila for re-raffle.
[2]
After
being re-raffled, the same was assigned to Branch 11 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila as
Case No. CR 94-133438.
On February 19, 1994, the accused in said case filed with respondent Court of Appeals a
petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for temporary restraining order and writ
of preliminary injunction
[3]
seeking to have the resolution of State Prosecutor Lugtu set
aside. A temporary retraining order prohibiting respondents, herein petitioners, from
proceeding any aspect of Criminal Case No. 6878 ("People of the Philippines v. Dr. Rodolfo
V. Aguila, Jr., et al.") was forthwith issued by respondent court on March 3, 1994.
[4]

Apparently unaware that the re-raffle had already been conducted, the accused filed
with the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila a motion to hold in abeyance
the issuance of the warrant of arrest and to defer the raffle.
On March 11, 1994, Branch 11 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, not knowing of
accused's motion, issued the order of Arrest against the latter.
Respondent court formulated the issue thus: whether or not the criminal prosecution
can be restrained upon the claim of the accused that the state prosecutor's resolution is a
mistake and that factually, no prima facie case has been made out for the offense charged
against them.
The Court of Appeals found that there was a prima facie case of the offense charged
against all accused with the exception of private respondent Dr. Rodolfo V. Aguila,
[5]
as
follows:
"The situation of petitioner Dr. Rodolfo V. Aguila, Jr. is different from that of his co-
petitioners. The evidence concerning the shooting and the taking of the victim indicated the
participation of the petitioners but not that of Dr. Rodolfo Aguila, Jr. We have scanned the
statements of the witnesses in relation to the resolution of State Prosecutor Reynaldo Lugtu
and there is nothing to indicate the participation of Dr. Aguila either in the purported
kidnapping or in that of frustrated murder. He is a doctor of medicine and his presence in
the case as more than amply shown in the statements of Aonuevo was avowedly only in
connection with the treatment of Aonuevo's injury. There was no mention at all in the first
two (2) statements he made and the only time Aonuevo mentioned Dr. Aguila was in the
third statement made more than a month after the purported incident on February 7, 1993
when in answer to one (1) question, he had mentioned the name of Dr. Rodolfo Aguila,
Jr.and by another answer to another question, had voiced out his suspicion concerning said
petitioner x x x."
[6]
(Italics supplied)
Hence, the instant petition by then Secretary of Justice Franklin Drilon, Undersecretary
Ramon Esguerra and State Prosecutor Reynaldo Lugtu, where they allege that the latter
committed no grave abuse of discretion and that the Court of Appeals erred permanently
enjoining the Regional Trial Court of Manila from proceeding against private respondent Dr.
Rodolfo V. Aguila in the criminal case for kidnapping with frustrated murder (Criminal Case
No. 94-133438).
The Court finds merit in and rules to grant the petition.
The purpose of a preliminary investigation is to establish probable cause
[7]
and "to
secure the innocent against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution x x x"
[8]
It is inquiry
to determine whether a crime has been committed
[9]
and whether there is probable cause to
believe that the accused is guilty thereof.
[10]
The investigating judge or prosecuting officer
acts upon probable cause and reasonable belief.
[11]

Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on
evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and definitely not on evidence
establishing absolute certainty of guilt.
[12]
It implies probability of guilt
[13]
and requires
more than "bare suspicion" but "less than evidences which would justify conviction."
[14]

Probable cause should be determined in a summary but scrupulous manner to prevent
material damage to a potential accused's constitutional right of liberty
[15]
and the
guarantees of freedom and fair play.
[16]
The preliminary investigation is not the occasion for
the full and exhaustive display of the parties' evidence. It is for the presentation of such
evidence as may engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed and
that the accused is probably guilty thereof.
[17]
It is a means of discovering the persons who
may be reasonably charged with a crime.
[18]
The validity and merits of a party's defense and
accusation, as well as admissibility of testimonies and evidence, are better ventilated during
trial proper than at the preliminary investigation level.
[19]

Petitioner State Prosecutor did not gravely abuse his discretion when he found
probable cause against private respondent Rodolfo V. Aguila, Jr. Part of the prosecutor's
resolution reads:
"On January 2, 1993, at about 8:00 o'clock in the morning, however, after the said December
18, 1992 incident, while Godofredo Aonuevo, a former caretaker of Good Harvest Poultry
Farm was at Tambo, Lipa City, he (Aonuevo) met Pete Reyes, Ariel Hubilla and Egay Perez,
who were then on board a car. Because of fear, Aonuevo tried to run away but the group
ran after him and caught him later. The group then forced him to board a Ford Fiera where
they beat him hitting his head and face causing him injuries. Because of this injuries, the
group brought him to a hospital in Lipa City where he was treated for head injuries. While
they were in said hospital, Dr. Rodolfo Aguila and Manolo "momoy" Ramos, a cousin-
bodyguard and hit man of spouses Agapito and Marcia Reyes arrived. After said treatment,
Aonuevo was brought to the office of Atty. Gregorio "boy" Moraleja in Batangas City where
Marcia Reyes confronted and asked him why he told on their secrets concerning her
indebtedness. At about 3:30 o'clock in the afternoon of the same day, the group brought
Aonuevo to the house of Adoracion Moraleja, mother of Marcia, at Bgy.
Concepcion. Thereat, he was brought back to the backyard and was told that he would have
rest. It was at this juncture that Momoy Ramos shot him at his back with a .38 cal. revolver,
causing him to fall on the ground. Aonuevo was on this position when Jojo kicked
him. Momoy Ramos who was then with @ Jojo, Ferdinand, Ex Moraleja, Polie Tikatik, Apeng
Marcayda, Ronie, Rez, Sandra Moraleja, Nixon (brother-in-law of Marcia Reyes), Arbolante,
Ariel Hubilla, Larry, Mio Alano, Dr. Rodolfo Aguila and Adoracion Moraleja, was about to shoot
him again but was prevented by Dr. Aguila, Ferdinand and the father of Momoy (Teofilo
Ramos). Over the objections of Momoy Ramos who was then very insistent to finish him off
right then and there, Aonuevo was then loaded in the van and brought to Batangas Regional
Hospital where he was transferred from one room to another without receiving any medical
attention for about three (3) hours. He suspected that Dr. Aguila actually wanted him to die
because he did not give him any medical attention and even warned him not to talk with the
police nor give then any information concerning the incident. He even added that he saw Dr.
Aguila, Marcia Reyes, Pete Reyes, Ferdinand Moraleja, Ex Morales and several others talking
with each other in an alley in the hospital.
After the said more than three (3) hours, Dionisio Tan, Jr., arrived in the hospital and after
being informed of Aonuevo's condition talked with Dr. Aguila and requested that
Aonuevo be brought out of the hospital and transferred to another hospital. Dr. Aguila
however refused and a heated argument ensued between them. It was at his instance that
Aonuevo himself pleaded to Dionisio Tan, Jr., to transfer him to another hospital as Dr.
Aguila would want him killed. Aonuevo was eventually transferred to St. Patrick Hospital
by Jun Tan (Dionisio, Jr.). According to him, the group has decided to kill him because he
was the former caretaker of spouses Agapito and Marcia Reyes and he now sided with Mrs.
Tan in the dispute between the two."
[20]

The Prosecutor's report made clear that, based on the victim's third sworn statement
dated February 7, 1993, respondent Dr. Aguila, Jr. was in the company of the other accused
during the shooting incident; that he suspected respondent Dr. Aguila wanted him to die
because the latter did not give him medical attention while at Batangas Regional Hospital;
that the respondent even warned him not to talk with the police regarding the shooting
incident and that he saw respondent talking with the other accused in the hospital.
Godofredo Aonuevo's second statement, given the morning after the shooting
incident, reads:
"47. T: - Sino ang tumawag kay Momoy?
S: - Si Dr. Rodolfo Aguila, si Fernan, at ang ama ni Momoy.
xxx xxx xxx
51. T: - Kasama pa rin ba si Momoy noong pagkadala sa iyo doon sa Bats
Regional Hospital?
S: - Hindi po, si Dr. Mocs Aguila."
[21]

