lntroduction: Renewing the

Philosophy of Nature
In out time, the philosophical qucstion of natur<:> is almost entirely for-
gotten. Oddly enough, this amnesia parallels a rising public conscious-
ncss of the fragility of the natural c1wironment. Corporate exccutivcs,
political lcadcrs, anrl informed are increasingly aware of, even
alarmed about, thc rate uf anthropogcnic ctwironmental rlegradation,
including thc loss of specics, the disappearancc of undcvclopcd lanrl,
thc contamination of air ancl water, and thc cffccL<; of fossil fue! use on
thc carth 's atmosphcrc. Today, this concern for the environment, locally
and globall y, is reflected in any issuc of a major ncwspaper. Certainly we
appear to be taking our rclationship with nature more seriously today
than al any point in recent history.
But in this ncwfound attcntivcness lo environmental problems and
thc race to solve them, the specifically philosophical dimcnsion of our
relationship with nature is obscured. lndeed, it seems as though our my-
opic focus on sohing "environmental problems" clistracts us from ask-
ing the most fundamental qucstions at stakc, l)Uestions abotll how these
"problems" have been framed. Discussing thc agenda of cnvironmcntal
higher education in Grcat Britain, .John Foster highlights the problem-
a tic assumptions of our "problem-solving" focus:
[Thc] offlcial conccption is continuous with the approaches established
earlier in the contcxt of tcchnological risk controvcrsics, thc nuclear
powcr debate, anti-motorway campaigns and similar; thc cmironmcnt
prcsents a class or problcms spccillable in physicall) reductionist terms,
tractablc in principie tu scientific, managerial and economistic methods
uf control, and to be adch-csscd through more or less existing power
structures and relationships. (Foster 1999, 360)
Once we scttle into approaching our ctn-ironmental crisis as a series of
problems to be t-csolved by calculativc rationality, we lose sight uf thc as-
sumptions that ha ve hrst set thc terms of su eh problems. For "problcms"
are not to be found in the naturc dcscribed by the scientist; they are in-
escapably cultural, political, ethical, and philosuphical. As Foster notes,
3
4
MERLEAU-PONTY'S PHILOSOPHY OF NATUR E
emironmental causes and consegue nces may be clescribable in the lan-
g- uage of the natural scicnccs, but "environmentaljnoblnns suhsist in thc
' lifeworld'-thc human world of \'aluc and sig-nifi cancc" (Foster 1999,
363). A similar point is made by Ncil Evernden, who notes that o ur ten-
dcncy to perct?ive our environmental clil emma as a series of ovcrwhclm-
ing "issues"-''oil spills, encla ng-ered specics, O/Oll<' depletion, ancl so
forth"-prevents us from looking decper and investigating the way such
issues ha ve becn framcd. E\ernclen adopts.John Livingston 's comparison
of such "issucs" lo the "rips of iccbcrgs":
Thcy are simply the ,isiblc portion of a much Jarger enti ty, most of
which lics bcncath thc surface, beyond our daily inspenion. The sub-
mcrgcd mass constitutes the fundamental "probl em," thal domain of
unspoken assumptions which legitimates, indecd C\'Cn dcmands, thc
bchavior which precipita tes thc stalc of affairs wc designa te as "the e mi-
ronmental crisis." (Evcrndcn 1993, xii )
Ifthe "environmental crisis" is, at hcart, a philosophi cal crisis, then
we might C'xpect it to a ttractthe a ttention of professional, acad emic phi-
losophcrs. And indeed , e nvironmental cthics e merged in the 1970s as
a professional specialization focused on envi ronmental conccrns. But
ra thcr than invest igating the rlecper assumptions about nature that
frame our C'nvironmental "issues," and thereby carryi ng- forward thc lo ng
tradition of philosophi cal investig-ation of nature, enviran me ntal cthics
has p rimarily departed from this lradition and e mbracC'rl thc superficial
focus on "issues" that characterizes thc widcr culture. Roderick Nash, in
his description of "Tht? Grccning uf Phil osophy," v.Tites that "well into
the middle ofthc twcntieth century, environmcntal cthics was simply in-
concei\-able as a subject for philosophy. Its emerge nce in thc 1970s rep-
resents the farthest extension of e thicaltheory in thc histo ry of thought"
(Nash 1989, 122) . Thi s characterization ofthc cnvironmentas a radically
new concern o n the philosophical hori w n, andas limited to revising or
extending traditional ethical theory to provide a suitable foundation for
society's newly discovered environme ntal convi ctions, mTrlooks the long
t raditio n of inquiry into nature that is asoldas, and was uriginally indis-
tinguishablc from, philosophy As Ronald 1-Iepburn has remarkcd,
"The history of philosophical ideas of nawre almost coinc ides with th t?
histOI]' ofphilosophy itself" (1-Iepburn 1967, 454).
This rediscovery of "the environmcnt" as an area o f philosophi-
cal interest sccms nove l in its context preciscly because of the legacy of
logical positivism. For early t:wcnticth-ccntury positivists, such as Moritz
Schlick, the philosophy of na ture could regain its cstccm o nly by divo re-
5
IN TRODUCTIO N
ing itself from thc metaphysical specula tion of the ninetcenth ccntury
and taking its task stri ctly as o ne of intcrpreti ng the meaning of the
propositi uns of thc natural sriences. The propositions of thcsc sciences,
Schlick argucs, require no "spccifically philosophical vindication" bc-
yond the \alidity tests interna) to the mcthods of thesc sciences them-
St?lves. Consequently, the philosophy of nature sho uld c ngagc in no on-
tologiral or e pistemological investigation of its own (Schlick 1949, 2-3).
Thc positivist position-still alive ancl well in influential environmen-
tal authors like E. O. Wilsun-is that ontologiral and epistemologiral
f]ttCstions are cither answera ble by the na tural scicnccs orare mcani n g-
less_1 The legacy of this positivisl vicwpoint-the collapsing of the phi-
losophy of nalnre into philosophy of scicnce and thc abando nme nt of
metaphysical inquiry into the bc ing of nature-made the emergence
of e nvironmental ethi cs appear as a radical dcparturc frum thc philo-
sophical traditio n, while also limiting this new fi eld to purely axiological
f]ttCstions.
Sincc it arosc in thc shadow of thC' positivist legacy, e nvironmental
ethi cs was constrai neclto perpetua te thc Kantian divisiun uf theurctical
from practica] knowlcdgc, leavi ng thc task of investigating nature lo the
natural sciences. This is perhaps why the only hi storical antcccdenl citecl
in many cnvirunmcntal cthics tcxts is thc scicntist Alelo Leopold, rather
than philosophers such as Spinoza or Thc focus un cthics,
understood as a theory of mora l o bligation, and the adoption of the sci-
entifically minde rl Leopold as patron thinker are symptoms of the ten-
dency of cnvironmcntal ethicists Lo situatc thcmsclvcs as complt?men-
tary to mainstream science and policy, rather than as raising dcepcr and
more radical qucsti ons a boutthe philosophical assumptions underlying
our sciC'ntific anrl politi cal As Rruce Foil!. and Robe n
Frodeman have notcd,
Philosophical reflection on naturc would be reborn on American
soi l, notas natural philosophy but a special branch of ethics, asan
investigation of our moral obligations toward that rcgion of thc world
aboul which positive knowledg-e had been provided by the natural sci-
ences .... Environmental philosophy, thcn, cmct-gcd nol asan allcmpl
to frcshly rethink natui'C using the ways and means ofconternporary
philosophy, but asan enlcrprise cnclosed wi thin Kantian confines_
(Foltz and Frodeman 2001, 3)
This uncritical adoptiun of the scientifi c concepti on of nature, as Foltz
and Frodeman point out, is reflectcd not only in the histori cal moti-
vation for environmenta l ethics, which followed o n the scientifl c and
6
MERlEAU-PONTY'S PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE
policy debates about emironme ntal conccrns, hut al so in t he appropria-
ti on of scic ntili c ccology and iLs concepts as a model for moral obli gat ion
(Foil! and Frodcman 2004, 4).
The limitecl intellectual contcxt o{ emironmental re\C''als the
need fot a richer, multifaceted phil osophical ofnature, onc
that its ontological, epistemologitl , ac\thetic. a nd theological
dimcmions, anrlthat also apprcciates the int crt\\ ining of the histoq of
phil mophi cal reflection on nature \\ith the conccpt o( nature itsel[ The
label t'l/tltiOIII!Il'lllal i\ i nappropriate f or th i m estigat ion, nce th is
tiH' mam of the that an incuin puts al is'>uc.
"In English," the C1ech philosopher Er<ll illl Ko h;i]... poi nt'> out,
tlw thoug-ht 11hich d cals with human itllt'l<lct ion 11ith the non human
world ., mo't commonly calkd l'lll'imllllll'llill{ l'lhin. tlw cthics ol o ur
natu ral (and social) contexL \lam C1cch authors thinl.. this term lcss
than lortunate. To call the contcxt of al l lile, thc lli<hphcrc, owemiron-
llll'tlllllal airead\ suggcst a ccrtain intc1 ptet<Jtion, as if tlw nonhtunan
1\0tld IH'tc but a '>tage on whi ch thc clt,tma ol humanlil'n ancl histon is
a< tcd out. ( Koh;l.. 2000, 2)
connotes the surrouncling world, tlw '>etti ng, ami implicitly
this nwans 1he for human beings. bcrnden a si mila r poinl:
"Tlwre can onh /u> cmironment in a thal hol<b cc nain assump-
tion\, and thcre can o ni ) be an cm ironmenlal crisis in a -.ociell that be-
li c\<:s in cmironment. "
1
The en\'ironmcn l," as a reili<at io n lhat stands
mer againsl 1hc human subj ecl, impli es an artificial di\ision bclween
nature a nd humans and encouragcs lo \iew natllle a collection of
things rathcr than in lerms ofmutuall) constit uti\'c rclatiomhips:
\\' hcnnatutc bccoml's discl'mible a M'pat alc thing, il can existas an
objen ol us'oion. Hut thc act of bccoming di,nmibil' ,al so indi<"a-
tiH' ola tran'olo rmatio n of the human contcxt or hac kgt ound. l\'alurc i.,
no longet a pan of 1hat whi ch 0111 cxi,tctH l' and 11 hich nwal-.
lhc phcnomcnon of daih life; it , lransfotmccllt 0111 a clcfiner ami
1 ('\l'<JI('J toa thing defined ami n'1calcd. lt is -.ct apat t to he opnated
u pon <11 nnu c 'otagc. through the uniH't'o,JI tool of ptu posin thought.
n.\l'IJH!cn 1993, 127)
Once "cm imnmental" phil osoph) broadcm ih seo pe of inquit:. as
Foil! and Frodeman argue, it also "takcs slcps beyond the \<'1! no ti on
o l 'cm ironmcnl' itsdf-a word whi ch has largeh, a nd uncriti call\', been
borrowed from lhe nalllral scienccs" (Foil/ and Frodcma n 2004, 7). Al-
7
INTROOUCTION
though sonw, like Kohk, hme prd'crred to spea]... of"ecological" ethics
and philosophy lo a\'oid thesc implicalions, 1his runs lhe risk ofun-
crilicall\' arlopt ing a scienlilic term thal ma' influence 1he analysis.
1
The proper objcct fot- an "cn\' ironnwnlal" phi losophy tttrns out
to be nol thc "emironment" at all, but rat hc r <;>cru;. naturc, as this con-
cepl ha'> been dc,eloped in 1he histon of \\'estern philosoph)_-, In this
lhe label environmnzta/ jJiulolojJhy should gin .. wa1 lo thc richer ami
more tradilional na me for this arca of incptin, jJhilolojJh)' of naturf. At lirsl
{lance, it ma) lhal naturf fall'> pte\ to lhc criticisms made
of mvironmmt abo\'e: by ma]...ing nalure \\'e sel it apan as
lhe objecl of o ur opcrations and thought. But o n this poinl naturp fares
bcttcr than nmimnmnzl for two rcasons: first, because the philosophi-
ral tracli tion already incluclcs resources that contcst this rcifi calion of'
na tu re, as does the Cree k conccpl ion of q,cru;; allCI seconcl, beca use our
cveryday understancling of nat ure is alrcady complex and paradoxical,
contcsting thc forcclosurc of lhc mcaning of lhe lerm. The tille fJhi-
!oiOjJiz)' ofnatureclescr\'I.'S to be IT\i\'ed precisely lwcausc thc rich ambigu-
il\' of the term resists prcmaturc reification.
A renewed of' nalurc would concern the being of nalurc,
lhc bcing of humanity, ami thc rc lalion helwccn lhem. \tore precise h.
1lw quesl ions addressed b1 a of natun: are twufolcl: first, whal
does il mean to understand human beings a part of nature, and how
can\\'{' lhink nalure slarting from our '>ilual ion wilhin it? How does our
sit uation as immanenllo naturc compromis(-or gin us acccss to-thc
being of nature? Seconcl, h011 can our undcr'>tanding of nalure respect
ils lranscendcncc? In other word'i, i-. therc a mcans of lhinking naturc
that can 1ake inlo accounl i1s excess mcr o ur and cultural
steJTOl)pes concerning il? Thc lirsl qucslion conccrns the truth-and
1lw 1 i m its-of' real ist or cm pi ricist i nlnpretations of nalurc, wh i le the
sccond cuestion mcasurcs thc truth and limits of "constructivisl" thco-
' ies. The prescnl work proposes a plwnonwno logical approach lo ad-
drcssing lhesc qucstions, and it clraws in particular on from the
Frcnch phenomenologisl \-Iauri cc Mcrleau-Pont\, whosc work is guided
throughout bl' the aim of' rclhin]...ing tlw relalion between nature and
human rellection. \lcrleau-Ponl\ "'"" not, in our contemporary sense ol
tlw tenn, an cmironmenlal phi losoplwr: he did not conrempo-
ran crises and proposc solulions. lnstead, hi'> lhin]...ing sceks to unco,er
1lw cleeper about 1lw human 1 elation.,hip with na tu re that
driH our conlemporan en\'ironmental -. itualion, a<, olher authors haH'
recognited.'' His efforLo; to dewlop a phenonwnological epislemolog\
a nd onlology thar a\'oid lhe Sn lla and Chal\ bdis of n:alism and ideal-
ism speak directl} lo the l'aci llalion hel\H'<'Il empiricism and constructi\'-
8
PHILOSOPHY OF
ism that hampers contemporary thinking about nature. More specifi-
cally, Merleau-Ponty providcs a philosophical account of what it mcans
to think nature from within, with ramifications for our understanding
o[ the human place in nature, our relation to non human animals, ancl
the mediating role of human culture in our access to nature. Further-
more, Mcrlcau-Ponty's efforts to articulate the foundations of phenom-
enology-to construct a sccond-order or meta-phenomenology-are
convergenl with the renewed philosophy of nature that we seek. In it<;
effort to describe ancl understand the naturl' of l'xpnimre, phenomenol-
ogy is inevitably led to investiga te the exfHrience of nature ancl, in general,
the relation betwecn experience ancl nature. Consequently, as this book
will clemonstrate, Merleau-Ponty's work is founclational for the stylc of
invcstigation that we call ecophenomenology.
7
The ecophenomenological approach to naturc suggcsts a critique
of and altcrnative to the tcrms of contemporary environmentalist ele-
bate, especially as this tends to resol ve itself into empiricist and construc-
tivist camps. Asan illustration, consider the claim, treatecl as a shibboleth
among environmentalist<; today, that humans are a "part of nature." This
claim of unity with nature is typically proposcd as an anticlote to the
theological ancl philosophical heritage of dualism. For example, Don
Marietta.Jr. notes that "until this century, very few people [in the main-
stream Western tradition] thought of humans as a part of naturc. The
'man '-apart-from-naturc view was dominant'' (Marietta 1995, 2). As an
alternative to this clualistic legacy, Marietta proposes a "person-as-part-
of-nature" vicw that emphasizes our clepenclence on ancl interconnect-
edness with the naltlral world, drawing especially on a holistic intcrprcta-
tion of ecolo.,ry. David Abram rnakes a similar claim:
According to the central current of the Western philosophicaltradition,
from its source in ancient Athens up untilthe presen1 moment, human
heings alone are posscssed of an incorporeal intellect, a "rational so u]"
or mine! which, by virtue ofits affinity with an eterna! or dh;nc dimen-
sion outside thc bodily world, us radically apart from, or above, all
other forms oflife. (Abran1 1996, 47)
But how should thc cnvironmcntally conccrnccl rcsponcl to this tracli-
tion of human exceptionalism? Should our response be to dcny that hu-
man beings have an "incorporeal intellect," as Abram seems to suggest?
Or should we instead dcny that having such an intellect is a uniqucly
human attribute, so that our understanding of non human animals ancl
the rest of nature is thereby richer? Does the problem rest with how we
have conccptualized our minds, wh our reductive intcrpretations of
9

naturc, or both? Rcgardless of how we answer this qucstion, the cffort
to return humans to their rightful place in nature holcls other perplexi-
ties for the environmcntally minded. Ifwc affirm that humans arejust as
natural as anything else under the sun, then the distinction betwcen the
natural and the artificial on which so much environmental rhetoric re-
lies is unclerminccl; nuclear waste, genctically moclifled crops, and urban
skylines are then justas "natural" as the most remole wilclerness. Pollut-
ing industries ha ve cven bcgun to adopt such rhetoric as a way of deflcct-
ing environmentalist critique. Furthermore, many arcas of current cnvi-
ronmcntal concern-restoration, urban ecology, traclitional ecological
knowleclge, agriculture ancl clomestication, environmental justice, ancl
so on-negotiatc ambiguous boundaries that refuse to resolve neatly
into the categories of cultural or naturaL
This ambiguity in undcrstanding the human "place" in nature
not only our understancling of ourselves, whether we are fully
natural or somehow transcendenl, but also our understanding of nature
as such. john Stuart Mili, among the first to thematizc thcse ambigui-
tics, distinguishes two principal senses of "nature": in its simplest form,
nature connotes "all the powers existing in either the outer or the in-
ner world ancl everything which takes place by mcans of thosc powers,"
a definition that inclucles humans ancl all of their activities within the
whole of naturc. But, alternatively, nature also names "what takes place
withoutthe agency, or without the voluntary ancl intentional agency, of
man" (Mili 1961, 370). Following Donald Crawford, we may call these
two senses "unrestricted nature" and "pure nature" respectively, with the
difference between them turning on whether human beings are wholly
includecl or wholly exclucled (Crawforcl 2004, 313-19). The ambiguity
of our understanding of thc human place in nature, thcn, is reflected
in our ambiguous, cven paracloxical, unclcrstancling of naturc itsclf.
As Kate Soper has noted: "We have thought ... of humanity as being a
component of nature even as wc have conceptualizccl nature as absolute
othcrness to humanity. 'I\'ature' is in this sense both that which we are
not and that which we are within" (Soper 1995, 21). Mary Midglcy points
out a similarly ambiguot1s logic in our use of the term animal:
If anthropologists ftom a strange planet carne he reto study our intel-
lectual habits and n1stoms, they might noticc somcthing rathcr odd
about thc way in which we classify the living things around us. They
would fine! us using a single worcl-animal-to describe an immcnsc
range of creatures, including oursclves, from blue whales to tiny micro-
organisms that are quite hard to distinguish from plants. On the othcr
hand, thcy would note also thatthc commoncst use of this word "ani-
>
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....
e
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12
MERLEAUPONTY'S PHILOSOPHY Of NATURE
thc jmtification and C\ idencc for thc claim ihdL En:n if it werc pos-
sibk, Lo prm idt> an epi'>tcmic grounding for t he '>Cicntist in
\\'ilson \ representationali st m o del of knowleclgc, its conscq ucnce wonld
still be that all of our e\'et)day knowlcdgt> of the world, granted LO us h)
our scnses, must be den ice! or held \Uspect. As Marv Midglev points out,
'The ontological question about a presumed nalit\ behind appearanct'
implies a s\\ccping distrust of all expcrit>nce-induding thc ob.scrva-
tions madt> b) scienti'>t!>" 88).
Thc clet>p problcm with ctnpiricist accounts of the emergcncc of
human knowing within naturt>, as tltis cxamplc illustrates, is thcir general
LO account fr the stanclpoint from \\ hi lh thc theory it-.elfis con-
stntc tcd. On \\'i bon \ \ iew, all knowlcdge is, in principie, reducible to
ph,.,ic'>; the human mind is a complicated machine; ancl free \\ ill (in-
cluding thc frccclom to choose an accuratc thcory ovcr an inaccuratc
one) is an illusion. But certainl y, o n this vicw of the world, he cannot
account for his 0\\'n claims to have prcsentecl thc world accu-
rateh. \\'i lson i., cott en lo rccogni1C that, if our thinking emerges \\'ithin
natllre, we must not only undcrstand how this is so (what it sa\S about
both naturt> ami ourselves), but a !so cngagc in a sccond-order reflection
aboutlt ow tltis cmcrgcnce shapes o ur own capacitics for thinking it. But,
unlike \Vilson, we lllltsl follow this effort through Lo the eJI(I, sincc our
themies about human refl enion \\ ill apph LO thc reflection that we
are undcnaki ng in the construction of thosc tlwories.
Tite phenomcnological approach to this quest ion not set us
clown the path toward skcpt icism. This is because, first of all, it does
not out to exjJ!ain rdlectio n, either in of natural proccsses or
otlwn' isc, but rather to describe out inhercnce in nature ami our m ocles
of access to it. Skeptical positions are ultimatclv contradicton insofar
as, whilc den) ing an) possihilit) of our access to naturc, they nevenhe-
less presume ancl rdy on such access in thc ,ery formulation of thcir
position. Phcnomcnolog) t.o start from a description of
fu ndamental acce'>s, it is assumed b) ami realists alike. E\et)
doubt about thc world presumes a more fundamental faith in our access
to it. Thus, wc haH' the opening lines of Merleau-Ponty's last, unfinished
manuscript, Th1' anrt tlu' lnviblf': "Wc scek the things thcmselves,
the world is what we sce: fonnulae ofthis kind express a faith common Lo
tlw natural man and thc philosopher-the moment he open-; his C)es"
( \117 :3). The flrst task of a philosophy of natllt e is Lo articula te the ba-
sis ft amllimits of this faith.
Btll of coursc, the fact that we have access to natnre, that thcre is
an openness o nto the real world, does not entail that this access is always
veridical or complete. We are immcrsecl not onh in nature but justas
13
INTRODUCTION
much in a particular cultural and historical situation that flts m with par-
tintlar le mes for viewing the ''orld. Justas there is no perspecti\c that we
can adopt out.'>ide the world of nature from which to compare our reprc-
sentations of it, so thne is no nonhistorical position front which to cval-
uate the nwdiating influences of historv, culture, languagc, ancl so on.
From a certain t hen, all of our theories of "naturt>" are cul-
lllral consuuctions with tlwir m'n sedimented haggage. and we arrin at
the danger of a second skepticism: the constniCti\ist 'iew of nature, which
holds that any "access" to nat u re translates a cena in fu nction of discourse
and ultimatclv our own sclf-rcf lections in the mirror oflanguage, culture,
and power. \\'ill iam Cronon, for instan ce, notes that since our concepts of
naturc emerge within a particular cultural setting, thc) necessarih
reflect human judgments, ,alues, and choices (Cronon 1996, 34). Con-
in words, "what wc mean whcn we use the worcl 'nature'
savs as muc h about ourst>lves as aboutthe things wt> label with that word"
(25). "Nature," then, is a "profoundly human construction," and we have
no hope of a flrsthand cncou nter with so me world "out there" that would
not be mediated by our i magi ni ngs and de si re<; (25).
On tlw f\ce of it, Cronon dcnies claims of tmmediatt>d access to
nature in order to counter a dangerous "dualistic vision" underl ying con-
temporary emironmelllalism that excludes entirely from the
natural. Cronon flnds this dualism lurking in all corncrs of the emiron-
mentalist agenda, including efforts on behalf of biodivcrsit\, endangered
species, rain frcst.s, ami especially tht> presenation of wilderness. 13} ac-
cepting the premise t hat "natttrc, to be naltlral, must aho be pristine,"
Cronon asserts, environmentalists have pland themselves in a paradoxi-
cal position: "if nature clies because we entcr it , thcn tlw onh wa) to saH'
nature is to kili ourst>lvt>s" This nostal gic \'e\\ of naltlre as pristine
aJHI set apart from human interaction has perpctuated emironmental
racism and class bias, Cronon contends; but, more imponantly, it dis-
tracts us from the more pressing task of disrmering the "middle ground"
\dwre humans and nature are intertwined (H()).
In seeking this "middle grouncl," Cronon is insistent that he is not
dcnying the cxistencc of a natural world "out there, " and he complains
of being misunderstood by readers who attribute to him the position
that , 1aturc is "onl) an idea" without an\ "concrete refcrcnt out thcre in
the world" (21 ). Different \i-;ions ofnature, he agrees, are not all equalh
tnte (:12). \'ct it is difficult to '><'<'. on his account, what it would mean to
haH' a "truc" conception of naturc or how \\C art> to evaluatc thc vcridi-
cality of diffcrent cultural comtructiom. lf C:ronon privileges thc truth
of anv one vision of naturc, it would be the account of nature as alien
and radicalh o ther, as 'Ton'\l't heyond the bordcrs of our linguistic uni-
14
MERLEAU-PONTY'S PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE
"The reality of naturc is undcniable," he \\Tites; "Thc cliffi-
cull\ ol capttn ing it with words-not C\Tn \\ith tlw word 'nature' itsclf-
is in fall orH of thc most compelling prool\ ofit-.. autonomy" (:)2).
Cronon \ con-;tnrnivist posi tion lea\('<; us -..ccs<m i ng between
a "nature" ol our own fabrication and a nounwnal rcalm of absolute
othnn<ss, aJHI this comes out clearh in his di,cu-;sion of the concept of
\\ildcrnc-.s. l le in.,ists that wildcrncss is "quite prolundh a human crea-
tion," but \\ith thc immecliate qualilication that "the nonhuman worlcl
\\l' encountcr in wilderness is far from being mcrd\ our 0\\n imention
(69-70). !lis position on wildcrness ancl thc human-naturc relation in
general has, he admits, a "deep ambi\alencc": on thc orH:' hand, humans
are ''pan of tlw natural worlcl, inextricabl) ticd to the ccological systems
that Mrstain thcir li\'('S." But, on the other hand, non human nature is an
"Othcr," a world "with its own indcpcndcnt, non human reasons for be-
ing as it is" (H7-H9).
1 have gi\'en so rnuch spacc to Cronon as a rcprcscntatin: of con-
struni,ist \'icws of nature beca use he raiscs a pr ofound challenge to any
claim to describe nature phenomcnologicallv. Certainl\' thc phenomeno-
logical im c-..tigation of na tu re is a human en tcrpri\l' ami mm wcll harbor
unc-...amined prejucliccs arising from tlw cullural, hi\torical. cconomic,
cthnic. and gcndered silllation of thc phcnomcnologi'>t. But from the
phenonwnological pcrspccti,e, su eh mcdiation-; cannot be treated as a
scr-ecn bct\\ccn appearance and rcalit\'. Thc distinction het\HTn illusion
and truth. bctwcen projection and ,eracil\, i-, a distinction al\\'<\\ S clrawn
witlun our expericnce. ,\t the limit. Cronon must conlss that his sion
olnaturc as absolute alterit} is also a comtruction of language with a
particular cultural history. But if there is am <H' nss to nature, c\'cn as
altcril\, it will onl) be throuKh our cultural mediatiom rathcr than apart
lrom them.
This is alrcady suggestcd by Cronon whcn he describes our won-
dcr in thc face of the wilcl as "an rxjnrssion of the non human world ex-
perienccd through thc lcns of our cultural historv" (HH. 111) emphasis).
This use of tiH' term rxprrssion illuminatcs a path for Cnmon \
dilliculties. the sanw path that Mcrlcau-Pont\ attributcs to C:1ant1e in
his attcmpts lO paint the nonhuman \\Orld. The paradoxicaltask of'C-
taruJc\ painting, as :\lerleau-Pont\' articulates it. is lO cxprcss naturc-
" hich includcs thc human as muchas the u,nurallandscape-on
ih 0\\11 [('llll'i, in it'> bmtc inhumanit\, alltlw \\hile that this
can be achicn:d onl} b} \\a} of' a creatin. appropriation of' thc conn.n-
tiom all(ltraditions ofpainting.
11
In othcr \\ords, Ctannc embraces thc
cllrt lo r cach nature's inhumanity through human mcans, ancl pre-
cisely th rough pai 11 terly cxpression. C ta nnc \ "do u ht" arises from "what
15
INTROOUCTION
:: mile] Bernard callecl C!anne's suicide: aiming for rcality while dcny-
ing himsclf the means to attain it" (S,\'S 17 12). Yet , as :\1crleau-Pontv
argnes, the paradoxical tension ol Ctannc\ task docs not originate in
his P''cholo.,') . but in thc natun: of' c>..pression it.self.
,\ ime'>tigation ol exprcs'>ion offep, a ke\ to re-
soh ing Cronon \ ambi,alence b' embracing hoth horns of his dilemma:
disclming nature on own tnm.1 taking it up in an exprcssin
gcslJIIT . .-\lrcad\ at thc lcnl of perccption, o u r con tact wi th thc natural
\\Odd st} litation and thc \cdimentation of a perceptual tracli-
tion. \'\' hat we reach through seeing, touching, painting, or speaking
about naturc is ol)\'iousl) not a leve! or nounwnal reality. But neithcr
are our styli1ation and crcati\'c appropriation a scr-ecn betwcen
and thc world; they are, insteacl, thc condition for what.soe,er
to appear, to be disclosed. Nature, thcrcforc, is preciscly what cliscloscs
itsclf through our expressi\'e acts, andas requiring such expression for its
disclosurc. 1 am suggcsting, then, that whal Merlcau-Ponty willlater say
about language when ckscribing it as a "good error" is true of cultural
mode'i of expression more general!\'; nameh. that it brings us to what it
names not lw a coincidence, but b\ a nwdiation or cxprcssi,c clistancc
t hat t he th i ng i tsc lf rcqui H.''> ( 1 '/ 12 . .-\s .-\lphonse de \\'ae lhens \\ ri tes
conccrning thc painter's \t)le, "lt i' llt'\Cr giwn; other-wise painting'>
\\ould be found in the real world just a'> tnc-; are. But it is also requircd
1)\ realit\ , as its truest meaning, which rcalit\ relinquishes cxclusi\'eh to
the artist \ crcati\'e exprcssion" (\\'aclhcns 1993. 17H). St} le, understood
a-. naturc's 0\\11 through embodicd lifc, therefore olfers
m a means to undcrstand Ctanne\ rcmark that "tlw landscape thinks
i1wllinme" (S.\'.\23/ 17).
\\'e willnot follow through with this in\'estigation of'expression he re,
which it is the aim ofthe chaptcrs that f'ollow to de\'elop with greatcr prc-
cision. Stepping back from both tlw empiricist approach championcd by
\\'ilson all(( the constructivism of' Cronon, Jet us note that they share a
common assumption, namcl). that nalllrc in its own right lacks a scnse
ora rneaning that is open to human undcrstanding. For thc cmpiricist,
thc \\orld operares as a causal machinc, \\ithout meaning or purpose,
and tlw meanings that human<; creatc mmt uhimatch be reducible to
rau'+al intcractions. But in this case. thcre is no placc \\ithin na ture f'or
the mine! that seeks to undcrstand it. ,\hcrnatin-h, f'or the constructivist.
sin ce meaning is the prm in ce of human thought ancl culture, natllre can
appear onh as a within this \\Cb or. at he<>t, a /JinK flll rh 011
thc margins of languagc. In neithcr case mm natun: be saicl to h<l\ e a
sen se of its own. The isl debate concerning nature
thereforc replays thc logic or tire reali-..t-idcalist debate lo which :\.t erleau-
16
PHILOSOPHY OF
Ponty responds throughout his A goal of the prcscnt work is to
bring the phcnomenological alternative to bcar on this debate, which
means describing our access to nature in a fashion that respects both its
autochthonous mcaning and its transcendence.
The realist and the constructi\'ist present us with a nature that has
two "faces" or dimensions: on the one hand, nature is takcn up in hu-
man-and nonhuman-acts of expression, its O\\ n '\, ild" meaning sen-
ing as the soil of cultural and linguistic meaning. Btll, on the other hand,
naLUre withdraws from o ur reflective regard and re,eals itself indirectly
as a kind of resistance to or excess over our rdlectivc capacitics. We will
see that this tcnsion, rather than undcrmining the phenomenology of
nature, can only be brought to ligiH through phenomenology, and that
iLs description is the phenomenological task par excellence. What we
learn through allentive description of our acccss to nature is that this
tcnsion must be cmbraccd rathcr than resolved, since naLUre's duality
is constitutive of its being, and of our own as wcll. Since Merleau-Ponty,
among phenomenologists, has bcen thc most allentive to the conver-
gcnce of a phenomenology of phcnomenology with a philosophy of
nature, his work offcrs the invitation to this task.
* * *
Our text is dividcd into five chapters that examine kC) moments in the
de,clopment of Merleau-Ponty's philosoph) of nature while roughly
following the historical sequencc of his works. The first chapter,
"Nature a!> Ccstalt and Melody," seLs out the ontologv of na tu re proposcd
in Mcrleau-Pont; 's first book, ThP Strurturr of/3,,/wvim; wherc matter, life,
and mind are clescribed as a set of hierarchically ncsted "gestalts"-holis-
tic and relational meanings. Sincc gcsta!Ls are taken by Mcrlcau-Ponty to
be ontologically basic, the totality of nature is unde rstood to be thc sclf-
organiling sct of dincrcntial relations formcd by thc structurcs of mal-
ter, lifc, ancl mind. Furthermore, gcstalts are inherently perceptual or
cxperiential, which definitively distinguishes Mcrlcau-Ponty's ontology
of na tu re from scientific rcalism and cstablishcs a fundamental ontologi-
cal continuity betwcen humans and tlw rcst of naturc. But the tension of
first foray into thc philosopln of nature conccrns ho\\
the experiential nature of the gcstalt is to be understood, and in par-
ti cular" hether this implics a relationship with comciou-.rwss.
Pont\ argucs that thc gcstalts ofwhich naturc is composed haH, as their
correlatc, a fundamentally \'ital and "perccpwal " consciousness that is
incxtricabh cmbcddcd within thc largcr natural structurcs from which it
17

emerges. Ncverthcless, he maintains a ccrtain priority for "i ntcllcctual"
consciousness as the highcstlcvcl ofgestalt intcgration.
The fundamental tension in Mcrleau-Ponty's first approach to the
philosophy of nature is thereforc stagcd bctwcen perceptual and intcl-
lectual consciousness, leading lo what he tcrms the "problem of perccp-
tion": how to maintain the ontological primacy ofperceptual conscious-
ncss alongside the epistcmological priman of intellcctual reOection.
Although ThP Strurture of BPhavior concludes without resolving this fun-
damental tension, Merlcau-Pont) '<; use of thc metaphor of melody to
characterize the relation betwccn lifc and thought suggests the neccssil}
of a mcthodological turn. More precisely, his account of intcgrated con-
sciousness as historical requires that the reflective position from which
naturc is described be situatcd within it, as onc gestalt among many. This
suggests an alternative "teleology" of consciousness, not as the progres-
sion toward scientific objec tivity, but toward an artistic or melodi c ex-
pression of thc theme of naturc's own conf1guration.
Chapter 2, "Radical Reflection and thc Resistance ofThings," takcs
up the thcme of the expr-essive role of reflection in Merleau-Ponty's scc-
ond major work, Phmornenology of Perception. Naturc is presented in this
text as our interlocutor in a corporeal "dialogue," as the correlate of
the perceiving body that rcmains "co-natural" with the world. But this
description of nature as thc correlate of thc percei, ing body confronts
two difficultics: first, it runs the risk of reducing naturc toa humanized
appearance, that is, of eliminating thc autonomy and transcendence
of the percci\ed. Second, si ncc thc body is an anonymous and general
"natural self" distinct from the "personal self" of thc reOectivc subject,
it is unclcar how reOection can gai n acccss to thc prereOective momcnt
of thc bocly's immersion in the world. Merlcau-Pon ty's response to these
ctifliculties takes the form of a radi calization or doubling of reflection:
"radical" rellection takcs account of its own immemorial past, thc prc-
rcflcrt ivc life in nature that conditions iLs operalion as reflcction. Such
rdlcction cannot be a coincidencc with that on which it reOects but is
instcad an operation of creative cxprcssion. This account of reflection
rccognites in naturc an aloofncss or resistance to our humanizati on that
comes to light precisely through reflcctive expression.
Merleau-Ponty's account of the radical and crea ti\ e naturc of rc-
llection ncvcrtheless remains ambiguous at the leve! of ontology. The
continuity of reflection with the perceptual dialogue of the body sug-
gesLs that reflection is an in tensiflcation ol' an expre'isive movement aris-
ing within naturc itself. But rellccrion also describcd as arising from
thc "tacit cogito," a radical rupture of the relation with nature that opcns

