A Path Still Taken Some Early Indian Arguments Concerning Time

A Path Still Taken: Some Early Indian Arguments concerning Time
Author(s): George Cardona

Reviewed work(s):
Source: Journal of the American Oriental Society, Vol. 111, No. 3 (Jul. - Sep., 1991), pp. 445-
464
Published by: American Oriental Society
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A PATH STILL TAKEN:
SOME EARLY INDIAN ARGUMENTS CONCERNING TIME*
GEORGE CARDONA
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA
The treatment of "time," both as a syntactic and a semantic category, by the Indian grammatical
tradition, is here discussed, and certain objections by the Buddhists to the views of Bhartrhari and
the Paninfyas are set forth and resolved.
1. SCHOLARS IN EARLY INDIA GIVE us considerable
evidence about arguments concerning time.' These argu-
ments range from the very general to the particular,
and the principal issues dealt with are as follows. In
general, what requires one to operate with time (kala)
as a separate ontological category? Once time has been
granted a separate ontological status, how many varie-
ties of time are to be recognized? In particular, can one
justify operating not only with past (bhiita, atikranta,
etc.) and future (bhavisyat, anagata) but also with
*
I am grateful to Ashok N. Aklujkar, Yohanan Grinshpon,
Wilhelm Halbfass, Bimal K. Matilal, David Seyfort Ruegg,
Ernst Steinkellner, Peter M. Scharf, and Albrecht Wezler for
their comments on drafts of this paper, a shortened version of
which was delivered as the presidential address before the
American Oriental Society on March 27th, 1990. Note that
metalinguistic markers (it, anubandha) attached to Sanskrit
elements are printed in bold face; e.g., laV refers to the L-affix
which bears the markers a and t. In addition, I follow a
convention concerning homorganic nasals instead of anusvara
with which only some editors agree: within compounds and
across a word boundary between very closely knit terms I
show nasals homorganic with following stops; e.g., sambandha
instead of sarhbandha. kificit instead of kirheit or kirh cit.
current time (vartamdna kala)? If one operates with a
separate entity called time, what accounts for its divi-
sions? If association with activities accounts for these
divisions, just how is this possible? In particular, can
one assume entities called actions which can distinguish
varieties of time, or are actions themselves merely to be
inferred? Can one justifiably speak of an action (kriya)
currently taking place? For, an action is not a single
entity but a complex of constituent action-moments
(samaharipa kriyd), whose unity is invented by speak-
ers; it is not a finished entity but something that is
brought to accomplishment. Hence, the question arises:
is there any moment at which an action can be said to
be current? If not and if time is so linked with actions
that they serve to make it known in different aspects,
then current time cannot be justified. Given such prob-
lems, should one assume instead that time divisions are
revealed by something other than actions? Finally, if
actions are required to account for time divisions, why
not simply operate with such actions, doing without
time as a separate category? Assume, on the other
hand, that something like a path that is traversed serves
to make known different aspects of time. Is there then a
justifiable present time?
In this paper, I shall be concerned principally with
two discussions in Patanfjali's Mahdbhdsya where ques-
tions concerning time are taken up and with parallel
discussions in Vaisesika, Nyaya, and Madhyamaka
works. These serve to demonstrate not only that schol-
ars of differing persuasions felt obliged to consider
issues touching on language and its description but
also that by the time of Patan-jali systematic views
concerning such major issues as I have noted had al-
ready been elaborated.
2. As is well known, Vaisesikas and Naiyayikas
accept time as a distinct substance (dravya); it serves
as the cause for certain caused knowledges: relative
Many of the major arguments are discussed briefly by
Balslev (1983). See also the introduction in Peri Sarveswara
Sharma 1972. My chief aim here is to place important discus-
sions found in the Mahdbhdsya in an appropriate context.
Accordingly, I could not consider again certain issues and
arguments about time in some important Buddhistic discus-
sions, as considered by Schayer 1938 and Frauwallner 1973.
Note also that in presenting viewpoints and arguments from
various schools of thought in what follows I do not intend to
imply historical relations except where I explicitly speak of
such relations.
445
446 Journal of the American Oriental Society 111.3 (1991)
proximity or removedness independent of spatial rela-
tion,' simultaneity,
non-simultaneity, long
duration
and quickness of actions. Such knowledges require a
cause that determines them, so that, by virtue of imply-
ing such a cause, they are "marks" (lingdni) which
make known time as an entity to be accepted.3 In
addition, it is accepted that-as opposed to direct per-
ception, which has as its possible object only a presently
existent something-inference applies to objects con-
nected with any of three time divisions, past, present,
and future, so that it can make known what is not now
existent by virtue of being past or yet to come. Accord-
ingly, three time divisions are accepted.4
3. A grammarian describing an Indo-European lan-
guage like Sanskrit, of course, also has to accept a
category of time, since particular constructions in the
language require operating with such a category. Thus,
for example, Sanskrit has what Western grammarians
traditionally call an accusative of extent, as in mdsam
svapiti' . . . is sleeping for a month', krosam svapiti' . . .
is sleeping for the distance of a krosa'. Accordingly,
AstadhydyT (henceforth A) 2.3.5: kdlddhvanor atyanta-
samyoge provides for introducing accusative endings
after nominal bases denoting time and paths on condi-
tion that there is a constant connection with the time or
way referred to. In addition, a grammarian has to
recognize three time subdivisions: past (bhata), current
(vartamana), and future (bhavisyat). Panini operates
with these as primitive notions which serve to condi-
tion the occurrence of particular linguistic elements.
Thus, for example, A 3.2.84: bhiite heads a section of
rules that introduce affixes after verbs on condition
that the actions in question are referred to the past
(bhite); one such affix is the L-suffix lun (A 3.2.110:
lun), introduced in deriving forms such as abhat (3rd
sg. aor. of bhii) 'was, came into being, became'.5 Simi-
larly, A 3.2.123, 3.3.13: vartamdne lat, Irt sese ea
(bhavisyati 3) introduce la( and
lr(, respectively, if ac-
tions are referred to current time and the future, as in
bhavati'is, becomes', bhaviyyati'will be, will become'.
As I said, Panini simply accepts concepts like var-
tamdna, bhiita, bhavisyat as primitives. In the same
vein, he assumes as primitive the knowledge of what is
meant by adya 'today', so that he does not need any
special rule in order to allow his using anadyatane
'(past or future) other than the day of reference'. In this
respect, Panini stands apart from some other grammar-
ians, who felt it necessary to formulate rules specifying
just what was meant by adyatana.6
Now, given the clear evidence indicating that specu-
lation concerning time and its status harks back to the
Vedic era,7 there can be no doubt that Panini must
have been aware of at least some of the issues under
discussion. That his grammar does not touch upon
such matters is only to be expected: the Astadhydyr is a
set of rules describing Sanskrit, not a discursive treatise
considering such matters as the ontological status of
time or its subdivisions. On the other hand, in the
course of their comments on Paninian siitras, Katya-
yana and Patan-jali do find occasion to bring up such
issues. Moreover, some of the things said on this topic
in the Mahdbhdsya are of genuine interest both in
connection with what we find said in major works of
later times and from the more general point of view of
methodology in considering such issues.
4. It is obvious that time is most intimately related
to actions, which take place in time and are describable
as being referred to past, current, or future, as in
Paninian siitras like 3.2.84 and so on (see sec. 3).
4.1. In addition, one of the major positions taken
concerning time is that it is an all-encompassing (vibhu)
eternal (nityam) substance (dravyam) that serves as a
measure of things involved in actions (parimdnam kri-
ydvatdm).8 Given that time is said to be a single entity,
one must account for its being referred to as various:
one speaks of present time (vartamdna kala), today
2
As when a young person and an old man who are respec-
tively more distant and closer in space to a person are known
to be less removed and more removed from that person.
3 VaiS 2.2.6: aparasmin param yugapad ayugapac ciram
ksipram iti kdlalingdni. NVt. on NS 2.1.39 (1.5 18): pardpard-
dipratyaydndrh ca sanimittatvat kdlapratisedho na yuktah.
4
NBh on NSL.1.5 (1.158-61): sadvisayam' ca pratyaksam
sadasadvisayam canumdnam
I
kasmat traikdlyagrahandt
trikdlayukta arthd anumdnena grhyante
bhavisyatlty anumT-
yate bhavatTti cdbhuid iti ca
I
asac ca khalv atTtam andgatam
ceti. Cf. NM 1. 198.
5
Abstract L-suffixes are replaced by finite verb endings and
participial suffixes; see Cardona 1988: 169-81 (229-39).
6
See, for example, the Kasikd on A 1.2.57: kdlopasarjane
ca
tulyam, which according to some scholars is an interpolation
(see Cardona 1976: 158-59 [1.3.3f.]).
7
For example, the Atharvaveda has two hymns (19.53,
54)
where, among other things, it is said that time created both
heaven and the various firm grounds that lie beneath (AV
19.53.5ab: kda6 'm umh divam ajanayat
kala imah
prthiv
r utd)
and that it gave rise to creatures and Prajapati
(19.53.1Oab:
kalah praja
asrjata
kda6 agre prajapatim).
8 VP 3.9.1: vydparavyatirekena
kalam eke
pracaksate I
nit-
yam ekam vibhu dravyam parimdnam kriydvatdm.
Cf. Vai
S
2.2.7: dravyatvanityatve vdyuna vydkhyate,
Candrananda:
adravyavattvdt paramdnuvdyor
iva dravyatvanityatve
kalasya.
CARDONA: Some Indian Arguments Concerning Time 447
(adya), the time when something is begun (drambha-
kdla), and so forth. This is accounted for on the
basis of actions associated with time, viewed as accom-
panying entities (upddhi) that impose their properties
on time, which is thus viewed as various.'
4.2. Nor is this point of view to be attributed exclu-
sively to Vaisesikas. It is clearly reflected also in gram-
marians' circles as one possible view concerning time,
without attribution to any particular sect.
4.2.1. Consider what is said in the Mahdbhdsya on
A 2.2.5: kdldh parimdnind. This siitra serves to derive
tatpurusa compounds like
mdsa-jdta 'born a month
ago'. The rule provides that terms referring to time
(kdldh) combine with a semantically and syntactically
related term denoting one whose measure (parimdnind
'with one that has a measure') is the particular time
referred to. Thus,
mdsa-jdta refers to someone who
was born one month ago, so that he is associated with a
month as a measure of time that has passed since his
birth.
In the first varttika on A 2.2.5 (kalasya yena samdsas
tasydparimdnitvdd anirdesah), Katyayana poses an ob-
jection to the rule as formulated: the rule is stated in
such a way that it fails to convey any understandable
meaning (anirdegah =
agamako nirdesah) because
what is signified by the term with which a time-word is
supposed to combine to form a compound is not re-
lated to the time in question through having it as its
measure. Patafijali explains as follows. That with which
a time-word forms a compound is not related to the
time in question as having it for a measure. Because it
does not have it for a measure, the siitra does not state
a meaning, that is, it does not convey a meaning that is
comprehensible.10 He goes on to note that a month is
not a measure with respect to someone born; on the
contrary, it is a measure for a group of thirty nights.
That is, the relation between the significands of mdsah
and jdtasya is indirect, since mdsah first is related, as a
measure, with triMs'adrdtrasya (mdsas triims'ardtrasya
jdtasya); this is comparable to drono badardndm deva-
dattasya 'a drona of badara fruits of Devadatta': as a
drona is not a measure relative to Devadatta-it is
directly related as a measure to the fruits that make up
this measure-and these fruits are directly related to
Devadatta, so is a month a measure directly related to
thirty nights that make up this length of time."'
In his second varttika (siddhaih tu kdlapariminaii
yasya sa kdlas tena), Katyayana suggests that the de-
sired result is obtained under a modified formulation:
a term X denoting a time Tx combines with a term Y
referring to some Y if Y is related to that which has Tx
as its measure." This itself is subject to the objection
9
Vai S 2.2.9: karyavigesena ndndtvam; Candrdnanda: kalas-
yaikatve katham drambhakalddivyapadega Tty atraha...
kdryam kriya kriydvigesendvistasya vastuna drambhasthiti-
vinasakriyd drstva kalasya ndndtvopacardd drambhakdlddiv-
yapoadesah; Pragastapdda 120: kalalifigaviksesd afijasaikatve
pi sarvakdrydndm
drambhakriyabhinirvrttisthitinirodhopdd-
hibhedan manivat pdcakavad vd ndndtvopacdra iti; cf. Vyo-
mavatl 129.19-130.4, Kiranavalf 80.
10 Bh 1.409.14-15: kdlasya yena samdsah
so)7arimdnT
tasya-
parimdnitvad anirdedah
I
agamako nirdego 'nirdedah.
