Meaning and Intuitive Act in the Logical Investigations

Ka-Wing Leung
Published online: 14 December 2010
Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010
Abstract This essay attempts to approach the dispute over the conceptualist or
non-conceptualist interpretation of Husserls conception of intentional experience
from a specic question: Is the intuitive act essentially a carrier of meaning? In the
sixth Investigation, Husserl apparently tries to show that intuition is no carrier of
meaning and therefore must be unied with a meaning-conferring act in order to be
meaningful. But it seems to me that the brief arguments given by Husserl here are
far from conclusive and that there are passages in the Logical Investigations which
suggest otherwise. I will try to demonstrate that the sense conferred by the inter-
pretation in perception is not different from linguistic meaning, and therefore per-
ception is actually a synthetic act of fulllment and is always meaningful. The
conceptualist reading is no less convincing and no less susceptible to objections than
the non-conceptualist one.
Dagnn Fllesdal, and Ronald McIntyre and David Woodruff Smith following him,
have tried to argue that, for Husserl, linguistic meaning and noematic Sinn are one
and the same.
1
If every intentional experience has a noema and therein a Sinn,
through which it is related to the object,
2
and if this noematic Sinn is not different
from linguistic meaning, it follows that linguistic meaning underlies every
intentional experience. While Fllesdal and McIntyre and Smiths arguments are
mainly based upon Ideen I, there is also evidence in the Logical Investigations that
can be used to support this kind of conceptualist reading of Husserls conception
K.-W. Leung (&)
Department of Philosophy, Tongji University, 1239 Si Ping Road, Shanghai 200092, China
e-mail: leung_kawing@hotmail.com
1
McIntyre and Smith (2005, p. 221). See also Fllesdal (2005, pp. 161168).
2
Hua III/1, p. 310. English translation quoted from McIntyre and Smith (2005, p. 221).
1 3
Husserl Stud (2011) 27:125142
DOI 10.1007/s10743-010-9086-2
of intentional experience. In the following essay I will try to approach this problem
from a specic question: Is the intuitive act essentially a carrier of meaning?
The main battleeld of the dispute over the conceptualist or non-conceptualist
interpretation of intentional experience is whether there is simple perception, or
simple seeing, which does not involve linguistic meaning.
3
In the sixth Investiga-
tion, Husserl apparently tries to show that intuition, which includes both perception
and imagination, is no carrier of meaning and therefore must be unied with a
meaning-conferring act in order to be meaningful. Husserl poses the question at the
very beginning of the sixth Investigation of whether every type of mental act, or
only certain types, can function as carriers of meaning.
4
After showing that the
expressibility of all acts is without relevance to the question whether all acts can
function in sense-giving fashion, so far, that is, as such expressibility means no
more than the possibility of making certain statements about such acts (LU II/2,
pp. 1112/678), and distinguishing several senses of the term expressed act
(ausgedruckter Akt), Husserl directs focus to the whole relation between meaning
and expressed intuition (LU II/2, p. 13/679). He raises the question of whether
such an intuition may not itself be the act constitutive of meaning, or if this is not
the case, how the relation between them may be best understood and systematically
classied (LU II/2, p. 13/679). This question is supposed to be resolved in the
following two sections, in which Husserl tries to demonstrate that meaning does not
lie in perception or other intuitive acts. This prepares for the introduction of the
main theme of the rst chapter of the sixth Investigation, that is, how the meaning-
conferring act is united with the intuitive act in the synthetic act of fulllment,
which, insofar as the intuitive act is not in itself a carrier of meaning, would be the
condition for any intuitive act to be meaningful. But it seems to me that the brief
arguments given by Husserl here are far from conclusive and that there are passages
in the Logical Investigations which suggest otherwise. Let us start the discussion
from the very beginning, then, and rst clarify Husserls conception of the
phenomenon of expression to which linguistic meaning is essentially related.
1
Husserl begins the rst Investigation with a distinction between two senses of
sign (Zeichen). According to Husserl, sign can mean either expression
(Ausdruck) or indication (Anzeichen). The former Husserl also calls meaningful
sign (bedeutsames Zeichen) and the latter indicative sign (anzeigendes Zeichen)
(LU II/1, p. 30/275). Every sign is a sign for something, but not every sign has
meaning [Bedeutung], a sense [Sinn] that the sign expresses (LU II/1, p. 23/
269). What characterizes an expression is that it always expresses a sense or
meaning. In contrast, the common characteristic of all indications is that certain
objects or states of affairs of whose reality someone has actual knowledge indicate
3
For a recent discussion, see Mooney (2010).
4
Husserl (1993, p. 8) II/2; English translation (1970, p. 675). Henceforth cited in the text as LU followed
by German and English page number s respectively.
126 Husserl Stud (2011) 27:125142
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to him the reality of certain other objects or state of affairs, in the sense that his
belief in the reality of the one is experienced as motivating a belief or surmise in the
reality of the other (LU II/1, p. 25/270). Despite his somewhat unusual choice of
terms, Husserl makes it clear enough that he uses the term expression in a
restricted sensemerely in the sense of speechand excludes other things,
such as facial expression, that usually go with this term (LU II/1, p. 30/275). As
Derrida (1973, p. 18) says: An expression is a purely linguistic sign, and it is
precisely this that in the rst analysis distinguishes it from an indicative sign.
Accordingly, what Husserl means by meaning (Bedeutung) is in the rst place
linguistic meaning. And it is precisely in this sense that we use the term meaning
in this essay.
