1

PLOTINUS AND THE PARMENIDES:

PROBLEMS OF INTERPRETATION
Matthias Vorwerk
The second part of Platos Parmenides with its dialectical exercises on the One
has received remarkable attention in the history of Platonism.1 Interestingly, the
more-or-less systematic interpretation of the hypotheses seems to have begun
only with Plotinus, who understood the hypotheses of the Parmenides onto-
logically and referred the first three of them to the three hypostases of his own
metaphysical system, that is, the One (or Good), Intellect, and Soul.2 While it is
undisputed that Plotinus adapted the first three hypotheses and exploited them
for the formulation of his version of Platonic metaphysics, it still remains a matter
of discussion whether Plotinus depended on the first hypothesis of the Parmenides
to invent, as it were, the absolutely simple One, transcending being and predica
tion, or whether he merely used it as justification for his metaphysical innovation.
I will argue that the answer lies in between: Plotinus was both inspired by the first
hypothesis and needed it as evidence for his Platonic orthodoxy. In the following,
I will first give a brief survey of the most relevant scholarship on Plotinuss inter
pretation of the Parmenides. Then, I will focus mainly on a close analysis of what
could be called Plotinuss apology: namely, chapter 8 of Enn. 6.1 [101: On the
Three Primary Hypostases, in which Plotinus explicitly introduces the Parmenides
in support of his metaphysics.
1. Proclus, In Parm. 630,37643,5 Cousin provides a survey of ancient interpretations of
the Parmenides, however, without giving names; in Theol. Plat. 1.10 = 1:42,49 Saffrey-Wester
ink, Plot.inus is named as one of the old, i.e., first, interpreters of the Parmenides. See Saffrey and
Westerink 19681997, 1, lxxvIxjcxix; Brisson 1994,28591.
2. These three hypotheses of the Parmenides are I: 137c3142a6; II: 142b1155e2; and III:
155e3157b4. III is actually a corollary to II, but Plotinus considers it to be a separate hypoth
esis; see Brisson 1994, 46 with n. 96.
23-
24 PLATOS PARMENIDES, VOLUME 2
VORWERK: PLOTINUS AND THE PARMENIDES 25
1. THE ORIGIN OF THE PLOTINIAN ONESTATUS QuAEsTIONIS
In his famous article The Parmenides of Plato and the Origin of the Neopla
tonic One~ E. R. Dodds argued against attempts popular at the beginning of the
twentieth century to ascribe the origin of the Plotinian One to oriental religious
influences. Contrary to this line of interpretation, Dodds pointed to the second
part of Platos Parmenides, namely the first hypothesis, as the main source for the
notion of a One that is beyond being and, hence, incapable of admitting any posi
tive predication. With the help of a list of parallels between the first and second
hypotheses of the Parmenides and descriptions in the Enneads of the One and the
One-Being, namely Intellect and the ideas, respectively, he showed that the Plotin
ian One had Platonic roots.3 The question, of course, arises whether Plotinus was
the first to interpret the second part of the Parmenides not merely logically but
ontologically, or whether he had predecessors. Against Proclus, who, in a survey
of interpretations of the Parmenides, names Plotinus as the first representative of
the ontological interpretation,4 Dodds referred to Neopythagorean sources, who
had developed already a notion of two Ones, a transcendent One and a One that
is opposed to the Indefinite Dyad, or, in the case of Moderatus, perhaps even of
three Ones.5 Ultimately, Dodds proposed, the origin of the Plotinian One should
be sought in the metaphysics of Speusippus, which, according to some sources,
included a transcendent One.6
J. M. Rist, building upon Doddss observations, argued that Moderatus, not
Speusippus, was the first to interpret the Parmenides ontologically, since Mod
eratus speaks of three Ones, which are related to the first three hypotheses of the
Parmenides, while his predecessors knew only of two (Rist 1962, 38991, 397).