The victim's third statement reads:
"06. Tanong: Nabanggit mo rin sa iyong unang salaysay (Tanong # 50) na
ikaw ay dinala sa hospital, Batangas Regional Hospital ikaw ba naman ay
nabigyan/inintindi sa nabanggit na hospital upang mabigyan ng lunas?
Sagot: Hindi po ako nabigyan ng lunas at ako po ay hindi dinala man lamang sa
Emergency Room sa halip ako po ay pinaikot-ikot sa ibat-ibang kuwarto ng
hospital na ang sapalagay ko ay ibig na akong mamatay ni Dr. Rodolfo Aguila.
07. Tanong: Bakit mo naman nasabing gusto kang patayin ni Dr. Aguila?
Sagot: Sa dahilang hindi nga po ako ginamot samantalang halos humigit
kumulang sa tatlong oras na po ako sa loob ng hospital na nabanggit at ang
sabi pa nga sa akin ni Dr. Aguila na kung may dadating na pulis ay huwag
akong magsasalita at magbigay ng report tungkol sa nangyari sa akin at
ang pagkaalam ko nga po ay itong si Dr. Aguila ay bayaw nitong si
MARCIA REYES at napansin ko pa nga na sila ay nag-uusap pa habang ako
naman ay halos mamatay na sa tinamo kong sugat dahilang sa pagkakabaril sa
akin ni Momoy.
08. Tanong: Binanggit mong nag-uusap sila, sino itong tinutukoy mong tao?
Sagot: Sila, Dr. Aguila, Marcia Reyes, Pete Reyes, Fernan Moraleja, Ex Moraleja
at iba pang hindi ko kilala.
09. Tanong: Paano mo naman nakita at saan sila nag-uusap?
Sagot: Doon po sa loob ng hospital malapit sa aking kinalalagyan doon sa alley
ng hospital (Batangas Regional Hospital).
10. Tanong: Matapos na ikaw ay hindi nalapatan ng gamot sa nasabing
hospital ano pa ang mga sumunod na pangyayari?
Sagot: Dumating po ang aking amo si DIONISIO I. TAN JR. at siya ay nakipag-
usap kay Dr. Aguila kung bakit hindi ako ginagamot at noong ako po ay
ilalabas ng hospital ay ayaw pumayag ng doktor na nabanggit na ako ay lilipat
sa ibang hospital ang nangyari po ay nagkasigawan sila (Dr. Aguila at Dionisio
Tan Jr.) ang ginawa ko ay tinawag ko ang aking amo at sinabi ko na ilipat ako
ng ibang hospital sa dahilang gusto akong patayin ni Dr. Aguila."
[22]
(Italics
supplied.)
The foregoing narration shows that Dr. Aguila had some participation in the plot
against Aonuevo. Taken altogether, all these constitute probable cause against private
respondent Dr. Rodolfo Aguila, Jr.
Moreover, the determination of the persons to be prosecuted rests primarily with the
prosecutor who is vested with quasi-judicial discretion in the discharge of this
function.
[23]
We have also ruled that the courts should give credence, in the absence of a clear
showing of arbitrariness, to the finding and determination of probable cause by prosecutors
in a preliminary investigation.
[24]

To reiterate, such a finding of probable cause does not ensure a conviction, or a
conclusive finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The allegations adduced by the
prosecution will be put to test in a full-blown trial where evidence shall be analyzed,
weighed, given credence or disproved.
The Court hereby rules that petitioner State Prosecutor did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in finding probable cause to hold private respondent Dr. Rodolfo Aguila, Jr. for
trial.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 33372, "Manolo Ramos, et al. v. Hon. Franklin Drilon, et al.," is
hereby MODIFIED so as to include Dr. Rodolfo V. Aguila in the Information for Kidnapping
with Frustrated Murder. The temporary restraining order dated March 3, 1994 and made
permanent on June 8, 1994, enjoining petitioners from proceeding against private
respondent Dr. Rodolfo V. Aguila, Jr. in Criminal Case No. CR-94-133438 is hereby LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, (Chairman), Puno, Mendoza, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.



ALLADO v DIOKNO
232 SCRA 192
BELLOSILLO; May 5, 1994

NATURE
Petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a temporary restraining order

FACTS
- Petitioners Diosdado Jose Allado and Roberto L. Mendoza, alumni of the College of Law,
University of the Philippines, are partners of the Law Firm of Salonga, Hernandez and
Allado. In the practice of their profession, and on the basis of an alleged extrajudicial
confession of a security guard (Umbal), they have been accused of the heinous crime of
kidnapping with murder of a German national named Van Twest by the Presidential Anti-
Crime Commission (PACC) and ordered arrested without bail by respondent judge.
- Petitioners filed this petition and principally contended that respondent judge acted with
grave abuse of discretion and in excess of jurisdiction in "whimsically holding that there is
probable cause against petitioners without determining the admissibility of the evidence
against petitioners and without even stating the basis of his findings," and in "relying on the
Resolution of the Panel and their certification that probable cause exists when the
certification is flawed." Petitioners maintain that the records of the preliminary
investigation which respondent judge solely relied upon failed to establish probable cause
against them to justify the issuance of the warrant of arrest. Petitioners likewise assail the
prosecutors' "clear sign of bias and partiality."
- On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General argues that the determination of
probable cause is a function of the judge who is merely required to personally appreciate
certain facts to convince him that the accused probably committed the crime charged.

ISSUE
WON the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in the preliminary inquiry
which determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest

HELD
- In the Order of respondent judge, it is expressly stated that "[t]his court after careful
evaluation of the evidence on record, believes and rules that probable cause exists; and
therefore, a warrant of arrest should be issued." However, we are unable to see how
respondent judge arrived at such ruling. We have painstakingly examined the records and
we cannot find any support for his conclusion. On the contrary, we discern a number of
reasons why we consider the evidence submitted to be insufficient for a finding of probable
cause against petitioners.
- The PACC relies heavily on the sworn statement of Security Guard Umbal who supposedly
confessed his participation in the alleged kidnapping and murder of Van Twest. For one,
there is serious doubt on Van Twest's reported death since the corpus delicti has not been
established, nor have his remains been recovered. Umbal claims that Van Twest was
completely burned into ashes with the use of gasoline and rubber tires from around ten
o'clock in the evening to six o'clock the next morning. This is highly improbable, if not
ridiculous. A human body cannot be pulverized into ashes by simply burning it with the use
of gasoline and rubber tires in an open field. Even crematoria use entirely closed
incinerators where the corpse is subjected to intense heat. Thereafter, the remains undergo
a process where the bones are completely ground to dust.
- Strangely, if not awkwardly, after Van Twest's reported abduction which culminated in his
decimation by cremation, his counsel continued to represent him before judicial and quasi-
judicial proceedings. Hence, even Asst. Solicitor General Estoesta believes that counsel of
Van Twest doubted the latter's death.
- Verily, respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the warrant for
the arrest of petitioners it appearing that he did not personally examine the evidence nor
did he call for the complainant and his witnesses in the face of their incredible accounts.
Instead, he merely relied on the certification of the prosecutors that probable cause existed.
For, otherwise, he would have found out that the evidence thus far presented was utterly
insufficient to warrant the arrest of petitioners.
- In Soliven v. Makasiar, we said that the judge (a) shall personally evaluate the report and
the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause
and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or, (b) if on the basis thereof he finds no
probable cause, may disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting
affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion on the existence of probable
cause.
- In People v. Inting, we emphasized the important features of the constitutional mandate:
(a) The determination of probable cause is a function of the judge; it is not for the provincial
fiscal or prosecutor to ascertain. Only the judge and the judge alone makes this
determination; (b) The preliminary inquiry made by a prosecutor does not bind the judge. It
merely assists him in making the determination of probable cause. The judge does not have
to follow what the prosecutor presents to him. By itself, the prosecutor's certification of
probable cause is ineffectual. It is the report, the affidavits, the transcript of stenographic
notes (if any), and all other supporting documents behind the prosecutor's certification
which are material in assisting the judge in his determination of probable cause; and, (c)
Judges and prosecutors alike should distinguish the preliminary inquiry which determines
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest from the preliminary investigation
proper which ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or released. Even if
the two inquiries be conducted in the course of one and the same proceeding, there should
be no confusion about their objectives. The determination of probable cause for the warrant
is made by the judge. The preliminary investigation proper whether or not there is
reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and therefore,
whether or not he should be subjected to the expense, rigors and embarrassment of trial is a
function of the prosecutor.
- ALLADO DOCTRINE: If upon the filing of the information in court, the trial judge, after
reviewing the information and the document attached thereto, finds that no probable cause
exists, he must either call for the complainant and the witnesses themselves or simply dismiss
the case. There is no reason to hold the accused for trial and further expose him to an open and
public accusation of the crime when no probable cause exists.
Dispositive Petition granted