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20
MERLEAU-PONTY'S PHILOSOPHY Of NATURE
The firth chapter focuses clircctly on the conccpt of "chiasm," thc
crossing or intertwining of scnse and the sensible, as thc key to Merleau-
Ponty's latcr ontology-ancl ultirnately to thc relation between humans
ancl nature. :'vlerleau-Pomy takes the of the body as para-
cligmatic of the chiasm, since the encroachmcnt of the sensible ancl scn-
tient aspects of the bocly in the experience of its auto-affection senes as
an archetypc for the cloubling of the worlcl into sensible and mcaning-ful
dimensions. In this self-clonbling, we fin el thc iclentity of lea\ing oneself
ancl retiring into oneself that Mcrleau-Ponty associates with the absolute
or the "ultimate truth." The chiasm thcrefore names a mocle of nonclif-
ference with self that captures the relation of the sensible ami scntient
aspects of the bocly ancl sense ancl sensible in nature.
The logic of chiasm is Merleau-Ponry's response to the ontological
diplopa of the philosophical traclition, since it expresses the interna!
paradox of the being of naturc, as we see through his rcadings of Bcrg-
son, Schelling, and cspecially Husserl. Here we take up the problem of
the .Janus-facecl cluplicity of thc pcrccivcd thing, iLs simultaneous imma-
nence ancl transcendence in the C\'ent of perception, to show that the
two faces of the thing correspond to its distance and proximity in the
lolcling-over of sensc and sensible. The duplicity of the thing is therefore
a function of being's clehiscence, thc divergencc bctween Yisible and
invisible climensions.
This brings ns, lastly, to the theory of expression that the chiasm
entails, ancl in panicular to the notion ofa "goocl error." This concept of
good error instructs us on how to understancl the rclationship between
language and silence. In Mcrlcau-Ponty's later thought, the n:sistance
ancl aseity of nature are located precisely in its silence, and philosophical
language is the effort both lo break this silcnce and to preserve it. The
"rcconversion of silence ancl speech '' by which Merleau-Ponty character-
i/es the philosophical prqject (V/171/ 129) is therefore also the cluc to
how wc are to unclcrstand the relation between humans ancl nature writ
largc. V\l1cn Merleau-Ponty describes philosophy as the expression of an
ontological interrogation, he oflcrs us a means to unclerstand our own
thinking as a continuation of nature's at \\'ith
this final thought, he captures the becoming-human of nature anclthe
becoming-nature of humanity.
1
Nature as Gestalt and Melody
In the recent wavc of in tercst devoted to questions of nature and ani-
mality in Mcrleau-Ponty's philosophy, the contribution of his first book,
The Strurlurr of Bl?havim; has becn entirely overlooked. Structure is ne\er
mentioned, for examplc, in David Abram 's T'he ,)jJe!l of !he the
best-known work on Medeau-Ponty and environmenLal thought, and it
rccei\'es no more than passing reference in a rcccnt collection of essays
also dcmtcd to this theme (Cataldi and Hamrick 2007). This absence is
both surprising ancl unfrtunate, sincc Mcrlcau-Ponty's first hook is thc
only one of his published cluring his lifetime to explicitly propose a
philosophy of nature, ancl he repcatcdly refers readcrs of bis later works
back to this point of departure.
1
Thc position establishecl in Thi! Strurlwt'
ofBelwvioris founclational bccausc it aims to reconcile mine! and nature,
to integrate transcendental philosophy with thc real, by starting from
the holistic and meaningful configurations already encountcred in the
perccptual world. Re.jccting thc alternatives of scicntiflc rcalism and neo-
Kantian intcllectualism, Strur/urecharacterizes the natural world as a
organizing system of "gestalts"-embodied ancl meaningful relational
configurations or structures. Physical matter, organic life, ancl conscious
minds are incrcasingly complcx suata of such gestalts.
The "gestalt ontology" proposecl in Strurlwt' anticipates later
wstcms-thcorctical descriptions of nature by treating physical, \'ital,
and mental structurcs as nested sets of holistic relations. Yet gestaiLS in
sense are irreducible to systems in the realist's sense of
this term, no matter how holistic or relational, because the gestalts of
which reality is composed are essentially perceptual. ;\faturc at its most
funclamcntalle\'el is meaningful ancl cxperiential; structures manifcst
the kind of unity and cohercnce that characteriLes perceptual wholes.
Already in this first work, thcreforc, we encounter in nasccnt form thc
insight to which Merleau-Ponty rcturns in his late lecture courses on
nature, namcly, that nature is inhcrently pcrccptual, that in it thcre is an
identity of bcing ancl bci ng-perccived (Barbaras 2001, 37).
Merleau-Ponty presents this discowry of the pcrceptual charac-
ter of naturc as the middle path between the realism of Gestalt thcory
anclnco-Kantian transcendental iclealism. Although Mcrlcau-Ponty bor-
rows examples and insights from the works of such Gcstalt theorists as
21
22
MERLEAU PONTY'S PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE
\\'ol!gang Khler, Kun Ko!Ika, and Kun Coldstcin, he rt:jccts Cestalt
thton 's to reintcrpret its 0\\'11 results in tlw tenns of scien-
tiflc naturalism. lf Ccstalt theon \ 0\\n dcsniptions are takcn
t\ktlcau-Pont\ argucs, then rcalit\ is inhcrcnth meaningllll and cxpc-
ricntial ,111<1 therdore irreducible to the ontol<>h" o( realism. The gc-
stalt must he under-.tood through i11te11tionalit'; thus. the antidote to
this rtalism is phenomcnolo.,''Y, especialh as dc,cJopcd in the \\Titings of
llusserl. S< hclcr. Fi11k, and Gurwits< h. Yet . sill( (' co11..,< ious11ess is also a
gcstalt. it can11ot he accorded the priorit\ grantcd to it h\ transcenden-
tal idc.llism; despite bcing intcntional. gcstalts cannot be the
produns of acts of consciousness or judgmcnts._lust as phcnomenolo.,')
countcrs thc rcalism ofCcstalt thcor\', thcn , an olgcstalts coun-
tcrhalal1ccs tlw idcalistic tcmptations ol piHnonwnolo.,'). The ultimate
airn of this comergence of Gestalt thcor') and phcnomcnolo.,') is thc
l'onnulation ora transcendental philosophv or na tu re that captures thc
tnrth ol both realism and idcalism while a\'oidi11g their limitations. Such
a philosophv \\'Ottld he transc<>ndcntal in its rccognition that meaning,
11' 111, is thc ultimate ontological catcgon; ).{l'stalts are ultimately sensible
meanings. But thi-. philosopln would also retain a proximit\' to rcalism,
si riCe such mcanings are not clerind l'rom consciousnes-. or mind but are
thc embodicd conligurations ol naturT itsell . 1 he lundamental tcnsion
ol .\krleau-Porll\ \ initial fonl\ into thc phi]o,opll\ of nature therefore
turn' on hcl\1 LO characterize nature as ,111 as\(' lllhlage olmcanings that
are embodied \\thout being real, and expnicntial \\ithout bcing subjec-
tin. !he promise ol \ philosopll\ ol nature emerges from
this ten\iotl.
.\lthough there is nothing- explicith "cm ironmental" about this ef-
lort to n concciw the 011 tological status ol na ttnT and mi nd, t he q uestions
raised h\ t\lcrleau-Pont) 's carly philosoph\' ol nat111e go to the heart of
our (' OIHTpliou of its meaning allCl \'aluc, and tlrus are l'oundational for
am dfrt to comenc nature or to dcvclop sustainable ways or lifc. The
dccp ecologist Arnc who oflers his own \'crsion ol'gcstalt ontology
that is indebted 10 t\lerleau-Ponty's aJHl shares ih core roncepts, has ar-
tindated mmt the need for emironmental thinking to engage
in an ontological 1\:ac'>\ Ira-. emphasitcd repcatedh
the need lor "thc philosoph\ of em ironmcntalism to mm e from eth-
ics to ontolo.,ro, and back'' 19R:). 1) , and he priorititcs emiron-
nH' lltal ontoloh" mcr enYironmental ethics as a mean-. to im igoratc thc
cm ironn1ental mmcmcnt in the luture.' Fur tlrermor e, ;-..;ae\s accorch a
certain pri\ ilcge to gestalt in this dlrt: he supporters of
the Lkep Ecolo.,ro, mmemcnt \\ill prolit lrom the lurther denlopmcnt,
and lorcdl articulation of gestalt perception and, more
23
----------------------------------------------
NATURE AS GESTALT ANO MELODY
gcstalt ontology" (l'\aess 1995, 2cJ!). This is becausc of gestalt
ontolo.,n. \ rccognition that naturc is experiential-"It is thc
real \\Orld \\t' cxpcricnce. :'-Jothing is more real" 1995, 244)-and
], consciousness must also undcrgo rcinter pretation in terms ofgcstalt
re l<ll ions: "\\'e are basicall\' ge'>tal t en t itie'> cxpnienci ng gesta! t.s" (
L 1
\'et it is preciseh on tlw cuestion ol thc of
and its relationship with mattcr allCl lik that \ \'crsion ol
gcstalt ontologv olfers an ach-ance m er that pmposed ;\!aess, as is ap-
parent lrom cflorts to the recursiYcness that
human consciousncss qua gc..,talt. Since consciousness, for
is a gcstalt rathcr than a suh,tance ora concept, it
ontologically continuous with mattcr allCI lile; consciousness is fully a
part ol naturc. But the gcstalts of mattcr, lil'e, and consciousncss par-
ticipatc in a hicrarchy or integration: lif(. the configuration
olrnatter in a more complcx wholc, whik consciousncss docs the same
1\ith lifC. The distinguishing clraractcristic ol consciousness, as the most
comprehensiw gestalt, is its recursiw oricntation toward thc structure
ol gestalts as such, toward \\hat t\krlcau-Pont\ calh the '\irtual" or thc
"'>tru< turc of '>lructures." fhis "qnteturc ol structures" is thc ideal and
ll ansposabJe S\'Stem of reJation -,hi ps that the '>\ '>ll'lll of gestaJts e m bodies.
In other \\Ords, the characteristic structun ol consciousncss is its oricn-
tation to\,ard the conliguration ol natun as such, which makes truth
and objeOi\ possible.
l elucida te this recursin: \llll< llll <' of comciousness, \l' t' will lirst
e:-..amine prckrred metaphor for explaining thc on-
tolo.,n, ol gestalts, and in particular thc rclationship bctwcen life ami
consciousness, melod). lt is not an cxaggcration to say that, for
Mcrlcau-Ponty, nature is musical, whiclt wlr) he can compare thc struc-
tural aspccts or the world toa svmphony (SC 112/ 1 :)2). \\'hile vital be-
ha\'ior Itas a "nwlodic" unit\' in relation \\ith its cnvironment, human
consciousncss is orientcd toward the thcme olnaturc's meloclics as such;
it i-. prcciscly this melodic esscnn that constit11tes the \'irtual "structurc
ol' structures." This musical interprctation of gestalts suggests thc lines
a long" hich 's inllection ol and
of uature are to be denloped: lile and thought are diiTcrent
of e:-..prcssio11 that them,ttitc, in \an ing dcgncs, their mm conligura-
lion. Like a nwlodv, the structun of a gcstalt is transposable, iterable.
Ihe phcnomcnologiral recluction \\oulcl t hnefor e be preci:,e h the the-
matitation of thc structurc ol \lltKtllll'" thc underh ing melocl\, of na-
tu re\ asscmblagc of aiHI rons<iou-.nc-.-. emerges as a gc:.talt
or icntcd to\\'ard thc ideal structtllt' nf gc-,talts.
24
OF NATURE
But a temion in Merlcau-Ponty's of natllrc comes to the
fore \\ith this ellort to understand as one gestalt among
manv, and it is to this problcm that our chapter turns next. On the one
hand, sincc gestalts are inhcrcntlv exwriernial, :-..1erleau-Pont) main-
taim that c\er; gestalt tacitly refcrs to an cxperiencing consciousncss,
albeit of a perceptual" rather than an "intelkctual" \ariet). Since ev-
cn moment of nature refers lo perccptual consciousncss as its cssen-
lial corrclate, \llcrleau-Ponty\ position retaim .1 dme proximit} to tran-
scendental idealism, the difTerence turning on 1he diHrgence berween
these two modes of consciousness. On tlw othcr hand, 10 the extent that
consciousness is simply one gestalt among manv, incorporating mattt>r
and lifc into a more complcx wholc, it ckser\'cs no constituti\'c priority.
Consciousmss woulcl be conditioned by tlw lower gestalts of which il is
conslituled rathcr lhan being lhc conclition for the appearance of any
gestal t as such. Rut in this case, it is not clcar whal can be meant by de-
<;crihing gcstalts as expcrienlial or pcrccptual. In othcr words, Mcrleau-
Ponl} lad ..s a language wilh which lo describe thc perceplual character
of na tu re without ha\'ing rccour<>e toa bv which nature woulct be
pcrcci\'ed.
The culminating problem of Tlu' Stwl'lure of Belwvim; which
t\ktleau-Pont) terms the "problem of perception," concerns the proper
rel.ltion and distinction between the-;e two dillrent le\els of conscious-
1hat is, bc1wcen life (perceptual consciomness) ancl thought (intcl-
lc< tu<tl or. again, between 1hc ,,orJd of perccplion and
the "tnre" or "objective" worlct. Merleau-Pontv cloes not claim to oiTer a
final re.,olution of this "problem of perception" in The Strurlllre oj BPiuw-
im, since a "dcfinili\c clarification" woulcl rcquire a clecpcr inlcrrogation
ol pcrn:ptual consciousness in i ts own terms (se: 227/ 21 0)-and this is
i ndeed t he task of h is seq u el, Phmomenology ofPt'm'jJiion.'' Bu t lhc analyses
of StrurlwP leaclus to thc brin k of a methodologiral rc\'ersallhat cannol
be carricd through within t.hc constraints of the initial inquiry. More
preciscly, Ivlcrleau-Ponty's account of consciousness as a gestalt within
the natural asscmblage of gestalts complicatcs thc vcry lcrms of his in-
quirv: Doc<; thc philosophcr who is dcscribing consciousness as emhed-
decl \\ithin nature stand outside of this nature? ls it possiblc to describe
consciousness as an cmbcdded gestalt '' ithout adclress-
ing lhe situatccl character of this \Cn clc'>cription? In short,
Pont\ 's imestigation of the relationship bet\\een nalttH' and conscious-
l1<'S\ rehounds on the terms of his <H\n inquin in a wa\ thalnecessitales
heginning ag-ain "from within.''"
This lcads us, finally, to considcr the implication<; ofMcrleau-Pon ty's
clescriptions of the embeddedness ol conscious gcslalts for his o\\n
25
NATURE AS GESTAlT ANO MELODY
nwlhodological approach. examples of fully integrated
human cxistence, in which consciomncss full\' appropriales and intc-
g-ratcs thc lowcr structures of mattcr allCl lik, are rarely philosophers or
scientists. Instead, he poinls toward artisls and writers, prccisely because
thn ctcmonstrate a historical grasp of thcir mm situated perspective.
This suggcsts an alternat\'C "tclcolo)?;\" of human consciousness-nol
in the clireclion of scientific objectiYit\, bul ins1ead toward an expressin:
laking-up of life within thought. . \lthough '/he .\trurturl' of Behauior con-
dueles on the brin k of thc mcthodologiralr e\ crsal that this insigh t intro-
dun.s, thc theme of mclod} suggcsts an a-suhjectivc logic of reflection as
a situated and historical ol cxprcssion. The natllral embedcled-
ntss of consciousness lhcrcfore implics an movcmcnt wilhin
nawrc itsclf, a movemcnt that might best be figuree\ as melodic.
The Structures of Behavior
.\s his paracligm of gestalt structurc, t\l erlcau-Pontv focuses on vital be-
havior-an organism's interaction \\ith its crwironmenl-becausc it is
"ntutral with respecl lo the classical distinctions bctween the 'mental'
ancl thc 'plwsiological' ancl thus can gin us an opportuniry of delln-
ing them anew" (SC2 4).
7
Be ha\ ior dcmon-.lratcs a lnel of meaningful
directeclness that, on the one hand, cannot be explained in terms ol
psychological alomism or camal realisnL On thc other hanct, such be-
ha\ior docs nol entail conscious As neither a thing nor
a nmccpt, beha\ior discloses a third kind ol bcing. namely, smse. In lhc
first hall of The Slructure of /Mwvi01; Merlcau-Ponty dc\'clops his account
of beha\ior by a detailect critique of tlw thcory of the rellex and condi-
tiOJH'd reflcx. We will not follow the dctails of hi s critique closely here,
hut instead concentrate on the positivc characteriJations of the gcstalt
strunmc ofbeha,,ior that emerg-e from his cliscussion.H In particular, this
strunure has lhree key elements: lirst, thc organism has a circular or
cliakctical relationship \v-ith its emironnwnl; second, this rclalionship is
oriented towarct a norm; and, laslh, tlw structllre mav detach itself more
m:ltss fulh from its material to bccome, at the limit, the '\ir-
tnal" theme of consciousness.
Drawing on the psychological theorie-. of his da\, Y1erleau-Ponl\
ckmonstratcs the incapacit\ of the 1heon of the reflex to ac-
co_unt thc irreducibl} meaning!ul character ofbchmior.'' Bul he
t hts sner1ce 1 1 1 - 1
as ata crossroac s: 1t cou e contrnue tr)mg to patc 1 up tts
,nodel of behavior with more subtlc ancl sophisticated ' 'ersions of the
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36
MERLEAU PONTY 'S PH ILO SOPHY OF NATURE
V\'ith the cmcrgence of the essence of a si tuation as thematic and
iterable in the human dialcctic also comes the ability to create structures
ancl orient one's behavior cntirely toward thc virtual as such:
This powcr of choosing and varying points of vicw permits man to
crcatc instrunHnLs, not under the pressurc of a dPfarto situalion, but for
a ,irtual use and especially in order to fabricate othcrs. Thc mcaning of
human work therefore is the recognition, bcyond thc prescnt milieu,
of a world of things visibl e for cach "1" muler a plurality of aspccts, tlw
taking posscssion of an imlcfi nite time and space; and onc could casily
show that the signification of speech or that of suicide and of the revo-
lutionary act , the samc. (SC