According to Rist, Moderatus did not develop the notion of the transcendent One
from the Parmenides, since it could already be derived from the Idea of the Good
of Republic 6 (509b); rather he regarded the first hypothesis as a confirmation of
3. Dodds 1928, 13233. For a similar defense of Plotinus against the charge of mysticism
see Gurtler 1992. -
4. See n. 1 above.
5. Dodds 1928, 13639. It is far from certain to what extent the report on Moderatuss
three Ones that we find in Simplicius, In Phys. 9:230,34231,24 Diels accurately represents
Moderatuss text, since Simplicius is not quoting first hand but from a lost treastise itepl ilxric
by Porphyry (frg. 236 Smith). Saffrey and Westerink (19681997, 2,xxvixxxv) have argued
convincingly that in Simpliciuss report the part that speaks of the three Ones is Porphyrian and
that, hence, Dodds falsely believed that Moderatus interpreted the Parmenides ontologically;
see in particular xxxiixxxv. However, the question is not settled; see Tornau 2000, 2045 with
n. 26.
6. Dodds, 1928, 40; see also Halfwassen 1993; Dillon 2003, 57.
it and, in doing so, he incidentally discovered the famous three Ones of the Neo
platonic interpretation,7 which Plotinus in turn adopted.
After this strong trend to establish Plotinuss dependence on Pythagoreaniz
ing or other Middle Platonic sources, B. D. Jackson proposed to reclaim Plotinuss
originality in interpreting the Parmenides.8 Going beyond Dodds, he not only
studied verbal allusions to the Parmenides in the Enneads but also conceptual
similarities, and he added to the parallel between the first two hypotheses of the
Parmenides and the first two hypostases of the Enneads also parallels between the
third hypothesis and the third hypostasis, Soul. Although he did not insist that
Plotinus was the first to interpret the Parmenides ontologically, he suggested that
Plotinus was original in adopting the notion of the one and the many of the Par
menides to develop his ontological hierarchy, and that it was in this respect that
he differed from Neopythagoreans and Middle Platonists.9
The most extensive analysis of Plotinuss reception of the Parmenides has
been presented by J.-M. Charrue in his study on Plotinuss reading of Plato.10
He surveyed carefully references in the Enneads to the first three hypotheses of
the Parmenides, both quotations and allusions, as well as conceptual parallels.
Supposing Moderatus as the source of the ontological interpretation, Charrue
inferred that Plotinus exploited only the first three hypotheses for his metaphys
ics, because Moderatus had done so too and had derived three Ones from them
(Charrue 1978, 5658). In spite of the influence of Moderatus, Charrue argues
that it was Plotinuss own reading of the Parmenides that led to the development
of the Plotinian system and that his reading of the Parmenides in turn influenced
his understanding of other Platonic texts.
According to these interpretations it is clear that
1. the first hypothesis of the Parmenides played an important role in partic
ular in the conception of Plotinuss first hypostasis, the absolutely simple
One;
2. that Plotinus may not have been the first to interpret the first hypothesis
ontologically if, in fact, Moderatus had already developed three Ones
from the first three hypotheses.
The question that still remains open is whether Plotinus depended on the first
hypothesis to develop the notion of the absolutely simple One or whether he
7. Rist 1962, 39899. Narbonne (2001) argues similarly that the Republic was sufficient for
Platonists to conceive of a first principle transcending being but that Plotinus provided with his
interpretation of the Parmenides a structure that could support all this (p. 190).
8. Jackson 1967, 31516. Similarly, Szlezk (1979, 3436) denies significant influence of
Pythagoreans on Plotinus, as Plotinus barely mentions them at all, and points to lamblichus as
the one responsible for the Pythagoreisierung des Neuplatonismus (p. 35).
9. Jackson (1967, 327), based on a combination of 5.1 [101.8.2526 with 4.2 [4] .2.5255:
One/lv, Intellect/tv xoAX, Soul/gv Kal xoXX, form in bodies/isoAX Kal L~v, bodies/,toAX.