RODOLFO SORIA and EDIMAR BISTA, petitioners, vs. HON. ANIANO DESIERTO in his
capacity as Head of the Office of the Ombudsman, HON. ORLANDO C. CASIMIRO
in his capacity as Deputy Ombudsman for Military, P/INS. JEFFREY T.
GOROSPE, SPO2 ROLANDO G. REGACHO, SPO1 ALFREDO B. ALVIAR, JR., PO3
JAIME D. LAZARO, PO2 FLORANTE B. CARDENAS, PO1 JOSEPH A. BENAZA, SPO1
FRANKLIN D. CABAYA and SPO4 PEDRO PAREL, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Yet again, we are tasked to substitute our judgment for that of the Office of the
Ombudsman in its finding of lack of probable cause made during preliminary
investigation. And, yet again, we reaffirm the time-honored practice of non-interference in
the conduct of preliminary investigations by our prosecutory bodies absent a showing of
grave abuse of discretion on their part.
Petitioners, thru a special civil action for certiorari,
[1]
contend precisely that the public
respondents herein officers of the Office of the Ombudsman gravely abused their
discretion in dismissing the complaint for violation of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code
(Delay in the delivery of detained persons) against private respondents herein, members of
the Philippine National Police stationed at the Municipality of Santa, Ilocos Sur.
From the respective pleadings
[2]
of the parties, the following facts appear to be
indubitable:
1. On or about 8:30 in the evening of 13 May 2001 (a Sunday and the day before
the 14 May 2001 Elections
[3]
), petitioners were arrested without a warrant by respondents
police officers for alleged illegal possession of firearms and ammunition;
2. Petitioner Soria was arrested for alleged illegal possession of .38 cal. revolver (a
crime which carries with it the penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period) and
for violation of Article 261 par. (f) of the Omnibus Election Code in relation to the
Commission on Election Resolution No. 3328 (which carries the penalty of imprisonment of
not less than one [1] year but not more than six [6] years);
3. Petitioner Bista was arrested for alleged illegal possession of sub-machine pistol
UZI, cal. 9mm and a .22 cal. revolver with ammunition;
4. Immediately after their arrest, petitioners were detained at the Santa, Ilocos Sur,
Police Station. It was at the Santa Police Station that petitioner Bista was identified by one
of the police officers to have a standing warrant of arrest for violation of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 6 issued by the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Vigan, Ilocos Sur, docketed as Criminal
Case No. 12272;
5. The next day, at about 4:30 p.m. of 14 May 2001 (Monday and election day),
petitioners were brought to the residence of Provincial Prosecutor Jessica Viloria in San
Juan, Ilocos Sur, before whom a Joint-Affidavit against them was subscribed and sworn to
by the arresting officers. From there, the arresting officers brought the petitioners to the
Provincial Prosecutors Office in Vigan, Ilocos Sur, and there at about 6:00 p.m. the Joint-
Affidavit was filed and docketed;
6. At about 6:30 in the evening of the same day, 14 May 2001, petitioner Soria
was released upon the order of Prosecutor Viloria to undergo the requisite preliminary
investigation, while petitioner Bista was brought back and continued to be detained at the
Santa Police Station. From the time of petitioner Sorias detention up to the time of his
release, twenty-two (22) hours had already elapsed;
7. On 15 May 2001, at around 2:00 in the afternoon, petitioner Bista was brought
before the MTC of Vigan, Ilocos Sur, where the case for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 6
was pending. Petitioner Bista posted bail and an Order of Temporary Release was issued
thereafter;
8. At this point in time, no order of release was issued in connection with petitioner
Bistas arrest for alleged illegal possession of firearms. At 4:30 in the afternoon of the
same day (15 May 2001), an information for Illegal Possession of Firearms and
Ammunition, docketed as Criminal Case No. 4413-S, was filed against petitioner Bista with
the 4
th
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Narvacan, Ilocos Sur. At 5:00 in the afternoon,
informations for Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition and violation of Article 261
par. (f) of the Omnibus Election Code in relation to COMELEC Resolution No. 3328, docketed
as Criminal Cases No. 2269-N and No. 2268-N, respectively, were filed in the Regional Trial
Court at Narvacan, Ilocos Sur;
9. On 08 June 2001, petitioner Bista was released upon filing of bail bonds in
Criminal Cases No. 2268-N and No. 4413-S. He was detained for 26 days.
10. On 15 August 2001, petitioners filed with the Office of the Ombudsman for Military
Affairs a complaint-affidavit for violation of Art. 125 of the Revised Penal Code against
herein private respondents.
11. After considering the parties respective submissions, the Office of the
Ombudsman rendered the first assailed Joint Resolution dated 31 January 2002 dismissing
the complaint for violation of Art. 125 of the Revised Penal Code for lack of merit; and
12. On 04 March 2002, petitioners then filed their motion for reconsideration which
was denied for lack of merit in the second assailed Resolution dated 25 March 2002.
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code states:
Art. 125. Delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper judicial authorities. - The
penalties provided in the next preceding article shall be imposed upon the public officer or
employee who shall detain any person for some legal ground and shall fail to deliver such
person to the proper judicial authorities within the period of: twelve (12) hours, for crimes
or offenses punishable by light penalties, or their equivalent; eighteen (18) hours, for
crimes or offenses punishable by correctional penalties, or their equivalent; and thirty-six
(36) hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by afflictive or capital penalties, or their
equivalent.
In every case, the person detained shall be informed of the cause of his detention and shall
be allowed, upon his request, to communicate and confer at any time with his attorney or
counsel.
It is not under dispute that the alleged crimes for which petitioner Soria was arrested
without warrant are punishable by correctional penalties or their equivalent, thus, criminal
complaints or information should be filed with the proper judicial authorities within 18
hours of his arrest. Neither is it in dispute that the alleged crimes for which petitioner Bista
was arrested are punishable by afflictive or capital penalties, or their equivalent, thus, he
could only be detained for 36 hours without criminal complaints or information having
been filed with the proper judicial authorities.
The sole bone of contention revolves around the proper application of the 12-18-36
periods. With respect specifically to the detention of petitioner Soria which lasted for 22
hours, it is alleged that public respondents gravely erred in construing Article 125
[4]
as
excluding Sundays, holidays and election days in the computation of the periods prescribed
within which public officers should deliver arrested persons to the proper judicial
authorities as the law never makes such exception. Statutory construction has it that if a
statute is clear and unequivocal, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without any
attempts at interpretation.
[5]
Public respondents, on the other hand, relied on the cases
ofMedina v. Orozco, Jr.,
[6]
and Sayo v. Chief of Police of Manila
[7]
and on commentaries
[8]
of
jurists to bolster their position that Sundays, holidays and election days are excluded in the
computation of the periods provided in Article 125,
[9]
hence, the arresting officers delivered
petitioners well within the allowable time.
In addition to the foregoing arguments and with respect specifically to petitioner Bista,
petitioners maintain that the filing of the information in court against petitioner Bista did
not justify his continuous detention. The information was filed at 4:30 p.m. of 15 May
2001 but the orders for his release were issued by the Regional Trial Court and Municipal
Trial Court of Narvacan, Ilocos Sur, only on 08 June 2001. They argued that based on law
and jurisprudence, if no charge is filed by the prosecutor within the period fixed by law, the
arresting officer must release the detainee lest he be charged with violation of Article
125.
[10]
Public respondents countered that the duty of the arresting officers ended upon the
filing of the informations with the proper judicial authorities following the rulings in Agbay
v. Deputy Ombudsman for the Military,
[11]
and People v. Acosta.
[12]

From a study of the opposing views advanced by the parties, it is evident that public
respondents did not abuse their discretion in dismissing for lack of probable cause the
complaint against private respondents.
Grave abuse of discretion is such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment on the
part of the public officer concerned which is equivalent to an excess or lack of
jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion
of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner
by reason of passion or hostility.
[13]

No grave abuse of discretion, as defined, can be attributed to herein public
respondents. Their disposition of petitioners complaint for violation of Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code cannot be said to have been conjured out of thin air as it was properly
backed up by law and jurisprudence. Public respondents ratiocinated thus:
As aptly pointed out by the respondents insofar as the complaint of Rodolfo Soria is
concerned, based on applicable laws and jurisprudence, an election day or a special holiday,
should not be included in the computation of the period prescribed by law for the filing of
complaint/information in courts in cases of warrantless arrests, it being a no-office
day. (Medina vs. Orosco, 125 Phil. 313.) In the instant case, while it appears that the
complaints against Soria for Illegal Possession of Firearm and Violation of COMELEC
Resolution No. 3328 were filed with the Regional Trial Court and Municipal Trial Court of
Narvacan, Ilocos Sur, only on May 15, 200[1] at 4:30 p.m., he had already been released the
day before or on May 14, 2001 at about 6:30 p.m. by the respondents, as directed by Prov.
Prosecutor Jessica [Viloria]. Hence, there could be no arbitrary detention or violation of
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code to speak of.
[14]

Indeed, we did hold in Medina v. Orozco, Jr.,
[15]
that
. . . The arresting officers duty under the law was either to deliver him to the proper
judicial authorities within 18 hours, or thereafter release him. The fact however is that he
was not released. From the time of petitioners arrest at 12:00 oclock p.m. on November 7
to 3:40 p.m. on November 10 when the information against him for murder actually was in
court, over 75 hours have elapsed.
But, stock should be taken of the fact that November 7 was a Sunday; November 8 was
declared an official holiday; and November 9 (election day) was also an official holiday. In
these three no-office days, it was not an easy matter for a fiscal to look for his clerk and
stenographer, draft the information and search for the Judge to have him act thereon, and
get the clerk of court to open the courthouse, docket the case and have the order of
commitment prepared. And then, where to locate and the uncertainty of locating those
officers and employees could very well compound the fiscals difficulties. These are
considerations sufficient enough to deter us from declaring that Arthur Medina was
arbitrarily detained. For, he was brought to court on the very first office day following
arrest.
And, in Sayo v. Chief of Police of Manila
[16]
--
. . . Of course, for the purpose of determining the criminal liability of an officer detaining a
person for more than six hours prescribed by the Revised Penal Code, the means of
communication as well as the hour of arrest and other circumstances, such as the time of
surrender and the material possibility for the fiscal to make the investigation and file in
time the necessary information, must be taken into consideration.
As to the issue concerning the duty of the arresting officer after the information has
already been filed in Court, public respondents acted well within their discretion in ruling
thus:
In the same vein, the complaint of Edimar Bista against the respondents for Violation of
Article 125, will not prosper because the running of the thirty-six (36)-hour period
prescribed by law for the filing of the complaint against him from the time of his arrest was
tolled by one day (election day). Moreover, he has a standing warrant of arrest for Violation
of B.P. Blg. 6 and it was only on May 15, 2001, at about 2:00 p.m. that he was able to post
bail and secure an Order of Release. Obviously, however, he could only be released if he has
no other pending criminal case requiring his continuous detention.
The criminal Informations against Bista for Violations of Article 125, RPC and COMELEC
Resolution No. 3328 were filed with the Regional Trial Court and Municipal Trial Court of
Narvacan, Ilocos Sur, on May 15, 2001 (Annexes G and I, Complaint-Affidavit of Edimar
Bista) but he was released from detention only on June 8, 2001, on orders of the RTC and
MTC of Narvacan, Ilocos Sur (Annexes J and K, Complaint-Affidavit). Was there a delay
in the delivery of detained person to the proper judicial authorities under the
circumstances? The answer is in the negative. The complaints against him was (sic)
seasonably filed in the court of justice within the thirty-six (36)-hour period prescribed by
law as discussed above. The duty of the detaining officers is deemed complied with upon
the filing of the complaints. Further action, like issuance of a Release Order, then rests upon
the judicial authority (People v. Acosta [CA] 54 O.G. 4739).
[17]

