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Case No. 1
Case Title: CONDE v ABAYA
GR No. 4275
December 23, 1909
Justice Arellano


Doctrine:

Right of action to enforce recognition of its
legitimacy last during the lifetime of such child,
but right of a natural child to compel
acknowledgement of its status continues only
during the life of the alleged parents. The right
of action for a declaration of legitimacy is
transmitted to the heirs of the child only when
the latter dies during minority or while insane
or in case the action has already instituted.
Action by a natural child can only be brought
against the heirs of the parents in the event of
the death of the parents during the minority of
the child, or upon discovery of a document,
after the death of the parents, expressly
acknowledging such child. This right of action
which the law concedes to this natural child is
not transmitted to his ascendants or
descendants.

Facts:

Casiano Abaya died intestate in 1899.
In the intestate proceedings for the settlement
of the estate of Casiano, his brother Roman
Abaya, who had been appointed administrator
of the estate, filed a petition whereby he
moved that he be declared as the sole heir of
the decedent.

Paula Conde, mother of Teopista and
Jose, unacknowledged natural children of
Casiano, opposed Roman's petition. She
contended that the right of her two natural
children by the decedent, and consequently,
her rights as heir of such natural children, was
superior to that of Roman. Teopista died in
1902 and Jose in 1903, after their father's
death but before the institution of this action.

Issue:

Petitioners Claim: Her right is superior
than Roman Abaya being the mother of the
Casianos natural children and prayed that
she be declared to have preferential right to
the property left by Casiano.

Respondents Claim: Being the
nearest relative of Casiano, moved the he be
declared as the sole heir to the exclusion of
others, and to be entitled to the possession of
all Casianos property.

Is the right of action on the part of the
child to obtain the acknowledgment of his
natural filiation transmitted to his
descendants?

Held:
No.

The right of action for the
acknowledgment of a natural child is,
extinguished by his death, and cannot be
transmitted as a portion of the inheritance of
the deceased child.

As legal basis, the Supreme Court
made a comparison between an action to
claim the legitimacy, and one to enforce
acknowledgment. Art.118.The action to claim
its legitimacy may be brought by the child at
any time of its lifetime and shall be transmitted
to its heirs, should it die during minority or in a
state of insanity. In such cases the heirs shall
be allowed a period of five years in which to
institute the action.

The action already instituted by the
child is transmitted by its death to the heirs, if
it has not lapsed before then.

Art.137. The actions for the acknowledgment
of natural children can be instituted only
during the life of the presumed parents,
except in the following cases:
1.If the father or mother died during the
minority of the child, in which case the latter
may institute the action before the expiration
of the first four years of its majority.
2.If, after the death of the father or mother,
some instrument, before unknown, should be
discovered in which the child is expressly
acknowledged.
In this case the action must be instituted
within the six months following the discovery
of such instrument.
Page 2 of 31


From the express and precise precepts of the
code the following conclusions are derived:
The right of action that
devolves upon the child to claim his
legitimacy lasts during his whole life,
while the right to claim the
acknowledgment of a natural child
lasts only during the life of his
presumed parents.

Inasmuch as the right of action
accruing to the child to claim his
legitimacy lasts during his whole life,
he may exercise it either against the
presumed parents, or their heirs; while
the right of action to secure the
acknowledgment of a natural child,
since it does not last during his whole
life, but depends on that of the
presumed parents, as a general rule
can only be exercised against the
latter. An action for the
acknowledgment of a natural child
may, as an exception, be exercised
against the heirs of the presumed
parents in two cases: first, in the event
of the death of the latter during the
minority of the child, and second, upon
the discovery of some instrument of
express acknowledgment of the child,
executed by the father or mother, the
existence of which was unknown
during the life of the latter. But as
such action for the acknowledgment of
a natural child can only be exercised
by him. It cannot be transmitted to his
descendants, or to his ascendants.

NOTE:
Another issue, first issue, was raised
in the petition, however none was discussed,
the case only referred to it as This court has
decided the present question in the manner
shown in the case of Pimentel vs Palanca
Question is whether an action to enforce
acknowledgement of natural child of a person
from whom the inheritance is derived be set
up in a special proceeding for the
administration and distribution of an intestate
estate.

The doctrine in Pimentel vs Palanca is
While an estate is in the course of settlement
in a special proceeding, no ordinary action
can be maintained by a person claiming to be
an heir, against the executor or administrator,
for the purpose of having his rights in the
estate determined.


Case No. 2
Case Title: PAMPLONA v MORETO
GR No. L-33187
March 31, 1980
Justice Guerrero


Doctrine:

When necessary proceedings for the
liquidation of the conjugal partnership were
not instituted by the heirs either in the testate
or intestate proceedings of the deceased
spouse or when neither was there an extra-
judicial partition between the surviving spouse
and the heirs of the deceased spouse nor was
an ordinary action for partition brought for the
purpose, the estate becomes the property of a
community between the surviving husband,
and his children with the deceased wife in the
concept of a co-ownership

When the surviving husband sells a specific
portion of the property co-owned to third
parties, there is a partial partition effected.

The obligation to deliver the specific portion
sold by the husband (as vendor) to the third
parties (as vendees) may be transmitted to
the heirs upon the death of the husband.

Facts:

Flaviano Moreto and Monica Maniega
were husband and wife. During their marriage
they acquired Lot Nos. 1495, 4545, and 1496.
They were covered by certificates of title
issued in the name of Flaviano Moreto,
married to Monica Maniega.

Flaviano and Monica had 6 children:
Ursulo, Marta, La Paz, Alipio, Pablo and
Leandro.

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The 6 children had also children of
their own (so may mga apo na sila Flaviano
and Monica).

On May 1946, Monica died intestate.
(At this time patay na sila Marta, Alipio, and
Pablo. Mas nauna sila kaysa sa nanay nila)

On July 1952, more than 6 years after
the death of Monica, Flaviano without the
consent of the heirs of his deceased wife
Monica (tinutukoy dito yung mga buhay pa
nilang mga anak at apo) and before any
liquidation of the conjugal partnership of
Monica and Flaviano could be effected,
executed in favor of Geminiano Pamplona
(married to Apolonia Onte) a deed of absolute
sale covering Lots 1495 for P900. It covered
an area of 781 sq. meters

As a result of the sale, the said
certificate of title of said lot was cancelled and
a new one was issued in the name of
Geminiano Pamplona married to Apolonia
Onte (will be referred to as Pamplona
spouses).

The Pamplona spouses constructed a
house on the eastern part of Lot No. 1496.
Flaviano at the time of the sale, pointed to it
as the land which he sold to Geminiano
Pamplona.

The Pamplona spouses had a son
named Rafael. Rafael also built his house
within the lot.

The vendor Flaviano and the vendee
Geminiano thought all the time that the lot
which was the subject matter of their sale
transaction was Lot No. 1495. Although the
fact is that the said portion sold thought of by
the parties to be lot No. 1495 is a part of lot
No. 1496. (Akala ng Pamplona spouses na
yung lugar na tinuro ni Flaviano ay Lot 1495,
eh Lot 1496 pala yun)

Later on the Pamplona spouses
enlarged their house and constructed a
piggery coral at the back of the house.

In 1956, Flaviano died intestate.

In 1961, the heirs of Flaviano and
Monica demanded the Pamplonas to vacate
the premises where they constructed their
house and the piggery. (At this time, patay na
sila Ursulo at La Paz, si Leandro nalang ang
buhay)

The Pamplonas refused to vacate.
The heirs eventually brought an action against
them to nullify the deed of sale.

The CFI ruled in favor of the heirs, the
deed of sale was declared null and void.

The Pamplonas appealed to the CA.
The CA affirmed the CFIs decision.

Issue:

Whether or not the deed of sale
should be annulled.

If the sale was valid, what is the
obligation of the heirs?

CLAIMS OF THE HEIRS:
The heirs grounded their argument on the
basis that Flaviano had no right to sell the lot
which he sold to Geminiano Pamplona as the
same belongs to the conjugal partnership of
Flaviano and Monica. Monica was already
dead when the sale was executed without the
consent of the complaining heirs.

CLAIMS OF THE PAMPLONAS:
The Pamplonas claimed that they are
purchasers in good faith


Held:

1
st
Issue

The sale made was valid.

There is no question that when the
petitioners purchased the property on July
1952 from Flaviano Moreto his wife Monica
Maniega had already been dead. Hence, the
conjugal partnership of the spouses Flaviano
Moreto and Monica Maniega had already
been dissolved.

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The records show that the conjugal
estate had not been inventoried, liquidated,
settled and divided by the heirs thereto in
accordance with law. The necessary
proceedings for the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership were not instituted by the heirs
either in the testate or intestate proceedings of
the deceased spouse. Neither was there an
extra-judicial partition between the surviving
spouse and the heirs of the deceased spouse
nor was an ordinary action for partition
brought for the purpose. Accordingly, the
estate became the property of a community
between the surviving husband, Flaviano
Moreto, and his children with the deceased
Monica Maniega in the concept of a co-
ownership.

Art. 493 of the NCC provides:
Each co-owner shall have the full
ownership of his part and of the fruits
and benefits pertaining thereto, and he
may therefore alienate, assign or
mortgage it, and even substitute
another person in its enjoyment,
except when personal rights are
involve. But the effect of the alienation
or the mortgage, with respect to the
co-owners, shall be limited to the
portion which may be allotted to him in
the division upon the termination of
the co-ownership.

There was a partial partition of the co-
ownership when at the time of the sale
Flaviano pointed out the area and location
sold by him to the Pamplonas on which they
built their house and the piggery.

The heirs on the contrary acquiesced
and tolerated such alienation, occupation and
possession. (It took them 9 years bago pa nila
kinontra yung sale na ginawa ni Flaviano at
kahit alam nila na nagtayo ng bahay at
babuyan ang mga Pamplonas)

Equity commands that the heirs, be
not allowed to impugn the sale executed by
Flaviano Moreto who indisputably received the
consideration of P900.00 and which he,
including his children, benefitted from the
same.

2
nd
Issue
Articles 1458 and 1495 of the NCC
provides the obligation of the vendor to deliver
and transfer the ownership of the whole
property sold. That obligation can be
transmitted on the vendors heirs upon the
vendors death.

Under Article 776, New Civil Code, the
inheritance which private respondents (the
heirs) received from their deceased parents
and/or predecessors-in-interest included all
the property rights and obligations which were
not extinguished by their parents' death. And
under Art. 1311, paragraph 1, New Civil Code,
the contract of sale executed by the deceased
Flaviano Moreto took effect between the
parties, their assigns and heirs, who are the
private respondents herein. Accordingly, to
the private respondents is transmitted the
obligation to deliver in full ownership the
whole area of 781 sq. meters to the petitioners
(which was the original obligation of their
predecessor Flaviano Moreto) and not only
one-half thereof. Private respondents must
comply with said obligation.

ADD-ON:
With respect to the erroneous identification of
the lot: the SC ordered that Register of Deeds
to issue a TCT covering the lot occupied by
the Pamplonas.


Case No. 3
Case Title: PEOPLE v UMALI
GR No. 84450
February 4, 1991
Justice Medialdea


Doctrine:

Persons convicted of falsification of a
document, perjury or false testimony are
disqualified from being witnesses to a will

Facts:

Gloria Umali and Suzeth Umali were
charged before the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 53, Lucena City for violation of Section
4, Article 1 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of
Page 5 of 31

1972 alleging that the abovenamed accused,
conspiring and confederating together and
mutually helping each other, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell,
deliver and give marijuana or Indian Hemp, a
prohibited drug to one Francisco Manalo y
Arellano, without authority of law.

