Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-59180 January 29, 1987
CLEMENTINO TORRALBA and RESOLUTION L. RUGAY, petitioners,
vs.
THE MUNICIPALITY OF SIBAGAT, PROVINCE OF AGUSAN DEL SUR and ITS MUNICIPAL
OFFICERS,respondents.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J .:
Challenged in the instant Petition, as violative of Section 3, Article XI of the 1973 Constitution, is Batas Pambansa
Blg. 56, enacted on 1 February 1980, creating the Municipality of Sibagat, Province of Agusan del Sur. The pertinent
provisions of BP 56 read:
Sec. 1. The barangays of Ilihan, Sinai, Sibagat, El Rio, Afga, Tabontabon, Perez, Magsaysay, Santa Cruz, Santa
Maria, San Isidro, Villangit, Del Rosario, Anahauan Mahayahay, and San Vicente, all in the Municipality of
Bayugan, Province of Agusan del Sur, are hereby separated from said municipality to form and constitute an
independent Municipality of Sibagat without affecting in any manner the legal existence of the mother Municipality
of Bayugan.
Sec. 2. The boundaries of the new Municipality of Sibagat will be: Beginning at the point of intersection of the
Cabadbaran-Old Bayugan and Surigao del Sur boundaries; thence in a southernly direction following the Old
Bayugan and Cabadbaran, Old Bayugan and Butuan City, Old Bayugan and Las Nieves boundaries, until it reaches
the point of intersection of Old Bayugan, Esperanza and the Municipality of Las Nieves; ...
Sec. 3. The seat of government of the newly created municipality shall be in Barangay Sibagat.
Sec. 4. Except as herein provided, all provisions of laws, now or hereafter applicable to regular municipalities shall
be applicable to the new Municipality of Sibagat.
Sec. 5. After ratification by the majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite to be conducted in the area or areas affected
within a period of ninety (90) days after the approval of this Act, the President (Prime Minister) shall appoint the
Mayor and other Officials of the new Municipality of Sibagat.
Petitioners are residents and taxpayers of Butuan City, with petitioner, Clementino Torralba, being a member of the
Sangguniang Panglunsod of the same City. Respondent municipal officers are the local public officials of the new
Municipality.
Section 3, Article XI of the 1973 Constitution, said to have been infringed, is reproduced hereunder:
Sec. 3. No province, city, municipality, or barrio may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary
substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code, and subject to
the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected.
The thrust of petitioners' argument is that under the aforequoted provision, the Local Government Code must first be
enacted to determine the criteria for the creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of the boundary
of any province, city, municipality, or barrio; and that since no Local Government Code had as yet been enacted as of
the date BP 56 was passed, that statute could not have possibly complied with any criteria when respondent
Municipality was created, hence, it is null and void.
It is a fact that the Local Government Code came into being only on 10 February 1983 so that when BP 56 was
enacted, the code was not yet in existence. The evidence likewise discloses that a plebiscite had been conducted
among the people of the unit/units affected by the creation of the new Municipality, who expressed approval thereof;
and that officials of the newly created Municipality had been appointed and had assumed their respective positions as
such.
We find no trace of invalidity of BP 56. The absence of the Local Government Code at the time of its enactment did
not curtail nor was it intended to cripple legislative competence to create municipal corporations. Section 3, Article
XI of the 1973 Constitution does not proscribe nor prohibit the modification of territorial and political subdivisions
before the enactment of the Local Government Code. It contains no requirement that the Local Government Code is a
condition sine qua non for the creation of a municipality, in much the same way that the creation of a new
municipality does not preclude the enactment of a Local Government Code. What the Constitutional provision means
is that once said Code is enacted, the creation, modification or dissolution of local government units should conform
with the criteria thus laid down. In the interregnum before the enactment of such Code, the legislative power remains
plenary except that the creation of the new local government unit should be approved by the people concerned in a
plebiscite called for the purpose.
The creation of the new Municipality of Sibagat conformed to said requisite. A plebiscite was conducted and the
people of the unit/units affected endorsed and approved the creation of the new local government unit (parag. 5,
Petition; p. 7, Memorandum).lwphl@it In fact, the conduct of said plebiscite is not questioned herein. The officials
of the new Municipality have effectively taken their oaths of office and are performing their functions.
A dejure entity has thus been created.
It is a long-recognized principle that the power to create a municipal corporation is essentially legislative in nature. In
the absence of any constitutional limitations a legislative body may Create any corporation it deems essential for the
more efficient administration of government (I McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, 3rd ed., 509). The creation of the
new Municipality of Sibagat was a valid exercise of legislative power then vested by the 1973 Constitution in the
Interim Batasang Pambansa.
We are not unmindful of the case of Tan vs. COMELEC (142 SCRA 727 [1986]), striking down as unconstitutional
BP Blg. 885 creating a new province in the Island of Negros known as the Province of Negros del Norte, and
declaring the plebiscite held in connection therewith as illegal There are significant differences, however, in the two
cases among which may be mentioned the following. in the Tan case, the Local Government Code already existed at
the time that the challenged statute was enacted on 3 December 1985; not so in the case at bar. Secondly, BP Blg. 885
in the Tan case confined the plebiscite to the "proposed new province" to the exclusion of the voters in the remaining
areas, in contravention of the Constitutional mandate and of the Local Government Code that the plebiscite should be
held "in the unit or units affected." In contrast, BP 56 specifically provides for a plebiscite "in the area or areas
affected." In fact, as previously stated, no question is raised herein as to the legality of the plebiscite conducted.
Thirdly, in the Tan case, even the requisite area for the creation of a new province was not complied with in BP Blg.
885. No such issue in the creation of the new municipality has been raised here. And lastly, "indecent haste" attended
the enactment of BP Blg. 885 and the holding of the plebiscite thereafter in the Tan case; on the other hand, BP 56
creating the Municipality of Sibagat, was enacted in the normal course of legislation, and the plebiscite was held
within the period specified in that law.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby dismissed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Alampay, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla and Bidin, JJ.,
concur.