The above disposition is in keeping with Agbay v. Deputy Ombudsman for the
Military,
[18]
wherein we ordained that
. . . Furthermore, upon the filing of the complaint with the Municipal Trial Court, the intent
behind Art. 125 is satisfied considering that by such act, the detained person is informed of
the crime imputed against him and, upon his application with the court, he may be released
on bail. Petitioner himself acknowledged this power of the MCTC to order his release when
he applied for and was granted his release upon posting bail. Thus, the very purpose
underlying Article 125 has been duly served with the filing of the complaint with the
MCTC. We agree with the position of the Ombudsman that such filing of the complaint with
the MCTC interrupted the period prescribed in said Article.
All things considered, there being no grave abuse of discretion, we have no choice but
to defer to the Office of the Ombudsmans determination that the facts on hand do not make
out a case for violation of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code.
As we have underscored in numerous decisions --
We have consistently refrained from interfering with the investigatory and prosecutorial
powers of the Ombudsman absent any compelling reason. This policy is based on
constitutional, statutory and practical considerations. We are mindful that the Constitution
and RA 6770 endowed the Office of the Ombudsman with a wide latitude of investigatory
and prosecutorial powers, virtually free from legislative, executive or judicial intervention,
in order to insulate it from outside pressure and improper influence. Moreover, a
preliminary investigation is in effect a realistic judicial appraisal of the merits of the
case. Sufficient proof of the guilt of the accused must be adduced so that when the case is
tried, the trial court may not be bound, as a matter of law, to order an acquittal. Hence, if
the Ombudsman, using professional judgment, finds the case dismissible, the Court
shall respect such findings, unless clothed with grave abuse of discretion. Otherwise,
the functions of the courts will be grievously hampered by innumerable petitions assailing
the dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with
regard to complaints filed before it. In much the same way, the courts will be swamped
with cases if they will have to review the exercise of discretion on the part of fiscals or
prosecuting attorneys each time the latter decide to file an information in court or dismiss a
complaint by a private complainant.
[19]
(Emphasis supplied)
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition dated 27 May 2002 is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Joint Resolution dated 31 January 2002 and the Order
dated 25 March 2002 of the Office of the Ombudsman are hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.



PREFERRED HOME SPECIALTIES, G.R. No. 163593
INC. and EDWIN YU,
Petitioners, Present:

PUNO, J., Chairman,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
- versus - CALLEJO, SR.,
TINGA, and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.

COURT OF APPEALS (SEVENTH Promulgated:
DIVISION) and HARLEY T. SY,
Respondents. December 16, 2005

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

D E C I S I O N


CALLEJO, SR., J.:


This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court for the
nullification of the Decision
[1]
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. No. 77493 granting the
petition of Harley T. Sy for certiorari and prohibition, thus nullifying the Resolution of the
Secretary of Justice in I.S. No. B-01-130 directing that an Information for estafa under
Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code be filed against Sy.

Edwin Yu is the president and majority stockholder of Preferred Home Specialties, Inc.
(PHSI). On February 6, 2001, he filed a criminal
complaint
[2]
for estafa under paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code against Sy, Rodolfo
O. Cruz and Katharina Tolentino, chairperson, president and treasurer, respectively, of
Specialty Oils, Inc. (SOI).

PHSI was engaged in the business of selling Fiesta Margarine, then being toll
manufactured exclusively by A.D. Gothong Manufacturing of Cebu. The product was the
only competitor of Star Margarine in the market.

The facilities of SOI and Oleo Marketing Corporation (OMC) were both located at the
South Coast Industrial Estate, Bancal, Carmona, Cavite. OMC was engaged in the
manufacture and packaging of margarine for industrial companies.
[3]
Cruz was also its
president.

In his Complaint-Affidavit,
[4]
Yu claimed that sometime in August 1997, he had a series
of conferences with Cruz in Carmona, Cavite. Cruz represented thatSOI was engaged in the
business of supplying, on a private label basis, high quality margarine with equal if not
better quality than Star Margarine, and that it had the capability to supply larger volume at
lesser cost. Proposals were made for PHSI to provide raw materials and two filling
machines for the manufacture and production of Fiesta Margarine; SOI, in turn, would toll
manufacture the raw materials into the finished product. Cruz also assured Yu that
deliveries would commence in October 1997, later reset to December 1997. Yu averred that
the plant of SOI was still being constructed then.

To assure himself of Cruzs expertise, Yu inquired from his friends in the edible oil
industry and learned that Cruz was highly regarded for his experience. He also learned that
although Cruz had suffered some financial reverses, he had a new business partner, Harley
Sy, the son of business tycoon Henry Sy. After carefully considering the proposal of Cruz and
Tolentino, Yu agreed, as after all, he had been assured of the products high quality at a
lower cost.
[5]


Yu decided to consummate his agreement with Cruz and delivered two filling
machines to OMC, including the requisite raw and packing materials as agreed upon. Yu was
dismayed when SOI was unable to make its initial delivery, and told Cruz sometime in the
last week of January 1998, that he was having second thoughts about continuing the
agreement.

Alarmed, Cruz sought the intervention of Sy. On February 12, 1998, Sy hosted a
luncheon for Yu at the Jade Garden, Greenbelt, Makati City, with Cruz and Tolentino in
attendance.
[6]
Sy assured Yu that Cruz was a technical genius when it came to the business
of margarine and other edible oil-based products. He assured Yu that SOI was the best in the
market, and that the delivery of the margarine would no longer be delayed. Sy impressed
upon Yu that his family owned the chain of SM shopping malls and that they had a good
reputation in the business community.

Yu relented and agreed to continue with his business agreement with SOI, through
Cruz. Thereafter, SOI delivered 4,199 cases of margarine in February 1998 covered by
delivery receipts
[7]
signed by PHSI. By late March 1998, PHSI received complaints that the
margarine it had distributed to its dealers/customers turned white. When apprised
thereof, Cruz explained that the discoloration was caused by the beta carotene ingredient
which had either expired or iodized after opening.
[8]
PHSI received the margarine and
returned the same to SOI.

Nevertheless, SOI transmitted to PHSI its statements of account.
[9]
PHSI drew and
issued Chinabank Check No. B-0000758
[10]
dated May 8, 1998 and Check No. B-
00007585
[11]
dated April 30, 1998, each in the amount of P541,438.65 payable to the order
of SOI. The latter deposited the checks in the account ofOMC with the Equitable Banking
Corporation.
[12]


SOI continued to provide and deliver margarine to PHSI from May to July 1998,
covered by delivery receipts issued by SOI.
[13]
PHSI, again, received complaints from its
dealers and customers that the margarine delivered by SOI had turned white. PHSI, again,
recalled the commodities and complained to SOI. According to Cruz, the discoloration of the
margarine was due to production parameters.
[14]
PHSI returned the commodities to SOI.
[15]


Yu aired his complaints to Sy during a casual meeting at the Manila Polo Club
sometime in August 1998. The latter assured Yu that he had instructed Cruz and Tolentino
to deliver margarine that would not discolor. Sy expressed his displeasure at the
mestizo arrangement between Yu and Cruz and decided that, henceforth, SOI would be
responsible for all raw and packaging materials, labor and all the aspects of their business
agreement.
[16]
Yu was delighted when the decision of Sy was implemented. The billing for a
kilo of margarine delivered to PHSI after August 15, 1988 was P66.75 reflecting an all-in
price.
[17]
PHSI then placed an order for 15,000 cases of margarine for the Christmas
season. SOI was able to deliver the order only in February 1999. The margarine delivered
by SOIagain turned white. Its dealers informed PHSI that the public no longer purchased
Fiesta Margarine.
[18]
PHSI sustained P216,094,302.00 in losses, inclusive of potential income
for five years at 75 per metric tons a month.
[19]


In a Letter
[20]
dated September 20, 1999, Yu wrote Sy, Cruz and Tolentino suggesting
that the matter be submitted to a panel of arbiters
composed of mutually known and respected friends. However, Yu learned that on
December 29, 1998, Tolentino filed an Affidavit of Non-Operation
[21]
with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC), reporting that SOI had not been engaged in business and had
not been operating since its incorporation in 1996; as well as an Affidavit of Non-Holding of
Annual Meeting
[22]
of stockholders in 1996, 1997, 1998. This prompted Yu to refer the
matter to counsel, who, in a Letter
[23]
dated March 6, 2000, informed Sy, Cruz,
Tolentino, SOI and OMC that they had acted fraudulently and in bad faith in their business
dealings with PHSI relative to the manufacture and delivery of margarine. Demands to settle
with PHSI were also made. Cruz responded in a Letter
[24]
dated March 15, 2000, where he
rejected the demands of PHSI, to wit:

In view of the above, it is very obvious that OMC never tried to
persuade Mr. Yu into toll manufacturing Fiesta. In fact, Mr. Yu rushed up to
OMC to produce Fiesta for the 1997 holiday season. Mr. Harley Sy was never
involved in the toll manufacturing arrangements with PHSI. In fact, Mr. Sy
was only able to meet Mr. Yu after PHSI began the toll arrangement. OMC
never asked Mr. Yu to exclusively toll the Fiesta brand. He could have
continued toll manufacturing with Gothong if he did not feel comfortable
with OMC.

