ARTI CLE

Chinas rise and Europes fall: time

to start worrying
Peter van Ham
Published online: 4 June 2011
Centre for European Studies 2011
Abstract Leaders in Latin America, Africa, the Middle East and Asia are placed
in front of what appears to be a very simple decision. Why spend time and effort
in quarrels over human rights and good governance, if there is a much easier
option at their disposal with results available right away? More and more
countries are now keen on belonging to the Chinese sphere of soft power
influence, which goes far beyond the quest for natural resources. The author
presents reasons why Europe and indeed the US should be worried about their
political and cultural hegemony. The author even goes as far as warning against
another Cold War rivalry between the West and China. China is on the move,
acting. The author concludes by suggesting that the EU should get rid of its
normative leadership illusions and do the same.
Keywords Soft power China Economic interests Third World Expansion
Chinese model Political dominance Military ambition
Europe is getting nervous and rightly so. For decades, Europeans have counted
on their American ally to provide military security through NATO, while limiting
themselves to rearranging their deckchairs, a pastime now called the Common
Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). But inevitably, the EU is approaching not
P. van Ham (&)
Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael, P. O. Box 93080,
2509 AB The Hague, the Netherlands
e-mail: pvanham@clingendael.nl
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European View (2011) 10:107114
DOI 10.1007/s12290-011-0156-4
one iceberg but several, and it will be a tall order to keep the EU Titanic afloat,
let alone on course. The United States has lost its strategic interest in the EU, and
the EU itself is preoccupied with its institutional set-up and salvaging its
cherished single currency, the euro. At the same time, Europeans are facing a
tougher, more competitive world where new global actors are rightfully claiming
a stronger voice and a bigger seat. The strange thing is we Europeans have
known this for at least a decade. We have seen the approach of the new,
tougher world in which Europe is relatively smallereconomically, politically
and militarily. But instead of confronting these realities and preparing Europeans
to defend their interests and values, the EU has hidden behind the chimera of its
so-called normative power, the soft power that derives from its unique
cooperative model. But in this field, too, China has become a serious competitor.
The Chinese model has proved fascinating and attractive for Third World
governments, since it combines strong government with economic growth and
social stability.
This paper examines Chinas rise as a competitor to Europes soft power.
Chinas growing role as an economic, political and military force is well known
and much studied. But what are the implications of Chinas soft power for an
entity (the EU) that often speaks down to the world from a moral high ground, a
point of view that is frequently resented rather than admired? If the Chinese
model becomes more attractive at the expense of Europes model, what will be
left of the EUs normative power base? The essay closes with a few policy
conclusions for the EU and its Member States.
Chinas model: inspiration, aspiration and power
Reflecting upon the EUs role in the world, European Commission President
Romano Prodi [11] argued that
Europe needs to project its model of society into the wider world. We are
not simply here to defend our own interests: we have a unique historic
experience to offer. The experience of liberating people from poverty, war,
oppression and intolerance. We have forged a model of development and
continental integration based on the principles of democracy, freedom and
solidarity and it is a model that works. A model of a consensual pooling of
sovereignty in which every one of us accepts to belong to a minority.
But things have changed over the past ten years. As Richard Youngs claims,
[t]he EU cannot be seen as such a soft, progressive liberal powerAuthoritarian
powers around the world are now much more critical of the EU than the EU is of
them [17 p. 127].
In a way, Europe and the US are engaged in a global model pageant where
the effective use of soft power plays an important role. Although all models
simplify and distort, the defining characteristics of the domestic US economic
model are straightforward: relatively low taxes and income redistribution
combined with equally low levels of health and social security, all within a
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system of little regulation. Internationally, the US economic model is called the
Washington Consensus, based on US-style deregulation which was forced on
the Third World by the IMF and the World Bank. The EUs soft power is most
evident in the transformations undertaken by governments in response to the
lure of joining Europe. For example, in February 2005, in a speech before the
European Parliament, Ukrainian President Viktor Yushenko announced that his
country has now clearly defined the ingredients and forms for further decisions.
These are the norms and standards of the European Union, its legislation, legal,
political, economic and social culture. European integration is the most effective
and, in fact, the only programme of reforms for contemporary Ukraine [14,
p. 22]. For most Central European countries, the choice has been a stark one: it is
either Belarus or Brussels.
But soft power is clearly not only a Western game. China especially has been
quick to learn that the fear of a rising Chinese giant could result in a negative
backlash, most notably within Asia itself. The Chinese model (sometimes called
the Beijing Consensus) is founded on economic development based on each
countrys specific qualities and characteristics [12]. It rejects the US approach of
one-size-fits-all and shock therapy. The Beijing Consensus suggests that
economic and political freedom do not have to go hand in hand, but that an
Asian version of capitalism may be imagined that does not fully comply with the
full spectrum of Western-style liberal democracy. Most important, China is
offering the world its own social model as a serious competitor to Western-style
liberal democracy and its market economy, as well as to Europes model of a
postmodern post-nationalism.
