EN BANC

[A.C. No. 1890. August 7, 2002]

FEDERICO C. SUNTAY, complainant, vs. ATTY. RAFAEL G. SUNTAY, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
BELLOSILLO, J.:
This Complaint for disbarment was filed by Federico C. Suntay against his nephew, Atty. Rafael G.
Suntay, alleging that respondent was his legal counsel, adviser and confidant who was privy to all his
legal, financial and political affairs from 1956 to 1964. However, since they parted ways because of
politics and respondent's overweening political ambitions in 1964, respondent had been filing complaints
and cases against complainant, making use of confidential information gained while their attorney-client
relationship existed, and otherwise harassing him at every turn.
Complainant enumerated the following cases filed by respondent to harass him: (a) Civil Case No.
4306-M[1] for injunction and damages in 1975, "Carlos Panganiban v. Dr. Federico Suntay," where
respondent appeared as counsel for the plaintiff involving fishponds which respondent had previously
helped to administer; (b) Civil Case No. 4726-M,[2] "Narciso Lopez v. Federico Suntay," in 1970 where
respondent appeared as counsel for the plaintiff to determine the real contract between the parties
likewise involving the two (2) fishponds which respondent had previously helped to administer; (c) Civil
Case No. 112764,[3] "Magno Dinglasan v. Federico Suntay," for damages where respondent appeared as
counsel for the plaintiff; and, (d) I.S. No. 77-1523, "Magno Dinglasan v. Federico Suntay," for false
testimony and grave oral defamation before the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan involving
complainant's same testimony subject of the complaint for damages in Civil Case No. 112764.
In addition, complainant alleged that respondent relentlessly pursued a case against him for
violation of PD No. 296[4] for the alleged disappearance of two (2) creeks traversing complainant's
fishpond in Bulacan covered by TCT No. T-15674. Complainant alleged that respondent's possession and
examination of the TCT and the blueprint plan of the property while he was still counsel for complainant
provided him with the information that there used to be two (2) creeks traversing the fishpond, and that
since respondent helped in the administration of the fishpond, he also came to know that the two (2)
creeks had disappeared.
Required to answer the charges respondent filed a "Motion to Order Complainant to Specify His
Charges" alleging that complainant failed to specify the alleged "confidential information or intelligence"
gained by him while the attorney-client relationship existed but which he allegedly used against
complainant when the relationship terminated. Complainant filed his Comments thereon as required in
our Resolution of 26 July 1978. Thereafter this case was referred to the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) for investigation, report, and recommendation in our Resolution dated 23 October 1978.
After almost four (4) years the OSG submitted its Report and Recommendation dated 14 October
1982 enumerating the following findings against respondent, to wit:
The evidence presented by complainant which was largely unrebutted by respondent establish two
counts of malpractice against respondent, one count of violating the confidentiality of client-lawyer
relationship and one count of engaging in unethical conduct.
1. Respondent committed malpractice when he represented Magno Dinglasan in the case for false
testimony and grave oral defamation filed by Magno Dinglasan against complainant before the Office of
the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan (I.S. No. 77-1523).
The case stemmed from the testimony given by complainant on December 21, 1976, before the Court of
First Instance of Bulacan in Civil Case No. 3930-M. When asked why Magno Dinglasan had testified
against him in that case, complainant stated that he once declined the demand of Magno Dinglasan, a
former official of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, for P150,000.00 as consideration for the destruction of
complainants record in the Bureau.
On account of that testimony, Magno Dinglasan charged complainant on July 29, 1977 with the crime of
false testimony and grave oral defamation (Exhibits G and G-1). During the preliminary investigation of
the case by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan, respondent acted as counsel for Magno
Dinglasan. When the case was dismissed by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan and it was
elevated to the Ministry of Justice on appeal, respondent continued to be the lawyer of Magno
Dinglasan.