Separate Opinions

CRUZ, J ., concurring:
I concur on the assumption that the required plebiscite, although not questioned here, nevertheless complied with
Article XI, Section 3, of the 1973 Constitution, and was duly held "in the unit or units affected," i.e. not only in the
proposed municipality but also in the mother municipality, in line with Tan v. Commission on Elections (142 SCRA
727), reversing Paredes v. Executive Secretary (128 SCRA 6) and Lopez v. Metro Manila Commission (136 SCRA
633) insofar as these cases held that the plebiscite could be confined only to the political unit proposed to be created.
Separate Opinions
CRUZ, J ., concurring:
I concur on the assumption that the required plebiscite, although not questioned here, nevertheless complied with
Article XI, Section 3, of the 1973 Constitution, and was duly held "in the unit or units affected," i.e. not only in the
proposed municipality but also in the mother municipality, in line with Tan v. Commission on Elections (142 SCRA
727), reversing Paredes v. Executive Secretary (128 SCRA 6) and Lopez v. Metro Manila Commission (136 SCRA
633) insofar as these cases held that the plebiscite could be confined only to the political unit proposed to be created.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 125646. September 10, 1999]
CITY OF PASIG, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTION and THE
MUNICIPALITY OF CAINTA, PROVINCE OF RIZAL, respondents.
[G.R. No. 128663. September 10, 1999]
MUNICIPALITY OF CAINTA, PROVINCE OF RIZAL, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
CITY OF PASIG, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J .:
Before us are two (2) petitions which both question the propriety of the suspension of plebiscite proceedings
pending the resolution of the issue of boundary disputes between the Municipality of Cainta and the City of Pasig.
G.R. No. 125646 involves the proposed Barangay Karangalan while G.R. No. 128663 involves the proposed
Barangay Napico. The City of Pasig claims these areas as part of its jurisdiction/territory while the Municipality of
Cainta claims that these proposed barangays encroached upon areas within its own jurisdiction/territory.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On April 22, 1996, upon petition of the residents of Karangalan Village that they be segregated from its mother
Barangays Manggahan and Dela Paz, City of Pasig, and to be converted and separated into a distinct barangay to be
known as Barangay Karangalan, the City Council of Pasig passed and approved Ordinance No. 21, Series of 1996,
creating Barangay Karangalan in Pasig City.
[1]
Plebiscite on the creation of said barangay was thereafter set for June
22, 1996.
Meanwhile, on September 9, 1996, the City of Pasig similarly issued Ordinance No. 52, Series of 1996,
creating Barangay Napico in Pasig City.
[2]
Plebiscite for this purpose was set for March 15, 1997.
Immediately upon learning of such Ordinances, the Municipality of Cainta moved to suspend or cancel the
respective plebiscites scheduled, and filed Petitions with the Commission on Elections (hereinafter referred to as
COMELEC) on June 19, 1996 (UND No. 96-016)
[3]
and March 12, 1997 (UND No. 97-002), respectively. In both
Petitions, the Municipality of Cainta called the attention of the COMELEC to a pending case before the Regional
Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 74, for settlement of boundary dispute.
[4]
According to the Municipality of
Cainta, the proposed barangays involve areas included in the boundary dispute subject of said pending case; hence,
the scheduled plebiscites should be suspended or cancelled until after the said case shall have been finally decided by
the court.
In UND No. 96-016, the COMELEC accepted the position of the Municipality of Cainta and ordered the
plebiscite on the creation of Barangay Karangalan to be held in abeyance until after the court has settled with finality
the boundary dispute involving the two municipalities.
[5]
Hence, the filing of G.R. No. 125646 by the City of Pasig.
The COMELEC, however, ruled differently in UND No. 97-002, dismissing the Petition for being moot in
view of the holding of the plebiscite as scheduled on March 15, 1997 where the creation of Barangay Napico was
ratified and approved by the majority of the votes cast therein.
[6]
Hence, the filing of G.R. No. 128663 by the
Municipality of Cainta.
The issue before us is whether or not the plebiscites scheduled for the creation of Barangays Karangalan and
Napico should be suspended or cancelled in view of the pending boundary dispute between the two local
governments.
To begin with, we agree with the position of the COMELEC that Civil Case No. 94-3006 involving the
boundary dispute between the Municipality of Cainta and the City of Pasig presents a prejudicial question which must
first be decided before plebiscites for the creation of the proposed barangays may be held.
The City of Pasig argues that there is no prejudicial question since the same contemplates a civil and criminal
action and does not come into play where both cases are civil, as in the instant case. While this may be the general
rule, this Court has held in Vidad v. RTC of Negros Oriental, Br. 42,
[7]
that, in the interest of good order, we can very
well suspend action on one case pending the final outcome of another case closely interrelated or linked to the first.
In the case at bar, while the City of Pasig vigorously claims that the areas covered by the proposed Barangays
Karangalan and Napico are within its territory, it can not deny that portions of the same area are included in the
boundary dispute case pending before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo. Surely, whether the areas in controversy
shall be decided as within the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of Cainta or the City of Pasig has material