Several things are said to be related to the phenomenon of expression, of which
some are essential and constitutive, some are not, and some are acts or intentional
experiences, some are not. Husserl says in 9 of the rst Investigation:
If we seek a foothold in pure description, the concrete phenomenon of the
sense-informed expression breaks up, on the one hand, into the physical
phenomenon forming the physical side of the expression, and, on the other
hand, into the acts which give it meaning and possibly also intuitive fullness,
in which its relation to an unexpressed object is constituted. In virtue of such
acts, the expression is more than a merely sounded word. It means something,
and in so far as it means something, it relates to what is objective (LU II/1,
p. 37/280).
This paragraph requires some clarication. First, according to Husserls own
statements put forth elsewhere in the Logical Investigations, the presence of
something physical is not always needed for something to be a phenomenon of
expression. It is true that a phenomenon of expression always needs some sort
of intuitive support (Stutze or Anhalt),
5
but that intuitive support need not be a
physical phenomenon correlative to a sensuous act, such as a spoken sound or a
written mark. An intuitive support is needed since meaning cannot, as it were,
hang in the air (LU II/2, p. 92/741). The intuitive support actually serves in the
phenomenon of expression as the expression itself, i.e., as that upon which a
meaning is conferred by the meaning-conferring act. Usually the expression itself is
something physical, such as an actually spoken sound, but it need not be. Something
imaginative or something not real can also do the job, as Husserl says in the rst
Investigation, in regard to the expressions used in soliloquy:
What we are to use as an indication, must be perceived by us as existent. This
holds also of expressions used in communication, but not for expressions used
in soliloquy, where we are in general content with imagined rather than actual
words. In imagination a spoken word or printed word oats before us, though
in reality it has no existence. We should not, however, confuse imaginative
presentations, and the image-contents they rest on, with their imagined
objects. The imagined verbal sound, or the imagined printed word, does not
5
LU II/1, p. 41/283; LU II/2, p. 53/710. Both Stutze and Anhalt are translated with support in the
English translation.
Husserl Stud (2011) 27:125142 127
1 3
exist, only its imaginative presentation does so. The difference is the
difference between imagined centaurs and the imagination of such beings. The
words non-existence neither disturbs nor interests us, since it leaves
the words expressive function unaffected (LU II/1, p. 36/279).
An imagined word, verbal or printed, is of course not a physical phenomenon. It is
not real in the sense of physical existence and does not exist in the physical world. If
an imagined word can also function as an expression in the phenomenon of
expression without having the expressive function affected, then it is clear that the
phenomenon of expression need not contain a physical component. What it actually
needs is rather an intuitive component, which may be physical or not.
Secondly, the division into the physical phenomenon and the act is not as neat as
it seems to be, even if we rene it, according to what we have just pointed out, into a
division between the intuitive support and the act. For the intuitive support has to
appear or be constituted in an act of intuition, which will be a sensuous act if the
expression is real, or will be an imaginative act if the expression is an imagined
word. Here the question arises: Into which side of the division should this very act
of intuition be put? If it is put together with the intuitive support, then on the one
hand there will be the intuitive support and the act of which it is the intentional
correlate, and on the other hand the other acts. If it is put alongside with the other
acts, then Husserl here seems to have neglected to mention one kind of act which is
essential to the phenomenon of expression.
Thirdly, on the side of acts, Husserl mentions two kinds, i.e., the acts which give
it meaning and possibly also intuitive fullness. The act which gives meaning to the
expression is called the meaning-conferring act (bedeutungverleihender Akt), and
the one which gives it intuitive fullness is called the meaning-fullling act
(bedeutungerfullender Akt). Husserl introduces these terms in 9 of the rst
Investigation:
If we leave side the sensuous acts in which the expression, qua mere sound of
words, makes its appearance, we shall have to distinguish between two acts or
sets of acts. We shall, on the one hand, have acts essential to the expression if it
is to be an expression at all, i.e. a verbal sound infused with sense. These acts
we shall call the meaning-conferring acts or the meaning-intentions [Bedeu-
tungsintention]. But we shall, on the other hand, have acts, not essential to the
expression as such, which stand to it in the logically basic relation of fullling
(conrming, illustrating) it more or less adequately, and so actualizing its
relation to its object. These acts, which become fused with the meaning-
conferring acts in the unity of knowledge or fulllment [Erfullung], we call
the meaning-fullling acts. The briefer expression meaning-fulllment
[Bedeutungserfullung] can only be used in cases where there is no risk of the
ready confusion with the whole experience in which a meaning-intention nds
fulllment in its correlated intuition (LU II/1, p. 38/281).
We have already showed that the sensuous act in which the real expression appears
is not essential to the phenomenon of expression. What is needed is instead an
intuitive act, which may be sensuous or not. Besides the intuitive act in which the
128 Husserl Stud (2011) 27:125142
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expression itself appears, another kind of act is also essential to the phenomenon of
expression. This is the meaning-conferring act. This is the very act in virtue of
which the expression is more than a merely sounded word, and becomes a
sense-informed expression. As for the meaning-fullling act, it is not essential to
the phenomenon of expression. In other words, an expression will still be a sense-
informed expression even if this kind of act is not present. Its function is not to make
an expression meaningful but to actualiz[e] its relation to its object. There is an
apparent contradiction in Husserls account as to whether a relation to an object is
essential to the expression, about which more will be said in the following sections.
2
Apart from the intuitive support and three kinds of acts mentioned above, three
other sorts of things seem also to be always related to the phenomenon of
expression. Husserl says in 14 of the rst Investigation:
Relational talk of intimation [Kundgabe], meaning and object belongs
essentially to every expression. Every expression intimates something, means
something and names or otherwise designates something. In each case, talk of
expression is equivocal. As said above, relation to an actually given
objective correlate, which fullls the meaning-intention, is not essential to an
expression (LU II/1, p. 50/290).