Thc crcativity ofthe human clialectic is captured in the notion of"impro-
visation" by which Merlcau-Ponty cha racteri 7es symboli c structure in its
oricntati o n toward virtuali ty. The animal is imprisonecl within the mel-
ocly prescribed by the vital norms of the species, but thc human being,
by virtuc uf its orientation toward thc cxpressive essence of a structure,
can improvise new mclodic behaviors: "Here behavior no longer hasoniy
one signification, it is itself signifi cation" (SC 133/ 122).
This account of the symbolic offers a n o rigi nal way lo concepwal-
ize consciousncss and typically human bchavior, not as a substance-a
soul or mind-that woulcl be mysteriously adjoined to our physical bod-
ies, but as an original leve) of structurc thal integra tes the physical and
vital into a more encompassing dialcctic. Thus Merleau-Ponty marks the
distinction betwecn bis strucltlral conception of consciousness as intc-
grativc clialectic and the classical view of the human being as a "rati onal
a nimal" composcd ofbody, spirit , a nd soul :
A normal man is nota bocly bearing ccrtain autonomous instincLs
joi ned toa "psrchologicallifc" dcfincd by certain charactcristic
proccsscs-plcasure and pain, cmotion , associat ion of idcas-and
surmountcd with a mind whi ch would unfold proper acLs ovcr this
infrastructure. The advent of higher orders, to thc cxtcnt that thcy are
accomplishcd, climinate the au tonomy of thc lowcr orders ancl give a
new signilication to thc stcps which comti tute them. (SC 195/ 180)
It follows that, with the passagc from thc vital to the symbolic leve) of
st ructure, a transformation occurs that marks a di!lerence of kind
between humans and no nhuman animals; vital bchavior, in appro-
priation at the leve) of thought, is given a new signifi catio n that alters
character entirely. Thus, Mcrleau-Ponty writes that "mancan never be an
37
NATURE AS GESTALT ANO MELODY
animal; his lifc is always more or lcss integrated than that of an animal"
(se 196/ 181) , j ust as vital behavior is always more or lcss intcgrated than
a physical
This manner of presenting the relations bctween thc lcvcls of gc-
stalts that comprise rcali ty suggcsts a teleology toward the true, objective
world revealccl to symbolic consciousncss. At thc human leve!, a passagc
is achieved from the perceived mvvnmenl, relativc to the nonns of the
spccies, lo thc universe, the gcnuinc structure of reali ty in its
thcmatic disclosure (SC I HH/ 17'1, 190-9 1/ 176). In this sensc, Mcrlcau-
Ponty's manncr of prcsenting thc structure of gestalt relations in
an inte ll ectualist direction, sincc thc onc truc \Vorld will be that which
is corrclated with fully explicit rational thought. On the other hand, by
treating consciousness as one leve! of structure that must emerge from
and remain d cpendent on preconscious structures, Me rlea u-Ponty's
clcscription is simultaneously pulled in an anti-intcllcctualist dircction:
the world from which consciousness eme rges can never be reduced to
an object of iLs themati c judgmenLs. The status of the me ntal, huma n
levcl of structurc therefore rcmains ambi guous at thisj uncturc: should
we on the one hand, the rootedness of consciousness in thc
lowcr dialectics from which it emerges, or, on the other hand, its virtual
recasting ofthis worlcl as a true and objective uni verse? Precisely how a re
wc lo undcrstand the situati o n of mind in na tu re and its rclationship to
the confi gurations of m alter and Ji fe? Furthermore, can this concepti on
of mind make sense of the very philosophical activity by which it is dis-
closcd? These probl ems come to the fore for Merleau-Po n ty under the
headi ng of thc "problcm of pcrccption."
The Problem of Perception
Along with the ambiguity o f the status of mind as a gcstal t structurc,
wc find that Merleau-Ponty's en tire ontology of remains funda-
mcntally ambiguous al this juncture. This is bccausc gcstalts havc bcen
dcscribed from the outsct in pcrccptual or cxperie ntial terms. For in-
stance, Me rleau-Ponty insists that the structures composing fundamental
reality do not exist "in nature.":.x Likewise, perccption is "not an event
in nature" and cannot be integrated with it (SC 157/ 145, 208/ 193). T
rnakc se nse of thcse perplcxing rcmarks, it is important tu recall the
sense of "nature" against whi ch Mcrleau-Ponty is opposing hi s gestalt o n-
tology, that is, the realist definition of nature as "a multiplicity of evcnts
externa[ lo cach othcr and bound together by relations of causal ity"
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40
MERLEAU-PONTY'S PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE
Such a rediscovery of our prereflective cngagement is madc ncccssary
by the clissimulation of a "restrospcctivc illusion," thc cunviction that
the world cxists "out there" in the realist scnsc, as a collcction of things
rat hcr than as self-organiLing structurcs of mcaning.
Merleau-Ponty describes our prereflective cxperience as Janus-
faced: on thc one hand, we experience things themselves, not reprcsen-
tations or appearances uf things. When scatecl ata rabie eating a mea!,
the tablc that l sce and touch is the "genuine article," directly given to
me in its sensuous aspect. But, on tlw other hand, 1 know equally well
ancl prior to all philosophical speculation that the tablc is only presented
lO me from a single Yantage point in space and time, ancl that it turns a
clifferent face toward my clining companions or the lloor. Thus, evcryclay
experience alrcady teaches that thc thing itself, the table that persists, is
distinct from the spatially and temporally situated perspectives or "pro-
files" through which it olrers to the senses. ln naive experiencc,
thcn, we already find that any perceptual has a dual aspect: it is
always both in-itsclf, the genuine article itself, and f(x-us, prcsented only
by way of the mediation of profiles and our situated boclily pcrspectives.
Merleau-Ponty this double aspect of the thing as follows:
Thc "things" in naivc cxpcricncc are cvident a;, wrsJ!Prlival it is
essenlial Lo thcm, both Lo offcr themsclvc;, without intcrpo;,cd milicu
and to tT\'cal themseh'es only gradually and ncvct complctely; thcy are
mcdiated by their perspectiva! appcaranccs; but it is nota qucstion of
a logical mediation sincc it introduces us to t he ir bodily reality; 1 grasp
in a perspccti,al appcarance, which 1 know is only onc of its possiblc
aspccts. thc thing itselfwhich transccncls it. A tramccndcnce which is
ttevertheles;, open to my knowledgc-this is thc very definition ofa
thing a-. it i'> imended by nai\T (SC202/ 187)
Our natural situation is theref()t"C a kind of realism, since we accept
the genuinc givenness of thc' world in general prior to the possibility
of any skeptical question about a particular pcrception. This realism of
prercllccti,e expericnce or thc "natural attitude" is distinct from scien-
tific naturalism (or what Husserl would call the "naturalistic attitude"),
since, in evcryday life, our selYes, our boclies, ancl the things around us
opcrate as three sectors of a field rather than as distinct substances or
orders of cvcnL<; in causal interaction. \fe do notas yct have any concerns
that we might be rcstricted toa real m of appearances that falls short of
rcality. :\for do we yet have a dilcmma about thc separation of conscious-
ness from its body: our intentions find thcir natural embodiment in our
41
NATURE AS GESTALT ANO MELODY
corporeal gestures, and "thc soul remains coextensivc with nature" (SC
203/ 189).
It is this in-itsclf-for-us charactcr of perceptual expcrience that any
adequatc account of our epistemic situation must explain, according to
1\lerlcau-Ponty. On this point, realism and idealism both fail, since they
mistakl'nly emphasi7e lirst one, thcn thc other, aspect ofthe dual given-
ness of the thing but are oblivious to the esscntial bond between them.
Realism fails to apprcciate that the tablc always exceeds rny actual cx-
pericnces of it, while idealism fails lo rccugnize that thc concordance
of the perspectives is not the work of a juclgment but springs from the
tablc Realistic reflection segregates thc primordialunity of experi-
encl' into the discrcte ontological regions of self, body, and thing, ancl
attcmpts to rcconstruct the original experience from these morcellated
pans. But by treating the body as a mediator betwecn the world and
consciousness, each unrlerstood as differcnt ordcrs of events, realism
climinates any hupe of rcaching the thing itself ancl ultimatcly floun-
dcrs in skcpticism. The rationalist tradition, culminating in Kantian ancl
neo-Kanrian critica! philosophy, cmphasizes the essential rclationship
betwcen the perceiYed object and the consciousncss that cncounters it.
For critica! philosophy, thc two of the natttral experience of thc
thing are two significations for consciousncss. Empirical consciousness
inhabits the hody and encounters only perspectiva! views of the object,
whilc transcendental consciousness accedes to thc true, thing.
But for critica! philosophy, the cxperienccs of cmpirical consciousness
are only preparatory, confused judgments, and in the ene! the body is
trcated as one thing in the world among othcrs. This path ofphilosophi-
cal thinking climinatcs "natnrized consciousness" asan original lcvcl of
expcrience and culminatcs in thc intellectualist undcrstanding of per-
ccption as a typc ofjudgment.
11
Mcrleau-Ponty repeatcdly afflrms that the "transcendental turn"
toward consciousness is nccessary as a correctiYe Lo rcalism and makcs
progrcss O\'er the naturalistic position. But thc critica! position is only
a flrst stagc of rcflection that must, in its turn, be superseded. As '\mi-
versal milien," transcendental consciousness woulcl reversc thc founding
relations between the three orclcrs of structurc, assimilating the physical
and. \'ita! orders without remainder into signilications for consciousness
and positing thought as equal to being. But if conscionsness is always
a structure in the making and is beholden to the nature on which it
is louncled, and if what we are able to think is a function of what we
are, then a genuincly transcendental philosophy must take these limita-
tions into account in the formulation ofits method. Phenomenology, on
42
MERLEAU PONTY'S PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE
Mcrlcau-l'ontv\ intcrpretation, o!Ters thc resourccs to do so. Merleau-
Pont\ distinguishes, then, between l\\O di!Tcrent ses of
tal " that stand in a relation o! "simple homommv": while
critica! idealism trades in signijimtion1. objec h for comciomncss, phc-
nonwnolog\ concerns diffcrcntial 1elatiom from \\hich both
comciousncss aJHI its significatiom arise. "intclligibilit\ in the nascent
statc" (SC 207). In this contcxt, :\lerkau-Pont\ cites a passagc from
Eugen Fin\... that clcarly inspires the general method of Tht' StrurturP of
/Jp/wvwr: "\\'ithout leming the natllral atti tudc onc could '>how how thc
problcm'> o! totality of thc natural world, pursued lO thcir root, encl up
instigating thc passage to the transcendental attitudc."
11
Tlw "problem of perception," which concerns thc relation between
lifc aJHI con-;ciousness, may therefore be r<'statcd in tcrms o! thc rclation
bctwccn .1/l'llriiii'Pand siKnifiration. lt is prcci'>cl) b) o!Tcring an account of
thc i1Hnplay bctwccn structure ancl significat ion within natural percep-
tion that phenomenolo?;y moves beyond thc iclcalist return to conscious-
ncss. :\krleau-Ponty describes this interpl;n in 1 he case of t he t hing, one 's
<mn bodv, and thc other pcrson. In cach case, wc find flrst a corc uf di-
nc t pcrccptions, namcl). thc profiles that are ofTcrcd from a single spa-
tial and temporal are supplcmc11tcd b\ sig11ifications,
a halo of \irtual gi\'ens that complete tlw ohjcct but are not given in a
din< 1 presentation. In the case of thc thi11g, lor instancc, thc corporcal
intcntio11alit\ ofpcrceptual comciom11css opcn-. onto tlw multiplicity of
profilt's through which the thing is prescntccl. hcsc su icth indi\'idual
perrcption-, disclose the thing-for-me , its perrcptnal pln<;iognomy that
rcmains inseparable from its material and temporal cmbodimc11t. Thc
thing\ indcx-thc ecceit\ that disdmcs "realh there"-
is rootcd in this dircrt perc('ptual gin'nncss: "lt is whc11 objects givc me
thc uniquc imprcssion of the 'scnscd,' when they have that direcl man-
ncr of taking hold ofme, that 1 say tlwy are existing" (SC22H/211 ).
But as soo11 as this si ngular cxpcriencc is rccognitcd or 11amed,
thc ccceit\ of the perceptio11 is subsumed undcr a mental concept and
thcrcb' into the esscntial. Perccption passcs to the conc('pt.
thc ohjcctin "thing itself'' that is iterable a11d trans-tcmporal. Tlw "thing
itsclf" that always cxceeds 111\ pcrccptio11s is a consuuct of signi-
lication-;; it is a11 object of thought rathcr than of pcneption in the su-in
scmt. The actual peiT('ptual gi\enJwss of thc thi11g is thcrefore always
i11complctc ami rcccives ,inual supplenw11tatio11 10 bccomc the full and
i11tcrsubjcnin thing. This act of co11ceptualitatio11 alw<I\S prcsupposes
thc perreptual expericncc as an "original tcxt " 011 which it i-, foundcd
(se 21 1 ) . PeiTl'ptual st ruc lU res se esa\\' i 11l0 si gl1 i lica ti O liS, so tha t \\'C
43
NATURE AS GESTALT ANO MELODY
lind tlw dialectical fcrment that givcs ri sc to intellectual consciousness
alreadv al the le,cl uf thc li\'cd pcrceptiol1 of the thing.
Tlw between perceptual '>tructurc a11d significatio11 also
appcars in the constitution of o11e \ 0\\11 boch. \h hody is gi\'en to 111\
H'neptual inspection through profilc\, li\...c othcr things, but with thc
diffcrcncc that it is, in principie. nc\CI l'lltirch accessible tome. Since
it alwa\'> presents itself tome from the sanw '>ide. 1 can ne\cr ha\'e the
<H wal e:-..perie11ce ofitas one thing among mam. :'\c\ertheless, m\ "oh-
jec tin" bod\, mv bod' as it 1\0Uld be seen h\ anothcr, presents itself
through '\ irtual" that suppkment boch 's clirect per-
ccplllal ginnncss. \\'e can distinguish , tlwrcfrc, thrce diffcreiH modes
of thc 's gi\enness: ()rst, it is percci\'Cd through particular profiles
from a gi\'ell angle ata panicular momcnt; wcond, it is experienced as
thc livcd unity ol' thcsc profiks, though ne\er complctcly, since some
profilcs always remain outsidc the rangc of' pcrceptual experience; lastly,
it is k.nown as a compl('te and objccti\'C boch, as a flly constituted thing
in '>pace. Thus, the perceptual hok or blind spot of my li\cd body, rc-
quircd hv my pcrcei\'ing f'rom some point that 1 cannot percei,e, is fill ed
1>\ \...nowlcdgc from others or f'rom scienn, just as the non-expericnced
profiles of thc thing may be k.nown cYcn though the\ are not li\'ed. This
l.lst stage in the constitution o( thc hoch is gin' JI onlv as an objen o!
thought , as it rcquircs virtual contribtned h\ others or thc
stuch of lo supplement actual pcrccptual cxpcriences. Such
significations wi ll ncn:r, howeH'r, be cqui\alcnt in Ill\ cxpcriencc to ac-
tualh c'\pcricnced perception'>. Plnsiologiral cxplanations of lll) boch.
stJ< h as ncurological accounts of pcrccption, are tlwref'orc nc\'er more
than significat ions forme; the) can nc,cr cxplain my li\'ed experience.
sincc thc\ are cleri\'ati\'e from it.
Lastly. the steps in tlw comtituti on or tllc body also illustrate an
intcrplay or st ructurc and signili cation in our expcri encc of others. lt
is onl\' at thc Jc,el of intellectual consciousncss, whcn we ha,e passed
11om the actual to thc \'irtual, that thc ot lwr bccomcs forme a prob-
lcm in principie and raises thc swrtcr or solipsism. At thc lcvcl of per-
rcptual cxpericnce, others cxist forme as embodied
e:-..i-.tcnts . .Just as m\ mind coexists with nalllre and 111\' body, so also the
mind or the other coexi-,ts within thc world that 1 pcrcci\e. The mental.
ron-,idcrccl as a structure of be ha\ ior, \ isiblc (rom thc oulsidc. so thal
"anothcr person in principie <H rc'>siblc 10 me a'> 1 a m to ( SC
23H. On the othcr hand, justas 1 han no guarantees. in any gi\'en
case, of hm ing undcrstood nl\self' corrccth, so al'>o I ma\ misunderstand
thc other, sincc truc undcrstanding must sin\... dccpcr than mere signifi-
44
MERLEAU-PONTY'S PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE
cations and capture the specificity of thc full structurc of the other's be-
ing 01 111\ mm (SC 238-39/ 222). In fact. this task of understanding can
ne\cr be carried entirely through to complction, cithcr in the case of
knowing myself or the other, since our k11<l\\ing is IH.'\Cr adcquate to our
lwing. and tlw transformation ohtructuns into significations can ncver
be accompl ished wi thout res id u e.
From \ clescription of thc intcrph\\ of structurc ancl
signification in our perceptual lile, severa! con e lmions follo\\ concern-
ing the relation between life and thought. First, a pcrn: ption strippcd of
signilications would lose iL<; claim to attain tlw "thing itsclf," since each
profilc would remain strictly indi\ idual ami isolatcd. J'hc transition from
pnccptual consciousness to intcllectual consciousness docs not befall
pcrception after the fact and from the outsidc, then, bllt ariscs already
within perception's tendency to complete itsclfvirtually and lo link pro-
files spatially ami tcmporally into a cohcrcnt expcricncc. But , sc-cond,
the "original lcxt" of perception can IH.' \'tT be cxhausti\'cly captun:d in
significatiom. Thc "lhing itself" is not tlw concatcnation of significa-
tions hut ratlwr the inexhaustible perceptual plcnitude from which thc\'
spring. Comequcntly, it is impossiblc to C\cr cflcct a purc passage from
sllurlllre to significalion, from thc meloch of perceplual lo
their \ irtual seo re. Lastly, thcn, we fin el he re the origin of t he "relrospec-
tiw ilh1sion" that moti\'ates nain rcalism all(l its nalllralistic legacy in
thc "ience)t (SC 218-1 9). Thc natural tendcnn of perception
is to < omtruct a completed world of full: explicit a \rtual
world of given and presenl reality. This i!. tlw "objectiw" world that bolh
and intellcctualism take for granted. Once lhc world of signi-
ariscs within pcrccption, thought to forgct its own con-
),titutive lristor) and rcconslruct pcrccplual cxpericncc from the \rtual
signiflcalions that emerge only on its basis. lt is a "natural error," thcn,
for consciousness lo lose itsclf in things, whi ch is why the phcnomeno-
logical rcduction is required as the "inversion" ofthis natural movcment
(.)'(: 2%/ 219-20).
\\'e must ask, howcvcr, if this rcsolution of tire rclalion betwccn
pcrceptual and intclleclllal comciousncss is adcquate, cYcn to l\ferlcau-
Pont\ 's 0\\ n examplcs. On this \'iew, intcllectual consciousness-mind
in tlw full scn<;c of the term-is ine\'itabh drawn into illusion and by its
m' 11 naturc de taches us from the richcr engagcmcnt that perccptual ex-
wrieme maintains \\ith the \\Orld. ,\ rell ie\al of perccptual conscious-
IWss \\Ould thercfore imply a break with rdlec tion ancl e\en a rcjection
of objccti\il\. \\'ould this not impl) an antirational position on l\1erleau-
Ponty's part? Doe<; this not e!Tect a complete r<' H' r<.,al or his presenta-
tion of mind as lhc highesl ancl most intcgrative of thc strata of gcstalts
45
NATURE AS GESTALT ANO MELODY
tlrat are our fndamcntal rcality? lfwc grant a kind of unstablc duality
hctween perceptual consciousncss, understoocl as thc immanent signif1-
ullion of the human being al the le\el of lile, anda consciousness lhat
,tChic\cs a highcr integration 1)\ taking up thc livcd into
ti K knm' 11 , \\ hat posi ti\ e i ntc rpretat ion is pos si blc of th is laucr. "higher''
< <>11'>( iou'iness? . \nd. more prccisch, should \\C con ti nue to associate the
higlwr integration of mind \\ith tht intt'ilenual comciousncss of tran-
s< cndcntal idealism, which withdraws from thc pcrcei\cd world into a
uniH'l\e of sign i
The H1stoncity of Consciousness
:\lcrlcau-Ponty's own examples of an "authcntic" intcgration of lik
"ith thought do not point in an intellectualist dircction. Ralhcr lhan
philosophcrs or scicntisLs, he namcs anists <111(1 wrilers-Beelhoven,
El Creco, Prousl, C1annc-as wcll as political leadcrs and heroes, such
,.., Saint-Exupry. n This is in accordancc with l\lcrlcau-Pontv's daim that
thc shift from perception of a limited cultural cmironmcnl LO pcrccp-
tion o[ a "unin.-rsc" takcs place eswcialh b\ mean'> o( an (SC 190 176).
ln1c integration of life \\ith thought docs not , thcn, imohe following
tlw rctrospecli\'e illusion thal replans tht liHd \\Orle! wilh thc known
,u1d <OIHTete strucmres with ideal significatiom. Another model of thc
intcg1 al ion of mine! must be prcscnted along'>idc, and as an authcntic
,tltcrnati\T to, that of inlellccwal comciousncss.
\\'e rnusl dislinguish here more dearlv than does :-.terlcau-Ponty
hctwceu "intcllectualist consciomncss, " thc one-sided consciousncss of
< ritical idcalism that transfrms tlw world into its signilication, and the
hi1toriml consciousncss of tire artisl or political actor. Thc diflerence, al-
' cadv implicd in Merleau-Ponty's discussion, is that intellcctualist con-
s< iomncss forgets its own constitutiw histOI'). it.s gcnesis in thc dialcctico;
of pll\sical mattcr and lile, \\ hich it transfonns but can ne\cr entireh
.tssimilatc. Becausc our life in-itsclf<" a stn1cturc can ne\'er be fullv trans-
poscd into lile for-itselfas a signification. bccauo;c our thought depends
on Oltl lile \\hile remaining incapable ol thinking it \\ithoul rcrnaindcr,
thnc is alwa\s a cenain truth to biological. ps\chological, ami sociologi-
cal c"\planations o[ ourschcs, of otlwr-. . aiHI of hio;ton. Thc assimilated
di,tlenics are ne\er fulh allCI complctch transformcd b\ consciousness,
,ll)cl otll being alwa\s excet"ds our thought of bcing. In this scnsc, thc
mine! is alwm<., in debt to naturc aiHI can IH'\cr o;cparate itself from its
natural roots. v\11ile there is a gcnui1w imtitution of comciousness that
46
MERLEAU-PONTY'S PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE
takcs up and transfonns the ol our silllations into a mean-
inglul world, this happcns authcnticalh onh whcn our signilications are
uuc to thc ... uuctures on which the, are loundcd. \\hich mcam appreci-
ating thcir hi\torical ancl the clcbt of mind to life and
mattcr. Thc intcllcctual conscious1wss ol nitical philosopln dcnies the
rcali1' ol dca1h, but tlw historical of an and polirical ac-
tion giH'S it its cluc.
1
" Thc liabilit' to dcath i ... nothing othcr 1han lhc rc-
of naturc at the core of our being.
\lcrlcau-Pont\'\ turn toward this comciousness as thc
gcnuinc intcgration of mind in naturc m\\ ith an unresohed in-
lcrprclati\'e queslion concerning hi.., carlicr dcsnipliom of intcgration
as a passagc to thc virtual. Can wc continue to charactcritc mind as a
"mbolic struclliH' in which bchaor makcs its own fonn thcmatic, as
a musician can transpose a structurc from 'iCore to hands to keys? Re-
(jllircd he re is a shift from thc iniPKmlion of llll'lltal SlrtiClliiT to thc insti-
IU/1011 of a human dialectic.
17
The institution of thc human includcs not
onlv thc making thcma1ic of a structurc, but also thc rccursi\'c rccogni-
tion ol thc history b\' which this to tlw \'irtual has bccn effected,
1hc au10nom\ ami inassimilablc rcsiduc olthc dialectics on which it is
founckd. and thcreforc a certain truth of duali ... m: "Tlw condi-
tiom of c:-..islcnce are indiscernible in 1hc \dlOlc \\'ilh which lhc\' collabo-
ratc (11/(/ rtnjnoml(l lhf fHf/l(f of tht' wholf rrn/1/0IIN ronnPid_) tflll(('jJIIlali::.Nl
wtilwul lhnn (1/1{/ wilhout il\ mn\lilutt l111/ory" (.\C 1 emphasis in
\\'e are a lile anda mind but IH'\cr in perfect
ne\'er a scamless whole. onh as merlapping circlcs that
IW\C'I ... cat llwmsciHs perfectly and are ah,a,., in sonw dcgrcc of disin-
"Thcrc is always a dualit\ which reappcars at onc lcn:l oran-
othn," Mcrlcau-Ponty \\Tites, since is nc\'Cr absolute and it
always r;1ils-at a lc\'cl in the writer, ata lown le\'el in thc aphasic"
(S(; 1 O).
Thc shifl tm,ard historical consciomness rebounds, then, on thc
earlicr characteri;ations of both consciousiH'" and thc gestalt, '' ith two
important conSC(jUCnces: first, despitc the temptation to hcar "form" or
"suunurc" in primarily spa1ial tenns, thc gestalt fundamentall\' tem-
poral. as is to tlw fore b, thc compa1 ison ''i1h mcloch.
1
' But thc
gestalt 1101 merch arrmcd tcmporalh; \\C lllll\l also lhatlhc
gestalt process proceeds historit al h. eh lhat each
cnllds \\ilhin i1self. as a structurc. 1he enti1e histon ol il'>
the licld \\hich it stands Olli . .Jmt as CHT\ pll\sical rcfcrs
ultimateh 10 the en tire of 1he unin'r'>e a-. background, so cach
organi..,m cnfolds wi1hin iL<> "organic nwmOI)" (10 use Lkrgson\ cxprcs-
sion) the enlire hislory of Ji fe of which it is tht culmination. ''' Likcwise,
47
NATURE AS GESTALT ANO MELODY
historical consciousncss, as thc le\'CI of slructural integration,
achie\'es self:awareness as the culmination of a dialectical history, but
onh b\ recogniting thc limits thal this historv creatcs for its own self-
1 ransparcnn. The excess of matt<."r and lif(. onr thought beco mes a kind
ofopaquc hi-,torvwithin consciousness, maintaincd the slippage
of its ''For m consciomncss expniences its inhcrcncc in an
at each moment; for it not a (jlleslion of an inherence in
material appara1uscs, which as a matter of fact can onh be objPrls for con-
hu1 of a pr<."sence to conscious1H'ss ol its own proper histon
ancl of the dialectical stagc'> which it has tra\crscd" (SC 20H).
This incliminable immanence of the subordinate structurcs, manifcst
in tlw disintegralion of consciousness in pa1hology ancl death, expresses
a ccr1ain limi1cd 1n11h UJHierl)ing the traditional notion of mind-body
dualism (SC 226/ 209).
10
l Iistorical consciousness rcmains profoundly
aware ofi1s own processual character and incompkteness, sincc its limits
and liability to dcath are insc.-ibcd in its Yc1v structurc. Furthcrmorc, to
thc lile that will be inscrilwd in thc structure ofthe
must be adclccl the seclimcntation of a human history, including
personal habi1s, language, and culture, \\ hich recei\C any me n-
I ion in Tht' S!rurlul'f of BPhm101:
1 his rclurns us lo 1he qucslion of thc rclation bc1wcen nature and
accorcling to tlw of Thc corrclation
between gcs1alts and consciousn<."ss cannot he 1reated a\ a as a real
rela1ion, 1hat could simply be sui'W\ed aiHI descrilwd from 1he outsicle,
as \k1leau-Ponty had inilially done when desn ihing mind a.s thc highest
stratum of natural Ir wc taJ...e thc situat-
edncss of thc mine! within the structurcs on "hich it rcnccts, then this
historical ami social emheddeclness will rehound on our own clescripti\'e
acccss lo thesc structurcs ami to thc mind ilsclf'. This rc(juircs us to bc-
gin anew our consicleration of thc nature of consciousness anclthc con-
'>Ciousness of nature. V\'e can now understand Mcrleau-Ponty's reasons
for describing the orientation of Tht' Slruclurf of BPhav-
1111 as rcs1rincd 10 the pcrspectin of 1hc "outsidc -.pcctalor," and why it
would be nccessan to the inquin again "from \\ithin":
lkh,l\ io1 rneab \t'r\ ,,e JI a dinTst\ of qu,tlitaL\ch distinct .,u-ucture'>
whcre \\e find in< easin!{h ponoUIHTd. "" \\(' dimh up the animal\c-
ric\, thc prcponderance ol cndogcnou-, condiuom ,111d, soto '>peak the
inili<IIH' of thc But for u.,, holding LO thc , icw of 1he oulside
tato1, we ha\ e not wl IOIII/'OIIt' <IJ>J><'<II. Thi., would onh be pos-
'>ihlc al the moment when thc conclun of languagc wo1dd obligc the
ouhidc spectator to cstablio,h \\ih the "J>ctl,Klc (lhc hcarer with thme
48
MERLEAU-PONTY'S PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE
who spcaJ...) rclatiom of truc reciprocit\ and to icknlih himsclf l! uly
\Ith "hat he penei,es. (PD 17; 'ce al-.o \(; 1:\7 126)
Thc "subjen" fr whom the gestalts dc-,cribed in 'J'/p S/nuturl' of &havior
appear, for whom they are "phenomena," is not situatcd within these
but looks on from outside. I'his indicatcs the limits of the
methodological approach of \ llrsl book, since this start-
ing point can not encompass its O\\n results; the lesson of historical con-
sciomnes'> is that our point of acccss cannot be dctached from its situa-
tion within the it describes. Thc subj ecti\it) that would be the
corrclate for our gestalt o ntology ha'> therefore comTniently remained
out-.ide of the structures describcd:
Evcn if it could not do more, atleast this fip, analysis kads us from an
ohjc<t\'>t conccplion of thc hmh toa suunur(' of bchm io1 that airead)
cktachcs the hod) from the ordcr of things and 1 einstate'> it a.'> totality
to he undcrstood in the pl'rrPJ!Iion oftht 1/11'1111/ot. (!'/) 17; mv emphasis)
'f'hl' Slrurllllf of Bdwvim; by cul minating in thc n'cog111t10n of the his-
torical qualil\ of gesta lb and of the consciousness that is institutcd within
them, leads us to the brin k ofa mcthodologicaln,ersalthat iLs O\\n start-
ing point pte\cnts it from carrying through. lt is therefore ncccssary to
bcgin the anahsis again "from within"-not immancnt to a subjecti\'-
it\, but immanent to the sclf--organi/ing configuratiom of nature within
which tlw perspecti\c of consciousncss emerges and lrom whi ch it can
ne\er detach itself.
Yct a '>l'ries of lessons can he carried forward from this first efTort ,
which are implied in use of the figure of music to char-
acteri/e tlw structures of beha\'ior. First , if consciousncss emerges in
countcrpoint with its milieu, as a kind of call-and-n:sponsc or duet, then
a pllilosophy that rcmains true to the insights of thi s musical beginning
"ill not be a philosophy ofsubjecti\'i tv. Ir the conflguration of thc sensible
or thc significatin happens at the conllucncc of all(l world, then
thi'i configuration is not the posscssion of the E\(_ ' n while con-
sciousnes-. llla\ be our only modc of access 10 th( enH'rgence of scnse in
the worlcl, it will at the same time be an cf!i:( 1 of this e mergen ce of sensc
aiHI will be dependcnt on conclitions that cxcecd its disdmin.: capacity.
TIH' plnsical , organic, and cul tural nwmon that is enfldecl within it will
thetefore form the opaque ob\'ersc of it;, abilit\ 10 illuminate itself and
the \\Orle!. Approaching nature "from \\i thin" \\ill rcquire a thematiLa-
tion of the role of mcmory and histot) in the subjectivit\ of the thinker.
In particular, it will be nccessary to understancl thc of the nature
49
NATURE AS GESTALT ANO MELODY
t hat is the spcciflc history of reflcction, refkction 's "i mpossible" memory
of the unreflective. Hcre we anticipatc Mcrleau-Ponty's discussion, in
Phi'IIOIIII'IIOlof!:)' ofPrrrPjJiion, ofthe "prehistor)" of thc "natural self" that is
one's bodv, a prehistory that can IW\Cr be maclc prcsent.
Second, thc integration of gestalts \\ ill not be an acn:ssion t\\ard
but instead a historical proccs'> of l'\jnnlion. Life will be thc
c;...prc-,sion of thc physical, ancl mind the cxpression of life. This impli-
cation airead\ f(>llows from \ charactcrinnion of the pas-
sage from life to thought in terms of an impro\'isation that canics for-
\\'<tr<l \\ hat t he lower clialenics had hcq u ea tlwd to i t wh ilc organ izi ng
them into a new whole. The clialectic of structurc and signiflcation must
make way, then, for an account of philmophical reflection as a modality
of expression. Such a philosophy of exprcssion is already suggestcd by
the characterit.ation of life and mind as orie nted toward levcls of musi-
cal st ructure.
Lastly, tll<' figure of music may suggest a positive interpretation of
the ontological status of gestalts, the sensible configurations of nature,
which rcmains ambiguous at the close ol 'f/ze Strurtuw of Bdzavior. We
would search this text in \'ain for a charactcrintion of the ontological
status of the gestalt that docs not define it in relation to the "outside
spcctator"-as a '"signiflcation" or "phenomenon "-or negati\'ely, eithcr
in contra!>t with the thing ancl idea ora'> theirjuxtaposition: '"the joining
of an idea andan existence which are indiscernible" (SC 223/ 206-7).
1 low, then, might the bcing of the sensible be described in its own right?
Pcrlmps the figure of music ofTcrs a gcnuine alternati\'e to both thing
and idea, the emergence of rhythm and melodv as somcthing more than
juxtaposed beats or notes while less than an explicit thought,
as a scnse that invades the ralher than being reducible loan ob-
jcct for it. The rhythm ofthc hcart and the brcath indicatc the musicality
of matter ancllife from which thc mine! emerges, and thc relation of the
li\'cd melody to its virtual scOIT may yct flgure the relation between life
all(l mind in an cntircly new rcgister, the rcgister of expression rather
than of signiflcation. This is a suggcstion 10 which Merlcau-Ponty will
rcturn in his latcr writings, but which mav alrcady be suggcsted when he
( haracterites our relation with natun , in Phmomeno!O[!J' of Pnrl'jJiion, as
'\inging Lh cworld" (PP218 2 17) .
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52
MERLEAU PONTY 'S PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE
world of our pcrcq>tual expericncc as "overlaid with anthropological
predica ( J>P :H'l9 373). 1 n thc m of descri bi ng thc boch \ dialogue
with naturc. that
thc thng i' imeparahle fmm ,1 pet.,on pcrcei,ing it, all(( ran llt'\Cr he
anualh 111 1111'l/ bcca11sc ih atli < 11l ,11iom are lhmc of 0111 H't' cxi-.tence.
and hecattsc il .,tands al 1he othn end of our ga1e ot al 1hc tcrminus of
a semon exploration which llltlf'l/1 it wilh humanill. ( J>J> :{7() :F3, scc-
ond cmph;l',i'> mine)
\'\'e confront he re the inhcrcnt paradox of a m o f
naLUre: to thc e' te ntthat phcnom(nol oh" starL'> from l'\jJITII'IW', we seem
constrainccl at thc outset to reduce naLUrc to thc rangc of mar perct>ptual
to franw it in tenns of our spati al and temporal scale, and lo
encounter it in anthropomorphic tcrms, that is, to humani1c it. Naturc
thcref'ore confronts phenomcnoloh" with a problcm or transccnclence
parallel to those of time, death , ancl the other: "Thc question is alwa\s
how I can be open to phenomena which transcend me allCI which ne\'cr-
cxisl onh lo the extenl that 1 take them up r fi'/Jrl'lldl] ancl li\'e
thcm" ( PP 11 7 12:)). 1'\aturc paradoxicalh presents itself as preexisting
us, as always airead\' there befi>re our a ttcmpts lo ma!...e ita themc of per-
cepti on or rcflection. But how can this precxisting nature be understood
as corrclativc ol tlw percei\'ing hoclv? As Merleau-Pontv willnote later, in
h is fi rsl lcct 11 re cou rse on "Tlw Conccpt of Na tu re," t h is "pre-existen ce
of natm,ll being" is the "\'en problcm of the philosopll\ of nature" (RC
111 IPI'l l i).
A se< ond though not unrelatcd problem concerm our reflecti\'c ,1('-
ccss to hodih dia logue with nature. \\' he n l\lerkau-Pont\ describes
the boch a "natural self," he so in a n explicit contrast with thc
"personal thc reflecti\'cly awarc "l " of onr consc ious agcncy ancl
indi,idual histo r\'. The "natural sclf" of the bod). IJ\ contras!, is anon-
\tnom and general ; it an intentionalit\ and te mpuralit\
fron1 that of the rellcctin cogil o. This conu.lst i., '>Cl off most
sharph in the following passagc:
EH't \ pnccption take.., plan in an atmosphcrc of gem ,1lit\ atl(l is prc-
scntcd 10 us anom mou.,h. 1 c111nol -.av 1hat 1 s<.'C thc hluc of the sk\ in
1hc '>Cnsc in which 1 'ia\ lhal 1 undcrstand a book or again in which 1 de-
r iele 1o clnotc mv lite lo m.tthcmalic-.. \lv perceplion, ncn whcn sccn
fro111 lhl' itl',icle, expn''>'>l''> a .{iH'Il ... ituation: 1 <.<111 '>Cl' hhl(' hecause f alll
11'1111/lltto colm..,, "hcrca' pcr.,onal atl'> e reate a '>illlalion: 1 a m a math-
emalin,ut hecame 1 haH' dt< idccl to he one. ',o, if 1 \\<tllltd to rcndet
-
53
RADICAL REFL ECTION ANO THE RESISTANCE OF THINGS
pt cfi.,eh lhe perccplual t"\pt ricnce, 1 oughl lo 'i<l\ lh,ll 11111' petTeiYC'> in
me. atHlnollhat I pcrce\e. hcn semalion <<lltit., 11i1hin it 1lw gctm
of ,1 drcam or depct 'onaliJ<Ilion '>uch as "e es pct icm-c in lhat qua<.,i-
'-lltpoa 10 11hich wc are tnluccd whcn wc realh In to liH thc lcH.'l of
't'll'<tlion. (I'P219 2:i0)
Ir thc ('orporeal self that in di a logue with naturc is anonymous
and general, di stinct fromtlw rcflecti,e "1," thcn what is our mode ofac-
cess to self-shurt of a fusion that would be a "quasi-st upor"? \\'hat
relation \\ith naturc is pmsible lor the thinkinK <.,ell of thc philosophea
engagecl in il'> de'icription?
At the <omergence of the"c two problems \H' find \
effn to dnelop a ne,, philosophical reflection. a "radical" reflection
that would undercut the prcjudice of the world. Radical re-
flecti on ain1s to take into account own immcmorial past, iLs prcre-
flectin life in nature, as the fundame ntal condition for its operation
as rdlcction. Such reflectio n will nccessaril) grasp its own emcrgence
from paerdlc<ti\'e life as \iolcnt in an inaugural '>t'llse, li!...e the \olence
of a pol iti cal rc\olution ora rc\ olutionaq wor!... of art. Li!...e an, a "radi-
cal" phenomenological rcllcction seeks lo rediscmca the scnse of the
woalcl al ih birth (PPx\'i/xxi\ ). \'e t thi s reflection is complete onl) when
it rccogni1es it.s reli ance on a natural si tuation that it can ncver full y
thcmati1c, ancl when ir inclucl cs, as pan of it.s dcfiniti on , iLs emergetHT
from natun asan "original past , a past which has nc,cr been a prcsent"
( PJ> 2HO 2H2).
1
Conscquen th, radical reflcction olfers a means for the
neati\ e e'pression of o ua prereflecti\e li\'es and continues. on anothcr
rq:{ister, lifc's fndamental hlith in the 1\0rld.
In thc torsio n of radical reflection, the mornent of the body\ dia-
logue 11ith nature and thc rdlcctin cxpression of this di alogue remain
ontologicall y continuous \ '<'l distinct, like tlw topological figure of tlw
\Jbiu-. strip. Conseque ntlv, radical re fl ecti on piares a limit on our hu-
manilation or nature, ancl, indccd, on any sense in" hich we ma) be said
to be "part of'' or "one 11 ith" na turc. The immemorial time at the heart
of all rdle< tion is the ano m mous time of nattll e, a rm thic or e lemental
time that t enl.l in.., irrecuperable for reflection. B\ c'pte'>si ng its O\\ n un-
re! k< t]H' lile in things, radical reflcction also opcns ont o a hostile and
alicn lace of nature, "no longn a n interlocutor, but el rcsolute l) !>. ilc nt
Othcr" lt is in this aloofresistance of nature that wc must
scc!... the !... e\ to its "miraclc or expression."
But it is at this poir ll, the ontological basis lor cxpre'>sion and re-
flection , that :\lerleau-Ponl\ \ inH''>t igation of natun: in Phnzomnzolo,l..,'l oj
PnajJiwn bdtn'>. On the one h.md, the logic of radicaltdlcction sugge'>ts
2 '"'
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56
MERLEAU - PONTY 'S PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE
The constancy of a pcrceived quality, of the thing, and ultimately
of the world as horit:on discloses the correlative unity of m y body as a po-
tentiality for sensory exploration, with its own kincsthctic logic. Likc thc
nonsensory prescnce of the quality or the lhing, this potcntiality is also
not perceived as such, function ing rather as the corporeal background
by which our senses are unifled and communicate intcrmodally. l\'ever-
theless, the body's role in perception remains more explicit in touch
than in vision. Vision offers the presumption of by occlud-
ing thc corporeal contrihution lo the scen lhing, all owing liS to "Oat-
ter Ollrselves that we constitute lhe world, becausc it presents liS with a
spcctacle sprcad o ut befo re us at a distan ce, and gives us the illllsion of
bcing immediately present e\crywhere and heing situated nowhcre" (PP
365/ 369) _ In touch, by contrast, the tactilc objccl musl flnd an "echo"
in my body, which must synchroni1.e wilh it according to its style. There-
fore, "as thc subject oftouch, 1 cannot Oattcr myself that I a m ever)whcre
ancl nowhere; 1 cannot forget in this case that it is through my body that
1 go to the world" ( PP 365/ 369). More gcncrally, lhe experience of per-
ception demonstrates lhat J must occupy a certain point of view on the
world, that I must be involved in the connguration of whal 1 perccivc,
and lhat my body carries a certain typical struclurc of lhe world that
makcs possible an attuncment anda communication with the sensible.
Thcsc descriptions reveal a symbiosis betwccn the world ami the
body, "certain ways the outside has ofirwading us ami certain ways we havc
of meeting this invasion" (PP367 / 370), which is preciscly what Merleau-
Ponty aims to capture with lhe language of question-and-rcsponse or
dialogue. My gazc and movemenls interrogate things, seeking a match
between each thing's particular vibration or style and the tcmplalcs of
all possible perceptions that def1ne the potcnliality of the body. The fui!
reality ofthe thing, its "truc" nalurc, is given as a reply only whcn m y body
fll y cocxists willl thc sensible, achieving the optimal balance of clarity
ancl richncss across all sensory modalities. Andjust as the potentiality of
my body is unifled across my different scnsory capacities, so the thing
is more than a mere coll ection of thc properties thus disclosecl, though
this does not reduce it toan cmpty substratum. Rather, lhe "real" thing is
prcciscly lhe expressive unity that gathcrs logether il<> \'arious manifesta-
tiuns across the different sensory realms: "Thc unily of lhe thing beyond
all ils flxed propcrtics is nota substralum, a vacant X, a subjcct in which
properties inherc, but that unique accent which is to he fonnd in each
one of them, that unique manner of existing ofwhich thcy are a seconcl-
order expression" (PP36H/ 372). Thus, the different sensible propcrties
of each thing are involvcd in a kind of "symbolism," cacha rcfcrcnt for
all others, and it is this "language which teaches itself" that our body
57
RADICAL REFLECTION ANO THE RESISTANCE OF THINGS
speaks in its dialogue with the sensible. For the hody to perceive, it mnst
"know" lhis sensible symbolic order, which mcans bcing ablc lo takc up
on its own account thatuniquc style uf existcnce animating each thing.
C:onscquently, the sense and thc existence of the world are inseparable,
thc meaning inextricably embodicd in the conftguration of its sensible
prcsentations, which is what is meant, Merleau-Ponty notes, when \Ve say
that somcthing is givcn to us "in the Ocsh" (PP369/ 373).
Recall that the task of this section uf Phnzomnwlo[!;y of PnwjJtion is
to demonstrate thc cxtension of the "miracle of cxpression" from the
body to the perceived world in its entirety. In a passage we cited ar the be-
ginning of this chapter, Mcrlcau-Ponty writcs, "This disclosure uf an im-
manent or incipient sense in the living bocly exlends, as we shall see, lo
the whole sensible wurld, and our gai'C, promplecl by the expcrience of
our own body, will discmer in all other 'objects' the mimrlP ofPxjm'.uion"
( PP 230/ 230, my cmphasis). This phrasc, "the miracle of expression,"
now reappears at the culminalion of Merleau-Ponty's description of the
body's dialogue with thc thing:
Prior to ancl independently o!' other people, the thing achic\TS that
mimdf' o{ I'XjlrP.uion: an inncr rcality which rc\-cals itsclf cxternally, a sig-
nificance which desrends into the world all(l hegins its cxistence therc,
and which can he ful ly undcrstood only when the eyes >eek it in own
location. Thus thc thing is corrclatiH' to my body and, in more general
terms, to my cxistcnce, ofwhich my body is merely the stabili/ecl struc-
ture. (1'?369/37:1, my emphasis)
It is through perceptual dialogue, then, lhat a shift is effected from thc
"prt:judice of the objective worlcl" toan ontology of the sensible as inher-
ently expressive.
This attribution of cxprcssion lo the thing, and ultimatel y to nature
in its enlirety, has attractecl the most attention from scholars sceking lhe
founclation for a new philosophy of na tu re in PhenomenolOfJ' ofPn(fjJlion.
Da\'id Abram, for exarnple, has suggested Merkau-Ponty's dcscriplion
of the body-world dialogue as thc starling point for a phcnomenological
etl\'ironmenlalism. Abram calls attention to Mcrleau-Ponty's use of the
actiwnoice in describing the sensible things as our questioncrs and inter-
loculors; things are not inert ancl passivc in Merleau-Ponty's descriptions
but alive, suggcsting lo Abra m a kind of phcnomenological animism that
would clemand from us the rcvision of an en tire series of lraditional du-
alisms (Abra m 1996, 44-56). For Abra m, thc "new 'environmental ethic'
toward which so many cnvironmcntal philosophcrs aspire" is to be found
preciscly through a "rencwed attentiveness to this perceptual dimcnsion
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60
MERLEAUPONTY'S PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE
are foundcd on thc unit) and ol lhe bodr, understood as
a totalit\ ( PP 369). ,\11(1, in tum, 1hc unil\ of thc body is
founded on that of the thing, it "IJ\ taking- things as our starting
point that our hands, eyes ami all 0111 scmc-orgam appcar to as so
mam intcrchangeablc instrunH.'Ills" (/,P :n2 :n:)). But this unity of thc
thing is the expressi\e st\lc that cuh anms its y;uiom sensible qualitics,
amlthat fold'> into itselfan infinit\ of relation-. binding it to thc world as
ultimate hori/on. Far from being comtituted h\ thc c-.pressin po\lcrs of
1hc hoch, wc find that the thing a nodc \\ithin tlw diacritical wstcm of
ll<llurc \m' n \\stcm of cxpression. rhc boch emerges as a unit' only in
rc-.ponding lo 1he summons ofthe thing-, onh 1)\ 1aking up ofiL<> own ac-
cord this expnssi\'e mmement that precedes it and 111akcs i1 pmsiblc. Al-
t hough the ordcr of explanation in Phi'II0/1/fJIO!ogy of Pnn'/Jiion runs from
thc cxprcssi\'(' body to the expressin world, the order of constitution, if'
this word is still appropriatc, runs in thc oppositc dircction. The boch 's
powers of cxpression are deri,atiw from thosc of nalttre, which gives a
nc\\ 1\\isl Lo the sensc in which the boch "si ngs the world."''
carries this thought when he our
contemplation of tlw sk' as thc sk\ 's 0\\11 within m:
,\, 1 colllcmplatc the blue of 1lu- ,.,, 1 .tlll nol 11'/111'1'1 fiKf/111\l ita., an
.ttmllll( -,uhjcu: 1 do not pmse'" it in 01 'pread 0111 towards it
\Olllt' idea of blut \IIth ,,., mightlnealthe \C( n1 of 11 . 1 ahandon m'self
10 11 all<l plunge imo this nnsten, it "think' lhclf wi1hin me," 1 ,un the
'k' ihclf "' it is drawn togethc1 ,md umf1cd , all() "' ll hcgins to cl<.i\1 !01
it..,cll [Jmlll 111,. ( PP24H 249)
1
'
lftlw ofthings is thc basis lor ottr 0\\11 , titen it is ncccssary
lo rccogni/c a kind of as m u eh as an \\'hen
1\krleau-Ponty ref'lrs to the body as a kind of "natural mine! [esnit],"
\\'l' therdre takc note of the ambiguil\' in this suggcstion: this
would be not onh a naturali/ed mind, but justa-. mucha thinking by and
of nature, the nalllre that inhabits usas an aloof othcr.
11
Radtcal Reflect1on and Phenomenology
\\'e han seen that 1he inn.stigation ofperceptual di,tlog-ue reaches. al its
limit, a disdosun of nature\ own e-.pressin tdos. Bttt lrom \\hat per-
spe( tin'. '' hat philosophical standpoint. i., thc pnccplllal dialogue with
nattttc dcsnibed? Ifthe "natural sclf" is a prndlc(tin engagement with
61
RADICAL REFLECTION ANO THE RESISTANCE OF THINGS
1ltl' scmiblc world, thcn rellcction would appear Lo involve a break with
thi' cngagement. lndeed, Merleau-Ponty describes thc "natural self" of
tlw boch, as it is t he subje( l of perception. as distinct and au-
tonomou., from thc -.elf," tlw " 1" of an individual, rcflecti\c
constiomness. This sets the tenns fo1 thc problcm of reflective acce'is LO
pnception, and thus to naturc. lt is to rcsohc tltis problcm of rcflc( tiH
<H cess to tlw prereflectiYe that :-.Ierleau-Pont\ his account uf "radi-
cal" or \Cconcl-ordcr reflection.
.h \\C ha\e ah-cad) noted, the "natural self" is distinguishcd from
tlw "personal self" bv its anommit\ and Strirtly speaking,
"someone" perceives in me, not quite a self in thc scn:,e that 1
,un, bccausc 1his somcone is not a distinct , cliscrete indi\'iclual. l:l By con-
tras!, the "personal self" is thc subjccl of nw ronscious agency and life
histon, which emerges like a fig-ure against thc background or hori.r.on
of thc anon)llHHIS, or like a topological fold in its surfacc (PP249/249-
!>0). he anonymous and general existence of m y boclil) organism has its
0\\11 monwntum of cxistencc from mv personal aims ancl wishcs,
ami it follows its O\\'n autonomous temporal rh) thms.
Considcr nrst thc distinct tcmporalit' of thc "natural self." Thc
,\11011\ mous hody occupies a "nalltral time" of "alwavs similar nows," of
repctiti\c rlnthms cstablishcd In thc t\picalit\ of its relations with an
ncrnl;n emironmenL This "natural time" sketche'> only the "cmpl\
fonn of thc truc C\'Cllt," which is fillcd out onh \\hcn taken up )), tn\
pnsonal cxis1cnce and set in to a h istorical time (PP 192-93 191-92;
scc also PP 99 96). Thercfore, of thc anomnHltt'> self we can say that
it is "onh thc barest raw material of a gcnuinc prcsencc in the world,"
hu1 this lirst pact with thc world linds cxpression in its being taken up
.111d m a de manifest by personal existence (PP 19:' 192). The time of
tlw anonymous body is thcrefore nne r historical time, with its unique
and non repcatablc C\'cnts, of wh ich m y 0\\'11 personal h istory ora shared
<ttl1ural history is composed (PI' l t is instead a kind of"pre-
histon" oran "absolute past," a time 1hat both precedes and follows
1he prescnl of the personal sel! like thc anommous borders of life and
ckath; it is the time ofa "past that ha-. newr bccn present" (PP280 282;
scc also PP 1 GO 158. 277 279, Hl 1) .
11
. nw natural self is funher diflnentiatcd from the personal sclf b,
its intcntional bearing toward tlw wo1ld . . \-.Sara l leinamaa has notcd.
the a non' mous bod' "is not a sophisticatcd mcchanism" but a "spccial
fonn of intentionalil\ ," an "operatiw" intcntionalit\' that and
makcs possiblc the "act" intentionalit\ of 1he personal self.'; lt is at this
opcrati\'C lc\'el, the level of lifc, tlMt \\C find a \\tnhiosis with the world,
a dialogue that has always airead, occurred in what amounts lo a pre-
62
MERLEAU-PONTY ' S PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE
history for conscious sclf. The perceptual facilit) of the bocly is, as
Mt>rkau-Ponty says of \'ision, an already-grantccl "gift of nature" or an
original)' institution (Stiftun!{), the operation ofwhich always rcturns us,
in some sense, to the Yery birth of thc world in an immcmoriality that
haunts c\ery present momcnt (PP 147/ 146; sce also PP 250-51 / 251).
Around thc margins of our personal lile, the habits that we haYe fonned
(individually or culturally) grade off into the anonymity of this "natural
sclf," so that we can no longer say in definite terms what is gi\en and
what is acquired, what is natural or cultural, e\en at thc le\el of pre-
rcflectiYe existencc. What makes thc body "natural," thcn, is not its bio-
logical detennination, since it includes _justas much the sediments of
our cultural and personal acquired habitsw 1 nsteac!, the "natural" sclf is
distinguishecl by its intentional structurc, thc manner in which it aims at
the sensible worlc!, in contradistinction to the way that lhe historical or
cultural worlcl is clisclosecl by lhe personal self.
The clistincl temporal rhythm and intentional oricntation of the
"natural sclf" underscore its autonomy from lhe personal self, a poinlto
which N1erleau-Ponty relurns repeatedly: The natural sclf"runs through
me, yel cloes so indepenclently of me" {1
1
P 193/ 192); "Each time 1 cxpc-
rience a sensation, 1 feel that it concerns not my 0\\'n being, lhe one for
which I am responsible ami f'or which 1 make decisions, but another self
which has already siclecl wilh thc world" ( J>J>250/ 2iJ 1). Furthermore, this
alien self running through me but distinct from me acts acrording to ils
own independent and absolute \'aluations of thc world-for instance,
that mountains are tall, npright, and difficult lo climb-\,hich are "not
simply mine" bul "originale from othcr lhan myself" (PP 502/ 51 1). Simi-
larly, whcn a group or dols_joins itself to forma figure before my cycs, "it
is as if, on the hither sicle of ourjudgment and our freedom, someonc
wcre assigning such and such a significance lo such and such a given
grouping" (/
1
/
1
Thus cloes thoughl cncounter thc life of
the body as always already underlying it, yct c\'acuated to the margins,
allCI following ils own spontaneous course in a radical coexislence \\ith
the world that i t pcrceives.
This c!istinction bctwccn anonymous and personal sclves shoulcl
guarrlus againsl thc lemptation to lreat the anonymous le\'el of organic
funclioning as a sort of irlealunity with nature to be t-ccmered by our con-
scious choices, as is suggestecl by Abra m 's approach. In a certain sen se,
this "oneness" or "pact" with naturc is ongoing, but it can nc\'cr be more
lhan marginal lO our personal sehes, which follm\' a diflerenl lemporal-
ity ancl cngage intentionally with what is, strictly spcaking, a diflerent
world. Ycl, perhaps paradoxically, it is precisely through the interlocking
of these disparate temporalities lhal lhe anonymous aJ1(1 personal sel\'es
63
RADICAL REFLECTION ANO THE RESISTANCE OF THINGS
arejoincd, so that whal cnables the emergen ce of the personal sclf is al
thc samc time whal binds it to condilions outside of itself: 'The fusion
of soul and bocly in thc act, the sublimation of biological into personal
existcnce, and of the natural into the cultural worlcl is made both pos-
sible aiJ(I precarious by thc temporal structure of our experience."
17
Fur-
lhermore, if the personal self emerges, as we hme saicl, as a figure or fold
against the background of the anonymous, thcn we must draw short of
finding any absolute cli\ide between these two aspects or layers of who
we are . .Justas t he personal sel r is ne\'er entirely constitulecl, and so ncver
completely autonomous or free, so the anonymous sclf is almos/ imper-
sonal, but airead) coloree! by my personal habits and carrying forward
a mm-emcnt of cxistence lhal dislinguishcs it from a mcrely biological
existence. " The natural and the personal therefore stand in a relation-
ship of"rcciprocal exprt>ssion" (PP IH6-R7/ IR5) according to the logic
of what 1 lusserl callcd Fundrrzmg, "founding" or "establishment":
Thc I(Hmding- tenn, or oiginator [i.c., thc bocly or nattnal
<,elr] ... is primary in thc scnse that the originatcd [ i.c. , the personal
sclf] is presentecl a'> a determnate or cxplirit form of the originator.
1\hich pn.'Ycnts thc latter from rcabsorbing the former, and yct thc
originator i-, not in thc cmpiricist sense and the originatecl is
not simph dcriYed from it, sinrt' it is through thc originatcd that the
oiginato is m acle manifest. (PP ,: 1 /1E)H)
In olhcr words, the personal sclf is an expressiYe determination of the
a non) mous or general sclf, depenc!en ton and emerging from this anon-
ymous self, but also callecl for by it and sustaining it by bringing il to ex-
prcssion. Since intersubjecti\'e communication is macle possible preciscly
by this anonymous corporeal le\'el, we might say thal each individual is
a uniquc dctennination or expression of the "samc" general or preper-
sonal self.
1
" The relation of organism to personal self is not, then, one
of substances, which would be a simple relurn lo onlological
dualism. :\'or is it described he re, as in The Strurture of Reluwior, in terms
of hierarchically nestcd structures or gestalts. Instead, wc fmd a "mme-
mcnt to ancl fro of existen ce which at one time allows itselfto take carpo-
real (orm ancl at others mo\es towarcls personal acts" ( P/
1
104/ 1 O 1). lt is
by the "imperceptible turn [toumant]" ofthis expressive moYcmenllhal
organic processes are taken up into human meanings. "
0
\<\'e concluded llw last chapter by noting the methodological re\er-
sal thal takes place at tht> close of The Struc/ure oflldwvol: Allhough mincl
was understood there as an inlegration of the physical ancl the vital in
a "higher" slructure, an examination of lhis inlegralion revealed that it
64
MERLEAU PONTY'S PHILO SOP H Y OF NATURE
could m'HT be rarried through without remaindcr. The "lowe r" orders
of mattcr all(llife always dc mand their duc ami haw a ccrtain autonomy
CH'Il \\i thin thc full\' integratecl human lifc. Furthcrmore, earh intcgra-
tiw moHment i" markecl by and bcars \\ithin itsclf thc hi stol\ of the
\tagc" through \rhich it has passed. A-, \\C notcd thc1 e, this undcr\tanding
of mind ,,., a historical integration-in-bccoming 1 ebouncb on the method
LO be followcd in articulating thc relation of mind aml11.1turc. lt i' along
thi" '"i" that distingui\hes thc nwthod of Tlzl' Strurlurl'
of/Mumun from that of PhnwmPnohlf!J' of Prmpl 11111. 1 n 1 he fi r'>t book, the
confi gu1ati om of rcalit\ are de'>cribcd hom thc ouhidc, as if the
undertaking this dc'>niption was not locatcd \\ithi n tlwse \ tructurcs; the
"out sidc spcctator" of Sirwlure nc\er truh idcntific., with the world per-
cci\Ccl all(l is not situated ,,ithin

By contra\t, J>hr'IIO/IImolilf!J' rcpcat-
cdly cmphasites thc nccd to resume tlw lile of pcrccpti o n "from within":
"As ftr a'> conscio usncss is ronccrncd, 1 can arri\'C at a notion of it only
b\' taking 1msclf' back in thc first place to that comciousncss ,,hi ch 1
am .... 1 mu\t ... resume contact with thc scn\ory li le which 1 lin Jinm
1111/hin" (I'J> 251 2:>5, my cmphasis)Y This taking-up fro111 within is en-
tirch distinct from introspection, which \Lart\ !10111 an under\tanding of
thc "mental''"" onc rcgion of bcing \\ithin the \\O riel (J>J>G9-72 65-69).
Pcncption "sccn from the inside," 1)\ col lll<l\l, "m'e" nothing to what
\H' knm\ in other wav'> ahout thc world," sincc it is thc "rc-neation or
rc-constitution of tlw \\Orl d at c\Cf\ mome11t" (J>J> 2 10 210). What re-
flcction llllt\1 ll'< mn, then, is prccio .. eh t lw na tu re ,ll thc rore of thc per-
<Ti\ ing ho<h. But hm1 can this bod) be expericnn:d !mm '' ithin h\ our
1dlcctin 1\ hich li,e a who lh othe1 time and \\OJld?
The c:-..pericnce of the prereflectiH' requi rn a fo1111 o f reflection
that can takc into arcount its own origins, a "radical" or
rc fl ect ion 1 hat i ncludes as pan of i ts mm cm en t thc un refkctiYc ex peri-
CIHT from which it emerges and Lo which it remains indcbt cd; it must
acknowkclge its origin in an unrcfl ect i\'l' ancl originary past. Evcry rc-
fl cction li able toan unreflccti \'c cxpericiHT '\d1ich it cloes not
abso1 b e ither in ftct or in theory" ( J>f> 19), all(( a rdlcc tion beco mes
radical \dH'n it take\ into account:
Rdkc 11011 cannot be thomugh-going, 01 hrr ng a complete elucida-
tron of it' object. if it does not ,\1 riH' at ,1\\.IH' ness of it'>elf "" 1\ell as of
11'. rnulh. \\e mmtnot o nh adopta rdlenin auitude. in an impreg-
nable CoKIIo. hut h u thermorc reflect on thi-. 1 e llcruon, tmdn.,tand
the n,llural -. ituation ''hich it is con-.cious of -,unccding ami \\hich is
thercfme pan of its dcfinition; notmereh prani< t' philmopln. but
1 cali/l the 11 an'>Jormation wh ich it brings with it in the spcctadc of thc
65
RADICAL R EFLECTION ANO THE RESISTANCE OF THINGS
world <tiJ(I in our cxistencc .... Tht ron of philmoph) is no longcr an
<tutonomou'> tran'>ccndental \Uhjcnitl, to be fund e\enwhcrc ancl
rHmlwre: it lic'> in the perpetua! beginning of rdlenion. atthc poim
\\here an incliliduall ifc begim 10 rdlcn on it.,elf. Rdlcction is tnrl)
nllec tion onh if it is not carried outside it-.elt , onh it it knows iLsclfa.,
1dln tion-<>n-an-umdlectiH-n.pnitnc e, .tnd romequenth .ts a change
m s11ucture of our cxistcncc. (J>J>7':>-71i 7!!)"
\\'lHn \\'l' bcgin to reflect on our situation, \H' find oursehes inescapahl)
in tire position ofa conscious, per.,onal \\ ith our indi\idual histories
and cul tural baggage in lO\\. Evcn il'\\c can attcmpt to with-
dr;m temporarilv into thc rhyth111s of bodih li fe, therc is no hope of a
pcrmancnt return to the level of ano1n mous existence.t
1
Alt hough we
are ncle r en tirely alienatccl from prcrcflccti\e li le, rontact with it can-
IIOI he ac hicved by going barkward, by secking a coincidence; instead,
1\l' practicc an intcnsiflcd rdlection, a reflection on reflection, a
\11111/lr'xion.r. Radical reflection is achieved whcn, in the midst of' the act
of 1 d lccting, ref lecti\e awarencss recognites its own radical dcpcnclcnn
on conditio11s that exceed iL<; thematitat ion. In othcr worcb, reflection
radical when it opcns, \\ithin ih O\\ n practice, the abyss that
undoc\ a m claim to complete recuperation, '' hcn it flcls within iL'ielf
ih 0\\ll and opaque past. This un1eflectin at thc corc of
rdlenion precise!\ the e<rnatural bond bctiH'Cil thc ano1n mous boch
ancl tlw world. In this sense, radical rcfi l'( tion thc method-
ologic al shift that wc Sal\ introducccl at thc el ose of Thf Strurltm' of BPhnv-
m, .,ince 1 cf lection now recognitc'> its in a thc impl ications
of \\hi(h it cannot exhamt.
Rdlect ion that achicvcs radicality in this sensc is charactcritcd by
its historicil), crcati\ity, and i\s historical , radical reflection con-
trast'> 1\ith intellectualism ancl empi ricism, whi r h by fliling to considcr
thcir mm conditions of possibility rema in incomplctc as forms of reflec-
tion. ,\dopting the perspective of thc outside spcctator, an incomplcte
rdlenion takc'> objcct as autoiWillOIIS all(( frgcts thc role that reflec-
tion phtls in this disdosurc. Rcflection\ tendencv to forget iLself
in this manncr-"the ncccssan, and ncccssarih rni.,Ieading wa) in ,,hich
a mind ih mm histon" (J>P 17 a continuation of percep-
tion \ natural tcndenn to occlucle it\ 0\\ n operatiom in fmo r of the ob-
jcct percei1 ed ( PP 71 67). In o ther intcllectualism and empiri-
both embrace \\'hat we haH' rcfencd 10 abme a\ tlw "prcjudicc of
the objccti1c \\Orld. " B) radical re! lec tion 1 igi lant con-
nming the excess of cxistcncc mer thought and rccognites its reliancc
on a situa tion that conditions ih operations \\hile nonethcless excecding
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68
MERLEAU-PONTY'S PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE
ace of Phmomenology. (ullowing the well-known remarks concerning the
impossibility of a complete reduction, and he clcarly consiclcrs II usscrl 's
continua) rccxamination of the possibility of the reduction as an exer-
cise in radical reflection. 1 n thc notion of rarlical reflection captures
two scnses of thc incompleteness of thc rcduction: first, that rcflcction
willnevcr climinate a certain opacity or blind spot from its own activities,
in the form of the historical and situational conclitions that makc rcflcc-
tion possible whilc rcmaining beyond its Second, reflection will
never break its own tacit affirmation of the world, which is why it tcaches
us, in the cnrl, "nothing but the urunotivated upsurgc"-the
the world" (PP viii / xv). lf a complete reduction is impossihlc, as Ber-
net has pointed out, this is duc to the "natural grouncl of human exis-
tcnce":
The phenomenological reduction in Husserl's sensc can only lct appcar
thc corrclation bctwccn thc constituting acti\ity of the transcendental
subjecl and the accomplishments uf this cunstitution. lt cannot recupcr-
ate or Jet appear that which prccc<ics ano this constitution.
Lctting na tu re appear as a <iimension of human existence that rcfcrs to
and calls for constitution without bcing cncloscd in it, requires a new
form of phenomcnological reduction. (13ernet 1993, 57)'"'
As at the conclusion of TJp Strurlun' of BPhavior, Merleau-Ponty te lis
us again in Phenommology of Pn-cejJtion that what is at stake is a genuine
transcendental philosophy, for which wc ha ve need of a "true phenome-
nological reduction" (PP60/ 57): "The descriptive methorl can accuire a
genuine daim only from the transcendental point ofview. But evcn from
this point of view, thc problcm remains as to how consciousness per-
ccives itself or appears to as inserted in a naturc" (PP 13nl / 8n4).
Thc gcnuine transcendental attitudc is alrcady implied in the shift from
dcscribing nature in tenns of objective being to unrlerstanding it in
terms of gestalts, that is, as having the valucs of thc sen sed in oras its very
configuration.
1
; But this turn holds thc danger ofwithdrawal into a tran-
scendental ego for which reflection woulcl be aclcquatc to the prcreflec-
tive, and the role of radical reflcction is precisely to maintain the excess
of the prereflective in relation to our reflective grasp of it. The opening
onto the true transcenrlen tal is thcrefore the "reflection on reflection"
or the "phenomenology of phcnomenology" that radical reflection en-
Thus the task of phenomenology converges with that of a phi-
losophy ofnature by seeking the grounrls for reflection in a prcreflective
moment that makes reflection possible while exceecling it.
69
RADICAL REFLECTION ANO THE RESISTANCE OF THINGS
The Nature of Reflection
\\'e have sccn that nature is the correlate of thc pcrceiving body in its
anonymity and gencrality, although it is not reducible to this correlation;
it within itself an infi nity of relations that always exceed the syn-
chroniL<Hions of sensibility. Remaining simply at the )e,el of perception,
thcn, nature demonstrates a dual aspect, an in-itself-for-us, that appears
paradoxical. But now we encoun ter a cloubling of this paradox, sin ce the
rdlective position from which wc can describe the body's dialogue with
nature is also merliated. Ir there is a first transcendencc of nature with
rcspect to thc body that perceives it, with which it is "co-natural," there
is a second transcendence of this prereflcctivc exchange in relation to
thc reflective that describes it. The dialogue of body ancl worlcl
always occupy, from the perspective of reflection, a past that has never
been prcscnt. Thercfore, when Merleau-Ponty rlescribes the "fundamen-
tal" or "transcendental" contradiction that phenomcnolo.,')' faces with
respect to all transccndents, the problem of nature, as a doubling of this
contradiction, has a certain
The link bctwccn thesc two problems of transcenrlcncc-nature
with respcct to the body, the body with respect to rcflection-is thc
body itself'. Merleau-Ponty makes this link explicit when he associates
the natural world as ultimat<" horizon with the anonymous generality of
the bocly:
The natural world is the hori1on of all hori1ons, the style of all possibk
stylcs, \vhich guarantc<>s for my expni<>nces a given. nota willed, unity
unclerlying allthe clisruptions of my personal and historicallifc.
countcrpan within me is thc givcn, general, and prc-pcrsonal cxistcnce
of' my sensory functions in which we ha,e discovercd thc definition of
thc bod). (P/':iHI / 3Hfi)
Thc anonymous body is thetefore the hinge between both paradoxi-
cal doublings-the in-itself-for-us of nature and thc prcrcflcctivc-for-
reflection of the hociy-each of' which manifests a certain resistance or
aloofncss as well as making possihle a certain crea ti ve exprcssion. Justas
percepti-on already thc natural world onto which it opens
(or, as Merleau-Ponty will later say, "stylizes" it), reflection is always in
some sense a reconstruction aftcr the fact of this perceptual moment.
10
Merleau-Ponty's originality lies in affirming this creative mediation as
the obverse of our openness onto transcendence, undercutting any skcp-
ticism about recapturing nature or the prereflective in th<"ir prelapsarian
70
MERlEAU-PONTY'S PHilOSOPHY O F NATURE
pu ri ty. Be cause the rlisclosu re of the real as su eh requ i res crcatiw: cxprcs-
sion, the o nly possible "rcturn" to naturc is by way of an appropriation
t hat goes bcyonrl it.
Thc parallcl rclationship betwcen pcrccption and reflC'ction allows
us to speci f) more precisely two aspccts uf our rclati onship with naturc:
its immcmoriality and aloofness. imnwmoriality, rccall
t hat perception opens on to the "corc of thc thing" that always cxcceds,
in i ts con traction of a n in fin i ty of rclat ions, t he perceptual encou n ter.
This is the basis fur the thing's paradoxical prcscntation to perception
as "in-itsclf. " Such a contraction of relations will includc thc temporal
as well as the spatial , with the conscqucncc that cach perccived enfolds
thc en tire history of its temporal tTlati ons and, by extensio n, thc history
of thc uni vcrse. Likc the refl cctive opening o nto the unrcflccti\'C', the
pcrccptual onto any perceived is thus a rclatiun with thc im-
memorial, a ll C'\'Cr-prC' sC'nt past. It is this contraction of the imme mori a l
past wi thin the dcpths of C\'<'ry perception of nature that leacls Mcrleau-
Ponty Lo describe such experi e ncc as the e terna! return of a "first rl ay":
'In ordcr that 1 may the tree as a tree, it is ncccssary that, be-
neat h this familiar mean the momcntary arrangcmcnt of thc Yisible
se ene should begin all ovcr as on t he \'ery first da y of the
to outlinc thc idea ofthis trce" (PP54/ 50- 51). Thc immcmo-
rial past of thc "fl rst d ay" animales e,ery perception, li ke thc
anonymous body, such a past ca n "prescnt" itself unly la tcrally, only as
the appeariug ofwhat cannot rlircctly appcar.
11
lf the "core of rcality" that is discloscd within perception is immc-
morial, thcn wc can a new appreciati on or the a loofness or inhu-
maniry of the that is, the sense in whi ch it rcjccts the
body. lf dcscriptions are accurate, then the
subject's relation with naturc is always aud essentially.Janus-faccrl: on thc
onc hand, anclas a conditi on for its attunement with the sensible, thc
body is en-natural with what it pcrcci,cs; but, on the othc r hand, andas
the condition for in-i tself, nature exceeds the body ancl withclraws
into an immcmorial depth bcfore thc body's advanccs. Thus, onr kin-
ship with ancl estrangement from nature are essentiall y linkcd alrcady al
the leve! of pcrccptual dialogue. This structure of kinship all(( estrangc-
mcnt is doublerl when we consiclc r reflection 's of thc prcreflcctivc
body. This suggcsts that thc kinship and cstrangcmcnt of reflective con-
sciousness with respect tu its own cmbucliecl naturc are cqually cssential.
The consequencc of this analysis is that naturc 's aloofncss and re-
sistance, or uur alicnation from it (and from our own boclies) , cannot be
treated me rely as a consequcncc of a particular cultural or intell ectual
histOI), nor as the result of our tcchnological innmati ons or phonetic
71
RADICAl REflECTION ANO T HE RESISTANCE Of T HIN GS
lt fo ll ows from the structure of perception ancl re flect io n as
such. as a manifcstation of' the relatiou of cxcess all(l withholding that
consti tutes thcir opcnness unto an altcrity, a n Other [Auln']"
(J>JJ Nature's otherness and exccss ovcr what wc can percci,c
or conccive is thcrefore impliecl in e\ery perceptual a nd reflec-
tive clescription. \\'e fo llowi ng Levi nas, call this aspect of nal urc
the "elemental," inhercn t in the "thcre is" of cve1-y
We haw said abmc that the of perception carries forward
an exprcssiYity opcrati\c in thc symbolism of thc thing, sincc thc unity of
the bocly is alreacly a response to the thing's soli citation. In thi s sense, the
exprcssivity of pcrception appeared to be an cxtension of t hc expressivc
telcolo..,ry uf nature itsclL Ir the bocly, situated as it is with in the
of relations that constitute thc "corc of rcality," is actually
a mument of nature's own expression, how cl oes the sitnation stand with
reflection, in thc light of' its double cstrangement from nalure? Therc are
two paths that wc mighttake in this question. The flrst path
would be to undcrstand thc crcativc mmcmcnt of reflection,
its radical reflexivity, as grounded within naturc's 0\\'11 duality, in the dc-
hi sccnce alrcady inti matccl by the separalion uf in-itsclf and for-us mo-
mcnts. In other worcls, reflection would remain fully continuo us with a
naturc that is not self-iclcntical. Down this path, we would hnd that reflec-
ti on,j ust as well as perception, leads toa ki nd of'"co-naturality," although
in a se nse that is primarily cliffcrential. Thi s a reinte rpretation of
reflection that sets it within the movcmcnt of an exprcssivc "teleol-
o..,r: of naturc. Thudore Geraets has argued, we fi nrl Mcrleau-Ponty\
latcr mming in this direction, leacling toward the
\icw that, in worcl s, "manis nalure's own way of its own


