Academy of Management

Data Dredging or Legitimate Research Method?
Historiography and Its Potential for

Management Research
Author(s): Robert S. Goodman and Evonne Jonas Kruger
Source: The Academy of Management Review, Vol. 13, No. 2 (Apr., 1988), pp. 315-325
Published by: Academy of Management
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? Academy of Management Review, 1988, Vol. 13, No. 2, 315-325.
D ata D redging or
Legitimate Research Method?
Historiography and I ts Potential
for Management Research
ROBERT S. GOOD MAN
Syracuse University
EVONNE JONAS KRUGER
Widener University
Historiography's potential as a management research technique has
not been extensively evaluated. This article describes historiography,
evaluates criticism directed toward it, and assesses its usefulness for
management research. I t asserts that historiography can make signifi-
cant contributions to variable selection and evaluation, theory
building, and hypothesis generation.
Although logical positivism continues to domi-
nate management research, other research meth-
ods have been advocated. These include multi-
ple hypothesis testing (Armstrong, 1979), strong
inference testing (MacKenzie & House, 1978; Platt,
1964), historiography (Glueck & Willis, 1979), hy-
brid methodologies (Harrigan, 1983), and multi-
ple methods of analysis (Hambrick, 1980; Snow
& Hambrick, 1980). Although historiography has
been recommended for use in strategic manage-
ment research, the method and its applicability
have never been fully explicated and discussed
in the management literature.
Historiography
Historiography is difficult to define and ex-
plicate. Although it is easy to describe the steps
that the historian follows, it is significantly
harder to understand the process that he or she
undertakes. Briefly, the historian rarely begins
with a theory from which hypotheses are de-
rived and subjected to test. Rather, a general
research question is formulated. For example,
Chandler (1977), in The Visible Hand, asked
"What were the factors responsible for the rise of
modern business enterprise in the United States
and with it managerial capitalism?" (p. 4).
I n order to answer these research questions,
the historian examines evidence from both pri-
mary and secondary sources.
Primary sources are first hand testimony about
an historical event; secondary sources are de-
scriptions of the event derived from and based
upon primary sources. The primary source rep-
resents the view of the eye witness, the second-
ary source the view of the journalist or scholar
who comes along later and tries to reconstruct
the story. (Handlin, Schlesinger, Morison, Merk,
Schlesinger, Jr., & Buck, 1970, p. 22)
Each source is critically examined. First, it is
authenticated. Second, its informational content
is analyzed. Third, its suitability as evidence sup-
porting or refuting an interpretation is evaluated
(Handlin et al., 1970). (Essentially an interpreta-
tion, the final result of the historical process is
roughly analogous to a theory.)
315
Authenticated and critically analyzed, sources
are assumed to be essentially neutral, "having
no more prima facie claim to validity than the
next until weighed against one another, checked
for accuracy against other source material, and
determination is reached as to which set of facts
most reasonably answers the point in question"
(Goodman & Pryluck, 1974, pp. 309-310).
The researcher then determines if these sources
can be woven into an argument answering the
question at hand. I f so, he or she "can then pres-
ent conclusions, using these facts as evidence
that best supports these conclusions, along with
reasons for asserting the reasonableness of his
position" (Goodman & Pryluck, 1974, p. 310).
Historiography, therefore, includes the body
of techniques, theories, and principles associ-
ated with historical research. I t is a way of ad-
dressing data and sources, asking questions, and
building theories based on evidence. I t need not
be restricted to producing "history," either in the
traditional narrative or the modern analytical so-
cial science formats.
Cnrticisms of Histoniography
Opponents of historiography argue that (a)
the method lacks objectivity, (b) the method
lacks direction (it is merely data dredging), and
(c) the method's conclusions are tentative and
not easily generalized.
Lack of Objectivity. The preception that histor-
iography lacks ways of ensuring objectivity fre-
quently educes feelings of distinct unease among
social science researchers. Their concern ap-
pears to stem from two beliefs. First, they hold
that social science research is driven by theory
and data, whereas historical research is not.
Second, statistical testing and inference are more
"objective" than historiography and can be used
to confirm hypotheses, whereas the results of
historiography usually offer subjective narratives.
These views, however, are not unanimously
held by either social science or philosophy of sci-
ence researchers. Anderson (1983) and Bagozzi
(1984) argued that science is more a deductively
theory-driven activity than it is a data-driven in-
ductive process (as summarized in Brown, 1979;
Suppe, 1974). Also, scientists now recognize both
the fallibility of observation and the dependence
of observation on a priori knowledge for context
and definition (Hanson, 1958; Kuhn, 1962; Popper,
1959). As Anderson (1983) explained:
The fact that observation is theory laden ...
call(s) into question the claim that science is se-
curely anchored by the objective observation of
"reality." I ndeed, theory dependence and falli-
bility of observation constitute problems for any
philosophy of science that admits a role for em-
pirical testing. (p. 28)
This issue of subjectivity also arises when em-
pirical testing is examined. Rudner (1953) ob-
served that scientists make value judgments ev-
ery time they accept or reject hypotheses because
there is nothing sacrosanct about a .05 level of
significance per se.