Here, Husserl seems to assert that the three things mentioned aboveintimation,
meaning, and objectsare all essential to the phenomenon of expression, or, to put
it another way, that all these things essentially belong to every expression, insofar as
it is an expression. This assertion is problematic, given what Husserl says elsewhere
in the Logical Investigations. Let us clarify their relationship with the phenomenon
of expression one by one.
In raising the question of whether these three things are essential to the
phenomenon of expression, the least problematic is meaning. For expression,
according to Husserls denition, is meaningful sign. In other words, a sign will
only be an expression if it has meaning.
6
Thus meaning is essential to every
expression. But we should still say a few words about Husserls conception of
meaning. In Husserls opinion, the relation of meaning to expression is established
by the meaning-conferring act. A sign becomes an expression when a meaning is
conferred upon it by the meaning-conferring act. But the nature of meaning is
different from that of both. Meaning is neither an act, nor of the nature of the
intuitive support upon which the meaning hangs, no matter whether the intuitive
support is a physical thing or an imagined thing. Husserl characterizes meaning as
ideal unity (ideale Einheit)
7
in contradistinction with the multiplicity of possible
6
Zum Begriff des Ausdrucks gehort es, eine Bedeutung zu habenEin bedeutungsloser Ansdruck ist
also, eigentlich zu reden, uberhaupt kein Ausdruck (LU II/1, p. 54).
7
For example: unsere Auffassung der Bedeutungen als idealer (und somit starrer) Einheit; unter
Bedeutungen ideale Einheiten zu verstehen; idealen Einheit, die wir hier Bedeutungen nennen (LUII/1,
pp. 89, 91, 92).
Husserl Stud (2011) 27:125142 129
1 3
acts,
8
wherein the term ideal should not be understood as something subjective
or psychological but rather in the sense of the Platonic idea as something objective
and independent of the mind. An objective unity of meaning : this is whatever it
is, whether anyone realizes this in thought or not (LU II/1, p. 94/325). Meaning is
neither something inside an act or other kinds of mental experiences, nor something
created by an act or by the mind which performs the act. We do not make the ideal
unities; we only see and discover them. They are a certain kind of being, but no real
being or subjective being. As Husserl says in 29 of the rst Investigation:
Though the scientic investigator may have no reason to draw express
distinctions between words and symbols, on the one hand, and the meaningful
thought-objects, on the other, he well knows that expressions are contingent,
and that the thought, the ideally selfsame meaning, is what is essential. He
knows, too, that he does not make the objective validity of thoughts and
thought-connections, of concepts and truths, as if he were concerned with
contingencies of his own or of the general human mind, but that he sees them,
discovers them. He knows that their ideal being [ideales Sein] does not amount
to a psychological being in the mind: the authentic objectivity of the true,
and of the ideal in general, suspends all reality [reales Sein], including such as
is subjective [subjektives Sein] (LU II/1, p. 94/325).
3
As for the relationship of intimation to the phenomenon of expression, it is more
problematic whether it is essential. Husserl thinks that expression, being a
meaningful sign, can also function as an indication, intimating to the hearer the
inner experiences of the speaker. He says in 7 of the rst Investigation:
If one surveys these interconnections, one sees at once that all expressions in
communicative speech function as indications. They serve the hearer as signs
of the thoughts of the speaker, i.e., of his sense-giving inner experiences, as
well as of the other inner experiences which are part of his communicative
intention. This function of verbal expressions we shall call their intimating
function [kundgegebende Funktion] (LU II/1, p. 33/277).
When Husserl says in 14 of the rst Investigation that every expression
intimates something, that something refer precisely to the thoughts of the
speaker, i.e., of his sense-giving inner experiences, as well as of the other inner
experiences which are part of his communicative intention. In discharging this
intimating function, expression is not only an expression, but also an indication.
9
We have pointed out above that, according to Husserl, it is the common
characteristic of indication that the reality of certain things indicates the reality of
8
die Bedeutung selbst, die ideale Einheit gegenuber der Mannigfaltigkeit moglicher Akten (LU II/1,
p. 77/312).
9
We have to be careful not to regard the expressive sign as one kind of indicative sign, or as Derrida
(1973, p. 21) says, make the expressive sign a species of the genus indication. See LU II/1, p. 23/269.
130 Husserl Stud (2011) 27:125142
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certain other things. Now, in the case of expression as an indication, what is
indicated is the reality of the inner experience of the speaker and what indicates is
the reality of the expression spoken. It wont be denied that expressions do
sometimes, or even for the most part, perform this function, but it is questionable
whether it holds good in every instance of expression. It should be noticed that
while Husserl speaks of every expression in 14, he speaks merely of all
expressions in communicative speech in 7. In fact, Husserl himself admits
elsewhere that in monologue expression does not indicate anything and it performs
no function of intimating:
Expressions function meaningfully even in isolated mental life, where they no
longer serve to indicate anything (LU II/1, p. 24/269).
In a monologue words can perform no function of indicating the existence of
mental acts, since such indication would be there be quite purposeless (LU II/1,
pp. 3637/280).
4
Of the three things mentioned above, the relation of the last to the phenomenon of
expression is the subtlest. In the statement every expression intimates something,
means something and names or otherwise designates something, the rst
something refers to the inner experiences of the speaker, the second to meaning,
and the last to the object.
10
Meaning obviously is essential to the expression,
inasmuch as expression per denitionem is a sign that has meaning, whereas there is
a case in which expression does not intimate the inner experiences of the speaker.