bearing to the creation of the proposed Barangays Karangalan and Napico. Indeed, a requisite for the creation of a
barangay is for its territorial jurisdiction to be properly identified by metes and bounds or by more or less permanent
natural boundaries.
[8]
Precisely because territorial jurisdiction is an issue raised in the pending civil case, until and
unless such issue is resolved with finality, to define the territorial jurisdiction of the proposed barangays would only
be an exercise in futility. Not only that, we would be paving the way for potentially ultra vires acts of such
barangays. Indeed, in Mariano, Jr. v. Commission on Elections,
[9]
we held that
The importance of drawing with precise strokes the territorial boundaries of a local unit of government cannot be
overemphasized. The boundaries must be clear for they define the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of a local
government unit. It can legitimately exercise powers of government only within the limits of its territorial
jurisdiction. Beyond these limits, its acts are ultra vires. Needless to state, any uncertainty in the boundaries of local
government units will sow costly conflicts in the exercise of governmental powers which ultimately will prejudice the
peoples welfare.
Moreover, considering the expenses entailed in the holding of plebiscites, it is far more prudent to hold in
abeyance the conduct of the same, pending final determination of whether or not the entire area of the proposed
barangays are truly within the territorial jurisdiction of the City of Pasig.
Neither do we agree that merely because a plebiscite had already been held in the case of the proposed
Barangay Napico, the petition of the Municipality of Cainta has already been rendered moot and academic. The
issues raised by the Municipality of Cainta in its petition before the COMELEC against the holding of the plebiscite
for the creation of Barangay Napico are still pending determination before the Antipolo Regional Trial Court.
In Tan v. Commission on Elections,
[10]
we struck down the moot and academic argument as follows --
Considering that the legality of the plebiscite itself is challenged for non-compliance with constitutional requisites,
the fact that such plebiscite had been held and a new province proclaimed and its officials appointed, the case before
Us cannot truly be viewed as already moot and academic. Continuation of the existence of this newly proclaimed
province which petitioners strongly profess to have been illegally born, deserves to be inquired into by this Tribunal
so that, if indeed, illegality attaches to its creation, the commission of that error should not provide the very excuse
for perpetration of such wrong. For this Court to yield to the respondents urging that, as there has been fait
accompli, then this Court should passively accept and accede to the prevailing situation is an unacceptable
suggestion. Dismissal of the instant petition, as respondents so propose is a proposition fraught with
mischief. Respondents submission will create a dangerous precedent. Should this Court decline now to perform its
duty of interpreting and indicating what the law is and should be, this might tempt again those who strut about in the
corridors of power to recklessly and with ulterior motives, create, merge, divide and/or alter the boundaries of
political subdivisions, either brazenly or stealthily, confident that this Court will abstain from entertaining future
challenges to their acts if they manage to bring about a fait accompli.
Therefore, the plebiscite on the creation of Barangay Karangalan should be held in abeyance pending final
resolution of the boundary dispute between the City of Pasig and the Municipality of Cainta by the Regional Trial
Court of Antipolo City. In the same vein, the plebiscite held on March 15, 1997 to ratify the creation of Barangay
Napico, Pasig City, should be annulled and set aside.
WHEREFORE, premises considered,
1. The Petition of the City of Pasig in G.R. No. 125646 is DISMISSED for lack of merit; while
2. The Petition of the Municipality of Cainta in G.R. No. 128663 is GRANTED. The COMELEC
Order in UND No. 97-002, dated March 21, 1997, is SET ASIDE and the plebiscite held on March
15, 1997 to ratify the creation of Barangay Napico in the City of Pasig is declared null and
void. Plebiscite on the same is ordered held in abeyance until after the courts settle with finality the
boundary dispute between the City of Pasig and the Municipality of Cainta, in Civil Case No. 94-
300.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing Purisima, Buena, and Gonzaga-
Reyes, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., on official leave.
Pardo, J., no part; was COMELEC Chairman.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 135927. June 26, 2000]
SULTAN USMAN SARANGANI, SORAIDA M. SARANGANI and HADJI NOR HASSAN, petitioners,
vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and HADJI ABOLAIS R. OMAR, MANAN OSOP and ATTY. NASIB
D. YASSIN, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
BUENA, J .:
Way back in the 1950s and during the martial law era, it has been said that even the dead, the birds and the bees
voted in Lanao. This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court which seeks to nullify the Order
issued by the Commission on Elections [COMELEC, for brevity] dated June 29, 1998, finding Padian Torogan in
Madalum, Lanao Del Sur as "ghost precinct," is an illustrative case.
The facts are as follows:
On September 15, 1997, a petition for annulment of several precincts and annulment of book of voters in Madalum,
Lanao Del Sur was filed with the COMELEC by, among others, Hadji Oblais R. Omar thru counsel Atty. Nasib D.
Yasin, herein private respondents. Among the precincts sought to be annulled was Padian Torogan, subject matter of
the present petition for certiorari.
[1]