Complainant testified in this disbarment proceeding that he consulted respondent, who was then his
counsel, about the demand made in 1957 or 1958 by Magno Dinglasan for P150,000.00 as consideration
for the destruction of complainants record in the Bureau of Internal Revenue. Respondents advice was
for complainant to disregard the demand as it was improper. Later, when Magno Dinglasan reduced the
amount to P50,000.00, complainant again consulted respondent. Respondent likewise advised
complainant not to heed the demand (pp. 61-62, tsn, May 21, 1981).
Respondents representation of Magno Dinglasan in I.S. No. 77-1523 constitutes malpractice (Section 27,
Rule 138, Rules of Court) for respondent was previously the lawyer of complainant and respondent was
consulted by complainant regarding the very matter which was the subject of the case. By serving as the
lawyer of Magno Dinglasan, in I.S. No. 77-1523, respondent thus represented an interest which conflicted
with the interest of his former client.
2. Respondent again committed malpractice when he served as lawyer of Magno Dinglasan in Civil Case
No. 112764 before the Court of First Instance of Manila.
Civil Case No. 112764 was an action for damages filed by Magno Dinglasan against complainant based,
among others, on the same testimony that complainant gave on December 21, 1976 before the Court of
First Instance of Bulacan in Civil Case No. 3930-M.
For the same reasons set forth above, respondents representation of Magno Dinglasan in Civil Case No.
112764 constitutes malpractice as thereby he represented conflicting interests.
3. In filing a charge against complainant for alleged illegal destruction of dikes, respondent violated the
confidentiality of information obtained out of a client-lawyer relationship.
In his capacity as lawyer of complainant from 1956 to 1964, respondent had the following functions:
Witness
A: He was my lawyer from 1956 from the time he passed the bar up to sometime in 1964
and my legal adviser on political matters and legal matters.
ATTY. AQUINO:
Q: As your lawyer from 1956 to 1964, will you kindly inform the Honorable Hearing
Officer what was the nature of the work of Atty. Suntay?
A: He handled my cases on the titling of our properties. He served as my legal counsel in
the Hagonoy Rural Bank of which my family is the majority stockholders. He used to help
me manage my fishpond. He is our legal adviser on legal matters. He is our confidant. We
have no secrets between us. He has complete access in our papers (tsn, May 21, 1981)
Complainant owned several fishponds in Bulacan, among them, the fishpond covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-15674. This fishpond was previously traversed by two creeks, Sapang Malalim
and Sapang Caluang. The existence of the creeks is shown by the certificate of title and the blue print
plan of the fishpond. In the certificate of title, the fishpond is bounded on the north and northeast by
Sapang Caluang and on the west by Sapang Malalim (please see Exhibit 6).
In a letter dated March 17, 1973, respondent reported the disappearance of the two creeks to the
authorities. The Chief State Prosecutor referred the letter to the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of
Bulacan. The Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan required the Public Works to conduct a re-survey.
(Exhibit 6).
In 1974, the Ministry of Public Works conducted a relocation survey of the fishpond. The relocation
survey disclosed that there were no more creeks traversing the fishpond. Sapang Malalim and Sapang
Caluang had disappeared.
Respondent was requested to file a formal complaint with supporting affidavits, for violation of
Presidential Decree No. 296. Respondent did so and the complaint was docketed as I.S. No. 74-193.
(Exhibit 6)
From the foregoing facts, it is clear that respondent made use of the information he gained while he was
the lawyer of complainant as basis for his complaint for the building of illegal dikes. His possession and
examination of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-15674 and the blueprint plan provided him the
information that there used to be two creeks traversing the fishpond covered by the title. Since he
helped in the administration of the fishpond, he also came to know that the two creeks had
disappeared. Thus, he gained the data which became the basis of his complaint when he was a lawyer
and part administrator of complainant. Under the circumstances, there is a violation of professional
confidence.