Upon arraignment, Gloria Umali
entered a plea of "not, guilty" as accused
Suzeth Umali remained at large. After trial, the
lower court convicted the accused and
imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

The accused appeal before the
Supreme Court the lower courts decision
alleging, among others, that the Court gravely
erred in giving weight and credence to the
biased testimony of Francisco Manalo.

As recounted by the lower court, the
Police investigators were urged by Mr.
Pangan (parent of a minor who was caught of
using marijuana) to determine the source of
marijuana, which has affected other minors in
their community. The investigators sought the
help of Manalo, then a prisoner who is facing
several chargers including violation of
Dangerous Drugs Act, to identify the source of
marijuana. They gave manalo a marked P5.00
bill to buy marijuana from a source known to
him. Through this frame-up, it was proved that
the source is accused Gloria Umali with the
testimony of Manalo and the confiscated
P5.00 bills from the accused.

Issue:

Whether or not the testimony of
Manalo should be given weight and credence

CLAIM OF PLAINTIFF:
The accused alleged that witness Manalo is
not reputed to be trustworthy and reliable and
that his words should not be taken on its face
value. Furthermore, he stressed that said
witness has several charges in court and
because of his desire to have some of his
cases dismissed, he was likely to tell
falsehood.

CLAIM OF DEFENDANT:
Plaintiff-appellee through the Solicitor General
said that even if Manalo was then facing
several criminal charges when he testified,
such fact did not in any way disqualify him as
a witness. "His testimony is not only
reasonable and probable but more so, it was
also corroborated in its material respect by the
other prosecution witnesses, especially the
police officers."

Held:

Rule 130, Section 20 of the Revised
Rules of Court provides that:

Except as provided in the next
succeeding section, all
persons who can perceive,
and perceiving can make
known their perception to
others may be witnesses.

Religious or political belief,
interest in the outcome of the
case, or conviction of a crime
unless otherwise provided by
law, shall not be a ground for
disqualification.

The phrase "conviction of a crime
unless otherwise provided by law" takes into
account Article 821 of the Civil Code which
states that persons convicted of falsification of
a document, perjury or false testimony" are
disqualified from being witnesses to a will."

Since the witness Francisco Manalo is
not convicted of any of the above-mentioned
crimes to disqualify him as a witness and this
case does not involve the probate of a will,
We rule that the fact that said witness is facing
several criminal charges when he testified did
not in any way disqualify him as a witness.
ACCORDINGLY, the appealed decision is
AFFIRMED with the modification that a fine of
(P20,000.00) be imposed.


Case No. 4
Case Title: DOLAR v DIANCIN
GR No. 33365
December 20, 1930
Justice Malcolm
Page 6 of 31



Doctrine:

The requirement of the statute that the will
shall be signed is satisfied not only by the
customary signature but also by the testator's
testatrix' thumbmark.

Experts testimony as to the identity of the
thumbmark or fingerprints is admissible. The
method of identification of fingerprints is a
science requiring close study.

Where the thumb impressions are blurred and
many of the characteristic marks far from
clear, thus rendering it difficult to trace the
features enumerated by the experts as
showing the identity or lack of identity of the
impressions, the court is justified in refusing to
accept the opinions of the alleged experts and
in substituting its own opinion.

Facts:

The will of deceased Paulino Diancin
which was executed by the latter at
Dumangas, iloilo, on november 13, 1927 was
denied probate in the court of first instance in
iloilo on the sole ground that the thumbmarks
appearing thereon were not the thumbmarks
of the testator. a thumbmark appears at the
end of the will and on the left hand margin of
each of its pages in the following manner
"Paulino Diancin, Su Signo, Por Pedro
Diamante. The witnesses to the will were
Pedro Diamante, Inocentes Deocampo, and
Juan Dominado.

A document of sale containing an
admittedly genuine thumbmark of Paulino
Diancin was presesnted as evidence for
comparative purposes. One Carlos J. Jeana
attempted to qualifiy as an expert witness and
thereafter gave as his opinion that the
thumbmarks had not been made by the same
person. one Jose G. Villanueva also
attempted to qualify as an expert witness
however the latter gave as his opinion that the
thumbmarks were authentic. However, both
the opposing witnesses agreed that the ink
used to make the thumbmarks on the will was
of the ordinary type which blurred the
characteristics of the mark. The petition of the
proponent of the will to permit the will to be
sent to manil to be examined by an expert
was denied.

The three instrumental witnesses
united and stated that there was another
person present during the execution of the
will. thus, Diosdado Dominado was presented
as a witness . the latter declared that he was
the one who prepared the will and that the
thumbmark that appeared on the will were
those of Paulino Diancin.

HELD:

The Supreme Court concluded that
the testimony given by Diosdado Dominado
was worthy of credit and that the thumbmark
appearing in the will were those of Paulino
Diancin and that the will be admitted to
probate.


Case No. 5
Case Title: YAP TUA v YAP CA KUAN
GR No. 6845
September 1, 1914
Justice Johnson


Doctrine:

It has been held time and time again that one
who makes a will may sign the same by using
a mark, the name having been written by
others. If writing a mark simply upon a will is
sufficient indication of the intention of the
person to make and execute a will, then
certainly the writing of a portion or all of her
name ought to be accepted as a clear
indication of her intention to execute the will.

Facts:

On August 23, 1909, Perfecto Gabriel,
representing petitioner Yap Tua, presented a
petition in the CFI Manila, asking that the will
of Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong be admitted to
probate, as the last will and testament of
Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong, deceased.
Tomasa died on August 11, 1909. It appears
that the will was signed by the deceased, as
Page 7 of 31

well as Anselmo Zacarias, Severo Tabora,
and Timoteo Paez.

After hearing of the two witnesses, the judge
ordered that the last will and testament be
allowed and admitted to probate and
appointed Yap Tua as executor of the will.
Yap Ca Kuan and Yap Ca Llu
appeared and presented a petition, alleging
that they were interested in the matters of the
said will and desired to intervene and asked
that a guardian ad litem be appointed to
represent them in the cause. The court
appointed Gabriel La O as guardian ad litem
of said parties. On the 2nd day of March,
1910, the said Gabriel La O appeared in court
and presented a motion in which he alleged,
in substance:
First. That the will dated the 11th day of
August, 1909, and admitted to probate by
order of the court on the 29th day of
September, 1909, was null, for the following
reasons:
(a) Because the same had not been
authorized nor signed by the
witnesses as the law prescribes.
(b) Because at the time of the
execution of the will, the said Tomasa
Elizaga Yap Caong was not then
mentally capacitated to execute the
same, due to her sickness.
(c) Because her signature to the will
had been obtained through fraud and
illegal influence upon the part of
persons who were to receive a benefit
from the same, and because the said
Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong had no
intention of executing the same.
Second. That before the execution of the said
will, which they alleged to be null, the said
Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong had executed
another will, with all the formalities required by
law, upon the 6th day of August, 1909.
Third. That the said Yap Ca Kuan and Yap Ca
Llu were minors and that, even though they
had been negligent in presenting their
opposition to the legalization of the will, said
negligence was excusable, on account of their
age. Said minors in their petition for a new
trial, attached to said petition the alleged will
of August 6, 1909, of the said Tomasa Elizaga
Yap Caong, and the affidavits of Severo
Tabora, Clotilde and Cornelia Serrano.

It has also been alleged that Tomasa
signed only her first name in the second will
and another person wrote her last name in the
will.

Issue:

Whether or not the second will is valid.

Held:

Yes. Issue on whether or not Tomasa
Elizaga Yap Caong executed the will of
August 6, 1909 (Exhibit 1), was not the
question presented to the court. The question
presented was whether or not she had duly
executed the will of August 11, 1909 (Exhibit
A). There appears to be but little doubt that
Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong did execute the
will of August 6, 1909. Several witnesses
testified to that fact. The mere fact, however,
that she executed a former will is no proof that
she did not execute a later will. She had a
perfect right, by will, to dispose of her
property, in accordance with the provisions of
law, up to the very last of moment her life. She
had a perfect right to change, alter, modify or
revoke any and all of her former wills and to
make a new one. Neither will the fact that the
new will fails to expressly revoke all former
wills, in any way sustain the charge that she
did not make the new will.

In said third assignment of error there
is involved in the statement that "The
signature of Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong, in
her first will (Exhibit 1) was not identical with
that which appears in her second will (Exhibit
A)" the inference that she had not signed the
second will and all the argument of the
appellants relating to said third assignment of
error is based upon the alleged fact that
Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong did not sign
Exhibit A. Several witnesses testified that they
saw her write the name "Tomasa." One of the
witnesses testified that she had written her full
name. The court is of the opinion, and we
think the law sustains our conclusion, that if
Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong signed any
portion of her name to the will, with the
intention to sign the same, that the will
amounts to a signature. It has been held time
Page 8 of 31

and time again that one who makes a will may
sign the same by using a mark, the name
having been written by others. If writing a
mark simply upon a will is sufficient indication
of the intention of the person to make and
execute a will, then certainly the writing of a
portion or all of her name ought to be
accepted as a clear indication of her intention
to execute the will.

The man who cannot write and who is
obliged to make his mark simply therefor,
upon the will, is held to "sign" as effectually as
if he had written his initials or his full name. It
would seem to be sufficient, under the law
requiring a signature by the person making a
will, to make his mark, to place his initials or
all or any part of his name thereon(known as
Knoxs appeal from a US Case). In the
present case we think the proof shows, by a
large preponderance, that Tomasa Elizaga
Yap Caong, if she did not sign her full name,
did at least sign her given name "Tomasa,"
and that is sufficient to satisfy the statute.

During the trial of the cause the
protestants made a strong effort to show that
Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong did not sign her
name in the presence of the witnesses and
that they did not sign their names in their
presence nor in the presence of each other.
Upon that question there is considerable
conflict of proof. An effort was made to show
that the will was signed by the witnesses in
one room and by Tomasa in another. A plan
of the room or rooms in which the will was
signed was presented as proof and it was
shown that there was but one room; that one
part of the room was one or two steps below
the floor of the other; that the table on which
the witnesses signed the will was located
upon the lower floor of the room. It was also
shown that from the bed in which Tomasa was
lying, it was possible for her to see the table
on which the witnesses signed the will. While
the rule is absolute that one who makes a will
must sign the same in the presence of the
witnesses and that the witnesses must sign in
the presence of each other, as well as in the
presence of the one making the will, yet,
nevertheless, the actual seeing of the
signatures made is not necessary. It is
sufficient if the signatures are made where it is
possible for each of the necessary parties, if
they desire to see, may see the signatures
placed upon the will.



Case No. 6
Case Title: AVERA v GARCIA
GR No. 15566
September 14, 1921
Justice Street


Doctrine:

1. When the petition fo probate of a will is
contested the proponent should introduce all
three of the attesting witnesses, if alive and
within reach of the process of the court; and
the execution of the will cannot be considered
sufficiently proved by the testimony of only
one, without satisfactory explanation of the
failure to produce the other two.

2. A will otherwise properly executed in
accordance with the requirements of existing
law is not rendered invalid by the fact that the
marginal signatures of the testator and
attesting witnesses appear in the right margin
instead of the left.