We rnay already f'tncl thc hint of this position, as
notccl abovc, in Mcrlcau-Ponty's characterization of our exprcssi\'c gcs-
turcs and as modcs of "si nging the world" (I-'P21H/ 217).
In his latcr writings, Mcrlcau-Ponty wi ll cha racteri1.e the relation-
ship bctwecn reflcction and in terms of a "tcleology," as we see
most cxpli citly in thc closing lincs of his late essay on Husserl, "Thc Phi-
losopher ancl ITis Shadow":
Thi s renewal of the worlcl is al so mind's rcncwal, a rediscovcry of that
brute mind which , untanwd any culture, is askcd to create cullllrc
atH'\\. From thcn 011 thc irrclatin is not natiii'C in itsclf, nor thc wstem
of ab'>olutc conscioumcss's apprchcnsions, nor man either, but thal
"teleolo.,')" llusscd spcaks about which is wriucn and thought aho111 in
parcnthcses-thatjointing ami faming of lk ing which is being rcal-
it.cd through man. (S22H/ I HI)
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74
MERLEAU - PONTY'S PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE
hnc ata significant tension within :\lerleau-Pont\ 's acco11nt ofour cmer-
gence within nat11rc, ancl onc which is tH'\Cr in fJhPnomPnnlof!J
of I)I'I!PjJiion. This tcnsion concerm tlw status of what \ferlcau-Ponty
herc namcs thc "pre-rdlccti\'c" or "tacit" cogito, the prerdlectin gi,en-
ness of the self to itsclf (PP3H 3-!. 46011. 1()711.). Thi-, cogito is "tacit"
or ''silcnt," in contrast with the e:-..plicit "spoken" cogito of thc Cartc-
sian fotmula, since it has not yet found e:-..pression ft itsclL .\ccorcling
to \kt leau-Pont\, this "tacit cogito" senes as a hingc bct11ecn the self
ancl thc 11orld, since it is simultancoush our ginnncss to oursehes ancl
our openness to the worlcl. As \l. C. Dillon has righth noted, the "tacit
cogi to" oc e u pies tlw position in of!JnrtjJI ion t hat wi 11, in
Mcrleau-Pont\ 's later works, be filled bY thc reflcxi1it\ of thc borly, as
figurcd in tlw rclation ofthc touching to tlw touchccl (Dillon 1997, 104-
f))_ But \lerleau-Ponty alreacly rccogni1cs thc rdlcxi\'itv ofthc touching-
touclwd relation in Plzenomnwlogy, wherc he categori1cs thc csscntial dis-
tinctions betwccn thc hocly anclthings in the world:
In this bundle ofbones and mmcle' whirh lll\ 1ig-ht h<llld prcscnts to
lll\ lcft , 1 Cdll anticipatc for an in .. .tant thc intcgunwnt 01 inramation ol
that othcr ri{ht hand. ali1e amlmobile. 11hirh 1 tlnustt<mards thing'>
in OJd('l 10 explore them. 1 he hod1 r.llch<'' 1t.self lrom the outside en-
gagcd in a cognitiH' process: it tries 10 tou< h it-.clf "hile being- touchcd.
,md mitiate' " 1--ind ofrcflcction" \\hich is \tdfl<i<'lll 10 di,ting-ui\h it
11om ohjen-.. (/'/' 109 1 06-)
Oddh, this "kind of' reflcction" airead\ opn;uivc in the body is ne1er
linl..ed b1 f\krleau-Pontywith the tacit cogito. But this is prccisely because
the tacit has no common basis with tlw natural sclf' of thc body,
sincc it is prescnted instcad, ttnder tlw influcncc of both Scheler atHI
Sartre, as a "rctreat of not-being" (PI) This intcrpretation of
our fundamental sclf-gi\'e1111ess is cchoed hv f\krlcau-Ponty\ othcr char-
anerintiom of the ontology of subjeni,it\ in 1'/u' IIO!tll' llofol(l' as a "fissurc"
or "gap" in thc world or, in thc \\ords of\'aln, as a "llaw"
in the "grcat diamoncl" (PP240 211 ). -'
1
This fissure or non-bcing ofsub-
jcct i1 i t\ is t he space of' auto-affcction, b1 '' h ic h conscious-
ness stcps back from nature in orcler to rdle< tiH' k11cmledge uf it.
Out -.upport lor this "non-being," \lerleau-l'ont\ s,l\s, is sincc
"spee< h is the excess of our cxistcncc m er natural be ( PP 229 229).
l"h us t1 ndn..,tood, thc taci t cogi to opcns a spacc 101 auto-allcct ion, but it
docs so in an intcriorit) that breaks with our natt11al being.
1
,\s \\T han sce11, anothcr tcndcnn is clomi11ant in
:Vkrlcau-Pont\ 's rdlections 011 onc that is bctter cxprcssecl
75
RADICAL REFLECTION ANO THE RESISTANCE OF THINGS
ll\ hi.., charactcrintion or the as a "hollow" or "fold" of the worlcl
(I)P 2 19 2-19-:)0). Thcsc topological llletaphor-. -.uggest that the auto-
.tfkction that comes to fruition in pnccption ancl rdlection is not
achic1cd 11ithin the immanencc of consciousness. Rathcr, rdlection re-
ttun-. to itsclf onlv b) wa) ol a passagc thmugh thc world: 1 am con-
'cious ol tlw world thnHtgh m1 hoch, and 1ct 1 <an l..nm1 111) bod) onh
t hmugh thc \1orld (PP 97 94). Thc implic .ttion of thc bod\''s dialogue
11ith things. then, is that "se11'>UOU'> rcflcction has to take the rounclabout
\1<1\ of cxtcriorityand difTerencc" (Bcnwt 60). Ifwe follow through
thc or the "folcl," it is clcar that thc anto-allcction in is no
longcran actilityofthcsubjcct, but rathet an ncnt ofnature. Reflection
''ould thcrefore be understood as the of the a-subjectil'e
1 i k of th i ngs. As we ,,ill se e, :V1erleau-Ponty\ la ter accoun t of' t he world as
"(lcsh" mmes precisely in this dircction. This tunt will also rcquire us to
rcconsidcr the naturc of exprcssion. The rdlccti\'C attemptto e11counter
thc inhuman lik of things requires a poetic mode of expression, since
l<tnguagc must be considered, not as tlw exccss of human subjccti\'it}
on' t natural but instcad as a rcgion of natural in 0\\'11
Funhcnnore, the mo1ement o( cxpression will not be a simple
rr.msition from silencc to sincc languagc \1ill be incorporatcd
into a siknce that is not its contran atHI \1hi< hit \1ill incorporate in turn
( 179). -,
B1 positing the tacit cogito as a "rctrcat of non-being," \!erleau-
l'ont\ lllows both Scheler and Sattre in gi1 ing human rdlcction an on-
unique statm. But thc contrast \\Otks onh if we assume for
bcing a l..ind of positi1ity, an absencc of an\ auto-affection, and ueat
rdlcction either as panicipation in a nom,otlclly (;t' l\1 or as being's
(ailcd spcculati\'e attcmpt to prmide its own f"oundation (Sartre 1943,
!iH 1- H:J !i20-21 ). If, on thc othcr hand, tTlutning to thc insights of the
(;cstalt ontolo.,ry prcscntcd in Tite .'-illllclull' of Bt'lumim; wc unclerstand
nature as a S\stem of dif'ferences without positin tcnn, how then should
\\C understand the ontological situation of rdlcctionr Would thcrc be,
in such an ontology, any basis lora pri1ilcging ofhuman rdlection, once
it is undcrstood as onl) one form olnaturc's auto-afTenio11 the
m.lll\ othet nodcs of cll.pressiYe lifc? \\'ould thc "brutc mind" that such
<111 ontolo,T\ reju1enates be in am sensc a clistinctin h human mind?
3
Animality
In his popular c nvironmentalist novel fllzmad, Daniel Quinn calls atten-
tion to the "creation lll\ th" of our culture, according lo whi ch human bc-
ings a re thc tclm of lhe C\olutionan process. To illmtratc 1his poinl, the
charactcr Ishmael, a telepathic gorilla, imagines an "ant hmpological"
inter\"iew \\ith a jelh fish undertakcn a hall bi llion ycar-. ago, prior 10 the
cvolution of land animals. In this imaginan dialogue, thejcfl)fish insists
that it procceds slrict ly on the basis of "obscrvation, logic, ami the scicn-
tific method," but comes to the concl usion thatjellyli slws themselvcs a re
the obvio us pinnacle of the evolutionarv process, the goal toward which
this process has tended from its outsct. Thc jelhfish's conclusio ns are
in tended to strike lhc rcadcr as ahsurd, sin ce lhe process of specialion
has not stopped in lhe mean lime; in retrmpecr, 1he jelh lish is only one
specics among mam. Bul, according to lshmael, human'> ;u e in no better
a posilion to draw such a conclusion aboul 1he ir own place in lhc cvo-
lutionary process. Ccnainly thcre is no scie ntilic basis for such a claim,
since the processes of speciation han continueclunabated sincc our ar-
rival on thc scene, and thcrc is consequenlh no rcason to think our spc-
cies is the last. L' llimalcly, the inlerprctation of the mcaning or goal of
the cvolutionan process is notan cmpirical question but a philosophical
one. The ubiquitous aggranditcnt e tll of hnmans as thc "clmax of the
1d 10lc cosmic drama of crcation" is thereforc rcnaled to be nothing
more than a cultural myth (Quinn 1992, :>4-58).
Quinn 's jcllylish story is in tended to clcmonstratc tite tc nacity of
our tenclencv toward "human cxccptionalism," and cspeciallv to illus-
trate that thc rejenion of theistic worl<h'icws is no guarantee of aYoiding
such dogma. But tlw mcssagc of the ston is complicated b1 the fact that
the imagined j<.'lh lish is itsclf a "rati onal" creature '' ith thc capacit\ for
Janguage, as is lshmael , the fictional gorill a who serves as mentor for thc
novel's human protagonist. Thc charactcrs of lhe gori lla all(( jellyfish
turn out to be huma ns in ani mal d rag wlto can make their case against
human cxceptionalism only by thcy rnakc use of the
distincti\ e h human capacities of language ancl reflect ion all(( thereby
reinscribe the HT\ diiTerence the1 sct out to cien). On thc one hand,
rcccnt rescarch that tlw cogniti\'C gap bet\H't'n humans and
76
77
ANIMALITY
othcr animals is much narrower than has formcrh lwcn supposed, with
thc grcming conscnsus that out dillcrcnccs are a mattn ol clcgrce ratlwr
than kind,
1
and c\cn thc ubiquitous critique ofanthropomorphism as a
wmptom of bias in scientific imtstigation is undergoing H'e\aluation.!
On the otlwr hand, e\Tll if humam are the product of an en>lutionan
process, and ewn if our cogniti1e ami communicatin capacities differ
only by degrce from thosc of other animals, might not thcsc diflerences
stilljustil) an exceptional status? EYcn if humans turn out not to be thc
"rational" animal, taking this adjcctive broadh, might wc not still be
1he onh jJIIilo\ojJiuml onc?
From the slandpoint of en>lutionan biolog". it
secms that tlw amwcr would be ncgati,e: human capa< itic-., inclucling
thosc of languagc ancl are just as much a product
of evolut ionarv sclcction as thc traits of other animals. E\en if humam
havc capacitics that clistinguish us from othcr spccics, thcsc are no more
or less exceptional that the distinguishing of othcrs. As Mary
\(iclgln puts t hi-. point, "\\'e are not thc only unique spccies. Elcphants,
as muchas oursclns. are in mam \\<t\'> uniquc; '>O are albatro-.ses, so are
giant pandas" (:\l idgle\' 2003, J:i2). Our uniqueness, thcn, rcgardlcss ol
thc caparit1 that we might highlight to make it salient, is no cause for
counting ourschcs as spccial. 1 f th is tcndency toward human exception-
alism lacks roots in scientific pcrhaps we can scek iLs sources,
as docs Midgle1, in our anxicties about the unacn: ptable parts of our
own nauu-cs, wh ich is wln attt'lll(HS to clarify o u r a m biguous uses of
lhe term animal cannot fail to be "dcepiY ami incurabh emotional"
( \Iidgle\ 1 i 1). Sin ce the drawing of thc distinction betwecn hu-
mans and othct animals concerns the constitution of our 0\\ n identitics.
it can IH'\Cl be a neutral orohjecti\e mattcr. \\'e ddinc ourseh-es byan ex-
ternalifation ofthosc qualit ics wc lind unacceptable in our 0\\n naturcs,
so that the distinction between huma n and animal is drawn not ouLsidc
ourselves but within us, betwecn "parts" of oursehes. Thus, as Ciorgio
\gambcn notes. the diYi'>ion of animal from "man" must be located
within "man" himsclf-for imtanre, as the interna( schism ofboch from
soul or of natural from di\ inc-surh that "man" must himsclf he uncler-
stood as a "place ... of ceaseles'> di' isions ancl caes u rae" (,\gamben 200-!,
IG). For Agamben, thc central qucstion of our "posthiston" is preciseh
that or our animalit)', posed most concrctcly by thc amhivalcnce of our
embodimcnt, "this hod)," as ,\gamben puts it, "that is irreducibly drawn
and di,idcd hctwccn animalit\ and humanit( (Agambcu 2004, 12) . "It
is more urgcnl," ,\gamben argues, "to work on these diYisions, to ask in
what waY-within man-ha-. m,\11 becn scparated from nonman, and the
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80
MERLEAUPONTY'S PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE
tlw animal is opcn to thc world around it , but opcn in a W<l) that fails to
to accede to bein.:{. lleidcggcr concludcs that "Being open
in rapti\'llion the eumtialfJOHPISion of the animal. On the basis of this
pmscssion it can be deprived, it can be poor, it can be detcrmin<.>d in its
bcing b\ povert\. "'' The animal, thcn, is "poor in world." \\'e take
carc not to intcrprct Hcidcggcr's remar ks as a straightforward justifi-
ration for am 1alue priorit) of humans O\er nonhuman animals, oras,
in the \\Or ds of \\' illiam just "anothcr c'>scntiali '>t or humanist
'thcon oftlw nature ofanimallifc."
111
ben if is corren to claim
that in lleidegger's text thcre is "no scn\c in \\hich Dasein ma) be saicl
to be 'bctter' than a li\'ing thing," it is rw\crthelc'>s ckar that 1 l eidegger
delineatcs an ontological boundary betwccn and humans ancl
accords to thc lattcr what we might callan "ontological privilcge."
11
Such
an ontological privil<.>ge may not be thc narcissism of thc jcllyfish that
Quinn warns us to avoid, but can we den) that it amounts toa form of
human cxceptionalism nonethcless? Othcrwisc, why draw a boundary at
precisclv this point, divicling all living things along thc axis of opcnncss
to bcing? Whv is ontological acccss the meas u re of a bcin:(s bcing?
Although Ilcidcggcr's in!>istcnce on tlw ontological gap bctween
the human ancl nonhuman animal has recci\cd considerable attention
in rcccnt it must be noted that he not alone among phc-
nonwnologists in rlrawing this

:\or can lleidegger's

insistencc on thc radical distinction bctwcen human ami animal be dis-
as a consequence of thc pcculiaritics of mm interpretation
of phcnomenology; rather, the animal-human di..,tinnion to thc
lwart 1101 onh of thc phcnomcnological mcthod but or philosoph) it-
self. In its attcmpts to think through the rclation of humans with other
animal s, allCI with nature more gcncrally. ph il osophv conf'ronts a funda-
mental ambiguity that has traditionally been expressed in terms of thc
contrast hetween lif'c and spirit. In his last work, l\Jan \ Plaa in Nature,
Max Scheler wrotc that "man is more of a problem to himself at the
prcsent time than ever before in all rccordcd historv" 0',\IK 10/ 4). For
Scheler, thc problematization of thc notion o f "man" is not a but
rathcr tlw nrv promise ofthe human it , of tlw "csscntialnature" that
distinguishcs m in kinrl from C\'CI') othcr spet Tlw notion or "man"
is, for Scheler, decepti,cl) ambiguous, ginn that we use this tcrm to re-
fcr, on thc one hand, to "the particular morphological e haractt>ristics of
manas a ..,ubdass of the \ertebratc'> al1(1 mammals" (S,\/1\ 12 6), \\hile,
on thc other hand. thc word "man" also "significs a set of charactcristics
\\hit h mmt he sharplv distinguishcd from thc concept 'animal. '" lt is
thcsc lattcr e haractcristics, thosc of Spirit or :\lind (GI'i.l/), that Scheler
as reprcsentatin of our "essenti al natu1 e" (SAl/\ 1 Scheler
81
ANIMALITY
willingl y attrihutcs to animals not onlv instinctual allCI habitual bcha\-
iors, but also practica! intelligencc, the capacitv of'"responding, without
trial and error, toa new situation meaninghtlly" (S,\11\ 33/ 29). Along
\\ith gerlllinc intclligence, Scheler recognitcs in animals "the capacit\
fr gcnerosit\, help, reconciliation, frien cbhip and similar phenomcna"
( .\ ,\11\ :"Jc,cnheless, the goals of this intelligent beha,ior are set
ll\ thc organism's clriYes, that the animalne\er has the opportunity to
rlroose between values as such. The animal\ choices are always a func-
tion of its \ital
The human bcing, for Scheler, can neither be placecl on a con-
tinuum with thc animal, to differ from it only b't degrecs, nor be set off
from the animal as clifferent in kind thanks to somc cognitive capaci t\'.
Rather, what definitively ciistinguishes "man" from animal is precisely the
dinwnsion of'spirit, which is "opposcd to life as such, evento li f'e in man"
(.)',\]/\ While the animal remains tiento thc vital interests of
milieu, the human, through thc dinH'nsion of spirit, is "open to the
worlcl": the animal
li\'t'\, as it \\ere, ccstaticalh imme1scd in il'. emironment which it caiTie'>
along '"a snail its shell. lt cannot transfrm the emironment
into an ohject. lt cannot perform the peculia1 act of detachment ami
di'>tance b\ which man transfo1ms ,111 "em imnmcnt" into the "world,"
01 into a \\m bol of the woild. (.\,\//\ 11
1 hi.., "peculiar act of dctachment ancl distance" made possihk by spirit
is thc foundation, accorcling to Scheler, of it>, idcation, the con-
o.,tmction of a world of ideas, and thc oricntation towarcl truth. lnclecd,
..,pirit motivates both philosophy and rcligion, since it re\cals to us thc
cont ingcncy of this carthly existenc<.> and thc transcendence of our spiri-
tual hcing in relation to it. lt is this distanrc that spirit opcns between
oursclves and the worlcl that nPrPHilalr>s, for Scheler, our alicnation
f'r om-and dominance ovcr-naturc:
\\lwn man. becoming himself, hml..e with thc nwthoch ofall preceding
lile to adjust orto be adjusted to tlw tmimnnwnt and embarl..ed upon
tlw op?,mire di1 ection of adapting tlw 1 t'Haled \\Olld to him'>e!Lmd to
his 0\\11 life of organic \tabilit\. \\lwn man '>q><uated him..,elf from nature
ami tramfonned it into an ohject suhje<t to domination anoto the con-
trol of \\lnboliC' manipulation-at thi'> moment man was aho diiYen to
anchor his own central bcing in sonwthing hc,ond thi-. \\OIId. !le \\ho
ha el placed himself so boldh ahmc thi., \\O l id rould no longer regard
himself mercl; as a "member" or "pa1 t" of this wodd. (S.\ /1\ HH. 90)
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84
MERLEAU-PONTY'S PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE
more generally thc rclation bctwccn lile and mine!, rcmains a point of
significant tcnsion. We find throughout ocmTe two op-
posing tendencics that tiennc Bimbcnet has described as the "archeo-
logical" and thc "teleological," the first oriented toward the primordial
origins of consciousness in its lived perceptual si tuation, and the latter
concerned with thc developmcnt of consciousness toward rationality
and as its telos (Bimbenet 2005). captures the
difficulty of reconciling thesc two tendencies in his fonnulation of thc
"problem of perception" at thc close of Tlze StrurturP of BPiwvi01; a ncl
this problem orients his analysis in its seque!, Plznwmmolof:)' of PnafJlion,
where he presents the return to "sen se experiencc" (le .smlir) as a means
of rethinking the undcrstancling in terms of both its "vital inhcrence"
(the archeological tendcncy) and its "rational intention" (the tclcologi-
cal tcndency; PP65/ 62). Since this return to sense expcricnce concerns
the rC'Iation bctwcen speciftcally human perccption and rationality, non-
human animals reccivc no signillcant trcatment in this text. The bricf
rcmarks l\lcrlcau-Ponty docs make conccrning animals rcitcrate hispo-
sitian in the earlier tcxt; for instance, he notes that "our body docs not
imposc dcfinitc instincts upon us from birth, as it docs upon animals"
(l>f.J 171 / 1 69), anclthat, whilc "animal behavior aims atan environment
(l'mwPll) and centres of rcsi:,tance (Widenland) ... . Human behavior
opcns upon a world (\Vell) and upon an (Gegm.1lanrl) beyond the
tools which it makes for itsctr''

Those who have read Merleau-Ponty's account of perccptual reci-
procity as providing the foundation for a kincl of "bioccntric egalitarian-
ism" might dismiss these rcmarks as insignificant asides clemonstrating
only Merlcau-Ponty's failure to appreciatc the implications of his own
descriptions. But this wottld be lo overlook the peculiar ontological role
that the human being plays, throughout :vterleau-Ponty's work, as be-
ing's means of sclf-cxpression. Dcscrihing art as a process of cxpression,
Merleau-Ponty recalls C1anne's rcmark that "the landscape thi nks itsclf
in me ... ancl l am its consciousncss" (SSS23/ 17). v\'hcn 1 contcmplate
thc blue of thc sky, 1\!erlcau-Ponty writcs in Phnwmmoloto' uf PerafJlion, "it
'thinks itselfin me,' 1 amthc sky itselfas it is drawn togcther anclunified,
andas it bcgins to exist for itsetr'' (PP248/ 249). The human percciver is
thereforc a kincl of "hollow" or "folcl" within bcing, what Merlcau-Ponty
describes a fcw pages earlier, rclying on the phrasc from Valry, as the
"flaw" in the "great diamoncl" of thc world (/JF240/ 241) This phrase is
repeated in Merlcau-Ponty's commcntary on Sartre in "A Scandalous Au-
thor," where the contrast bctwccn the ontological situation or humans
and nonhuman animals is clearly clrawn: "Mattcr, sky, harvests, animals
are bcautiful. Man 's attitucles, his very clothes, bear witncss to the fact
85
ANIMALITY
that he is of a diffcrcnt 01-der. He is a flaw in the great diamoncl of the
IH>rlcl" (S.\:) 57 / 4.). "Man" can serve asan interruption in the plenitude
of being precisely because of his constitutive negatiYity, which-eYen if
\Jerlcau-Ponty conceives of this as a hollow or fold rathcr than a hole of
absolute non-bcing-apparently distinguishcs us from thc continuity of
natural being, including non human animals. It is our expressive capacity
ancllanguage in particular, as thc cxcess of our existence over natural bc-
ing, that provides the support for this circumscribed negativity ancl un-
\cils that "miraclc ofcxpression" toward which all othcr bcings tend (PP
1 t is thcrcforc only th rough human exprcssion, su eh as
the paintings ofCzanne, that thc truth ofthe worlcl can be made mani-
fest: "Inclecd only a human being is capablc of such a vision which pene-
trates right to the root of things hencath the imposccl ordcr of humanity.
Everything indicates that animals cannot looh at things, cannot pcnctratc
them in expectation of nothing but thc truth" ( SNS 22/ 16).
Yct a ncw anrl significant developmcnt in Merlcau-Ponty's under-
standing ofthe human-nonhuman relation is introducecl in a briefradio
address conccrnccl with animallifc that he presented in 1948.
21
Criticit-
ing the classicalunclerstancling of animals (as well as children and "prim-
itives") as eithcr irrational mechanisms or privativc analogues of adult
human consciousness, Mcrlcau-Ponty affirms that nonhuman animals
"proceed to trace in their envi ronmcnt, by the way that they behave or
act, thcir vcry own vision of things" and consequcntly cannot be deniccl
a "kind of in teriority" ( C Merleau-Ponty contin u es lo affirm he re
that the animal 's way of" 'gi,ing shape' to the world" is characteristic of
its specics ami lacks thc coherence toward which the "healthy, civilised,
adult human being strives" (e40/ 75-76, 37/ 72). Yct he also cmphasi/es
the of h umans to atta in the cohercncc for which they strivc, open-
ing a space for human unclcrstanding to inform itselfthrough a "liv[ing]
alongside" the non human animal (e 37/ 72, 39/ 75). The "normal" pcr-
son is thcrcforc "intcd ... to rediscover within himsclf thc whole host
of bntasies, dreams, pattcrns of magical bchavior and obscurc phcnom-
cna" that remain a pan of cvery consciousness and that "!cave his knowl-
cdge of thc natural world -iddlecl with gaps, which is how poelly creeps
iu" (e 37/ 73). Artistic expression, then, especially that of modern art,
takcs as its inspiration the i rrational kernel of human consciousncss and
finds thcrc a kinship with the child, thc "primiti1e," and cs-
pccially thc animal. The kinship is manifcst, Merleau-Ponty concludes,
in the role that animals play as emblematic of the human, and e\en thc
superhuman, in the drcams of "primitives," the cxperienccs of children
ami poets, and "the secrct rcveries of our inner lite" (e 40-42/ 76-77).
Thc most mature fonn of human consciousness is thercfore that which,
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88
MERLEAU-PONTY'S PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE
inlnlwinin('!l Althoug-h no treatnwnt of this "man-animal intenwining-"
appear<, in thc puhlished portion of Thr \'i11hlr (1/1(//hr f1111iliblr, \\T can
g-ain sonH' ol intcntiom from his coursc notes.
In 's 1957-58 cottrsc on ",\nimalit\, the lluman
Bo<h, and tlw Passag-e to Culture," he takes up ag-ain thc musical fig-
ure of animal heha\'ior, this time 1)\ wa' ol a reading- of the etholog-ist
.J akob \On l.'exkiL Alrearly in '1/r .\/rur/u/1' oj !Munlf(ll, :\krlcau-Polll\'
had notcd l lcxkll\ proposalthat "e\ en organism ... is a meloch \\hich
sing-s itself"," but thcre had onh been quoting- a passage
citcd \\ithout rclercnce by Frcclcrik Bll\tcnclijk (.'-i(.' 17'2 I.'J9). :\ferleau-
Pont\ \ onlv invcstigation of llexkiill\ \\Ork on ih own tcrms occurs in
thi s lccturc coursc two dccadcs latcr. :\l<:lod) is again al the center of
i\.l<:rleau-Pont\ 's interests, and he concludes lhat "il is lhe thcme of thc
nwlody ... that best exprcsscs thc in1ui1ion of thc animal according lo
Uexkll" (,\'23:1/ 178). What the notion ofnwlodyclucidatcs is thc on-
tolog-ical statm ofthe animal's l ' mul('{/, its milieu or cnvironmcnt, which,
according- to Ucxkll, can be explaincd nei1her through physical pro-
cesses alone nor through an explicil plan in the consciousness of the
animaL In lact, lhc l'mwrl/must he C\Okcd asan cxplanator) principie
both lr lhc animal\ physical dc,elopment and for its bchmior. But the
l 'nmlf'll ihclf cannot be reduced lo or objcct; il is, instcad, a kind
of sclf-organi1ation at the leve! of life. Thm, it is a kind of "mclorly that
is singing itsdf":
\\'lwn IH' imcnt a mdod\, thc mdoch sing-. in us mudt n1o1 e than we
sing it; it gocs do\\n the tlnoal ol lhc singc1, a' l'nlllst ""'- ... \\'e think
n;umalh that thc past '><'<Tetes thc futmc altead of it. But this notion of
time is rcfuted b1 the meloch. ,\ thc monwn1 1dH'n tlw mcloch bcgins,
thc lastnotc is thcrc, in its own mannn .... lt is in this \\a\ that things
happcn in thc construclion ofa li1ing hcing. Thc1c is 110 priority of
dkcl ove1 C<IIISI' .... lt is impossihlc lo di-.tinguish the means and the
cnd, tlw c\sence and the exi\tcncc in it. Fmm a ('('IHCI of pln'>iral mat-
lt'l -.urge-. an cmemble of principies of di-.et'llllllent ata ginn moment,
\\hirh meam that in this region of the \\Oild, th< n \\ill he a \ita! <'l<'llt.
1 73-7-t)
\\' het-eas 's earli et use ol 1he musi(al metaphor had em-
phasited 1he fi"it\ of the organism\ nwlo<h b\ thc a priori '>tructurcs
of \ita! need, Iwre 1he accent is on the ccologi(al relationships formed
hetween 1hc mg-anism, olher creatun.,, a11<l lheit milieu. In fact, the
animal\ nwlod) en1ers into a kind of counler point "ith its milieu that
remaim c,ursall) inexplicable: "Each action of lhe milieu is conditioned
89
ANIMALITY
In thc action of thc animal; 1he animal\ behmior arouscs rcspomes
from the milieu .... In bric!', lhc exterior and the interior, 1he situation
,111d 1he mownwn tare n ot in a si m pie rclat ion ofcausalil\" ( .V229 l 75).
1 he rcla1ion betwe('n organism and milieu is thct cf'ore one of meaning-,
,tnd thc l 'mwrlt as a "natural plan" is alrca<h the introduction of wm-
bo]i.,m anda "heginning of culture." Bul 1here is no subject lo which
thc nwaning of this contrapunl<\l melo<h can he attribwed, since lhe
"unfurling- of the animal is like a purc \1,\ke th,tt is rclatcd tono boat''

:\krleau-Ponl\ draws '>imilar rondmiom from Roben Hardouin \
,t<coun 1 of animal mimicry and ,\do! f' Ponma nn \ t''-am i nation of animal
appcaranccs, both of wh ich rcsist explanation ci t hcr in terms of adapta-
tion lor oras a mere on 1he part of the outside ob-
Animalmimicry points loan intri nsic relation or indivision oflhe
,tnimal from its surroundings, a mutual "contaminati on" thal seems to
cntail a kind of"natural magic" But thc indi,ision
of mimicrv is no more magical, l\krleau-Pont\ suggests, than the miracu-
Iou" ('lllergence ofsense organs, \\hich, wi1hout \iolating 1he constrainrs
ol ramalil\, succccds in making- 1hc "or dinan and lhc cxtraordinan
communicate" (,\ ' 186). Portmann\ stu<h or 1hc forms of animal
.q>pcarancc undcrscore'> lhe fundanwntalh <'xpr<'ssi\ c characler of the
animal\ rclation \\ith its mili<'tt ancl the intetnal relation or indi<>tinc-
tion that cxists bctween tlwm. Tlw animal\ ltm presents an "existen tia!
\<IItH ol manifslalion" that ariscs nei1hn ftom tlw pursuit of survival
nor !mm a m inlcntional purposc bul in ,1 "perccplual rela1ion" be1ween
anim,ll and milieu (S246 1R8).
2
"
Funhcrmorc, we cannot under.,tand thc rclalions between animals
\\ilhin a species as a sum of individual'> extnior to eme another: "\-\' hal
<xists ate not scparatcd animals, but an interanimalily," wherein cach
animal is the mirror of lhc ot hcrs (N 2 17/ 189). This aspcct of animal
lile lind'> development in Konracl I.onnt and 1\'ikolaas Tinbergcn's de-
i pt ions of animal commun ication, wh ic h demonstrale thc cmcrgence
o( S\lnholism from natural sig-ns and tlw "reciproca! cxpression" mani-
kst in rituali'>tic beha\iors. "In shot t," "wc can
spcak in a ,-alid wav ofan animal cultmc" 198).
But :\1erl<v.tu-Pontv\ eHort lwrc is nol to taisc the animal to thc
len( of S\ mbolic behm ior or rdlectiH' acti\ it\ he had earlier re sen ed
lor human consciousness. His condmions are, instcad, ontolog-ical: "Bc-
h,n ior can be clefincd onh b' a pnreptual rclation and .. . Being can-
not be clefi ned out'>ide of' perccind he(ng-" (.\' 217 189). This remark
illuslrates thc re,ersal of mcthod that l\krleau-Pont\ \ studics of nature
and animal i1y follow in his lcctun courses, as compared with the car-
90
MERLEAU-PONTY"S PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE
licr focus on the problem of pcrccption posect in tcrms of thc rclation
between human perccptual and rellecti\'C consciousncss. In Tlw Strur-
lure of Belwvior, the conccpt of structurc attempted to hold two
incompatible approaches lo naturc: un thc onc hand, \lcrlcau-Ponty
saw in ,ita! behavior an immancnt and But
un thc othcr hand, his commitment to phcnomenological principies re-
quired him to trcatthis immancnt intelligibility asan object for human
consciousncss. This problcmatic rclationship betwcen thc Conccpt sunk
into Nature ancl thcn made explicit in sdf-conscious awarencss is prc-
ciscly thc "problem of perccption" arouncl which lirst
two books arc oricntcd. But in the nature lccturcs, \lerleau-Ponty takcs
mllurc as the noninstitutcd, as what precedes the intcntional acti\'ity uf
consciousness, and this allows him to dc\'elop his carlier into
thc mdodic unity of animal lifc into the articulation of an ontology of
percei\'cd bcing. Rather than relllrning to by way of pcrccptual
consciousness, these studics of animal lilf- indica te thc constituti,e refer-
cnce to perception within Being itsclf. Rcnaud Barbaras exprcsscs this
mcthodological re\'ersal as follows:
In [Phmomnw/o;y ofPI'IujJiion], thc natural world ... was reduccd to thc
achantage ofan incarnatcd subject, anclthc constittttin referencc of
this subjcct toa percei\'cd world was mack to appear. In thc latcr worb,
suspcnds subjecti\'il) ami beconH'' intcrcstcd in only
natutal bcing, al thc hean ofwhich he discmcr-. a comtitutivc rcfcr-
cnce to pe1-ception. (Barbaras 2001,
In this re,ersal of his approach, \-lerlcau-Ponty is no longcr thinking
nature, ancl thc animal in particular, in accorclancc with Agamben 's
"anthropological machine," that is, with thc aim of marking an interna!
schism in "man." Approaching both the animal and thc human by way
of "natural bcing" allows him to recognitc an irreducible lneinrwdf'l; an
intertwining, of animality ami humanit).
\lerleau-Ponty's investigation of thc lnfinandf"r is founcl primarily
in thc notes for his thircl and linal on the concept
of naturc in 19.)9-60, ":\'ature and Logos: Thc lluman Body.