4. The evidence also establishes the commission of unethical conduct by respondent for serving as lawyer
of Panganiban and Lopez x x x and for himself filing criminal charges against complainant which were
later dismissed. The cases wherein respondent served as lawyer for the adversary of complainant or filed
by respondent himself against complainant are the following:
1. Carlos Panganiban v. Federico Suntay, Civil Case No. 4306-M, CFI, Branch VII, Malolos, Bulacan;
2. Narciso Lopez v. Federico Suntay, Civil Case No. 4726-M, CFI, Branch II, Malolos, Bulacan;
3. Magno Dinglasan v. Federico Suntay, I.S. No. 77-1523, Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan;
4. Magno Dinglasan v. Federico Suntay, Civil Case No. 112764, CFI, Branch XX, Manila; and
5. Rafael G. Suntay and Magno Dinglasan v. Federico C. Suntay, I.S. No. 74-193, Office of the Provincial
Fiscal of Bulacan, for violation of P.D. 296.
While there may be validity to respondents contention that it is not improper for a lawyer to file a case
against a former client, especially when the professional relationship had ended several years before, yet
under the over-all circumstances of the case at bar it can not be said that respondent acted
ethically. Complainant was not a mere client of respondent. He is an uncle and a political
benefactor. The parties for whom respondent filed cases against complainant were former friends or
associates of complainant whom respondent met when he was serving as the lawyer and general adviser
of complainant. The cases filed by respondent were about properties which respondent had something
to do with as counsel and administrator of complainant.
x x x x
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, undersigned respectfully submit that the evidence establishes
commission by respondent of malpractice for violating the confidentiality of client-lawyer relationship
and engaging in unethical conduct x x x x[5]
Resolution of this case was delayed despite receipt of the foregoing Report and Recommendation
in view of the Omnibus Motion to Remand Case to the Office of the Solicitor General; Motion to Disqualify
Solicitor Rogelio Dancel to Act on this Case and Motion to Suspend Period to File Answer dated 18 January
1983 filed by respondent principally accusing handling Solicitor Dancel of having given unwarranted
advantage and preference to the complainant in the investigation of the case.
After several pleadings on the issue were filed by both respondent and Solicitor Rogelio Dancel,
the Court in its Resolution dated 22 August 1983 denied respondent's motion to disqualify Solicitor
Dancel and required the OSG to proceed with the investigation of this case. However, no further
proceedings were conducted by the OSG until the records of the case together with other cases were
turned over to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on 19 May 1988.
After almost three (3) years from the time the records of this case were turned over to it, the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline submitted to this Court on 11 May 2001 Resolution No. XIV-2001-169
adopting and approving the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner finding
respondent guilty as charged. The IBP recommended that respondent Atty. Suntay be suspended from
the practice of law for two (2) years for immoral conduct. In so recommending the Investigating
Commissioner adopted in toto the findings of the OSG in its Report and Recommendation dated 14
October 1982. In our Resolution of 5 September 2001 we noted the foregoing IBP Resolution. However,
in view of the penalty involved, this case was referred to the Court En Banc for final action pursuant to our
Resolution dated 18 January 2000, Sec. 2, par. (b), in A.M. No. 99-12-08-SC.[6]
After a review of the records of this case, the Court finds the IBP Recommendation to be well
taken. As found by both the OSG and the IBP Investigating Commissioner, respondent Atty. Rafael G.
Suntay acted as counsel for clients in cases involving subject matters regarding which he had either been
previously consulted by complainant or which he had previously helped complainant to administer as the
latter's counsel and confidant from 1956 to 1964. Thus in Civil Cases Nos. 4306-M and 4726-M
respondent acted as counsel for estranged business associates of complainant, namely, Carlos
Panganiban and Narciso Lopez, the subject matter of which were the two (2) fishponds which
respondent had previously helped to administer.