On September 18, 1997, the COMELEC, thru the Clerk of the Commission sent telegrams to the respective Board of
Election Inspectors (BEI) of the questioned precincts in Madalum, Lanao Del Sur, including Padian Torogan, to file
their answer to the petition for abolition of precincts and annulment of book of voters.
[2]

On October 31, 1997, the incumbent mayor of Madalum, Lanao Del Sur, Usman T. Sarangani, herein petitioner,
together with other oppositors who were allegedly barangay chairmen of the twenty- three (23) barangays the "Books
of Voters" and precincts of which were sought to be annulled and abolished, respectively, filed an "Answer in
Opposition"
[3]
which included the affidavits of the barangay chairmen of the affected precincts attesting to the fact
that the move to annul the book of voters and abolish the questioned election precincts were for the purpose of
diminishing the bailiwicks of the incumbent mayor of Madalum, Lanao del Sur.
[4]

After hearing and submission of formal offer of exhibits and memoranda by the parties, the COMELEC issued an
Order
[5]
dated February 11, 1998, referring the case to its Law Department for appropriate investigation. The
COMELEC - Law Department conformably issued a memorandum dated April 29, 1998 directing Atty. Muslemin
Tahir, the Provincial Election Supervisor of Marawi City, Lanao del Sur "to conduct a rigorous incisive investigation
on the alleged ghost precincts and thereafter submit a report on the investigation conducted."
[6]
Consequently, Atty.
Tahir created a TASK FORCE INVESTIGATION TEAM by virtue of a memorandum dated June 13, 1998 directing
Election Officers Casan Macadato, Sacrain Guro and Anuar Datudacula "to conduct ocular inspection on the alleged
twelve (12) ghost barangays in the Municipality of Madalum, Lanao Del Sur."
[7]

On June 18, 1998, an ocular inspection was conducted on the alleged ghost precincts yielding the following results
"At 12:10 pm, the Task Force Investigation Team from the COMELEC accompanied by
traditional leaders, political leaders, many concerned residents of this town, a representative
from the Lanao del Sur Provincial Statistics Office, Mr. Lacson Abdullah, and a Team from the
DILG-ARMM, Lanao del Sur, arrived in the area supposedly Barangay Padian Torogan with
these comments and observations:
"It appears that in this area there are only two structures: One is a concrete house with no roof,
and the other is a wooden structure without walls and roof. This obviously mean that no single
human being could possibly reside in these two structures.
"Also, it came out that the name Padian-Torogan means a cemetery not a residential place. So
this contradicts the records being brought by the COMELEC Team from the Census saying
that the area has 45 households with a total population of 285. (Ref. Municipal census Report
as of September 1, 1995).
"Besides, no less than the Chairman of the COMELEC Investigating Team asked the people
around who among them is a resident or a registered voter in the so-called Barangay Padian-
Torogan, and no one answered affirmatively.
"Then at 12:50 PM, the COMELEC Investigating Team still with the people mentioned above
are in Barangay Lumbac to look for the other supposed Barangay named Rakutan, and found
this observations.
x x x.....x x x.....x x x
"By the way, unfortunately, at the peak of this ocular inspection, the Madalum Municipal Chief
of Police Mahdi Mindalano, armed with UZI pistolized Machine Gun, arrived at the scene at
exactly 12:55 pm boarding an orange Mitsubishi car with four armed bodyguards, the (sic)
confronted the Team Leader of the COMELEC Investigating Group and angrily insisted to stop
the ocular inspection.
"This STACOM Mindalano, in warning a photographer not to take a shot on him, pointed his
pistolized Rifle to this man when the photographer positioned his camera to take a picture of
him while he is arguing with the investigating leader, Mr. CASAN MACADATO.
"Moving camera film and several pictures are added hereto for further information and as
exhibits. Also attached hereof are the names and signatures of among the more-or-less one
hundred people who observed the conduct of this ocular inspection.
(NOTE: This writer, Mr. Khalil Y. Alawi, is a member of the five (5) man Committee from the
DILG-ARMM, Lanao del Sur created in respect to the Memo/Invitation from the COMELEC
Provincial Office of Lanao del Sur dated June 15, 1998 signed by Mr. CASAN MACADATO,
EO II, Chief Investigation Team. Mr. Macadato designated verbally and in public Mr. ALAWI
to be his Secretary during this investigation, and of course, the (sic) with the consent of the
DILG Team).
"I hereby certify that the foregoing are true and correct to the best of my knowledge.
Prepared by: (sgd) Khalil Y. Alawi
Member, DILG Team
Submitted by: (sgd) Casan Macadato
Election Officer II
Chairman, Task Force Investigation Team"
[8]