As a fast-growing economic power, China has a strong incentive to pre-empt
the tendency of regional powers to form a counterbalancing coalition. Chinas
autocratic political system, its claim on Taiwan and its record of human rights
violations are all cause for concern, especially in the West. China has been quick
to acknowledge that image management is essential in order to limit suspicions
and worries. Beijing recognises that in order to become the cultural gyroscope of
Asia, it needs soft power to pull other countries within its economic and political
reach. Chinese President Hu Jintao argued in 2003 that Chinese culture belongs
not only to the Chinese but also to the whole world We stand ready to step
up cultural exchanges with the rest of the world in a joint promotion of cultural
prosperity [7, p. 19].
Compared with the Washington Consensus, Chinas competing model of
market-based authoritarianism may well be more attractive, safer and less
politically risky for leaders in Latin America, Africa, the Middle East and Asiain
short, for the whole non-Western world. In countries as different as Brazil and
Iran, China is considered a political and social model of great interest and
relevance. Moreover, Beijing is trying its utmost to make its social model even
more attractive by offering generous aid programmes to Third World countries
without the good governance strings the West attaches to its own aid. Mark
Leonard goes as far as to claim that Chinas attempt to present an alternative
political-economic model is the biggest ideological threat the West has felt since
the end of the Cold War [10].
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Soft power as a threat?
Recasting Chinas soft power as a threat may be too alarmist. In their study on
Chinas rise, Bates Gill and Yanzhong Huang conclude that Beijing faces serious
constraints in translating [soft power] resources into desired foreign-policy
outcomes [7, p. 17].
Indeed, for the time being, Chinas foreign policy behaviour suggests that
Beijing is prepared to respect the established norms of international politics,
including the peaceful settlement of conflicts, open markets, arms control and
disarmament and respect for international law.
Still, Chinas imperial identity is probably stronger than that of the US and the
EU combined, having developed over many dynasties from the early modern
Ming (13681644) to the Quing dynasty, which ended in 1912. Moreover, Chinas
foreign policy identity has been markedly shaped by its experiences of
humiliation, victimhood and racism. Even contemporary rising China claims
the position of victim in international politics, where historical eventsranging
from the Boxer Rebellion at the turn of the nineteenth century, to the NATO
bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999are all considered
evidence of Chinas victimhood in international politics [15]. Given this historical
context, it is hardly surprising that Chinese foreign policy discourse emphasises
international status and prestige as the most desirable value [5]. Now that the
West is becoming apprehensive about Chinas rise, most Chinese see this as a
long-overdue resumption of their natural role and place in Asia and beyond.
As mentioned earlier, Chinas economic, political and military awakening
could easily result in a negative backlash, upsetting the US and Japan and giving
rise to counterbalancing coalitions. Chinese authorities are well aware of this risk
and stress that image management is required to confront and reduce
suspicions. China has a long tradition of propaganda, with an elaborate
apparatus controlling what is fit to know by its own society [13]. State-
controlled propaganda is, of course, far removed from todays postmodern soft
power game. Communist ideology does not, therefore, play any role in Chinas
emerging imperial claims. Then again, China has been remarkably adept in using
its soft power capital by developing what Beijing labels winwin relationships.
These non-hegemonic ties have taken different forms.
For example, Beijing has begun to emphasise the cultural attractiveness of
China, setting up Confucius Institutes, the equivalents of the German Goethe
Institute, the British Council and the Maison Francaise, with the specific aim of
promoting throughout the world the study and knowledge of Chinese language
and culture. China Radio International is now broadcasting in English, 24 hours a
day, and the number of foreign students enrolled in Chinas universities has
tripled from 36,000 to more than 100,000 over the past decade, with more than
75% of these students coming from Asia. The Chinese government aims to
quadruple the number of foreigners studying Chinese to around 100 million by
2010. This aim is significantly easier to reach now that the US has introduced
more stringent visa requirements for foreign students in the aftermath of 9/11.
As a result of Chinas economic growth, outbound tourism has increased
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dramatically, and in some European capitals Chinese tourists already outnumber
those from Japan. The sight of affluent Chinese tourists crowding Amsterdam,
Berlin and San Francisco obviously conjures up images of wealth and self-
confidence, which is exactly the role China is carving out for itself.
Geopolitics and soft power
Another preferred mechanism of gaining influence has been the use of trade
and aid as political levers and public relations instruments. Chinas emerging
Africa strategy is the most obvious case of a remarkable attempt to gain status
and influence as soft power tools. Its motives in Africa are clear: get access to the
continents ample raw materials; gain market access for Chinas exports; get
African support for Chinese foreign policy goals in international organisations;
and, to top it all off, counter both the US and EU if possible [6, pp. 219220]. The
twenty-first-century version of the scramble for Africa is mainly prompted by
the growing need for energy resources and raw materials. China already imports
around 30% of its gas and oil from sub-Saharan Africa and purchases copper
from the Congo, platinum from Zimbabwe and ferrochrome and uranium from
other African countries. This resource grab clearly follows the lines of classical
imperialism, but, like the empires of old, China cloaks its economic motives with
the spread of its Beijing Consensus.