Thcrc
:\lcrlcau-Ponty Tcilhard de Charclin 's id en tification of rellection
as the cliffcrcntiating charactcristic of human cvolution, sin ce this woulcl
amount to "establish [ing] man in a climension whcrc he no longcr had
any rclation with lifc" (,\" In other \\"Orcls, the prioritiL<ltion of
rellcction undcrstoocl as "ccphalitation" or "ccrcbrali;ation" would ka el
tu thc samc crror that wc saw in Scheler, as it rclies on concci\'-
91
ANIMALITY
ing of our capacity for reflection as necessarily invol\'ing a break with
naturc and lifc. Thc alternativc, Merleau-Ponty argucs, is to rccognitc
thc body's auto-affection-for cxampk, its capacity to touch itself ancl
to ;.ce itsC'If-as "rcllcction in figura! form" (\ ' 335/ 268, 340/ 273). Such
bodily rellcrtion would nol be the activity of a consciousness but insteacl
"'the coming-to-self of ... the Selbslung of Being, without a notion
of rhc subjcct" (X 335/ 268; see also .\ ' 340/ 273). From this undcrstancl-
ing of thc corporeal hasis for rclkction, Mcrlcau-Ponty m oves directly to
affirm the lnPinandn or intcrtwining of the human ancl animal: "From
this it follows thatthe relation ofthe human ancl animality is nota hicrar-
chical rclation, but lateral, an that docs not abolish kinship"
(X 335/ 268; sce a !so ,\' 340/ 273). Accordingly, if rcllection is inhcrcntly
corporeal and vital, thcn it invol\'eS nota break in thc continuity of our
rclations with animals but an anlrmation of this kinship.
\.1erleau-Ponty describes the tnm'e into rdlcction, in the passagc
just citccl, asan "mercoming" ora "surpassing," lUZ drjHlssemenl, but at
thc same time he insists that this mm'e is lateral rather than hicrarchi-
cal. At sc\cral other points in thc notes, he dcscribcs this transition as
a "metamorphosis," which implies a transformation rather than a tran-
This to rccognite a speciflc cliffcrence between hu-
mans and othcr animals in terms of reflection , even whilc rcsisting the
tcndcncy tu promote this difference toa kind of cxccptionalism. In this
rcgard, thc dcscription of animal-human intert\\ining contrasts with
\-lerleau-Pont:y's carlicr accounl in T/p Strurlure of Behavior, whcrc spirit
or mind is dcscribcd as the most comprehensiYe gcstalt, insofar as ittran-
wh i le incorporating the lower gcstalts of physical naturc ancllife.
Thc charactcristically human is still dcscribccl by :\<lcrleau-Ponty in terms
of spirit, hut now thc cmphasis is on spirit concci,ecl as a certain man-
ncr of being a body, on thc "bocly ofthe spirit" in \'alry's ancl
conscquently as a ccrtain di,ergence or Yariation of the more general in-
terrogati\'c tcnclency of lilf-: "Hody of Spirit, nature of Spirit. \'\' hich docs
not impede that thc contc11l is ,-cr) cti!Tcrcnt from the animals-thc hu-
man world from thc animal L'nmwlt-but the spirit is as naturalto manas
1\'ature is to animals" (.\' 28R/ 225) ?
1
This metamorphosis of lifc in lo spirit, or of animality into human-
ity, is comparable, l\lcrlcau-Ponty claims, to the emC'rgence of lifc from
physicochcmistry, a comparison that again echoes his carlicr dcscription
of mattcr, lifc, ancl mind as comprclwnsivc Hcre,
howc\'cr, thc transformation is prcscntcd notas a transccnclence toward
a higher levcl of structure but as a latcralmoYement cntailing no funda-
mental ontological diKontinuity:
92
MERLEAU-PONTY'S PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE
.Justas therc is an hwinandnof lifc and physicochemi'>try, i.e. , the rcali-
ntion of lil e as a fold or singularity of physicochcmistn -or struc-
ture-so too the human tu be taken in the lnPinanrlPrwith animalit;
aJl(l :\laturc .... ,\mi this is 11ll\ 11c are corHerned wi th the bock befure
bcing rcason, humanit) is another corporeit1. (.\'269 20H; see also
.\ ' 277 2 14)
This relation of intertwi ning is not trul y a surpassing, thcn, sincc wc fi.nd,
o n the o nc hand, "strange anticipations or caricatures of the human in
thc animal" (N 277/ 214), whilc, on thc other hand, the animality of
the human remains a "permanent attestation," so that, finall y, "animality
ancl humanity are giw'n only togcthc r" (.\'338/ 271). It is preciscly this
"st range kinship" that the notion of flesh is intended to make cogent,
sin ce it prcJ\idcs a means for understanding the visibility of thc it11'isiblc,
that is, the l'ital inhere nce ofspirit, in a way that treats thc two as ob,erse
ancl rcverse or pan ofa single ontological circulation. Just as the dual as-
pect of my body, splitting into sensibl e and sentient, fi gures being's dual
aspect ofl'isibility and imisibility, so it is thatlife clivcrgcs along multiple
lincs, both huma n a ncl nonhuman, neither remaining simply one nor
becoming entirely multiplc. Thus, wc can ncithcr draw a sha rp ontologi-
cal bounclary bctwccn human and nonhttman a nimal s nor arrange their
relations hi erarchi call\':
One cannot concei1T uf the relation'> between species or bctwecn thc
'>pecies and man in tcrms o! a hieranhy. There are differences of qual-
ity. but for this l'ery reason liling creatures are not superimposcd ttpon
one anothcr, the transcendcnce of onc by the othcr is, so to speak,
lateral rather than frontal, ami one mccts all sorts of anticipations and
rcminisccnccs. (NC 1%-:H Hi.' )
The best clue that we ha\'e for unral'cling this "strangc kinship,"
\lferleau-Ponty is "mythicalthinking." By way of cxample, he rc-
fcrs toa catalog, / ,ps masquPs F.\q1maux, for a contemporaneous exhibit
at the Guimet:
Masb uf thc lnuit!:) pe recall the original doublc naturc. Thc animal and
its human douhlc, the lnttit , are inscribed on the samc side, presentcd
eithcr simultaneously or alternati,ell', thanks toa clispositi\'e of mobilc
flaps opening ami cutti ng in on cach other. In this 1vav is rcstitutcd the
primiti1e state, when the emelope was a mas!-. that 11c willfully separatcd
in order to appear as man oras animal , changing appcarance hut notes-
scncc .... lt tTcalls a Lime ... 11hen the separation was not yct dlected. "
93
AN IMALITY
Commenting on thi s passage, l\-l e rleau-Ponty c mphasizcs the transition
from a "primordial indil'isi o n and mctamorphoscs," an origin in which
the human douhles the ani mal and the animal doublcs the human, to the
prese nt statc of scparation. But the caricatures and strangc bccomings
that mark the lateral relationship betwcen humans and animals are not
always so unidirectional, as Merleau-Ponty had recogni1.ed in 1948, when
he noted thc role tha t animals continuc to play "in thc sccret rc\'erics of
our inne r lif'e" (C40/ 76). Perhaps, then, the separation marked by Inuit
masks may be matchcd bv an exchangc or co-constitution in an oppositc
dircction. This exchange ofanimality-humanity anticipates thc concept
of "bccoming-animal" proposecl by Gillcs Deleuze ancl Fli x Guattari,
according to which human and a nimal e n ter into a single block of' be-
coming, a kind of duct or countcrpoint. For Dclcuzc and Guattari, such
bccoming, as we fine! it in musicians like Oli1ier Mcssiaen or painters like
Francis Bacon, is always bidirec tional: "Thc painter and thc musician do
not imitate the animal, they become-animal at the same time as thc ani-
mal bccomcs what they willcd, at the cleepest leve! uf thcir concord with
f\'at urc. Becoming is always double: that which o ne becomcs bccomes no
lcss tha n the onc that becomcs" (Dclcuze and Guattari 1980, 374/ 305).
Thus, Bacon 's slabs of fl esh disclose a "common zone of undccidability"
hctwec n human and animal, an open spacc within which cach is in tra n-
into its othcr (Bogue 2003, 11 1).
Merleau-Ponty's own intercst, howel'er, lies in what this primordial
indi\'ision ancl biclirec tional metamorphosis may teach us about our-
sches and abotll mind's emergence within nature. Thc "cxtraordina ry
represcntation of the animal as variant of humanity ancl of humanity as
\'ariant of animality" in the Inuit masks dcmonstrates that "thc re must
be a vital foundation of man ancl o f spirit ," namely, the human body (S
277a/ 307nll). This "strange kinship" revcals to us our intertwining with
"sensible Bcing," so that c1cn mine! or spirit is "increclibly penetratecl by
its corporeal st ructure" (N 339/ 271, 335/ 268). Whilc Tfzp Struclwr of Be-
havior had placeclthc accent on spirit or mind asan integrative clialectic
of frm tha t subsumes lif'e, Me rleau-Ponty here treats mind as emcrgcnt
from life by way of thc "fi gu ral form" of rcfkction in thc human body {lV
335/ 268). What distingui shcs mine! is prcciscly its orientation towarclthe
in\'isible dime nsion Being.
Merleau-Ponty says of this invisible dimension, which he equates
wi th mind or spiri t, that it is "not another positi\'ity: it is the in\'Crse or
thc othe r side of the ,isible," a "brute and sal'age mind" that unclerlies
our language and cultural acquisitions (X 274/ 212). Wc can only un-
de rstand this invisible dime nsion or being starting from thc l'isiblc, and
this process of rcfl ection is the "coming-to-self of Being ... without thc
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96
MERLEAUPONTY'S PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE
animals risks returning lo a philosophy of consciousnt:ss lhal alit:nates
humanity from life. If the relation of one hand touching anolher-thc
"touching-toucherl" relation-is "reflection in figura! form, the inner of
wbat is oult:r," tht:n refleclion can no longer be considered a capacity of
lhe human being; it is ratber thc "coming-to-self of Bcing," which entails
a lateral rather than a hierarchical relalion belween lifc and mind (N
3Hl/ 273). Animal being is, lherefore, just as much as human being, an
inlerrogative fold within the world's flesh. Consequently, when, in The
arulthe lnvible, Mt:rkau-Ponty defines philosophy as "the percep-
tual faith queslioning ilself about ancl founds this questioning on
a of the world 's flesh ( 1 '/ 139/ 103, 160ff./ ll9ff.), he is
admitting the possibility-perhaps eyen the necessity-ofan onlological
queslioning at the leve! of life as such. In other words, he is announcing
the possibility oran animal pbilosophy.
4
The Space of lntentionality and
the Orientation of Being
;\lerleau-Ponty's contribution tu our understanding of thc body's role
in the constitulion uf"livecl" spacc is well known.Jeflrey Malpas, fur ex-
ample, consiclers i\.lerleau-Ponty's Plzenomenology of Pn-rejJlion lO be an
"important instance in which the central role oflocality, especially as this
ariscs through emhoclimenl, is givcn philosophical grounding" (Mal-
pas 1999, H). Similarly, Eclward S. Cascy's cflorts to vindicate place are
inrlebted to Merleau-Ponty, cven if Casey Mcrleau-Ponty among
those philosophcrs who remained "insensiliYe" lo place by failing to
make it a thematic topic of stucly.
1
Neverthcless, Casey's proposal to
treal borly ano place as "congruent borrows heavily from
:\1erleau-Ponty, ancl he aclmits that, whilc "other phenomenologically
oriented writcrs havc exploren the further significa11cc oflivecl space, ...
11c>ne has clone so with such nuanced attenlion as Merleau-Ponty paid to
the way the lived budy gcars into placcs in their felt immccliacy" (Cascy
1997, 238)
These commentators havc given considerable attention to the lived
body's role in constituting space, bula deeper !ayer of Merleau-Ponty's
has escaped discussion, namely, his to redefine lhe spa-
tiality of intentionality itsclf. Clearly, Merleau-Punty presenls thc rela-
tion between lhe livecl bocly ano space as an intentional relation, even
as he gives thc meaning of "intentionality" a ncw inflection. This is why
his account of space escht:ws the altermtti\es between space as a given,
empirical reality-what he terms "spatialized" space-ancl space as an
isotropic ancl homogenous set of formal relations, that is, geometrical or
"spatializing" space. v\'hereas rcalists emphasi...:e lhe formcr, attempting
lo reconstruct the experience of space from causal physical rclatiuns,
idealists emphasit:t: the lauer, treating space as a synt.hctic mental or so-
cial conslruct, a sel of formal relations subjectivcly cunstiluted 011 thc
basis of perceptual cues. Rut space as wc prereflectively cxpcrience it,
"lived" space, is neither spaliali1ed nor spatialit:ing; it is a "thirrl form
of spatiality" presupposed by hoth. Livecl space is smsible, a meaning-
ful relatiun formed bctween thc borly ancl its environmc11t, and consc-
quenlly we musl unclersland it not in terms of causes ur significations,
97
98
MERLEAU-PONTY'S PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE
but instead, as \lcrlcau-Ponty tells us, in terms of "motives [moti(,]" (PP

Mcrleau-Ponty introduccd the term molivalion, borrowcd from
1 1 usserl 's fdf{ls, carlicr in Phmommology of Pr>rrPjJlion, where he describes
itas "one of those 'fluid' conccpts which ha ve tu be forme el if we want to
get back to phcnomena" (PP61 / 57).
1
In the chaptcr on spacc, thc con-
c<:>pt of motivatiun works to reinterprct another fluid concept, that of in-
tentionality. To say that spacc is motivated is to say that it must be under-
stood through intcntionality. M<:>rlcau-Ponty introduces the chapter on
space by reminding us that his investigations point toward a "ncw con-
ception of intcntionality," and the investigation of spacc is precisely in-
tended tu clucidate this new intentionality Tlw "classical"
conception of intentionali ty, which Mcrlcau-Ponty attributes to thc I lus-
scrl of the ldMs, "treats thc cxpcrience of the world as a purc act of
constituting consciousness," ancl does so only to thc cxtcnt that it un-
derstands consciousness as "absolutc non-being," while thc hylctic con-
tents ofconsciousncss belong to "opaque being" (PP281 / 283). Merleau-
Ponty's new conception of intcntionality is in tended asan altermlli\e to
this Manichean ontoloh'Y of plenitude versus \'Od.
The language of plenitude ancl void, full and empty, is obviously
a spatialized language. Although lcrlcau-Ponty's charactcri;.ation of
"classical" intentionalit:y here sounds more Sartrean than Husserlian, if
we acccpt Derricla's rcading of llusserl's "principie of principies," thcn
Husserl's privileging of presence imoh-es the effort to radically segrega te
an "inside" of primordial intuition from the of
and exteriority in general.
1
In fact, if wc consicler the many ways that
intentionality has bccn unclcrstood in ontolog-ical terms, we tind that
like an arche-spacing is always in play. This is truc nol only
of the Sartrean negativity within the plenum of being ancl of 1 Iusserl-
ian presence, butjust as much so for Heidegger's "clearing" or the latcr
Merleau-Ponty's hart ancltalk of "folcls." This creates a strange circular-
ity: spacc is tu be unclerstood as intentional, while inlentionality is, in
sumcthing like a transcendental sense, spatial.
llcre Mcrleau-Ponty is criticizing a particular manner of spatial-
i;ing- intentionality, namcly, as a ,-oicl within positivity, a "hole" in Bcing-.
Deleuzc has callecl attcntion to the differences between the conccptions
of "non-being" at work in Sartre, on the one hand, all(l llciclcggcr ancl
:vlerleau-Ponty on the other. \<\'hile for Sartre, non-being entails a neg-
ative in being, for Heidegger it refcrs to differcncc ancl ruestioning.
Dclcu;.e notes that "Merlcau-Ponty ... undoubtedly folluwed a more
Heideggerian inspiration in spcaking of 'folds' ancl 'plcating' (by con-
trast with Sartrean 'boles' ami 'lakes of non-being') from The PltnwnU' IIol-
THE SPACE OF INTENTIONALITY ANO THE ORIENTATION
OF BEING
99
op,y of PercejJlion onwards, and in rcturning to an ontology of cliffcrcnce
ami questioning in his posthumous book, The l'i.lible and !he Invisible."''
But in Phenomenolo{!J of J>n-rejJlion, :vlcrlcau-Ponty clocs not consistcntly
break with tlw Sartrcan undcrstanding of fundamental intentional-
ity as a ncgativity in being. we ha\e sccn in our prcvious chapters,
:\lcrleau-Ponty describes the tacit cogito as a "retreat of not-being'' ancl
perception, following Valry, as rhc "flaw" in the "grcat diamoncl" of the
world.
Iris prcciscly in Merleau-Ponty's treatmcnt of space in Phmommol-
ogy ofPercejJlion that we can locate the nerve of this tension over how to
understand negativity and intentionality, and for this reason Merleau-
Ponty's investigation holds philosophical implications that run much
deepcr than simply dcscribing the corporeal basis for the constitution
of lived space. Considet-, for instance, the way that Mcrlcau-Ponty char-
intentionality interms ofnon-being in his clcscription ofbodily
spatiality:
space can be dislinguished from externa] spacc ancl em"Ciop
instcad of sprcading them out, beca use it is the darkncss nccded
in the thcatrc to show up the performance, thc background of somno-
lcnce or reserve ofvague powcr against which tlw gcstttre ancl iL5 aim
stand out, thc :..one ofnol hPill{{in front ofwhich precise bcings, figure'>
ancl points can cometo light. (PP 117/ 115, my cmphasis)"
In this description, bodily space is like the background in a gestalt struc-
ture that always retrcats to the horizon in of the figure that it allows
to appcar thematically, namcly, the spatial object. Butthis background is
dcscribed as a "zone of not being," and therefore as a break or void that
tlw human body introduces into "nature." The rucstion that we raise
about this description is as follows: Are \I'C are to understand the cmer--
gcncc of sense, including thc sensc of space, as a kincl of interruption of
naturc-understood as the full positivity ofbeing-or rather as naturc's
0\l' ll interna] nwvement of transcenclcnce, as being in dehiscence? In
simplest tcrms, is intentionality a part of na tu re ora break with nature?
In the passage we ha\'e jttst citcd, :\1erleau-Ponty adopts the tradi-
tional view of naturc as a plcnitudc ora full prescnce, as entirely what
it ofTering no "room" lr reflection or awareness. On this vicw, the
human being first introduces the space of "free play" that allows a sclf-
rcflcction tu uccur. Lacking this "free play," nature woulcl also lack any
space in its own right, and consequcntly itlacks any depth, mo,emcnt, or
orientation. The "for itself" would be preciscly the transcendental spac-
ing that first opcns the possibilitv of mcaning, awarencss, perception,
100
MERlEAU-PONTY'S PHilOSOPHY OF NATURE
and hence the possibility for worldly spacc, dcpth, orientation. Whcn
\llerleau-Ponty refers to bodily space as the "wne of not being" in front
ofwhich beings appear, he seems to be endorsing such a view.
Rnt the chapter on space in Phmomnzolug;y suggests something
much richer than this tradirional \'ew; it stages a rc\'ersal in how hcing's
own orientation is to be understood. \\'e can glimpse here rhc beginnings
of a wholly dilferenr manncr of understancling the relation between hu-
mans and naturc, which holds implications for how we are to understand
fundamental intentionality ancl therefore the relationship bctween the
li\'cd body and spatiality. To work through this richer conception, wc must
first unclerstand what 1\lerlcau-Ponty means by describing space as always
preceding itself, always already constitutecL This leads to the primordial
"lc\'el of all lcvcls" that exceeds any possible thematization. We will then
lind that this "leve! of all le\els" is associatcd with a ncvcr-present pasr
and a never-prcscn t space, which are correlated with the anonymous
body undcrstood as a "natural" subject. This subject is "natural" by hav-
ing its roots in thc absolute past ancl prehuman space of naturc. Thc
new conccption of intentionality thar Mcrlcau-Ponty promiscs is therc-
forc discovered whcn being's own orientation is rcvcalcd as a lndamcn-
tal intersection of body and nature. This suggests that Mcrlcau-Ponty's
latcr introduction of thc languagc of carf, "divergence," is the working
through of this fundamental continuity of thc human and thc natural.
This notion of rart, as we will see, clocs nol avoicl a kind of"spatializing"
of intentionalit:y; but it docs rejcct the alternation of plenitucle and \'Oid,
interpreting the formation of sense not as a negativc within being but
rather as naturc's own play of difference. In thc ene!, then, thc space of
intentionality points toward a fundamental oricntation of being.
To se e why this is so, let us loo k first at Mcrleau-Pon ty's introduc-
tion of thc "leve! of al! levcls." Whcncvcr the body acts as an agent in
the world, taking the perceptual fleld as a situation of possible action,
it establishcs a functional nonn or "leve!" by which space is to be reck-
oned. Thc agent of this orientation is not the "real" body, given as a
thing in the objecti\'c world, but the "virtual body," a system of possiblc
actions organizcd toward a goal (PP289/ 290). The virtual body "inhab-
or "gears into" thc world in such a way that the world is polari!ecl
accorcling to thc body's tasks; livcd space is thereby oriented into left
and right, up and clown, near and moving and at rest. Consider, for
instance, what is involvccl in locating oncself on a map, or negotiating a
three-dimcnsional mazc projectcd on thc screen of a computcr. In each
case, the body comes to inhabit the ,irtual spacc that it projects, shifting
between diffcrcnt systcms of possible oricntation in the same way that
THE SPACE OF INTENTIONAliTY ANO THE ORIENTATION
OF BEING
101
a singcr shifts between kcys while continuing to sing the same melocly.'
This phcnomcnon of changi ng spatiallc\'cls rcveals that thc true
oflived space is the body, "gcaring into" the worlcl in what i\lerleau-Ponty
describes asan "organic rclation" (PJ--'291 / 293).
But e\'cry such oricntation, by instituting a certain leve! as a norm,
prcsupposes a more funclamentalle\cl that serves as iLs ground. \\'hen 1
stand in a gallery looking ata painting, cxploring the virtual spacc that it
opens forme, this already presumes as its loundation thc leve! adopted
by my body in the gallery hall, as it stands npright al the appropriatc fo-
cal distance befare thc painting. Our livecl expcriencc re\'eals to us that
'>pace is always already constitutccl, that it always precedes iLself, sinrc
c\'ery cxpcriencc ofa spatiallcvel presupposcs an alrcady gi\'en le\'elthat
sen-es as its grouncl (PP 291 / 293). But if C\'ery perception prcsupposcs
a more fundamental spatializing, this spatializing can be nothing other
t han the essent ially oriente el character of being itsclf. Merlcau-Ponty de-
scribes this as follows:
Sin ce e\'cry concci\'able bcing is rdated either dircctly or lo
thc pcrcei\'ecl world, and thc pcrcci\cd world is grasped onlv in
tenns of orientation, we cannot dissociatc being Ji-om oricntcd bcing,
and thcrc is 110 occasion to "found" spacc orto ask what is the Ie,el of
alllevels. Thc pt-imot-rliallc\'cl is 011 the horizon of all our pcrccptions,
bttt it is a hori/(lll which cannot in principie cver be rcachcd and the-
mati7ed in our exprc:.s pcrccption. (PP293/ 295) "
The primorcliallcvcl ofspace, accorcling to this passage, is not itsclfa per-
ceivcd space; it is a space that has nevcr bcen presentecl, e,en as it condi-
tions the possibility of all given space. Notice that this primordial lcvcl
of space plays the same role as what Mcrlcau-Ponty had earlier tenned
thc "1one of not bcing," that is, it is the ultimatc grouncl bcfore which
the spatial thing appears. But hcrc this ground is describecl in terms of
orientcd being rathcr than non-being. 1 Tere the tcnsion betwccn thcsc
two different ways of unclcrslanding thc fundamental intentionality or
space bccomcs salient.
This primordial "leve! of alllcvels" plays a role lor space analogous
lo the one that the "past which has never been prescnt" plays for time.
Merleau-Ponty's reference to "a kind of original past, a past which has
nevcr been present" occurs as the ,ery last linc of thc chapter devotcd
to "Sen se Experience" ("Le Sentir"), which immediately precedes the
chapter on space. The link betwccn this original)' past anrl originary
space is suggcstcd when Mcrlcau-Ponty describes the "secret act, always
102
MERLEAU-PONTV"S PHILOSOPHV OF NATURE
in tlw past, b, \\hirh we gave oursclvcs a world" (J>J>:tl. 1 and refers
to the fundamental pact bctwccn the boch and thc \\Orld as a "prchis-
ton."" 1 k \\Tites that
111\ lit \l pcrception and 1111 tir\l hold ttpon tiH' 1\otld mtt\l appeat to
me .t\ .tction in accordancc with an catlict agt <enwnt rcachcd betwccn
.\ ;utd the 1\0tld in general. 111\ hi-,tot 1 be thc continuation of"
prchi\ton .md must utili/c thc laucr\ anJIIItcd tC\ttlt'> . .\1\ pcr\onal
l' \.i'>tencc mmt be the re-,umption of ,, prq>l"t'>on,tl 11 ,1dition. There
" thndorc. anothcr subjen bcncath me. fot 11hom the 1\0tld e>..isLs
bdot e 1 .un Itere, ancl who marl..'> out 1111 place itt it. This capti1c or
nattual 'J>itit is 111\ hod\, ... tlw '>\Stcm of anommous "ftulction-," which
cmclop e1cry particular focu'> in a general ptojcn. 296)
At the most fundamental le\'el. space represcnts "a communication
with thc world more ancient than thottght.'' a comnHmiration that,
while opaque to reflection, remaim operatiH in C\"en pcrn.:ption (PP
1 2\)()). But communication with tlw \\"Otld is not cfTected by my
personal sclf; in thc strict scnse, it is not mine. Rathcr, it is cffccted by
the '"anommoiiS" le,cl of hodih fnctioning that wc dcscribcd in chap-
tet 2. 1>\ '01 1)\ '"one" who percein .. .., in me H'l bdorc llH:. lhc
irrct rieYable space and time are )oomehm, correlated "it h this imper-
sonal '"one" that is nn bocly unclerstood as a "natural spirit." The '"abso-
lute past" of thc anommou'\ bod\ also, thncfotc, an past of
naturc" (!Jf> J()O 158).
To absolute past of nature a prehuman spatiality,
\1hich i\letleau-Pontv describes in his encoutller \\ith a stonc from the
Tttilerics wal l. llcre we can glean scnsc of IHm nature is associated
\\ ith originarv spacc ami time, ami thcrcfore or its conlll'ction with the
anonymous body. :\1erleau-Ponty writcs that
1 tll"H"t wholh li1e in 1arietie' of human ')M<<. httt am alwa1s tooted
in a natural and non-human sparc .. \s 1 11all... ano'' thc l'lacc de la
( .oncot de. all() th in k uf nw-,clf "" totalh c.tug-ltt up in thc cit' of Paris.
1 can t nt 1111 CH' '> on one stonc of tlll' luilcltl'\ 1\all. thc Squarc rlisap-
.md thne ., then nothing hutthi-, -,toue cntitch 1\ithout hi-.ton;
1 can. ftuthctmore. allo\\ lll\ g;vc to he ah'>orhcd h1 thi' \l'llmlish. grill\
sudare . md thcn there i'> no longct enu a \lOtH' thcrc. but mcrch
thc ph11 of ltghtupon an indefinitc -.ub\lann .... 1:\1 b hO<h . 1\hich
throug h 111\ hahits cnsutT'> 1111 in-,cttion 11110 a human world. doe'> so
otth h' projccting me in thc lir'>l place ittto a natutal 1\0tld 1\hich can
THE SPACE OF INTENTIONALITV ANO THE ORIENTATION
OF BEING
alwa\S he disrcrncrl undnhing thc othcr. '" thc camas undcrlic.., thc
picturc and make' it appcar Jllhllh\tantial. ( J>p 12)
1
"
103
.Jmt as the anommous functioning of m\ bodv leads a kind of indcpen-
dent cxistenre ll"hile subtending nn personal lile and history. so the
natural world remains c\"er pn.-.ent bcneath or behind my e\crydav lifc,
lil-..e a background required for the human \\orle! to stand forth. \\'e
alreach secn in chapter 2 how :\lerleau-Pont\ describes. beneath the an-
tlnopomorphic layers that our human existence onto naturc, a
'"non-human elcment" that holds itselfaloof from us, "hostile and alen,
no longet an interlocutor, but a resolutch silent Other" (PP372/ 376).
11
Yet it is onh our personal, reflectin sches that this nature resists. The
pt cpcrsonal ancl anonymous body has airead\' given itsclf O\'er to this
world, frming a pact with it that makes possiblc thc \'ery coalescencc
of the personal sclf ancl its thematinuion of