10. Charrue 1978, 43115 and 26466 on the Parmenides.
I
26 PLATOS PARMENIDES, VOLUME 2
VORWERK: PLOTINUS AND THE PARMENIDES 27
merely welcomed the first hypothesis as evidence and justification from Plato
himself that he was not introducing a new principle but observing faithfully the
Platonic tradition. As representatives of both views the following two statements
may suffice.1 J.-M. Charrue asks with regard to Plotinuss use of negative predi
cation of the One:
Plotin laurait-il imagine sil nen avait trouvles traits prcurseurs dans la pre
mire hypothse du Parmnide? (Charrue 1978, 84)
And he concludes at the end of his book:
Cest la lecture du Parmnide qui paraIt faire faire a Plotin ses principales dcou
vertes et lui fournir les themes majeurs de sa philosophie.... Linterprtation
plotinienne du Parmnide marquait donc bien le point de depart dun systme
hirarchisqui ... et la caractristique de linterprtation plotinienne de Platon.
(Charrue 1978, 264 and 265)
B. R. Dodds, on the other hand, writes:
But these Platonic texts are not the true starting-points of his philosophy: he
does not believe in the One because he has found it in the Parmenides; on the
contrary, he finds it in the Parmenides because he already believes in it. Nor does
his exposition normally start from Plato: ... he will cite for confirmation a text
from Plato. (Dodds 1960, 2)
Dodds sees Plotinus defending himself against charges of unorthodoxy and com
pares his practice of quoting Plato to that of seventeenth century philosophers
quoting Scripture. He bases his claim in particular on Plotinuss apology in 5.1
[10] .8, which is the key passage to a proper understanding of Plotinuss interpre
tation of Plato and his self-conception as a Platonic philosopher.
2. PL0TINUss APOLOGY
In ch. 8 of Enn. 5.1 [10]: On the Three Primary Hypostases, Plotinus defends him
self against possible allegations of introducing new doctrines, with the help of a
doxographical account that starts with Plato. His main intention is to show that
already Plato had conceived of three hypostases, if only implicitly:
Therefore also Platos divine principles are three: ~dl things are around the King
of allfor he means the first thingsand the Second is around the secondary
things and, and around the tertiary is the Third.12
In the text preceding the quote Plotinus had shown that Soul is an image of
Intellect (3.7) and Intellect an image of the One (7.1). These three hyposta
ses constitute the realm of divine principles (i.i~pt toi~tav Ta Oria, 7.49). Now
he sets out to identify these same three principles in Plato and refers to a pas
sage from the Second Letter, which by modern scholarship is not considered to
be authentic.3 In 3 12de the author of the letter writes about the first principle
(itepi Tfjc rot itpthtot, qn~aewc), but only in the form of a riddle Cot aivry~.t&v).
Then follows the passage that Plotinus quotes: All things are around the King of
all and for his sake, and he is the cause of all noble things; the secondary things
are around the Second and the tertiary around the Third.14 The text speaks of
three Kings, as it seems, and in particular of a first King, who is described as the
final cause of all things (Ke~vov L~v!ica xvta).5 The term King appears in the
Republic in connection with the Idea of the Good and its offspring, the sun, who
are said to reign the one over the intelligible kind and region, the other over the
visible (I3aatXei~etv To 11V vor~ toO yvouc te ical rxov, TOO cth OparoO, 509d2
3).16 In this context there are only two kings, not three as in the Second Letter,
but Plotinus may not have had this passage in mind, since the term King had
become already a common predicate for the first principle in earlier Platonists.17
It was Numenius who first conceived of three Godsif we disregard the dubious
case of Moderatus18, but the fragmented state of his works does not allow us
to determine with certainty whether he made reference to the Second Letter. This
seems to be probable, however, because Numenius calls the first God exempt
12. Kal & roi3ro ical ta flXflrwvoc rptrr r itvrct irepl toy itvrwv 3arnXaq90i
yap icp&TctKal &i~r~pov ~tspi r &1~Tepa iccil itepi r tpira tpIrov Enn. 5.1 [101.8.14. All
translations are mine.