Bh 1.409.15-17: na hi jdtasya mdsah parimdnam
I
kasya
tarhi trirhmadrdtrasya I tadyathdI drono badardnarh devadat-
tasyeti I na devadattasya dronah parimdnam I kasya tarhi
badardndm.
12 Bh 1.409.19-20: siddham etat j katham I kdlaparimanarh
yasya sa kdlas tena saha samasyata iti vaktavyam. In the
example under discussion
(mdsajdta -mdsa-s
jdta-as), the
person born (jdtasya) is related to a period of thirty nights
(trimhsadrdtram) which has a month as its measure. As can be
seen, I have adopted an interpretation of varttika two in
which kdlaparimdnam is a bahuvrihi compound, kdla- in this
compound refers to a month, and the compound itself refers
to the period of thirty nights that has a month as its measure.
This brings the varttika into harmony with what Patafijali
says in his Bhasya on varttika one. It must be noted that the
precise formulation of varttika two brings up several difficul-
ties of interpretation, centering around whether kdlapari-
manam is interpreted as (a) a sas~thi-tatpurusa (kdlasya pari-
manam) or (b) a bahuvrThi compound (kalah parimdnam
asya) and what one considers the referent of kala in this
compound. Taking mdsajata- as the standard example to be
accounted for, let Tstand for time in general (kdlasdmdnyam),
Tx for a particular time span such as a month (masddih
kdlavisesah) which serves to measure T, X for a term denoting
Tx, J for one whose birth is delimited by the time span Tx,
and Y for a term referring to J. Under either interpretation (a)
or (b), yasya is equivalent to Y, referring to J. Kaiyata (Pr
11.663) considers both interpretations of kdlaparimalnam: (a1)
kala- in this compound refers to general time T, and the
tatpurusa compound refers to a time TX, which measures gen-
eral time; sa kdlas, on the other hand, also refers to such a
measure of time; a term X denoting a month or such, which
measures general time related to some J forms a compound
with the term denoting J (Pr: kdlasabdena kalasamanyam
ucyate I yasya jdtddeh sambandhinah kdlasamdanyasya pari-
mdnam mdsddi sa kdlo mdsddih samasyate); (b') kdla- in
kdlaparimdnam refers to a particular time Tx, and the com-
pound refers to general time T, which has Tx as its measure; a
term X forms a compound with a term Y denoting some J if T
is related to it (Pr: athavd kdlagabdena mdsddih kdlavigesa
that, although it succeeds, the sitra now is formulated
differently."3 The immediate answer, of course, is that
the siftra should be left as stated (yathdnydsam evdstu),
which brings up a retort: It was precisely under this
formulation that the objection made in the first varttika
was set forth.14
And this brings us to the central point. The objector
is asked: What do you consider time to be when you
say this? To which the reply is made: Time is said to be
(kalam dhuh '... say time is . . . ') that on account of
which increases and decreases in material beings are
seen.'" Further, it is said, when this entity time is
connected with a certain action, it gets designations
like 'day' and 'night'. The action is the movement of the
sun. And time gets the designations 'month' and 'year'
due to the repeated action of the sun.16 If this position
is taken, however, then a time called 'month' is indeed
a measure with respect to someone born."7 That is,
time in one of its varieties serves to delimit an act, the
act of being born, which is a boundary; from the time
of birth, a month has passed.18
4.2.2. When a participant in the discussion on A
2.2.5 asks another what conception of time he has
when he sets forth an objection (see 4.2.1), it is not
farfetched to conclude that more than one conception
of time was indeed well known at the time. And when
the answer is given that time is said to be that on
account of which increase and decrease are witnessed
in material things, Patafijali is setting out in brief a view
that is also maintained by others. Later on, too, this
view is maintained. In particular, Bhartrhari goes into
considerable detail to expound how time is said to be
the efficient cause (nimittam) with respect to the coming
into being (utpattau), remaining in existence (sthitau)
and disappearance (vind.e) of all things that come into
being, exist, and disappear; and time, which remains
throughout, functions as cause in different ways, divid-
ing itself (vibhaktenatmand 'through a divided self').'9
The universe of all there is (visvam) is divided by time
(tena
vibhajyate)
through its inhibiting and permit-
ting (pratibandhdbhyanujiidbhydm) particular acts to
occur. Hence, it is spoken of as the string-puller (swtra-
dharam 'string holder') for this world viewed as a pup-
pet.20 For if time did not inhibit and also let go of such
ucyate
I
sa kdlah parimdnam yasya kdlasdmanyasya tad yasya
sambandhi tena sa kdlo mdsddih samasyata ity arthah). As
Nagega notes (Ud 11.663), under (a'), the identity of the mean-
ings of the terms kdla used in the varttika, which fits with
what one understands must have been intended, is done away
with, so that Kaiyata suggests the alternative (b). (Ud: kdlasab-
deneti
I
kalaparimanam iti sasthTtatpurusah I atra vydkhydne
vdrttikasthakdlapaddrthayoh svarasata aikyam pratTyamdnam
bhajjetety
ata dha athaveti| atra pakse kdlaparimdnam iti
bahuvrThih tad yasyeti tat kalasdmanyam.) Annambhatta
brings up another difficulty under (a'): kala- is now linked
with yasya, hence is not immediately connected with pari-
mana, so that one has an improper compound. (Udd V.133:
nanv evam yasyety etadapeksamanasya kdlasabdasya pari-
mdnasabdendsdmarthydt samdso na sydd ata aha athaveti.)
The Ratnaprakasa adopts a tatpurusa interpretation that is
different: (a2) kdla- of the compound refers to a time stretch
such as thirty nights, of which a month is the measure, and the
compound refers to Tx. A term X compounds with Y denoting
J, if a span like thirty nights delimits J. (Ratnaprakdaa V. 135:
kdlaparimdnam iti
I
kdlasya trimsadrdtrddeh parimanam kdla-
parimdnam mdsddi
I
tadvdcako mdsddisabdah svavdcyamdsd-
diparicchinnah kdlas trims~adrdtrarupo yasya paricchedakas
tadvdcakenajatddind samasyate sa tatpurusa iti vacandrthah.)
As can be seen from Sivaramendrasarasvati's explication, his
tatpurusa interpretation involves difficulties in that yasya re-
fers to one that bears a relation to a thirty-night span, which is
not the direct referent of kalaparimdnam. In effect, a bahuvr'i-i
interpretation seems most appropriate. Kaiyata's interpreta-
tion invokes general time, and thus departs to a degree from
what Patafijali has said earlier. Hence my preference.
3 Bh 1.409.20: suitram tarhi bhidyate.
1' Bh 1.409.20-21: yathdnydsam evdstu
I
nanu coktam kd-
lasya yena samdsas tasyaparimdnitvdd anirdesa iti.
1' Bh 1.409.21-23: kam punah kalarn matva bhavdn aha
kdlasya yena samdsas tasyaparimdnitvdd anirdesa iti
I
yena
martindm upacayds cdpacayds ca lak~syante tam kalam dhuh.
6
Bh 1.409.23-25: tasyaiva hi kayacit kriyayd yuktasydhar
iti ca bhavati rdtrir iti ca
I
kayd kriyayd
I
ddityagatyd
I
tayai-
vdsakrd dvrttayd mdsa iti bhavati samvatsara iti ca.
17
Bh 1.409.25: yady evami bhavatijdtasya
mdsah parima-nam.
18
Pr 11.665: jdtasya
jananakriydvadhir ma-sena paricchid-
yate na ca mdsavyatiriktah kascit trims~adrdtro'sti yasya
mdsah parimdnam sydt
I
na ca kdlasdmdnyam paricchidyate
kdla eva hi samsargibheddvdptamdsddibhedavyavahdrah kri-
ydydh parimdnam na vastvantarasya
1' VP 3.9.3: utpattau ca sthitau ca vina-se cdpi tadvatdm
nimittam kdlam evdhur vibhaktendtmand sthitam.
20 VP 3.9.4: tam asya lokayantrasya suitradhdram pracak-
sate pratibandhdbhyanujiadbhydam tena visvamh
vibhajyate.
The view of time as a power that governs what comes about
through its inhibiting and permitting powers is set forth
not only in this section of the Kdlasamuddesa, where it fits
within the context of tenets maintained by Vaisesikas-and
acceptable within Bhartrhari's general system-but also else-
where in the Vdkyapadiya and in Bhartrhari's autocommen-
tary thereon, as well as in the commentaries of Vrsabhadeva
and Helaraja. The roles played by time as permitting and
inhibition, stages of evolution would become inter-
mixed, without their due sequence." Moreover, Bhar-
trhari also explains that a single entity, time, takes on
divisions imposed on it through its association with ac-
companying factors, namely, activities in particular of
the sun: Its being (tasydtmd 'its self') is differentiated in
many ways by virtue of the differences that rest on ex-
ternal properties; for there is no thing that is in and of
itself differentiated or non-differentiated.22 A similar
note is struck by Vaisesikas, who also operate with a
single entity, time, and differences imposed upon it.23
inhibiting are further elaborated in VP 3.9.15-23 and 24-26,
respectively. In VP 3.9.30, these are said to play a role in
time's having sequence imposed on it, and in VP 3.9.70, they
are considered in connection with the flow of water out of a
tube, used in measuring out different spans of time. VP 1.3,
adhyahitakalath yasya kalaiaktim updfritdh I Janmddayo vikd-
rah sad bhdvabhedasya yonayah, brings in for the first time in
the Vakyapadlya the concept of time as a power (sakti) of
Brahman which has imposed upon it divisions. The six modi-
fications of being which are the sources (yonayah) of different
modes of being and acting (bhdvabhedasya) rest on this
power. In his Vrtti, Bhartrhari explains as follows. All capaci-
ties of being (saktayah) that come about (janmavatyah) are
dependent on and accompanied by the independent power
(svdtantryena 'independence') of Brahman that is called 'time'
(kdldkhyena), so that they are in accordance with the activity
of this time-power. Hence, the varied status of all things is
seen as something that appears as in sequence, because of the
restriction on the powers of things due to the inhibiting and
permitting of time; Vrtti on VP 1.3 (18.3-19. 1): kdldkhyena hi
svdtantryena sarvdh paratantra janmavatyah ?aktayah samd-
vistah kdlasaktivrttim anupatanti
I
tatas ca pratibhdvam vais-
varuipyasya pratibandhdbhyanujfidbhydih saktyavacchedena
kramavdn ivdbhdsopagamo laksyate. That is, all things that
come into being, such as trees, do so in a certain order: first
one has a shoot, then buds, and so on. The material cause of
such things has a power to produce them, but time has the
inhibiting and permitting capacities that impose order: at one
stage, it inhibits the arising of buds while allowing a shoot to
arise, at another it inhibits a shoot but allows buds. The other
powers, then, are dependent on this independent power which
is time. In his Vrtti to VP 2.22 (p. 202), Bhartrhari remarks
that the independent power (kartrsaktih 'capacity of an agent')
called time provides for sequence, through inhibiting and
permitting, only in things that are produced: kdldkhyd hi
kartrsaktih kdryesv eva
pratibandhdbhyanujfidbhydam paur-
vdparyam prakalpayati. This is brought up in connection with
a consideration of vakyasphota, which is without sequence.
Time's inhibiting and permitting powers are also brought up
in the Vrtti on VP 2.49: santa eva visesd ye paddrthesu vya-
vasthitdh
I
te kramdd anugamyante na vdkyam abhidhdya-
kam. This concerns a particular view-which Bhartrhari does
not ultimately accept-about how a sentential meaning is
understood, namely that a sentence is a sequence (krama):
particular qualifications of entities denoted by given words
such as devadatta, go, and abhy-dj in sentences like devadatta
gdm abhydja 'Devadatta, bring the cow', namely the status of
being an agent, object and so on, are already present in these
meanings and are understood in order by hearers, as they hear
the words that make up an utterance, so that one need not
assume that a unit called vdkya 'utterance' is independently
the signifier of this meaning. In the Vrtti to this karika (p. 213),
Bhartrhari remarks that the particular qualifications are under-
stood by hearers due to time's favoring this, and this favoring
behavior of time is called its power to inhibit and permit:
arthatvam dpadyamdnesu ydvanto visesah sannihitd niyata-
prasiddhavyavasthds te ... kdlavrttyanugrahena pratiban-
dhabhyanujnidkhyena pratipattrbhir anugamyante. In his
commentary on VP 3.9.30, Helaraja explicitly notes what is
meant by pratibandha and abhyanujfid; see also VP 3.9.1 1,
Helaraja's comments on VP 3.9.10, 11, 13, 26, 42, 46, 53, 56,
62, 71, 73, and Phullaraja's commentary on VP 3.7.34.