On the other hand, I.S. No. 77-1523 for false testimony and grave oral defamation before the
Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan, and Civil Case No. 112764 for damages before the then Court of
First Instance of Manila, were filed in behalf of Magno Dinglasan, a former Bureau of Internal Revenue
(BIR) official, regarding whose alleged demand for P150,000.00 from complainant in exchange for the
destruction of the latter's record in the BIR, respondent had previously advised complainant to
disregard. Civil Case No. 117624 and I.S. No. 77-1523 were precisely filed against complainant because
the latter had previously testified on the alleged demand made by Dinglasan. Although respondent
denied that there was ever such a demand made by Dinglasan, the point is that his word on the matter,
i.e., whether there was in fact such a demand, would carry much weight against complainant considering
that he was the latter's counsel in 1957 or 1958 when the alleged demand was made. In addition,
respondent initiated the prosecution of complainant in I.S. No. 74-193 for violation of P.D. No. 296[7] for
the disappearance of the two (2) creeks, namely, Sapang Malalim and Sapang Caluang, previously
traversing complainant's fishpond in Bulacan covered by TCT No. T-15674 by using information obtained
while he was in possession of the certificate of title and the blueprint plan of the property.
As the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 21.01. - A lawyer shall not reveal the confidences or secrets of his client except:
a) When authorized by the client after acquainting him of the consequences of the disclosure;
b) When required by law;
c) When necessary to collect his fees or to defend himself, his employees or associates or by judicial
action.
Rule 21.01. - A lawyer shall not, to the disadvantage of his client, use information acquired in the course
of employment, nor shall he use the same to his own advantage or that of a third person, unless the client
with full knowledge of the circumstances consents thereto.
A lawyer shall preserve the confidences and secrets of his clients even after termination of the
attorney-client relation.[8] As his defense to the charges, respondent averred that complainant failed to
specify the alleged confidential information used against him. Such a defense is unavailing to help
respondent's cause for as succinctly explained in Hilado v. David - [9]
Communications between attorney and client are, in a great number of litigations, a complicated affair,
consisting of entangled relevant and irrelevant, secret and well known facts. In the complexity of what is
said in the course of the dealings between an attorney and a client, inquiry of the nature suggested would
lead to the revelation, in advance of the trial, of other matters that might only further prejudice the
complainants cause. And the theory would be productive of other unsalutary results. To make the
passing of confidential communication a condition precedent, i.e., to make the employment conditioned
on the scope and character of the knowledge acquired by an attorney in determining his right to change
sides, would not enhance the freedom of litigants, which is to be sedulously fostered, to consult with
lawyers upon what they believe are their rights in litigation. The condition would of necessity call for an
investigation of what information the attorney has received and in what way it is or it is not in conflict
with his new position. Litigants would in consequence be wary in going to an attorney, lest by an
unfortunate turn of the proceeding, if an investigation be held, the court should accept the attorneys
inaccurate version of the facts that came to him x x x x
Hence, the necessity of setting down the existence of the bare relationship of attorney and client as the
yardstick for testing incompatibility of interests. This stern rule is designed not alone to prevent the
dishonest practitioner from fraudulent conduct, but as well to protect the honest lawyer from unfounded
suspicion of unprofessional practice x x x x It is founded on principles of public policy, on good taste x x x
x [T]he question is not necessarily one of the rights of the parties, but as to whether the attorney has
adhered to proper professional standard. With these thoughts in mind, it behooves attorneys, like
Caesars wife, not only to keep inviolate the clients confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of
treachery and double-dealing. Only thus can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their
attorneys which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, IBP Resolution No. XIV-2001-169 dated 29 April 2001 is
adopted and approved. For violating the confidentiality of lawyer-client relationship and for unethical
conduct, respondent Atty. Rafael G. Suntay is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2) years
effective upon the finality hereof.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and all courts throughout the country.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago,
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, and Corona, JJ., concur.


[1] Of the then CFI-Bulacan.
[2] Also of the CFI-Bulacan.
[3] Of the then CFI-Manila.
[4] Directing all Persons, Natural or Juridical, to Renounce Possession and Move Out of Portions of
Rivers, Creeks, Esteros, Drainage Channels and Other Similar Waterways Encroached Upon by Them and
Prescribing Penalty for Violation Hereof.
[5] Rollo, Vol. III, pp. 207-214.
[6] Referral of Administrative Matters and Cases to the Divisions of the Court or to the Chief Justice and
Chairmen of Divisions for Appropriate Actions.
[7] See Note 4.
[8] Canon 21, Code of Professional Responsibility.