13. See Brisson 1987b, 8184, 12728; also Saffrey and Westerink 19681997, 2, xxxxvi,
and Atkinson 1983, 188 with further references.
14. it!pi tOy itvtcov ~3ctciiX~a itvt CciTt Kat CiceIvou ~VEKci ,tvtct, icat CKEIVO ctittov
itvtwv tthv icaA&v. &6repov & nCpi r &iirepa, Kal tp[rov itCpt t-rpIra, 312e14. Plotinus
quotes it also in 1.8 [511.2.2732 and alludes to it more frequently; see Atkinson 1983, 188.
15. For the One as final cause in Plotinus see Bussanich 1996, 5 155.
16. Cf. 597e68: ToUr flpa ~arai icalO rpayqoiroi, thrsp ~u~ujrijc Ccitt, rpItoc rtc iurO
IlaatXCw iatt ri~ Xq9e(ac itepuicthc, icai itvre oL XA0L ~u~ii1tai.
17. E.g., Apuleius, Apol. 64; Numenius, frg. 12,1213 des Places. See DOrrie 1970, 21735
repr. 1976, with OBrien 1992. For a history of the exegesis of the Second Letter in antiquity see
Saffrey-Westerink 19681997, 2, xxlix, on Plotinus xliiixlix. Whether Moderatus had used
the Second Letter, as Saffrey and Westerink (ibid., xxxiixxxv) propose, remains a matter of
speculation.
18. See above n. 5.
11. For further references see Gatti 1996, 1037.
28 PLATOS PARMENIDES, VOLUME 2
VORWERK: PLOTINUS AND THE PARMENIDES 29
of all works and king (pyv ... ~pyuv av1nrvrwv Kal ~3ctatX~a, fr. 12,13 des
Places), which comes close to the description in the Second Letter of the King of
all as final cause.19 Since we know that Plotinus read Numeniuss works in class
and was even accused of plagiarizing him,20 it may be legitimate to infer that
Plotinus was following him in giving the Second Letter a prominent place in his
apology: especially as the Plotinian hypostases were prefigured by Numeniuss
three gods.2
Plotinus continues:
He [Sc. Plato] also says that there is a Father of the Causecalling Intellect
Cause, for he considers Intellect to be the Demiurge; he [sc. the Demiurge], he
says, makes the Soul in that mixing-bowl. Intellect being the Cause, he means
by Father the Good, i.e., that which is beyond Intellect and beyond Being; but
often he calls Being and Intellect Idea.22
The second reference Plotinus provides is a short quotation again from a pseudo-
Platonic letter, this time the Sixth Letter (323d). In that passage the author
mentions the God and Ruler of all things, of those that are and those that will be,
and the Father and Lord of the Ruler and Cause.23 Plotinus identifies the Cause
as Intellect and explains that Intellect corresponds with the Demiurge of Platos
Timaeusnot without reason, since the Demiurge is presented as the best of
all causes and as intellect.24 Plotinus refers the causality of the Demiurge to
the mixing of the world-soul, which is described in detail in the Timaeus (35a1
36b6). However, he introduces subtle distinctions. Since the Timaeus speaks of
the mixing of the world-soul and later (41d47) of the mixing of individual souls
in the mixing-bowl, Plotinus infers that three kinds of soul can be distinguished:
19. See Saffrey and Westerink 19681997,2, xxxvxxxvi.
20. Porphyry, Vita Plot. 14.12 and 17.16.
21. Cf. frg. 15,45 des Places: ~sv o~v Trp&toc itepl t vo9t, 6 & &6TEpOc nepi r
voqt Kal cdaOqr. There are, of course, two notable differences: Numenius first god is both a
being and an intellect; his third god is either the world-soul or the ensouled cosmos, at least not
an undescended soul According to Vita Plot. 17.46 Amelius wrote a book On the Dogmatic
D~/7erences between Plotinus and Numenius (Hapi tfic Kar r &y~1ata toO flXwt(vou itpc tOy
Nou~ujvtov &wpopdc).