21VP 3.9.5: yadi na pratibadhnlydt
pratibandham ca notsr-
jet
I
avasthd vyatikfryeran paurvdparyavindkrtdh.
22
VP 3.9.6: tasydtmd bahudhd bhinno bhedair dharmdn-
tara-srayaih
I
na hi bhinnam abhinnam vd vastu kificana vid-
yate. Elsewhere in the Kalasamuddesa, Bhartrhari returns to
the same theme of how a single entity, time, is differentiated
by properties imposed on it. Thus, he says, different designa-
tions, such as carpenter, apply to a single person, depending
on different activities that he might engage in; similarly,
according to different activities, designations like season and
season names come up in respect of the single entity, time;
3.9.32: kriydbheddd yathaikasmims taksddydkhyd pravartate
kriydbheddt tathaikasminn rtvddydkhyopajdyate.
The single
entity, time, accompanied by activities that impose their
properties on it (kriyopddhis ca san), acquires the properties
of being past, future, and current (bhuitabhavisyadvarta-
mdnatdh), divided according to eleven kinds (ekddasabhir
dkdrair vibhaktdh); 3.9.37: kriyopadhis ca san bhuitabhavisya-
dvartamanatdh I ekadasabhir dkdrair vibhaktdh pratipadyate.
This repeated stating of a theme is not actually repetitious,
since Bhartrhari makes the point in different contexts of the
Kdlasamuddesa. The point that Bhartrhari makes is reiterated
by later Paninlyas. In particular, Kaiyata cites VP 3.9.6-8 in
his comments on the Bhdsya to A 2.2.5 (11.664).
23 See note 9 above. Vaisesikas also speak of time as a cause
of an effect. For example, Vyomasiva says that time's being an
accompanying cause is recognized through reasoning on the
basis of concurrently present and absent cause and effect, as
when one sees a blossom at a restricted time,
not at another
time; thus, blossoms such as the patala come up
in
spring,
not
4.2.3. It is obvious that Bhatrhari's treatment of
time is in great part indebted to what Patanijali said
earlier, and indeed Kaiyata cites from the VakyapadTya
in the course of his comments on the Mahdbhdsya on
A 2.2.5.24 It is also clear that Bhartrhari knew of and
referred to Vaisesika doctrines. On the other hand, it is
not self-evident that Vaisesikas are at all indebted to
Patanijali or any grammarian for their view that time is
a single entity whose variety is accounted for through
imposition of properties of actions associated with it.
In addition, note carefully that when Patanijali speaks
of time's being said to be that which determines increase
and decrease in material beings (4.2.1 with note 15), he
is reporting a viewpoint. This is most easily understood
under the assumption that in Patanijali's time thinkers
had already arrived at systematic conclusions concern-
ing such entities as time. To be sure, one might hesitate
and say instead that the passage in question shows
merely that Patanjali knew of a view-possibly only a
folk view-concerning time and that this does not
necessarily imply prior systematic thinking about the
topic.
5. There is, however, additional evidence which lends
support to the position that such topics were indeed
considered systematically prior to Patanijali's epoch.
5.1 The Mahdbhdsya on A 3.2.123: vartamane lat
deals with two main issues. Does the siitra as formu-
lated account for the use of present endings in certain
particular instances? Is one justified in countenancing a
current time (vartamana kala) distinct from past and
future?
5.1.1. A 3.2.123 specifically provides for introducing
the L-affix laf on condition that an action is qualified
as taking place currently, at a current time (vartamane).
In varttikas 1-2 ( pravrttasydvirdme s4iyd bhavanty avar-
tamdnatvdt, nityapravrtte ca kdldvibhdgdt) Katyayana
states two objections to the rule as formulated, claiming
that present endings (bhavantf)25 have to be provided
for separately for instances where: (1) a particular act
has been begun and not yet terminated but is not
currently going on; (2) an act is spoken of that always
is going on, so that there is no time division in question.
Patanfjali illustrates these with the following examples:
[1] (a) ihadhTmahe 'we are studying here', (b) iha
vasamah 'we are staying here', (c) iha pusyamitram
yajayamah 'we are serving her as sacrificial officiants
for Pusyamitra'; [2] (a) tisthanti parvatdh 'the moun-
tains are in their place', (b) sravanti nadyah 'the rivers
flow'. He also explains why the use of present forms
like adhTmahe, vasamah, yajayamah, tisthanti, sra-
vanti does not succeed by A 3.2.123, as formulated:
(A) Because the actions in question, although they
have begun and have not come to their termination,
may not actually be going on (avartamdnatvdt'because
of their not being current') when [1] (a-c) are used.26
For example, [1] (a) can be used by students whose
studies have begun but not yet been finished, at a time
when they are not actually engaged in studying but
doing such things as eating; in terms of A 3.2.123, as
formulated, then, adhTmahe does not obtain, since the
act of studying is not currently going on, so that a
separate statement is necessary to provide for present
endings in such instances.27
(B) It is assumed that the category of current time
(vartamanah kalah) is always in opposition to past and
future (bhuitabhavisyatpratidvandvah). Since A 3.2.123
provides for laf to occur if an action is referred to
current time, then, it will not account for usages such
as [2](a-b). Here there can be no question of any
current time opposed to past and future. The moun-
tains spoken of have always stood in their place; it is
assumed that they are eternally standing, so that there
is no past time at which their act of standing took place
which no longer takes place; nor is there a future time
at which this act will take place that did not occur
beforehand. Similarly for the rivers' flowing.28
at another time. Similarly, one speaks of something requiring
a time of birth, which shows that time is an accompanying,
efficient cause. Vyomavatr 128: tatha niyatakale kusumadeh
kdryasyopalambho na kdldntare ity anvayavyatirekdbhyarm
tasya kdranatvam vyjhdyate I
tatha hi vasantasamaya eva pdta-
ladikusumdndm udgamo na kdldntare ity evam karydntaresv
apy uihyam
I
tathaprasavakalam apeksate iti vyavahdrdt kdra-
natvami kdlasya
I
tathd hi sahakdrinam apeksyopalabdheh
kdlasya sahakdritdm antarena prastadv ayamh vyavahdro na
sydt.
24 VP 3.9.6-8 are e-ited in Pr 11.664; note that in his Uddyota
on the passage (11.664) Nagesa has the reading dharmyan-
tarairayaih instead of dharmantarasrayaih.
25
bhavanti is an old term used by prior teachers, instead of
the Paninian term
la(,
which refers to an L-affix that can be
replaced by personal endings; Pr 111.279: bhavantlti latah
puirvdcdryasajifid .
26 Bhasya 11. 123.3-4: pravrttasydvirdme sdsitavya bhavantij
ihddhrmahe iha vasdmah iha pusyamitram yajayamah I kith
punah kdranaam na sidhyati
I
avartamdnatvdt.
27 Pr 111.279: ihddhrmaha ity adhyayanamh prdrabdham na
tu viratam
I
yadd ca
bhojanddikriydrm
kurvanto nddhryate
tadddhrmaha iti prayogo na prdpnotlti vacanam.
28 Bhdaya 11.123.6-8: nityapravrtte ca sdsitavya bhavantlf
tisthanti parvatah sravanti nadya iti
I
kith punah kdranamh na
Clearly, Katyayana and Patanijali envision current
time only as opposed to past and future, standing
between these two extremes. Only under this assump-
tion do the examples given by Patanijali make sense.
Suppose, on the contrary, that one considered being
current merely the property of pertaining to now (sam-
pratitanatvam). It would then be quite in order for the
mountains' standing and rivers' flowing to pertain to
current time: they never cease to stand and flow, so
that, a fortiori, they now stand and flow. Accordingly,
commentators quite rightly remark that the argument
in question is based on considering current time only in
the restricted manner noted.29 Now, one could at least
claim for examples like [2] (a-b) that the mountains
and rivers stand and flow forever only from the point
of view of human speakers, who cannot know of any
possible point at which these acts did not occur and at
which they will cease. For an example like [2](c) dtmdsti
'the self is', from the point of view of most orthodox
philosophical stands in India, there is no question at all
of any present time as opposed to past and future.
Accordingly, later commentators give this as an addi-
tional example.30
Commentators go even farther, arguing as follows.
An example like [2](a) involves the standing of moun-
tains, which always occurs, so that it is not something
that is brought about. By definition, an action (kriya) is
something brought to accomplishment (sadhya), so
that the standing in question is not an action. Accord-
ingly, currency (vartamdnatva), which is a property of
actions, also fails to hold here. Moreover, an imper-
manent entity that is brought to completion must have
a state of future coming into being, by virtue of its
being a created impermanent being; and an entity that
has come into being perishes, so that it has a state of
being past. Accordingly, an act signified by a verb is
current only in opposition to past and future. And
whatever always is, in effect, has neither property of
being past or future, so that it has neither the property
of currency nor the property of being an action."
5.1.2. In varttikas 3-4 on A 3.2.123, the objections
brought up in the first varttika are met, as follows:
(C) Examples such as [1](a-c) involve a currency
that is within the norm, since they involve acts that
have been initiated but not brought to termination;
moreover, there is a temporary cessation of given ac-
tions even in instances where there is no question that
acts are properly considered to take place currently
(vtts. 3-4: nydyyd tv irambhd-napavargat, asti ca muk-
tasarhsaye virdmah).
(D) In addition, there are indeed divisions of time
involved in examples like [2](a-b). Patafijali explains
as follows. What is regularly considered current time
relative to an action is that stretch of time during
which an act has been initiated and not brought to its
sidhyati
I
iha bhitabhavisyatpratidvando vartamanah kalo na
cdtra bhitabhavisyantau kdlau stah.
29 Helaraja on VP 3.9.79 (72.5-14): nanu ca sampratitanat-
vam vartamdnatvam bhitabhavisyatpratiyogi I nityesu cavic-
chedena pravartamdnesu bhutabhavisyator abhdvdt sutardam
tadupapattih I tatrocyate
I
iheme kdlanimittd vyapadeSdh para-
sparavydvrttaSarfrdh kiIakrtopakdrdand-m eva bhdvdndam yuk-
tdh
I
te ca janmavantah
I
tatra hi niyatdvadhijanmaparigra-
henaitadupapattih
I
tathd ca sddhanasannidhdne 'bhimukhot-
pattayo bhdvinah | ydvadavasthdnam vartamdndh
I
vyapagata-
SarTrd bhtatdh
I
tad ayamh vartamd-navyapadeSo bhutabhavis-
yadavadhimadhyavartiyatra bhuitabhavisyantau na stas tatra
naiva sambhavati tad uktam bhdaye bhutabhavisyatpratid-
vando vartamdna iti I yatra hi bhutabhavisyantau tatra tat-
pratiyogi vartamdna ity arthah
I
nitye~su ca bhuitabhavisyator
abhdvdt tadabha-vah.
Ud 111.280: nanu vidyamdnakdlasambandhitvaru pam var-
tamdnatvam asddhyasydpi sambhavatity ato bhda.ye bhuitet-
ycddi.
Pr 111.280: nityapravrttasya bhuitabhavisyattvdbhdvad var-
tamdnatvdbhdvah.
Ud 111.280: vartamdnatvdbhdva iti| bhuatddivirodhivarta-
mdnatvdbhdva ity arthah I tddrsam eva vartamdnatvam sitre
vivaksitam piurvam bhute ity ukteh agre ca bhavi~yatfti
vaksyamanatvdd iti bhdvah. As can be seen, Nagesa remarks
that the view in question assumes that Panini also viewed
current time in this manner, since he formulated the sutra A
3.2.123 between 3.2.84: bhMte and 3.3.3: bhavisyati gamydda-
yah.
30 E.g., VBhS 120: dtmdsti parvatdh santityddau tattatkd-
likdndam rajnidm krivdyd anityatvdt tadvdistasyotpattyddikam
dddya vartamdnatvam uihyam. On the Bhdsya examples to
which Kaundabhatta appeals, see 5.1.3.
31 Pr 111.279-80: nityapravrtteti parvatds tisthantity ddau
sthdnddeh sarvadd sadbhdvat sddhyatvdbhavdt kriydrupatvd-
bhdvdt taddharmasya vartamdnatvasydpy abhdva iti bhdvah |
sddhyasydrthasydnityatvad avasyath bhavisyattvena bhdvyam
utpannasvdpi na-sad bhiutatveneti
bhatabhavi~satpratidvandvo
vartamdno dhdtvarthah
I
nityapravrttasya bhiutabhavisyattvd-
bhdvdd vartamdnatvabhdvah kriydrapatvdbhdvas cety arthah.