But whether there is always an object which an expression designates in each case is
not so obvious. Before we deal with this question, we must remark on the use of the
term object in Husserl. This term is ambiguous. On the one hand, generally every
intentional correlate is called object by Husserl.
11
Meaning is also an object in
this sense, insofar as it is an intentional correlate.
12
On the other hand, Husserl also
uses the term object particularly to refer to what can be given by the intuitive act,
especially when it is contrasted with meaning, as in most of the cases in the rst
Investigation. Meaning is not an object in this sense. When Husserl says in 14 that
relational talk of intimation, meaning and object belongs essentially to every
expression, it is specically to what can be given by the intuitive act that the term
object here refers.
10
See also: Man hat bei jedem Namen zwischen dem, was er kundgibt (d. i. jenen psychischen
Erlebnissen), und dem, was er bedeutet, unterschieden. Und abermals zwischen dem, was er bedeutet
(dem Sinn, dem Inhalt der nominalen Vorstellung) und dem, was er nennt (dem Gegenstand der
Vorstellung) (LU II/1, p. 32).
11
For instance, Die intentionalen Erlebnisse haben das Eigentumliche, sich auf vorgestellte
Gegenstande in verschiedener Weise zu beziehen (LU II/1, p. 372).
12
Das Wort intentional lat, seiner Bildung gema, sowohl Anwendung auf die Bedeutung, als auf den
Gegenstand, der intentio zu. Intentionale Einheit bedeutet also nicht notwendig die intendierte Enheit, die
des Gegenstandes (LU II/1, p. 97, no. 1) See also Dreyfus (2001, p. 200f).
Husserl Stud (2011) 27:125142 131
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It seems that Husserl contradicts himself when he says in 14 on the one hand,
that relational talk of intimation, meaning and object belongs essentially to
every expression, every expression names or otherwise designates some-
thing, and on the other hand, that relation to an actually given objective correlate,
which fullls the meaning-intention, is not essential to an expression. Although it
is not rare to nd contradictory statements within the Logical Investigations as a
whole, it is still very unlikely that Husserl would contradict himself within just one
paragraph. Actually, upon closer scrutiny, it can be seen that the objects, or
objective correlates, referred to in the two sides of the seemingly contradictory
statements quoted above are not the same. What is spoken of is, on the one hand,
object without qualication, and on the other, actually given object. The term
actually given (aktuell gegeben) is important, as well as its cognate actualize.
We have pointed out in Section One above that the meaning-fullling act is not
essential to the phenomenon of expression. And in the passage from 9 of the rst
Investigation quoted there, Husserl says that the function of the meaning-fullling
act consists in actualizing its relation to its object. Also closely related to these is
the term realized. Husserl says in 9 of the rst Investigation:
It [viz. expression] means something, and in so far as it means something, it
relates to what is objective. This objective somewhat can either be actually
present through accompanying intuitions, or may at least appear in represen-
tation, e.g. in a mental image, and where this happens the relation to an object
is realized. Alternatively this need not occur: the expression functions
signicantly, it remains more than mere sound of works, but it lacks any basic
intuition that will give it its object. The relation of expression to object is now
unrealized as being conned to mere meaning-intention. A name, e.g., names
its object whatever the circumstances, in so far as it means that object. But if
the object is not intuitively before one, and so not before one as a named or
meant object, mere meaning is all there is to it. If the originally empty
meaning-intention is now fullled, the relation to an object is realized, the
naming becomes an actual, conscious relation between name and object
named (LU II/1, pp. 3738/280281).
This passage is very important for our purpose, though the meanings of some
statements within it are not very clear. The gist of it can be summarized with the
following points:
(1) An expression is related to an object through the meaning it has. Husserl says
in the above passage that in so far as [indem] it means something, it relates to
what is objective. More frequently, Husserl uses the term mittels
(through), when he speaks of the relation between the expressions meaning
and its connection with an object.
13
For example, in 13 of the rst
Investigation Husserl says: An expression only refers to an objective
13
Some instances: dem mittels der Bedeutung ausgedruckten (genannten) Gegenstand; deren
Gegenstand als derjenige erschient, welcher in der Bedeutung bedeutet, bzw. welcher mittels der Bedeutung
genannt ist; die in der Bedeutung gemeinte und mittels ihrer ausgedruckte Gegenstandlichkeit (LUII/1,
p. 39, 41, 46).
132 Husserl Stud (2011) 27:125142
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correlate because [dadurch, da] it means something, it can be rightly said to
signify or name the object through [mittels] its meaning (LU II/1, p. 49/289).
For Husserl, the expressions meaning is the medium through which the
expression is related to an object.
(2) Relation to an object belongs essentially to the expression. We have shown
that for Husserl expression always has meaning, and expression is related to an
object through its meaning. But from the truth of these it does not necessarily
follow that expression is always related to an object. Husserl nonetheless
asserts that it is when he says that a name, e.g., names its object whatever the
circumstances, in so far as [sofern] it means that object. And only because
Husserl thinks that relation to an object belongs essentially to the expression
can he say that in meaning, a relation to an object is constituted. To use an
expression signicantly, and to refer expressively to an object, are one and the
same (LU II/1, p. 54/293).
(3) The expressions relation to an object can either be realized or unrealized.
Now, it seems odd that Husserl would think that relation to an object is
essential to the expression, while at the time thinking that the meaning-
fullling act, in which the object is given, is not essential to the expression.