In the matter of Oleo Manufacturing Corp. (OMC), and Specialty Oils,
Inc. (SOI), SOI tried to enter into the toll manufacturing agreement with PHSI
in 1998 instead of OMC but SOI never received any payment from PHSI and
no formal agreement was ever entered between SOI and PHSI. SOI only
started having sales in late 1999. Thus, SOI never had an operation before
1999. PHSI made only one payment, and that was to OMC.
[25]



In his Counter-Affidavit,
[26]
Sy denied that he had any business dealings with PHSI
and Yu. He admitted that he, Cruz, Tolentino and Yu had a luncheon on February 12, 1998 at
the Jade Garden, but it was purely a social meeting and no business matters were
discussed. He averred that Yu had been dealing with OMCand not with SOI, and that he was
neither a stockholder nor an officer of OMC. He declared that Tolentino had executed the
two affidavits in good faith.

For his part, Cruz admitted in his Counter-Affidavit
[27]
that he and Yu (PHSI) had
business negotiations relative to the manufacture/production of margarine, but averred
that he did so in his capacity as OMC president and not of SOI. He alleged that, contrary to
Yus claim, it was PHSI, through its manager Monching Macasinag, who proposed the toll
manufacture of margarine. Moreover, he accepted the proposal on the condition that PHSI
would provide the raw materials which consisted of coconut oil, hydrogenated palm oil and
packaging materials; PHSI would provide four filling machines, labor and supervision for
the margarine filling line, and OMC in turn would manufacture and supply palm oil and
other additives for the blending and processing of margarine. It was also agreed upon that
PHSI would pick up the finished product from the facilities of OMC. Cruz averred that PHSI
delivered only two filling machines with the capacity equivalent to one-half the minimum
capacity of the OMC plant. Since the composition did not match, half of the products were
sent back by PHSI to the plant for remaking and reprocessing, and as a result, the recycled
portion was lighter. To remedy the situation, he suggested to Yu that additional filling
machines be delivered. PHSI delivered an additional but unfinished filling machine to
the OMC plant.

Cruz denied having committed to deliver the finished products by October or
December 1997 and having made representations as to the quality and volume of deliveries.
As proof that PHSI had business arrangements with OMC and not with SOI, Cruz submitted
copies of Authority to Withdraw
[28]
for the period of February 10, 1998 to March 21, 1998
signed by Yu, addressed to OMC. As proof that Yu was aware that the facilities of SOI were
still under construction as he visited the
compound of SOI and OMC in Carmona, Cavite, Cruz submitted Requisitions/Purchase
Orders
[29]
for materials and labor for the construction of the facilities ofSOI. As proof that
PHSI delivered an unfinished filling machine to OMC and that a filling room was being
installed in the said plant, Cruz submitted photographs of the machine and room.
[30]


Cruz admitted, however, that the delivery receipts of finished products and
statements of account were those of SOI and not of OMC, and that the checks were drawn
and issued to SOI but were deposited in the account of OMC. Cruz maintained that SOI was
just starting its sales operations and was in the process of building its customer data base.
As proof that the two checks paid by PHSI were deposited in the account of OMC, Cruz
submitted deposit slips
[31]
thereon. Cruz insisted that the defects of the margarine were due
to PHSIs failure to comply with its promise to deliver the additional two filling machines.

Tolentino adopted the material allegations of the counter-affidavit of Cruz and
denied, for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief, the truth of Yus
claim that she executed and filed with the SEC two affidavits on December 29, 1998.
[32]


In his Reply/Affidavit,
[33]
Yu declared that he signed the authority to withdraw
addressed to OMC and not to SOI only because Cruz requested him to do so.SOI was actually
using the plant of OMC because SOI was still in the process of constructing its own
plant.
[34]
He averred that PHSI entered into an agreement for the supply of high quality
margarine with SOI, not with OMC. Cruz offered formulas with a 20% mark-up in favor
of SOI for the toll manufacture of high quality margarine, and Yu chose the most expensive
formula. He accepted Cruzs proposal under the impression that as early as 1997, SOI was a
financially liquid company.
[35]


After the requisite preliminary investigation, the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor
issued a Resolution
[36]
on August 31, 2001 finding no probable cause against the
respondents and ordering the dismissal of the complaint. The Provincial Prosecutor
declared that Yu, the complainant, failed to prove that fraud or deceit was employed by the
respondents in their dealings. He ruled that Yu failed to present evidence to show that at
the time he entered into an agreement with respect to the toll manufacturing of Fiesta
Margarine, the respondents had no intention of rendering the services required of them.
There was, in fact, evidence to the contrary, since the complainant admitted that there were
actual deliveries of margarine; and although there were delays and issues on the quality of
the margarine delivered, this was not equivalent to deprivation of property, right or
interest. The Prosecutor further explained that the respondents performance of their
obligation negated fraud and deceit, and that the issues of delay and quality of the
margarine could only give rise to civil liability.

The Prosecutor further declared that the complainant, likewise, failed to show that
the representation of Cruz that SOI was engaged in the business of toll manufacturing high
quality margarine induced PHSI to part with its money. Although the margarine delivered
by SOI was substandard, the complainant failed to prove that the respondents had no
intention to deliver high quality margarine when Cruz and Sy agreed to the arrangement. It
was pointed out that the complainant himself alleged that background inquiries on
respondent Cruz revealed that the latter was well-regarded for his expertise. The
Prosecutor emphasized that Yu never made any investigation on the background or
reputation of SOI; neither did he ask Cruz to produce an authorization or board resolution
showing his authority to enter into a contract or agreement with PHSI.

Yu appealed the Resolution to the Department of Justice (DOJ). On March 12, 2003,
the Secretary of Justice issued a Resolution
[37]
reversing that of the Provincial Prosecutor,
finding probable cause against all the respondents therein. The Provincial Prosecutor was
directed to file the necessary Information for estafa against all the respondents. According
to the Justice Secretary, PHSI did business with SOI for the production and supply of the
formers margarine requirements on the respondents representations that SOI was actually
engaged in the business of producing margarine and that it was the best in the market. Such
representations were simply false, as SOI had not, in fact, commenced business operations
since its incorporation in 1996, as evidenced by the Affidavit of Non-Operation and Affidavit
of Non-Holding of Annual Meeting dated December 8, 1998, executed by Tolentino and filed
with the SEC. Certainly, the Justice Secretary concluded, PHSI would not have dealt with
the SOI for the manufacture and supply of its margarine product had not respondents made
such false representations; hence, they must be prosecuted for estafa under Article 315
paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code.

The Provincial Prosecutor thereafter filed the Information with the Regional Trial
Court on March 17, 2003.
[38]
The accusatory portion reads:

That on or about the period of August 1997 to July 1999, in the
Municipality of Carmona, Province of Cavite, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating, and mutually helping one another, with deceit, and by means
of false pretenses and fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneous
with the commission of the fraud, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously, defraud PREFERRED HOME SPECIALITIES, INC. (PHSI)
represented by its President, EDWIN YU, in the following manner, to wit:
The above-named accused, as Chairman, President and Treasurer,
respectively, of SPECIALITY OIL, INC. (SOI), represented SOI to be a
corporation engaged in the business of manufacturing/supplying high
quality margarine and induced PHSI, through EDWIN YU, to produce
margarine from SOI and to provide for the machines and materials needed
for the production/supply of said margarine when in truth and in fact it has
no capacity to produce the margarine needed as it had not commenced its
business operation from the time of its incorporation in 1996, to the damage
and prejudice of PHSI in the amount of TWO HUNDRED SIXTEEN MILLION
PESOS (P216,000,000.00), Philippine Currency.

CONTRARY TO LAW.
[39]



Sy filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in the CA for the nullification of the
DOJ Resolution, alleging that the Justice Secretary committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in finding probable cause against him
for estafa.
[40]


On December 2, 2003, the CA rendered judgment
[41]
granting the petition and
reversing the DOJ Resolution. The fallo of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed
Resolutions dated March 12, 2003 and May 19, 2003 directing that an
Information for Estafa be filed against petitioner are hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The Secretary of Justice and the Provincial Prosecutor of the
Province of Cavite are hereby ordered to dismiss the complaint
and withdraw the Information for estafa against Harley Sy.

SO ORDERED.
[42]


The CA ruled that there was no probable cause for estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, as Yu and PHSI failed to adduce evidence that Sy
employed deceit and pretended to possess business or imaginary transactions with SOI. In
fact, the appellate court declared, PHSI and Yu adduced evidence that SOI, through Cruz and
Sy, concluded a business transaction with PHSI for the delivery of high quality margarine,
and that SOI delivered the commodities to PHSI albeit on a delayed basis. If, at all, the
appellate court ruled, the liability of SOI is not ex delicto but only civil, based on breach of
contract. Moreover, the appellate court ruled, Sy made the representations after the
contract had been perfected and after the deliveries had already been made for which PHSI
paid SOI.