Helaraja on VP 3.9.79 (72.17-19): evami ca krtvdtra kdla-
vacchedabhdvdt kalopadhirpapd kriyaiva ndsti| sd hi kalo-
pddhih sakramd sddhyamdnasvabhdvda tadabhavas cdtreti
kriydkdrakopadhinibandhand sarvaiva vyavasthd vaktavyety
uktam.
termination.32 The person who brought up the objec-
tion, moreover, is addressed as follows. You consider
an example like [3](a) bhuhkte devadattah 'Devadatta
is eating' to involve indubitably current time. Yet while
Devadatta is involved in eating he also interrupts the
actual eating with other actions; he laughs, chats,
drinks water. If, then [3](a) is viewed as involving
proper current time, so should [1](a-c) be viewed as
involving proper current time.33
5.1.3. The second objection is answered with the
observation that there truly are time divisions (vt. 5:
santi ca kdlavibhdgdh). One can properly say not just
[2](a) tisthanti parvatah but also [4](a) sthdsyantipar-
vatah, (b) tasthuhparvatdh. Moreover, it is not merely
because sentences like [4](a-b) can be used that one
concludes there are time divisions involved. There ac-
tually are such divisions, viewed as follows. There were
past kings, are present kings, and will be future kings
who have performed, do now perform, and will per-
form certain acts. These acts serve to characterize the
mountains' standing as occurring in the past, in current
time, and in the future.34
5.1.4. The validity of the concept of present time is
also brought into doubt. Patanijali goes on to remark
that someone else says there is no current time.35 More-
over, he remarks that those who maintain this view cite
verses,36 as follows:
1. The wheel is not turning, the arrow is not being
made to fly, rivers are not flowing to the ocean. This
world is immobile, not active. One who perceives thus
is truly sighted.37
2. A young man, wise and held in respect, considered
himself one who pondered on matters, and questioned
the crow: "Tell me, crow, what it is that makes up your
flight. You are not flying in the time that is yet to come
or in the time that has passed; and if you are flying in
the immediate moment, then this entire world is in
flight." Even the Himalaya then is in motion.38
3. There is a triad of times: the one that has yet to
come, the one that has passed, and the current one.
And in all of these there is no going. Of what, then, is it
that one says ' . . . is going'?39
As Kaiyata notes in his comments, speaking of a
future flying by using the present form patasi 'you are
flying' is not possible, since the act of flying in question,
by virtue of its not yet coming to be, is non-existent at
present, and patasi also is not justified with reference to
a past act of flying, which too is non-existent. If, despite
the act of flying not occurring currently, one could use
32
Bh 11.123.11: esa ndma nydyyo vartamdnah kdlo yatrd-
rambho 'napavrktah.
3 Bh 11. 123.13-15: yamh khalvapi bhavdn muktasamsvayam
vartamdnami kdlami nyayyamh manyate bhunkte devadatta iti
tenaitat tulyam
I so)pi
hy avasyam bhunjdno hasati vajalpati
vd pdnTyam vd pibati I yady atra yuktd vartamdnakdlatd
drsyata ihdpi yuktd drsyatdm. The Vdkyapadiya in turn pre-
sents two ways of viewing this situation: (a) All acts are
interrupted by other activities in their course; (b) The activi-
ties that could be viewed as interruptions are considered part
and parcel of the total set of acts that make up composite
activities such as eating. VP 3.9.82-84: (a) vyavadhdnam
ivopaiti nivrtta iva drsyate
I
kriydsamuiho bhujyddir antard-
lapravrttibhih
I
na ca vicchinnaruipo pi so 'virdmdn nivartate
sarvaiva hi kriydnyena saihkTrnevopalabhyate (b) tadantard-
ladrstd va sarvaivdvayavakriyd sdd~rydt sati bhede tu tadani-
gatvena grhyate.
34 Bh 1.123.17-22: santi khalvapi kdlavibhdgdah tisthanti
parvatah sthdsyanti parvatah tasthuh parvatd iti| kith sak-
yanta ete sabdd prayoktum ity atah santi kdlavibhdgah|
ndvasyam prayogdd eva
I
iha bhutabhavisyadvartamdndndm
rdffdrm ydh kriyds tds tisthater adhikaranam
I
iha tavat tis-
thanti parvatd iti samprati ye rajdnas tesami yah kriyds tdsu
vartamdndsu sthdsyanti parvatd itla uttaram ye rdjdno
bhavisyanti tesdm yda kriyds tdsu bhavisyantfsu tasthuh
parvatd itrha ye rajino babhuivus tesdmi yda kriyds tdsu
bhtadsu.
Rh 11.123.23: apara dha ndsti vartamdnah kala iti. Siva-
ramendrasarasvatT remarks appropriately that the claim being
made is based on the momentary nature of activities that
supposedly make up a composite act. There is no activity that
has the form of a composite of component acts and is distinct
from these. The component acts, moreover, are momentary
(ksanikdh), so that they may appropriately be past or future,
but they cannot appropriately be current. Ratnaprakasa
VI.289: avayavdtirikto 'vayavr kriydruipo ndsti
I
avayavarupas
ca kriyda ksanikdh I
tatha ca tdsdam bhuitatvami bhavisyatvamh
va sambhavati na tu vartamdnatvam iti bhdva#h. The same
point is made again and again by other commentators;
see
below.
36 h 11. 123.23: api cdtra Rlokdn uddharanti.
37 Bh II.123.24-25: na vartate cakram isur na pdtyate na
syandante saritah sdgardya
I
kutastho 'yam loko na vicestitasti
yo hy evam pasyati so py anadhah.
38 Bh 11. 124.1-5: mTmdrhsako manyamdno yuvd
medhd-
visammatah j kdkam smehdnuprcchati
kith te patitalak-
sanam andgate na patasiatikrdnte ca kdka na I yadisamprati
patasi sarvo lokah pataty ayam
II
himavdn api gacchati.
39
h 11. 124.6-7: andgatam atrikrdntamh vartamdnam iti
trayam
I
sarvatra ca gatir ndsti gacchatfti kim ucyate.
patasi, then one would open the door to using patasi
with reference to
any thing, including
a mountain.40
Bhartrhari earlier sets forth the same argument, in the
following way. A thing either is an existent or not;
there is no third. Thereby, leaving aside past and future,
41
there is no middle, which one could call current.
Helaraja explains thus: An action is said to have the
42
property of being brought to accomplishment. Now,
of all the possible moments in an act, a moment that is
past has already come into being (san 'being'), hence is
an accomplished entity, and the action is past at that
moment. A moment that is not yet existent (asan 'not
being') has yet to be brought about, is a future one,
and an action is characterized as to be in that moment.
These are the only possible kinds of moments. There is
no moment that has both characteristics, of being and
not being, since it is contradictory for a single entity to
have contradicting essential properties. Hence, it is not
possible to justify the property of being current as a
qualifier of what a verb denotes,43 Helaraja goes on to
cite the third verse of the Mahdbhdsya passage given
above,44 and then makes an important point. An action
is not directly known (paroksd 'beyond direct percep-
tion'). Instead, it is inferred from a result, which means
that it must be past. How, then, can it be spoken of
using a present affix, as in patati? And, if one insisted
on such usage, then one would have to allow speaking
of the Himalaya, which is not seen to be associated
with any separation and conjunction with places as a
result of any activity on its part, using the same verb
form.45
5.1.5. In saying that an action is not directly per-
ceived and has to be inferred, Helaraja is in fact hark-
ing back to what Patanfjali said centuries earlier. In the
Mahdbhisya on A 1.3.1: bhavddayo dhdtavah, the
suggestion is made that a verb base (dhdtu) be defined
as a speech unit that signifies an action (kriydvacana).
The question then immediately arises: What is an ac-
tion? The first answer is: It is Thd ('activity'). Where-
upon, the question arises: What is Thd? To which the
answer given is: It is cestd.46 The questioner now shows
his annoyance, remarking: You just explain words with
words. You don't show any particular sort of thing and
explain that an action is of this kind. This evokes a
definite answer: An action is absolutely not visible. An
action cannot be pointed out visually as a mass like a
foetus come out of the womb.47 Instead, it can only be
known through inference (sdsdv anumdnagamyd). And
40
Pr 111.283-84: andgata iti I andgatatvdd evdsattvdt pdtak-
riydydh patasTti vyapadeso'nupapanna ity arthah. atikrdnta
iti I tathaiva kriydyd asattvdt. sarvo loka iti I kriydyd vartamd-
natvdbhdve gi yadi pataslti vyapadesas tadd viSesdbhdvdt
parvatdddv api patasTti vyapadesaprasanga ity arthah.
41 VP 3.9.85: sad asad vdpi vastu sydt trtTyam ndsti kinicana |
tena bhitabhavisyantau muktvd madhyam na vidyate.
42 sddhyamdndvasthd: cf. VP 3.8.1 (note 49).
43
Helaraja on VP 3.9.85 (76.6-9): sddhyamdndvasthd kriyd
bhanyate I tatra ca yah ksano'tTtah sa san siddhasvabhdva iti
kriyd tatrdtltd I yas cdsan sa sddhyah sa bhdvT ksana iti tatra
bhavisyadupddhikd kriyd
I
na cdnyo'sti ksanah sadasadu-
bhayarupah I viruddhasvabhdvasyaikatvavirodhdt I tatas ca
vartamdnatd dhdtvarthaviSesanamh nopapadyate.
44
The passage is cited with some variants; see note 45.
45 Helaraja on VP 3.9.85 (76.9-15): tad uktam bhd.ye
andgate na patasi atikrdnte ca kdka na yadi samprati patasi
krtsno lokah pataty ayam I himavdn api calati iti I paroksa
kriyd phalendnumryamdntvdt kathamn vartamdnapratyayenoc-
yeta I evam himavin aparidrstasamyogavibhagakriyakaryah
kasmdn na patatrti vartamdnapratyayena vyapadiiyetety
arthah.
46 As Kaiyata points out, although ihd and cestd elsewhere
signify distinct activities, they are used in the present context
with reference to activity in general: Pr 11.179: Thdcestdiab-
dayor anyatra vydpdravUiesavacanatve
)gTha
vydpdramdtra-
vacanatvami boddhavyam. Nagega properly notes that rhd is a
mental activity, wishing, while cesta is a physical activity
involving movement of the body; Ud 11.179: mdnasavya-para
icchdrtipd ihd. ... kayaparispandag cesta.
47
Or: as a foetus still in the womb cannot be shown visually.
Bh: kriyd ndmeyam atyantdparidrstd I agakyd kriya pindT-
bhuad nidarsayitum yathd garbho nirluthitah. The two inter-
pretations depend on whether garbhonirluthitah is taken as
(a) from garbhah nirluthitah or (b) from garbhah anirluthitah.
Pr 11. 180: garbho nirluthita iti I yathd kuksistho garbho prat-
yaksas tathd kriyety arthah I athavd yathd nirluthito nirgatah
kukser garbhah pratyakso naivam kriyeti vaidharmyena
drstantah. Here, (a) can be appropriate: one can point to and
directly show a foetus once it has come out of the womb, but
one cannot similarly point out an action as a whole, the com-
plex of constituent action-moments (pindTbhiuta 'become a
mass'). On the other hand, as Kaiyata notes, (a) involves a
comparison of entities with different properties: a foetus that
can be seen as a single mass versus a total action, which
cannot be seen as a single whole. Moreover, one could argue
that there are more immediate examples available to illustrate
something that is directly perceptible, so that interpretation
(b), which also does not involve a contrastive comparison,
should be preferred. Whichever interpretation is preferred,
moreover, the stress is clearly on the fact that a composite
action is not directly perceptible. An additional point, which I
454
Journal of the American Oriental Society 111.3 (1991)
this inference can be of two sorts. First, on condition
that all participants that serve to bring an activity to
completion-as when grains of rice, a pot, water, fire
and a person like Devadatta-are present, sometimes
one rightly says pacati' . . . is cooking', and sometimes
one does not have this. That, as a consequence of
whose being one rightly says pacati, is an action. Al-
ternatively, that on account of which someone like
Devadatta is first in one place and then in another
48
place such as Pataliputra, is an action.