[9] 84 Phil. 569, 578-579 (1949).







FIRST DIVISION
[A.C. No. 4103. September 7, 1995.]
VERONICA S. SANTIAGO, BENJAMIN Q. HONTIVEROS, MR. SOCORRO F.
MANAS, and TRINIDAD NORDISTA, complainants, vs. ATTY. AMADO R.
FOJAS, respondent.
Amado R. Fojas for and in his own behalf.
SYLLABUS
1.LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS; ATTORNEYS; OWE FIDELITY TO CLIENT'S CAUSE AND MUST BE
MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN THEM. It is axiomatic that no lawyer is
obliged to act either as adviser or advocate for every person who may wish to become his client. He has
the right to decline employment, subject, however, to Canon 14 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and
must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He must serve the client with
competence and diligence, and champion the latter's cause with wholehearted fidelity, care, and
devotion. Elsewise stated, he owes entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the
maintenance and defense of his client's rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability to the
end that nothing be taken or withheld from his client, save by the rules of law, legally applied. This simply
means that his client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by
the law of the land and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. If much is
demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the
correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar, and to the public. A lawyer who
performs his duty with diligence and candor not only protects the interest of his client; he also serves the
ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal
profession.
2.ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT EXCUSED BY REASONS OF PRESSURE AND LARGE VOLUME OF LEGAL WORK.
In his motion for reconsideration of the default order, the respondent explained his non-filing of the
required answer by impliedly invoking forgetfulness occasioned by a large volume and pressure of legal
work, while in his Comment in this case he attributes it to honest mistake and excusable neglect due to
his overzealousness to question the denial order of the trial court. Certainly, "overzealousness" on the
one hand and "volume and pressure of legal work" on the other are two distinct and separate causes or
grounds. The first presupposes the respondent's full and continuing awareness of his duty to file an
answer which, nevertheless, he subordinated to his conviction that the trial court had committed a
reversible error or grave abuse of discretion in issuing an order reconsidering its previous order of
dismissal of Salvador's complaint and in denying the motion to reconsider the said order. The second
ground is purely based on forgetfulness because of his other commitments. Whether it be the first or the
second ground, the fact remains that the respondent did not comply with his duty to file an answer in
Civil Case No. 3526-V-91. His lack of diligence was compounded by his erroneous belief that the trial
court committed such error or grave abuse of discretion and by his continued refusal to file an answer
even after he received the Court of Appeals' decision in the certiorari case. There is no showing
whatsoever that he further assailed the said decision before this Court in a petition for review under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court to prove his claim of overzealousness to challenge the trial court's order. Neither
was it shown that he alleged in his motion to lift the order of default that the complainants had a
meritorious defense. And, in his appeal from the judgment by default, he did not even raise as one of the
errors of the trial court either the impropriety of the order of default or the court's grave abuse of
discretion in denying his motion to lift that order. Pressure and large volume of legal work provide no
excuse for the respondent's inability to exercise due diligence in the performance of his duty to file an
answer. Every case a lawyer accepts deserves his full attention, diligence, skill, and competence,
regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free.
3.ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT EXCUSED BY THE FACT THAT THE CLIENT'S CAUSE IS A LOSING CAUSE. The
respondent's negligence is not excused by his claim that Civil Case No. 3526-V-91 was in fact a "losing
cause" for the complainants since the claims therein for damages were based on the final decision of the
Med-Arbiter declaring the complainants' act of expelling Salvador from the union to be illegal. This claim
is a mere afterthought which hardly persuades us. If indeed the respondent was so convinced of the
futility of any defense therein, he should have seasonably informed the complainants thereof. Rule 15.05,
Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility expressly provides: A lawyer, when advising his
client, shall give a candid and honest opinion on the merits and probable results of the client's case,
neither overstating nor understating the prospects of the case. Then, too, if he were unconvinced of any
defense, we are unable to understand why he took all the trouble of filing a motion to dismiss on the
grounds of res judicata and lack of jurisdiction and of questioning the adverse ruling thereon initially with
this Court and then with the Court of Appeals, unless, of course, he meant all of these to simply delay the
disposition of the civil case. cdasia
D E C I S I O N
DAVIDE, JR., J p:
In their letter of 8 September 1993, the complainants, former clients of the respondent, pray that the
latter be disbarred for "malpractice, neglect and other offenses which may be discovered during the
actual investigation of this complaint." They attached thereto an Affidavit of Merit wherein they
specifically allege:
1.That we are Defendants-Appellates [sic] in the Court of Appeals Case No.