Yu filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision, which the appellate court
denied, hence, the instant petition.

Petitioners aver that based on the evidence on record and as ruled by the Secretary
of Justice, there is a prima facie case for estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the
Revised Penal Code against private respondent. Thus, in substituting its findings for those
of the Secretary of Justice, the CA acted beyond its competence in the certiorari proceedings
under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Petitioners point out that the only issue in the petition below was whether the
Secretary of Justice acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction in finding probable cause against the respondents therein. The error
committed by the Secretary of Justice, if any, on his appreciation of the evidence on record
and its probative weight, are mere errors of judgment and not of jurisdiction. According to
petitioners, the remedy of private respondent, after posting bail, was to proceed to trial and
file a demurrer to evidence in due course, and, in case his motion was denied, to proceed in
adducing evidence. They argue that the CA acted beyond its authority in ordering the
Provincial Prosecutor to dismiss the complaint and withdraw the Information
for estafa against private respondent, considering case law that writs of prohibition and
injunction will not issue to enjoin criminal prosecution.

Petitioners assert that the first element of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a)
of the Revised Penal Code was sufficiently established in the evidence and documents
submitted. Private respondent Sy, as chairman and majority shareholder of SOI, together
with Cruz and Tolentino, personally met with petitioner Yu on February 12, 1998 at the
Jade Garden Restaurant, during which Sy made the following representations to Yu: SOI,
was the best in the market; they would no longer incur delay in the delivery of the
margarine; SOI was actually engaged in the business of supplying high quality margarine
which could rival, if not surpass, the quality of Star Margarine; and Cruz was a technical
genius when it came to the business of margarine and other edible-oil based products. Sy
also stated that, since his family owned SM shopping malls, it would be unethical for him to
sell his own brand of consumer products, thus, the policy of SOI to supply, on a private label
basis, existing brands owned by third parties like the Fiesta Margarine of PHSI. Sy, with
Cruz and Tolentino, presented a proposal showing three formulas for margarine; the
margarine that SOI initially supplied to PHSI was based on the first formula containing
Stearin which, though expensive, made the margarine top quality and well worth the price.
Sy also intimated to Yu that it was his policy to meet major customers like him, and even
boasted that his family has a good reputation in the business community, known to be
honorable and fair in its business dealings.

Petitioner Yu insists that private respondent made these representations
notwithstanding the latters knowledge that SOI had not been in operation from the time of
its incorporation in 1996 until 1998.

Petitioners, likewise, posit that the second element of the crime of estafa under
Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, is also present in this case. The actual
defraudation of the petitioners came after private respondent made false pretenses and
fraudulent representations on February 12, 1998, that SOI was among the best in the
market and was actually engaged in the business of supplying high quality margarine.
Moreover, such representations were made prior to the commission of the fraud against the
petitioners and that PHSI was subsequently led to part with its money by issuing two
Chinabank checks in the aggregate sum ofP1,082,877.30. Petitioners assert that they would
not have parted with their money without such assurances and representations. Private
respondents concealment of the material fact that SOI was not in operation was committed
prior to the actual defraudation of petitioner PHSI. Moreover, subsequent to the meeting
between private respondent and petitioner Yu, several statements of account were sent
by SOI to PHSI for the collection of payments. The timely intervention of Sy was deliberately
undertaken at a time when the petitioners were about to terminate the failed toll
manufacturing agreement due to the unexplained delay and defective character of the
margarine products produced by SOI. Private respondents false pretenses and fraudulent
representations were but a part of a grand scheme, consisting of a series of continuous acts
with a common design and purpose, in conspiracy with Cruz and Tolentino, with no other
purpose but to defraud petitioner PHSI.

Likewise present, the petitioners aver, is the third element of estafa under Article
315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code. The actual defraudation of the petitioners
was a direct result of the false pretenses and fraudulent representations of private
respondent, Cruz and Tolentino. Petitioners aver that from the start, they relied heavily on
the representations and assurances of private respondent that his family was well-known in
the business community, which resulted in renewed dealings and transactions, ultimately
leading to the issuance of the two checks. As such, the false pretenses and fraudulent
representations employed by Sy on February 1998 was the direct cause of the defraudation
of petitioners. The petitioners posit that had they not relied on Sys false pretenses and
fraudulent representations, they would not have proceeded with their transactions and
dealings with SOI, and such check payments would not have been made.

Finally, petitioners insist that the last element of estafa under Article 315, paragraph
2(a) of the Revised Penal Code is also present because private respondents false pretenses
and fraudulent representations resulted in damage to PHSI when it was inveigled to part
with its P1,082,877.30. As a direct consequence of the fraud committed by private
respondent and his co-accused, a total of three nationwide recalls of Fiesta Margarine were
made on March 1998, July 1998 and February 1999, after delayed deliveries and numerous
complaints from distributors and customers regarding the defective character of the
product. This resulted in grave and irreparable damage to the business name and
reputation of PHSI, leading to its subsequent closure.

The petition has no merit.

The petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended, filed
with this Court is inappropriate. The proper remedy from the CA decision is a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45. This is so because (a) the CA had jurisdiction on the
petition for certiorari filed by respondent Sy, the petitioner therein; and (b) a petition under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is a speedy, inexpensive and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.

On the merits of the petition, we find and so rule that the CA did not commit grave
abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in taking cognizance of
and granting the petition of respondent Sy.

It bears stressing that a writ of certiorari is of the highest utility and importance for
curbing excessive jurisdiction and correcting errors and most essential to the safety of the
people and the public welfare. Its scope has been broadened and extended, and is now one
of the recognized modes for the correction of errors by this Court. The cases in which it will
lie cannot be defined. To do so would be to destroy its comprehensiveness and limit its
usefulness.
[43]


The appropriate function of a certiorari writ is to relieve aggrieved parties from the
injustice arising from errors of law committed in proceedings affecting justiciable rights
when no other means for an adequate and speedy relief is open. It is founded upon a sense
of justice, to release against wrongs otherwise irreconcilable, wrongs which go unredressed
because of want of adequate remedy which would be a grave reproach to any system of
jurisprudence.

The finding of a quasi-judicial officer may be nullified by a writ of certiorari if such
finding resulted from an application of an erroneous legal
standard.
[44]
In resolving the issue of whether the Secretary of Justice acted contrary to the
2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, or without or in excess of his authority, the Court has to
delve into and review the evidence on record. The Court can and has to consider the
evidence submitted to the Investigating Prosecutor for the sole purpose of determining
whether such officer exceeded his jurisdiction or acted illegally or arbitrarily.
[45]
Indeed,
in Prendergast v. Retirement Board of Firemens Annuity and Benefit Fund of Chicago,
[46]
the
appellate court of Illinois declared:

The law is well settled that on a common law writ of certiorari, the only
province of the trial court is to consider the record and ascertain whether
the board had jurisdiction, whether it exceeded its jurisdiction, whether it
proceeded according to law and acted on evidence, and whether there is
anything on record which fairly tends to sustain the action of the board; and
where the inferior tribunal is not arbitrary in its finding and there is
evidence in the record of its proceedings which fairly tends to support the
finding, a reviewing court is not justified in substituting its judgment for the
discretion and judgment of the inferior tribunal.
[47]



The need for the respondent herein to seek a cert writ from the CA was imperative
because of the frontal inconsistency between the findings and conclusion of the Provincial
Prosecutor who received the evidence of the parties, and those of the Secretary of Justice
who reinstated the Resolution of the Provincial Prosecutor on appeal.

In Mendoza-Arce v. Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas),
[48]
this Court held that the
acts of a quasi-judicial officer may be assailed by the aggrieved party via a petition
for certiorari and enjoined (a) when necessary to afford adequate protection to the
constitutional rights of the accused; (b) when necessary for the orderly administration of
justice; (c) when the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority; (d) where the
charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance; and (e) when there is
clearly no prima facie case against the accused. The Court declared that, if the officer
conducting a preliminary investigation acts without or in excess
of his authority and resolves to file the Information despite the absence of probable cause,
such act may be nullified by a writ of certiorari. Indeed, under Rule 112, Section 4 of the
2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Information shall be prepared by the Investigating
Prosecutor against the respondent only if there is a finding of probable cause to hold the
latter for trial. The Investigating Prosecutor acts without or in excess of authority under the
Rule if he files an Information against the respondent despite absence of evidence showing
probable cause therefor.
[49]
If the Secretary of Justice finds no probable cause and reverses
the Resolution of the Investigating Prosecutor based on the evidence on record, and orders
the latter to file an Information against the respondent therein despite the absence of
probable cause, the Secretary of Justice acts contrary to law, without or in excess of
authority. Such ruling may be nullified in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure.
[50]


A preliminary investigation is designed to secure the respondent involved against
hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution. A preliminary investigation is an inquiry to
determine whether (a) a crime has been committed; and (b) whether there is a probable
cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof. It is a means of discovering the person or
persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime. Probable cause need not be based on
clear and convincing evidence of guilt. The investigating officer acts upon reasonable belief.
Probable cause implies probability of guilt and requires more than bare suspicion but less
than evidence which would justify a conviction. A finding of probable cause needs only to
rest on evidence showing that more likely than not, a crime has been committed by the
suspect.
[51]


However, while probable cause should be determined in a summary manner, there
is a need to examine the evidence with care to prevent
material damage to a potential accuseds constitutional right to liberty and the guarantees
of freedom and fair play,
[52]
and to protect the State from the burden of unnecessary
expenses in prosecuting alleged offenses and holding trials arising from false, fraudulent or
groundless charges.
[53]


The petitioner charged the respondent, Cruz and Tolentino of estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, which penalizes a person who defrauds another

2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts
executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:

(a) By using a fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess
power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or
imaginary transactions; or by means of other similar deceits.