This oddity will vanish if it is noticed that for Husserl the meaning-fullling
act which gives the expression intuitive fullness does not bring about its
relation to an object. We have shown above that Husserl thinks that an
expression is related to an object through the meaning it has. In other words, it
is not the corresponding meaning-fullling act, but the meaning which the
expression essentially has, that is responsible for its relation to its object. What
the corresponding meaning-fullling act does, when it is also enacted, is not to
bring about the expressions relation to its object but rather to actualize or
realize this relation. When the corresponding meaning-fullling act is
enactedbe it a perception or imaginationthe relation to an object is
realized and its object is actually present or actually given; there is an
actual, conscious relation between name and object named. But as the
meaning-fullling act is not essential to the expression, this [viz. a realized
relation to an object] need not occur. Yet, in this case, the expression still
names its object, that is to say, there is still a relation of the expression to its
object by virtue of the meaning that the expression has, although now this
relation is unrealized, which means that the object related to the expression
is not actually given by the intuitive act.
14
5
In the above sections we have shown that amongst those things which are said to be
related to the phenomenon of expressionthe intuitive support, meaning, object,
and two kinds of actthe intuitive act that provides the intuitive support and the
14
Cf. Tugendhat (1970, pp. 4849).
Husserl Stud (2011) 27:125142 133
1 3
meaning-conferring act are essential, whereas the meaning-fullling act and
intimation are not. Apart from these there is actually one more act, also related to
the phenomenon of expression in a non-essential way, that we have already come
across. In the passage from 9 of the rst Investigation quoted in Section One above
in connection with our discussion of the meaning-conferring act and meaning-
fullling act, Husserl mentions a further actin addition to the sensuous act, the
meaning-conferring and the meaning-fullling acts that we have discussedthough
he does not refer to it with the term act. This is what Husserl in this passage calls
whole experience. He says:
These acts, which become fused with the meaning-conferring acts in the unity
of knowledge or fulllment [Erfullung], we call the meaning-fullling acts.
The briefer expression meaning-fulllment can only be used in cases where
is no risk of the ready confusion with the whole experience in which a
meaning-intention nds fulllment in its correlated intuition (LU II/1, p. 38/281).
This whole experience is also an act or intentional experience.
15
It is an act in
which the meaning-intention or meaning-conferring act is fullled by the
corresponding intuition. Husserl calls this kind of act fulllment. He says in 8
of the sixth Investigation:
From the tranquil, as it were static coincidence of meaning and intuition, we
now turn to that dynamic coincidence where an expression rst functions in
merely symbolic fashion, and then is accompanied by a more or less
corresponding intuition. Where this happens, we experience a descriptively
peculiar consciousness of fulllment: the act of pure meaning, like a goal-
seeking intention, nds its fulllment in the act which renders the matter
intuitive. In this transitional experience, the mutual belongingness of the two
acts, the act of meaning, on the one hand, and the intuition which more or less
corresponds to it, on the other, reveals its phenomenological roots. We
experience how the same objective item which was merely thought of in
symbol is now presented in intuition, and that it is intuited as being precisely
the determinate so-and-so that it was at rst merely thought or meant to be
(LU II/2, p. 32/694).
The terms fulllment and the meaning-fullling act can easily lead to
confusion. Despite the fact that both of them are composed of words deriving from
the verb fulll, they actually refer to different kinds of actthough Husserl
himself seems not to be very careful about words and sometimes uses the term
fulllment to refer to the latter act.
16
It is clear from the above quoted passages
that the unifying act is called knowledge or fulllment by Husserl, and what are
united in such unifying act are called meaning-conferring acts and meaning-
15
Eben darum durfen wir nicht blo die Signikation und Intuition, sondern auch die Adaquation, d.i.
die Erfullungseinheit, als einen Akt bezeichen (LU II/2, p. 35).
16
For instance: Was die Intention zwar meint, das stellt die Erfullung, d.h. der sich in der
Erfullungssynthesis anschmiegende, der Intention seine Fulle bietende Akt, direkt vor uns hin (LU II/2,
p. 65).
134 Husserl Stud (2011) 27:125142
1 3
fullling acts, the latter of which Husserl emphatically warns against confusing with
the whole experience. Strictly speaking, fulllment refers to the whole
experiencethat is, those unifying or synthetic acts in which the meaning-conferring
acts are united with the corresponding intuitionswhile the meaning-fullling act
refers to the intuitive acts which give fulllment to the meaning-conferring acts in the
synthetic act of fulllment. In other words, the meaning-fullling act is actually an
intuitive act, and it is called the meaning-fullling act, insofar as it is that whose
role it is to fulll other intentions in knowledge.
17
Husserl says in 13 of the sixth
Investigation:
All intentions have corresponding possibilities of fulllment (or of opposed
frustration): these themselves are peculiar transitional experiences, character-
izable as acts, which permit each act to reach its goal in an act specially
correlated with it. These latter acts, inasmuch as they fulll intentions, may be
called fullling acts, but they are called so only on account of the synthetic
act of fulllment, or rather of self-fulllment (LU II/2, p. 49/707).
Husserl also uses the terms recognition (Erkenntnis) and calling (or
naming, Nennung) to designate the act of fulllment. He says in the sixth
Investigation:
Talk about recognizing objects, and talk about fullling a meaning-intention,
therefore express the same fact, merely from differing standpoints (LU II/33,
p. 695).
And
To call something red [Rot Nennen]in the fully actual sense of calling
which presupposes an underlying intuition of the thing so calledand to
recognize something as red, are in reality synonymous expressions: they
only differ in so far as the latter brings out more clearly that we have here no
mere duality, but a unity engineered by a single act-character (LU II/2,
p. 28/691).