On the basis of the foregoing, Election Officer Casan Macadato submitted to the Provincial Election Supervisor of
COMELEC in Marawi City its 1st Indorsement dated June 19, 1998 reporting the results of the ocular inspection that
Padian Torogan and Rakutan were uninhabited.
[9]

On June 29, 1998, the COMELEC issued the assailed Order finding "Padian Torogan as ghost precinct." The
dispositive portion of the COMELEC Order reads:
"ACCORDINGLY, the Commission En Banc:
(1) resolves to GRANT the request and hereby:
(a).....DIRECTS the Task Force Investigating Team created pursuant to the Order of the
Commission en banc dated February 11, 1998, to continue the conduct of ocular inspection and
investigation as contained in the original directive of the Law Department dated April 29,
1998;
(b).....RECOMMENDS to the PNP Director and the Regional Director of the Philippine
National police, (1) to immediately relieve and transfer Chief of Police Mahdi Mindalano of
Madalum, Lanao del Sur and transfer him to an area where it will be extremely difficult for
him to return to Mandalum and do further damage to effort of the Commission to investigate
ghost precincts in said area considering the urgency of said investigation. (2) to look into the
possibility of involvement of other policement (sic) in Madalum in the aforestated criminal
mischief of the Police Station Commander or their possible partisanship.
(c).....RECOMMENDS to AFP Regional Command, Armed Forces of the Philippines, to
immediately assign sufficient number of men to maintain peace and order in the Municipality
of Madalum, Lanao del Sur, and to escort and secure the safety of the COMELEC
Investigating Team during the conduct of ocular inspections and investigations.
(2) findsPadian Torogan asghost precinct andshall beexcludedfromthespecial election to
beconductedin Madalum.
(3) Order the Investigating Team, thru Macadatu, to immediately resume the investigation, the
remaining ghost precincts in Madalum and to submit its findings to the Commission with
dispatch, allowing it to submit partial findings if necessary.
The Law Department of this Commission is hereby directed to implement this order.
SO ORDERED." (emphasis supplied)
[10]

On November 3, 1998, Sultan Usman Sarangani, Soraida M. Sarangani and Hadji Nor Hassan, in their respective
capacity as former Municipal Mayor, incumbent Mayor and Vice-Mayor of Madalum filed the instant petition
for certiorari and mandamus urging us to nullify the Order issued by the COMELEC, for having been issued with
grave abuse of discretion. Likewise, petitioners moved to consolidate this case with G.R. No. 134456 entitled "Sultan
Sarangani, et. al vs. COMELEC, et. al" alleging that G.R. No. 134456 also involves a COMELEC decision declaring
the precinct corresponding to eight (8) barangays in Madalum, Lanao del Sur as ghosts precincts.
In a resolution
[11]
issued by this Court on January 19, 1999, we denied the motion to consolidate, considering that
G.R. No. 134456 had already been dismissed in our resolutions of August 4, 1998 and August 18, 1998.
The basic issue to be resolved in this petition is whether or not the respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion in declaring Padian-Torogan as ghost precinct.
[12]