Petitioner PHSI, as the complainant below, was burdened to adduce evidence to
prove the following elements of estafa under Article 315 (2(a) of the Revised Penal Code:

a. That there must be a false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means

(1) by using fictitious name;

(2) falsely pretending to possess (a) power, (b) influence, (c)
qualifications, (d) property, (e) credit, (f) agency, (g) business or
imaginary transactions; or

(3) means of other similar deceits.

xxx

b. That such false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means must be
made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the
fraud.

c. That the offended party must have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent
act, or fraudulent means, that is, he was induced to part with his money or
property because of the false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means.

d. That as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage.
[54]


In order for estafa to exist under Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code, it is
essential that the false pretense or fraudulent representation be made prior to or at least
simultaneously with the delivery of the thing or property, it being essential that such false
statement or representation constitutes the very cause or the only motive which induces
the offended party to part with his money.
[55]
In the absence of such requisite, any
subsequent act of the accused, however fraudulent and suspicious it might appear, cannot
serve as basis for prosecution of estafa under the said provision.
The representor must have knowledge of the falsity of his representation or his
ignorance of the truth. He must have the intention that his false representation be acted
upon by the representee and in the manner reasonably contemplated. The representee
must be ignorant of the falsity of the representations, must have relied on the truth thereof,
and as a consequence, must have sustained injury.
Material injury, however, is not essential in the crime of estafa. It is enough that
there is disturbance of personal rights.
[56]
There must be damage although it is not required
that it be susceptible of determination.
[57]
The gravamen of the felony is an intent to deceive,
or fraudulent intent. Intent, being a state of the mind, may be proved by words or by the
conduct of the accused before, during and after the transaction, subject of the case,
independent of and distinct from the non-compliance of the promise or representation of
the accused.
[58]


A representation is anything which proceeds from the action or conduct of the
party charged and which is sufficient to create upon the mind a distinct impression of fact
conducive to action.
[59]
False may mean untrue, or designedly untrue, implying an
intention to deceive, as where it is applied to the representations of one inducing another to
act to its own injury.
[60]
Fraudulent representations are those proceeding from, as
characterized by fraud, the purpose of which is to deceive.
[61]
False pretense means any
trick or device whereby the property of another is obtained.
[62]


The Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of
his jurisdiction in finding probable cause for estafa against respondent Sy, as principal, on
his unsubstantiated finding that he conspired and confederated with Cruz and Tolentino in
defrauding PHSI.

The ruling of the Secretary of Justice that PHSI had no business transaction
with SOI was based solely on Tolentinos affidavits filed with the SEC where she stated
that SOI had no business transactions since 1996. The Secretary of Justice assumed that the
contents of the affidavit were true, and ignored the admissions made by Yu which were
corroborated by the petitioners documentary evidence on record. The ruling of the
Secretary of Justice amounts to grave abuse of discretion. The admissions and documentary
evidence of the petitioners must prevail over Tolentinos affidavit.

The Secretary of Justice unequivocally declared, in his assailed resolution, that PHSI
did business with SOI for the production of high quality margarine. The evidence relied
upon were the delivery receipts SOI issued covering margarine toll manufactured and
delivered to PHSI; it was also stated that PHSI made payments to SOI for the margarine
delivered to it. In his complaint-affidavit, petitioner Yu even admitted that in a series of
conferences with himself, Cruz and Tolentino in August 1997, they reached an agreement
wherein SOI obliged itself to process raw materials supplied by PHSI, and to toll
manufacture the same into high quality margarine with machines supplied by PHSI. The
latter, in fact, delivered raw materials and machines to SOI; the said materials were
processed and margarine was
manufactured with the machines supplied by PHSI from January to February 10, 1998. PHSI
acknowledged receipt of the finished product via delivery receipts. In Yu and his counsels
letter to Sy, they insisted that SOI had concluded a business transaction with PHSI, but the
respondent alleged that SOI had reneged on its agreement.
[63]


The Court agrees with the petitioners contention that the luncheon hosted by
respondent Sy on February 12, 1998 at the Jade Garden Restaurant was not merely a social
affair. Cruz and Tolentino had arranged the luncheon to be hosted by respondent Sy to
persuade and convince Yu to continue with the toll manufacturing agreement between PHSI
and SOI. PHSI had lost business during the 1997 Christmas season when SOI reneged on its
commitment to deliver margarine in October 1997 and December 1997. Respondent Sy
was the chairman of the Board of Directors of SOI and the son of Henry Sy, the business
tycoon. Yu had to be reassured that the delivery of margarine to PHSI would no longer be
delayed.

The Court is also inclined to agree with the petitioners contention that respondent
Sy made the following representations during the luncheon: (a) SOI was the best in the
market; (b) Cruz was a technical genius when it came to the business of margarine and
other edible-oil based products; (c) SOI was actually engaged in the business of supplying
high quality margarine with the use of Stearin formula which could rival, if not surpass,
the quality of Star Margarine; and (d) there would be no more delay in the delivery of high
quality margarine to PHSI. However, the Secretary of Justice did not consider said
representations of respondent Sy in finding probable cause against him.

The finding of the Secretary of Justice that Sy conspired with Cruz and Tolentino to
commit estafa is not supported by any evidence on record and must, likewise, be discarded.

Under Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code, there is conspiracy if two or more
persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy must be proven on
the same quantum of evidence as the felony subject of the agreement of the
parties. Conspiracy may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence consisting of acts,
words, or conduct of the alleged conspirators before, during and after the commission of the
felony to achieve a common design or purpose.

It is a common design which is the essence of conspiracy. The conspirators may act
separately or together by commission on different manner but always leading to the same
unlawful result.
[64]
The character and effect of a conspiracy are not to be judged by
dismembering it and viewing its separate parts but only by looking at it as a whole.
[65]
Acts
done to give effect to the conspiracy may be, in fact, wholly innocent acts. Yet, if they are
parts of the sum of the acts which are relied upon to effectuate the conspiracy which the law
forbids, they lose that character. Such acts become a public wrong if the result is harmful to
the public or to the individual against whom the concerted action is directed.
[66]


The evidence of the petitioners is that, only Cruz and Tolentino represented SOI
during their conferences with petitioner Yu in August 1997. Respondent Sy was not present
during said conferences. Neither is there evidence that respondent Sy was privy to said
conferences or to any agreement that Cruz and Tolentino had with petitioner Yu for the toll
manufacturing of margarine for petitioner PHSI; or that said respondent conformed to or
ratified any scheme or plan of Cruz and Tolentino to defraud petitioner PHSI. Actual or
even constructive notice of such scheme or plan may not be imputed to respondent Sy
simply because he was the chairman of the board of directors of SOI. The Court subscribes
to the view that
Imputed or constructive notice cannot be relied on to support a
charge of direct, personal conspiracy to defraud. It is not unlike a case where
actual notice is imputed to a principal because of the mental condition of his
agent. Actual notice, said the court in Reisan v. Mott, 42 Minn. 49, 43 N.W.
691, implies a wrongful purpose or intent in the mind of the person whose
conduct is in question. It is not to be conclusively presumed or legally
imputed to him merely because of the mental condition or the knowledge of
the same, or be a participant therein. He cannot enter into a combination of
two or more persons to accomplish by concerted action some demand or
unlawful purpose, or to accomplish some purpose, not criminal or unlawful
in itself, by criminal or unlawful means, simply and solely because of the
mental condition or physical acts of his agent.
[67]



In this case, respondent Sy is not criminally liable for estafa, as principal, even
if, gratia arguendi, he made false representations to Yu on February 12, 1998. By law, the
felony of estafa purportedly committed by Cruz and Tolentino had already been
consummated when PHSI delivered raw materials to SOI which the latter processed and toll
manufactured into margarine, which, in turn, were delivered to PHSI sometime in the last
week of January 1998. The delivery by PHSI of raw materials after February 12, 1998 and
the payment of P1,082,877.30 by PHSI on April 30, 1998 and May 8, 1998 do not negate the
consummation of the felony, but merely aggravated the injury already sustained by PHSI
and increased the damage it suffered.

Case law has it that one who joins a conspiracy while the felony subject thereof is
being committed or before the said felony is committed and performs overt acts to achieve
the common design or purpose, is criminally liable for said felony.
[68]
On the other hand,
one who joins a conspiracy after the felony subject of the conspiracy has been completed or
consummated is not criminally liable as a conspirator. There can be no ex post
facto conspiracy to do that which has already been done and consummated.
[69]
When a
crime has been fully committed, one not already guilty is too late to be a sharer in it, though
if it is a felony, he or she may become an accessory under Article 19 of the Revised Penal
Code.