The term naming can also easily lead to confusion. As we saw, Husserl states
that a name, e.g., names its object whatever the circumstances, in so far as it means
that object, which means that an expression, insofar as it has meaning, can always
be said to name its object, no matter whether the relation to its object is realized
by the corresponding intuition or not. In other words, both the realized and the
unrealized relation of the expression to its object are called naming. Now, when
Husserl says that to name something red is equivalent to recognizing something as
red, it is merely the realized relation of the expression to its object that is meant.
Therefore, in the above passage, Husserl has to add the remark that here naming
(or calling) is used in the fully actual sense, which presupposes an underlying
intuition of the thing so called.
17
LU II/2, p. 39/699. The English translation mistakenly has intuition for intention in this passage.
Husserl Stud (2011) 27:125142 135
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6
Now we can return to our original question: whether the intuitive act is essentially a
carrier of meaning, or in other words, whether the intuitive act is also sense-
giving (sinngebend) (LU II/2, p. 8/675). As we remarked above, Husserl in 3 of
the rst chapter of the sixth Investigation focuses on the relation between meaning
and intuition and tries to resolve the problem of whether such an intuition may not
itself be the act constitutive of meaning by demonstrating that meaning does not lie
in perception or any other intuitive. But the arguments given by Husserl in 4 and
5 in the rst chapter of the sixth Investigation are not very convincing. The
arguments given by Husserl concerning the relation between the intuitive act and
the expression in general are found in 4, whereas in 5 Husserl deals with the
relation between the intuitive act and one particular kind of expression, i.e., what
Husserl calls the essentially occasional expression, a more specic question that
we shall not take up here.
The arguments given by Husserl in 4 can be separated into two stages. The rst
is that we could base different statements on the same percept [Wahrnehmung],
and thereby unfold quite different senses, and conversely, the sound of my words
and their sense might have remained the same, though my percept varied in a
number of ways (LU II/2, p. 14/680). And the second is that percepts may not
only vary, but may also vanish altogether, without causing an expression to lose all
its meaning (LU II/2, p. 15/680). Husserl seems readily to admit that the rst stage
is not conclusive and agree with the objection that it only showed meaning to be
unaffected by such differences in individual percepts: it might be held to reside in
something common to the whole multitude of perceptual acts which centre in a
single object (LU II/2, p. 15/680). The second stage is Husserls reply to this
objection, and it seems to Husserl to be conclusive enough to remove any further
doubt that meaning does not lie in the perceptive act itself. But it seems to me that
this second argument is also far from sufcient to achieve Husserls overall purpose,
which is to prove that the intuitive act is not sense-giving. What it can accomplish is
only the assurance that the intuitive act is not essential to the phenomenon of
meaning and that expression is still meaningful even without the corresponding
intuition. But it is not enough to exclude the possibility that the intuitive act is also
meaningful even without uniting with the meaning-conferring act in the synthetic
act of fulllment; thus it might still be sense-giving in itself. More importantly,
there are some passages in the Logical Investigations that seem to support this
possibility. Additionally, Husserl seems to have neglected to consider the possibility
that intuition is essentially sense-giving, in the sense that it has always already been
united with a meaning-conferring act insofar as it is an intuition, that is, insofar as it
is an intuitively intentional act.
There is evidence in the Logical Investigations that suggests that the intuitive act
is meaningful in itself. For example, Husserl says in 6 of the sixth Investigation:
The relation between name and thing named, has, in this state of union, a
certain descriptive character, that we previously noticed: the name my
inkpot seems to overlay the perceived object, to belong sensibly to it If we
136 Husserl Stud (2011) 27:125142
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turn to the experiences involved, we have, on the one hand, as said before, the
acts in which the words appear, on the other hand the acts in which the things
appear. As regards the latter, the inkpot confronts us in perception. Following
our repeated demonstration of the descriptive essence of perception, this
means no more phenomenologically than that we undergo a certain sequence
of experiences of the class of sensation, sensuously unied in a peculiar serial
pattern, and informed by a certain act-character of interpretation [Auffas-
sung], which confers it with an objective sense (LU II/2, p. 2425/688;
translation modied).
Although the context of this passage is the union of name and thing named in the
synthetic act of fulllment, what Husserl says here about perception is by no means
restricted to this context and is supposed to be valid for perception generally. He
himself speaks here about the essence of perceptionthat is, about perception
qua perception and not only qua perception as united with the meaning-conferring
actand further, the words repeated demonstration show that Husserl here refers
to a view that he has put forth in other contexts, even when the union of name and
thing named is not in question. This is conrmed by Husserls description of the
essence of perception in other places in the Logical Investigations.
What interests us most in this description of the essence of perception is the
assertion that in the course of perception, the sensation is informed by a certain
act-character of interpretation, which confers it with an objective sense. This act
of interpretation, which here is said to be the very thing that confers the sensation
with an objective sense, is regarded by Husserl as the sine qua non for the
appearance of a perceptual object. Husserl says in 23 of the rst Investigation:
The perceptual presentation arises in so far as an experienced complex of
sensations gets informed by a certain act-character, one of interpreting
[Auffassen] or meaning [Meinen]. To the extent that this happens, the
perceived object appears, while the sensational complex is as little perceived
as is the act in which the perceived object is as such constituted (LU II/1,
p. 75/310; translation modied).
If interpretation (Auffassung) is also an act which is sense-conferring (sinnver-
leihend), and if it is at the same time a condition of possibility for the appearance of
a perceptual object, no matter whether the perception in which it appears is united
with the meaning-conferring act or not, then it is obvious that perception is in itself
sense-giving in a certain sense, or that it is an act in which there is always an
element which is sense-giving in a certain sense. Therefore, if we stick to Husserls
description of perception quoted above and admit that the act of interpretation is
essential to Husserls conception of perception, then there is no question that
perception is sense-giving for Husserl. The only question that remains is whether the
Auffassungssinni.e., the sense that is at issue hereis the same with linguistic
meaning, i.e., the meaning or sense that is essential to the phenomenon of
expression.