5.1.6. As we could expect, Bhartrhari considers the
same issues and presents them in some detail, basing
himself on what Patafijali had said earlier. Let us con-
sider briefly, then, some major points that Bhartrhari
makes in the Kriyd- and Kdlasamuddesa sections of the
Vdkyapadfya [VP]. A verb such a pac is considered to
denote an action, cooking. The essential feature of
what is understood to be an action (kriyetipratTyate) is
that it has sequence (daritakramarapatvdt) and is ac-
cordingly spoken of as something that is brought to
accomplishment (sddhyatvendbhidhlyate), whether it
has or has not been brought to accomplishment, as
when one says apaksft'. . . has cooked', pacati' . . . is
cooking', paksyati' . . . will cook'.49 In fact, what users
of the language speak of, using such verb forms, is not
a single simple entity but a complex (samuihah 'group')
of constituent activities (gunabhftair avayavaih 'parts
that are subsidiary [with respect to the whole]').50 The
whole in question is a composite of parts that arise in
sequence (kramajanmandm) and are not ever actually
together.51 Accordingly, Bhartrhari says that the com-
posite that is called 'an action' (kriyeti vyapadisyate) is
something whose unity (abheda) is conceived by the
mind (buddhydprakalpitdbhedah).52 Now, the consti-
tuent moments of activity that make up the composite
act occur in sequence, no sooner arising than they pass
(kramat sadasatam . . . samuihindm), so that they do
not themselves (tesdm dtmdnah 'their selves') come
into relation with organs of perception like the eyes,
whose range of operation is limited to existent ob-
jects.53 In effect, the action-moments in question can-
not be objects of direct perception, since they are indeed
momentary. Bhartrhari emphasizes that, as pouring
cannot take up here, concerns precisely what is meant by
nirluthita-, given that luth means 'roll about, wallow'.
48
Bh 1.254.13-19: yadi punah kriydvacano dhdtur ity etal
laksanam kriyeta kd punah kriyd I ih/ I kd punarihd
I
cest|
kd punas cestd vydpdrah I sarvathd bhavda- sabdenaiva
sabddn dcaste na kificid
arthajdtam nidarsayaty evaiijdtiyikd
kriyeti
I
krivd ndmeyam atyantdparidrstd I asakyd kriyd
pindibhiad nidarsayitum yathd garbho
nirluthitahl savdv
anumdnagammyda ko 'sdv anumdnah| iha sarvesu sdddhanesu
sannihitesu kaddcit pacatlty etad bhavati kaddcin na bhavati
yasmin sdadhane sannihite pacatity etad bhavati sd nu~namh
kriyd
I
athavd yayd devadatta iha bh/utvd pdtaliputre bhavati
sda nunamkriyd. Cf. BA 11.114.10-11 (on A 3.2.102), 120.9-
10 (on A 3.2.115).
49
VP 3.8.1: ydvat siddham asiddhamh vd sddhyatvendbid-
hfyate
I daritakramaru~patvdt
tat kriyeti pratlyate.
50 The major constituent acts involved are said to be: putting
a pot on a stove, pouring water into the pot, putting rice
grains into the water in the pot, bringing firewood up to the
stove, lighting it, stirring what is in the pot with a spoon,
letting out the scum that forms on top of the water, and taking
down the pot from the stove. E.g., Bhadsya on NS 2.1.42
(1.524): ndndvidhd caikdrthd kriyd
pacatitil
sthadlyadhisra-
yanam udakdsecanam edhopasarpanam agnyabhijvdlanam
mandasrdvanam adhovatdranam iti (see also below with
note 54). As Vatsyayana says, the entire composite has a
single purpose (ekdrtha): to produce softened rice grains.
Bhartrhari speaks of the constituent acts as subsidiary in that
separate terms are not used with reference to them when one
uses a single verb such as pac. Helaraja on VP 3.8.4 (9.4- 5):
tatrdvayavdndrm samuddye gunabhdvdpatteh sabdabhedaprayo-
jakatvdbhdvdd ekadhdtapdddnakriydika samuddyasvabhdvdva-
tisthate 'since the constituent parts get the status of being
subsidiary with respect to the whole, they do not condition the
use of separate terms, so that there is a single act that is a
complex denoted by a single verb'.
51 As opposed to the parts of a substantial entity, such as the
threads of a piece of cloth, which do indeed occur together to
form a whole.
52 VP 3.8.4: gunabhatair avayavaih samuthah kramajan-
mandm
I
buddhyd prakalpitdbhedah kriyeti vyapadi.yate.
Helaraja (9.3-4) succinctly puts it as follows: The sequential
action-moments that come into play with one single result as
an intended goal are made unified by the mental activity of
gathering together (sahkalandbuddhyd samdpdditaikydndm);
it is these unified moments that one speaks of as an action:
kramavatdam ksandndm ekaphaloddesena pravrttdndm san-
kalanabuddhyd samdpdditaikydndrm kriydtvaivyavahdrah.
5 VP 3.8.6: kramdt sadasatdam tesda- tesdan dtmdno na
samuhindm I sadvastuvisayair yanti sambandham caksurddi-
bhih. Helaraja (10. 12-14) appropriately brings this into connec-
tion with the Mahdbha.ya's statement that an action has to be
inferred. Earlier, in his commentary on VP 3.8.1 (5.23-25),
Helaraja remarks that it will be said that a meaning entity
which is sequential, so that its parts arise and disappear, does
not have the property of being perceived directly, since its
parts do not continue to occur currently: evam ca piurvd-
par bhutasya sakramasydrthasydgamdpdyitvdd bhdgdndm
avartamdnatvdt pratyaksdbhdvah.
water into a pot, and so on, constitute parts of cooking,
so must the acts of pouring water into a pot, and so on,
also be recognized to have parts.54 One can go on down
to the very last atomic moment of activity, no longer
divisible into components, and each such prior moment
is divisible into components; moreover, kriyd 'action' is
simply not used of this very last indivisible moment."
Accordingly, one cannot say that an action as such
is directly perceived. As Patanijali said earlier, it is
inferred.
And from this, one can conclude that there is no
moment at which one can truly speak of an action as
current, as Bhartrhari says in VP 3.9.85 (see 5.1.4 with
note 41).
5.1.7. From the Mahdbhdaya discussion summarized
in sections 5.1.4-6, it is patent that scholars earlier
than Patafijali had considered how one could justify
the concept of current time; some had rejected such a
concept, basing their position on the view that what
one considers an action is nothing more than a series of
action-moments, none of which can be directly viewed
as current.56 It is worth emphasizing that in the Maha-
bhdaya on A 1.3.1 Patafijali cites verses which encap-
sulate the conclusions reached; he reports what he has
received as accepted doctrine of some thinkers, reflected
in these verses.
5.2. A similar argumentation lies behind a section of
Nydyasitra [NS], which I shall now consider briefly.
The position is set forth that there is no current time
(vartamdndbhdvah), and this is based on the following
argument. Relative to something that falls (patatah),
one can properly account for only a time that has
already been covered in falling and a time to be cov-
ered, no third time.57 In his Bhdsya on this sUtra,
Vatsyayana invokes an example familiar not only from
Nyaya but also from Madhyamaka (see 6), that of a
path that is traversed during motion. A fruit that breaks
loose from where it is attached to a tree falls to the
ground. During this fall, at any given point, what is
above the fruit between it and the starting point is
the path which has been covered in falling (patito
'dhvd) and what is below the fruit between it and the
ground is the path to be traversed in falling (patitavyo
'dhvd); the time connected with the former is that of
past falling (patitakalah) and the time connected with
the latter is that of future falling (patitavyakdlah).
There is no third part of a path of falling which could
be grasped as involving a current time, during which
one would say that falling is currently taking place.
Therefore, one concludes that there is no current time
connected with this or any act.58
There is no need here to consider in detail the argu-
ments given in subsequent sutras to justify the concept
of current time. Nevertheless, what Vatsyayana says in
his Bhdsya on NS 2.1.40 is worth noting. The argument
proposed to show that one cannot correctly operate
with current time assumes that time is linked with
things like paths traversed and things that fall, so that
any time varieties are revealed by these. But, says Vat-
syayana, time in its varieties is not brought out (vyah-
gya 'to be made manifest') by participants in acts; it
is brought out by actions, as when one says patati
' ... falls, . . . is falling'.59 In the particular example
54 VP 3.8.9: yathd ca bhdgdh pacater udakdsecanddayah|
udakdsecanddlndam jfieyd bhdgds tathdpare. Some maintain
that, although the composite action said to be denoted by a
verb like pac is indeed not directly perceptible because the
components do not occur together, each moment is directly
perceptible and pacati is used on the basis of mentally
unifying these perceptible constituent moments. Pr 11.181:
dhdtuvdcyasya samahasya yugapadasannidhdndd apratyak-
satve py ekaikasya tu ksanasya pratyaksatve buddhyd tdn
ksandn sahkalayyapacatTtiprayujyate. As Nagega notes in his
comments on this Pradlpa passage, others hold that com-
ponent acts like putting a pot on the stove are not single
moments but themselves composites of other activity-moments
such as putting out one's hand, taking the pot, bringing into
contact with the stove, and so on; and the final most minute
moment, which is no longer divisible, is, by the very nature of
speech, not signified, nor is it directly perceptible. Ud 11.181:
pare tv adhigrayanddir api naikaksandtmakah tasydpi hasta-
prasdranapdtraddnacullTsamyojanddayo 'vayavah santy eveti
so pi samuharupa eva I yas tu tesdm apy avayavah para-
manvdkhyah sa tu sabda.taktisvabhdvdn naiva vacyo napi
pratyaksah.
5
VP 3.8.10: yas cdpakarsaparyantam anupraptah pratU-
yate
I
tatraikasmin kriyasabdah kevale na
prayujyate.
56 The concept of present time is also defended; see 5.4.
57
NS 2.1.39: vartamdndbhdvah patatah patitapatitavyakd-
lopapatteh.
58 NSBh 1.517: vrntdt pracyutasya phalasya bhumau prat-
ydsidato yad urdhvam sa patito 'dhvd tatsamyuktah kdlah
patitakdlah I
yo 'dhastdt sa patitavyo 'dhva tatsamyuktah
kdlah patitavyakdlah
I
neddnTm trtTyo 'dhvd vidyate yatra
patatTti kdlo grhyeta tasmdd vartamdnah kdlo na vidyate.
59
NSBh 1.520: nddhvavyangyah kdlah kim tarhi kri-
ydvyangyah patatlti; cf. NM 1.203. A falling fruit and a path
along which it falls are not considered proper to bringing out
time differences in that they remain the same; for example, the
space in which a fruit falls is the same whether a fruit has
started to fall along it or not. NVTT 1.520: ndtitddirqpatd
under discussion, one has past time when the act of
falling has ceased; future time is that at which this act
will begin (utpatsyate 'will arise'). And current time is
the time at which an ongoing act (vartamdnd kriya
'current action') is grasped in a substance. Moreover, if
one does not grasp falling as currently going on in an
object, in relation to what does one understand cessa-
tion and beginning?60 In connection with this last
argument of Vatsyayana's, Vacaspatimisra invokes in-
ference, in a manner partly comparable to that of the
Mahdbhdaya (see 5.1.5 with note 48): In the absence of
a falling that is going on, of what is the fruit's heaviness
the cause, in relation to what does the fruit play the
role of a kdraka, and relative to what is the contact
between the fruit and the ground a result to be brought
about?61
5.3 Vdtsyayana's arguments are doubtless directed
specifically against arguments which Nagarjuna ad-
vanced in his Mulamadhyamakakdrikds [MMK].62
Nagarjuna's claims, moreover, are quite reminiscent of
the claims set forth in 'lokas cited by Patan-jali in the
Mahdbhdsya (see 5.1.4), and some of the arguments
brought up trying to defend the notion of current time
also remind one of what Patafijali said. Let me, there-
63
fore, summarize the major points brought Up.
5.3.1. The aim of the second chapter of Malama-
dhyamakakdrikas is to demonstrate that there is no
going (gatih), no goer (ganta), and no path that is to
be gone upon (gantavyam)." The arguments center
around the terms [1] gamyamdna; [2] gamyate; a
combination of these, [3] gamyamdnaih gamyate; and
[4] gacchati. A brief discussion of background con-
cerning them is in order.
[2] is derived, according to Paninian rules, from
gam-la(: the L-affix la( follows the verb gam 'go'. This
L-affix is introduced here under two conditions: an
object (karman) relative to going is to be signified65
and the action denoted by the verb is referred to current
time (A 3.2.123 [see 3.2]). The L-affix is replaced by
the verb ending ta,66 whose -a is then replaced by -e:67
gam-L
-
gam-ta
-
gam-te. Once the verb is thus fol-
lowed by an ending, of the sarvadhatuka class, signify-
ing an object of going, it takes the suffix yak:68 gam-te
gamyate. For example: adhvd gamyate 'the path is
being gone on', devadattena adhvd gamyate 'the path is
being gone on by Devadatta'. An L-affix is also intro-
duced if an agent is to be signified, as in gacchati
'... is going (- gam-lat),
where the parasmaipada end-
ing tip replaces la(, introduced to signify an agent. In
deriving the present participle gamyamdna, one also
begins with gam followed by la(, introduced under the
same conditions as [2]. gam-ya-mana is comparable in
structure to adhfydna- 'studying' (- adhi-iy-ana) and
in function it is also comparable to saydna- 'lying'.