Facts:

Eutiquia Avera instituted for the
probate of the will of Esteban Garcia and
contest was made by Marino Garcia and Juan
Rodriguez as guardian for the minors Jose
Garcia and Cesar Garcia. Upon the date
appointed for the hearing, the proponent of
the will introduced one of the three attesting
witnesses who testified that the will was
executed with all the necessary external
formalities, and that the testator was at the
time in full possession of disposing faculties.
Two of the attesting witnesses were not
introduced, nor was their absence accounted
for by the proponent of the will.

The attorney for the opposition introduced a
single witness whose testimony tended to
show that at the time the will was made the
testator was so debilitated as to be unable to
comprehend what it was about.
Page 9 of 31


Trial judge found the testator to be of sound
mind and that the will was properly executed.
It admitted the will to probate. Appeal was
taken.

Issues:

1. Whether a will can be admitted to probate,
where opposition is made, upon the proof of a
single attesting witness, without producing or
accounting for the absence of the other two;

2. Whether the will in question is rendered
invalid by reason of the fact that the signature
of the testator and of the three attesting
witnesses are written on the right margin of
each page of the will instead of the left
margin.

Held:

1. It is undoubtedly true that an uncontested
will may be proved by the testimony of only
one of the three attesting witnesses,
nevertheless in Cabang vs. Delfinado, this
court declared after an elaborate examination
of the American and English authorities that
when a contest is instituted, all of the attesting
witnesses must be examined, if alive and
within reach of the process of the court.

In the present case, no explanation was made
at the trial as to why all three of the attesting
witnesses were not produced.

(Probable reason is the that, although the
petition for probate was pending from
December 21, 1917, until the date set for
hearing, which was April 5, 1919, no formal
contest was enetered until the very day set for
the hearing; and it's probable that the attorney
for the proponent, believing in good faith that
probate would not be contested, repaired to
the court with only one witness, and upon
finding that the will was contested,
incautiously permitted the case to go to proof
without asking for a postponement of the trial
in order that he might produce all the attesting
witnesses. This does notnof itself supply any
basis for changing the rule. ---- Not really
important. Baka bigla lang nya tanungin bakit
di pinakita ibang witnesses.)

However, this point was not raised by the
appellant in the lower court either upon the
submission of the cause for determination in
that court or upon the occasion of the filing of
the motion for a new trial. This question
cannot now be raised for the first time in this
court.

2. No. It is true that the statute says that the
testator and the instrumental witnesses shall
sign their names on the left margin of each
and every page; and it is undeniable that the
general doctrine is to the effect that all the
statutory requirements as to the execution of
wills must be fully complied with. Still some
details at times creep into legislative
enactments which are so trivial it would be
absurd to suppose that the legislature could
have attached any decisive importance to
them.

The instrument now before us contains the
necessary signatures on every page, and the
only point of deviation from the requirement of
the statute is that these signatures appear in
the right margin instead of the left. By the
mode of signing adopted every page and
provision of the will is authenticated and
guarded from possible alteration in exactly the
same degree that it would have been
protected by being signed in the left margin;
and the resources of casuistry could be
exhausted without discovering the slightest
difference between the consequences of
affixing the signatures in one margin or the
other.

In the case before us, where ingenuity could
not suggest any possible prejudice to any
person, as attendant upon the actual deviation
from the letter of the law, such deviation must
be considered too trivial to invalidate the
instrument.

Judgment appealed from affirmed.


Case No. 7
Case Title: NAYVE v MOJAL
GR No. L-21755
December 29, 1924
Justice Romualdez
Page 10 of 31



Facts:

A proceeding for the probate of the will
of the deceased Antonio Mojal instituted by
his surviving spouse, Filomena Nayve was
opposed by Leona Mojal and Luciana Aguilar,
sister and neice, respectively, of the
deceased. Mojal and Aguilar alleged that such
will is not valid because of the follwing
defects: (a) That it is not signed by the testator
and the witnesses on each and every page on
the left margin; (b) that the sheets of the
document was not paged with letters; (c) that
the attestation clause does not state the
number of sheets or pages actually used of
the will and (d) that the testator does not
appear to have signed all the sheets in the
presence of the three witnesses, and the latter
to have attested and signed all the sheets in
the presence of the testator and of each other.

Issue:

Whether or not such will is valid
despite the upper mentioned defects.

Held:

Yes, such will is valid despite the
mentioned defects.

(a) In the case at bar, the testator
signed on the third page of the will not on the
left margin, as it was by the witnesses, but
about the middle of the page and the end of
the will; and that the fourth page was signed
by witnesses, not on the left margin, as it was
by the testator, but about the middle of the
page and at the end of the attestsion clause.

Applying the doctrine of the Avera v.
Garcia and Rodriguez case whereoin the will
in question was signed by the testator and the
witnesses, not on the left but right margin, the
Court held that as each and every page used
of the will bears the signatures of the testator
and the witnesses, the fact that said
signatures do not appear on the left margin of
each page does not detract from the validity of
the will.

(b) Citing the case of Unson v. Abella
with regard to the matter that the sheets of the
document are not paged with letters, the Court
held that paging with Arabic numerals and not
with letters is within the spirit of the law and is
just as valid as paging with letters.

(c) As to the propositon that the
attestation clause does not state the number
of sheets or pages of the will, it must be noted
that the last paragraph of the will states that
such is composed of four pages. No proof of
aliunde is necessary of the number of the
sheets of the will. There can be no doubt that
it complies with the intention of the law that
the number of sheets of which the will is
composed be shown by thw document itself,
to prevent the number of sheets of the will
from being unduly increased or decreased.

(d) With regard to the fourth defect
that was pointed out by Mojal and Aguilar, it
must be noted that in the attestation clause
that the testator signed the will in the
presence of each of the witnesses and the
latter signed in the presence of each other
and of the testator. So that, as to whether the
testator and the attesting witnesses saw each
other sign the will, such a requirement was
clearly sufficiently complied with.

The act of the testator and witnesses
seeing reciprocally the signing of the will is
one which cannot be proven by the mere
exhibition of the will unless exhibition of the
will unless it is stated in the document. This
fact is expressly stated in the attestation
clause before us. Thus, the fact that the
testator and the witnesses signed each and
every page of the will is proven by the mere
examination of the sinatures in the will, the
omission to expressly state such evident fact
does not invalidate the will not prevent its
probate.



Case No. 8
Case Title: TESTATE ESTATE OF PILAPIL
v CA
GR No. L-47931
June 27, 1941
Justice Diaz
Page 11 of 31


[Note: Sorry ito na talaga best na magagawa
ko. The original text is in pure Spanish and
yung only translation niya online, super
magulo and di magkakaconnect. Read the
Ruling part cos dun mo siya fully maiintindihan
talaga]


Doctrine:

The purpose of the law to establish the
formalities required authenticity is undoubtedly
ensure and guarantee their authenticity
against bad faith and fraud, to prevent those
who have no right of succession to the
testator, and win-win will happen with the
legalization of same. It has fulfilled that
purpose in the event that there has been talk
that, in the same body of the will and in the
same page where it appears the attestation
clause, or one third, it expresses the will
consists of three pages and because each
one of the first two takes in hand the note in
letters, and in part and second pages of it.
These facts clearly excludes all fear,
suspicion, or any hint of doubt has been
replaced some of its pages to another.


Facts:

P. Eleuterio Pilapil, being parish priest
of Mualboal of Cebu Province, died in
December 6, 1935. No product will having
been presented after his death, at least until
early February 1939, his brother Calixto Pilapil
promoted the 6th of said month and year, the
case of intestacy No. 399 to request
fuesenombrado property manager of the relict.
Simeona Pilapil appealed and the Court
granted it, naming him administrator
thereupon said Intestate. Within a few days, or
the March 4, 1939, the appellee in turn
promoted file No. 407, which was previously
made mention, to request the legalization as a
testament of the late P. Eleuterio Pilapil, of
Exhibit A is the duplicate to the coal of Exhibit
C. The attestation clause is as follows:

at the end of the same (exhibits A and
C), there witnessing this clause:

When shall read:

We who sign below, we state: That the
pre-insert Testament and Last Will,
has been subscribed and sworn
declared by the Testator, Rev. P.
Eleuterio Pilapil in the presence of us
all of the testator and pray, each of us
signed in the presence of us, here in
Cebu, Cebu, IF, today November 27,
1935.

(Signed) WENCESLAO Pilapil
Witness

MARCELO Pilapil
Witness

EUGENE K. Pilapil
Witness

The two documents, exhibits A and C, consist
of three pages, and in the left margin of each
of the first two, are the firms that are at the
end of the main body of these documents and
their attestation clause and that are, according
to the evidence, signatures of the late P.
Eleuterio Pilapil, and witnesses Wenceslao
Pilapil, Marcelo Pilapil and Eugene K. Pilapil.

APPELANTS CONTENTION:
(A) They contain erasures and alterations that
the respondent leave to explain;
(B) has not been proved that the deceased, -
prescindimiento of what is on the documents
in exhibits A and C -, was competent to test
old;

(C) has not been proved that the deceased
owned the Spanish which is the language in
which those documents are written;

(D) In one of the clauses of these documents
are the ban on the airing in slab Courts;

(E) None of the two has been prepared,
signed and witnessed in accordance with the
provisions of Article 618 of the Code of Civil
Procedure.

Held:

Page 12 of 31

Scratches and changes are noticed in
exhibits A and C are some facts which now for
the first time, and in this instance, is not to be
given attention, when it should have been
done while the matter was still in court of their
origin. We can not take them into account in
the present stage of the proceedings because,
assuming that already existed then, can and
should be, but did not say in express terms
the Court of Cebu, which I consider not vitiate
such documents, it is rebuttable presumption
that "all the facts relating to the issues
discussed at trial were exposed to and
appreciated by the court." Being based on
these facts the court that were tested in court,
declare as follows: "The intervention of the
three instrumental witnesses of the document
took place in a haphazard manner, on the
occasion in which the same were to visit
Eleuterio Pilapil who was ill in the Southern
Islands Hospital, and there the now deceased
begged them to act as witnesses of the
document already had then prepared. "

In preparing the will, being in
Mualboal, was no more than natural that
expressed in it that there were prepared, and
leave the date blank but still put the name of
the month that were put into clean, ie October
1935.

The age of the testator as to whether
he spoke Spanish which is the language of
the two exhibits are drawn or not be said that
being a priest and parish priest of Mualboal,
Cebu, must be presumed that had the old
fundademente competent to make a will, and
that he understood the Spanish spoken and
therefore it is common knowledge that to be a
parish priest of one must be a priest, and to
be, it takes many years of study in seminars
where Spanish is spoken is as official
language like English. Moreover, no evidence
has been proven that the testator did not
understand that language.

And insofar as the exhibits A and C
can not be legalized because not prepared
and signed in accordance with the law, saying
that their pages are not numbered with letters,
and because in its attestation clause is not
expressed that they were signed by the three
attesting witnesses in the presence of the
testator, suffice to call attention to the fact that
the bottom of the first page is in the note letter
clearly says, "Go to 2. page" and the fact
that the foot of the second page, there is this
other note: "Pass through 3. page" and also
call attention enough to the first two lines of
the third page is the last, where, to complete
the arrangement that is contained in the last
paragraph of the previous page, or second, it
states:

. . . consists of two items; CONTAINS sixteen
provisions and is written three pages,

which agrees closely with the true facts as
they appear in the aforementioned two
exhibits, because they contain actually two
articles and sixteen provisions, not more, not
less.