18
It seems to me that this is the critical question for the conceptualist or
18
This is precisely what Kevin Mulligen argues against. See Mooney (2010, p. 31).
Husserl Stud (2011) 27:125142 137
1 3
non-conceptualist reading of Husserls conception of perception and of intentional
experience in general. If the Auffassungssinn is not the same as linguistic meaning,
then even though it can still be said that for Husserl perception is sense-conferring
or sense-giving in a certain sense, one cannot say that perception is always
meaningful and that it is a carrier of linguistic meaning as the conceptualist
understands this; thus, the conceptualist view is not warranted. But if, on the
contrary, the Auffassungssinn is the same with linguistic meaning, then, because
perception is sense-conferring, it is always meaningful, and the conceptualist
reading is warranted.
7
There are some scholars who observe that throughout Logical Investigations,
Husserl works with a distinction between meaning as conceptual or logical
signication [Bedeutung] and as non-conceptual interpreting sense or apprehending
sense [Sinn or Auffassungssinn].
19
I disagree with this observation, for the
following reasons:
First, Husserl states explicitly that he uses the terms meaning (Bedeutung) and
sense (Sinn) synonymously. He says in the rst Investigation:
Meaning is further used by us as synonymous with sense. It is agreeable
to have parallel, interchangeable terms in the case of this concept A further
consideration is our ingrained tendency to use the two words as synonymous, a
circumstance which makes it seem rather a dubious step if their meanings are
differentiated To this we may add that both terms are exposed to the same
equivocations (LU II/1, p. 52/292).
Accordingly, Husserl also uses the term meaning-conferring interchangeably
with sense-conferring and with sense-giving. I dont see why we should take
this explicit statement of Husserl as being restricted to his treatment of expression
only rather than covering all the Investigations.
20
One reason that Husserl brings
forth in support of his using the two words synonymously is that it is our ingrained
tendency. In other words, it is in complete accord with the ordinary usage of
German to use the two words synonymously.
21
Therefore, even without Husserls
explicit statement, it would only be natural to assume that the two words are used
interchangeably unless stated otherwise, as in the case of Frege. But nowhere in the
Logical Investigations do we nd Husserl making the dubious step of explicitly
differentiating the two words and dening what the difference amounts to. And the
evidence pointed out by scholars for Husserls supposed distinction between
meaning and sense is all contextual rather direct, which means that, in the
absence of Husserls direct statement that he uses the two words differently, this sort
of evidence, which is often drawn from contexts that deal with issues other than the
19
Mooney (2010, p. 20).
20
Ibid.
21
Cf. McIntyre and Smith (2005, p. 222).
138 Husserl Stud (2011) 27:125142
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distinction in question, only becomes evidence through the scholarly interpretation
itself. Therefore, I think that the burden of proof should lie with the non-
conceptualist reading rather than the conceptualist reading.
Secondly, Husserl also uses the term interpretation (Auffassung) to designate
the act in which the expression becomes meaningful, and states that this kind of
interpretation is akin (verwandt) to that in which the intuitive object arises. He
says in 23 of the rst Investigation:
The understanding interpretation [verstehende Auffassung], in which the
meaning of a word becomes effective, is, in so far as any interpreting is in a
sense an understanding [Verstehen] and a rendering [Deuten], akin to the
divergently carried out objective interpretation [objektivierende Auffassung] in
which, by way of an experienced sense-complex, the intuitive presentation,
whether percept, imagination, representation etc., of an object, e.g. an external
thing, arises (LU II/1, p. 74/309; translation altered).
The kind of interpretation pertaining to the phenomenon of expression Husserl calls
the understanding interpretation, and the kind of interpretation pertaining to the
appearance of the object in intuition he calls objective interpretation. Now, if
both kinds of interpretation are akin in the sense that Verstehen or Deuten is
involved in both of them, wouldnt it be more likely that the sense that each of them
confers is also one and the same kind of thing?
Thirdly, Husserl states that sign and meaning are also involved in our perception.
While on the one hand Husserl states that the understanding interpretation is akin to
the objective interpretation, on the other hand he also thinks that they have different
phenomenological structure. He continues in 23 of the rst Investigation:
The phenomenological structure of the two sorts of interpretation is, however,
somewhat different. If we imagine a consciousness prior to all experience, it
may very well have the same sensations as we have. But it will intuit no
things, and no events pertaining to things, it will perceive no trees and no
houses, no ight of birds nor any barking of dogs. One is at once tempted to
express the situation by saying that its sensations mean nothing to such a
consciousness, that they do not count as signs of the properties of an object,
that their combination does not count as a sign of the object itself. They are
merely lived through, without an objectifying rendering derived from
experience. Here, therefore, we talk of signs and meanings [Bedeutung] just
as we do in the case of expressions and cognate signs (LU II/1, p. 75/309;
translation altered).
Of the most interest to us in this paragraph is the way Husserl talks about sign. As
we remarked earlier, Husserl begins the rst Investigation by distinguishing two
kinds of sign: the meaningful sign and the indicative sign. The former Husserl calls
expression and the latter indication, each of which discharges a very distinct
function. Now, which sign is meant by Husserl here? Sign in general? Expression?