Thc past that has

neYcr been present and thc spacc that precedes any possiblc perccption
are thet ef"ore the time and spare of t his ano m mous body and the nature
"i th in wh ic h i t dwclls. Th i'> originan "oneness of man and world" is re-
pt essed by our perccption, although it still slip" through to giYe
rise to hallucinations ancl myth'>, remincling us that our bodv is "connatu-
ral with tlw world" ( PP'2!JI '2.)2,
l r thc origin of spacc, ami of intcntionalit\ more generally, can be
tt.l<ed toa fundamental unit\ ol the boch and naturc-a uniry that is
opacue to perception and reflcction b' being their unthema-
titable condition-then the hoch is not thc introduction of ncgati,it)
into thc plcnum of bcing. i'> as m u eh an event of nature as
of tlw This is what allows Merleau-Pont\' to charactcrite nature as
exprcssin; thc cxpressi,c unity that charactcrites the body as livC'd is ex-
tended to t he sen si hle world in i ts en ti tTlV (/Jf> / '239). Conseq u en tl y,
1\lerlcau-Ponty's projcct is to fonnulate an ontology of .\NIS, in the dual
mcaning of this tenn, which C'ntails that naturc is both exprcssiYc and
oriented in iLs own right. u
:\lerleau-Ponty's cfTorLs to understand this expressi,e co-natural it)
repeatediY draw him bacl-.. te-+ the cxampk of CtantH'. As he \\Tites in
tlw chapter on -.pace, "C1anne said that tlw painter in thc face of his
'motif' is about 'to join the aimkss hands of nature'" ( PP 303 30:').
rhat tlw hands of nature are catttions m against undcrstand-
ing the oricntatiou of nature as the reimtatcment of a in a m
traditional sense of the term. \'et nature oflers to tlw painter a motitte,
that is, an embodied scnsC' irreducible eithet toa cause ora sign, ancl
this motin belongs as much LO thc landscape in which CLannc discm-
104
MERLEAU PONTY'S PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE
crs it as to thc cxprcssivc movemcnts by which he grants it visibility on
a canvas.
11
Nferleau-Ponty later describes C1anne's painting as "a n at-
tcmpt to recapturc the physiognomy of things ami faces by the integral
rcproductiun uf thcir sensible cunf1guration. This is what naturc con-
stantly ancl effortlessly achieves, and it is why the landscapes of C1.anne
are 'thosc ofa prc-worlcl in which as yct nomen cxistcd'" (PP372/ 376).
In nature, sense and existence are indistinguishable, ancl C1.anne's cf-
f"orts are "prchuman" prcciscly through thcir aim in \'isible
forrn thc cmcrgcnce uf scnsc, thcrcby revcaling "thc base uf inhuman
nature upon which man has installe d himself" (S,VS 22/ 16). But it is
only through thc art of painling, with its all-too-human history and tech-
niqu<?s, that Ctanne can negotiate this return to nature, which is there-
forc ncvc r rcally a rcturn so much as a flrst disclosurc. Exprcssion hcre
oflers an alternative understancling ofintentionality, which is neither the
prcsentation of sense to consciousncss nor the opcning of a zonc of non-
being within the causall; closecl nexus or nature. It is rather the event
of sense formcd at thc conftuence of body and nature, which owes as
much to nature's mutifas tu uur taking it up. lntentiunality is thcrefore
inseparable from naturc's own scnsc, own topology, and thus its own
ongmary spanng.
A.fter thc publication of" Phmommolog;y ojPn<PjJiion, when layi ng out
the plan fur his future work, Mcrlcau-Punty spukc uf a "guud ambigu-
ity" in thc phcnomcnon of cxprcssion that \muld "gather togcther ...
nature ancl culture into a single whole" (Pf) 48/ JI ). Thc closest that
he comes to offering us such a thcory of" expression is arguably in his last
essay, "Eyc a!lCI Mind," whcrc thc prublcm uf spacc is again appruachcd
through an inYcstigation of painting. Mcrleau-Ponty finds in Descartes'
analysis or copperplate engravings thc paradigmatic cxamplc of a phi-
losophy for which Bcing is absolute positivity, and fr which space be-
comes thc "in-itsclfpar cxccllcncc" By intcrprcting dcpth
as lcngth as secn by another or by Cocl, Descartes strips all envelopment
or implication from things, lcaYing thcm absolutely juxtaposed. Each
point of" spacf' is thcrefre understood through as "only
what it is, ncithcr more nor lcss.'' In this ontology, "oricntation, polarity,
emelopment are, in space, clcrivcd phcnomena linked tu my prcscnce.
Space rcmains absolutely in itself, cverywhere equal to itsclf, homoge-
nous" ( OF4 7/ 131). To this ontology uf absolute positivity, Merlcau-Ponty
the approach to spacc found in moclcrn paintcrs, including C-
Janne, whose pursuit or dcpth is an effort to portray the "clefl agration of
Reing," the envelopme nt ancl mutual clepenclence or things in a space
that simultaneuusly guarantccs thcir autunomy (Oh' 64-65/ 140). Sirni-
larly, whcn :vtatissc and Klcc recliscover the power or line, it exists notas
THE SPACE OF INTENTIONALITY AND THE ORIENTATION
OF BEING
105
a thing, but insteacl as "a certain hollow opened up within thc in-itself, a
ccrtain constitutivc cmptincss-an cmptincss which ... sustains thc sup-
posccl pusitivity or things" (OE 7G/ 144).
This language ofhollows and constitutivc emptiness rccalls Mcrlcau-
Ponty's earlier talk ofthe "tone ofnot being." Rutthere the non-being in
qucstion was the human body, which flrst introduced a void into natuJT.
1 Icrc, by contrast, tite linc cffccts a "rcstrictiun, segregatiun, ur mudula-
tion uf a pregi,en spatiality,'' ancl seeing is our means of being present
at the "flssion" or "dchiscence" ofBcing (OE77/ 144, 81 / 146, 85/ 147).
\\' hen the painter manages to capture this dehi scence, to Yisibly portray
thc inYisiblc evcnt by which Yision is sustaincd, thcn no break can be lo-
cated in the circuit bctween the bocly anclthe wurlcl; in Mcrlcau-Pont} 's
words, "it is impossiblc to say that hcrc nature ends and the human be-
ing or expression begins. It is, then, silent Reing that i tself comes to show
f"orth its own meaning" (0/'."l-17/ 147).
This last scntence is clearly a paraphrase uf Merleau-Ponty's
ite linc from llusserl 's C:ar/Psian ,\1editations, which he translatcs in PhP-
nomnwlogy of Pi>rreption as follows: "It is 'pure and, in a way, still mute ex-
wricncc whirh it is a qucstion of bringing to thc purc cxprcssion of
own sen se.' "
1
'' lt is cviclent, then, that Merlea u-Ponty takes his description
to be a continuation of the phenomcnological projcct, nota flight into
metaphysical speculation , anclthat the dehi scence or being is proposed
as a ncw understanding of in tentionality pose el in ontological tcrms. But
as rcads this linc from J lusserl, it requires the phenom-
enologist to take scriously naturc's effort, its stri\"ing, in its silence, to
cxprcss its mm sense. The funclamental"spacing" ofintentionality turns
out to be, then, norhing othcr than the oricntation-thc scnsc-of bc-
in.(s own stri,ing t<marcl cxprcssiun.
In this case, the languagc of karl and chiasm on which Merleau-
rclies in articulating his ontolohrY are unamidably spatial , and not
as a consequence or the diflicultics or applying ontic languagc
to the ontological. Thc spatiality of Pmrl, howcvcr, is not that uf idcn-
tit); it is nota spacc that woulcl simply be what it is. For being- to ha\'c
an oricntation, its space must be a play of differcncc. As
writes in a working note to ] 'he Fi.sible and the fnvisibli>, "space docs not
comprise j}()inls, lines, any more than time does .... Wc havc to pass from
the thing (spatial or temporal ) as identity, to thc thing (spatial or tem-
poral) as diflerence" ( \ '/ 248-49/ 195). The "spacing" of intentionality
is precisely this play of diffcrence within bcing, thc harl or gap that is
pcrceptual sense.
1
" Even m<?tltal ancl social life are to be undcrstuud as
"differentiations ora spatio-temporal architcctonics" ( l7285/ 232); the
soul is "a lwllow and nol a vuid, not absolutc non-being with respect toa
106
MERLEAU-PONTY'S PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE
Being that would be a plenitude ancl hard cure," and our incarnation is
no longer a "fault in thc clcar diamond" of philosophy or the world (VI
2R6-R7 / 233). We must not say, then, that thc fundamental "spacing" of
intcntionality is introduccrl into naturc by the body, but rather that the
fundamental spaci ng uf naturc, own cxprcssi\'c Pmrl, constitutes the
body as a fold of its flesh. Intentionality is nota zonc uf ncgatiYity pcne-
trating thc plenitudc of positivc bcing, but space in its most originary
sen se, the expressive play of
5
The Human-Nature Chiasm
It is wcll known that Merleau-Ponty introduces the figure of"chiasm" in
his later work, even cntitling thc final scction of his manuscript in prog-
"Thc lntcrtwining- Thc Chiasm" ("L'entrelacs-Le chiasme"). Thr
tcnn derives from the Greek xwcr..o<;, mcaning a crosslike or diagonal
arrangcmcnt, such as the letter X. The figure of the chiasm captures, for
:\[erleau-Ponty, the logic of thc rclation bctwccn thc visible and thc inris-
iblc, that is, bctwccn thc sensible and scnse. The intertwining o[ sensible
ancl sensing is best cxhibited in thc revcrsibility of the human body, such
as whcn onc hand touches another. But the n\ersibility of thc human
body is more than just an cxamplc for Mcrlcau-Ponty; it serves as thr
paracligm for a kind of crossi ng that defines being as such. Thc chiasm is
therefore the kcy to Mcrlcau-Ponty's Iater ontology, and in particular, to
his undcrstanding of the relationship bctwccn humans ancl nature.
An invcstigation into thc chiasmic relation between humans and
naturc is called for by the current state of cn\"ronmcntalthin king, which
rclies almost excl usi\cly on thc positiYist o ntology of t he natural scicnces.
Thc privileging of naturalism is apparcnt, for instancc, through the ap-
propriation of such as "ecology" and "ecosystem." As Brucc
Foltz notes:
Either tacitl> or explicitly, the character of environmental crisis is re-
garded as alllhoritatively clefinecl by thc natural scicnccs. This assump-
tion clinates not only thc primacy of scicntifically objectitiecl nalurc a\
thc suhjcc1 of thc but also the primacy of thc cybc-rnctic concept
uf emiJII('Ill as the definiti\l' framc- of rc-fcrcnce for any further analysis.
(Foil/ 1!19.), 4)
Alongside famous examplcs such as Arnc Naess's "Deep Ecolu," ..
ancl Murray Bookchin 's "Social Ecology," we can place he re the writings
of J. Baird Callicott, Holmes Rolston 111, Karcn Warren, Ji m Chcnev,
and many othcrs. In this contcxl, the lcgitimacy of environmental phi-
losophy and literary thcory is subjcctto evaluation according to its scien-
tific "foundations."
1
But scicntific naturalism is an insufficicnt basis for
thinking the huma n rclation with nature, as it rclics on an ontology of
positivc beings that cxist fmrtes ex/m and rcccnt tendencies toward
107
108
MERLEAU PONTY'S PHILOSOPHY Of NATURE
holistic and W'>lcm-.-theoretical modeling do not alter t hat f un clamen tal
assumption." fhe naturalistic tendcnric'> of"emironnHntal" thought are
thcreforc nwtapll\'>ical in Heidegger\ scmc, adopting a \tandpoint out-
'>dc thc crt.; thc1 purport to desn ilw, allCI trcating naturc, tlw human
subject, and thci1 relatiom in tcnm of prc-,ence and availability-ulti-
mately in tcrms of Bt'.lland, "standing nsc-r1c."
1
Reactions against this uncritical adoption of naturalism in <:'IW-
ronmental tlworv han. gencrallv 1akcn 1he form of "constructivist" ac-
counts of natun that cmphasi1e thc mediated cultural and linguistic
charactcr of <111 knmdedge of naturc. For the constructiYist, nature is
ei ther cq ui1 alent 10 o u r cultural reprcscnlations of i 1 01 wi 1hd raws in to
an unknowable, noumenal alterit1.
1
Such constructi\sl \cws of nature
do not escape !mm the "metapll\-.ic-; of prcsence," since thc1 cntail an
agcnt rcsponsiblc for the act of constructing-for examplc, socie1y, in-
slitutions, language, powcr-thal is itsclf trcated as a given rcality. Fur-
thcrmorc, thc constructi1ist posi tion taci th rcl c'> on an opcn IH'SS 10 the
11orld that its -,clf-understanding cxrludes . . \s \1erleau-Pont\ points out,
linguistic and cultural representations are thcmsehe-. a <j>crt.;. a liling
proclucti1 it1 that out-.trips our attcmpts to restrict it toa rational wstcm,
so that naturc essentialh exceeds ou1 1arious connotations of the tenn
(;\' 19/ 3). Since language and culture always presuppose a
scnsc, a nature, that conditions them without their heing able to take it
into account, natllrc is irreducible to our linguistic and cultural rcpre-
For l\ll'rleau-Pont), nature is thercforc nota pn,ent and ob-
jectifiable realit\, but thc "autoproduction ofa sense" (.\' 19 it has an
"interior" that "cletermined from within" and that our reflec-
tin detcrmination. [mofar it is ,\ kind of noninstituted productil'iry,
a prereflecti1e "life," nature 1\ith the or imtitutcd
character of anifacts of culture, iiH luding linguistic representations.
"Environmental" thinking, whcther of the naturalistic or construc-
tivist necessarilv misses or prcreflective life
of nature, 1dtich rcquircs a rcopening of the question of the being of
nature, rathc1 than an attempt to think nature on the modcl of present
beings. But sincc nature .tnd undcrginb our 1dlcoion on it,
our access to it imoln.s a complex logic. Since we emerge fmm 1\ature
ami remain entanglcd in it, it can be an of study fr us only in
an enigmatic way: "lt is onr soil-not what is in front of us, ftcing us,
but rather, that which canics us" (.\'20/ 4). Thc clifflcult\ offrmnlating
an ontologv of nature therefore concerns the character of the position
from which this nature is to he descrihed, that is, the embecldedness of
reflection or mind \lithin nature. Rdlcction emerges from allCI opcns
onto natun:, \el insolar as this reflc< tion is also conditioned l>1 naturc,
109
THE HUMAN - NATURE CHIASM
it cannot c'hausti1eh circumscribe it. To reconsider the being of nature
., also to recomider our 0\\11 heing, and the moment \1lwre the being
of natun and of thc human lt is this monH.' IIt of crossing, tlw
hccoming-nature of humanit1 and the becoming-human of nature, to
"hich applics tlw term rhirmn.
Merleau-Ponty's later work is intenderl to makc e'plicit the ontol-
ogy unclcrlving h is carlier writings, and thc dcvclopmcn t of 1 his on tolo.., ry
is cxplicith linked with the investigation ofnature. ' In the ontolog\
of "flcsh," prohablv the most famom concept in tllerlcau-Ponty 's ocmTc,
can be delelopcd only b\ 11,11 of an ontolog\ of nalllre. The stud1 of
naturc a sector or "leaf" ofbcing senes <lS an "introdu< tion to the defl-
nition of hcing," an approach that arcords with \lerlc.tu-Ponty's "law" of
"indircrt" ontolo..,", which is that being in general 111<1\ be approachccl
only through particular beings (HC 12!)//PP 156: sec 1'/233/ 179).
Furthermore, natllre is not mereh eme rcgion of being among others,
since it ontolog\ 's "priviil'ged exprcssion," a "total pan" of thc '\in-
rulum" in which thc multiple planes or lc1els of being are enfoldecl (.\'
26:) 2CH). lt is h1 approaching through natmc that
Pont\ aims to disclose our 1 elations with naturc: "J\'ature in us
must han sonw relation to :'\aturc of us: 1\ature out-
'>icle ofus must be revcaled to m h1 thc 1\ature that wc are" (.\'267/ 206) .
This human-nature chiasm providcs thc rcsources lor rcsponding to
the "ontological diplopa" of thc Cancsian tradition (N 266/ 20.'); RC
125-2H 1 :)6-:)9). The logic of the chiasm, we will argue, prm id es a com-
peliing alte1nati1<.' to both naturalistic and con-.uuctilist approaches to
na tu re, 11 hile accounting for thc limited truth of ea< h.
Tlw fjp;t section of our chaptcr examines thc origin of thc conr cpt
of "chiasm" ancl its developmcnt in :\krleau-Pontv\ writings, especialh
in tlw rontcxt of the itv of the bodv. \\'e scc hcrc that the
cncroachment of the sensible and senticnt aspccts of the body in the
cxpericncc of scll-touch functions asan archet1pc for thc doubling of
tlw world into 'emihle anclmeaningfl dimensiom. The rc1ersible logic
o( the 1<'\Cals the idcntit1 of lcaYing onesclf and rctiring into
oneself that :\lnkau-Pont1 associatcs \1ith the absolute or tlw "ultimatc
truth," ancl thi' justifies the p1 im it\ 11c h;wc grantcd to this concept in
ou1 anahsi,. Sccond, wc will work through the logic of < hiasm as a re-
sponse 10 thc ontological diplopa of thc philosophical tradition, ancl
in particular thc way that the figure of the chiasm captures the interna!
paradox of tlw lwing of natun , follcming Merlcau-Polll\ \ rcadings of
Bergson, Schelling, and cspccialh llus,erl. Third, \I' C takc up again the
problem of the .Janus-!aced duplicit1 of thc pcrcci1ed thing, according
to which the thing is re1ealed through its appearing to me preciseh as
8
110
MERLEAU - PONTY'S PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE
cxceeding that appearing, as cxisting in-itsclf. Bricfly rctracing l\l!:'rleau-
Ponty's carlicr trcatmcnts of this theme, we show that thc two faces of
thc thing now correspond to il'> distance and proximity in the folding-
ovcr of sen se ami sensi ble. Thc duplicit> of the thing is thercforc a func-
tion of bcing's dchiscence, the divergencc bctwccn its visible ancl invis-
ible dimensions. This brings us, lastly, tu thc theory of cxprcssion that
the chiasm cntails, and in particular the notion ora ''goocl error." This
conccpt of good error instructs us on how to undcrstand thc relation-
ship bctween language aiHI silcncc. In 1\lerleau-Ponty's later thought,
the resistance ancl ascity of nature are located precisely in its silence,
which it bccomcs thc task of philosophical language to express whilc
nevertheless preserving it as silcnce. Thc "rcconversion of silence and
speech" hy which Mcrlcau-Ponty characterit.es the philosophical project
( \'/ 171 / 129) is therefore also the el u e to how we are to undcrstand the
rclation bctwccn humans and nature writ large.
The e hiasm of Sentient and Sensible
1\lcrleau-Ponty first introduces the conccpt of "chiasm" in his 1951 essay
"Man and Ad\'ersity," where he cites the following passage from Paul
\'alry to illustratc thc paradoxical "crossing of glances" that occurs in
an cncounter with others:
:\o o11c coulct think if his could not take kan of differcnt
C\ es which followccl him_ A' wo11 as gla11ccs mcct, wc are no longer
\\'holh lwo. ancl il is hanllo rermrin alone. This exchange (thc term is
exact) realizcs in a \ ' CI"}' short time a tran'>position or llH:'l<ll hesi'>-a
chiasma of two "clestinies," two points of\'icw. a son of simulta-
ucous reciproca! limitalion occurs. You capture my image, my appear-
ancc: 1 capture yours. You are 1101 mP, since you scc me and 1 do not sce
11nself. \\' hat 1 lack is this me that you see . . \nd what you lack is thc you
1 see. Anclno matter how br wc advancc in our mulualundcrstanding,
as muchas wc rcflcct, so much will we be cliffercnt. (S291/231-32)"
\'all>ry's term rhiasma, in its literal anatomical usage, refers to the cross-
ing of two or more nenes or ligaments, ancl especially to the X formed
where the optic nenes cross at thc base of the brain, allowing for imagcs
from lhe right \'isual field to he processcd in rhe left visual system of
the brain ancl \ice versa.
7
Obviously, neither Valry nor Merleau-Ponty
intend this tcrm in its strict anatomical usage, but rather as a figure for
111
THE HUMAN-NATURE CHIASM
the "exchange" ami reciproca] limitation of glances, that is, as a figure
for ttnderstanding both the paradoxi cal contact and separation of the
intersubjectiYc relation.
J'\e\'ertheless, thc optical origins ofthe term resonate with Merleau-
Ponty's rcpcatccl rcliance on the example of binocular \'ision in his de-
script ions of lhe intcntionality of perceptual synthcsis. For examplc, in
l'hrnomPnolog)' of Pnn'fJiion he writes that "though perception brings to-
gethcr our sensory experiences into a single world, it clocs not do so in
tlll' way that scicntific colligation gathers together objects or phenomena,
but in the way that binocular \'ision grasps one sol e (1-'1-'266/ 268).
The examplc of binocular \'ision clemonstrates, for Merleau-Ponty, the
way in which perception leacls us toward the ipse ity of thc thing, but
does so only by way of disparate pcrspccti\'al imagcs that, on thcir own
account, do not appear as fnlly real (PI-' 269/ 270-71). The monocular
perspecti\'e of cach eyc con\'erges on the onc, true object, but this is a
svnopsis rather than a synthesis preci sely bccause thc monocular images
are isolable only retrospecti\ely and ha\e no autonomous existencc. Bin-
ocular Yision therefore afflrms the pregiven unity of thc world, which it
assumes rather than cliscoYers: "V\'e can no more construct pcrception
or the thing and of the worlcl from discretc aspects, than we can make
up thc binocular vision oran ot:ject from two monocular images" (PI-'
:-iHO/ ;{H4). Furthcrmore, binocular \'ision tcaches precisely that to havc
the thing disclosed in its ipseity, iLs "concrete prescncc," is at thc same
time for it to transccncl the appcarancc it takes in any particular pcrcep-
lllal image, so that "the aseity ofthe thing. unchallengeablc prcsence
and thc perpetua! absence into which it withdraws, are two inseparable
aspects of transcenclence" (PI' 270/ 271).
\\'hen i\lcrleau-Ponty later appropriates lhe term rlziasma for his
m1n use in the manuscript and working notes of 'f/p \ 'ible and the lnvis-
iblt', he follows Vall>ry by briug-ing together the moclel of binocular \ision
anclthe intersubjectivc relation. In a note from Nmembcr 1959 entitled
"The chiasm [chiasnw]," he \Hites:
Chiasm [rhia.\11/a] by 1d1ich what announces itself lo me as being ap-
pears in thc eyes of the others lo bc only "statcs of consciousncss"-Hut,
likc thc chiasm of thc qcs, this onc is aho wlrat makes us he long to thc
same world-a world whiclr i-, not hut form'i L'> unily across
incompossibilitic'> Sllch as that of my world ancl thc 1n>rlcl of llw othcr.
( 1'/268/ 214-l:'>) "
Self and other, which from the outside seem to occupy their own im-
manent pcrspectives on the world, are fundamentally in a rclation of
112
MERLEAU-PONTY'S PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE
coexistcnce lwf"ore the one world onto which both perspertivcs open.
\\' hile the two pcrspccti\Ts are distinct and enn incompossibl<:, atlcast
rell mpecti' 01 thc\ are not enclosed, any
11101 <' than are the monocular imagcs ofllw two eH''>. fhus, the notion of
chiasm expresses, lrom the beginning, tlw unit\-in-diflerence of open-
ing., onto tlw \\Orld, at both intra- all(l intcrcorporeal Jc,cls.
:\lerlcau-Pont\ \ adoption of <hiasm e:-..tends this conccpt in two
01 iginal dircctiom. First, it becomes a generalitcd account of t lw cross-
ing 01 re,crsibilitv of thc scnticlll and sensible of the body, as
wc sce cspeciallv in :\lerleau-Pont\ 's renewcd attent ion to thc reflexi,i ty
of touch .'' Second, thc chiasm offcrs a llt'\\ UJH!erstanding- of thc Janus-
faccd aspccts of thc th ing, that is, tha t the th i ng presents i tsel ras a corre-
late of my sensihility yet also maintains its aloofncss and aseity, a point to
which we will rcturn in the next section or this c haptcr. Conccrning the
first innovation, thc chiasmic understanding or sent icnt and sensible,
:\krleau-Ponty continues in the same note citcd above: "The chiasm [rhi-
a.\IIW] is nol onh a me othcr cxchange ... it also an cxchangc bctwcen
me all(l thc world, bct\\een the plwnomenal hodv and thc
hodv, betwcen the pcrceiving aJHI the pcrcei\cd" ( 1'/268 2L'). In the
tcxt of Tht' l 'ilible all(//lte Invisible, Merleau-Pont\ thc chiasm of
touc h as follows:
\h I\\O hands touch thc samc thing' bccausc tiH'\ <11 e the hancb of onc
sa111c boch .. \nd ntcach of thcm has its 01\11 tanilc cll.pcricncc. lf nonc-
thdcs-. thc1 h<t\l' LO do \\ith onc -.ole l.tngihll', it is hct<lll'>l' thcn e"ist.'>
a \CI\ peculia1 relation from onc Jo liH' olhtt, ,tnoss lht rorporeal
spat c-likc that holding bctwecn 1111 two C\ cs- making of 1111 hands
OIH' sok organ of cxpcrience. as it makcs of 111\ two l'\l'S thc channels of
o m so k Cn topean \ision. ( 1 '/ 1 H() 1 11 )
We <,('C hcrc thattouch thc samc comcrgcnn to\\ard thc world
that .\lnlt-au-Pont\ attributes to binocular vi,ion. But touch also makes
salient thc nossing rclations betwcen thc senticnt and aspects of
thc boch. or what Merleau-Pont\ had earli cr tnmcd the "phenomenal"
and "ohjcrt iH" boch. Chiasm in its more general the e n-
noachmclll bctwecn thcse two of tlw boch: ".\ '>Orl of dehiscence
opcns lll\ hoch in two, ... beLween lll\ boch lookcd at and m\ hod1 look-
ing, lll\ boch touchcd and m1 boch touching, therc is mcrlapping or
cnnoachmcnt, so that we must sa\ thatthe pass into usas well as
''e into things"' ( \716:> 123). Thc "encroachnwnt" ormlrlappingofthe
is to he understood as a variant of this en< roachmtnt of touch.
1
"
Thc encroachment of the '>('nsiblc and scnti ent aspects of thc
113
THE HUMAN - NATURE CHIASM
bod;, cspcciall y in the case of touch, takcs on an ontological priority fr
\lerkau-Pomy prccisely throngh its chiasmic qualitie'>. Because the body
hoth sensible ancl sentient, that is, beca use it capable or sensing it-
sclf. it paradigmatic ofbeing; it is an "excmpla1 sensible" ( 1'/179 135;
s('(' aho 2GO) ora "protol\l)(' of Being" ( 1'/179 136). Thc split-
ting of tlw boch illlo sensible and <;entient aspe< h 01 "lea1es" has a paral-
kl in C\CJ\ bcing. namelv, it'> dehiscencc into '\isible" (<;emible) and "in-
lisible" (nwaningful ) dimemions. Thm, the hoch\ sen'e<; as
thc fundamental clue to the interpla1 of sen se and <;ensible that charac-
tnitcs bcing such. :\lore precisch, thc cncroachmcnt of sensible and
-.cnticnt aspects in the body reveals thc more general belonging-togcther
of sen se and t lw sensible:
\\'e sa1 tlwrcforc thal our hod) is a hci ng of two leans, from one si de a
thing among lhings and ollwrwisc what 'rees them and touchcs them;
\\(' sa\, hccausc it is e,ident, thal it unitcs thcsc two properties within
it-,elf. and its doublc-hclongingtH'ss to the otdcJ ofthc "object" and
LO thc order of the .. rt' \eals LO us quite uneXJ)('ctcd relation'>
bt'l\\een tlw two ordcts. lt cannot be b' incomprehensible accidcnl that
thc hoch has thi'i double rcfen' nn'; it tcadtcs m thal each calh for the
othct. ( 1 '/1 HO-Hl 137)
In this description of the rcfk:-..ilit\ of touch, .\lerleau-Ponty cm-
t lncc clemenLs that haH' broader ontological signiricancc: Fir'>t,
it is onh becausc thc body manifests tlw chia'>m ofscnsible and sentient
that it is able to participatc in thc world or sensible things. Percei,ing
tlH'rdore depcnds upon an ontological or continuity bctwccn
thc percciwd ancl the one who pcrccivcs: "Thmugh this crisscrossing
wit hin it of thc touching and tlw tangible, its own movements incor-
por<llc t hcmsel\'CS into the universc thcy in terrogatc, are recorded on
thc samc mapas it" (V! 176/ 133). Sccond, the "diflercnce without con-
tradiction" that characteri7cS t he rclation lwtwccn the touching hand
,\llcf tlw touched hand, between tlw senticnt and scmihle aspects of the
hoch, will also hold truc for tht relation bci\\C'Cil sensible amlmcaning-
ful asperts of thc perceived world: thc boch "communicate<; to the things
u pon \\ hic h i t el me'> o ver that idcnti l\ wi 1 hou t supcrposi t ion, that diffn-
('IHT wi thout con tradiction, t hat el inrgence h<twccn thc \\ i th in and tlw
\\ i thout t hat romtillllcs i natal se( rcl" ( \'/ 1 79 1
1
Like the rcla-
tion of thc two e\ es in hinocula1 01 of sclf ancl other in thc cross-
ing of gla nccs, then. the chiasm o f tmu hing a rclation that
strinh conforms ncither to identit\ 11 01 toju'dapmiti o n, demonstrating
1 ,ulwr another manner or unit\ -in-difkrcncc.
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116
MERLEAU PONTY'S PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE
\\'hcthel in the relatiom 1\th being- 01 in thc 1elatiom ol hcing 1\th
me. dialcrtiral thoug-htl\ that 1\hi< h <tdmih that cach 1('1111 1'> itsclf onh
h' pnKcTdmg t<ma1 d tlw oppmed 1<'1111, he< omes '' hat it i-. throug-h
the mm<'lll<'ill, that it i-. onc <Jll()the .,ame thing for eath lo pa.,s into
the ot hc1 or to bccome lO leaH' it.,cll and lo rctI<' into il',ell,
that the rcnui pelal mm<"lll<"n t and thc <enll ilugalmmcml'lll <liT on<
.,ole moH'llll' lll. becau-.c earh term ., ih o\\n medialion. liH' c'igenn
fr , lwcomlll.{ . md c\l' ll !01 an aulod<-.trllctlon \dtich giH'" the othcr.
( 11 12 1 90-91 )
sclf-medialing- mo,cme tll is oh\"ioush whal :\1crleau-Pont\ aims LO
coli\C\ ,,ith tlw ll gurc of chi ,t'>lll, \Cl chia-.mic bccoming i-. distinct from
dialenic in L\\o \\<l\S: first, bccau-,e in t he < hia-.m thc mcdiating and me-
diatcd terms nt'HT achicYc an idcntity, mai ntaining, in-. tcad , thc nondif-
l'crc ncc of h'art ( \ '/126/ 92, :HH 264) . This is why Mc rlcau-Pont) consis-
tentlv prefers the chiasmic languagc of .. .,, nopsis" lo that or "svnthcsis."
chiasm i-. "ll\ perdialenical" insola1 as it ese he\\ S (ixit\ in thescs
aJHI does not presume an' (inal or complete S\ nthesis in an
(OJ-m," ai ming instead Lo disclme thc hcing that lics "not o utside o( us
and not in us, hut thcrc wherc thc two movemcnts eros-." ( 1'/130/ 95).
The crossing o( samc ami othcr fo nns a chia-.m through ennoachnwnt,
not through dialectical surpassing ( \ '/31H 26-l, sec also 2<H 155). In
othn words. chiasm is the scll-mediating t ccomersion of transccndence
aiHI immanc nn. This ddinitinl\ thc logi< o( e hiasm from
tlw primiliYistnostalgia (ora lmt unity of nature or beiug, which is thc
d.utgcr of Bergwnian intuiti on ( \ '/l(i)j 12 1). And it also dista nces thc
t hough t o f < h iasm from a m pmi ti' ist connpt ion of lwi ng, indud ing
the dialcct ical 'cr-. ion propmcd b\ Sartre, \\hit h is "11\ :\lcrleau-Ponl\
prdi.rs thc o(\ isi ble and i misiblc, i 11 \\ h ic h thc im isi blc is "thc
limit or degnT tero ofvisihilit\," to esscntiall ) contradi ctor) terms such
as Being and Nothingncss (S 2 1; scc also \ '/269/2 L"l). In short, it is
lwrausc of tlw logic of chiasm that T/11' 1 'i1iblt and thl' lm'lliblt m a\ lw de-
'>< t ihed, in the words of Renaud Barbaras. as "an extraot dinan cxample
o( no ndialectical thought" ( Hat baras 200 l . \. \.ii).
Ontologtcal Diplop1a and the
Phenomenologtcal Reductton
(( thc relation of humam <tiHI naturc is LO be descrilwd chiasmically,
this does not entai l -.etting thc two into a dialcctical opposition that,
117
THE HUMAN - NATURE CHIASM
through t hc ncgation or its terms, woulcl arrivc ata S\ nthcsis. The logic
of < hiasm pur-,ucs a synopsis t <llher than a.,, nthesis. \\'e noted aboYe that
\lerlcau-Pont\ \ carlicst appropriati ons of thc conccpt of chiasm refct to
t he achie\ ement of binocular 'ision, the disclosurc of a si ngle, un ified
imagc through thc unity-i n-di fTere nce of thc two eyes. But, according Lo
\lerleau-Pont;, thc histon ol \Vestern ontologv is charactcritcd by a par-
.tdoxical "diplopia" o r "'strabism" in its mci llatio n betwccn trcating being
.1s fully positiH' oras enti1 c h ungraspablc, that is, as Being or Nothing-
nc'>s. 11 The response to this diplopia is not dialcctical S\llthc-,is, but thc
,1chievement o fa binocular o ntology, that is, an ontology that recognites
the tcnsion bet\\ccn both polcs as constillttiYc of bcing:
Do \H' not find c\ely,,hele thc doubk CTI titucle that being cxists, that
appear<JI HT'> are onh <1 manife.,tation anda restriction of heing-and
thal appcarann''> ale thc canon ol e\erything tlr at we can under
'>tand b1 "being," 1hat in this respcct it ., bcing in-iL.,el f which appcars
a., an ung.a'>pable ph,mtom, an Could wc not fincl whal has
bccn callccl an "ontologcal diplopa (Biondel), 1\hich <Jftcr '>O much
philmophical eflort we cannot expcct to bring LO a rat ional rcduction
ancl wh irh lcavcs U'> 1\ith thc so le altematH' of whollv embracing it,
j u.,t as ow gate take'> on1 monocular imagc'> lo makc a single vision
out of them? \ ' icwed in this wa\ the continua! shifting ol philo.,ophies
from OIH' pc"pecti\e to tlw other would not inn>he am contradiction.
in the '>eme of inach l'l tcncc or incoiH'I enre. but woulcl bejustified
anrl f<Hmdecl llpon being. t\11 OIH:' <ould do ., to ask the philosophc1 to
admit thio, phenomenon and to rellcct upon it, rathl'l than mercl1 sul-
fcring it and occup' ing altcrnatiYch two ontological pmitions, each ol
"hiclr c,cJudes ami imites the othe1. (fU 127 IPP 1 :l7-:>H)
I'he new ontolo.,')' requires a "conccpt of being such that its contradic-
l ions, nci the r accepted nor 'transcended,' sti 11 han their place" ( RC
12H IPP 15H). and this meam assembling both images of being-thc
po'>iti\ist and negati\'ist-into a "binocular" o ntological 'icw that "rc-
H"als in being itselfan o\'l'rlap or mmcnwnt" (RC 12H !PI) ! Vl ). In thc
terms of our contemporarv debate, this would rcquire forming an imag-e
of naturc such that the two "mo nocular" imagcs, the c mpiri cist and con-
positions, are made necessan 1)\ naturc's 0\\n interna! o,crlap
,lt)c( 1110YCl1H'I11.
\\'e can find thc n.,ourccs for -.uch a "'binocular" ontolog\ in
's account o( the historical de,e lopmcnt of the concept
of naturc, ancl cspccially in his readings o! Schelling, lkrgson, ancl ll us-
serl. Thesc readings giw m a clue to the unfolding ofa chiasmi c rclation
118
MERLEAU - PONTY'S PHILOSOPHY Of NATURE
bctw<.Til humans ancl nawre that culrni nalcs, perhaps uncxpectcdly, in
llus-.erl\ phcnomenology. As we 1rill it llusserl who "rediscoYers
lhal iclentit\ o( 're-enleringself' all(l'going-<Httsidesclf' ,,hich, for Hegel ,
dcfincd 1 he ahsohne" (S 20-t 161 ). 1 his is beca use the phcnornenologi-
cal n:duction, followed through to its end, b1 ings into nlid 1hosc "em i-
mns and edgcs" (S 21 1-!) that limn am imman<.nce o! consciousness,
and ultimateh reco\'crs a truth of the natural allilude and a \\f>[/1/zes
primto all tlwses (S206-7 Thus, it is In pushing phenomenology
to ils limit that wc can met-comc thc bifrcation of mind and nawre, lo-
cating the 1urning point at ,,hirh each passes into the othcr.
Scnclling takes the f1rst stcp in embracing tlw paradoxiral
mcdiation ofbcing h) posing in a radical wa\' the qucstion ofhow rcflcc-
lion can be equalto the task of thinking prcn: fkctil'e naturc. I le rejects
thmc philosophies thatmake Being conlemporar\' with rcflcrtion, lead-
ing him toan account of n:.le ;\'atur as thc "exccss of Iking over the ron-
sciousness of Being" or "11) per-bcing" (Sw-1;111', l 'hn.II'I [X 62/ 38]). This
1' 1'111' .Vatur is an "abyss of the past" ora "barbarie principie" that reveals
itsdf in our perreptual experience prior to reflection. murh as
Pont\ had dcscribcd the "immcmorialit\'" oftlw naluralthing in Plznwm-
!'llolof-,1)' of Pl' lfl'j>lion. n By retrie1ing thc perceptual '\tate of indi1ision"
prior LO subject ami objcct, Schellin.{ aim-, lo di.,dosc our commonalit)
11ith a11 of life in a "common root of pre-objccti1e Being" (.\' 61 W).
Sche11ing wants to reach the "non-knm' n, " the l ' n,l!/''lllll\11, "nota science
of 1'\atun>, bul a phenomenolo.,'> o( prercflcxiH' lking" (.\ ' 66 41).
This phenome1wlo.,ry of prndlexiH bcing i., most successful in
S<hl'lling\ desrription of light as revealing a kind of L'rwiuen, an ar-
chaic knowleclgc" within nature itsclL i'vlore preci.,eh. light re\ nota
knowledgc hul a kinct of sensc lhal awaits and cal ls !or human comple-
lion, a preparation in things for my 1ision to !11ow; lighl "explores the
fidd promotecl our gal.(:' and prepares it to be read" (.\'67 / 42). Schel-
ling\ cxamples echo l\1erleau-Ponty's own dc-.rriplion in Phnwmmo{Of!:)'
ofPI'In'fJiion of thc lighting that "direcls mv ga;c ami causes meto scc thc
ohjccl, so 1 hal in a sen se it /mow.1 ami 11' 1' 1 t he object" ( PP 3:->8/ 361). This
forckno11 ledgc of li ght re1 eals na tu re to be "an arrangement of matcrials
that cannol be comidered as the whiclc of an idea, but 1hat prepares
the seme that humanity gil'cS LO it" (.\'!)7 12) . fhercforc, ''what livcs in
:'\al me i., nol mincl or spirit, but rather liH' beginning of meaning in the
pron'" of ordcring itselL but "hich has not fulh emerged .... The sub-
jcct has to in len ene to bring meaning out fulh , but this disengagement
o( meaning is not comtituting" (.\'6H
Nawral procluctivity and human knmdedge are reciprocally im-
plicated in this L'rwissen of ;\lature, manife.,ting the human-nature chi-
119
THE HUMAN - NATURE C HIASM
asm: " lt is in humanity that things lwcome conscious b thcmschcs; bul
1hc relation is reciproca!: humanil\ is also the becoming-conscious of
1hing.," (.\'()8 43). Iluman reflection is thcn!ore notan cmpty freedom,
an aniLjJh_Ysis that breal-..s 11ith nature, but rathcr naturc\ recapitulation
at thc le1cl of consciousness. Still, 11e cannot equatc such nature 11ith
"h.u is rcvealed to reflection, -;i nce the phi lmopl11 of rcflcction can fmd
in na1u1c "'at best a reciproca! relation bcl\\CCil subject and (.\'
!i9 t l). ll cre the problem of radical rdlcnion relurns-and indeecl,
J.tspcrs de-;cribes Schelling\ phi losopln a "1 dlectio11 011 what is not
rcfleclion" (.\' 71 15)-since rdlection seems incapable of graspi11g
1 h,ll of being mer comcious11css 1 hat a phenomenology of nature
sccks. Srhelling's philosoph) ofnalliiT begi11s hcrc to look like an impos-
sibk task, si nce philosophical intuition rcmains blind lo tlw
nalurc thal grounds and precedes it.
Schelling's kcy contribuli on lo 1hinking nature is precisely his will-
to anclmakc thcmatic this paradoxical circle, embrac-
in.{ il rather than rcsol\'ing or eliminating it. On thc onc hand, thc rc-
llllll LO nalure seeks the stale of indivision that precedes reflection. Bu t.
on lhe other hand, sincc it i-; inc1 itabh through a reflecti\e exercise
that this primordial insertion in naturt' is to be rccmcrecl , the naturc at-
laincd cannot be a primitin coincidcncc. This situation ma) either be
interprete<! as a paradoxical circle, thc in<.' \ itablc failure or any thought
of ll<llnr<. , oras the constituti1e tension of a sunessf ul t hinking of nature,
lhat is, as a thinking that succceds prccisch iu, failurc. Schel-
ling\ cin le, 1hen, which makes us pass cncll es'>h from intuition to reflcc-
lion .utd from reflection lo inluilion, " i., not ncccssarih Yicious, so long
a-, IH' understand that "the Absolute is not onh 1hc ,\bsolul c, but also the
diakcticalmmement of!inite all(( infinitc" 17). \\'e must not col1-
sicler reflectil'( mcdiation as a contanli11ation of thc purity of prcreflec-
liH natun:, but rathcr treat the wry lcnsion bclween re!lection and thc
prcreflcctive as naturc's ncccssary distance or wilhdrawal. Thus, il is only
1)1 passing through reflertion, rather than b1 stopping short of or going
bc\OIHI il, lhat we arrive ata cirdc o! double-becoming that character-
i;cs lhe relalion hetween humanitv and nalure: ";'\!ol o11l) must
!>crome 1ision, but humanit\ musl also becomc ;\!aturc" (.\'73 '-17).
fhe next step in the clelelopment o! this insi.{ht from Schcllin.{ is
located, b1 :\lerleau-Pont\ , in Bergson \ nro.{nition of the "parado:-." or
"reciproca! envclopment'' inhcrent to pcrccptio11: '" Bei11g is anterior LO
pcncptio11, and this primonlial Bcing is concci,ahk onh in relalion to
pen e ptio11" (.\" 83 5:)). 1 he desrrip1io11 of thc "u1ti1 erse of images" in
.\taller and ,\tnnory is an allempt lo <Kr uatch describe this reali7ed con-
lradiction. Bergson cloes not mal1<t).{l' LO !oll<m out this thought , since
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122
MERLEAU PONTY'S PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE
apparcrll and thc truc. Thcrc b a preparation l01 phcnomcnolog\' in
tht natural attitude. lt is thc natural attituclc 1\hich. b\ rcintnprcting
it.'> 0\\11 pmccclures, in lt i'> the natural anitude
it'>elf" hich gocs be\Cmd in phenomenoloJ.,'Y-ancl '><> it clocs not
go be\oud itsdf. Rcciprocalh. the uam<t'rHkntal anitudc is and in
spi te ol <'\<'nthing "naturar (naliuluh). (\ 207 1() 1)
From this encroachment of transcendcmal and natur,\1 attitudc-.. \H' see,
once again, both the necessit) of thc reduction and thc irnpossibility of
its complction.
1
' \'et it remains necessan to son out the irnplications of
thi:. erHToachrnent for our relatiomhip \\ith thc natural prcgiHnncss
of thc world. 1 fu-.serl\ analyses raise the prospcct , sug-
gests, that "'wc do not have to think about the world and oursch-cs in
tcrms of thc bi{urcation of Na tu re ami mind [ l'ljJritl ,"ami he cxpresses
doubt O\'(T whether "any combina! ion (even a subtlc one) of these two
conccpls sunices to giH' the philosophical formula ofour situarion in be-
ing" (S205/ 162). \\'e cannot interpret the contradictiom ofthe reduc-
tion as preparatorv to some resolution in of om polc or lhe othcr,
lhcn, but imtcad as the means to umeil a "lhird dimcmion" in which the
distinclion bctwcen suhjcctive and e beco mes problcmatic. The
name for this "' third dimension," as borrm''" il from Hus-
'>crl, i-. "'fle..,h" (.\ 203 162,211 167). Bullhi'> mean-. that the alternali\e
lO the dichotonn between mind and naturc ., nolhing othcr than the
chiasm of semibk ami scnse. As 1 will arguc lwl<m. it i'> prcciscl) in lhe
"good cnor" of thc tirar/, in lhc nondil'fcnnce o! thc gap bet\\C<.'n thc re-
flccting and the reflccted on, that the cxpn.,.,in comergence of lhe
cultural all(l the natural is to be sought.
But a implicalion of Mcrleau-Ponl\ \ rcading of llusserl
must also be madc sali ent at thisjunnure. Phenonwnolog;'s grcalcst task
in lhc wake of 1 lusserl, Merleau-Ponly holds, to thc "haecceity
ofnalurc" lhat constilutcs phenomenoloh')''s mm int erna)
which l\lerlcau-Ponl)' ccuates with Schell ing\ "' barba om sourcc": "\\l1at
phcnomenolOh'J within us-natural bcing, thc ' barbarous ' source
Schelling spokc of-cannol remain out.,ide phenomcnolo.,l'\ and should
haH' its place \\ithin it" (S 225 17R). In othcr \\Orcb, phenomcnolog) 's
la'>k rtmains that ol radical refleclion, ofrecogniting rdlcction's inelim-
inablc debl lo a prcrellccti\e hislon lhat alwa\s c:-..cccds ls reach.
1
' But
lwrc wc learn that the namc of this n.,ist;mce. o! thc "barbarous source,"
i., "natural bcing." 1 Iow does 1he chiasmic rdalion o! natural and tran-
.,cendcntal accounl fr this resistance ol nawral being, and \\hat would
it mean for phenomcnology to makc a plan \\ithin itsclf for such rcsis-
tance?
123
THE HUMAN - NATURE CHIASM
The Dupl1city of the Thing
rJw qttC'>lion oflhe reSSlance ofnallJraJ being returns liS lO the problcm
ol the .Janm-faced character of lhe thing that rccurs in cach of Merleau-
Pont\ \ major woks. recogni1es lhat our primordial faith
in thc ''orld silllatcs us "in oursehes ami in the lhings," a position that
he attribulcs to lhe "' natural man," that is, thc pcrson who maintains the
rl<ltural attitude ( \7 212 1 60). he n,ttural attitllde is characterized h\ a
kind of "animal taith in two :-ceminglv contradicton convictions: first ,
that "'we sce thc things thc world what \\' C see" ( VJ17 3).
Hnt this re,elalion ofthc 1\0rld happcns onl) through one's own
boch, aJHI its appearance maintains a singular relation with that body.
"Thc 'natural ' man holds on to both ends of thc chain, lhinks al llzP .lame
time thal his pcrccption enters into thc things and that it is formed lhis
of his body. Yet coexistas thc lwo convictions do withoul difficulty in
thc cxercisc of lifc. once rcduced to thcses and to propositions they de-
'>lroy onc another and lca,e us in ( rJ The natural
attilucle is lhcrcfore characteritcd bv thc incompossible horns of the
pcrceptual faith , which retlection sccms incapable of rcconciling.
two poles ol thc "perceptual faith" corrcspond to \\ hal
\lerlcau-Ponl\ had carlier clescrihccl a'> tlw paradoxical cluplicity of the
thing, ih status asan on the onc hand, the perceiwd
thing is prcsenled preretlecti\eh as r cal and as cxceeding its semible
appearancc; but, on thc other hand, il only by way of it<> ap-
pcarances, and thcrefore seerns rcstricted 10 subjcct\C immancnce for
the wrcci\ing indiclual. Empirici-.m cmphasite'> the flrstmoment, allCI
constrtJcti\ismlhe second. In 'f'lu, Stnuluii'OjBthmi!I; as we saw in chap-
tcr 1, Merleau-Ponty proposed lo accounl for both aspccls of the thing
through thc intcrplay of perceplual structures aiHI intelleclual signiti ca-
tions. Therc argued that a pcrceived thing is taken to be
lrulv cxistcnl only when il prcsenls the uniquc aspcct of thc "scnsccl,"
lhat is, only when it is givcn dircctly toa pcrccption (SC 228/ 211). E ven
so, thc incli' idual's pcrccplion clocs nol exhaust the thing, insofar as lhc
!alter appcars onh through a multiplici t\ ol "proliles." Thc "completecl"
thing, such as a cuhe wilh six ecual -.idcs, is attainccl onl) as an ideal
.,igni{ication lhat could nc\cr, in princ iple, be dircctly percci,ecl (SC
213). Accordi ng to 1his "perspecti\ ism" of pcrccption, every object
has a "1011C of individual perspcctiH' '-," on \\hich its existcntiaJ index
1 as wcll as a halo of "intersuhjcnin -,igni{icaliom," the conccpts or
lhal "acts of rccognition aJ1(1 denomination" cxtract from the
-.en-.ibk givcns (SC 231-32 21 1-15). ,\ccording to this solution, how-
cver, lhe two aspecLs of the lhing rc111ain incommunicable: the sensible
124
MERLEAU PONTY'S PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE
ecccit1 of thc thing cannot be cxprcssed in languagc 01 concepts, and
tiH' signifi cance of things has no cxiste nt ial dcnsit1. Onh
a mute perccption cnjoys thc full rcality of the thing, while language
draws us toward an intcllcct ualintion of the world "as ohjcct of an infin-
it' ol truc judgmcnts" (S(; 229n 1 2 19n54) . \'\' hat is lacking in Tlu Strur-
11111' ofBduwior is a ontological grounding for the re lationship
hctw<cn structurc ami signifi cat io n.
\\'hen Mcrlcau-Pont\' rcturns to this prohlem in PhfnomPnoloK)' of
P!'l'rtjJiwn, thc dual aspccts of the thing are prcscntccl as a lu11ction of the
boch \ dialogi cal cxchange with thc ''orld. On tlw onc ha11d, "the thing is
inseparable from a person pcrceiving it, ancl can ncvcr be actually in it1Plf
bccausc its artic ulations are thosc of our ven cxistencc" ( PP 370
Yct, 011 thc othc1 hand. thc thing maintains an aloofncss that is thc inde:-..
of ih ascity, sin ce it is "rooted in a background of naturc '' hi ch is alien to
ma11" Thc task is thcrcforc to undcrstand "both that thc
thing is the corrclatc of 1111 knowing hodv, all(l that it rejects that bodl'"
(PP 379). As 11e describcd in chapter 2. :r.. re rleau-Po11t1 aims
to account for this autonom) ofthc thing in terms ofan immemorial di-
mc ll sion that corre lates with the anonvmity ofthe "natural sclf." Thc asc-
itl of thc thing, asan clement o [ naturc, runs deeper than perccptual
structurc ancl ihclf as a namclcss rcsistancc to rellection. But
ir precise!) thc bcing of thc "natural self" that remaim ambiguous in
Phf' lllllllflloloro oj PPrfPjJiion, where it is presentcd both as "co-natural with
thc world" a ndas a "tacit cogi to" that introduces a fi ssurc or gap into the
\\orld of natun . The ambiguit) cxtcnds to i\1crlcau-Pont\ 's undcrstand-
ing of radical rcflecti on and its acccss to thc immemoria l rcsistance of
naturc: what would it mean . then, to think nature in its openness and its
asc itY?
The conccpt of chiasm in T/p \ 'i\iblP ami thP I nvilih!P is Merkau-
Po nty\ response to thi s dil'liculty. The distinction betwccn structurc and
sig11ilicati on ha-; its ontological foundations in t he intertwin ingofscmihle
ami sensc. and thc pcrccptual qucstion-and-rcph is subtended b1 a more
fundament al ontol ogical qucstioning, that is, h) the sclf-int errogation of
bc ing. In othcr words, the rel'ersibility of touching-touchcd afl(l more
gcnerally of scming ancl sensible is a manifc'>tation of the reflexilitv of
being. its 0\\11 dehisccJHl' into scmible nattllt' and meani ng. Tlw en-
croarhmcnt hetwcen scnse and sensi ble, on 11 hi ch thc duplici t) of thc
thing resLs, first inaugurales body and world. Pcrceptual dialogue is not,
therefore, tlw originan disclosure or the duplicitl of the thing, but onlv
its echo or its aftershock. The paradoxical difficulty of rellecting 0 11 the
can no longer be treatcd as a specifi call) human intri gue
but becomes a paradox of bc ing, since reflccting and re ll cctcd-on are
125
THE HUMAN NATURE CHIASM
the dimc11sions opencd b\ being's sclf-segrcgation. The consequence is
that bcing is not primordialh sc lf-ident ical but an c1cnt oforiginary non-
differcmc ofwhit h thc di1 ngence bct\l'een touching and touchcd is thc
exemplar. The duplicity of the thing is thc rcvcrberation of the duplicitv
ol the hod\ and. ultimateh, or being.
011c consequence of duplicit1 of being is that meaning, its in-
dimension, is no t a purc negation of o r break with its visible di-
mcnsioll , ami neithcr can it be founded 011 ac ts ol con-;ciousness: "The
l l'j)(Lmlwn [ hwt] 1\hich, in approximation. meaning, nota
no 1 alkct m_Ysl'/jwit h, a lad .. 1\ hich J constitute as a lack 1)1 thc upsurge
ol'an mdwhich 1 gil'e 111yscll'-it is a llfllum/ ncgatil'ity, a fi rst institution,
alwavs a iread\' tlwre" ( V/270 216). Rather than locate meaning within
thc gap that the 11egating '>ubject opcm "ithin tlw positi1it\ of being.
wc must instead rerognize that being doubles itsclf (rom within, that its
dchisccncc into visible ancl invisible is already a scparatio n or l'olding ol'
a natural negati1 i11. Rcllection is therdorc thc 11101cment through us of
<1 ncgation sunken into bei n g: "1 le 11ho questions is not nothing, he is-
a nd this is somet hing guite diffe rent-a be ing that qucstions himsclf;
the nega tive in him is borne bv a n infras tructure ofbeing" ( \'/160/ 120) .
This con junction of ontologiral negation '' ith qucstioning 01 interroga-
tio n is 110t incidental.''' i\krleau-Pon t\ \ examination of the m le of fonn
or totalit) in organic del'elopment lcads him to recognize an "operant
non-being" at worl.. at thc lc1cl of life, which int roduces the imbalance
IJI \\ hi ch organic dCI'clopmcnt is oricntcd toward its future (.\' 207 l:).)-
;)6). Ihis o pc rant 110 11-bci ng is not thc ,hsence ol somethi11g it
is rathcr a11 "intc rrogative be ing, which defines lil'c" (N 207/

l n-
tcrrogation namcs thc torsion o r of the sensible by which
it doubks itselfwith an imisible sheath. The negatil(' is thcrdorc to be
unde rstood topologically a'> a lold ora di1 e rgcncc, an kart, rathcr than
a nothi ngncss. Thc figure of interrogation namcs the operation of tlw
negatil'( in its its manner ofturning back o nto itselfin or-
der to el'f(ct a "non-dilfercnce-wi th-self." Stricth swaking, thcn. 11e 111\ISl
rccogni;e that being is not 11hat it H, not

lt is through
this 1110\Tmen t that bcing is "in thc intcrrogatin mode,"
and it is precisclv this intcrrogatil'c mmcment of bei 11 g that is its <Jrcnc;.
its unmotilated
\\'herc then are we to locate, in self-nwdiation ol hcing, thc
rcsistancc that tlw unrc ll ertive offers to rellection, that is, t he "barba-
mus source" or that "backside of things that \\' C ha1e not comtitutecl" (.\
2'27 I HO)? \\l1at does it mean to associatc specilically 1\ith
"natural" being? A clue is olfered h> Merlcau-Pont) in a worl..ing
note l"rom Nove m be 1960:
126
MERLEAU-PONTY'S PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE
Tlw \CI"Y pulp of the sPnsible, \\hat is indclinahk in it, i-, nothing elsc
than thc union in it of thc ''inside" \th tht the contact in
thid-.nn.._ ohelfwith sclf-- 1 he ab-,olute ol the "semibk" is this sta-
bilited t'"-plosion i.c. imoh ing retlll n
1 he rl'lation bctwee11 the cinularitics ( 111\ bo<h-tlll' scmiblc) cloes
not pte.,entthc dilllcullies thatthc tl'lalion bet\\CCI1 ta\t't'>" or linea
ordn'> prc-,ents ( nor the immanenre-tt ansccndctHT altcrnatin)
( 1 '/ 21iH)
Tlw of the chiasmic manner of thinking is that it_joins thc two
faces olthe thing as olwcrsc and reverse, that it makes thc thing genu-
inch Janus-faccd. Thc aseity and resistancc o( thc thing, what is "inde-
llnablc" in it, are a consequencc of its own duplicity, the facl that thc
of being is also instantiated within it. Wc must grasp the
proximity at1CI distance of thc thing notas two contrary faces, but as one
single circuit through the thickness or llcsh:
\\'e understanclthen whv wc scc thc things themsdn' in their places,
'' het e thc\ ate, according to thcit being whi( h i-, indeed more than
thcir being-pcrceind-and wh\ at the '>ame time \\C are '>cpat-<llcd lrom
tite m In allthc ol thc loo l.. and ol the bo<h; it is that this dis-
t,lll<C is 1101 thc conttan of this prm-.imit\, it i., dceph cortsonant with it,
it is\\11011\IIIOUSWith it. (\ '/178 l:t"i)
\\'hat remains to be understood in our relation 1\ ith nat\IIT is
this "di'itance" that is not the contran of "prm-.imitv," but that is, in a
paradoxical sense, S\ nonymous with it.
Good Error and the Expression of Nature
Throughottl :VIcrlcau-Ponty's writings, it is through cxpression that a re-
lation of rlistance can paradoxicalh be a pmximit\. lf expression is the
bond bct\\een nature and culture, this is lwcausc it is ncither a relation
o( rcscmhlance nor of 1 n his tssa\ on \lalraux \ theory of
pai 11 ting, "lncli rect Language and t he \'oi(('S of Si lencc," :\1erleau-Pon 1)
notes that "modern painting, like mockrn thought ohliges us
LO admit a ttuth which docs not resemble \\hich is without any
<''ternal model and without anv predestincd instruments of expression,
and which is nevertheless truth" (S72/ 57). It is this truth without rescm-
127
THE HUMAN-NATURE CHIASM
hlance that calls, borrowing a phrasc from Malraux, a
"cohcrent deformation ":
[here is meaning \dwn we submitthe data ol the wotld Lo a "cohcrent
delmmation." That comergence ol alltlw \isiblc and intcllcctual \t'C-
Lors ol tite painting toward the '><lllll' mearting. X. is airead\ skctchcd
out in the painter\ perccption. lt lwgirts as soon as he perceives-Lhat
is. as soon as he at-range<. certain gaps all(l lissures, figures ancl grounds.
a top anda bottom, a normanda de\iation. in the inaccessible fullncss
olthings.(-'>68 :)4)
rlw ontolo.,>y of chiasm does awa} with anv presumption of an "inac-
rcssible fullness of things," ancl docs so preciscly by making the "cohcr-
cnt deformation"-in the form of the fmrt or gap that separates the
dimension of sensible and sense-an element of every being. An iden-
tit) of thc touching and the touched, or of thc visible and the invisible,
\\Ottld reduce the world either LO facticity orto ideality ( Vl 194/ 148) .
B\ extension, the clivergence inherent in all perception and reflection
not a tailure, since the establishment of a pure identitv bet:ween the
l\\O tcrms would climinate the mon.: ment betwcen thcm. In
othet words, it is preciseh the "fai lure" of idcntit' that opens sense as a
mmemcnt of expression. Thc karl, as thc hinge of rcversibility, is the
ontologkal motor of the "gaps and tissures" b' which the world is mean-
( \ '/ 166 12.t-25): "What there is i-. not a coinciding by principie
01 a presumpti\e coincicling anda factual non-coinciding, abad or abor-
tin tntth, but a privative non-coincicling, a coinciding from afar, a di-
\crgence, and something like a 'good error' "
no ontological break to be located bctwcen cxprcssion and the cx-
prcssed, save for this divergence of "good error" that makes the expres-
'>ion possible. lnsofar as every perccption is from the first expressive,
c\cn what Merleau-Ponty elsewherc calls "good form," the convergence
of a pcrceptual arrangemcnt toward a ccrtain privilcged form, is ulti-
mateh a form of "goocl