CA-G.N. CV No. 38153 of which to our surprise lost unnecessarily
the aforesaid Petition [sic]. A close perusal of the case reveals the
serious misconduct of our attorney on record, Atty. Amado Fojas
tantamount to malpractice and negligence in the performance of
his duty and obligation to us, to defend us in the aforesaid case.
That the said attorney without informing us the reason why and
riding high on the trust and confidence we repose on him either
abandoned, failed to act accordingly, or seriously neglected to
answer the civil complaint against us in the sala of Judge Teresita
Capulong, Case No. 3526-V-9, Val., Metro Manila, so that we were
deduced [sic] in default.
2.That under false pretenses Atty. Fojas assured us that everything was in
order. That he had already answered the complaint so that in spite
of the incessant demand for him to give us a copy he continued to
deny same to us. Only to disclose later that he never answered it
after all because according to him he was a very busy man. Please
refer to Court of Appeals decision dated August 17, 1993.
3.That because of Atty. Amado Fojas' neglect and malpractice of law we lost
the Judge Capulong case and our appeal to the Court of Appeals.
So that it is only proper that Atty. Fojas be disciplined and
disbarred in the practice of his profession. cdtai
In his Comment, the respondent admits his "mistake" in failing to file the complainants' answer in Civil
Case No. 3526-V-91, but he alleges that it was cured by his filing of a motion for reconsideration, which
was unfortunately denied by the court. He asserts that Civil Case No. 3526-V-91 was a "losing cause" for
the complainants because it was based on the expulsion of the plaintiff therein from the Far Eastern
University Faculty Association (FEUFA) which was declared unlawful in the final decision in NCR-OD-M-
90-10-050. Thus, "[t]he unfavorable judgment in the Regional Trial Court is not imputable to [his]
mistake but rather imputable to the merits of the case, i.e., the decision in the Expulsion case wherein
defendants (complainants herein) illegally removed from the union (FEUFA) membership Mr. Paulino
Salvador. . . ." He further claims that the complainants filed this case to harass him because he refused to
share his attorney's fees in the main labor case he had handled for them. The respondent then prays for
the dismissal of this complaint for utter lack of merit, since his failure to file the answer was cured and,
even granting for the sake of argument that such failure amounted to negligence, it cannot warrant his
disbarment or suspension from the practice of the law profession.
The complainants filed a Reply to the respondent's Comment.
Issues having been joined, we required the parties to inform us whether they were willing to submit this
case for decision on the basis of the pleadings they have filed. In their separate compliance, both
manifested in the affirmative.
The facts in this case are not disputed.
Complainants Veronica Santiago, Benjamin Hontiveros, Ma. Socorro Manas, and Trinidad Nordista were
the President, Vice-President, Treasurer, and Auditor, respectively, of the FEUFA. They allegedly
expelled from the union Paulino Salvador. The latter then commenced with the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE) a complaint (NCR-OD-M-90-10-050) to declare illegal his expulsion from the union.
In his resolution of 22 November 1990, Med-Arbiter Tomas Falconitin declared illegal Salvador's
expulsion and directed the union and all its officers to reinstate Salvador's name in the roll of union
members with all the rights and privileges appurtenant thereto. This resolution was affirmed in toto by
the Secretary of Labor and Employment.
Subsequently, Paulino Salvador filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela, Metro Manila,
Branch 172, a complaint against the complainants herein for actual, moral, and exemplary damages and
attorney's fees, under Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code. The case was docketed as Civil Case No.
3526-V-91.