In the attestation clause and another copy on
a subject matter Testament, is claimed by the
three instrumental witnesses who signed it,
which
has been subscribed and sworn declared by
the testator, Rev. P. Eleuterio Pilapil in the
presence of us all;

and followed, also stated by the same
witnesses that:
to beg of the testator, signed each of us, here
in Cebu, Cebu, today November 27, 1935.

The phrase "to beg of the testator" that
attached to the signed and signed his will in
the presence of the attesting witnesses,
permits and justifies the inference that the
testator was present when the last stamped
their signatures there.

The wording of the attestation clause in this
will not technically free repairs, but is
substantially a law enforcement.

We maintain the view that should be required
strict compliance with the substantive
requirements of the will, to ensure its
authenticity, but at the same time we would
not be taken into account defects that do not
affect this purpose and the other part , to be
taken into account, could thwart the will of the
testator. (Rodriguez against Yap, supra.)

Page 13 of 31

It should not be allowed to hinder legal
formalities using common sense in the
consideration of wills and to frustrate the
wishes of the deceased solemnly expressed
in their wills, as to the granting of which there
is not even a shadow of bad faith or fraud.

For these reasons, finding according to law
the appealed decision of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu, hereby, confirm it,
condemned to the appellants to pay the costs.
So ordered.


Case No. 9
Case Title: TESTATE ESTATE OF ABADA v
ABAJA
GR No. 14715
Justice Carpio


FACTS:

Abada died in 1940 while his widow
died in 1943, leaving no legitimate children. In
September 1968, Abaja filed with the CFI-
Kabankalan, Negros Occidental (later became
RTC) a petition for probate of the last will and
testament of Abada, which allegedly named
as heirs his natural children, Eulogio Abaja
(father of respondent Abaja) and Rosario
Cordova. Nicanor Caponong (Caponong)
opposed the petition on the ground that
Abada left no will when he died in
1940. Caponong further alleged that the will,
if Abada really executed it, should be
disallowed for the following reasons: (1) it
was not executed and attested as required by
law; (2) it was not intended as the last will of
the testator; and (3) it was procured by undue
and improper pressure and influence on the
part of the beneficiaries. Citing the same
grounds invoked by Caponong, the alleged
intestate heirs of Abada, his nephews, nieces
and grandchildren, opposed the petition too.

Consequently, the RTC admitted to
probate the will. The RTC-Kabankalan ruled
on the only issue raised by the oppositors in
their motions to dismiss the petition for
probate, that is, whether the will of Abada has
an attestation clause as required by law. The
RTC-Kabankalan further held that the failure
of the oppositors to raise any other matter
forecloses all other issues.

ISSUE:

W/N the will can be admitted to
probate.

CLAIM/S OF PLAINTIFF:
The will is not notarized and therefore, invalid.
The will is written in Spanish but testator did
not know of such language.
The will is not signed by three witnesses.
The attestation clause does not expressly
state the circumstances that the
witnesses witnessed and signed the will and
all its pages in the presence of the testator
and of each other.

DEFENSE OF RESPONDENT:
(See answers made by the Supreme Court in
the Ruling.)

HELD:

The RTC and CA did not err in
admitting to probate the will. Abada executed
his will on June 4, 1932. The laws in force at
that time are the Civil Code of 1889 or the Old
Civil Code, and Act No. 190 or the Code of
Civil Procedure which governed the execution
of wills before the enactment of the New Civil
Code.
The matter in dispute in the present
case is the attestation clause in the will of
Abada. Section 618 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2645,

governs the form of the attestation clause of
Abadas will. Under Section 618 of the Code
of Civil Procedure, the requisites of a will are
the following:
(1) The will must be written in the
language or dialect known by
the testator;
(2) The will must be signed by the
testator, or by the testators
name written by some other
person in his presence, and by
his express direction;
(3) The will must be attested and
subscribed by three or more
credible witnesses in the
Page 14 of 31

presence of the testator and of
each other;
(4) The testator or the person
requested by him to write his
name and the instrumental
witnesses of the will must sign
each and every page of the will
on the left margin;
(5) The pages of the will must be
numbered correlatively in letters
placed on the upper part of
each sheet;
(6) The attestation shall state the
number of sheets or pages
used, upon which the will is
written, and the fact that the
testator signed the will and
every page of the will, or
caused some other person to
write his name, under his
express direction, in the
presence of three witnesses,
and the witnesses witnessed
and signed the will and all
pages of the will in the
presence of the testator and of
each other.

Under the Code of Civil Procedure, the
intervention of a notary is not necessary in the
execution of any will. Therefore, Abadas will
does not require acknowledgment before a
notary public.

Caponong-Noble points out that
nowhere in the will can one discern that
Abada knew the Spanish language. She
alleges that such defect is fatal and must
result in the disallowance of the will. However,
Alipio testified that Abada used to gather
Spanish-speaking people in their place. In
these gatherings, Abada and his companions
would talk in the Spanish language. This
sufficiently proves that Abada speaks the
Spanish language.

A problem in the attestation clause
contested by Caponong-Noble is that nowhere
can it be gleaned that it was signed by three
witnesses. On this point, the Court agrees
with the appellate court in applying the rule on
substantial compliance in determining the
number of witnesses. While the attestation
clause does not state the number of
witnesses, a close inspection of the will shows
that three witnesses signed it. We rule to
apply the liberal construction in the probate of
Abadas will. Abadas will clearly shows four
signatures: that of Abada and of three other
persons. It is reasonable to conclude that
there are three witnesses to the will.

Finally, Caponong-Noble alleges that
the attestation clause does not expressly state
the circumstances that the
witnesses witnessed and signed the will and
all its pages in the presence of the testator
and of each other. This Court has ruled:
Precision of language in the drafting of an
attestation clause is desirable. However, it is
not imperative that a parrot-like copy of the
words of the statute be made. It is sufficient if
from the language employed it can reasonably
be deduced that the attestation clause fulfills
what the law expects of it.
The last part of the attestation clause
states in English, in its witness, every one of
us also signed in our presence and of the
testator. This clearly shows that the attesting
witnesses witnessed the signing of the will of
the testator, and that each witness signed the
will in the presence of one another and of the
testator.


Case No. 10
Case Title: CANEDA v CA
GR No. 103554
May 28, 1993
Justice Regalado


Doctrine:

Court Main Doctrine: "It may thus be stated
that the rule, as it now stands, is that
omissions which can be supplied by an
examination of the will itself, without the need
of resorting to extrinsic evidence, will not be
fatal and, correspondingly, would not obstruct
the allowance to probate of the will being
assailed. However, those omissions which
cannot be supplied except by
evidence aliunde would result in the
invalidation of the attestation clause and
ultimately, of the will itself."
Page 15 of 31


Main Doctrine: The non-inclusion in the
attestation that the will has been signed by the
witness/es in the presence of the testator
invalidates the will.
Article 805 essential requisites:
(absence of one = invalid)
1) number of the pages
2) signature of the testator on every
page, in the presence of the attesting
witnesses.
3) signature of the witness on every
page, in the presence of the testator
and of one another

Rationale of the parts of the formalities:
(Attested Will)
1) Page Number
- safeguard against possible
interpolation or omission of one or
some of its pages and to prevent any
increase or decrease in the pages
2) Signature of Testator and Witness
- purpose of authentication and
identification and indicates that the will
is the very same instrument

Sub Doctrine (because extracted from another
case) : Substantial compliance under article
805 is only limited to those omissions or lack
which can be cured or inferred based on the
will and not those which require an extrinsic
evidence (basta pag ang something cannot be
inferred from the will it is not substantial
compliance. example non-inclusion in the
attestation that the will has been signed by the
witness in the presence of the testator, which
is not also stated in the attestation part of the
will, impossible to confirm na it was signed in
the presence of the testator kasi patay na
siya, you cannot infer such from the will
because it was not stated in the attestation
part)

Difference of an Attestation and
Subscription, Attestation means the act of
senses which can be usually confer to a
mental act, while subscription is the
mechanical act of signing. to simplify
attestation is this, knowing and certifying that
the will is published in accordance with the
law (signed, attested, etc) and subscribing is
signing in each page.

Two kinds of Will:

1) Ordinary or Attested Will
(Goverened by article 804 - 809)
2) Holographic Will (article 810)
Common Requirement : 1)writing 2)
written in a language known to the testator
(XPN: attestation part in ordinary will (Ratio:
not part of testamentary disposition))

Facts:

December 5, 1978, Mateo Caballero is
a widow and has no children and is in his
twilight years, made a last will and testament
in Cebu with three witnesses (Cipriano
Labuca, Gregorio Cabando and Flaviano
Toregosa) and is assisted by his lawyer, Atty.
Lumontad and with a notary public Atty.
Manigos. The Following are the Devicees and
Legatees who have no relation with the
testator:
Presentacion Gaviola,
Angel Abatayo,
Rogelio Abatayo,
Isabelito Abatayo,
Benoni G. Cabrera and
Marcosa Alcantara

And with the attestation clause as
follows:

"We, the undersigned attesting
Witnesses, whose Residences and postal
addresses appear on the Opposite of our
respective names, we do hereby certify that
the Testament was read by him and the
testator, MATEO CABALLERO; has published
unto us the foregoing Will consisting of
THREE PAGES, including the
Acknowledgment, each page numbered
correlatively in the letters on the upper part of
each page, as his Last Will and Testament
and he has the same and every page thereof,
on the spaces provided for his signature and
on the left hand margin, in the presence of the
said testator and in the presence of each and
all of us."
April 4, 1979, Mateo personally filed a
petition for probate of his last and will and
testament, after a year (May 29, 1980) Mateo
Page 16 of 31

died even before his will is heard by the
probate court.

Benoni Cabrera was appointed as the
administrator of Mateo's estate, after which
the herein petitioner appears and claims to be
nephews and nieces of the testator who
instituted a petition ""In the Matter of the
Intestate Estate of Mateo Caballero". Benoni
Cabrera died and was substituted by the
respondent William Cabrera.

Petitioners now sought to invalidate
the last will and testament of Mateo

Issue and Held:

Claims of the Plantiff (winner)
1) The testator was already in the poor
state of health such that he could not have
possibly executed the same and also
questions the genuiness of the signature of
the Testator

It is self-serving, strangers cannot
beat the testimony of the two attesting
witnesses and notary public in contending that
Mateo was in good health and is of sound
mind at the time of making of the will,
furthermore it was Mateo himself who
personally filed his last will and testament
before the probate court which clearly shows
the fact that Mateo was in good health and of
sound mind at the time of the making of the
will (considering only the petitioners contends
such fact and no other evidences were
presented in this case)
Main -> 2) That the will failed to comply with
the legal formalities which is a fatal defect
which is the non compliance with the required
attestation which article 805 provides that it
must be attested and subscribed by three or
more credible witnesses in the presence of
the testator and of one another.

The court Agrees with the petitioner
because what is fairly apparent upon a careful
reading of the attestation clause herein
assailed is the fact that while it recites that the
testator indeed signed the will and all its
pages in the presence of the three attesting
witnesses and states as well the number of
pages that were used, the same does not
expressly state therein the circumstance that
said witnesses subscribed their respective
signatures to the will in the presence of the
testator and of each other, because if you
carefully read the attestation clause what was
only depicted signing and being witnessed to
sign is the testator himself only and there are
no indication in any part of the will or
attestation clause which can be inferred that
the witnesses have signed the last will and
testament in the presence of the testator and
of each other.