On a preliminary matter, though not clear, it appears from the records that Padian Torogan is a barangay in Madalum,
Lanao del Sur and it was erroneous for the COMELEC to consider Padian-Torogan as a ghost precinct. In any case,
the court is not tasked to determine whether the so-called Padian Torogan is a barangay or a mere election precinct.
The petition states that precinct No. 27A located in Barangay Padian Torogan was the one declared as a ghost
precinct by the COMELEC although the assailed Order did not mention any specific precinct but simply declared
"Padian Torogan as ghost precinct." To be clear, what was necessarily contemplated by the assailed Order would be
the election precinct in the said place.
It must be noted that under the Omnibus Election Code, there should be at least one precinct per barangay.
[13]
In
designating election precincts, the COMELEC usually refers to them by number. Nevertheless, the determination of
whether a certain election precinct actually exists or not and whether the voters registered in said precinct are real
voters is a factual matter. On such issue, it is a time-honored precept that factual findings of the COMELEC based on
its own assessments and duly supported by evidence, are conclusive upon this Court, more so, in the absence of a
substantiated attack on the validity of the same.
[14]
Upon review of the records, the Court finds that the COMELEC
had exerted efforts to investigate the facts and verified that there were no public or private buildings in the said place,
hence its conclusion that there were no inhabitants. If there were no inhabitants, a fortiori, there can be no registered
voters, or the registered voters may have left the place. It is not impossible for a certain barangay not to actually have
inhabitants considering that people migrate. A barangay may officially exist on record and the fact that nobody
resides in the place does not result in its automatic cessation as a unit of local government. Under the Local
Government Code of 1991, the abolition of a local government unit (LGU) may be done by Congress in the case of a
province, city, municipality, or any other political subdivision.
[15]
In the case of a barangay, except in Metropolitan
Manila area and in cultural communities, it may be done by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan or Sangguniang
Panglungsod concerned subject to the mandatory requirement of a plebiscite
[16]
conducted for the purpose in the
political units affected.
The findings of the administrative agency cannot be reversed on appeal or certiorari particularly when no significant
facts and circumstances are shown to have been overlooked or disregarded which when considered would have
substantially affected the outcome of the case. The COMELEC has broad powers to ascertain the true results of an
election by means available to it.
[17]
The assailed order having been issued pursuant to COMELECs administrative
powers and in the absence of any finding of grave abuse of discretion in declaring a precinct as non-existent, said
order shall stand. Judicial interference is unnecessary and uncalled for.
[18]
No voter is disenfranchised because no
such voter exist. The sacred right of suffrage guaranteed by the Constitution
[19]
is not tampered when a list of
fictitious voters is excluded from an electoral exercise. Suffrage is conferred by the Constitution only on citizens who
are qualified to vote and are not otherwise disqualified by law. On the contrary, such exclusion of non-existent voters
all the more protects the validity and credibility of the electoral process as well as the right of suffrage because the
"electoral will" would not be rendered nugatory by the inclusion of some ghost votes. Election laws should give
effect to, rather than frustrate the will of the people.
[20]

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED, and the assailed Order dated June 29, 1998 of the Commission
on Elections is UPHELD. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Gonzaga-Reyes,
Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Vitug, J., official business.
Pardo, J., no part, was Comelec chairman at the time.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 103328 October 19, 1992
HON. ROY A. PADILLA, JR., In his capacity as Governor of the Province of Camarines Norte, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
R E S O L U T I O N

ROMERO, J .:
Pursuant to Republic Act No. 7155, the Commission on Elections promulgated on November 13, 1991, Resolution
No. 2312 which reads as follows:
WHEREAS, Republic Act No. 7155 approved on September 6, 1991 creates the Municipality
of Tulay-Na-Lupa in the Province of Camarines Norte to be composed of Barangays Tulay-Na-
Lupa, Lugui, San Antonio, Mabilo I, Napaod, Benit, Bayan-Bayan, Matanlang, Pag-Asa, Maot,
and Calabasa, all in the Municipality of Labo, same province.
WHEREAS under Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution
1
the creation of a
municipality shall be subject to approval by a majority of votes cast in a plebiscite in the
political units directly affected, and pursuant to Section 134 of the Local Government Code
(Batas Pambansa Blg. 337)
2
said plebiscite shall be conducted by the Commission on
Elections;
WHEREAS, Section 6 of said Republic Act No. 7155 provides that the expenses in holding the
plebiscite shall be take out of the Contingent Fund under the current fiscal year appropriations;
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, as the Commission hereby resolves, to
promulgated (sic) the following guidelines to govern the conduct of said plebiscite:
1. The plebiscite shall be held on December 15, 1991, in the areas or
units affected, namely the barangays comprising he proposed
Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa and the remaining areas of the mother
Municipality of Labor, Camarines Norte (Tan vs. COMELEC, G.R. No.
73155, July 11, 1986).
xxx xxx xxx
In the plebiscite held on December 15, 1991 throughout the Municipality of Labo, only 2,890 votes favored its
creation while 3,439 voters voted against the creation of the Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa. Consequently, the day
after the political exercise, the Plebiscite Board of Canvassers declared the rejection and disapproval of the
independent Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa by a majority of votes.
3

Thus, in this special civil action of certiorari, petitioner as Governor of Camarines Norte, seeks to set aside the
plebiscite conducted on December 15, 1991 throughout the Municipality of Labo and prays that a new plebiscite be
undertaken as provided by RA 7155. It is the contention of petitioner that the plebiscite was a complete failure and
that the results obtained were invalid and illegal because the plebiscite, as mandated by COMELEC Resolution No.
2312 should have been conducted only in the political unit or units affected, i.e. the 12 barangays comprising the new
Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa namely Tulay-Na-Lupa, Lugui, San Antonio, Mabilo I, Napaod, Benit, Bayan-Bayan,
Matanlang, Pag-Asa, Maot, and Calabasa. Petitioner stresses that the plebiscite should not have included the
remaining area of the mother unit of the Municipality of Labo, Camarines Norte.
4

In support of his stand, petitioner argues that with the approval and ratification of the 1987 Constitution, particularly
Article X, Section 10, the ruling set forth in Tan v. COMELEC
5
relied upon by respondent COMELEC is now passe,
thus reinstating the case of Paredes v. Executive Secretary
6
which held that where a local unit is to be segregated
from a parent unit, only the voters of the unit to be segrated should be included in the plebiscite.
7