The issue of whether there is probable cause for estafa against respondent Sy as an
accessory was not raised in the Department of Justice, the CA, or even in this
Court. Nevertheless, since the issue is interrelated to the issue of whether or not there is
probable cause for estafa against the respondent, as principal, the Court shall resolve the
issue if only to write finis to this case.

The petitioner failed to adduce evidence that the respondent knew, as of February
12, 1998, that Cruz and Tolentino had committed estafa relative to the toll manufacturing of
high quality margarine to PHSI. The only plaint of Yu, at that point, was the delay in the
delivery of the commodity. Neither is there evidence, direct or circumstantial, that
respondent Sy profited from the business transaction between the petitioner and SOI. The
facts are as follows:

First. Yu admitted in his Reply-Affidavit that, as early as 1997, he came to know
from the industry that respondent Sy and Cruz had ventured into a new company. He
agreed to negotiate with SOI for processing raw materials supplied by PHSI, to be
manufactured into high quality margarine with the use of machines also supplied by PHSI
knowing that he was dealing with a financially liquid company. Yu was assured
that SOI was using the facilities of OMC.
[70]
Yu could not have been deceived by the
representations of the respondent that SOI was the best in the market.

Second. Even before meeting respondent Sy on February 12, 1998, Yu had made
inquiries from his friends in the edible oil industry and learned that Cruz was well-
regarded for his experience. In fact, Yu was already convinced of the capability of Cruz and
his group to supply margarine of better quality than the margarine toll manufactured for
PHSI by Gothong in larger volumes and at lesser cost.
[71]
The glowing description of
respondent Sy of the technical capability of Cruz was thus not a surprise to Yu. He had
already confirmed the technical capabilities of Cruz to deliver even before
respondent Sy declared Cruz as a technical genius. If, contrary to the results of his
inquiries, Yu discovered that Cruz was not, after all, a technical genius because the
margarine delivered by SOI turned out to be defective or substandard or not of high quality
than Star Margarine, then Yu has nobody but himself to blame. When the representee
undertakes his independent investigation, he is ordinarily chargeable with knowledge of all
the facts which such an investigation should disclose and has no right to rely on the
representors statements.
[72]


Third. Petitioner PHSI paid P1,082,866.30 for margarine already delivered by SOI
before the meeting by respondent Sy and petitioner Yu on February 1, 1998. There is no
showing in the records that respondent Sy knew or came to know after May 1998 of said
payment. Indeed, respondent Sy could not have learned of said payment because the checks
were forthwith endorsed by Cruz to OMC of which respondent Sy was not even a
stockholder or an officer.

Fourth. When respondent Sy was informed by petitioner Yu that the margarine
delivered by SOI turned white, the former was apologetic. Indeed, in a casual meeting with
respondent Sy in August 1998 at the Polo Club, respondent Sy told Yu that SOI would
assume responsibility for all raw materials, packing materials, labor and all aspects of the
business venture and that the billing for a kilo of margarine delivered after August 15, 1998
was P66.75 reflecting an all-in" price as prescribed by respondent Sy.
[73]
Petitioner Yu was
even delighted.

Fifth. The margarine delivered by SOI turned white because the beta carotene used
was either expired or had iodized after opening and due to production parameters.
[74]
When
Yu complained to respondent Sy, the latter told him that he had instructed Cruz not to
release the margarine again unless he was 100% sure that the margarine would not
discolor.
[75]


IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 77493 are AFFIRMED. Costs
against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.




Ma. Imelda Pineda-Ng vs People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 189533, November 15, 2010

FACTS:

On December 19, 2007, an Information for Qualified Theft was filed against: (1)
Richard Francisco (Francisco), Branch Manager of private complainant Philippine Business
Bank (bank) located in Dolores, City of San Fernando, Pampanga; (2) Mailada Marilag-
Aquino (Aquino); and (3) petitioner Ma. Imelda Pineda-Ng
]
(petitioner).

The prosecution found that Aquino had drawn and issued the 7 checks in favor of
petitioner. In turn, petitioner presented these seven (7) checks for payment before the bank
by virtue of her Bill Purchase Accommodation facility through Francisco, who, in excess of
his authority, approved the payment of these checks despite the fact that each check had a
face value of more than P100,000.00 and that the same were actually drawn from Closed
Accounts and/or drawn against insufficient funds.

Judge Maria AmiFaith Reyes of RTC 42 in San Fernando, Pampanga found probable
cuase for the issuance of warrant of arrest against Francisco, but dismissed the case against
Aquino and the Petitioner. However, on Motion for Reconsideration by the Prosecution,
Judge Reyes reversed its earlier order and found probable cause against the Petitioner and
Aquino and ordered their arrest.

Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari, but it was dismissed by the Court of
Appeals. In dismissing the case, the CA found the no abuse of discretion was made by Judge
Reyes and that she did not rely solely on the recommendation of the prosecutor. Moreover,
the CA held that while it is true that there is no crime of Conspiracy to Commit Qualified
Theft as argued by petitioner, the Information charged all the accused with consummated
Qualified Theft; thus, Aquino and petitioner were charged as principals by direct
participation. Subsequently, the CA denied petitioners motion for reconsideration in its
Resolution dated September 8, 2009.

Hence, this Petition ascribing grave abuse of discretion to the CA insofar as the
impugned decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals are inconsistent with and not
supported by the law, the facts, as well as, the settled jurisprudence laid down by the
Honorable Supreme Court on the matter of filing of criminal cases against the accused where
there is no evidence sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that an offense was
committed.



ISSUE:

Whether or not finding of probable cause by Judge Reyes was supported by a
sufficient evidence to engender a well founded belief that an offense was committed

HELD:

The Supreme Court denied the Petition.
Probable cause has been defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances as
would lead a person of ordinary caution and prudence to entertain an honest and strong
suspicion that the person charged is guilty of the crime subject of the investigation. Being
based merely on opinion and reasonable belief, it does not import absolute certainty.
Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, as the
investigating officer acts upon reasonable belief. Probable cause implies probability
of guilt and requires more than bare suspicion, but less than evidence which would
justify a conviction.
1


The Supreme Court also accorded respect to the factual findings of the City
Prosecutor and the CA that petitioner indeed encashed these allegedly anomalous checks.
Suffice it to state that a finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether
there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction it is enough that there is a reasonable
belief that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged.
2




HAROLD V. TAMARGO vs. ROMULO AWINGAN, LLOYD ANTIPORDA and LICERIO
ANTIPORDA, JR.

Atty. Franklin V. Tamargo and his eight-year-old daughter, Gail Franzielle, were shot and
killed. The police had no leads on the perpetrators of the crime until a certain Reynaldo
Geron surfaced and executed an affidavit dated. He stated that a certain Lucio Columna told
him during a drinking spree that Atty. Tamargo was ordered killed by respondent Lloyd
Antiporda and that he (Columna) was one of those who killed Atty. Tamargo. He added that
he told the Tamargo family what he knew and that the sketch of the suspect closely
resembled Columna.

On March 8, 2004, Columna (whose real name was Manuel, Jr.) executed an affidavit
wherein he admitted his participation as "look out" during the shooting and implicated
respondent Romulo Awingan (alias "Mumoy") as the gunman and one Richard Mecate. He
also tagged as masterminds respondent Licerio Antiporda, Jr. and his son, respondent Lloyd
Antiporda. The former was the ex-mayor and the latter the mayor of Buguey, Cagayan at
that time. When the killing took place, Licerio Antiporda was in detention for a kidnapping
case in which Atty. Tamargo was acting as private prosecutor.

ISSUE: Whether or not the co-cospirators admission in this case constitute a valid vicarious
admission (exception to the res inter alios acta rule).

RULING: No. Judge Daguna failed to consider that Columnas extrajudicial confession in his
affidavit was not admissible as evidence against respondents in view of the rule on res inter
alios acta.

Res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet. The rule on res inter alios acta provides that the
rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another.
Consequently, an extrajudicial confession is binding only on the confessant, is not
admissible against his or her co-accused and is considered as hearsay against them.

1[19] Chan v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 147065, March 14, 2008, 548 SCRA 337, 352.
2[22] Ang-Abaya v. Ang, G.R. No. 178511, December 4, 2008, 573 SCRA 129, 142.

An exception to the res inter alios acta rule is an admission made by a conspirator under
Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court:

Admission by conspirator. The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the
conspiracy and during its existence, may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator
after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.

This rule prescribes that the act or declaration of the conspirator relating to the conspiracy
and during its existence may be given in evidence against co-conspirators provided that the
conspiracy is shown by independent evidence aside from the extrajudicial confession. Thus,
in order that the admission of a conspirator may be received against his or her co-
conspirators, it is necessary that (a) the conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than
the admission itself (b) the admission relates to the common object and (c) it has been
made while the declarant was engaged in carrying out the conspiracy. Otherwise, it cannot
be used against the alleged co-conspirators without violating their constitutional right to be
confronted with the witnesses against them and to cross-examine them.

Here, aside from the extrajudicial confession, which was later on recanted, no other piece of
evidence was presented to prove the alleged conspiracy. There was no other prosecution
evidence, direct or circumstantial, which the extrajudicial confession could corroborate.
Therefore, the recanted confession of Columna, which was the sole evidence against
respondents, had no probative value and was inadmissible as evidence against them.