Defense of Respondent
1) Atty. Manigos and Cipriano testified
that Mateo was in good health and is of sound
mind at the time of the making of the last will
and testament.
CA & RTC -> 2) There is substantial
compliance with article 805 in relation to
article 809
No, there is no substantial
compliance, the execution of a will is
supposed to be one act so that where the
testator and the witnesses sign on various
days or occasions and in various
combinations, the will cannot be stamped with
the imprimatur of effectivity.

Under Article 809, the defects and
imperfections must only be with respect to the
form of the attestation or the language
employed therein if it can be proven that it
substantially comply with article 805 provided
further that the evidence or proof of such can
be deduced from the will ALONE and
WITHOUT resorting to evidence aliunde
whether it be written or oral.

What happened in this is case is a
total absence of one requisite of article 805
which invalidates the will

Trivial Matters:
An attestation clause refers to that
part of an ordinary will whereby the attesting
witnesses certify that the instrument has been
executed before them and to the manner of
the execution the same. It is a separate
memorandum or record of the facts
surrounding the conduct of execution and
once signed by the witnesses, it gives
affirmation to the fact that compliance with the
Page 17 of 31

essential formalities required by law has been
observed. It is made for the purpose of
preserving in a permanent form a record of
the facts that attended the execution of a
particular will, so that in case of failure of the
memory of the attesting witnesses, or other
casualty, such facts may still be proved.
Conflicting Rulings of the supreme court with
respect to substantial compliance in
attestation:

Nayve vs. Mojal and Aguilar
Main contention : omission of statement in
clause will not invalidate if signed kasi nga
kitang kita naman na pinirmahan na therefore
you can say that they did so what the law
required substantially

Attestation clause must estate the fact that the
testator and the witnesses reciprocally saw
the signing of the will, for such an act cannot
be proved by the mere exhibition of the will, if
it is not stated therein.

The fact that the testator and the witnesses
signed each and every page of the will can be
proved also by the mere examination of the
signatures appearing on the document itself,
and the omission to state such evident facts
does not invalidate the will.

Sano vs. Quintana (Court Prefers this case
kasi mas recent siya kesa sa Mojal)
Attestation clause which does not recite that
the witnesses signed the will and each and
every page thereof on the left margin in the
presence of the testator is defective.

Legal Basis of court in this ruling (ata)

Gumban vs. Gorecho
The attestation clause had failed to state that
the witnesses signed the will and each and
every page thereof on the left margin in the
presence of the testator. The will in question
was disallowed. which affirmed the Sano vs
Quintana and modify the Nayve vs Mojal.


Case No. 11
Case Title: CODOY v CALUGAY
GR No. L-123486
August 12, 1999
Justice Pardo


Doctrine:

Article 811, par. 1 provides: In the probate of
a holographic will, it shall be necessary that at
least one witness who knows the handwriting
and signature of the testator explicitly declare
that the will and the signature are in the
handwriting of the testator. If the will is
contested, at least three of such witnesses
shall be required.

The word shall connotes a mandatory
order, an imperative obligation and is
inconsistent with the idea of discretion and
that the presumption is that the word shall,
when used in a statute, is mandatory.

Facts:

On April 6, 1990, Evangeline Calugay,
Josephine Salcedo and Eufemia Patigas,
devisees and legatees of the holographic will
of the deceased Matilde Seo Vda. de
Ramonal, filed a petition for probate of the
holographic will of the deceased, who died on
January 16, 1990. Eugenia Ramonal Codoy
and Manuel Ramonal filed an opposition to
the petition for probate, alleging that the
holographic will was a forgery and that the
same is even illegible. Petitioners filed a
demurrer to evidence and the lower court
granted the same. It was reversed on appeal
with the Court of Appeals which granted the
probate.

The following are the witnesses
presented to prove the authenticity of the will:

Augusto Neri, Clerk of Court, where the
special proceedings for the probate of the
holographic will of the deceased was filed. He
presented documents that bear the signature
of the deceased.

Generosa Senon, election registrar, was
presented to produce and identify the voters
affidavit of the decedent. However, the voters
affidavit was not produced for the same was
already destroyed and no longer available.

Page 18 of 31

Matilde Ramonal Binanay, testified that
the deceased lived with her in her parents
house for 11 years. During those years with
the deceased, she acquired familiarity with her
signature and handwriting as she used to
accompany her in collecting rentals from her
various tenants of commercial buildings.

Matilde Ramonal Binanay testified that
at the time of the death of decedent, she left a
holographic will which was personally and
entirely written, dated and signed, by the
deceased.

Fiscal Rodolfo Waga testified that he
handled all the pleadings and documents
signed by the deceased, as a result of which
he is familiar with the handwriting of the
latter. He testified that the signature was
similar to that of the deceased, but he can not
be sure.

Mrs. Teresita Vedad, an employee of
the DENR. She testified that she processed
the application of the deceased for pasture
permit and was familiar with the signature of
the deceased.

Evangeline Calugay, one of the
respondents, testified that she had lived with
the deceased since birth, and was in fact
adopted by the latter. That after a long period
of time she became familiar with the signature
of the deceased.

From the testimonies of these
witnesses, the Court of Appeals allowed the
will to probate and disregard the requirement
of three witnesses in case of contested
holographic will, citing the decision in Azaola
vs. Singson, ruling that the requirement is
merely directory and not mandatory. Hence,
this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the provisions of Article 811 of
the Civil Code are permissive or mandatory.

CLAIM/S OF PLAINTIFF:
Petitioners argued that the repeated
dates appearing on the will after every
disposition is out of the ordinary. If the
deceased was the one who executed the will,
and was not forced, the dates and the
signature should appear at the bottom after
the dispositions, as regularly done.

DEFENSE OF RESPONDENT:
Respondents claimed that the deceased
Matilde Seo Vda. de Ramonal, was of sound
and disposing mind when she executed the
will on August 30, 1978, that there was no
fraud, undue influence, and duress employed
in the person of the testator, and the will was
written voluntarily.

Held:

Article 811 of the Civil Code is
mandatory. The word shall connotes a
mandatory order. We have ruled that shall
in a statute commonly denotes an imperative
obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of
discretion and that the presumption is that the
word shall, when used in a statute is
mandatory.

The article provides, as a
requirement for the probate of a contested
holographic will, that at least three
witnesses explicitly declare that the
signature in the will is the genuine
signature of the testator.

In the case at bar, the goal to achieve is
to give effect to the wishes and to determine
the true intent of the deceased. Not all the
witnesses presented by the respondents
testified explicitly that they were familiar with
the handwriting of the testator.

A visual examination of the holographic
will convince us that the strokes are different
when compared with other documents written
by the testator. We, therefore, cannot be
certain that the holographic will was in the
handwriting by the deceased. The records are
ordered remanded to the court of origin with
instructions to allow petitioners to adduce
evidence in support of their opposition to the
probate of the holographic will.

Case No. 12
Case Title: AJERO v CA
GR No. 106720
September 15, 1994
Page 19 of 31

Justice Puno


Facts:

On January 20, 1983, petitioners instituted for
allowance of decedent's (Annie sand) holographic
will. They alleged that at the time of its
execution, she was of sound and disposing
mind, not acting under duress, fraud or undue
influence, and was in every respect capacitated to
dispose of her estate by will. This was opposed by
private respondent, Clemente Sand, on the
grounds that: neither the testament's body nor
the signature therein was indecedent's
handwriting; it contained alterations and
corrections which were not duly signed by
decedent; and, the will was procured by petitioners
through improper pressure and undue influence. The
petition was likewise opposed by Dr. Jose Ajero.
He contested the disposition in the will of a
house and lot located in Cabadbaran, Agusan
Del Norte. He claimed that said property could
not be conveyed by decedent in its entirety, as
she was not its sole owner. The trial court having
found that the holographic will in question was
written entirely, dated and signed in the
handwriting of the testatrix with three (3)
witnesses to have explicitly and categorically
identified the handwriting with which the
holographic will in question was written to be
the genuine handwriting and signature of the
testatrix admitted the probate, however on
appeal with CA this was reversed and the
petition for probate was dismissed on the ground that it
fails to meet the requirements for its validity by not
complying articles 813 and 814 of the NCC which
read, as follows: Art. 813: When a number of
dispositions appearing in a holographic will are signed
without being dated, and the last disposition has a
signature and date, such date validates the
dispositions preceding it, whatever be the time of prior
dispositions. Art. 814: In case of insertion,
cancellation, erasure or alteration in a
holographic will, the testator must authenticate
the same by his full signature. It alluded to certain
dispositions in the will which were either unsigned and
undated, or signed but not dated. It also found that the
erasures, alterations and cancellations made thereon
had not been authenticated by decedent.

Issue:

Whether or not the CA was correct in
disallowing the probate of the will based on the
provisions of Articles 813 and 814?

Held:

The Court ruled that the decision of
the Appellate court is erroneous.
In the case of holographic wills, what assures
authenticity is the requirement that they be
totally autographic or handwritten by the
testator himself,
7
as provided under Article
810 of the New Civil Code, thus:
A person may execute a
holographic will which must be
entirely written, dated, and
signed by the hand of the
testator himself. It is subject to
no other form, and may be
made in or out of the
Philippines, and need not be
witnessed. (Emphasis
supplied.)

Failure to strictly observe other
formalities will not result in the disallowance of
a holographic will that is unquestionably
handwritten by the testator.
A reading of Article 813 of the New Civil Code
shows that its requirement affects the validity
of the dispositions contained in the
holographic will, but not its probate. If the
testator fails to sign and date some of the
dispositions, the result is that these
dispositions cannot be effectuated. Such
failure, however, does not render the whole
testament void.

Likewise, a holographic will can still be
admitted to probate, notwithstanding non-
compliance with the provisions of Article 814.

Thus, unless the unauthenticated
alterations, cancellations or insertions were
made on the date of the holographic will or on
testator's signature, their presence does not
invalidate the will itself. The lack of
authentication will only result in disallowance
of such changes.

It is also proper to note that the
requirements of authentication of changes and
signing and dating of dispositions appear in
Page 20 of 31

provisions (Articles 813 and 814) separate
from that which provides for the necessary
conditions for the validity of the holographic
will (Article 810). The distinction can be traced
to Articles 678 and 688 of the Spanish Civil
Code, from which the present provisions
covering holographic wills are taken. They
read as follows:

Art. 678: A will is called
holographic when the testator
writes it himself in the form
and with the requisites
required in Article 688.

Art. 688: Holographic wills
may be executed only by
persons of full age.
In order that the will be valid it
must be drawn on stamped
paper corresponding to the
year of its execution, written in
its entirety by the testator and
signed by him, and must
contain a statement of the
year, month and day of its
execution.

If it should contain any erased,
corrected, or interlined words,
the testator must identify them
over his signature.

Foreigners may execute
holographic wills in their own
language.