Indication? And more specically, what does the term cognate signs at the end of
the passage mean? In the Logical Investigations, Husserl only distinguishes two
kinds of sign. He never indicates that there are other kinds of sign beside these two.
Husserl Stud (2011) 27:125142 139
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If there are only two kinds of sign, then the term cognate signs, which is put in
contrast with expression in the above passage, can mean nothing but the
indications. However, if we take the term cognate signs as referring to the
indications, then it is simply not true to say that we can talk of meanings here. For,
according to Husserl himself, in the case of indication we can talk of sign but we
cannot talk of meaning, since the expression is the only kind of sign that has
meaning. So, granted that we can talk of both signs and meanings in the context of
perceptionwhich in contrast to a consciousness prior to all experience contains
an objectifying renderingthen the sign referred to here cannot be the
indication, and that leaves expression as the only possible candidate. There are no
cognate signs. If sign and meaning are involved in our perception, it is the
expression and the meaning proper to it that is involved.
8
If the sign involved in our perception is the expression, then how can there be any
difference between the phenomenological structure of the understanding interpre-
tation and the objective interpretation? Indeed, it makes sense to say that they are in
fact one and the same kind of interpretation. If sign is involved in every perception,
and if the sign involved is the expression, then all the things essential to the
phenomenon of expression must also be present. According to our discussion above,
this includes the expression itself, meaning, relation to object, the act in which the
expression itself appears, and the meaning-conferring act. Certainly, we usually do
not utter anything in perception, but (as pointed out before) the expression itself in
the phenomenon of expression need not be a real word. A silent and imaginative
word can also do the job. It seems to be me that it is this kind of silent and
imaginative word that is the sign involved in perception. And accordingly, the
meaning of the word is what is meant by the expression, and the perceptual object
what is actually designated by it. But if all these components are there, doesnt the
act of perception become the synthetic act of fulllment? I believe that this is the
unavoidable outcome, if the above interpretation of ours is acceptable. Provided that
we can, as Husserl believes, talk about sign and meaning in perception, and the
expression is the only kind of sign that has meaning, then all perceptions are
actually synthetic acts of fulllment, and the objective interpretation which is
supposed to confer the sensation with an objective sense is nothing other than the
understanding interpretation which confers meaning on a word. We are talking
about the same kind of sign, the same kind of meaning or sense, and the same kind
of interpretation in both cases.
One may object that there are some experiences in which we cannot make sense
of what we perceive and express what it is, but it surely will not affect the fact that
they are perceptions. To this we can reply that even in such experiences there is
always something that we can express and have already expressed. For example,
now we perceive a colorful object and we cannot tell what this is. Isnt this an
example of perception without expression? I dont think so. In fact, even if we dont
know what this colorful object is, something has already been expressed, some
140 Husserl Stud (2011) 27:125142
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meaning already meant, and some object already actually designated, when we say,
whether with real or imaginative words, that this is a colorful object. For,
colorful object is also an expression, and in so far as it is an expression, it has
meaning and relation to an object. I believe that other cases of the experience in
which we seem to be unable to express what it is that we perceive are also like this.
There is always something that has already been expressed at the moment when we
are conscious of the perceptual objectfor example, that it is of a certain color, a
certain size, or a certain shape. As long as perception is always accompanied by
these kinds of expression and meaning, it is actually a synthetic act of fulllment
and is always meaningful.
The above argument can also be applied to other intuitive acts. And so it can be
said that all intuitive acts are synthetic acts of fulllment, always including the
meaning-conferring act as one component. In other words, all intuitive acts are
meaningful. If this is the case, then the scope of acts or intentional experiences
which involve the meaning-conferring act can be enlarged still further. Husserl
thinks that each intentional experience is either an objectifying act or has its basis
in such an act (LU II/1, p. 493/648). And he divides objectifying acts into two
kinds, the signitive act and the intuitive act (LU II/2, p. 67). The former amounts to
the meaning-conferring act, and the latteraccording to our demonstration above
amounts to the meaning-conferring act plus the corresponding intuition. The
meaning-conferring act is present in both. If every intentional experience, as Husserl
believes, involves the objectifying act (either being an objectifying act itself or
having one as its basis), and if the meaning-conferring act, as we believe, is always
present in the objectifying act, then the meaning-conferring act is involved in every
intentional experience. In short, all our intentional experiences are meaningful.
I am not making the claim that our interpretation is the only possible one. As we
have already pointed out, it is not rare to nd contradictory statements within the
Logical Investigations as a whole. Conicting interpretations can easily arise out of
these contradictory statements.
22
The conceptualist interpretation is no less convinc-
ing and no less susceptible to objections than the non-conceptualist one. But the
conceptualist interpretation that we present above does have the advantage that, if it is
correct, many insights in the Logical Investigations gain a clearer explanation. For
example, those hidden aspects of the perceptual object which are subsidiarily
meant (mitgemeint) can be better explained by reference to meaning. Those aspects
of a perceptual object which come into view can mean nothing in themselves. For
example, when I see a part of an unknown animal, I will have no expectation as to
what I will see when the other part of it is revealed. Only when, based upon the part I
see, I interpret this animal as a cat according to the meaning of the expression cat as
it is known to me, will I expect to see a tail when its hinder part is revealed to me. This
sort of expectationwhich is a very common characteristic in perceptioncan
hardly be sufciently explained if we dont suppose that perception always contains
the meaning-conferring act and is always meaningful.
23
22
Cf. Mooney (2010, p. 34). But I disagree that the weight of argument seems to point in the non-
conceptualist direction.
23
I would like to thank the two anonymous referees and Prof. Steven Crowell for their valuable opinions.
Husserl Stud (2011) 27:125142 141
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