22. AyEL & xcsi toO alriou elvaL 7tar~pa a.ITLOV ~iv tOy voOv A~ywv. &ijILoupVOc V~P
6 voUc ct~rr~ -roOtov & pqot r?~v ~pu)(1~v itoteiv v t lcparfipt KeIvW. toO atrlou & yoU Ovtoc
itar~pa pqai tyaOOv ial tO ~7tL~KeLVa yoU Kal ~7cKatVa oOc~iac. ltoXXct)(OU & tO OV Kal tOy
voUv tt~v i&av Aiyat, 5.1 [101.8.49.
23. rOy tfiv nvtwv eeov iiye~sva r&v te Ovtwv Kal TfiV ~saXAOvrcov, toO re iiyeisOvoc ical
airiou 7tat~pa icOptov, 323d24.
24. Tim. 29a6 (ptotoc tfiv airIwv), 39e7 (voU); cf. the distinction between t & yoU
q~uoupyq~va and t & VyKqc yiyv~teva, 47e45. For the identification of the Demiurge
with the Plotinian Intellect see 5.9 [51.3.26; 5.20 with Vorwerk 2001, 9 194.
one that is in the mixing-bowl, which Plotinus equates with the undescended
hypostasis Soul; one that is descended but pure, namely the world-soul; and one
that is descended but somehow inferior to the world-soul, so that it descends
deeper into matter and animates individual bodies.25 Hence, with the help of the
Timaeus, Plotinus extrapolates from the term Cause, which is more fully char
acterized in the Sixth Letter as Ruler of all things, of those that are and those that
will be: two hypostases, Intellect as the paradigmatic cause of the cosmos and
Soul as that by means of which Intellect orders the cosmos. The Father of the
Cause is then easily identified with the first hypostasis, the Good. The Idea of
the Good of the Republic is beyond being (509b), a phrase that Plotinus quotes,
but extends: beyond Intellect and beyond Being (~irKeLva yOU Kai 1t~KELVa
oiiaIa).26 The passage from the Republic provides support only for the genera
tion of the ideas by the Idea of the Good, but it does not mention any Intellect.27
That is why Plotinus adds that Plato equated Being, Intellect, and Idea. If the Idea
of the Good is the cause of all other ideas and the ideas are identical with Intellect,
then the Idea of the Good is the cause of Intellect, namely, its Father. Moreover,
if the Idea of the Good is beyond Being and Being is identical with Intellect and
the ideas, then the Idea of the Good is beyond Intellect and the ideas. There is no
obvious passage in Plato that equates Intellect and ideas, but Plotinus interpreted
the Timaeus in such a way that he located the paradigm of the Timaeus within the
Demiurgic Intellect.28 Thus Plotinus deduces from the Sixth Letter three hypos
tases: the Father of the Cause/the Good, the Cause/Intellect, and that which is
caused/Soul, perhaps again following Numenius.29
Plotinus concludes:
Consequently, Plato knew that Intellect derives from the Good and Soul from
Intellect; and these teachings are not new, and they have not been formulated
now but long ago, however not explicitly; my present teachings are merely inter
pretations of those earlier ones and they prove that these doctrines are old with
the help of references to the writings of Plato himself.30
25. Cf. 4.3 [271.18, esp. 7.812; 4.8 [61.8; also 5.1 [101.12.
26. Cf. 1.6 [11.9.3639; 6.8 [391.16.34; 1.7 [54].1.1920, and Whittaker 1969, 91104.
27. tO elval te ical t?~v oOiIav Oit ~KeIVou cu~rroZc 1tpoc~eivai, 509b78.