This separation and distinction adds
support to the interpretation that only the
requirements of Article 810 of the New Civil
Code and not those found in Articles 813
and 814 of the same Code are essential to
the probate of a holographic will.
The Court of Appeals further held that
decedent Annie Sand could not validly
dispose of the house and lot located in
Cabadbaran, Agusan del Norte, in its entirety.
This is correct and must be affirmed.
As a general rule, courts in probate
proceedings are limited to pass only upon the
extrinsic validity of the will sought to be
probated. However, in exceptional instances,
courts are not powerless to do what the
situation constrains them to do, and pass
upon certain provisions of the will.
11
In the
case at bench, decedent herself indubitably
stated in her holographic will that the
Cabadbaran property is in the name of her
late father, John H. Sand (which led oppositor
Dr. Jose Ajero to question her conveyance of
the same in its entirety). Thus, as correctly
held by respondent court, she cannot validly
dispose of the whole property, which she
shares with her father's other heirs.
.


Case No. 13
Case Title: AZAOLA v SINGSON
GR No. L-14003
August 5, 1960
Justice Reyes


Doctrine:

Since the authenticity of the holographic will
was not contested, proponent was not
required to produce more than one witness;
but even if the genuineness of the holographic
will were contested, Article 811 of our present
Civil Code cannot be interpreted as to require
the compulsory presentation of three
witnesses to identify the handwriting of the
testator, under penalty of having the probate
denied. Since no witness may have been
present at the execution of a holographic will,
none being required by law, it becomes
obvious that the existence of witnesses
possessing the requisite qualifications is a
matter beyond the control of the proponent.

Facts:

Fortunata S. Vda. de Yance died
in Quezon City on September 9, 1957. The
petitioner Francisco Azaola, submitted for
probate the holographic will, whereby Maria
Milagros Azaola was made the sole heir as
against the nephew of the deceased Cesario
Singson. Petitioner Francisco Azaola, sole
witness, testified that 1) he saw the
holographic will one month, more or less,
before the death of the testatrix, as the same
was handed to him and his wife; 2) he
recognized all the signatures appearing in the
Page 21 of 31

holographic will as the handwriting of the
testatrix; 3) that the penmanship appearing in
the aforesaid documentary evidence is in the
handwriting of the testatrix as well as the
signatures appearing therein are the
signatures of the testatrix; 4) in answer to a
question of his counsel admitted that the
holographic will was handed to him by the
testatrix, "apparently it must have been written
by her".

The opposition to the probate was on
the ground that (1) the execution of the will
was procured by undue and improper
pressure and influence on the part of the
petitioner and his wife, and (2) that the
testatrix did not seriously intend the
instrument to be her last will, and that the
same was actually written either on the 5th or
6th day of August 1957 and not on November
20, 1956 as appears on the will.

The probate was denied on the
ground that under Article 811 of the Civil
Code, the proponent must present three
witnesses who could declare that the will and
the signature are in the writing of the testatrix,
the probate being contested; and because the
lone witness presented by the proponent "did
not prove sufficiently that the body of the will
was written in the handwriting of the testatrix."

Petitioner appealed that 1) he was not
bound to produce more than one witness
because the will's authenticity was not
questioned; and 2) Article 811 does not
mandatorily require the production of three
witnesses to identify the handwriting and
signature of a holographic will, even if its
authenticity should be denied by the adverse
party.

Issue:

Whether or not Article 811 is
permissive or mandatory.

Held:

SC agreed with the appellant that
since the authenticity of the will was not
contested, he was not required to produce
more than one witness; but even if the
genuineness of the holographic will
were contested, Article 811 of the Civil Code
can not be interpreted as to require the
compulsory presentation of three witnesses to
identify the handwriting of the testator, under
penalty of having the probate denied. Since
no witness may have been present at the
execution of a holographic will, none being
required by law (Art. 810, new Civil Code), it
becomes obvious that the existence of
witnesses possessing the requisite
qualifications is a matter beyond the control of
the proponent. For it is not merely a question
of finding and producing any three witnesses;
they must be witnesses "who know the
handwriting and signature of the testator" and
who can declare (truthfully, of course, even if
the law does not so express) "that the will and
the signature are in the handwriting of the
testator". There may be no available witness
acquainted with the testator's hand; or even if
so familiarized, the witnesses may be
unwilling to give a positive opinion.
Compliance with the rule of paragraph 1 of
Article 811 may thus become an impossibility.

As can be seen, the law foresees the
possibility that no qualified witness may be
found (or what amounts to the same thing,
that no competent witness may be willing to
testify to the authenticity of the will), and
provides for resort to expert evidence to
supply the deficiency.

But it can not be ignored that the
requirement can be considered mandatory
only in the case of ordinary testaments,
precisely because the presence of at least
three witnesses at the execution of ordinary
wills is made by law essential to their validity
(Art. 805). Where the will is holographic, no
witness need be present (Art. 10), and the rule
requiring production of three witnesses must
be deemed merely permissive if absurd
results are to be avoided.

Again, under Article 811, the resort to
expert evidence is conditioned by the words "if
the Court deem it necessary", which reveal
that what the law deems essential is that the
Court should be convinced of the will's
authenticity. Where the prescribed number of
witnesses is produced and the court is
Page 22 of 31

convinced by their testimony that the will is
genuine, it may consider it unnecessary to call
for expert evidence. On the other hand, if no
competent witness is available, or none of
those produced is convincing, the Court may
still, and in fact it should, resort to handwriting
experts. The duty of the court, in fine, is to
exhaust all available lines of inquiry, for the
state is as much interested as the proponent
that the true intention of the testator be carried
into effect.

Our conclusion is that the rule of the
first paragraph of Article 811 of the Civil Code
is merely directory and is not mandatory.

In view of the foregoing, the decision
appealed from is set aside, and the records
ordered remanded to the Court of origin, with
instructions to hold a new trial in conformity
with this opinion.



Case No. 14
Case Title: NAZARENO v CA
GR No. 138842
October 18, 2000
Justice Mendoza


Doctrine:

The estate of a deceased person is a juridical
entity that has a personality of its own.
Judgment in a case binds only he parties
therein and not the estate of a deceased
person which may have been represented at
one time by one of the parties.
There is also an implied trust when a donation
is made to a person but it appears that
although the legal estate is transmitted to the
donee, he nevertheless is either to have no
beneficial interest or only a part thereof.

Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with
other compulsory heirs, must bring into the
mass of the estate any property or right which
he may have received from the decedent,
during the lifetime of the latter, by way of
donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order
that it may be computed in the determination
of the legitime of each heir, and in the account
of the partition.

Facts:
Maximino Nazareno, Sr. and Aurea
Poblete were husband and wife. Aurea died
on April 15, 1970, while Maximino, Sr. died on
December 18, 1980. They had five children,
namely, Natividad, Romeo, Jose, Pacifico,
and Maximino, Jr. Natividad and Maximino, Jr.
are the petitioners in this case, while the
estate of Maximino, Sr., Romeo, and his wife
Eliza Nazareno are the respondents.

During their marriage, Maximino
Nazareno, Sr. and Aurea Poblete acquired
properties in Quezon City and in the Province
of Cavite. It is the ownership of some of these
properties that is in question in this case. After
the death of Maximino, Sr., Romeo filed an
intestate case in the Court of First Instance of
Cavite. In the course of the intestate
proceedings, Romeo discovered that his
parents had executed several deeds of sale
conveying a number of real properties in favor
of his sister, Natividad. One of the deeds
involved six lots in Quezon City which were
allegedly sold by Maximino, Sr., with the
consent of Aurea, to Natividad on January 29,
1970 for the total amount of P47,800.00.

Among the lots covered by the above
Deed of Sale is Lot 3-B which is registered.
This lot had been occupied by Romeo, his
wife Eliza, and by Maximino, Jr. since 1969.
Unknown to Romeo, Natividad sold Lot 3-B on
July 31, 1982 to Maximino, Jr.

When Romeo found out about the sale to
Maximino, Jr., he and his wife
Eliza locked Maximino, Jr. out of the house.
On August 4, 1983, Maximino, Jr. brought an
action for recovery of possession and
damages with prayer for writs of preliminary
injunction and mandatory injunction with the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. On
December 12, 1986, the trial court ruled in
favor of Maximino, Jr. which was affirmed by
the Court of Appeals

On June 15, 1988, Romeo in turn filed,
on behalf of the estate of Maximino, Sr., the
present case for annulment of sale with
Page 23 of 31

damages against Natividad and Maximino,
Jr. The case was filed in the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, where it was docketed
as Civil Case No. 88-58. Romeo sought the
declaration of nullity of the sale made on
January 29, 1970 to Natividad and that made
on July 31, 1982 to Maximino, Jr. on the
ground that both sales were void for lack of
consideration.

On March 1, 1990, Natividad and
Maximino, Jr. filed a third-party complaint
against the spouses Romeo and Eliza. They
alleged that Lot 3, which was included in the
Deed of Absolute Sale of January 29, 1970 to
Natividad, had been surreptitiously
appropriated by Romeo by securing for
himself a new title in his name. They alleged
that Lot 3 is being leased by the spouses
Romeo and Eliza to third persons. They
therefore sought the annulment of the transfer
to Romeo and the cancellation of his title, the
eviction of Romeo and his wife Eliza and all
persons claiming rights from Lot 3, and the
payment of damages.
The issues having been joined, the case
was set for trial. Romeo presented evidence
to show that Maximino and Aurea Nazareno
never intended to sell the six lots to Natividad
and that Natividad was only to hold the said
lots in trust for her siblings. He presented the
Deed of Partition and Distribution dated June
28, 1962 executed by Maximino Sr. and Aurea
and duly signed by all of their children, except
Jose, who was then abroad and was
represented by their mother, Aurea.

Romeo received the title to Lot 25-L
under his name, while Maximino, Jr. received
Lots 6 and 7 through a Deed of Sale dated
August 16, 1966 for the amount
of P9,500.00. Pacifico and Joses shares were
allegedly given to Natividad, who agreed to
give Lots 10 and 11 to Jose, in the event the
latter came back from abroad. Natividads
share, on the other hand, was sold to third
persons because she allegedly did not like the
location of the two lots. But, Romeo said, the
money realized from the sale was given to
Natividad.

Romeo also testified that Lot 3-B was
bought for him by his father, while Lot 3 was
sold to him for P7,000.00 by his parents on
July 4, 1969. However, he admitted that a
document was executed by his parents
transferring six properties in Quezon
City, i.e., Lots 3, 3-B, 10, 11, 13, and 14, to
Natividad.

Romeo further testified that, although the
deeds of sale executed by his parents in their
favor stated that the sale was for a
consideration, they never really paid any
amount for the supposed sale. The transfer
was made in this manner in order to avoid the
payment of inheritance taxes. Romeo denied
stealing Lot 3 from his sister but instead
claimed that the title to said lot was given to
him by Natividad in 1981 after their father
died.

Natividad and Maximino, Jr. claimed that
the Deed of Partition and Distribution
executed in 1962 was not really carried
out. Instead, in December of 1969, their
parents offered to sell to them the six lots in
Quezon City, i.e., Lots 3, 3-B, 10, 11, 13 and
14. However, it was only Natividad who
bought the six properties because she was
the only one financially able to do so.
Natividad said she sold Lots 13 and 14 to
Ros-Alva Marketing Corp. and Lot 3-B to
Maximino, Jr. for P175,000.00. Natividad
admitted that Romeo and the latters wife
were occupying Lot 3-B at that time and that
she did not tell the latter about the sale she
had made to Maximino, Jr.

Natividad said that she had the title to Lot
3 but it somehow got lost. She could not get
an original copy of the said title because the
records of the Registrar of Deeds had been
destroyed by fire. She claimed she was
surprised to learn that Romeo was able to
obtain a title to Lot 3 in his name.