Accordingly, the issue in this case is whether or not respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in
promulgating Resolution No. 2312 and, consequently, whether or not the plebiscite conducted in the areas comprising
the proposed Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa and the remaining areas of the mother Municipality of Labo is valid.
We rule that respondent COMELEC did not commit grave abuse in promulgating Resolution No. 2312 and that the
plebiscite, which rejected the creation of the proposed Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa, is valid.
Petitioner's contention that our ruling in Tan vs. COMELEC has been superseded with the ratification of the 1987
Constitution, thus reinstating our earlier ruling in Paredes vs. COMELEC is untenable. Petitioner opines that
sinceTan vs. COMELEC was based on Section 3 of Article XI of the 1973 Constitution our ruling in said case is no
longer applicable under Section 10 of Article X of the 1987 Constitution, 8 especially since the latter provision
deleted the words "unit or."
We do not agree. The deletion of the phrase "unit or" in Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution from its
precursor, Section 3 of Article XI of the 1973 Constitution not affected our ruling in Tan vs. Comelec as explained by
then CONCOM Commissioner, now my distinguished colleague, Associate Justice Hilario Davide, during the
debates in the 1986 Constitutional Commission, to wit:
Mr. Maambong: While we have already approved the deletion of "unit or," I would like to
inform the Committee that under the formulation in the present Local Government Code, the
words used are actually "political unit or units." However, I do not know the implication of the
use of these words. Maybe there will be no substantial difference, but I just want to inform the
Committee about this.
Mr. Nolledo: Can we not adhere to the original "unit or units"? Will there be no objection on
the part of the two Gentlemen from the floor?
Mr. Davide: I would object. I precisely asked for the deletion of the words "unit or" because in
the plebiscite to be conducted, it must involve all the units affected. If it is the creation of a
barangay plebiscite because it is affected. It would mean a loss of a territory.
9
(Emphasis
supplied)
It stands to reason that when the law states that the plebiscite shall be conducted "in the political units directly
affected," it means that residents of the political entity who would be economically dislocated by the separation of a
portion thereof have a right to vote in said plebiscite. Evidently, what is contemplated by the phase "political units
directly affected," is the plurality of political units which would participate in the plebiscite.
10
Logically, those to be
included in such political areas are the inhabitants of the 12 barangays of the proposed Municipality of Tulay-Na-
Lupa as well as those living in the parent Municipality of Labo, Camarines Norte. Thus, we conclude that respondent
COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Resolution No. 2312.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Gutierrez Jr., Cruz, Feliciano, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, Davide, Jr., Nocon,
Bellosillo, Melo and Campos, Jr., JJ., concur.
Padilla, J., is on leave.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-114783 December 8, 1994
ROBERT V. TOBIAS, RAMON M. GUZMAN, TERRY T. LIM, GREGORIO D. GABRIEL, and ROBERTO
R. TOBIAS, JR. petitioners,
vs.
HON. CITY MAYOR BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, CITY TREASURER WILLIAM MARCELINO, and THE
SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD, all of the City of Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, respondents.
Estrella, Bautista & Associates for petitioners.