In [5] saydnd bhunjate
yavandh 'Yavanas eat while
lying down', saydndh refers to persons whose act of
lying characterizes how they perform the act of eating;
in [6] adhTydno vasati' . . . is staying while he studies',
adhTydnah refers to someone whose studying is the
reason for his staying somewhere. According to A
3.2.126: laksanahetvoh kriydydh (latah satrsdnacau
124), la( is replaced by the parasmaipada suffix S'at( or
the atmanepada suffix hdnac, if it has been introduced
after a verb whose significand is spoken of as character-
istic (laksana) or cause (hetu) relative to an activity.
kdlasya kdrakavyangyd tayos tadavasthydt api tu kriydv-
yangya; 1.521: tasmat kriya kalabhivyaktinimittam
nddhvd
gantavyasya tddavasthydt
I
yo 'sau gantavyo desah sa yathd-
bhiuta evanutpannakriye phale tathabhiuta evotpannakriya
ity
abheddn nadhvd kalvyaktihetuh.
60 NSBh 1.520-21: yadd patanakriyd vyuparatd bhavati sa
kdlah patitakdlah
I
yadotpatsyate sa patitavyakdlah I
yadd
dravye vartamdnd kriyd grhyate sa vartamdnah kdlah
I
yadi
cdyamh dravye vartamdnarh patanam na grhnati kasyopara-
mam utpadyamdnataim va pratipadyate.
61 NVTT I.521: na ca vartamdnapatanam asiddham yena na
kdlam vyanjydt
I
tadasattve kasyedam kdranam gurutvam
kasya ca phalam karakam kasya ca phalabhiumisamyogah
karyah.
62 It has also been suggested that Nydyasiutra 2.1.39-43 were
interpolated into the text by Vatsyayana, ' . . . inasmuch as
the objections raised therein emanated most probably from
Nagarjuna.
. . '(Vidyabhusana 1920: 106 n. 1). However, I do
not think the arguments in the sutras require Nagarjuna as an
opponent, since the major claim against which they are di-
rected was already raised much earlier.
63 For secondary literature, including translations, of the
Mulamadhyamakakdrikds, see Ruegg 1981: 126-27; on the
second chapter in particular, see Ruegg 1981: 10-11, with
references. Kamaleswar Bhattacharya 1980 has emphasized
that Nagarjuna's arguments are largely based on grammatical
considerations (cf. Ruegg 1981: 11).
64
MMK 2.25cd: tasmad gatig ca gantd ca gantavyam ca
na vidyate. As is known, what Nagarjuna denies is movement
and so on considered as self-existent entities.
65 A 3.4.69: lah (kartari 67) karmani ca bhdve cakarmake-
bhyah. On this and the satras cited in note 66 see Cardona
1988: 173-74 (232).
66 A 3.4.77-78: lasya, tiptasjhisipthasthamibvasmastdtdm-
jhathdsdthdrhdvhamidvahimahin.
67 A 3.4.79: tita dtmanepaddndm ter e. See Cardona 1988:
178, 321 (235, 396).
68
A 3.1.67: sarvadhatuke yak. See Cardona 1988: 117 (156).
Now, sentences like [7] tisthan muitrayati'... urin-
ates (is urinating) standing up' or [8] gacchan bhaksa-
yati'... eats (is eating) on the go' can answer different
sorts of questions. First, these could be used in reply to
the questions [9] katham muitrayati 'how does . .. ur-
inate?' asked in connection with, say, a Yavana, and
[10] katham bhaksayati 'how does . . . eat?', asked of
some person such as Devadatta. The acts of standing
and going are here spoken of as characterizing the acts
of urinating and eating, and the participles used are
immediately accounted for by A 3.2.126. In addition,
[7]-[8]
could answer to the questions [11] ko yavanah
'which is the Yavana?', [12] ko devadattah 'which is
Devadatta?' That is, someone sees several people urin-
ating and eating, and inquires which one of these in
particular is a Yavana or Devadatta.
In his first varttika on A 3.2.126 (laksanahetvoh
kriydyd guna upasahkhydnam), Katyayana proposes
that an addition has to be made to the rule to account
for the replacement of la( by a participial affix in order
to derive sentences like [7]-[8], on the assumption that
what is being characterized is a participant in an act.69
In his second varttika (kartus ca laksanayoh paryd-
yendcayoge) Katyayana goes on to suggest a second
addition to the rule: If there are two actions that serve
to characterize an agent (kartuh. . . laksanayoh), la(
following each of the verbs signifying these is in turn
replaced by a participial affix, provided ca 'and' is not
used in connection with the verbs. This is meant to
account for sentences like [13] yo 'dhiydna dste sa
devadattah 'Devadatta is the one who is studying while
he sits', [14] ya dsino WhTte sa devadattah 'Devadatta is
the one who is sitting while he studies'.70 Later on,
however, Patanfjali says these additions do not have to
be made. In [7], the act of standing characterizes the
act of urinating, and in [8] the act of going characterizes
the act of eating, even if these are considered to answer
[1 1]-[12].7' Urinating and eating, thus characterized,
then characterize Devadatta, in which case one can be
more specific about what [7]-[8] answer to by using
more explicit sentences like [15] yas tisthan muitrayati
sa devadattah 'Devadatta is the one who is standing
while urinating'.72
Now, in a comparable way, [3] gamyamdnam (adhva-
jdtam) gamyate contains the participle gamyamdnam.
It could hardly be the case, moreover, that [3] would be
used in answering to a question of type [11]: anything
that is being gone upon or gone to by someone is
indeed being gone upon or gone to; it would, therefore,
hardly make sense for a person to ask which among
several things being gone upon is a sort of path and to
be answered with [3]. By the same token, [3] is peculiar
as an answer to a question of type [9], namely [16]
katham gamyate 'dhvd 'how is the path gone upon?' or
[17] kadd gamyate 'dhvd 'when is the path being gone
upon?' Still, [3] could more easily be conceived of as an
answer to this type of question. Accordingly, let us
translate it, 'the path is being gone upon as it is being
gone upon', a redundant but still comprehensible an-
swer which amounts to saying that the path in question
is being traversed now, not at a future or past time.73
In addition, there is a past participle gata-, in the
derivation of which the suffix kta-one of two suffixes
(the other being ktavatu) called nisthd-is introduced
after gam on condition that the act of going is referred
to the past (bhuite) and that an agent or an object is to
be signified.74 In [18] adhvd gatah 'the path has been
69
Bh on vt. 1 (11.127.27-28): laksanahetvoh kriyaya guna
upasankhydnam kartavyam
I
tisthan miurayati gacchan bhak-
sayatTti. Pr 111.292: yadd tu kdrakam laksyate tadartham idam
vacanam
I
bahusu muitrayatsu ko devadatta ity ukte yas
tisthan miurayatlti prativacanena devadatto laksyate. It does
not matter for the present discussion that Kaiyata goes on to
suggest that guna could be interpreted to speak of a quality-
such as the impurity that accrues to someone who does some-
thing like urinating while standing-and not a participant in
an action (karaka), viewed as a subsidiary (guna) in compari-
son with an action, which is the principal thing spoken of.
70 Bh on vt. 2 (11.128.2-4): kartus ca laksanayohi parya-
yendcayoga upasankhydnam kartavyam
I
yo 'dhiydna aste sa
devadattah ya asTno 'dhite sa devadattah
I
acayoga iti kimar-
tham
I
ya dste cddhTte ca sa caitrah. As shown, participles are
not used in sentences like ya dste cddhTte ca sa caitrah 'Caitra
is the one who is sitting and studying'.
7' Bh 11.128.15-17: tat tarhi vaktavyam
I
na vaktavyam I
laksanahetvoh kriydyd ity eva siddam
I
iha tdvat tisthan
miitrayatfti tisthatikriyd miitrayatikriydyd laksanam
I
gacchan
bhaksayatiti gacchatikriyd bhaksayatikriydyd laksanam.
72 Pr 111.293: sthitikriydlaksitd tu miitranakriyd yas tisthan
miitrayati sa devadatta iti sarvandmapardmarse devadattasya
laksanam tadgatasya vdsaucdder iti bhdvah. Similarly, Patafi-
jali says that in [11] the act of studying characterizes sitting
and in [2] sitting characterizes studying.
73 The essential difficulty of course lies in the fact that [3] has
to involve an act of going that characterizes the very same sort
of act, an act of going. And if only one act is involved, the
difficulty is all the more sorely felt. The latter point is crucial,
in that Nagarjuna insists on it. For, as Peter Scharf has
pointed out, one could have sentences like asmdbhir gam-
yamdno 'dhvd tendpi gamyate 'he also takes the way we go
by', involving different instances of going.
74
A 3.2.102: nisthd (bhiite 84), A 3.4.72: gatyarthdkarma-
kaslisasTnsthasavasajanaruhajfryatibhyas
ca (ktah kartari ca
71, tayoh 70).
gone on', gata- refers to an object and is coreferential
with adhvan-.
5.3.2. Nagarjuna begins his argumentation by con-
sidering three possible types of paths (adhvajdtam)
where going (gamanam) could take place: (a) one al-
ready traversed (gatam), (b) one not yet traversed
(agatam), (c) one being traversed (gamyamdnam). It is
not possible to say of either (a) or (b) that it is currently
being gone on (gamyate). A path on which going has
ceased is referred to by gata-, while gamyate is said of a
path which is being currently involved in going. It is
incoherent that a path on which going has ceased be
referred to by the term gamyate, which expresses a
connection with going, so that it is improper to say that
what has been gone upon can be spoken of using
gamyate. Further, agatam refers to a path on which
going has not begun, while gamyate refers to something
on which going is currently occurring; since what is yet
to be and what is currently occurring are absolutely
different, then, it is also improper to speak of what is
yet to be gone upon, using gamyate. Moreover, there is
no third kind of path aside from (a) and (b) (gatdga-
tavinirmuktam) of which one could predicate that it is
currently being traversed.75 Accordingly, an act of go-
ing cannot be said to occur in what is referred to by
- 76
gamyamana.
5.3.3. Nagarjuna next takes up and refutes an argu-
ment for saying that one must consider a path currently
being gone on to be the locus of going. The claim made
is that going is known to take place where there is a
physical activity-moving one's feet and so on (cestd
yatra gatis tatra). It occurs on (c), not on (a) or (b).77
This claim is rejected, as follows. We have the terms
[1] gamyamanam, in which the participial suffix skanac
denotes an object, and [2] gamyate, in which the ending
te denotes an object. In each instance, the object is
relative to an act of going. [1] and [2] are combined in
the utterance [3] gamyamanamh gamyate, which, accord-
ing to normal understanding, involves only one act of
going. On the other hand, if one assumes that going
takes place currently on (c), and that [3] conveys this, a
problem arises. It is not possible to justify two such acts
here (gamyamdne dvigamanam. . . naivopapadyate)
with respect to one path. Yet this is what one would
have to assume. Conversely, if one continues to accept
that only one such act is involved, then one would have
to assume that the referent of [1] is not connected with
going (gamyamdne vigamanarhihy agamanam). Accord-
ingly, how can one justify going relative to (c)? (gam-
yamdnasya gamanarh katharh ndmopapatsyate?)78
If, in order to maintain a single act of going for [3],
one accepts that only [2] directly involves a signified
relation with going, then one also accepts that this act
is brought into relation with the reference of [1] (gam-
yamanasya gamanam yasya); one then has to accept
the undesired consequence (tasyaprasajyate)
that [1] is
used with reference to an entity that is not linked with
going in the first instance (rte gater gamyamdnam).79
If, on the other hand, one accepts that the referents
of both [1] and [2] are related to going to begin with,
then [3] involves two acts of going, denoted by gam in
[1] gamyamdnam and gam in gamyate.80 This has an
undesirable consequence. It is not possible to account
for an act of going without someone who performs it
(gantdrarh ... tiraskrtya gamanarh nopapadyate), so
that under this view [3] would now involve two agents
of going (dvau gantdrau prasajyete).8'
5.3.4. Let us say one argued that, despite the prob-
lems pointed out, it is proper to accept that an act of
going does indeed take place, since there is a person
such as Devadatta, who performs as agent of, hence is
the locus of, this activity. But, argues Nagarjuna, it can
be shown that there is no such entity. If going cannot
be accounted for without an agent of going (gantarath
cet tiraskrtya gamanarh nopapadyate), in the absence
of an act of going (gamane 'sati) for what reason will
there be a goer?82
7 MMK 2.1: gatarh na gamyate tdvad agataii naiva gam-
yate
I
gatdgatavirnirmuktarh gamyamanaii na gamyate, with
Candraklrti's expatiation (PP 92.9-93.3).
76 PP 93.8-9: tasman ndsi gamyamdnam
I
ato na tad gami-
kriyayd dvisyate na gamyate iti ndsti gamyamdne
)9i
gama-
nam.