But to sa\ that expression has ih ontological basis in thc fcarl at
thc lwatt of every being cannot mean that evcrv expression is "success-
ful," that creative utterance is trttc, ot thatthere are no constrdints
on what would count as, for instancc, an articulation of nature. \'\11al
ron\trains any expression-\dwthcr a pcrception. a reflection, ora lin-
gui ... tic utterancc-is its rclatiomhip with the silence that precedes it and
to which it aims to gi'c voice. As \\C han notcd in previous chapters,
Merlcau-Pont} persistently iclcntific\ the task of phenomenology with
128
MERLEAU-PONTY'S PHILOSOPHY Of NATURE
exprcssing mute experiencc, following the quotation from Husserl 's Car-
/Psian MPriitatiom that he again cites in Tfp \ 'isiblP anrlthP lnvible. "It is
the cxpericnce ... still mute which we are concernecl with leading to thc
pure expression of own meaning" ( V/171 / 129). But hcrc he elabo-
rates furthcr on the muteness thal precedes philosophical expression.
Thc "world of si lence" is the l ,eben.Hvfll, thc perceived world ( Vl224/ 170,
225/ 171)-that is, thc world of silcnce is nature

lt is
nature's si lence that allows it lo be givcn other than as a positiYity: "The
sensible appcarance of the sensible, the silenljJenuasion o[ the sensible
is Being's unicue way of manifcsting itself without becoming positivity,
without ceasing to be ambiguous and transcendcnt"; lhc sensible is thc
"possibi lity to be evidcnl in si lence" ( V/267 / 2 14, my emphasis). This si-
lence is therefore lhe key clifference bctween the sensible and sense, that
is, betwccn the world of perception and the world of mcaning. Both are
"diacrilical , relative, oppositional" systems, but whilc the fonner is visible
ancl mute, the lauer is invisible ancl voiced ( V/267 / 213-14).
Thc case of language reveals, according to Ylerleau-Ponly, both
"bow we are to and how we are nol lo return to the things lhemselves,"
ancl this is becausc language reveals the way to treat thc "inexplicable
alteration" and "strange distance" of the Pcart as a part of the very defi-
nition of what is lo be cxpressed (VI 166/ 124-25). If we takc the aim
of languagc to b<' a coincidencc with thc mute world of nature, if lan-
guagc seeks to escape from ils own culture-bound horizon ancl put us
into contact with purcly prelinguistic expericnce-which is how Timo-
thy Morton describes thc goal of "ecomimetic" writing-then thc impos-
sibilit) of this aim prescribes language's inevitable failurc. As Morton
corrcctly notes, "my attempt to break the spell of languagc results in
a further imolvement in thal vcry spcll," since writing cannot "achieve
escape vclocity from writing itsclf" (Morton 2007, But Morton's reli-
ance on figures of escape shows that he has not followed this thought
enough; he falls prey to what Mcrleau-Ponty elsewhcrc calls thc "ideal
of an absolute proximity, " thal is, of a thought that defines contact with
things by absolute proximity with the very point and instant wherc thcy
are (.\'C 359). But ir, as we have seen, the of the thing is il-
lusory, then this demand for absolutc proximity is nothing more than a
prejudice. Does thc factlhat language ncver coincides with prelinguistic
expcricnce guarantee its failure, thcn, or cloes it instead rcquire thal we
redefine what counts as success, no longcr as coincidence bul insteacl
as disclosure of what may only be clisclosed by diverging from it, a break
with mutencss that nevertheless conveys what the world in its silence
to say [veul rlire] " ( Vl61 / 39)? The "good enor" of Pcart pushes us
past thc opposition bctween the pure original and the mcdiatecl by rec-
129
THE HUMAN - NATURE CHIASM
ognizing that the originary is already ancl from thc first mediated. Thus
it is lhat "language realizcs, by breaking the si lcnce, what the sil encc
wished and did not obtain" ( Vl230/ l76). Language that is "opcrative,"
truly active ancl creative, is "open upon lhings, call ed forth by the voiccs
of sil ence, and continues the cffort of articulation which is the Being of
every being" (VI 168/ 126-27).
Furthermorc, lhe transition from si lence to language is not uni-
dircctional, not a sms unique, any more than the phenomenological re-
duction cffects a passage to immanence. Jusl as thc recluction, in the
end, revindicates the world of the natural attitude, so language, through
its very powcrs of expression, rediscovers an envclopmcnt in silence:
The taking poss('ssion of the world uf si leuce ... is no longer this world
o[ silence .... Can this rending charactnistic of reflection (which,
wishing to return to itsclf, leave) i/)e/f) come 1.0 an end? ThPrc would be
needecl a silence that cnvclops thc speech anew, after one has come to
rccognite that spPPch envelopeclthe alleged si len ce of thc psychologi-
cal coinciclence. What will this silence be? As the ruluction hnally is not
for Husserl a transcendental immanence, but the disclosing of the
lhP.I.I, this sil ence wi ll no/ be tite conlrary of language. ( \'/233/ 179)
lf the relation between silence ancl language parallels the relation
belween thc unrcflective and reflection, then a chiasm obtains betwcen
thcm: on the one hancl, therc must be a linguistic sense alreacly emer-
gent in the silent sensible, something thal il "wants lo say." Ancl, on the
other hand, there must be a concomitant conversion of language back
i nto naturc, a fleshiness of language by which it continucs to be a <Pmc;.
1f this is so, lhen the very bcing of nature and language are inextricably
intertwined; neither can be defined in positi,e terms and apart from the
essential movcmenl unclerway by which each crosses into its In
lhis case, "nature" is reached only through its exprcssion in language,
while at the samc time languagc becomes, nol a means of human com-
munication or represenlation, bul a movcment of nature itsclf. An al-
lusion to this dual sense of the rclation belween language ancl nature
serves as the closing passagc of Merleau-Ponty's fmal manuscript:
In a 'eme the wholc of philosophy, as Hussed says, consisL-; in restoring
a power to a birth of meaning, ora wild meaning, an cxprc,siou
of expericncc by experience, whi ch in particular clariliPs the spPcial do-
main of languagc. AIHI in a scnse, as \'alrv said, language is evcrything,
sin ce it is the voice of no one, sin ce it is the very , o ice of tlw things, the
waves, anclthe forests. And what wc have to unclerstancl is that there is
130
MERLEAU-PONTY'S PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE
no dialenical 1 C'\Trsal from onc of th< .. ,c LO tite other; we do not
haH'lO rcassembk them into a S\IHIHsis; thn a1c l\\O <I'>JWCl'> ofthc
nHrsibilit' \\hich is tlw uhimaiC' 1n11h.
\'\'hen presented the plan for hi'> future work to the
Collige de France in 1951, he concluded ll\ calling lora stuch of the
"good ambiguit'" in the phenomenon of expression, "a spontaneit;
which gathers together ... nature ami culture into a single wholc" (PRP
11). This aim of joining nature and culture through the of
cxp1 ession is airead\ apparent in PhPnommolof!:)' of Pt' ITPfJiion, where the de-
scription ofbody-worlct dialogue serves the cnd ol e-xtending the "miracle
of cxpression" from the body to all othcr worldh (PP 230/ 230,
But this aim is only fu lly achievcd when expression is under-
stood through the figure of chiasm, which trcats the vcry being of the
sensible as a process of becoming-sensc and an "ell'on of articulation" ( \'/
16R/ 127). In Merleau-Ponty's final ontolo.,>y, wc lind that reflection and
languagc are iterations or intensifications of the circulation between vis-
ible and imisible dimensions of being, ancl rdlection strives to put into
language what the things, in their silence, want to sav. The aseity and
resistancc of the thing is preciseh its silencc, \et this silence is not thc
opposite ol spccch. Thc recomersion of siknce and speech which
Metlcau-Pont\ characteri1es philosoph\ is thcrcfore aho the recomer-
sion o( nature and culture.
Conclusion
\\' hile 's exploratiom of pcrception, the body, animal-
t\, art, and ontol<>6'Y haYc much to offer a rcnewed philosophy
of naturc, his ke} contributions to this emltl can he summari7cd con-
in two points: first, that pcrccivcd nwaning is ontologicall} basic,
such that the perceivect worlct of naturc is lllcaningful on its own terms.
Th is mcans that it is thc world of pcrccption as revealed through experi-
cncc that is the foundation of cnvironmcntal philosophical exploration,
rather than the secondary worlct of scientilic rcalism. Sccond, thc rcla-
tion between humans and nature is fundamentally expressive, and this
cntails an incliminable mrl. Rathcr than an "alienation" from naturc,
this gap or ctivergence is precisely the condition of our contact with
nature, and our continuation of its own ontological duplicity. Conccrn-
ing the fip, point, Mcrlcau-Pontv\ position that naturc, as the worlct ol
originan pcrception, bears a mcaning as its own interna) configuration.
Both sides of the ongoing debate mer tlw mcaning or nllue of nature,
empiricist anct constructivist, sharc thc assumption that rea1it; apart
lmm human) desirc or judgment is <1 neutral and Yalueless
matter, so that nature on its own terms lacks nwaning. Mcrlcau-Pont} 's
approach is dellned by his comiction that naturc has its own meaning-
lul conliguration to which wc are oricntcd al a len:lmorc originary than
thought, at thc )c,-cl of our bodil) cngagcment with the perceived. Ami
sincc our bodics and minds are of thc sanw stulf as t his pcrccivcd, our
own meaning-making is an event within tlw largcr process of naturc's
production of sense. The implications of this attribution of sense to
nature are manifold, and we ha\'(' hardh bcgun to explore them here. In
particular, wc lack a language with which lO describe naturc as mcaning-
ful \\thout ing that this meaning is dcrivcd from a consciousncss
or suhjccti\il). As notes throughout his work, an efTort to
gcnuinelv undo the dualistic models for thinking matter, life, anct mind
must indudc a far-reaching reinterpretation of our ontologr. This rc-
mains the task for anr future philosopll\ ol nature.
Yet, qualilying this nr<;t point. does not re-
duce human existence toa momcnt ol nature\ meaning, and thus he
intenencs in the debate over the <,ense in \\hich humans ma) be consid-
CINI a "part of naturc." A common jenmiad in emironmcntal thinking
131
132
MERLEAU-PONTY'S PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE
pmits our continuity with naturc and tlwn st1 ugglc'> to explain our
contempor<ll) alienation from it, rcprocturing a version of thc classical
'"prohlcm of eYil" that limits our abilit\ to think through cmironmental
in panicular the relationship bctwccn naturc all(\ culture. As
notcd in our introduction, responses to this p1 ohlcm tcnd to alternatc
bcl\H'en 1110 on the onc hand. diagnoscs of tlw cultural '>ource(s)
of our alicnation from naturc-agricultun', language. dualism, capi-
talism, -,cxism, social hierarch). tcchnolo.,T\, and so on-couplcd with
nostalgic calls for a rcturn to prelapsarian unity; and on thc other hand,
cfl01ts to dcmonstratc that such human endcaYors are not distinctil'e, or
at not '"unnawral," becausc their can be traccd to natural
and cYolutionary processes. Such arguments citlwr strand us on the
hithcr sidc ofan inexplicable break betwccn culture and naturc, or else
reduce culture toan cffcct of nature.
Merlcau-Ponty's analyses disclosc a more subtlc logic at work in thc
intcrtwining of nature and culture, as he shows airead\' in its most basic
form: tlw taking-up of thc anonymou'> and organic functions of one's
mvn ho<h by a personal and reflectiYc sciL The logic of rdlection on
the unreflecti1e dcmonstrates that rcfkction undcniabh opens onto an
unrcflcniw dimension of which it is itself onh a certain intemilication
and fmm 11hich it '>tands forth as a figure against a ground. Bound to this
unrcflecti\c ground, rcOcction rcmains alwa\s ontologicalh continuous
11ith it, H'l rellection 's 0\\'11 range is abo inescapabh prcscribed b) thc
hlind '>pot that this ground maintains at thc lwan of ib operations. The
unrefkctin-in a word, naLUre-remains for tll<.' self a prehis-
ton, an inecuperable past. This mcans that. in a cenain scnsc. rellection
has alwavs already diYcrged from a monistic unit\' with nature. by its l'ery
esscncc as rcllection. But this is only to say that rcflcction cannot make
itself into a mute self-coincidcnce.
1\lcrlcau-Ponty's insight into the logic of rdlcction-and this is his
signiflcant contribution toa philosoph\' o( natltJT-is to reali;c
that such "alicnation" does not cut us ofT from naturc or from ourselvcs,
precise!\' becausc it is the condition fr the f .\jnt\\III of nature, for its
articulation in perception, languagc, or thought. Since our ontological
coJHiJHJit\ with nature is fundamentalh expH''>sin', and thnefore esscn-
tialh mcdiated, there is no purch "natural" laH'r 01 le\ll of expcrience
free fmm sclection, intcrpretation, and scdimcntation. Our expericnce
of thc pencind 11orld always inl'ohcs, for \krleau-Pont\, a paradoxical
conjunction of transcendcncc ancl immancnce: we encounter mnure in
ih aloof altcrit\ onl) through a creati1e all(\ cxpnssin act that gcrmi-
natcs within Thc encounter with nawre is therdre always the para-
133
CONCLUSION
doxical ekl/mi.l by which rdlection takcs up an unreflcctive ami never-
prcsent past, and this prehistoricalunit\ with nature is a mcmory that we
create as much as discoYer. In the encl, we fincl that this sclf-rcnding
mmcnHnt of cxpression is nota potcntialit\ ol tlw human subject so
muchas an e\rnt ofnature itself, of its 011n clupli( it\ , 11hich cntails that
ou1 "alienation" from naturc, if this 11ord has am sense, can onl) be a
momem of nature's own self-unfolding e>..prcssion through us.
fo tlw reader understandabh upset h\ prcssing cmironmental con-
cerns, such language may not appear \'Cn practical or producti1e. This
kincl of philosophical rcflection ctoes not lend itself as onc component
of a '"toolhox" for soh ing emironmcntal prohlems. hme we sought
to extract cthical prescriptions from Merleau-Pont\ 's descriptions. To
cxpcct such conclusions is to miss the force of our distinction betwecn
"cnvironmcntal" thought and thc philosophy of' naturc. Thc Ycry cffort
to define our rel<Hion with naturc in tcrms of"enl'ironmental problems"
i'> problematic beca use it fails to appreciate the particular henneneutical
task ofphilosoph), alongsicte othcr humanitics discipline'>, in intcrrogat-
ing thc framing of such problems. In general, thcn, our approach has
not bcen to problem-sohe, but rather to problemati1c the ontological
assumptions driYing this problcm-orientcd
does our account of naturc. an\ more than anv other ontolog\,
len el itsclf to simple nonnati1e cxtcnsion, a mi-.take that has plagued e mi-
ronmental philo'>oph) sin ce its embrace of ccological '"hannom"
"interdependence" as moral guidc-,. \\'hetlwr or not allthings hang
togcther," as Arne :\'aess claimcd, is a suitable scicntific clcscription of
ccological rclations, this bct tclls us nothing about the normatil'e ;oals
wc '>hould pur<,ue in our relation with things.
1
Certainly there would
be no neecl to argue that things \hould hang togethcr, since, to the ex-
tcnt that this is an ontological claim, things cannot do othcrwisc. To use
cither a scicntific oran ontological de-,cription as thc basis for norms of
human behavior is fundamentally to misunclerstand thc kincls of ques-
tions poscd bv scicnce, ontology, and cthics. A similar mistake has often
l)('en made by those who look to Mcrlcau-Pont\ \ clc-,criptions of flesh
.ts thc basis fr ncw cthical principies in our relation with nature. lf all
things are llesh, ancl none more so than am other, how could this imph
.un '>tandard ofjudgment for human bchaYior, em imnmental or other-
llisc? :\lauro Carbone puts the point as fllows:
lhc '>llangcr, a'> fl esh of nn flcsh. isjust bcr.tusc olthatm\ brothcr. Rut
lll\ brother could ,,e JI he Ca in. 1 111\'>t'lf < oulcl ht' '>tlfh. As a condition
for al/ these pmsibilities, a'> .t conclition of "a 1 l'll'rsibilit\ alwm> imma-
fll
134
MERLEAUPONTY'S PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE
IH'Ill and tH ,er realilcd in fact," flcsh lumb l'!ll'r) pmsiblc ethics and
1'!11'1)' poo,sible politics, that is, cloes not lound any patticul.u ethics or
pol iti o . (Carbone 2002, 57)
For similar rcasons, Mcrkau-Po nty's ontolor, of naturc can o!Ter us
no guidance in diagnosing thc particular cultural and historical en:nt
known as thc "cm iro nmental lt makcs no claim o n us to rcturn
to simplet wa\s of lifc, give up our cars and compute ro,, cultivatc a closer
pcn:cptual attunement with the no nhuman world, or dc,elop more
C\Ocatin philosophi cal concepts (which is not to den\ that \\'e might
havc o/111'1 compclling reasons, ethical as wcll as practica], for wishing to
do thcsc things), sin ce such hehavioro, ne ither embrace nor rcjcct the
flcshincss of things, but in fact have no bcaring o n it. That wc are folds of
the worlcl's flesh, thercforc, points tono partintla r c thi cal conscqucnces,
c nvironmcntal or otherwise. Thcre are good rcasons, thercfore, to resist
thc dcmand for quick applications of thc philosophy of na tu re sketched
out a bove .
. \nd yet, whil e we rcj ect the assumption that allthinking of na ture
nnt st he "applied," il does not fo ll ow that ontological comideralio ns
hme no rc lationship to o ur perccption ai1Cl behmioro,, orto thc pursui t
of cmironmental goals. An "ontological shifl" in our pcrccption of the
\\Orld can alt(' r o ur c thos shifting our scmc of wlwt i.1 ami how we ex-
pericnce an<l interprel o ur relations with thing'> . . \.\ :-\aess has argued,
"cthics fo ll ows from how we expcricncc thc world," so thal thc articu-
lati on of a ncw e mi ron m e n tal eth ic would be luous if we could
undcrsta nd thc world differently at an ontological A change in
o u r th in ki ng abo u t what is can lead to an Ctl ti re l) el i f!crcn t conception
of c thi cs, o t1e that circlcs less around principies o f moral obligation and
that instcad concerns our dwclling within thc world.
1
\\'hc t1 authors su eh
as Williarn Cronon note the ways that our cnvironmcntal policies have
becn dri,cn by phil osophical conceptiotls of the relation betwecn hu-
man'> aJHI tlature, 1 takc them to be making much the samc point con-
ccrning the relative imponancc of o ntological considcrati ons in re fram-
ing our relation with naturc.
1
lt is wort hwhik to pose thc question, thcn, of what encountering
thc world through l\ferleau-Ponl) 's \'ision of usas monwnt\ in thc dchis-
ccncc of flesh \\Ould mean for o ur rclatiomhip wi th naturc. This is the
undcrh ing question that has guided our tcxt from the start. The legacy
of the rcali'>m and idealism with which l\kt leau-Pont\ grapplcd in his
li fet i me remai m al ive and wcll in con le m poran cm i ronmcn tal tho ugh t ,
'' herc it undermi nes our ability lO recogni1c nature as thc very e mbodi-
mctll of sen se and hcing as cqui,alent to pcrcciH'd bcing. A
135
CONC LU S I ON
rclationship with naturc must thcrcforc takc seriously thc rcality of the
pcrceind world and the sensuousncss ofwhat is. This is distinct from any
kind of acsthcticism prcciscly beca use it cotH'Ct m our sh ift in ontological
'ision rather than anv ethical injunction. lf out lwing is asan expressive
folcl of thc world's flesh, then this celebration of the percei,ed is ne,er
tlw attai nment of coincidence or stasis, but instcad lhc c\cr-renewed
bringi ng to voicc ofwhat thc things ofthc \\Orld striH', in the fermenl of
thcir '>ikn(e, tosa\. To encounter naturc, thc scnse within or
\\ithoul, i-, abo lo creativcly cxprcss it, to take up ih rhylhms as our 0\\n,
so that one can never Sa) where to draw a linc bctwccn thc exprcsscd and
its cxprcssion. To be a pan of naturc as chiasmic intcrtwining is ne\er to
flnd o ncsclf at home, thercfore, but alwavs to be rcnt the play of an
inside that opens onto an ouL'iide, an o utside that expresses itselfwithin.
Na tu re ancl humanity are prccisely thc dttpl icity of' this circling, thc cvcr-
l'<'llewed nversal of immanc ncc and transccndcncc, a nd the aclvent of
disco\'l'ring onesel f only by lca\'ing oncself bchind.
Notes
lntroduction
l. Wilson describes logical positivism as "the mw,t valiant ronrertcd cffort
ner mounted by moden1 philosophers," and he clearly his own views
on "consilience" as the continuation ofthcir projert. See \\'ilson 1998,61-63.
2. Although :\ash notes that carlier philosophers such as Spinon all(l
\\'hitehcad took an interest in the "moral status of nature," he does not present
thc emegence of emironmental philosoph) as the continuation or clevelop-
ment of this tradition (Nash 1989, 122).
E\crnden 1993, 123. See also Monika Langer's discussion o[ [,ernden
011 this point in "Merleau-l'olll) and Dccp Erology," in.Johnson and Smith 1990,
118-19.
4. Scc E\crnden especially chapter 1; and Kirkman 2002, espe-
cially part l.
5. See Foltt. and Frodeman 200<1, 7.
6. See, for example, Abram 1996; Brook 2005; Everndcn 1993; Langcr
1990; Langer 2003; \1arietta 2003; and the collected in Cataldi and Ham-
rick 2007.
7. See Toadvine 200la; Brown and Toad\'ne 2003.
8. For reccnt variations on thcse accounts of what differentiates humans
from thc rcst of nature, see, for examplc, Rolston 1991; Evernclen 1993, espe-
cially chapter 5; Shepard 1998; \lax Odschlacger, "Boundaries ancl Darwin:
Briclging the Great DiYide," in Brown ami Toach'ine 2007; ancl.J. Baird Callicott,
"1 .amarck Redux: Temporal Sra le as the Key to the Bounclaq Between the Hu-
man and ;'\latural \\'orlds,'' in Brown and Toachi ne 2007.
9. For examples of the m le this debate plays in wilderness pn.'ser,ation, see
Callicott 1991; Rolston 1991; Callirotl 1995; Noss 1995; Cronon 1996; ancl the cs-
'>ayscollcctccl in Callicott and 1\elson 1998, especiall) parts and 4. Concerning
restoration, sec thc cssays collected in Throop 2000.
10. It is well known, for instance, that Bergson oiTers just such an evolu-
tionary account o[ these tendencies of the human intellect. See especially Berg-
son 1959, l:'l-65. BtJI a more compelling explanation must also
ronsider the ndtur<d influences that have made materialism aJl(l ;uomism so at-
uactivc in the Western uadition, as has becn done b} i\laq Midglcy 200(i, among
others.
11. Sce "Ct.anne's Douht" (SXS 13-33/ 9-25).
137
138
NOTES TO PAGES 21-lS
Chapter 1
l. !>hi'IIIIIIII'IIOio.,'\ of Pnrl"jJiion Tlu.\twllll/1'11/ IJI'IIfl l'/111 '>OIIlt' thirt1 times,
and \k1leau-t>olll1 refers thc rcadcr lo it <tgain in llw famou., final chaptc1 of The
1 iltblnwd lht !tntlihiP ( \'/ 19 1 117) .
2. \le1leau-Ponl\ gcncralh translall''- gt'\lalt ,1., "f1m" 01 "'>tructutT .. a11d
ll'>l''> thl''>l' In m'>..,, nol1\moush. In thc German U'>agc. !he term refers 1101 0111)
to thc spatial shapc or a1Tangemem of an objcn but to temporal q1unures as
\\ell . 11 ma1 abo refer toan cntit\ ha,ing '>Uth a \ha pe 01 ;urangenwnt. Tlnts, thc
te1 m W'lla/1 implic'> an cmbodiment or instantiation gene1 ,tlh 1,1< king in thc En-
gli'>h notiom of form or structure. On thc .,enses of the te1 m gt' lla/1, '>l'l' Khler
1917, 1 O 1-:. On JI,Jerleau-Pont\ 's dcbt to Ge.,talt J>"< holo).\\. e<,pecialh thc Bcr-
lin <,('hool, see l.estc1 Embree, "t-lcrleau-Pont\ \ Examination of Ces1alt t>s\chol-
O).\\',"inSallis l9Rl.
:t Allhough :"'acss\ best-known dbcus'tiom of' his g<''>lall ontolo..,y make
no m<'nlion of Merlcau-Ponty (:'\Jacss 1985; ;\lacss 19R9; Arne Naess, "Ecosophy
and (;c.,talt Ontolo10." in Scssions 1995), thc laun\ influence is acknowlcdged
in more pnhlicatio11s (;\laess 20(H; !'\ae<,s 2005). On ,\me !'\ae\s's gestalt
ontolog\. <,<e Toadline 2005a.
l. Arne :--laess, "Sclf-Rcalization: ,\n F('ological .-\ppmach lO lking in the
\\'orld," in Scs.,iom 199:1.
5. On the "problcm of perception." '>l'C al so .\( 191 / 176, 219,
210 221.
6. lt i' a long these lines that 1 inte1 prct :\lcrleau-Pont\ \ de'>niption of the
relation h<t11een hi'> l\\O books: rltl' \1111rlwP of8/wrlflll appmaches the per-
reind 1101ld from an external, JOint of \ i<" "hile Phmommolof!J oj PPT-
rl'jll/011 que'>tions peneptual comciousne'>s reflexinh 01 "'fm1n \\ithin." (See "L' n
indit de \laurice in /'/) "An Llnpuhlishcd lcxt b1 \lerleau-
Pont\," in >o> 1-5; ancl 'Titres ct tra,aux-Projet d'cmcigncment," in PI), 13,
17). 1 rcturn to this point al thc conclusion of this chaptet.
7. Mcrleau-Pont) consciously app1 opriat<'' 1 he tu m hPhal'lll against its use
bv bch;11 iorism, which uncritically adopts sricntifi< naturalism and romequently
1educcs behavior toa collcction of rdlexes and conditioncd rcflcxes stripped of
am intrinsic connection or meaning 4).
R. Fo1 a11 mcnie" of thc general argument of TltP .\tmrtun of 8Phmim; see
Bannon 1967.27-57.
\In kau-Pontv illustrates thc collapse of th(' < la.,.,ic ,11 theon of thc reflex
and thc i1buffidcnn of'the au"ilian l11pothesc'> inuoduced to bol.,ter i1 through
a '>lKrc.,.,in n:amination of thc roncepb of thc thc place of cxcitation,
the rcfle" cirntit, ami the reaction. Ilc n idenn dr<l\\11 fmm Kun Goldstein
ami other gestalt to illmtratc the imuflicienn of cach no1ion: thc effect
of a romplcx is oftcn unforcseeahlt> on the ba'>i'> of it'> dcmelllan prop-
CI tie'>. si1H e ih dlcct is often due more to "its 'JMiial <ll r.111gemcnt. its rh\ thm,
aiHI the rl11thm of ih intensities'' (SC H-9 JO); IIH' 1eflex rannot be dcfined by
its "place of excitation," '>incc "the excitation ofone nnptol can C\okc different
1dlcxcs and the ex< ilation of two distinct poinb can gi1 t' 1 i-.e to llw samc reflex"
139
NOTES TO PAGES 26-29
( .\(; 1 1 1 ()); 1hc rdkx circuit is "nei1hcr anatomiralh nor functionall) isulated"
hui 1 emaim dcpcndent on intemal bodih ('onditions ami is subject to enebral
influenre.,, so that, in thc cnd, it b thc "total 'tlale of the ncrnn1s s1stem" that
musl he ronsidered in understanding ,un reaCiion (.\C 15 17. 25 26}; la'>th.
l'H'Il if 'pcrific receptors, ami circuitn rould lw identified for each re-
fkx, no explanation could he offered for "l11 one nene pathwa) rathcr than an-
o! he1 "'" '>l'iected, and the ad,tpt,uion of an organi.,m 's 1-csponse
to the stimulu'> would remain 111\Stct ious.
1 O. :\kdeau-Pont\ doe., not de m th,u ll u e 1 dkxes do exi'>t. 1 lis puint is
r<llhel that the rcflex is not the fundamental explanaton principie for hehaY-
ior hut onlv a spcciali1ed case that ;uises in patholog-ical '>ituations or tlw arti-
fi< ial conditiom of thc laboraton. In f;H 1, he suggests that the pure reflex ma)
1)(' found most readill' in human bcings. since \\e are pe1 haps alone in bcing
ah k to "abandon 1his or that pan o[ l ou1 J bo<h .,<paratd) to the influences of
the milicu" (SC 47/ 45). The cxlcnsion of rdkx behmior lo all organisms as
1heir undcrlying principie would thm be the most an1hropomorphir of gesturcs,
while recogni1ing that othcr organisms pursue their own 1al goals would beuer
arcord \\ith obscrl'ablc scientific fach.
1 l. SC 106 96. For this example, le,nt-l'ont\ rites Koffka 1925 1916,
17111 177.
12. :\k1leau-Pont1 's citation of "id<1n" here scems to rcfer again to Koffka.
llu (;mwth o{the .\/inri ( 1 92.)}, 17411'. llmn\el, this disru\Sion does not appear on
th<''>t' page'> . .\lcdeau-Pont\ ma\ han in mind tht di'><w,sion of "Scnsoq Leam-
lng: 1 he lkHlopment ofColor \'i.,ion," found in the 2nd edition ( 1946) of 1111'
(;mwlh of lht .\lmd at
13. To gain thi'> ne\\ aptitudc, the organism mmt pla1 an actiYe role in e'-
lraning 1he general rele1-ance of a '>ituation f10m ih cxpniencc. l'rial and error
., neithe1 a necessaq nora sufficient rondition fm 1hi., ahili11, 'tincc some c;L'>CS
of k<lt ning orru1 aftcr onh a single 1 epetition, 11 hile in other ca.'>es repeated at-
lemph ne\er rc'tult in the acquisilion of the ncw aptitude. "Thc dccisil'e tctor,"
\k1leau-Pont) argues, is "the mannet in \\hich fonuii<His congruitics a1e utilitcd
ll\ !he organi'>m, in thc claboration which thc organism makes them undcrgo" (SC
10\l- 10 100). The organism prmides the f'ramework of practical categorics, par-
tirul;u to its 1hat situate a trial and iLs pmsihk out<omes within the general
goal-oricnted '>llttcture. In other \\orcb. tlw ,mi mal adopts a kind of practical "hy-
polhesi.," that situates auempts in rl'lation lO the goal. In case., wherc rcpcated
allcmpts are necessan. such as whcn a rat is lcaming to mm e through a
lcaming rcquirc\ that thc animallw ( apable of '>''>tcmaticallr ranking the diflcrcnt
possiblc solutions, dctem1ining their \al m in 1 elation 10 the goal. All of this would
he pos.,ible onh if \\hat is at stake i'> the stimutu., ,md '>ituation as it appears to the
organism, rathcr than the "objee1i1e" recomttunion of the sitnation in terms of
lis "nal'' parts. Thc beh;11ior of leaming demomuates 1hat an organism orienl!>
itsdf towanl a mcaningful and stn.tcllned cmimnnHnt that mav well be distinct
fmm our scientific uni,erse of' things. Ihi., atuibution of a meaningful world to
lhe organism is nota mauer of anthmpomo1 phi e pwjenion but is demanded b\
,my antti"Llll' description ofthe heha1i01 of ka1 ning (.W: 111-12 101-2).
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142
NOTES TO PAGES 37-47
of hnman spirit in ,\tan\ P/aa in Salull', which \krlcau-Pont\ cites in the nn
IH'\.l paragraph of his tc\.t (.W: 191nl 2 16n98) .
28. In chaptcr we consider the ramificaliom of \ arcount
ofa11imah in this and later texts.
29. Merlcatr-l'ont\'' s criticisrm of (;cstalt psvcholo.,'l turn on its to
appreciate this point; '>Ce .'iC E 1 1 10.
:\O. Sec, for irwann:, SC 101-2 92. 207-8. 221 20:i.
:H. As sms of be ha' ior. thc paradigma tic e\.ampk of struc-
llllt'. "onc is no longcr dcaling with a material rcalit\ nor, moreonr. with amen-
tal rcalit) . but \\ ith a ..,ignificathc \drole ora '>tructtnc which propcrly bclongs
ncithn to thc externa! world nor to interna! lifc. lt i-, rcalism in gcrwral which
must he called into question" (V. 197 182). A fulh cll\eloped "philmopll\ uf
form" \\ould thcrdore replace the "philmoph' of '>llh'>t<lllces" that has guidcd
the tradition. libnating it from it\ realistic pmtulates ( SC 143 132).
Scc \note to this efTect at 2 19n:i(i.
33. Scc ai\O se 2 1 l-1 7/ 198-20 l.\-, makes dear in a foot-
nott. his criticisms are directed pr imarily towarcl the neo-Kantianism of l.on
Brurl',dl\icg, rather than toward Kant himself. 'iinn :-.terleau-PorH\ finds sugges-
tiom of an altematin de,elopment in Cntirur of JudKIIll'lll. See \C 1 206,
2 18n 11.
:H. cites Fin t..\ "\ 'crgegenwrtigtnrg und 13ild," Jalnbwhfiir
}J}u/ollifJitiP und jJhiillomnw/ot;rhf Fo11dllwK 11 ( 19:10) , 279. Thi-, pa-,-,agc may be
ftuHI in Fin k 1966, 15- Hi: "Bemer !..ung: \lan t..iinntc schon in dn natrlichen
Eimtellung 1cigen, wie die Gan/lll'ihprobleme dn natrlichen \\'dt. radit..al
dm('hdadn, sdhsl cinc \H'Iden fr den l'bergang in clil' transLen-
dent <t lc Einstellung." \ refcrCII('l' to this passage 0('('lll'\ at sr.
222n2 248n40.
3:i. The example of Beethmcn i-, mentioncd at SC22 1 20:i, andEl Greco
i-, discus.,ed at .\(. 219-20 203-1. abo the mention o( the \\Titn "' a higher
knl of inlegration (S(. 227 210). fhe El Greco di.,('us-,ion p<ualld., inmam re-
'-P<'<ls \lerlcau-Pont\ \ later examination uf C{;mne in "Cnnne\ Doubt," in
St>n\1' (11/(/ Xon-Sm\1'. \ quotation from Saint-b.up{' r' is u-,ed to similar effect as
the conduding lirw'> of Phenomenolo,_n; of l'l'l'rPjJiion, !)20 4.)6. See al.,o the
lino" in SmiP aiUI .\'on-Smw
3(). Concerning lhe need lO giH' dcath its duc. '>l'l' )(.'220 '20 l. 2Hl 223.
:H. fhe lcrm l/11/ilulion, '>0 imporl<lnt for \ l,uer work,
used in thi'> sense at .\(;224/ 208.
38. Wolfgang Khler uses the cxample of meiO<h to emphasi1e the tcmpo-
ralit\ of the gestalt. See (;p\/a/1 fJyrlw/o;y. 10-1.
:\9. See Bcrgson 1959, 510 1998, 19: "The nolution of liH' li,ing being,
lit..e lhat of the embr \O, implies a ('Ontinual reconling of dtmuion. a persisten(' e
o( thc past in 1he pre'>ent, and so an appearan('e, at lea'>t. of organic mcmof) ...
10. ll worth noting thatlhe ontolog) of '>llll('lliiTS does not simpl) el imi-
natc "mind-body dualism," but ratlwr a!fi rms ancl explaim ''both liH' distinction
and the union of the soul and the boch" (SC226 209).
143
NOTES TO PAGES 51 - 60
Chapter 2
l. This plu ase appears thmughout Phrnomnw!f:O' of Pnrrf!lWil with seYeral
'<11 iations, indudi ng the "prejudice of the world [ {p jJiiju;,> du mondP]" (PI' 1 1 6,
(i!>/ 62) , the "prcjudicc of thc ohjecti\'e world" ( PP 12/ 7, 71 / 67), the "prejuclice
ol cletenninate being or of the world" ( PP 62n ;)9n). and thc "pr cjudicc uf oh-
jtOi\e thought" ( PP 370 37:1).
2. On tlw boch as a "nalur <ti '>clf.'' se e al'>o PI' 199 198, 250 2:i l . 502 .> 11.
3. Thc '' mJ,. of Dm id :\br a m exemplan in th is rcgard. Se e ,\bram 1996.
cspecially 11-:)6. f'hi-, themc is al'lo treated b) l.anger 1990; Don E. Marieuajr.,
" Bar!.. lo Earth 11ith Refkction ancl Ecolog)," in Brown and Toachine 2003; ami
hcrnckn cspccially -ll -60.
1. This suggcsts that "nrdic al" reflection, in Plwnommolol!) of PmPj;lion, car-
rit' ' th rough lhc methodologic al re' ersal that i'> suggested at thc el ose of 1111'
.\tmrltu'l' of ll1'hmn. nameh, the incorporation of the historie,\! of
lhc rdlcctin standpoint of the philosopher undertaking the phenomenological
clcsrriplion ('>ce t hapter 1 ).
5. Thc'>l' frmulations \lillundoubtcdh callto mind llciclegger\ di'>rns-
sion of earth and its relation lO \\orld in 'Tht Or igin of thc \\'ort.. of Art." .\1-
1 hough the len u res that culminaled in thi-, l''>'>a\ were deliHred in lhe mi d-
I thcre is no e\ idence that was familiar \\ith them prior to
this essay's first publicalion in 1/ohwe;e ( 1950) . 1/ohwe;P is ('itcd among the texts
lor \lerleau-Pont\ \ later rours<' ' al the Collige de France (in .\'o/Ps rfp w1111,
/959-1 961).
6. TJp \'trrnl/111' oj /Jphmllll \ cle'>niptions of or-g-<tni'>m-emironment intcr-
anion often haH' rccoursc to 1lw lrope of queslioning o r pr obkm sohing: tlw
cmironment poses a question lo the organi.,m, which must tlwrdi>re tind a11
approprialt' solntion or reph: the dung beetle that loses a leg mmt find the
solution to the unn.pected pmbkm posed b' lhi-, loss (SC39 39); the rat in thc
111<11<' adopl'> a general h\lJ<>Ihesi'> in see!..ing thc t'\.i t (.\C 110 lOO); and sunfish
lc<tm to recogn ilt' a cenain gcner al form of dc('cption ( .w; 1 06-7 97; sce al-,o
lli 15, IO(i 96).
7. We hme mainlained thc published translation of lhi-, phrase, although
tiH' French original read'> "primordial consciousnes.., [rliii\C' III'P]" rather than
"primordial ('Omlann "; the lattcr phrase seem<, more appropriate to thc conlt''t
of \lerlcau-l'onl\ \ remart..s.
8. Thc l<tst .,enlence of this quotation ., mi'>sing from the English transla-
tion. The Frene h rcads: "Nous nous ignorons en die, el c'esljustemenl ce qui
t'll fait une< hmt."
9. 1 rekr hn e to the bmous passagc in lhc chapter on .. he Bod} a'> :,_
prc"'ion, ami "The 1101cls, \Oweh, ,urd phonemes are .,o mam wa\s of
' singing the world, a ncl ... lhei r funnion is to repr esent things not, as the na in
onomatopoctit thcon had it, b\ reason of an objecti\'e resemblance, but be-
rau'>e they extract , and lileralh express, their t'lllotional esscnct" {1'1'218/ 217).
lhis "emotional esscnce" would ht preciseh thc embodied st\ le ofthe thing thal
144
NOTES TO PAGES 60-62
\1erleau-l'ontr, in the chaptcr on "Thc Thing and the Natural \\'orlrl," calls the
"corc of realit>."
10. The translator suggcsts that the phrasc "it 'thinks iL-;elf in me'" is a
rcfcrence to the contcmpl ation of thc sky in Paul \'alit-y's ''Thc Grmeyard br thc
Sea" (Valtq 1971) , 216-17:
:-.tidi l-haut, \lidi sans mounnwnt
En '>O -.e pcnsc et com ient <1 soi-m(mc.
And Noon up thcrc. Noon th e
Thinks its mm thought apprming it'> mm sclf.
This attrihution is madc plaw,ible by \1erleau-Ponty\ rcfcrcncc to the next
sta111a of the pocm carlicr in this '><une chapter (se e J>J> 240/ 2 11). 1 lowner, the
same precise phrasc is attrihutecl to C/annc in "Czannc's Doubt," an cs'>a> ptth-
lishccl in thc samc year as l'hmommology ofl'nujJiion:" The lanclscapc thinks itself
in me [si' jJI'II\1' en moi ], ' he saicl, ami 1 am its J 7). This
phrasc is drawn fromJoachim Gaschet's ChanllP ( 1921 ), whcrc Czanne is quoted
as follows:
The lancbcapc tTfiC'ct '> itself, humani/cs it'>clf, thinks itselfwithin me l/1
jmnagl' 11' rpjftl', 1'/wmani.IP, lt' jJI'IHI' en moi]. 1 ohjcctivi/t' it , projccl it, fix it on
m> c;nvas .... You \\ere talking tome the other day about Kant. lt mm sound
like nomen<;c, but 1 would '><'t' lll}''>t:'lf as t he \uhjccti\ e consciou>ness of that
latHhcapc, and lll\ can va'> a'> itl s] objecti\'C consciomllt:''>'>. (C;t',chct 1921. un-
pagina ter! 1<)91. );)(), tran'olation moclified)
11. 1'1' 294 / 296. Thi; comment anticipatcs of
thc "hocly of the mine! " (anotlwr phrasc borrowed from \'alry) in his last writ-
ings. Sce, for instance, \'/27-1-75/ 221.
12. For 1\lcdeau-l'ontv's usage of the phrasc "natural subject ," see PP
199 198,239/ 239.2:J0/ 25J,399/ 404,iJ02 :)JI.
1 In fact, each of lll) senses may be describcd as little injust
this '>Cnsc, as '>O many general ancl anonymous "natural sclvcs" that opcrate au-
tonomously from 111) personal will. See l . 100/ 97. 404-5.
14. 1 examine the contrasting temporalitics of thc natural all(l personal
sclf in "Le pas-,agc du tclllJY natt1rd" (Toaclvine 2008a).
1 :). llein:imaa 2003, .J3. This clistinction ., aclopt ed. of course, from JI us-
scrl , although \lerlean-l'onty cruates the "operativc" leve! of intentionalit) with
lleideggcr 's notion of "existcnce" ami wit h llusscrl's "logos of thc acsthctic
''orld." Se e J>J> xi ii / xx, 178. 48G. 490/ 498.
16. l am suggesting that what terms thc "habit body'' (cmjJJ
/wblllll'/) in clistinction from the "present bodv" (r01jJ\ artud) names that as-
pcct of our anonymous sclves that has been frmed through the seclimentation
of personal and cultural hahits. Thc boclv" is therdim '>ynonymous
with the "personal self," while the "habit bocly" is an aspcct of the (anonvmous)
"natural self" (ami, according to l\lcrlcau-Pont)''s explicit remarb concerning
the interweaving of thc natural ancl the cultural in human beings, ultimatcly in-
145
NOTES TO PAGE 63
distinguishable from it in fact). Therefore, I clraw thc clistinctions between thcse
terms in a slightly cliiferent place than cloes Heinamaa, who takes "habit bodv"
ami "actual bodv" as aspects of the "personal bocly" (or personal sclf), although
she agrees that motor habiLs 'Tunction in thc same way as the anonymous bod)"
and that the line between habitual ancl present is an C\'Oiving one. See llcin:i-
maa 43-44. The relevan! passages conccrning habitual/ present body in
Plzmommolof!J' ofl'n<Pjllion appear at 166-72/ 164-70, 97-98/ 95. On t he undecid-
ability of the natulal / cultural clistinction in human existence, sce PP 199/ 197-
9H, 220-21 / 219-20.
17. I'J> 100/ 97. On thc ncxt page, Merleau-Ponty claborates on this pornt:
The '>pC'cific past, whidt our body is, can be recaptured and 1aken liP by an
incli,i cluaf life onl) becau>e that life has ne,er transcended it, but secretl)
nouti'>hes it, dt:'voling thercto pan ofits strength, because its pre,ent ., sti ll
that past. This can be >een in cases of illness in which hodil\' e\ents become
the events of the dav. t:'llahles liSto centre our existence is also what
preven t., liS from centring it completely, and the anon) mit\ of our bod)
insC'parably both freeclom and senitudc. Thtls, to '>11111 up, the ambiguity of
being-in-the-world ., tramlated hy that of the body, and this is understood
through that oftime. (PP 101 98)
! H. See, for instance, the discussion of thc rclation between personal and
anonymous existencc at PP 188-92. Since every reflection ancl volun-
tar)' action of m y personal self only against the constant )Jl'Cpersonal back-
ground of the natural self, the "1" is tll'\er, in the fmal analysis, autonomous or
complctel) constitutcd (PP241 / 242). t\'or, on the other hand, is the natural sclf
l'\'lT full) impersonal: "Thus there appears round our personal cxistence a mar-
gin of almos/ impersonal cxistellce, which can be practically takcn for granted,
ami which 1 rel y on to kcep me alive" ( PP99/ 84). Sara ll ein;unaa has notcd thc
signifi cance of this distinction hetween the anonymous ancl personal selves, call-
ing this the "most important distinction that Merleau-Pont; makes in his phe-
nomenology of the bodv." See her discussion of this distinction in Heinamaa
2003,41-44.
In general, the relationship betwcen my personal sclf and m) bodily or-
ganism is onc of rcprcssion and partial sublimation, and it is in this sensc that
\lcrleau-Pont) describes the bod) asan "inborn complex":
lt ma) ewn happe11 whc11 1 am in danger that my human .,ituation aholi'>IH'>
lll) biological one, that 111) bodv lencls without rt:'st:'ne lo action. But
ti1C''>t' moments can be nomon than momC'nts, and for most of the time
personal txist<'nn tTptTsses thC' organism without being able eilllt:'r 1o go
beyond it orto renounce itself: \\thout, in otlwr heing ablc either to
reduce the organi'om lo ih txisHntial self, or itsclf to the organism. (1'1'99-
100/ 97)
In this passage. Merleau-Pont\ cites again thc example of Saint-Exupry,
which, as we notecl in thc pre,ious chaptlT, is one of his key examples of"authen-
tic" integration of biological and human suuctures.
11
146
NOTES TO PAGES 63-66
19. This the conclusion that lleiniimaa Otl the basb of .'vterlcau-
l'ontl \ characttTilation of thc f1u' of as anommous.
See lleiniimaa 2003, 5ln31.
20. lhis phrase is in tended lO echo Be1 g-.on \ notion o( thc "turn
of t''J>cl it'nce" in ,\la/lrr and ,\temO')' ( Bergson 1959. 32 1 199 1, 1 H l-H5), a pas-
-.agc that cites" hcn di-.c I!Ssing Bngson in t he 1enure-. on naturc
(.\ H!i :)H). Concerning the relatiom bctwccn all(l on
thi'> "ttll n." '>Ce Barbaras, "Le tournant d e l'c,pl icncc: ct Bcrg-
-.on. in B,11ha1a-. 199H.
21. Scc our at the clo'>c of chap1e1 1 all{lthe following
from thc material-. that -.uhmitt('{( f(n his candidan at the Col-
li>gc de h ,\IHT in 1951, where he bctllt'Cil the mcthod of his flrst
l \\() 1\01 k ... :
\\'e hall' fir-.t 111adc an cflort of thi-. -.oll con< e1 ning- thc 1 dation-. betwecn the
s11hjcn and the organic conditiom of his lile, 01 in othc1 words, conccrning
thc traditional problcm ofthe rclatiom of thc soul and tht bodv. Since it is
thc junction of thc'c two ordcrs, pcrception nll"t bt<ollle 0111 theme, and
thi-. i-. thc concc111 of 0111 first two publi-.lwd wo1 J.s tlw first , The Stmrlwe of
8tha!'itll, considers thc ma11 who pcn ci1c-. f 1om t lw ouhi<k ,m el 11 to show
tht g-cnui11e mcaning ofc,.pnimcntalle-.earch that hq.{in'> hom the per-.pec-
of tlw ouhidc '>pcctator. Thc othc1, Pht'lllllllt'lllllo;;:. of Pnu'jJIIIm, tal..cs up
,, pmition ''ithin the '>ubject in orde1 to -.how. fir-.t, how acquired l..no1dedge
imite-. u-. to concei1e ofthi-, -.ubject\ 1l'lallom 1\lth hi-. ho<h ,md hi-. world,
.md la-.th in ordc1 to '>l..ctch a thcon of cmhciou-.ne-.., and of 1 dkction that
mal..t''> the'><' relation'> po<>siblc. (!'[) 1:1. 1111 ll.tn'>lation)
22. al'>o PP240 240, 249n 250n .. \ 'imilat cmphasi'> on the indi,idual
,md -.ituatcd < haracter of thc inquin be founcl in i\lc lleau-l'ont\ \ sugges-
tion thatthc ps1chologist who studic'> thc bo(h nHN recliscmcr that he himsclfis
the boch undcrdi;,cussion (PP 112 109-10), that\H'IIlll'>tseek the prc-objective
" in to uncler'>tand sensing (1'1' IU 11) , and that space can be
on thc hasis of"flrst-hand C"-()('ritrHc" (I'P2H7 2H\J).
2:t On "radical rcflcction," scc abo 1'1' l xi, i" x1i, x1i / xxiii, 217/ 247,
2:1:1-53 251-:>!i. 278-H0/ 280-H2, :1:14 :t\7, 11 2-1:1 II H-19, 157 161-63,311-
12 .)2 1.
21. rli'>CII'>'l'' thi'> po-,.,ibilitl ,md ih limih at /'/' 192-93/
191-92.
23. \le1leau-Pont1 introduce;, this term o nh (,Hel , in "/111' 1 '111ble al/(1/hr Jn-
l'tltblt, hut "In pn-1 ellenion" i'> dearh a de1 clopnwnt of thc problema tic o f "radi-
< al tdknion." 1 '/61 38, 70 46.
26. "><'<' al-.o PP i1 xi. 1dwrc refk,ilt' anah'>i'> is dc-,nibt'd as "an incom-
pktt' f01m of 1dknion which lw,e-. '>ight of it-. 01\11 lwg innings": aJl(l/'1'69 66,
1dH'IC "< l<l',,ical -.cicncc" i-. dc'>crihcd a-. a "fonn of perception 1dtich lmcs sight
of its 01 igins and believes itself complete. "
27. ')ce, for instance, P/'71-75 71: "In fan, the thinking Ego can ne1cr
aboli-.h it.'> inherencc in an indi1idual subjcn, " hi ch l..nows all things in a par-
147
NOTES TO PAGES 66 -67
tinda1 pcrspective. Reflcction can ncvrr mal..e me stop sccing the sun two hun-
dred vanh. awav on a mist\ da1, or secing it ' risc' and 'sct,' or thinking with thc
cultural apparatus with which lll\ education, lll\ pn1i0u'> efforts, m )
hi-.ton, hall' proded me.''
Scc aho PP 45:1 4GO: "\\ hate1er 1 think 01 decide, it is alwa)S against the
hackgmund of what 1 ha1e pt-e\ ioush bdincd 01 done. 1/abemu.\ idea m vrram, we
po"e" a l!uth, but this cxperience oftruth would be ,tbsolutc l..nowlcdgc onh if
IH' rould thcmatile c1en that if we CTascd 10 be in a situation."
2H. "There would be no present, th,u is 10 '><1\, no sensible world 1\ith iLs
thickmss and ine,haustiblc richnes'>. if pnception. in llegel 's wmds, did not
retain a past in the depth of the pre'>ent , aml did not contractthat past into that
<kpth" (/'/'27i 279).
29. fh is quotation appcars twice in l 'httwiiii' IIOio.;y of Perreptwn (PP 253-
51 251-55, x x1ii). Thc originalma) be found in Edmund 1 Husserliana,
10!. 1, Crult\irmi1rhe Meditalionen, ed. Stephan Stras-.er NijhofT: Thc
llague, 1950) , 77; Car/e.lian ,\In/ita/ion\, tram. Dorion Cairns ( Dordrecht: Klu-
IH'I, 1993), 3H-39; A1Mitatiom mrt\I'IIItl'l, trans. Cabriclle Pciffer and Emmanuc1
l.nina' ( l'aris: \ 'rin , 1996), 33. CotHTrning Metkau-Pontv\ of this phrasc
thmughout h is work, see Jacqucs l'aminiaux, "Expc1 ience, Form
in ltincr.try,'' in Taminiau' 1990.
:10. attrihutcs the tet ms "01 igina11 laith" ( l 'rglaubr) and
"originan belief" ( L'rdoxa) lo Htt'>serl aml repcatcdh associatcs them in his di'>-
cussions ( PP50-51 47, 371-72 :175, :l!l.' 100, 1 19nl 125n8; '>Cl' also "Phcnom-
nolog\ and thc Scicnces of :\lan," PRP :i 82) . "Originan lwlid" is cxplicith a t-
I! ihlltCcl lO 1 (us...erl\ f:xjJeril'llff tlllrfjllrff{llll'/1/, 1\ hen \\('Can (In el era( mentiOilS
olthe tetm L'ulo.\a ( H usscrl 19 IH, 60, li7, Hi!l 197:1 .. )9, ()5, 3H7).
/'/'66 62,379 383, -l6H. 175.
:l2. Scc also llm-.erl 194H, 110 197:l. 100: '', \lthough it prmides cenaint\
of1wlidand being, thc confirmaton \es,' likc thc 'no.' is in a wa1 a modi}lmlion
a1 romfmml wilh the romjJlelel) ori!{inal, 1/llllllldft('([fnimal modr of rntain
m/u/ty in whirh thc comtitution of the objen is realiLecl unifonnly and
tntirch without conflict."
:1:1. See <tbo /'/'4Fl4/ 161:
fhne an ofiillion which i'> nota pmli-.ional f(Hm o[ l..nowledge de'>Lined
LO later Loan ab'>olutc form, hut 011 tht conu,lr\'. both thc oldcst or
mo-.t rudime11 tan. and thc 1110'>1 COII'>Ciou-. 01 mat111 <' fn11 of I..IH>I\ lcdg-c-
an opinion \\hich is originan i11 the douhle -.(nw of "OJigina1" and "fullda-
ment,l." fhis is what call'> up bef01 e us 1111111'1/ung 111 gnwml, 10 which positing
thought-douht o1 demonst1 ation-can '>llh'>t'qmnth 1 el ate in or
denial. lhc re is '>OillC '>Ctl'>c, '>omething amlnotnothing.
">e e abo use of "thete i., .. (ti) a) at/'/',ii "i' ami 502 51 O.
:l l. PP457 464-65. Thi., use of ..,ugge'>h a diflerent
tion than appears earlie r in the tcxt, when i\lontaignc\
f01m of intcrrogation with that of the schi1ophreni( who all affirmation
o! thc w01ld (PP341 344). willrclulllto thi'> phrase from Mon-
148
NOTES TO PAGES 68-70
taigne in charactcri1ing interrogative thought in Thr VisiblP and the Invisible. At
thc cnd of the chapter on "lnterrogation and lntuition," he holds that :\1on-
taigne's formula leads us ultimatcly to the guestion "what is the tltrrP i1?," 1vhich is
to be "answered" only through philosophy's "reconvcrsion of silcnce and speech
into one anothcr" ( VI170-71 / 128-29).
:3f>. "lf it wcrc possible to lay barc and unfold all the presuppositions in
what 1 call my reason or my ideas at c>ach moment, we should always find cxpc-
riences which have not bcen madc explicit, large-scale contributiom from past
ami present, a whole scdinwntary history' which is not onh rclevantto the gene-
\ of thought, but which determines .1rmr"; and on the next page: "1 can
'hrackct' my opinions or the beliefs 1 have acguired, but, whatcver 1 think or
decide, it is always againstthc background ofwhatl have pre1iously bclicvcd or
done" (PP453/ 459-60).
:36. Itere Bernet us ahead toward Merleau-Ponty's remarks in his
famous late essay on llusserl , 'Thc Philosopher and His Shadow" (S 225/ 178):
"\\' hat resists phenomenology within us-natural bcing, thc 'barbarous source
Schelling spokc of-cannot remain OLIL';ide phcnomenology and should have
its place within it." Thodore Ceraets, in considering the transformation of phe-
nomenology that Merleau-Pont:y's account of nature requircs, turns toward pre-
ciscly this same passagc from "The Philosopher and His Shadow" (Ceraets 1983,
305). Wc will return to this passage in chapter 5.
37. PP 72/ 69. On this point, Merleau-Ponty ci tes 'Ozr Strurturr of Behavior
and refers again to thc passage from Fink's "\'crgegenwiirtigung und Bild" that
played a dccisi1e role in the tormulation of this argument (PP63/ 59).
Merleau-Ponty's convictions concerning the con,crgcncc of phenomenol-
ogy ancl Gestalt theory were certainly shaped by his familiarity with the similar
claims pul forward by A.ron Gurwitsch. On this point, see Embree 1981 and
Toad vine 2001 b.
38. See PPxvi / xviii and especially PP73-77/ 69-74.
39. On this notion of fundamental or transcendental contradiction, se e PP
418-19/ 42:): "Primat" 125-26/ PRP 18-19.
40. See thc di,cussion of "sryle" in painting and rclation to the
tions of perception, f>A183ff./59ff.
41. :\lerleau-l'onty returns to this repeatcdly in his later
work, oftcn expressing it with a quotation borrowed from Lucien 1 lerr's com-
nu.:' ntar) on 1 legel, as we sce in the summary of his 1956-57 course on the con-
cept of nature:
says Lucien 1 1<-rr in a commentupon Hegel, "is there from the first
da)." lt presents itsclf always as airead y there before us, and yct as nc11' bcfm-c
our ga1e. Reflexive thought is disorientt>d b) this implication of the immemo-
rial in thc prt''>elll, the appeal from the past lO tlw rnost recent present. ( ac
94/ pp 133)
Sce al so 1'/ N 76/ 49. The quotation from ll err appears in his article
"Hegel" (llerr 1894), 1000. We will return to this passage in chapter 5.
149
NOTES TO PAGES 71-74
4.2. See Le,inas 1, especially 45-60; nas 1969, 130-42; Le1inas
1985, 47-52. For a lucid exposition of the elemental in Levinas's thought, see
Sallis 1998.
4.3. Geraets 1983, 305-6.
14. See Merleau- Ponty's critica) remarks concerning the traditional no-
tions of teleology in RC 1 04.-5, 11 O, 1 1 7/ 11'1' 141, 146, 151. On these two sen ses
of tcleology, see al so Gcracts 1983, 305-6; Carbone 2004, 31.
45. This citation is from Mcrlcau-Ponty's summary of his 1956-57 lectures
on "The Conccpt of Nature, I. " The corresponding passage in the lectures is at
.\'68-69/ 43-14. \\'e return LO Merleau-Ponty's reading o[ Schelling in chaptcr 5.
46. See also the rcferenccs toa "teleology" of consciousness, again attrib-
uted to Husserl, at PP453/ 460 and 456/ 463.
47. Scc, for instance, Merleau-Ponty's discussion of thc insect's "being-
in-thc-worlcl" at PP 93/ 90, where he cites the "Vi tal Structures" section of Thr
Strurturr of Behavior.
4.8. Se e al so CeraeLs 1983, 301-2.
49. In "The Primacy of Perception," Merleau-Ponty remarks that "Human
pcrccption is dirccted to the world; animal perception is directeclto an environ-
ment, as Scheler said" ("Primar" 150/ PRP 40).
f>O. See, for instancc, thc citation from Scheler's l)ie Wissniformrn und die
Geselllchaft at f>P 1 In 17, which al so speaks of the necessity of a break with
the immersion in the environment in order to better possess it. We examine
the relationship betwecn Schclcr's and Merlcau-l'onty's positions mo1-c closcly
in chaptcr 3.
51. Although thc proximal source for this description of the "double sen-
sation" of touch is Ilusserl (whose Carlrsian Aleditation.\ is quoted within this pas-
Merleau-Ponty also cites a similar descri ption fmm Drr Aufbau dn
Tastwe/t at PP 364/ 3G7.
f>2. lt is not, however, an absolute non-being ora hole; sec PP 247/ 248,
249/ 249-f>O. Se e al so the response to Sartre at PP 274ff./276ff., where Merleau-
Ponty en>kes the disti nction betwecn the personal a nd anonymo1ts levels of the
sclf to offer an altcrnati1-c to Sartre's account of the immediatc rcflcxi,ity of
consciousness.
53. Scc the similar remarks in Mcrleau-Ponty's prescntation of his thcsis
to the Socit Franc,:aisc de Philosophic: "There is a center of consciousncss by
which 'wc are not in thc world.' Butthis absolute cmptiness is observable only at
the momcnt when it is filled by expcricnce. \'\'e do not sec it, so lo speak, except
marginally" ("Primat" 151/ PRY41 ).
54. In his latcr writings, Merleau-Pont) call s into question the notion of
the tacit cogito, finding it to be a retrospcnivc illusion of coinciclence with a
prelinguistic consciousncss, when in ct language is already presupposcd in
thc constitution of the basic notion of consciousness. Scc VI 224-2f>/ 170-7 1,
229-30/ 1 7:) -76, 179, 294/ 240; S 192-9:3; 1 f>2-f>3.
See also John Sallis's critica) remarks concerning the tacit cogito in Sal-
lis 197:3, 114-lf>. Sallis's critica) conclnsions concerning thc failure of Merleau-
150
NOTES TO PAGES 75-83
's project to maintain a di'>tance betwcen thought ami rc-
quire rcevaluation in thc li gh t of Merlcau-Ponty's reccnth publishcd lenure
comses, espcciallv his account ofSchdling in the 1956-5 7 course on thc concept
ofnature. \\'e takc up this issuc again in chaptcrs 4 and 5.
55. On this point, scc also my "The Rccom"Crsion of Siknce and
Speech" (Toadvinc 2008b).
Chapter 3
l. Se e, for instancc, Griflin 2001; and Beckoff, Allcn, and Burghardt 2002.
2. Scc Elliot Sobcr, '"Comparativc Psycholo,r; Mcets Emlutionary Biolo..,r;:
1\lorgan's Canon ami Cladistic Parsimony," and Samha D. Mitchell , '"Anthropo-
morphism and Cross-Species Modcling," both in Daston and Mitman 2005.
3. for an mTrview of early phenomenological appropriations of research
on chimpantt'C consciousness, see Embree 2008.
4. llusserl ID73, 114-1 6. Thesc passages are discusscd in San :-.1artn ami
Pintm Pei'laranda 2001, 352-53.
5. Scc San Martn and Pintos Petiaranda 2001, 344.
6. See Derrida 2002, 400.
7. See, as examples. Abram 1996 ami "Reciproci ty," in folt7 ami Frodeman
2004, 77-92; Atterton and Calarco 2004; Clark 1997; Christian Diehm, "Natural
Disastcrs," in Brown ancl Toadvine 2003, 171-85; Lingis 2003; l'ainter and l.oll:
2007; Steevcs 1999.
8. Heidegger 1927, 49-50, :)8/ 1962,75,84-85. Se e alsoAgamben 2004, 50(f.
9. lleiclegget 1983, senio n 62, 39 1; Heidegger 1995, 269.
10. \\'illiam "Life Bcyond the Otganism: Animal Being in Hci-
deggcr's ft'ciburg Lectut"C'i, 1 929-30,'" in Stcevcs 1999, 198.
11. :VIcNeill, "l.ife Beyond the Organism," 248n 16. Sec also David Wood 's
insightful commentarv on llcidegger"s humanism, "Commml nP m1 mangn: De-
construction ami Humanism," in \\'ood 2002, 1 ::F>-52.
12. In addition to the works by Agamben, Derrida, ancl \\'ood
airead y ci tcd, se e Derrida l D87: Derrida 1 D89; Derrida 199.); llaar 1 9D3; Kre ll
1988; Krell 1992; Llewclyn 1991, espccially chapter 7; Skoet 200 1; ancl David
\\'ood, 'Thinking with Cats," in :\tterton and Calaren 2004, 129-44.
13. Sce Schcler' s of the plwnomenological recluction at SMK
53-55/ i> l-51.
14. 1 explore the rclationship betwecn Merleau-l'onty ancl Scheler on this
issuc in more dctail in .. ' Strangc Kinshi p': ;...rerlcau-Ponty on the 1 !tunan-Animal
Rclation" (Toaclvi ne 2007b).
15. Sce SC 189-92/ 175-76.
16. This citation from Man \ l'laa in Satw"Pappears at SC 19 1/ 176. Merleau-
Ponty refcrs to pages 47-!"JO of the 1928 edition of f)i P Stellung de.1 Mmsrhen im 1\os-
mos (Darmstadt: Otto Reichl). In the 1947 eclition, thc cited passagc appears on
39-"10. lt is rcndered in I lans Meyerholrs translation as" [A spiritual being su eh
as man l is capablc of transforming the prima1y centers of resistan ce ancl reac-
151
NOTES TO PAGES 83-90
tion into'objects.' (The animal remains immersed in them 'ecstatically')" (Man's
l'larr in SaturP, 37).
17. llcidcggcr 1983, section 58b, 347-48; lleidcgger 1995, 238-39.
18. See SC 1911 176, 2ll / 224 and o ur discussion of this point in chapter l.
19. See also Merlcau-l'onty's remark, in his discussion of intersubjectiv-
ity, that, unlikc the gaze of the human being. "a dog's gaze directed toward me
causes me no embarrassment" (PP 114/ 420). Su eh remarks certainly distinguish
Merleau-Potll) 's position here from that taken by Derrida in "Thc Animal That
Therefore 1 A m (More to follow)" ( Derrida 2002).
20. This phrase, which we ha1c cited in thc prel"ious chapter amito which
we shall rcturn again, is clrawn from \ 'al ty's poem "The Gravcyard by the Sea"
.1971 , 216-17).
21. In this series ofseven radio address<'s, Crnnnir1 1948, the fiHtrth is cle-
\'otcd to "Exploration el u monde pe re,: u: L'ani malit" ( C 33-42); "Exploring the
World of Perception: Animal Life" ( The \1orld of PnrejJtion, 69-77).
22. Ancl, to be fairer to lleicleggcr than we have been above, his thinking
of animal bcing in ThP Fzwdammtal C:mzajJ/J of Metajlhy.1ir.l must abo be read apart
from the project or eleYating the human representational subject. See William
Mc:--Jeil 's to this ertect in "Life Beyond the Organism," 212-13.
23. The flni shed portion of thc textmakes any reference to non hu-
man Iife. save to clifferentiate the experience one has of the gaLe ofanother human
being from iLs "feeble echo" occasioned by the loo k of an animal ( 1'/1 02/ 73). See
also a working note from Februat 1959, where :V1crleau-Pollly describes animals,
alongsicle thing' ancl madmen, as "quasi-companions" ( 1 '/234/ 180). (Compare
the 'imilar remark from PhnwmnwloKY ofPnrf'jJlion quoted in note 19 above.) In
another working note, .\1erleau-Ponty disting-uishes his position from a "hylozo-
ism," since "the flesh of the world is not selfsnzsing [sP sPnlir] as is my flesh" ( \'/
But eYen if the flesh of" the world is not sentient in general, what of" the
sentient flesh ofnonhuman \\'ould notthis sentience also be the expres-
sivc irruption of being\ t>mrt?
24. 1'/ 328/ 274. Sce also Merleau-Ponty\ outlines fur the completion of
The \ 'iblnmd thr hwilible included in the editorial note by Claude Lefort, \'/10-
11 / xxxv- xxxl"i; the working notes at \'/222/ 168, 226/ 172, 230/ 1 76-77; and the
translator's introcluction to Sal un' , .\' xiii-xx.
23. On the role that musical motifs play in .\lerleau-Ponty's philosoph) of
nature, se e lll) essay "The i\lelody of" l.ife ;11(\ t he Motif of l'hilosoph) " (Toadl"ine
20<f>c) .
26. As the trans lator of _,, nafWI' indicatcs (.\'atwl' , 303n 1 1) , the accuracy
of prescntation of Portmann has been criticited b) some com-
mentators, such asjacques Dewitte (1998). Since my interest here is with the
philosophical conclusions that Mnleau-l'ont) draws on the basis of his reacling
of" Portmann, whether this rcading is true to Portmann \ intentions is not at
ISSlle.
27. Mcrkau-Ponty's summat; of thi s coursc appeat s in R.C 171-80/ JPP
192-99. Merleau-Ponty's manuscript notes for tlw course, in a seri es of eight
sketches, are at ,\' 2G3-3.'>2/ 2m-81.
152
NOTES TO PAGES 91-101
r\lthough the theme of "interanimalitr" alrcady appeas in the
on thc comept of nature ( .\' 2 17/ 189; RC 1 1 1/'P 1 ()3), the notion of an
animal-human lnnnandrror intcrt\1ining appea' in tlw final coursc.
28. See, fo1 instancc, RC 177/ 196: "Thc objen of thc la'>t pan of thc coursc
'''''"" to deo,cribc thc animation of the human borh, not in termo, of the descent
into it of pure con..ciousncss or rcflection, but . 1 melammfilwlil of lile, and
thc bO<h '" tlw 'boch oj the spirit' (\'aln)" empha.,is mine). See also .\'
310 272,277a 307nll.
29. me'> this expression at HC 177 196; .\ 281 222, 288. 255.
30. Thc colllrast between "fusion with an l 'mupf'' aJHI "p1 ojection of a
\\1>/t" .,m acle again at ,\' 284/ 222.
/ .1' 1 lllflltlll'\ 1:\quimaux, exhibit catalog to / .1 ma11111', Guimct,
Pars, lkcember 1959-May 1960. Merleau-Pont\ cite-. the tcxt b1 Eleh ne Lot-
Fald, (lkpartment ofthe Archives, l\1use de l'llomml') , 9. This text is repro-
duce<! al 11 .
32. Reg;mling Claudel 's L'oril houte, se e i\'C 198-201 ancl Carbone 2004,