Natividad insisted that she paid the
amount stated in the Deed of Absolute Sale
dated January 29, 1970. She alleged that their
parents had sold these properties to their
children instead of merely giving the same to
them in order to impose on them the value of
hardwork.
Natividad accused Romeo of filing this
case to harass her after Romeo lost in the
Page 24 of 31

action for recovery of possession which had
been brought against him by Maximino, Jr. It
appears that before the case filed by Romeo
could be decided, the Court of Appeals
rendered a decision in affirming the trial
courts decision in favor of Maximino, Jr.

Issue:

Whether or not the subject properties
of the Deeds of Sale are part of the estate of
the deceased.


Held:

The Nazareno spouses transferred
their properties to their children by fictitious
sales in order to avoid the payment of
inheritance taxes. Facts and circumstances
indicate badges of a simulated sale which
make the Jan 29, 1970 sale void and of no
effect. Natividad never acquired ownership
over the property because the Deed of Sale in
her favor is also void for being without
consideration. It cannot be denied that
Maximino, Sr. intended to give the six Quezon
City lots to Natividad. As Romeo testified, their
parents executed the Deed of Sale in favor of
Natividad because the latter was the only
"female and the only unmarried member of
the family." She was thus entrusted with the
real properties in behalf of her siblings. As she
herself admitted, she intended to convey Lots
10 and 11 to Jose in the event the latter
returned from abroad. There was thus an
implied trust constituted in her favor. Art.1449
of the Civil Code states:
There is also an implied trust
when a donation is made to a person
but it appears that although the legal
estate is transmitted to the donee, he
nevertheless is either to have no
beneficial interest or only a part
thereof.

There being an implied trust, the lots in
question are therefore subject to collation in
accordance with Art. 1061 which states:

Every compulsory heir, who
succeeds with other compulsory heirs,
must bring into the mass of the estate
any property or right which he may
have received from the decedent,
during the lifetime of the latter, by way
of donation, or any other gratuitous
title, in order that it may be computed
in the determination of the legitime of
each heir, and in the account of the
partition.


Case No. 15
Case Title: RIVERA v IAC
GR Nos. 75005-06
February 15, 1990
Justice Cruz


Doctrine:

When the authenticity of the will is not being
questioned, there is no necessity of
presenting the three witnesses required under
Art. 811; an opposition made by a mere
stranger did not have legal effect of requiring
the three witnesses.

Facts:

On May 30, 1975, Venancio Rivera, a
prominent and wealthy resident of Mabalacat
Pampanga died. On July 28, 1975, Jose
Rivera, claiming to be the only legitimate
surviving son of the decedent filed a petition
for the issuance of the letters of administration
over the decedents estate docketed SP. no.
1076. Adelaido J. Rivera opposed the petion
filed by Jose and denied that Jose was the
son of the decedent. Adelaido also averred
that the Decedent was his father and that the
latter did not die intestate but in fact left two
holographic wills.

On November 7, 1975, Adelaido
Rivera filed with the regional trial court of
angeles, a petition for the probate of the wills
and was in turn opposed by Jose Rivera. the
two cases were consolidated and late
appointed Adelaido Rivera as special
administrator. after the joint trial, the judge
found that Jose Rivera was not the son of the
decedent but of a different Venancio Rivera
who was married to Maria Vital. the Venancio
Rivera whose estate is in question is married
Page 25 of 31

to Maria Jocson, by whom he had seven
children, including Adelaido. Jose Rivera
therefore had no claim claim to the estate of
the decedent.

the Holographic wills were admitted to
probate. On appeal, the decision of the trial
court was affirmed by the then intermediate
appellate court. Adelaido Rivera offered
Venancio Rivera's baptismal certificate
showing that his parents where Magno Rivera
and Gertrudes de los Reyes, as contrasted
with the marriage certificate submitted by jose,
which indicated that the Venancio rivera
subject thereof was the son of Florencio
Rivera and Estrudez Reyes.

Held:

The Supreme Court concluded that
Jose Rivera was not the son of the decedent
hence, being a mere stranger, he had no
personality to contest the wills and his
opposition therero did not have the legal effect
of requiring the three witnesses. the testimony
of Zenaida and Venancio Rivera Jr. who
authenticated the wills as having beed written
and signed by their father was sufficient.



Case No. 16
Case Title: LABRADOR v CA
GR No. 83843-44
April 5, 1990
Justice Paras


Doctrine:

Date of holographic will can be placed in the
main body; Intention to execute a will, not a
partition agreement plain from the words of
the holographic will at bar

Facts:

Melecio Labrador died in Zambales,
where he was resideing, and left
behind a parcel of land. He had 9
heirs and a holographic will.

Sagrado, Enrica and Cristobal
Labrador (heirs), filed a petition for the
probate of the alleged holographic will of
Melecio. Jesus and Gaudencio Labrador
(heirs) filed an opposition to the petition on the
ground that the will has been extinguished or
revoked by implication of law. They allege that
before Melecio's death in 1971, he executed a
Deed of Absolute Sale converying to
oppositors the lot in considering of P6,000. In
1973, Jesus sold the land to Navat.

Sagrado filed for annulment of the
Deed of Absolute Sale over the parcel of land
which Sagrado allegedly had already acquired
by devise from Melecio under the holographic
will.

The trial court allowed the probate of
the will and declared null and void the Deed of
Absolute Sale. The court also directed the
respondents to reimburse petitioners the
redemption price of P5,000 for the property
paid by Sagrado. On appeal, the CA modified
the decision by denying the allowance of the
probate of the will for being undated and
reversing the order of reimbursement.
Petitioner's MR was denied by the CA. Hence,
this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the alleged
holographic will of Melcio Labrador is dated,
as provided for in Article 810 of the Civil Code,
as it was placed in the main body of the will.

Held:

The will has been dated in the hand of
the testator himself in perfect compliance with
Article 810. It is worthy of note to quote the
first paragraph of the second page of the
holographic will:

And this is the day in which we
agreed that we are making the
partitioning and assigning the
respective assignment of the
said fishpond, and this being
in the month of March, 17th
day, in the year 1968, and this
decision and or instruction of
Page 26 of 31

mine is the matter to be
followed. And the one who
made this writing is no other
than MELECIO LABRADOR,
their father. (emphasis
supplied)

Respondents claim that the
date in the will was when the testator
and his beneficiaries entered into an
agreement on "the partitioning and
assignments of the fishpond.
Respondents are in error. The
intention to show 17 March 1968 as
the date of the execution of the will is
plain from the succeeding words of the
paragraph. The will was not an
agreement but a unilateral act of
Melecio who plainly knew that what he
was executing was a will. The act of
partitioning and the declaration that
such partitioning as the testator's
instruction or decision to be followed
reveal that Melecio was fully aware of
the nature of the estate property to be
disposed of and of the character of the
testamentary act as a means to
control the disposition of his estate.

As to the finding the
reimbursement of the P5,000
representing the redemption price as
erroneous, the CAs conclusion is
incorrect. When private respondents
sold the fishpond with right to
repurchase to Navat for P5,000, they
were actually selling property
belonging to another and which they
had no authority to sell, rendering
such sale null and void. Petitioners,
thus "redeemed" the property from
Navat for P5,000, to immediately
regain possession of the property for
its disposition in accordance with the
will. Petitioners therefore deserve to
be reimbursed the P5,000.


Case No. 17
Case Title: SEANGIO v REYES
GR No. 140371-72
November 27, 2006
Justice Azcuna

Doctrine:

1. Holographic will as provided under article
810 must be entirely written, dated and signed
by the hand of the testator himself in or out of
the Philippines, and need not be witnessed.
Segundo's document, although it may initially
come across as a mere dis inheritance
instrument, conforms to the formalities of a
holographic will prescribed by law. An intent
dispose mortis causa can be clearly deduced
from the terms of the instrument, and while it
does not make an affirmative disposition of
the latter's property, disinheritance of Alfredo
is nonetheless an act of disposition in itself.
Disinheritance results in the disposition of the
property of the testator Segundo in favor of
those who would succeed in the absence of
Alfredo

2. It is a fundamental principle that the intent
or the will of the testator,expressed in the form
and within the limits prescribed by law, must
be recognized as the supreme law in
succession. All rules of construction are
designed to ascertain and give effect to that
intention. It is only when the intention of the
testator is contrary to law, morals or public
policy that it cannot be given effect.

3. Considering that the questioned document
is Segundo's holographic will, and that the law
favors testator over intestacy, the probate of
the will cannot be dispensed with. Art. 838
provides that no will shall pass either real or
personal property unless it is proved and
allowed in accordance with the rules of court.
Thus, unless the will is probated, the right of a
person to dispose of his property may be
rendered nugatory.

Facts:

Private respondents filed a petition for
the settlement of the intestate estate of the
late Segundo Seangio and prays for the
appointment of private respondent Elisa
Seangio-Santos as a special administrator
and guardian ad litem of petitioner Dy Yieng
Seangio.

Page 27 of 31

Petitioners Dy Yieng, Barbara and
Virginia all surname Seangio opposed the
petition. They contended that Dy Yieng was:
(1) Dy Yieng was still healthy and in full
command of her faculties; (2) deceased
Segundo executed a general power of
attorney in favor of Virginia giving her the
power to mange and exercise control and
supervision over his business in the
Philippines; (3) Virginia is the most competent
and qualified to serve as the administrator of e
estate of Segundo because she is a CPA; and
(4) Segundo left a holographic will
disinheriting one of the private respondents,
Alfredo Seangio.

Petition for the probate of the
holographic will was filed by the petitioners
and said that probate proceedings should take
precedence because testate proceedings take
precedence and enjoy priority over intestate
proceedings.

Private respondents moved for the
dismissal of the probate proceedings on the
ground that the document purporting to be the
holographic will of Segundo does not contain
any disposition of the estate of the deceased
and thus not meet the definition of a will under
article 783. According to private respondents,
the will only shows an alleged act of dis
inheritance and nothing else; that all other
compulsory heirs were not named nor
instituted as heir, devisee or legatee, hence,
there is preterition which would result to
intestacy. Private respondents maintained that
the court is not barred from delving into the
intrinsic validity of the will and may order
dismissal of the probate when on the face of
the will it is clear that it contains no
testamentary disposition of the property of the
decedent.

Petitioners filed their opposition to the
motion to dismiss.

RTC dismissed the petition for probate
proceedings.

Petitioners' motion for reconsideration
was denied.

Issues:

1. WON the document by Segudo was
a holographic will

2. WON the compulsory heirs in the
direct line were preterited in the will

Held:

1. Court is convinced that the
document, even if captioned as KASULATAN
NG PAG-ALIS NG MANA, was intended by
Segundo to be his last testamentary act and
was executed in accordance with the law in
the form of a holographic will.

A holographic will under art. 810 must
be entirely written, dated and signed by the
hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no
other form, and may be made in or out of the
Philippines and need not be witnessed.

Segundo's document was written,
dated and signed by the hand of Segundo
himself.

The disinheritance of Alfredo is an act
of disposition in itself. The disinheritance
results in the disposition of the property of the
testator Segundo in favor of those who would
succeed in the absence of Alfredo.

It is only when the intention of the
testator is contrary to law, morals or public
order that it cannot be given effect.

Unless the will is probated, the
disinheritance cannot be given effect.