As the complainants' counsel, the respondent filed a motion to dismiss the said case on grounds of (1) res
judicata by virtue of the final decision of the Med-Arbiter in NCR-OD-M-90-10-050 and (2) lack of
jurisdiction, since what was involved was an intra-union issue cognizable by the DOLE. Later, he filed a
supplemental motion to dismiss.
The trial court, per Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong, granted the motion and ordered the dismissal of the
case. Upon Salvador's motion for reconsideration, however, it reconsidered the order of dismissal,
reinstated the case, and required the complainants herein to file their answer within a non-extendible
period of fifteen days from notice.
Instead of filing an answer, the respondent filed a motion for reconsideration and dismissal of the case.
This motion having been denied, the respondent filed with this Court a petition for certiorari, which was
later referred to the Court of Appeals and docketed therein as CA-G.R. SP No. 25834.
Although that petition and his subsequent motion for reconsideration were both denied, the respondent
still did not file the complainants' answer in Civil Case No. 3526-V-91. Hence, upon plaintiff Salvador's
motion, the complainants were declared in default, and Salvador was authorized to present his evidence
ex-parte.
The respondent then filed a motion to set aside the order of default and to stop the ex-parte reception of
evidence before the Clerk of Court, but to no avail.
Thereafter, the trial court rendered a decision ordering the complainants herein to pay, jointly and
severally, plaintiff Salvador the amounts of P200,000.00 as moral damages; P50,000.00 as exemplary
damages or corrective damages; and P65,000.00 as attorney's fees; plus cost of suit.
The complainants, still assisted by the respondent, elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, which,
however, affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court.
The respondent asserts that he was about to appeal the said decision to this Court, but his services as
counsel for the complainants and for the union were illegally and unilaterally terminated by complainant
Veronica Santiago.
The core issue that presents itself is whether the respondent committed culpable negligence, as would
warrant disciplinary action, in failing to file for the complainants an answer in Civil Case No. 3526-V-91 for
which reason the latter were declared in default and judgment was rendered against them on the basis of
the plaintiff's evidence, which was received ex-parte.
It is axiomatic that no lawyer is obliged to act either as adviser or advocate for every person who may
wish to become his client. He has the right to decline employment, 1 subject, however, to Canon 14 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes
fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. 2 He must
serve the client with competence and diligence, 3 and champion the latter's cause with wholehearted
fidelity, care, and devotion. 4 Elsewise stated, he owes entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm
zeal in the maintenance and defense of his client's rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning and
ability to the end that nothing be taken or withheld from his client, save by the rules of law, legally
applied. 5 This simply means that his client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense
that is authorized by the law of the land and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or
defense. 6 If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to practice law
carries with it the correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar, and to the
public. A lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and candor not only protects the interest of his
client; he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and helps maintain the respect of the
community to the legal profession. 7
The respondent admits that it was his duty to file an answer in Civil Case No. 3526-V-91. He justifies his
failure to do so in this wise:
[I]n his overzealousness to question the Denial Order of the trial court, 8 [he]
instead, thru honest mistake and excusable neglect, filed a PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI with the Honorable Court, docketed as G.R. No. 100983. . . .
And, when the Court of Appeals, to which G.R. No. 100983 was referred, dismissed the petition, he
again "inadvertently" failed to file an answer "[d]ue to honest mistake and because of his
overzealousness as stated earlier. . . ."
In their Reply, the complainants allege that his failure to file an answer was not an honest mistake but
was "deliberate, malicious and calculated to place them on the legal disadvantage, to their damage and
prejudice" for, as admitted by him in his motion to set aside the order of default, his failure to do so was
"due to volume and pressure of legal work." 9 In short, the complainants want to impress upon this Court
that the respondent has given inconsistent reasons to justify his failure to file an answer.
We agree with the complainants. In his motion for reconsideration of the default order, the respondent
explained his non-filing of the required answer by impliedly invoking forgetfulness occasioned by a large
volume and pressure of legal work, while in his Comment in this case he attributes it to honest mistake
and excusable neglect due to his overzealousness to question the denial order of the trial court.