77
MMK 2.2: cestd yatra gatis tatra gamyamdne ca sd
yatah I na gate ndgate cestd gamyamane gatis tatah.
78
MMK 2.3: gamyamdnasya gamanami kathami ndmopapat-
syate I gamyamdnam vigamanami yadd naivopapadyate,
with
Candraklirti's comments (PP 94.14-95.3). As has long
been
known (see de La Vallee Poussin 1903-13: 94 notes 2-3;
Bhattacharya 1980: 92 note 10), the readings
vigamanam
'devoid of movement' and dvigamanam 'movement
inhering
in two' (PP 94.14: dvigatam gamanam dvigamanam) are at
issue in the second half of the verse. In my paraphrase,
I have
allowed for the arguments assuming either reading,
in accor-
dance with the Prasannapadd.
79
MMK 2.4: gamyamdnasya gamanami yasya tasya prasa]-
yate I rte gater gamyamdnami gamyamanamh
hi
gamyate,
with
the Prasannapada (PP 95.8-12).
80 MMK 2.5: gamyamanasya gamane prasaktam
gamanad-
vayam I yena tad gamyamdnami ca yac catra gamanarm punah.
81 MMK 2.6: dvau gantdrau prasajyete prasakte gamanad-
vaye
I
gantaram hi tiraskrtya gamanami nopapadyate.
82 MMK 2.7: gantdrami
cet tiraskrtya gamanarm
nopapa-
padyate
I
gamane 'sati gantatha kuta eva bhavisyati.
Under an argument analogous to that of MMK 2.1,
an agent of going (gantd) does not currently go (na
gacchati), and one who is not an agent of going (aganta
certainly does not currently go (naiva gacchati). What
third one is there distinct from one who goes and one
who does not go?83 If it is not possible for there to be
an agent of going without an act of going (gamanena
vind gantd yadd naivopapadyate), how will it be pos-
sible to have the utterance [19] ganta gacchati 'a goer is
going'?84
One who maintains the position that a given in-
dividual is a goer by virtue of his association with
going-so that one says ganta gacchati-(pakso gantd
gacchatti. ... gantur gamanam icchatah) suffers the
undesirable consequence that there is a goer without an
act of going (tasya prasajyate gamanena vina gantd).85
And if the same person maintains that one uses not
only gacchati but also gantr- because of a connection
with an act of going, then one suffers the undesired
consequence of having two acts of going involved in
the utterance gantd gacchati: one going by virtue of
which gantr- is used and a going which the goer referred
to by gantr- performs, so that one uses gacchati.86
5.3.5 One could argue as follows. It is well known
from common usage that one can say things like [20]
devadatto gantd gacchati 'Devadatta, an agent of go-
ing, is going', comparable to [21] vaktd vdcam bhdsate
'the speaker is uttering speech', [22] karta kriydam karoti
'the agent is carrying out an act' ('the doer is doing a
doing'). In each instance a single act is involved, so that
the act of going whereby the agent of going in [20] is
expressed as such is the very same act of going which
he performs. Accordingly, the faults given do not ob-
tain, and it is accepted that there is indeed an act of
going.87 Against this the following is said. An agent of
going does not come into connection with and carry
out the self same act (gatim tam sa na gacchati 'he does
not go that going') whereby he is shown as and called
an agent of going (gatyd
yaydjyate
gantd). A sentence
like [23] devadatto grdmam gacchati 'Devadatta is go-
ing to the village' is normal: a certain person (kascit)
goes to something (kificid dhi gacchati) that is distinct
from him. On the other hand, an agent of going-
spoken of in a sentence like [20] -who would carry out
the act of going whereby he is an agent of going does
not obtain before the act of going (na gatiparvo 'sti).88
Nor does an agent of going spoken of in a sentence like
[20] perform an act of going (sa na gacchati) that is
distinct from the one whereby he is referred to as an
agent (gatyd
yaydjyate
gantd tato 'nydm), since it is not
possible that there be two acts of going (gatTdve nopa-
pady ete yasmdt) when one person is going (eke [= ekas-
min] tu gantari).89
5.3.6. It is not necessary to dwell on the rest of
Nagdrjuna's argumentation in the present context. I
think it worthwhile, on the other hand, to consider in
more detail the situations he deals with, and how he
envisions them to be logically incoherent. Let us begin
with the sentence [19] ganta gacchati. The argument
involved is that [19] concerns a single act of going, by
virtue of which one says gacchati. There is not a second
8 MMK 2.8: gantd na gacchati tdvad agantd naiva gacchati |
gamane 'sati gantdtha kuta eva bhavi~yati.
84
MMK 2.9:
gantd tavadgacchatrti
katham evopapatsyate
gamanena vind gantd yadd naivopapadyate.
85
MMK 2.10:
pakso gantd
gacchatrti
yasya tasya prasaj-
yate
I
gamanena vind gantd gantur gamanam icchatah.
86
MMK 2.11:
gamane
dve
prasajyete ganta yady uta
gacchati
I
ganteti
cdjyate
yena gantd san yac ca gacchati.
87
PP
105.12-14:
atraha I iha devadatto gantd gacchatTti
lokaprasiddham I tatra yathd vaktd vdcari bhdsate karta
kriydih karotrti prasiddham
I
evari yayd gatya gantety abhiv-
yajyate tdm gacchatrti na yathoktadosah.
88
MMK 2.22: gatyd
yaydjyate
gantd gatim tdra sa na
gacchati I yasmdn na gatiparvo 'sti kaicit kinicid dhi gacchati.
Situations such as those envisioned in [23] are considered in a
slightly different context also in the Vakyapadrya, in connec-
tion with the distinction between external being (bahyasattd)
and mentally conceived being (aupacdrikT sand). Just as one
can use [23], one should be able to say atkurojdyate 'a shoot
is arising (from a seed)', which concerns a shoot's coming into
being. This requires an externally existent act of reaching a
state of being (dtmaldbha 'gaining a self'), an object of this
act, namely the self that is gotten (labhya), and an external
agent which obtains this (labdhr). This is not possible under
the view that terms refer to externally existent beings. For, if a
term like ankura refers to such an externally existent thing,
for what reason is it said to be arising (yadi sad jdyate kasmdt);
and if there is no such external being, how is it said to arise?
(VP 3.3.43: dtmaldbhasya janmdkhyd satd labhyaii ca labh-
yate I yadi saj jyate kasmdd athdsaj jdyate katham). The act
of going (gamanam) denoted by gam takes place in connection
with an existent agent of going (sato gantuh) and with an
existent object that one goes to (sati gamye). If, now, the agent
of coming into being is considered comparable to the agent of
going, so that it is an existent entity before the act, then the
meaning of the verb jan, namely 'coming into being', fails; and
if the agent of coming into being is not treated as comparable
to the agent of going, then it cannot be an existent that is agent
of coming into being (nafjayate 'is not born'). (VP 3.3.44: sato
hi gantur gamanam sati gamye pravartate I gantrvac cen na
janydrtho na cet tadvan najdyate.)
M9 MMK 2.23: gatyd
yaydjyate
gantd tato 'nydm sa na gac-
chati I gatr dve nopapadyete yasmdd eke tu gantari.
act of going involved with respect to the designation
gantr-. Without an act of going, however, it is not
possible to say gantr- of someone, as it is impossible
properly to say [18] agacchan gantd 'a goer who is not
going'. Accordingly, [19] is improper. To be sure, one
could correctly say gacchati, but to add gantd to form
[19] is improper.90 Conversely, if one starts out saying
that gantr- is used as a designation by virtue of relation
with going, so that it refers necessarily to someone
involved in movement, since there is no second act of
going involved, [19] is not appropriately possible.9' In
addition, it is assumed that [3] gamyamanam gamyate
involves a similar paradox for the same reasons: If one
single act of going is involved, by virtue of which one
says gamyate, so that this alone involves a relation with
the act, then one would have to say, improperly, that
gamyamdnam can refer to something not involved in
going, so that the sentential meaning of [3] would re-
main unfulfilled.92 Conversely, if one begins by saying
that the designation gamyamdnam applies because of a
connection with going, it will not be possible, given that
there is a single act of going at issue, to have an addi-
tional relation with going, as designated by gamyate.93
5.3.7. The question arises: are [3] and [19] neces-
sarily as parallel as Nagdrjuna makes them out to be?
And the answer must be that they are not, if one takes
a particular stand. Consider again [1] gamyamana from
the point of view of how Panini derives this participle.
The suffix S'dnac here replaces the L-affix lat, which is
introduced to denote an object, and on condition that
the action in question is referred to current time. Accord-
ingly, the passive participle gamyamdna- can properly
be used only with reference to an object that is actually
involved in an act of going. Now, there are other par-
ticipial forms that, from a grammatical point of view,
do not have such a requirement. Thus, yajamdna-94
refers to someone who is a patron of sacrifices, but the
use of this term does not require that the yajamdna
actually be involved in this act at the moment it is used.
In this respect, yajamana- is comparable to a term like
dsana- 'seat' or Sayana- 'bed'.95 To be sure, dsana-
signifies a locus relative to sitting and Sayana- signifies
a locus relative to lying, but the very use of these
derivates does not require that they play the role of
locus at that moment. On the contrary, these terms
refer to entities that are apt to be used as loci. Accord-
ingly, one can have these followed by a locative ending,
showing that they function as loci of acts at a given
time, as when one says [20] dsana aste' . . . is sitting in
the seat', [21] Sayane Sete' . . . is lying in the bed'.96 The
same can be said of an agent noun such as pacaka-,
paktr- 'one who cooks'.97 In terms of Pdninian rules,
the affixes of dsana-, Sayana-, pacaka-, paktr- are intro-
duced without any condition of time reference. Accord-
ingly, it is grammatically proper to say [20] pacakah
pacati, just as in English one can correctly say 'The
cook is cooking'.98 Moreover, it is possible to say that
each of the sentences [19], [20], [21] does indeed involve
two actions: one denoted by the verb in the derivate,
90
PP on MMK 2.9 (98.10-13): gantd gacchatrti vdkya
ekaiva gamikriya tayd ca gachatlti vyapadigyate I
ganteti tu
vyapadege ndsti dvitrya gamikriyeti I gamanena vind gantdgac-
chan ganteti yadd na sambhavati tadd gantd gacchatlti na
yujyate I kamam gacchatity astu I ganteti tu na sambhavati.
As in MMK 2.9cd, so also in MMK 2.16cd, Nagarjuna insists
that one cannot say someone is a goer unless that person is
actually involved in going (gamanena vind ganta yadd
naivopapapadyate). This is said in the context of denying the
possibility that a person referred to by gantr can rightly be
said to be at a standstill (MMK 2.16ab: gantd tOvat tisthatlti
katham evopapatysate). In his commentary, Candrakirti
rightly emphasizes the premise of the argument: without an
actual act of going, the designation gantr cannot apply (ndsti
'is not'): vind ca gamanam gantrvyapadego ndsti.
91
PP introduction to MMK 2.10 (98.14-15): atha gatiyogat
sagatika eva gantd I tathapi dvitryagamikriyabhdvadgacchatrti
vyapadego na sydt.
92 PP on MMK 2.4 (95.4-5): atha gamyata ity atraiva
gamikriydsambandha isyate I evarh sati gamyamanavyapadege
nasti kriydsambandha iti na pariparnatd vdkydrthasyety dha.
93 PP on MMK 2.3 (94.8-10): iha hi gamikriydyogdd eva
gamyamanavyapadeham icchati bhavan tac ca gamyata iti
bravTti I ekd cdtra gamikriyd I tayd gamyamanvyapadego bha-
vatu kamam adhvanah I gamyata iti bh/yah kriyasambandho
gamyamdnasya na yujyate....
94
A 3.2.128: pu-nyajoh 9dnan introduces OJnan after piun
'purify', yaj'perform
a sacrificial rite, venerate.'
95
Formed with the suffix Iyuf(-cana). A 3.3.117: karana-
dhikaranayog ca lets this affix follow a verb if an instrument or
locus is to be designated.
96
See Cardona 1974:275-77.
97
Derived by A 3.1.133: nvultrcau with the affixes
Vvul(-
aka), trc.
98 I leave out of consideration here the semantic difference
between the types paktt- (affix trc) and phktr- (affix trn); the
latter signifies someone whose custom or nature it is to cook
or who cooks well; the former refers to one who cooks at
some time or who should cook at some time. This does not
affect the basic argument: neither type requires for its
appropriate use that the referent in question be involved in the
act signified by the verb.
the other by the verb of the finite, form. The former
action in each case is not referred to any particular
time and indeed is not necessarily going on for the term
to be used; the latter is referred to current time in each
of these sentences.