The fascinating side of Chinas Africa strategy is that it combines ordinary
economic interests and realpolitik goals with the smart use of soft power.
Chinas quest for resources is understandable and, of course, fully legitimate. But
China is also making serious efforts to gain friends across Africa. By boosting
Chinese tourism to the continent, setting up training programmes for Africas
future opinion leaders and creating new structures for Sino-African business
relations, China is trying to loosen the Wests hold on Africas elite. China is also
keen to generate goodwill by boosting its economic support to Africa (as well as
to Latin America), increasing its development aid and cancelling the debt of
some 30 African countries, worth many billions of US dollars. It is little surprise
that many African leaders now consider China their main friend and a serious
Great Power.
Gill and Huang [7, p. 24] suggest that Chinas charm offensive is felt
particularly in the Middle East, Latin America and Africa, and has worked miracles
for this rising powers political fortunes. They refer to BBC polls in representative
countries in these regions which increasingly favour Chinas growing influence in
world affairs. The authors [7, p. 24] conclude that the existence of like-minded
states in these regions and the attractiveness of Chinas development model
have facilitated Beijings quest for market access, natural resources and political
influence. They quote political leaders as diverse as Brazilian President Lula and
Iranian leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who all champion the Chinese model. Gill
and Huang further argue that the improvement of Chinas image in countries
like Australia and France in the past decade in part explains why some Western
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democracies seem less willing to get mixed up in USChina tensions, such as
over Taiwan [7, p. 25].
China uses the soft power it has generated in Africa and Latin America to
encourage these countries to take Chinas side, and several African states have
already been lured into Beijings camp (such as Sudan and Ethiopia). China also
uses its leverage with these countries to limit any criticism of Chinas human
rights record in international fora such as the UN Commission on Human Rights.
Beijing still claims that its military modernisation is based on objective self-
defence requirements [8], which is a story it seems to be getting away with.
Despite the massive build-up of Chinas military, obviously preparing for military
contingencies in the Taiwan Straits, Beijings relationship with Taiwan has
improved noticeably over the years. This calls for an explanation. Of course, the
time was ripe, with the US faltering and blundering in Iraq and the EU in an
introspective mood pondering its Constitution. Chinas hearts-and-minds policy
has markedly improved its soft power base, which has in turn facilitated its
military build-up by neutralising suspicions of a looming Chinese hegemony in
the region. Especially American and Japanese military analysts are warning of a
China on the march, suggesting that Chinese leaders aim to match the United
States in military power, with a new Cold War lying ahead [2, p. 22]. Chinas
defence spending has been rising for 15 consecutive years, without a clear
explanation by Chinese authorities of what the countrys military modernisation
is aiming for. China already boasts the worlds largest army (with 2.3 million
soldiers), has hundreds of advanced fighter aircraft, an impressive submarine
fleet, frigates, destroyers and an expanding strategic nuclear arsenal with stocks
of new theatre-range missiles. The launch of a Chinese (weather) satellite in
January 2007 set alarm bells ringing in the US defence establishment, since it
indicated Chinas interest in space dominance [1].
The main explanation is that China has drawn the lesson that soft power is an
invaluable asset to manage its economic, political and military ascent. It is the
lubricant to overcoming obstacles of any kind, since it changes the context in
which Chinas foreign policy actions are being seen. What may have looked like
aggressive behaviour or hegemonic plans a few years back now looks like the
normal policies of a rising power legitimately looking for a constructive role and
place in the region and beyond. Opinion polls show that since the late 1990s,
perceptions of Chinas role in Southeast Asia have shifted, and that in many
countries in the region China is considered a pre-eminent regional power,
playing a constructive role [9, p. 1; 4]. Almost without exception, Southeast Asian
leaders accept Chinas rise, both economically and politically, not as a security
threat but as something that should be managed.
Rebooting the West?
In his book Rebooting the West [3, p. 5], Christopher Coker suggests that the
reason many in the West lack confidence in the future is that the West is in the
midst of a crisis based on three intellectual failures: a failure of political
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leadership; a failure of moral purpose; and third, and most damning perhaps of
all, a failure to think long term. These challenges are more serious for Europe
than for the US. Europe lacks the military capabilities and the strategic vision to
deal with the tougher global environment that is dawning. The EU clings to the
illusion that its normative power will generate influence and power. This is a
dangerous mistake. The EU needs to shed the illusion of normative leadership
and start adopting a more realist perspective on world affairs, firmly rooted in a
shared notion of European interests [16]. Obviously, this remains difficult given
that no natural and shared European interests exist. Both the EU and its
Member States need to take heed of the warning implicit in Cokers analysis. The
challenge of optimalising Europes interests in a recalibrated world order is no
luxury but constitutes the core of Europes very existence as a special regional
entity. In this respect, China does Europe a great favour in offering this
challenge; it is now up to Europe and its leaders to use the remaining time to get
hold of the rudder and avoid the icebergs that are dangerously close.
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Peter van Ham is head of global governance research at the Clingendael
Institute in The Hague, and a professor at the College of Europe in Bruges. He is a
member of the Advisory Council on International Affairs to the Dutch
government and parliament.
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