28. See 5.9 [5].8.17 with 6.7 [381.8.2232; 39.2834 and Sophist 248e249d4; also 5.9
[51.9.18 with Timaeus 39e79 and Vorwerk 2001, 134.
29. Cf. frg. 12,23 des Places: toO &~~noupyoUvro & OeoU ~etvai vopi~eoOat itat~pa
rOy itp&-rov OeOy, and 1314: rOy &iJUOUpyLKOV & OeOv i1y4sovei~ & oOpavoU iOvra.
30. ~icyre HAroiva ei&vaL ~Ic ~i~v ryaOoU rOy voUy, Lic & toO yoU rf~v ~IJux1~jv. ~ai elvat
roO AOyou tol~a& ~si~ icatvoOc ~u~& vOy, nAat sty eipiiaOat ~d1 vairewra~vw, roO &
~Uv Xyouc t~9yqrc ticeivuiv ~EyOV~VcLL saprupioic lTLcrrwacqsvovc -rc 6~ac rai5tac iraXat
elvat rotc a6roU toO HXtoyo yp~taaiv, 5.1 [10].8.914.
30 PLATOS PARMENIDES, VOLUME 2
VORWERK; PLOTINUS AND THE PARMENIDES 31
At this point Plotinus has concluded his apology. He has presented the prin
cipal passages in Plato that support his metaphysical system and shown that he
is no innovator but merely an interpreter of Plato.31 One might wonder why it
is that he has not introduced the Parmenides here if it is so fundamental for the
development of the three hypostases? The answer may be that the Parmenides was
not that fundamental after all, at least not for a justification of the three hyposta
ses. Therefore it is only within the doxography which Plotinus provides in chaps.
8.149.32reaching from Parmenides over Anaxagoras, Heraclitus, Empedo
des, Aristotle to Pythagoras and Pherecydesthat he introduces the first three
hypotheses of the Parmenides as a correction of Parmenides himself:
Platos Parmenides speaks more accurately when he distinguishes from each
other the First One, which is the One more properly speaking, and a Second,
whith he calls One-Many, and a Third, the One-and-Many. Thus, he also is in
agreement with the three natures.32
In the preceding passage (8.1423) Plotinus criticized Parmenides, particularly
for calling being one in spite of its multiplicity. It is with respect to. the notion
of unity that he considers Platos Parmenides to be more accurate because of his
differentiation of three degrees of unity: the absolutely simple One (tv, Parm.
137c4-142a7), the One-Many (~v noAX, 144e5), and the One-and-Many (~v ical
icoAX~ 155e5). Only then does he add that this distinction corresponds with the
three hypostases, the three natures (8.23).
The fact that the Parmenides is introduced by Plotinus last has been observed
already by Saifrey-Westerink, who explain:
Cela doit signifier quil procde du plus connue au moms connu, et que mme
cest lui probablement qui introduit le Parmenide de Platon, dont il interprte
les trois premieres hypotheses par les trois hypostases, comme une autoritnou
velle dans cette question des principes premiers.33
31. Atkinson 1983, 19 192 remarks quite appropriately that Plotinuss exegetical method
is reminiscent of allegorical interpretation of myths, in so far as it tries to uncover hidden doc
trines.
32.6 & itap HXtwvt Hap~LEVI~9c ICpLI3OtEpOV XyLOV &cupei it XXr~Xwv tO np&rov
~v, 6 KVpLthtEpOV isv, ical E6tEpOV nv itoXA A~ywv, ical tpIxov ~V icai itoAA ical IqKovoc
o6rw ical a~tOc ~OTL talc q~aea~ talc tpiaiv, 5.1 [101.8.2327. Proclus, In Parm. 1240,3237
Cousin distinguishes similarly between the historical and Platos Parmenides: ical rcu~tfl
6L~GT9KEV 6 itap flXtWVL flapllavi&lc to~ ~V toic ~1t!OLV, Ott 6 ~iv dc tO ~V OV ~3XItEL icai
roUte pi~rnv LIVaL itvtwv aitLov, 6 & tic tO ~v, lutO toO ~vO Ovro tic tO ~ivwc ~v ical npO toO
Ov-ro vapa1ithv. He probably has our passage in mind.