Of course, [19] ganta gacchati is comparable to
[24] pdcakah pacati. It is indeed appropriate to main-
tain that the former does involve two goings, just as the
latter, two cookings: a potential act and one which
is spoken of as actually going on. There is nothing
paradoxical here, and no problem arises unless one
maintains that the referent of a term like gantr-,
pacaka- must be involved in the act denoted by the verb
of the derivate, if this term is ever used; that he be so in-
volved at the time one uses the utterance; that such an
utterance involve only one act, namely the one going
on; and that this very act is the one designated by the
verb in the agent noun. On the other hand, a sentence
like [3] gamyamdnam gamyate requires that the referent
of gamyamdna be involved directly in going. As is clear
from A 3.2.126 (see 5.3.1), in Panini's derivational
system, a sentence like [3] is not gotten simply by
combining totally independent entities gamyamanam
and gamyate. On the contrary, having sMnac substitute
for laf requires a relation between two actions. Accord-
ingly, one would be required to say that going charac-
terizes itself.
5.3.8. One cannot insist, however, that Nagarjuna
hold the very same views as a Paninian grammarian. In
fact, Nagarjuna explicitly refuses to accept the possi-
bility that two self-existent (that is, reified) goings be
involved when one uses gantd and gacchati in a sentence
like devadatto ganta gacchati. Of such examples, he
says, "An agent of going does not perform a going that
is distinct from the one whereby he is shown to be a
goer, since it is not possible that there be two goings
when one single person is going" (MMK 2.23, see
note 89).
5.4. The Buddhistic position thus maintained is com-
patible with the view that there are merely moments in
a flow, not a permanent something that persists.99 It is
worth emphasizing that the viewpoint of moments in a
flow was also taken under consideration by early Pdnin-
ian grammarians, precisely in the context of activities;
see 5.1.4-6. Let us return now to this context and
consider answers given by grammarians to maintain
that present time is a validly held concept.
5.4.1. As one infers that there is something distinct
from substances, which we call an activity, so also does
one infer that there is a current time, although one
cannot justify this in terms of actual perception, any
more than one can justify a unitary activity like cook-
ing in terms of direct perception. Patafijali, in the
Mahabhdsya on A 3.2.123, continues the argumenta-
tion by presenting two ways suggested to refute the
arguments against accepting present time. Both of these
involve inference.
Patanijali first cites another 'loka, which says the
following. There is a reason (hetu) for which one enters
into an activity (kriydpravrttau yo hetuh) like going,
namely the result of such an act, reaching a goal.
Considering (samTksya 'having considered') the activity
intended for the result (tadartham yad vicestitam)
that is the reason for entering into an action, one
should use gacchati without giving it a second thought
(avicdrayan 'not considering').'00 That is, accepting that
99
See, recently, Matilal 1985: 276-77.
100
Bh
11.124.8-9: kriydpravrttau yo hetus tadartham yad
vicestitam I tat samrksya prayuii]ta gacchatity avicdrayan.
Kaiyata appropriately remarks that hetu here refers to the
prompting cause (prayocanam), that is, reaching another
place (desantarapraptih); Pr 111.284: hetuh
prayojanam
gama-
nasya desdntaraprdptih tadartham phaldrtham ity arthah.
Nagega gives more details: by hetu is meant the reason
which prompts one
(prayojakah)
to undertake an act, that is,
the result (phalam) of an action; by vicestitam is meant the
composite of acts (kriyasamuhah) which one considers to lead
to the result; the samTks.ya means 'after making .. . an object
of the mental organ'. That is, one accepts a mentally posited
currency for a mentally posited composite, and on this basis
the use of gacchati results. Ud 111.284: kriyarambhe yo hetuh
prayojakah phalam tadartham yad vicestitarh kriydsamuhas
tadanukiuatvena samTksya buddhivisayikrtya I bauddhasa-
muihasya bauddhavartamanatvam addya gacchatiti prayogo-
papattir ity arthah.
Helaraja, in his commentary on VP 3.9.89 (78.8-13), cites a
variant of the verse, with tad apeksya instead of tat samTksya,
and gives a varying interpretation: the cause (hetuh) with
respect to one's beginning an action is a mental activity of
wishing for a result. The activity of the participants, which has
the act of going for its purpose and ends when the result of
going is achieved, is what is meant by vicestitam: there is a
physical activity preceded by a mental activity, and this ends
when the result is accomplished; the entire composite of such
activities is viewed as undifferentiated, and this constitutes the
essence of being a current activity: tad uktarm bhd.sye kriya-
pravrttau yo hetus tadartham yad vicestitam
I
tad apeksya
prayunhfita gacchataty avicdrayan itil phalakamand manaso
vydpdrah kriydpravrttau hetuh kriyartham vicestitam sd-
dhandnam samrambhah
I
sdmdnyavisesena tadarthata
I
evanca
there is a single person named Devadatta who is first in
one place and then in another (see 5.1.5 with note 48),
one reasons that the result in question-reaching an-
other place-cannot be without a cause; its cause is the
act of going; understanding that going is currently
taking place as referred to by gacchati is an unrefuted
knowledge based on this cause, and the inferred com-
posite act is said to occur currently in the sense that it
has begun but not been brought to completion.'0' Patafi-
jali then notes that someone else asserts that indeed
there is a present time, but that it is not perceived by
ordinary people, just as the movement of the sun is not
perceived.'02 Moreover, he notes, a 'loka is cited in
regard to this: A modification is not directly seen when
the participants in an act are present, as the threads
inside of a lotus stalk are not seen burning; those who
have insight in three times make known that modifica-
tion known as being; for a subtle being is knowable
through inference.'03
5.4.2. As could be expected, Bhartrhari also answers
the objections in accordance with what was said earlier
by Patafijali. A result is observed to follow a complex
of action-moments, not individual component action-
moments, so that one concludes that there is a com-
posite that is capable of causing that effect to come
about (kiryotpattau samartham). As this is capable of
producing an effect with the property of sequentiality
appropriate to it (svena dharmena) by virtue of its
component action-moments, so may it be grasped intel-
lectually in its guise of occurring (dtmatattvena 'in its
proper essential quality, its own property of being what
it is'); this constitutes its being present.'04 In effect, this
amounts to saying that, in order to account for a result
such as Devadatta's being in one place at one time and
somewhere else at another, or rice grains being soft-
ened, one must assume a cause, that this cause is a
composite which one mentally posits, and that, in accor-
dance with a particular conception of what present
time is (see 5.1.2), the composite can be conceived of as
current up to the production of the result in question.
To be sure, component action-moments come and go,
but this does not militate against the view being main-
tained, since actual existence (sattvam) is not what
characterizes currency. 05 Further, as the entire com-
mdnasavydpdraparvakah kayavydpdrah phaldvasdno 'bhede-
nadhyavasito vartamdnakriydsvabhdvah svavdcakasabdapra-
tipadya iti sphutam uktam.
As shown, the Bhdsya remarks that one should use gacchati
without considering (avicdrayan) something about what one
says. Kaiyata notes that by this is meant: without the stain of
poorly conceived ideas (Pr 111.284: kuvikalpakalankarahitam
ity arthah); that is, the use of a present form like gacchati is
devoid of the fault attributed to it. In his NardyanTya on the
PradTpa passage in question (VI.293), Narayana specifies
what Kaiyata is referring to: contemptible pseudo-reasons
brought up by the piirvapaksin:
kuvikalpetiI
ye pirvapak-
sinodbhdvitah kutsitd vikalpd nydydbhdsds ta eva dosari4-
patvat kalahkakhyas tadrahitam uktena samlcTnena nyayena
tesdai nirdkrtatvdt.
'' Pr 111.284: iha
pratyabhijiidutt
ksanabhanganirase de-
vadattasya desdntaraprdptir nirhetukd na sambhavatTti gama-
nakriyaiva tasyd nimittam
I
taddlamnbanas ca gacchatlti pra-
tyayo 'badhita upapadyata iti sattvah tavad avagamyate
kriydydh.
Ud 111.284: samuhasya vartamdnatvam tu prdrabdhdpari-
samaptatvam eva.
102 Bh 11.124.10: apara aha asti vartamanah kala iti I
ddityagativan nopalabhyate. Nagesa contrasts this with the
earlier statement, as follows. Under the first argument, it is
accepted that there is no actual present action, and one only
infers a mentally posited composite act and mentally posited
currency for it; under the second argument, it is held that
there actually is a current action at each component instant,
and that, although it is not perceptible by ordinary people, it
is directly perceptible by yogins, on whose authority it is
accepted. Ud 111.284: evam vdstavavartamdnakriydbhdvam
anglkrtyvnumitabauddhasamuiharfipakriyd-h tadvartamdnat-
vam ca bauddham daritya prayogdn upapddyeddnTtm vdstava-
vartamdnakriydm tattatksanavartinTm yogipratyaksapramd-
nikam cs?ritya samadhatte.
03
BA 11. 124.10-13: api ca slokam udaharanti
I
visasya vail
iva dahyamind na laksyate vikrtih sannipate astTti taim
vedayante tribhdvdh saksmo hi bhivo 'numitena gamyah.
104
VP 3.9.89: karyotpattau samartham vi svena dharmena
tad yathd I itmatattvena grhyate sd casmin vartamdnatd.
Helaraja appropriately remarks that svena dharmena refers to
the property of sequence with which a composite activity is
associated (78.2: . . . svena kramitmakena dharmena yuktarh
tatsamuharupam ... .; similarly, MadhavTyadhatuvrtti 7: ...
svena dharmena kramavattvena tathi yuktam. ..). He also
interprets itmatattvena as meaning the existent nature proper
to that composite, then says that this property of being
constitutes its currency (78.2-3: yad atmatativena dtmiyena
vidyamanena svabhdvena grhyate tadi tasyaivamhvidhasya
yeyamh vidyaminati sd vartamdnatd).
105 Helaraja on VP 3.9.89 (77.23-25): atra ca sadasattve pi
ksandndrh vartaminatopapadyata eva na hi sattvamh var-
tamdnatdlaksanam kintu prdrabdhdparisamdptatvam
I
tac ca
yavatah ksanasamuihasya phaldvadhipravrttih tavatah prik
phalopajanandd abhedenddhyavasitasyisty eva. Note that the
composite act is considered to be satisfied (samapyate 'is
completed') with respect to individual component acts, so that
posite is mentally present, so is each component, with
its imposed sequence, considered to be current (var-
tamdnatdm anubhavati'experiences currency').'06
6. It is clear that the scholars whose views are en-
capsulated in the verses Patanijali cites in the Mahd-
bhdsya on 3.2.123 (see 5.1.4), and Paninian grammarians
in general, maintain opposed positions with respect to
the validity of present time. It is also true, however,
that they have something in common: under both posi-
tions, it is accepted that present time is no more an
external tangible reality than is time itself. The gram-
marian, however, accepts that one must operate with
an inferred time in order to account for certain realities
and that, in the same vein, it is valid to operate with
composite activities and posited component activities
treated as occurring currently. In the same way, al-
though Nagarjuna would doubtless have to concede to
a grammarian his particular views based on grammar-
ians' premises, he would also oppose accepting as valid
a real current time justifiable on non-linguistic grounds.
More importantly for a proper appreciation of syste-
matic thought concerning such issues in ancient India,
the manner in which Patanijali presents arguments con-
cerning time and present time, in particular, makes
it quite probable that he was aware of conclusions
reached on the basis of systematic arguments. In brief,
although Patanijali himself, of course, does not set
forth a single system of thought concerning such major
issues-that is not the purpose of the Mahdbh&dyya
he doubtless knew of such systems.107
currency thus assumed for the composite viewed as a single
entity is also imposed on the component actions, since one
can say, for example, pacati, at a moment when only one such
act is taking place; VP 3.8.5: samuihah sah tathabhuitah
pratibhedam samuihisu I samdpyate tato bhede kalabhedasya
sambhavah.
106 Helaraja 78.4-6: ayam arthah I niyatapaurvdparyah sa-
muihas tdvat kramikah
I
tasya ca sadasadruipakatve pi phala-
vadhi parasparam adhyastakramah svakale sannihita ekaiko
p9i ksano vartamdnatdm anubhavati.
107
Views about present time which Patafijali knew may well
have arisen in Buddhistic circles. It is also worth mentioning
that there is no need to see in Nagarjuna's own arguments any
indebtedness to the Mahdbhdsya. Indeed, given the well-
known fact that the Bhiisya had ceased to be handed down
continuously in a teacher-student lineage at some time before
Candragomin, it is more probable that Nagarjuna's argu-
ments, though in part parallel to those reflected in the
Mahdbhdavya, were independently wrought.
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A Path Still Taken Some Early Indian Arguments Concerning Time

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