BIDIN, J .:
Invoking their rights as taxpayers and as residents of Mandaluyong, herein petitioners assail the constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 7675, otherwise known as "An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly
Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong."
Prior to the enactment of the assailed statute, the municipalities of Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to only one
legislative district. Hon. Ronaldo Zamora, the incumbent congressional representative of this legislative district,
sponsored the bill which eventually became R.A. No. 7675. President Ramos signed R.A. No. 7675 into law on
February 9, 1994.
Pursuant to the Local Government Code of 1991, a plebiscite was held on April 10, 1994. The people of
Mandaluyong were asked whether they approved of the conversion of the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a highly
urbanized city as provided under R.A. No. 7675. The turnout at the plebiscite was only 14.41% of the voting
population. Nevertheless, 18,621 voted "yes" whereas 7,911 voted "no." By virtue of these results, R.A. No. 7675
was deemed ratified and in effect.
Petitioners now come before this Court, contending that R.A. No. 7675, specifically Article VIII, Section 49 thereof,
is unconstitutional for being violative of three specific provisions of the Constitution.
Article VIII, Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 provides:
As a highly-urbanized city, the City of Mandaluyong shall have its own legislative district with
the first representative to be elected in the next national elections after the passage of this Act.
The remainder of the former legislative district of San Juan/Mandaluyong shall become the
new legislative district of San Juan with its first representative to be elected at the same
election.
Petitioner's first objection to the aforequoted provision of R.A. No. 7675 is that it contravenes the "one subject-one
bill" rule, as enunciated in Article VI, Section 26(1) of the Constitution, to wit:
Sec. 26(1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in the title thereof.
Petitioners allege that the inclusion of the assailed Section 49 in the subject law resulted in the latter embracing two
principal subjects, namely: (1) the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city; and (2) the division of
the congressional district of San Juan/Mandaluyong into two separate districts.
Petitioners contend that the second aforestated subject is not germane to the subject matter of R.A. No. 7675 since the
said law treats of the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city, as expressed in the title of the law.
Therefore, since Section 49 treats of a subject distinct from that stated in the title of the law, the "one subject-one bill"
rule has not been complied with.
Petitioners' second and third objections involve Article VI, Sections 5(1) and (4) of the Constitution, which provide,
to wit:
Sec. 5(1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and
fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts
apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with
the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio,
and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party list system of registered
national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations.
Sec. 5(4). Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a
reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standard provided in this section.
Petitioners argue that the division of San Juan and Mandaluyong into separate congressional districts under Section
49 of the assailed law has resulted in an increase in the composition of the House of Representatives beyond that
provided in Article VI, Sec. 5(1) of the Constitution. Furthermore, petitioners contend that said division was not made
pursuant to any census showing that the subject municipalities have attained the minimum population requirements.
And finally, petitioners assert that Section 49 has the effect of preempting the right of Congress to reapportion
legislative districts pursuant to Sec. 5(4) as aforecited.
The contentions are devoid of merit.
Anent the first issue, we agree with the observation of the Solicitor General that the statutory conversion of
Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city with a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand indubitably
ordains compliance with the "one city-one representative" proviso in the Constitution:
. . . Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall
have at least one representative" (Article VI, Section 5(3), Constitution).
Hence, it is in compliance with the aforestated constitutional mandate that the creation of a separate congressional
district for the City of Mandaluyong is decreed under Article VIII, Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675.
Contrary to petitioners' assertion, the creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject
separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion into a highly urbanized city but is a natural and logical
consequence of its conversion into a highly urbanized city. Verily, the title of R.A. No. 7675, "An Act Converting the
Municipality of Mandaluyong Into a Highly Urbanized City of Mandaluyong" necessarily includes and contemplates
the subject treated under Section 49 regarding the creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong.
Moreover, a liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule has been invariably adopted by this court so as not
to cripple or impede legislation. Thus, in Sumulong v. Comelec (73 Phil. 288 [1941]), we ruled that the constitutional
requirement as now expressed in Article VI, Section 26(1) "should be given a practical rather than a technical
construction. It should be sufficient compliance with such requirement if the title expresses the general subject and all
the provisions are germane to that general subject."
The liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule had been further elucidated in Lidasan v. Comelec (21
SCRA 496 [1967]), to wit:
Of course, the Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an enactment,
language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute
details therein. It suffices if the title should serve the purpose of the constitutional demand that
it inform the legislators, the persons interested in the subject of the bill and the public, of the
nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation" (emphasis supplied).
Proceeding now to the other constitutional issues raised by petitioners to the effect that there is no mention in the
assailed law of any census to show that Mandaluyong and San Juan had each attained the minimum requirement of
250,000 inhabitants to justify their separation into two legislative districts, the same does not suffice to strike down
the validity of R.A. No. 7675. The said Act enjoys the presumption of having passed through the regular
congressional processes, including due consideration by the members of Congress of the minimum requirements for
the establishment of separate legislative districts. At any rate, it is not required that all laws emanating from the
legislature must contain all relevant data considered by Congress in the enactment of said laws.
As to the contention that the assailed law violates the present limit on the number of representatives as set forth in the
Constitution, a reading of the applicable provision, Article VI, Section 5(1), as aforequoted, shows that the present
limit of 250 members is not absolute. The Constitution clearly provides that the House of Representatives shall be
composed of not more than 250 members, "unless otherwise provided by law." The inescapable import of the latter
clause is that the present composition of Congress may be increased, if Congress itself so mandates through a
legislative enactment. Therefore, the increase in congressional representation mandated by R.A. No. 7675 is not
unconstitutional.
Thus, in the absence of proof that Mandaluyong and San Juan do not qualify to have separate legislative districts, the
assailed Section 49 of R.A.
No. 7675 must be allowed to stand.
As to the contention that Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 in effect preempts the right of Congress to reapportion
legislative districts, the said argument borders on the absurd since petitioners overlook the glaring fact that it was
Congress itself which drafted, deliberated upon and enacted the assailed law, including Section 49 thereof. Congress
cannot possibly preempt itself on a right which pertains to itself.
Aside from the constitutional objections to R.A. No. 7675, petitioners present further arguments against the validity
thereof.
Petitioners contend that the people of San Juan should have been made to participate in the plebiscite on R.A. No.
7675 as the same involved a change in their legislative district. The contention is bereft of merit since the principal
subject involved in the plebiscite was the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city. The matter of
separate district representation was only ancillary thereto. Thus, the inhabitants of San Juan were properly excluded
from the said plebiscite as they had nothing to do with the change of status of neighboring Mandaluyong.
Similarly, petitioners' additional argument that the subject law has resulted in "gerrymandering," which is the practice
of creating legislative districts to favor a particular candidate or party, is not worthy of credence. As correctly
observed by the Solicitor General, it should be noted that Rep. Ronaldo Zamora, the author of the assailed law, is the
incumbent representative of the former San Juan/Mandaluyong district, having consistently won in both localities. By
dividing San Juan/Mandaluyong, Rep. Zamora's constituency has in fact been diminished, which development could
hardly be considered as favorable to him.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan and
Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.