Packet-Hiding Methods for Preventing Selective

Jamming Attacks
Abstract
The open nature of the wireless medium leaves it vulnerable to intentional interference
attacks, tpicall referred to as !amming" This intentional interference with wireless
transmissions can be used as a launch pad for mounting #enial-of-Service attacks on wireless
networks" Tpicall, !amming has been addressed under an e$ternal threat model" However,
adversaries with internal knowledge of protocol specifications and network secrets can launch
low-effort !amming attacks that are difficult to detect and counter" %n this work, we address the
problem of selective !amming attacks in wireless networks" %n these attacks, the adversar is
active onl for a short period of time, selectivel targeting messages of high importance" &e
illustrate the advantages of selective !amming in terms of network performance degradation and
adversar effort b presenting two case studies' a selective attack on T(P and one on routing" &e
show those selective !amming attacks can be launched b performing real-time packet
classification at the phsical laer" To mitigate these attacks, we develop three schemes that
prevent real-time packet classification b combining crptographic primitives with phsical laer
attributes" &e anal)e the securit of our methods and evaluate their computational and
communication overhead"
Existing System
%n *$isting Sstem &ireless networks rel on the uninterrupted availabilit of the
wireless medium to interconnect participating nodes" However, the open nature of this medium
leaves it vulnerable to multiple securit threats" Anone with a transceiver can eavesdrop on
wireless transmissions, in!ect spurious messages, or !am legitimate ones" &hile eavesdropping
and message in!ection can be prevented using crptographic methods, !amming attacks are much
harder to counter" The have been shown to actuali)e severe #enial-of-Service +#oS, attacks
against wireless networks"
This strateg has several disadvantages"
o -irst, the adversar has to e$pend a significant amount of energ to !am
fre.uenc bands of interest"
o Second, the continuous presence of unusuall high interference levels
makes this tpe of attacks eas to detect"
Proposed Sstem
%n Proposed Sstem, we address the problem of !amming under an internal threat model"
&e consider a sophisticated adversar who is aware of network secrets and the implementation
details of network protocols at an laer in the network stack" The adversar e$ploits his internal
knowledge for launching selective jamming attacks in which specific messages of /high
importance0 are targeted"
To launch selective !amming attacks, the adversar must be capable of implementing a
/classif-then-!am0 strateg before the completion of a wireless transmission" Such strateg can
be actuali)ed either b classifing transmitted packets using protocol semantics, or b decoding
packets on the fl"
To mitigate such attacks, we develop three schemes that prevent classification of
transmitted packets in real time" 1ur schemes rel on the !oint consideration of crptographic
mechanisms with PH2-laer attributes" &e anal)e the securit of our schemes and show that
the achieve strong securit properties, with minimal impact on the network performance"
Modules:
1. Hiding 3ased 1n (ommitments
A Strong Hiding (ommitment Scheme +SH(S,
(rptographic Pu))le Hiding Scheme +(PHS,
An A14T-based Hiding Scheme +A14T-HS,
2. Packet-Hiding Techni.ues
3. 5eal-Time Packet (lassification
4. Selective Jamming Attacks
5. Simulation
Modules Description:
A Strong Hiding (ommitment Scheme +SH(S,
%n this Module, &e propose a strong hiding commitment scheme +SH(S,, which is based
on smmetric crptograph" To satisf the strong hiding propert while keeping the computation
and communication overhead to a minimum" To satisf the strong hiding propert, the packet
carring d is formatted so that all bits of d are modulated in the last few PHY layer symbols of
the packet" To recover d, an receiver must receive and decode the last smbols of the
transmitted packet, thus preventing earl disclosure of d" &e now present the implementation
details of SH(S"
(rptographic Pu))le Hiding Scheme +(PHS,
%n this Module, we anal)e the implementation details which impact securit and
performance" (rptographic pu))les are primitives as a method for establishing a secret over an
insecure channel" The find a wide range of applications from preventing #oS attacks to
providing broadcast authentication and ke escrow schemes" Proposed a construction called
time-lock puzzles, which is based on the iterative application of a precisel controlled number of
modulo operations" Time-lock pu))les have several attractive features such as the fine
granularit in controlling tp and the se.uential nature of the computation" Moreover, the pu))le
generation re.uires significantl less computation compared pu))ling solving"
An A14T-based Hiding Scheme +A14T-HS,
%n this Module, packets are pre-processed b an A14T before transmission but remain
unencrpted" The !ammer cannot perform packet classification until all pseudo-messages
corresponding to the original packet have been received and the inverse transformation has been
applied"
Packet-Hiding Techni.ues
%n this Module, packet-hiding techni.ues on the network performance via e$tensive
simulations" To implement the hiding sub laer and measure its impact on the effective
throughput of end-to-end connections and on the route discover process in wireless ad-hoc
networks" &e chose a set of nodes running 678"99b at the PH2 and MA( laers, A1#: for
route discover, and T(P at the transport laer" Aside from our methods, we also implemented a
simple MA( laer encrption with a static ke"
This packet-hiding methods re.uire the processing of each individual packet b the
hiding sub laer" &e emphasi)e that the incurred processing dela is acceptable, even for real
time applications" The S(HS re.uires the application of two permutations and one smmetric
encrption at the sender, while the inverse operations have to be performed at the receiver"
5eal-Time Packet (lassification
%n this module, once a packet is classified, the adversar ma choose to !am it depending
on his strateg" (onsider the generic communication sstem depicted" At the PH2 laer, a packet
m is encoded, interleaved, and modulated before it is transmitted over the wireless channel" At
the receiver, the signal is demodulated, deinterleaved, and decoded, to recover the original packet
m"
Selective Jamming Attacks
%n this module, proposed a !amming-resistant communication model for pair wise
communications that does not rel on shared secrets" (ommunicating nodes use a phsical laer
modulation method called ;ncoordinated #irect- Se.uence Spread Spectrum +;#SSS," The
also proposed, a !amming-resistant broadcast method in which transmissions are spread
according to P4 codes randoml selected from a public codebook" Several other schemes
eliminate overall the need for secret P4 codes
Simulation
%n this module, for each !amming strateg" &e observe that a selective !amming attack
against 55*< messages is e.uall effective to a constant !amming attack" However, selective
!amming is several orders of magnitude more efficient" 1n the other hand, random !amming fails
to disrupt the route discover process due to the flooding mechanism of A1#:"
System Requirements:
Hardware 5e.uirements=
Sstem = Pentium %: 8"> ?H)"
Hard #isk = >7 ?3"
-lopp #rive = 9">> Mb"
Monitor = 9@ :?A (olor"
Mouse = Aogitech"
5am = @98 Mb"
Software 5e.uirements=
1perating sstem = - &indows BP"
(oding Aanguage = (C"4et
#atabase = S.l Server 877@