33. Saffrey and Westerink 19681997,2, xlv.
Saifrey-Westerink correctly see that Plotinus uses in his apology (8.18) well
known Platonic passages, but I think they misinterpret the function of the Par
menides in 8.2327: it is not introduced primarily as Platonic support for the
three hypostases but as a criticism of the historical Parmenides; only then is it
recognized as providing further evidence (a~tpwvoc ot~rw Kai ai~tc) for the
three hypostases. The division of chapters devised by Ficino should not lead us to
misunderstand the structure of the text. The section on Parmenides (8.1427) is
not an addition to the preceding section on Plato (8.114) but the opening of the
doxography of philosophers other than Plato: Pre-Socratics, Aristotle, Pythago
reans (8.149.32). Hence, in 5.1 [101.8 Plotinus does not present the Parmenides
as the Platonic key-text for the three hypostases or for the absolutely simple One
beyond being.34
3. CONCLUSION
Plotinus developed the system of three hypostases not primarily from the Par
menides but from other Platonic texts, continuing a tradition that had culminated
before him in Numenius. The Platonic passages to which Plotinus refers in 5.1
[10].8.19 are Ep. 2.312e and 6.323d in combination with Tim. 35ab, 41d and
Resp. 509b. None of these allows Plotinus to say that Plato identified the first
principle with the One; however, he infers from them that Plato did assume three
principles (Ep. 2.312e, and implicitly 6.323d):
1. the Good: xv-rcov I3ctatXe~c, Ep. 2.312e; al-nov itattjp, Ep. 6.323d;
tyct8v, Resp. 509b.
2. Intellect: &1~tepoc, Ep. 2.312e; ai-nov, Ep. 6.323d; Demiurge, Tim. 35ab,
41d; ~7t~KELVG oi~a(a, Republic 509b.
3. Soul: -rpivoc, Ep. 2.312e; (the product of a(rtov, Ep. 6.323d;) icpa-ntjp, Tim.
41d.
Obviously, Plotinus displays a fair amount of creativity in reconciling these pas
sages, just as some of his Platonist predecessors had done before. He probably was
34. See above pp. 2425 with n. 7. It is interesting to see that in 5.1 [10] there is only one
allusion to the Parmenides outside ch. 8. In 5.2 Plotinus adapts the verb irocytatelv, which is
used in the second hypothesis, and applies it to the soul: noAUc o~v o&roc 6 OeO irl rfl ~vvxii~t
& inrpXeL v to&roLc Elvai cruvapOrkr~, ci ~ lutoataretv ~9~Xot; cf. Parm. 144b12: ~id itvra
llpa ~toXA Ovra i~ oi)aia vav4tqtat ical o~cvO &itootarct ~rfiv Ovrwv. This may, in fact, be
an allusion to the Parmenides passage, as in both texts reference is made to the multiplicity of
being; however, if Plotinus were consistent in his interpretation of the hypothesis, he should not
have used a phrase from the second hypothesis to qualify soul. Moreover, according to Slee
man and Pollet (1980, s.v.), Plotinus uses the verb itoatarclv quite frequently in a variety of
contexts. Therefore the passage is of little significance. What is significant, however, is the fact
that Plotinus does not use in 5.1 [10] the terminology of the Parmenides to characterize the three
hypostases although he refers to the Parmenides in 5.1 [101.8 as evidence for them.