Chapter 4
l. Ca'>CI 1993, 11 . Cascv\ most imp01tant of !\lerleau-Pontv
rna1 be found at Casc1 1993, 17-105; and Ca-,n 1997,
2. \\'e mu'>t ah.o mention Da1id \ (200 1) book-length imestigation
of \kleau-PonL\ 's philosopln of space, w hich comidn., tlw horh 's cmplacement
.me! <OJl'.titution ofspace in the light of contemporan cmpiicalc.,eanh.
3. !\ledeau-Pont1 attributes the concept of motiation to llmserl at PP
()1 n/ 57n 11. See llusscrl, ldea1l (1976), '>ettion 47.
l. Sincc llu.,scrl\ "pure presence" .,, in fact, comtituted hv a p111 e differ-
ence, De1rida is lcd to recogni1e a "spacing" at work in temporali nion itselfthat
brc<1k'> clown anv dlrt lO distingubh an ab.,olute iutni01 it1 or <xtcriority. See
De11 ida especially 85-86.
5. lklt'ulc 1968, 89-90/ 1994, 64. Undoubtcdlv, Ddeu/c has in mind
l\1nlcau-l'ontv's remarks at ??249/ 249-50.
6. Compare also this passage from Merleau-Pont\ 's di-,cu.,sion of abstract
mmement: "Thc abstract movcment hollow., out w ithin that plenum of the 1vorld
in whi< h con< rete mmement took place a 1onc of nfknion and .,ubjcttivit\; it
.,upnimposcs u pon phy.,ical space a 1irtual or human '>pa<c" (I'P 129 128) .
i . lhis ., at I'P'2!Hl 292- 93. which can be related
to lm., of the "melodic chat-acte1 " of ge'>ttlll'., <IIHI ( I'P
122 1'20, 151 153) .
8. Stq>hen P1 ie.,t daim'> to tind here (01 , m o e preci.,eh, in a .,imitar pas-
.,age on tlw pnreding pagc) c1idence of the "limit,Jtion., of a phcnomenological
appnM< h to philmoplw" (Priest 1998, 111 ). But Prie.,t doe., not '>eem to under-
.,tand thc ha.,ic nwt hods of phenomenological imestigation or of \krleau-Pont) ' s
153
NOTES TO PAGES 102-8
own original appropriation of this mcthod, '" is apparent when he asserts that
" no logical relation mav he known through pnceptual cxpcrience, so it cannot
be known through pcrceptual expnience that our primordial encounter with
being prcsupposes space" (Priest 1998, 111). Priest .,ecms completcl) unaware of
thc di-,tinnion between argumentation and plwnonwnological de'>niption, ami
('qualh unaware of !\lerlcau-Pontv\ ba'>i< the-,is of the priman of perccption,
whirh holcls that all reflcctilc categorics (including logical relations) are deril-a-
tin from perceplllal cxpcticnce.
9. See al so PP 326 328: "An initial pe1 e eption independent of MI) back-
g OIIIHI inconceivahle. E1en wrception pH' .,uppme.,, on thc percei1ing sub-
jen \ pan, a certain past, and thc absuac t fu11rtion of pNception, as a coming
together of objecLs, implies some m o e .,en ct an lw \1hich we elabora te our en-
IJOIIIIlCJH." ,\ .,imilat point is made at/'/'277 '27!1.
1 O. As we suggcstcd in chaptcr 2, thi\ iption of the "indefini tc
't<mcc" of naturc clearly anticipates Levi nas 's accoun t of t he elemental il y a. Se e
l.evinas 2001, 45-liO; I.evinas 191i9, 130- 12.
11. Sce also PP 374/ 378: "Things are ooted in a background of natme
11 hi< h is alen to man. For our human exbt<' IHT, the thing ., much less a poi e
whi< h attracl'> than one which rqwl-.."
12. See, for cxample, PP 381 :)85: "The natlllal worlcl ., the hori10n of
.111 lw1 i1om, the stvle of all possible st1 le'>, 11 hich guarantees fOJ- 1111 experience'>
a giH'n, nota willecl, unit1 undnhing all thc disruptiom of 1111 personal and
histmical life. lts countcrpart 11ithin me ., the ginn, gene<tl ancl prt>pcr<mnal
c,i.,tcJHT of 1111 -.emory functions in 11hkh IH' han cli'lcme-ed the ddinition of
the hoch."
1:\. !\leleau-Pont1 calb attention to tlw douhk u.,age of thc Frcnch 11' 111,
which, like the German Sinn, signifie-. both "meaning" and "diJ-ection" (PP
292 '291 ). On thi' point, '>t't' aho is 2001, 21.
1 l. The French tcnn molifthat ,'dnleau-Pontl he <' <lllrihut<' ' to C1annc
ca11 ie., both thc sense of .. 111otif" (design. themc) ami of "111ot1-c" (1-eason !
doi ng .,omething).
1 :). I'P 253-5 Concerning thi., quotation fro111 Cwt1'.1ian ,\/nlita-
liOII\, '><'t' chaptcr 2, note 29 abme.
1 G. Seca !so 1 '/250/ 197: 'The figt11e-gmuncl cJi.,tinction introduces a third
te1 m hctwccn the 'subject' and the ' ohjen. lt is thal 11'/Hnatum 1 h'artl fip, of all
that ., the pnreptualml'wlinK [ 11'111]."
Chapter 5
l. Fo1 l''\amplc. \\'o.--ter 1 !l!JO; kman 2002; Phillips 2003; Love 200:).
2. Fm < ritical dkctio11 on emimnnH'lltal philmopln \ appropriation of
ccoloh" .md '>\stem'> theon, see 1 <''(J<'< ialh chapter 1; and Kirk-
man '2002, e.,pecialh chaptel '2 .
:\. Scc "The Qucstion Conceming l ec hnoloh" " in lleidcgger 1993. Folv
154
NOTES TO PAGES 108 - 12
( 1995) develops this link between environmcn tal thin king- pro-
posing llciclegg-er's notion of"inhabitation" asan ahcmatin,.
4. See, for examplc, our discussion of the work of \\'illiam Cronon in the
introduction.
3. notes for the completion ofhis last manuscript, Thl' \'is-
iblP and tlw lnvilible, reveal that sig-nifi cant ponions of the projected text wolilcl
have dealt with nature. See 1'/ 222/ 168, 1 On the place of nature in
thc plan of the manuscript, see Claude Lcfort\ editorial note, 1'/ 1 0-12/ xxxv-
xxxnl.
6. For the original passage, see \'alry 1941 , 47-4H. , \n alternative English
translation appears in Valry 1970,26-27. Merlcau-Ponty cites this passag-e again
in the summary of his 1952 course, "Studies in the Literar) l 'se of l.ang-uagc"
(RC 25/ fPJ> 82).
7. The term rhiasma is also used in genetics, where it refers to the point
where chromatids are intertwined in a cell or where thC) exchang-e scg-ments
during nuclear division. Althoug-h it is plausible that Yl.erlcau-Ponty was familiar
with this sense of the term from his studies in biolo.,')', there are no indications
thatthis sense holcls any special rclatiomhip to his 11se of the term.
The tcrm rhia.\I!W is med in thc completed ponion of 'IJtl' \'ilibll' and the
lnvi>ible and in the early working notes collectecl in that volume (see 1'/212/ 1 GO,
252/ 199, 268/ 214-15). This spelling of ll1e term also appears in the introduc-
tion to Si,(,rrl\, prewmably draftecl in February 1960 (S 30/ 21). However. starting
with thc last working note pennecl in February 1960, '>pdling
of this term chang-es lO rhia.\II!P, which is retaincd throu_{h the remaimler of his
working no1cs afl(l in the ti tic of the last drafted chapter of his manuscript (see
1'1 10/ xxxv, 12/ xxx,ii, 292/ 239, 319/ 266,
322/ 268, 323/ 270, !'he 1crm rhwne never actually appears in the
drafted tcxt of rhe \ 'i1ible and lhP lnvisiblP, and rhia.llllfl appcars only in the appar-
entlydiscarded appendix, ''Preobjective Being: The Solipsist \\'orld" ( 1' /212/ 160).
The French term rhirHIIU'COJTcsponds Lo the English "chiasmu.,," referring to thc
rhetorical fonn in which the structure in one of two parallel clauses is innTted
in the othcr. Since the English "chiasm" may rcfcr to either meaning, the distinc-
tion between rhir11111a and rhimllll' is obscurcd in mo'>t English translations. Evans
and Lawlor incorrectly claim that :\lcrleau-Ponty uses the later spelling, rhiall/11',
throughout (Evans and Lawlor 2000, 17-1 Hn2). \\'e "ill return Lo the '>econd
scnse of"chi<t\m," understood as chiasmus, below.
H. See al so the discussion of binocular ,ision at 1 7-H, and the
analo.,'} with intcrsubjenive rdationsat 1'/27/ 11.
9. As melllioned in chapter 2, :\lerleau-Pont) had airead, recog-nited the
distincti,c reflcxivity of the bod) in PhPnomnwlog)' ojf>najJiion, whcre it is in-
clllded as onc of the essential diffcrcnces bctween the bmh ami pcrceind ob-
jccts (PP 109/ 106-7). But there he does not draw an) more general ontolog-ical
conclusions fi-om this dcscription. Thc link betwecn thc carlier ami later trcat-
ments of the touching-to11clwd rel;uionship is f()llnd in 'Tiw Philosopher ami
!lis Shadow," whcre :\1erlea11-Pontv n,cognites that llusserl's de\cription of this
155
NOTES TO PAGES 112 - 2S
rclation "overtums our idea of the thing and the world'' ami "results in an onto-
log-ical rehabilitation of thc sensible" (S 210/ Hi6-67). The ontological implica-
tiom. of the relation are furthcr cleveloped in his third coursc on the concept of
nature in 1959-60 (.\'270-7 1/ 209, 2HO-H1 / 218, 283-86/ 223-24) and in "Eye
and atOE 18-21 124-25.
1 O. See also \ '/ 17:/ 1 "\\'hat is this prcpossession of thc visible, this art
of interrogating it according to its own wishes, this inspired exegesis? \\'e would
perhaps find the answer in the tactile palpitation where the questioncr and thc
CJllestioned are closer, ami ofwhich, after all, the palpation ofthe eye is a remark-
able ,ariant. ..
11. 1\lerleau-l'ontv also refers lo this ''difference without comradinion"
as a "non-diffcrence" that woulcl not be an idcntity. See \'/ 257/ 204, 315/ 261.
/ 273, ami especially 317-18/ 264: "Start from this: therc is nol idcmity, nor
11011-idelltit), or non-coincidencc, there is inside and outsicle turni11g about onc
another." This idea \ also developed in thc lcctnres on nature, for examplc, at
.\' 208/ 156.
12. The spelling rltia\lill' first appears in the last note 19GO, and
this spelling is maimainecl !or the remainder of Thl' Visible aiUithe Invisible (see
\'/10/ xxxv, 12/ xxx\'ii, 292/ 239,
322 26H. 32V270, This is also thc spclling adoptecl !or the M ay 19GO
outlinc of proposed chapters, a11cl nltimatcly for the final chapter of the manu-
.,cript. Sce also note 7 abo,c.
13. Tllis phrase occ11rs thronghout The \ 'ilible and thP fnvi.lible. See, f(>r ex-
ample, 1'/56/ 34, 74/49, 165/ 12<1. 252/ 199.
14. Sec, forexample, 1'/219/ 166; .\'171-72/ 127, RCI27/ 158.
The concept of "ontological diplopa" is bot rowcd from Blonclel
15. For both of these Merlcau-Ponty relies on passagcs drawn
from K. 1 ,owith \ Nil'tzsrhr, PltilosojJhy of thP Etrmal HecwTf'fl rP of lhl' Saml'. Se e the
translator's notes al ,\' 290-91, n7 and n8.
16. l examine in more cletail Merleau-l'ont) \ imerpretation of the role of
negation in lkrgson in ":--lature and Negation: Merleau-Ponty's Reading of Bcrg-
'>on" (Toach-ine 2000).
17. See also S 226/ 179: "Husserl always prcscnts the 'return lO absolutc
con.,ciousness' as a title for a multitude of operations which are learned, gradu-
alh effccted, ami nevcr completed." Of course, this echoes his more famous
statcment to this effect in thc prcfacc of Pherwmmolof!J of J>rm'/Jlion, PPviii / xv.
1H. \\'e '>tT Itere tlw link between comments conrcrn-
ing "radical" or "second-orcler" reflcction in Phmonu' rwlogy o{PPITI'jilion (e.g., PP
7:3-77 72-74) anclthe "11\ per-reflection" of Tltl' \ 'isible rmd tlw lnvi1iblr> (VI 61 / 38,
70-71 146).
19. :\lcrlcau-Ponl\ is he re ITsponding to Sartre\ identification of ques-
tioning with nothingness. lleidegger, in section 2 or Being mul Timr, famously
describes the bcing of Omr>in as a CJIIl'Stion, ami more precisely. as a CJUestion-
ing of lking. lt is Dawin 's being as a q11estioning of Being that grants it priority
in the imcstigation of thc meaning- of lking; /)a\fin is ontically uniq11e by the
=

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:<
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"'
n
o
:<
o
"'
"'
n
o
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