Certainly, "overzealousness" on the one hand and "volume and pressure of legal work" on the other are
two distinct and separate causes or grounds. The first presupposes the respondent's full and continuing
awareness of his duty to file an answer which, nevertheless, he subordinated to his conviction that the
trial court had committed a reversible error or grave abuse of discretion in issuing an order reconsidering
its previous order of dismissal of Salvador's complaint and in denying the motion to reconsider the said
order. The second ground is purely based on forgetfulness because of his other commitments.
Whether it be the first or the second ground, the fact remains that the respondent did not comply with
his duty to file an answer in Civil Case No. 3526-V-91. His lack of diligence was compounded by his
erroneous belief that the trial court committed such error or grave abuse of discretion and by his
continued refusal to file an answer even after he received the Court of Appeals' decision in the certiorari
case. There is no showing whatsoever that he further assailed the said decision before this Court in a
petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to prove his claim of overzealousness to challenge
the trial court's order. Neither was it shown that he alleged in his motion to lift the order of default that
the complainants had a meritorious defense. 10 And, in his appeal from the judgment by default, he did
not even raise as one of the errors of the trial court either the impropriety of the order of default or the
court's grave abuse of discretion in denying his motion to lift that order.
Pressure and large volume of legal work provide no excuse for the respondent's inability to exercise due
diligence in the performance of his duty to file an answer. Every case a lawyer accepts deserves his full
attention, diligence, skill, and competence, regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a
fee or for free.
All told, the respondent committed a breach of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
which requires him to serve his clients, the complainants herein, with diligence and, more specifically,
Rule 18.03 thereof which provides: "A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable."
The respondent's negligence is not excused by his claim that Civil Case No. 3526-V-91 was in fact a
"losing cause" for the complainants since the claims therein for damages were based on the final decision
of the Med-Arbiter declaring the complainants' act of expelling Salvador from the union to be illegal. This
claim is a mere afterthought which hardly persuades us. If indeed the respondent was so convinced of the
futility of any defense therein, he should have seasonably informed the complainants thereof. Rule 15.05,
Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility expressly provides:
A lawyer, when advising his client, shall give a candid and honest opinion on
the merits and probable results of the client's case, neither overstating nor
understating the prospects of the case.
Then too, if he were unconvinced of any defense, we are unable to understand why he took all the
trouble of filing a motion to dismiss on the grounds of res judicata and lack of jurisdiction and of
questioning the adverse ruling thereon initially with this Court and then with the Court of Appeals,
unless, of course, he meant all of these to simply delay the disposition of the civil case. Finally, the
complainants were not entirely without any valid or justifiable defense. They could prove that the
plaintiff was not entitled to all the damages sought by him or that if he were so, they could ask for a
reduction of the amounts thereof.
We do not therefore hesitate to rule that the respondent is not free from any blame for the sad fate of
the complainants. He is liable for inexcusable negligence.
WHEREFORE, ATTY. AMADO R. FOJAS is hereby REPRIMANDED and ADMONISHED to be, henceforth,
more careful in the performance of his duty to his clients. cdlex
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Bellosillo, Kapunan, and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1.Canon 31, Canons of Professional Ethics.
2.Canon 17, Code of Professional Responsibility.
3.Canon 18, Code of Professional Responsibility.
4.Vda. de Alisbo vs. Jalandoon, 199 SCRA 321 [1991].
5.Canon 15, Canons of Professional Ethics.

6.Id.
7.Francisco vs. Bosa, 205 SCRA 722 (1992).
8.Order denying the motion to reconsider the order which set aside the previous order dismissing the
case, reinstated the complaint, and required the complainants to answer the complaint.
9.Appellant's Brief (CA-G.R. No. CV-38153), 3; Annex "12" of the Respondent's Comment.
10.Section 3, Rule 18, Rules of Court. See Circle Financial Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 196 SCRA 166
(1991); Golden Country Farms, Inc. vs. Sanvar Development Corp., 214 SCRA 295 (1992).