32 PLATOS PARMENIDES, VOLUME 2
VORWERK: PLOTINUS AND THE PARMENIDES 33
not aware of the dubious authorship of the Letters; but even so, the philosophi
cal context of the passages he quotes remains mysterious, and intentionally so
(Ep. 2.312d). In Plato~s dialogues, on the other hand, there seems to be a lack of
consistency in the description of the first principles: The Republic proclaims the
idea of the Good as the cause of all other ideas, without explaining in detail the
relationship between ideas and intellect or ideas and cosmos; the Timaeus illus
trates the latter, introducing a divine Demiurge who creates both the cosmos as a
copy of an eternal Paradigm and the Soul, but is silent on the first principle itself,
the Good. Rather than understanding these puzzling discrepancies as different
versions of the same philosophical doctrine, for example, by identifying the idea
of the Good with the Demiurge, Plotinus interprets them as complementary, that
is, by subordinating Demiurge and Paradigm to the Good. Thus Plotinus accepts
the identification of Paradigm and Demiurge current in most Middle Platonic
philosophers,35 but emphasizes the absolute transcendence of the Good beyond
being, which is less clearly stated in the Republic, but logically necessary in view
of the simplicity of the first principle (see 2.9 [331.1.116).
It is the inconclusive nature of evidence in prominent Platonic texts concern
ing the first principle that must have drawn Plotinuss attentionor the attention
of those who might have taken a similar approach before himto the Parmenides.
There he found in the first hypothesis a description of a One that does not par
ticipate in being and could be equated to the Good beyond being described in
the Republic. Furthermore, he referred the second and the third hypothesis to
Intellect and Soul respectively, because he assumed that these hypotheses rep
resented less unified versions of the One, the One-Many (Parm. 144e) and the
One-and-Many (Parm. 155e). Plotinus concludes in 5.1 [101.8.2327 that Platos
Parmenides agrees with his theory of the three hypostases, but nowhere else; it is
only in this one passage that Plotinus explicitly points to the Parmenides in sup
port of his system of three hypostases.
The reason for Plotinuss reluctance to present the Parmenides more openly
as Platonic evidence for the three hypostases is probably the fact that the first
three hypotheses cannot be interpreted systematically so as to correspond exactly
with the three hypostases. Whereas the first hypothesis fits the nature of the
Plotinian One well, because it negates all predicates that may be conferred on
it, the second and especially the third pose greater difficulties.36 Plotinus quotes
from the second hypothesis frequently, but neglects the fact that it includes the
attribution of time to the second One, which he identifies with Intellect (Parm.
151e155d), and that it makes this One the object not just of knowledge, but also
35. For an account of Middle Platonic interpretations of the place of the ideas see Drrie
and Baltes 1999, no. 131 with the commentary pp. 31236; on Plotinus no. 131.7 with pp. 329
36.
of opinion and sense-perception (155d). All these characteristics are irreconcil
able with the Plotinian Intellect. To the third hypothesis Plotinus only refers for
the term One-and-Many, which he clearly links to the Soul in 5.1 [101.8.26, but
he disregards all other attributions.37
The fact that Plotinus did not fully explore the second and particularly the
third hypothesis and that he did not discuss problematic elements in them that
contradicted the nature of Intellect and Soul, indicates that he did not intend to
interpret the first three hypotheses of the Parmenides systematically.38 Plotinus
realized that the first hypothesis provided Platonic evidence that supported his
doctrine of the absolutely simple One and allowed him to identify it with the Idea
of the Good beyond being. Furthermore, the first and second hypothesis proved
to be a fruitful conceptual source regarding the problem of the one and the many,
as Jackson and Charrue have shown, and allowed him to explore the nature of
the different Ones with the help of a rich set of terminology and phraseology.
However, the hypotheses of the Parmenides were not suitable to derive the three
hypostases from them.
37. See Charrue 1978, 10414, esp. 109, n. 129.
38. Charrue 1978, 260 similarly concludes that Plotinus is eclectic in his interpretation of
the hypotheses.
36. See Jackson 1967, 32227; Charrue 1978, 85114.