2. Compulsory heirs in the direct line
were not preterited in the will. Segundo's last
expression to bequeath his estate to all his
compulsory heirs with the sole exception of
Alfredo. Segundo didn't instituted an heir to
the exclusion of his other compulsory heirs.
The mere mention of the name of one of the
petitioners, Virginia, in the document does not
institute her as the universal heir. Her name
was included plainly as a witness to the
altercation between Segundo and his son,
Alfredo.

Page 28 of 31

Considering that the questioned
document is Segundo's holographic will and
that the law favors testacy over intestacy, the
probate of the will cannot be dispensed with.

Trial court should have allowed the
holographic will to be probated. It is settled
that testate proceedings for the settlement of
the estate of the decedent take precedence
over intestate proceedings for the same
purpose.

Petition granted.



Case No. 18
Case Title: CAPITLE v ELBAMBUENA
GR No. 169193
November 30, 2006
Justice Carpio-Morales


Doctrine:

Mere estrangement not being a legal ground
for the disqualification of a surviving spouse
as an heir of the deceased spouse



Facts:

The parcel of agricultural land subject
of the present controversy contains 1.8144
hectares, identified as Lot 1849 (the lot), and
situated in Barangay Valle, Talavera, Nueva
Ecija.

Respondents Fortunata Elbambuena
and Rosalinda Olar (Rosalinda), spouse and
daughter-in-law, respectively, of Olar, now
deceased, claim that Olar relinquished one-
half to Rosalinda by a "Kasunduan"

and that
the remaining portion of the lot was
surrendered to Fortunata.

Respondents, alleged that on
petitioners request, petitioners were allowed
to occupy the lot to pursue a means of
livelihood. Since 1990, however, petitioners
did not pay rentals despite demand therefor,
and neither did they heed the demand to
return the possession of the lot, drawing
respondents to file a Petition for Recovery of
Possession and Payment of Back
Rentals
3
against petitioners before the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board (DARAB) Regional Office in Talavera,
Nueva Ecija,

Petitioners, on the other hand,
claiming that they have been in possession of
the lot since 1960, presented a "Waiver of
Rights"
4
executed by Olar wherein he
renounced in their favor his rights and
participation over the lot; a "Sinumpaang
Salaysay"
5
wherein Olar acknowledged that
he co-possessed the lot with petitioner Capitle
since 1960; and a Pinagsamang
Patunay
6
from the Barangay Agrarian Reform
Committee (BARC) Chairman and barangay
chairman of Valle certifying that they
(petitioners) are the actual tillers and
possessors of the lot. Petitioners further claim
that since 1959, respondent Fortunata was
already separated from Olar and she even
remarried, thus giving her no right to inherit
from Olar.
The two cases was jointly resolved in
favor of petitioners. On Appeal to the DARAB,
the decision was set aside ordering petitioners
to vacate the lot and to deliver the same to
respondent.

Aggrieved, petitioners appealed to the
CA, which affirmed the appealed decision.

Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not respondents are entitld
to inherit the subject land from the deceased
Olar.

CLAIM OF PLAINTIFF:
Petitioners concede that although Olars death
passed all his rights and interest over the lot
to his legal heirs, his intent of not bequeathing
them to his estranged wife but to a relative,
who helped him in tilling the lot and who took
care of him, should be accorded respect over
the intent of the law on hereditary succession.


Page 29 of 31

CLAIM OF DEFENDANT:
Cristobal Olars death substantially passed all
his rights and interest in and over the subject
property to his legal heirs by operation of law.
In the case at bench, to herein respondents-
appellees: to Fortunata Elbambuena, being
his surviving wife, and to Rosalinda Olar, his
sons surviving spouse, acting for and in
behalf of her children with Nemesio Olar.

Held:

Although estranged from Olar,
respondent Fortunata remained his wife and
legal heir, mere estrangement not being a
legal ground for the disqualification of a
surviving spouse as an heir of the deceased
spouse.
16
Rosalinda, on the other hand, is the
surviving spouse of Olars son. The two are
thus real parties-in-interest who stand to be
injured or benefited by the judgment on the
cancellation of the CLOA issued in Olars
name.



Case No. 19
Case Title: GUERRERO v BIHIS
GR No. 174144
April 17, 2007
Justice Corona


Doctrine:

A notarial will is not valid when it is
acknowledged before a notary public by the
testator and the witnesses outside the notary
publics territorial jurisdiction. Outside the
place of his commission; the notary public is
bereft of power to perform any notarial act; he
is not a notary public.

Facts:

Felisa Tamio de Buenaventura died
on Feb. 9, 1994.

She had two daughters: Bella
Guerrero and Resurreccion Bihis.

Bella filed a petition for the probate of
the last will and testament of Felisa in the
RTC of Quezon City. This was opposed by
Resurreccion.

The trial court appointed Bella as the
special administratrix of the decendents
estate. Bella took her oath as temporary
special administratrix and letters of special
administration were issued to her.

After Bella presented her evidence,
Resurreccion filed a demurrer thereto alleging
that Bellas evidence failed to establish that
the decedents will complied with Art. 804 and
805 of the Civil Code.

The trial court denied the probate of
the will ruling that Art. 806 of the NCC was not
complied with because the will was
acknowledged by the testatrix and the
witnesses at the testatrixs residence at No.
40 Kanlaon St. QUEZON CITY before Atty.
Macario Directo who was a commissioned
notary public for and in CALOOCAN CITY.

Bella elevated the case to the CA but
the CA dismissed the appeal and affirmed the
resolution of the trial court.

CLAIM OF RESURRECCION:
Bellas evidence failed to establish that the
decedents will complied with Art. 804 and 805
of the Civil Code.

CLAIM OF BELLA:
Bella admits that the will was acknowledged
by the testatrix and the witnesses at the
testatrixs residence in Quezon City before
Atty. Directo and that, at that time Atty. Directo
was a commissioned notary public for and in
Caloocan City. She, however, asserts that the
fact that the notary public was acting outside
his territorial jurisdiction did not affect the
validity of the notarial will.


Issue:

Did the will acknowledged by the
testatrix and in the instrumental witnesses
before a notary public acting outside the place
of his commission satisfy the requirement
under Art. 806 of the Civil Code?

Page 30 of 31

Held:

It did not.

An acknowledgement is the act of one
which has executed a deed in going before
some competent officer and declaring it to be
his act or deed. In the case of a notarial will,
that competent officer is the notary public.

The acknowledgment of a notarial will
coerces the testator and the instrumental
witnesses to declare before an officer of the
law, the notary public, that they executed and
subscribed to the will as their own free act or
deed. Such declaration is under oath and
under pain of perjury, thus paving the way for
the criminal prosecution of persons who
participate in the execution of spurious wills,
or those executed without the free consent of
the testator. It also provides a further degree
of assurance that the testator is of a certain
mindset in making the testamentary
dispositions to the persons instituted as heirs
or designated as devisees or legatees in the
will.

Sec. 237 of the Notarial Law provides:
No notary shall possess authority to do any
notarial act beyond the limits of his
jurisdiction.

A notary publics commission is the
grant of authority in his favor to perform
notarial acts. It is issued within and for a
particular territorial jurisdiction and the notary
publics authority is co-extensive with it. In
other words, a notary public is authorized to
perform notarial acts, including the taking of
acknowledgements, within that territorial
jurisdiction only. Outside the place of his
commission, he is bereft of power to perform
any notarial act; he is not a notary public. Any
notarial act outside the limits of his jurisdiction
has no force and effect.

Since Atty. Directo was not a
commissioned notary for and in Quezon City,
he lacked the authority to take the
acknowledgment of the testatrix and the
instrumental witnesses. In the same vein, the
testatrix and her witnesses could not have
validly acknowledged the will before him.
Thus, Felisas last will and testament was, in
effect, not acknowledged as required by law.

ADD-ON:
Atty. Directo was directed to show
cause why he should not be administratively
sanctioned.


Case No. 20
Case Title: SAMANIEGO-CELADA v
ABENA
GR No. 145545
June 30, 2008
Justice Quisumbing


Doctrine:

Attestation clause is not part of a will

DOCTRINE OF LIBERAL INTERPRETATION
In the absence of bad faith, forgery or
fraud, or undue and improper pressure and
influence, defects and imperfections in the
form of the attestation or in the language used
therein shall not render the will invalid of it is
proved that the will was in fact executed and
attested in substantial compliance with all the
requirements of article 805.


Facts:

On April 27, 1987, Margarita S.
Mayores died single and without any
ascending nor descending heirs as her
parents, grandparents and siblings
predeceased her. She was survived by her
first cousins Paz Samaniego-Celada (Paz)
and three others. Before her death, Margarita
executed a Last Will and Testament on
February 2, 1987 where she bequeathed one-
half of her undivided share of a real property
located at Singalong Manila to Lucia Abena
(Lucia), her lifelong companion since 1929,
and two others in equal shares. She likewise
bequeathed one-half of her undivided share of
a real property located at San Antonio Village,
Makati to Lucia and two others in equal
shares. Margarita also left all her personal
properties to Lucia whom she likewise
designated as sole executor of her will. After
Page 31 of 31

Paz filed a petition for letters of administration
of the estate of Margarita before the RTC of
Makati, Lucia filed a petition for probate of the
will of Margarita before the RTC of Makati.
The two cases were consolidated and the
RTC rendered a decision declaring the last
will and testament of Margarita probated and
Lucia as the executor of the will. Paz
appealed the RTC decision to the Court of
Appeals which but the Court of Appeals
affirmed the RTC ruling, hence she appealed
to the SC.

Paz argued that Margarita's will failed
to comply with the formalities required under
Article 805 of the Civil Code because the will
was not signed by the testator in the presence
of the instrumental witnesses and in the
presence of one another. She also argues that
the signatures of the testator on pages A, B,
and C of the will are not the same or similar,
indicating that they were not signed on the
same day. She further argues that the will was
procured through undue influence and
pressure because at the time of execution of
the will, Margarita was weak, sickly, jobless
and entirely dependent upon Lucia and her
nephews for support, and these alleged
handicaps allegedly affected her freedom and
willpower to decide on her own. Lucia, for her
part, that the petition for review raises
questions of fact, not of law and as a rule,
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are
final and conclusive and cannot be reviewed
on appeal to the Supreme Court.
Whether or not Margaritas will conformed to
the formalities required by law.

Issue:
Whether the will should be invalidated
by reason of failure to comply with the
requirements under 805?

Held:
Anent the submission that the will is
fatally defective for the reason that its
attestation clause states that the will is
composed of three pages while in truth and in
fact, the will consists of two pages only
because attestation clause is not part of the
notarial will, the same is not accurate. While it
is true that the attestation is not a part of the
will, the court, after examining the totality of
the will is of the considered opinion that error
in the number of pages of the will as stated in
the attestation clause is not material to
invalidate the subject will. It must be noted
that the subject instrument is consecutively
lettered with pages A, B, and C which is
sufficient safeguard from the possibility of an
omission of some of the pages. The error
must have been brought about by the honest
belief that the will is the whole instrument
consisting of three pages inclusive of the
attestation clause and the acknowledgment.
The position of the court is in consonance with
the doctrine of liberal interpretation.

Article 809 which reads In the
absence of bad faith, forgery or fraud, or
undue and improper pressure and influence,
defects and imperfections in the form of the
attestation or in the language used therein
shall not render the will invalid of it is proved
that the will was in fact executed and attested
in substantial compliance with all the
requirements of article 805.