Since no scientific hypothesis is ever completely
verified, in accepting a hypothesis the scientist
must make the decision that the evidence is
sufficiently strong or that the probability is suffi-
ciently high to warrant the acceptance of the
hypothesis. Obviously, our decision regarding
the evidence and respecting how strong is
"'strong enough," is going to be a function of the
importance .. . of making a mistake in accept-
ing or rejecting the hypothesis. (p. 52)
The subjective influence of scientists' personal
characteristics on their research frequently has
been acknowledged (Fisch, 1977; Mahoney,
1976). Bagozzi (1984), citing Nisbett and Ross (1968)
and Thorndyke and Hayes-Roth (1979), con-
cluded that "presuppositions, biases, and cogni-
tive faculties influence and constrain the so-called
immutable data" (p. 18).
Social forces and expectations have an im-
pact on research in a similar manner (Barnes,
1977; Bloor, 1976; Merton, 1973). Bloor and Barnes
agreed that the production of scientific knowl-
edge is a sociological process. Anderson (1983)
concurred that scientific values are "as much a
function of cultural, political, social, and ideologi-
cal factors as are any beliefs held by members
of a society" (p. 24).
316
Mitroff (1975) presented evidence that scien-
tific ideas are tested against both theories and
networks of social and personal relations. Theo-
ries are associated with their perpetrators who
serve as personal advocates. This is particularly
true, Mitroff observed, when theories are "bold,"
"provocative," and "all encompassing."' Their ad-
vocates are frequently "ardent," "passionate,"
and "partisan"-willing to do anything to "mus-
ter every bit of evidence favorable" (p. 245).
Historiographers readily admit that they are
disputatious. I ndeed, they thrive on dispute be-
cause advocacy and disputation advance their
fields. They are trained to (a) be skeptical of each
source and its content, (b) attempt to discredit
evidence, and (c) challenge theories. Further-
more, they openly advocate their positions, and
they expect their theories to be questioned and
scrutinized by their colleagues, just as they do
not hesitate to present evidence challenging ac-
cepted theories. Many modern historiographers,
for example,
agree with the relativist that interpretation is
inescapable; they agree with the scientific his-
torian, however, that objectivity ... must stand
as the historian's ideal. Accordingly, they for-
swear all single-valued or dogmatic theories of
history and subject theory itself to the perpetual
counterattack of facts. . . . The interpretations
which can hold in suspension the largest num-
ber of diverse facts are those most likely to do
justice to the total complexity of a past which
can never be fully recovered. (Handlin et al.,
1970, p. 20)
D ray (1964) concurred by asserting that it is the
historiographer's task "not only to establish the
facts but to understand them. And this will in-
volve him in giving explanations" (p. 5).
The historiographical interpretation, or ex-
planation, is intended to be a postulate or theory.
I ts validity is determined by how well and how
long it withstands scrutiny and attack by those
who examine its underlying evidence. This ten-
tativeness of the historiographic interpretation is
similar to the strong inference approach advo-
cated by MacKenzie and House (1978), who quote
Hebb, "A good theory is one that holds together
long enough to get you to a better theory" (p. 13).
I n order for historiographical research to be
valid, objectivity must be one of the researcher's
primary goals. I f it is not, interpretations will not
withstand collegial attack or command respect.
Those who use historiography may appear to
subjectively select evidence supporting precon-
ceived theories and hypotheses, but their method
requires a rigorous examination of all possible
evidence before conclusions are reached. As a
research method, historiography is no more sub-
jective than other social science methods.
Lack of D irection. The criticism that historiog-
raphy lacks direction and is merely data dredg-
ing stems from its apparent similarity to class-
ical induction. I n discussing induction, Francis
Bacon, in Book I of Novum Organum (1620),
argued:
We cannot learn about the world by arguing,
however skillfully, about abstract principles. On
the contrary, we must interpret nature by deriv-
ing "axioms from the sense and particulars, ris-
ing by gradual and unbroken ascent, so that the
method arrives at the most general axioms last
of all. This is the true way ... a new I nductive
Logic.
"
(Bacon summarized in Magill & McGreal,
1961, p. 374)
Because induction is so expansive, it is diffi-
cult to devise questions that can be investigated
in what Armstrong (1979) described as an "effi-
cient manner." Unlike Baconian induction, how-
ever, in historiography research questions are
carefully structured before sources are investi-
gated so that they can be researched in an
inductive, but more efficient, manner. Further-
more, historiographers study domains that are
more restricted than those examined through the
philosophical process of Baconian induction.
The careful scrutiny of sources prior to hypoth-
esis formulation may appear to be data dredg-
ing. But historiographic research begins, as pre-
viously indicated, with a research question. The
examination of sources is intended to result in
hypothetical explanations accounting for all rele-
vant variables and relationships.
Lack of Generalizability. Unfortunately, social
science researchers, other than historians, do
not often use historiography due to their ques-
317
tions about generalizability. Historiography,
however, should not be restricted to historical
questions. Because it places emphasis on under-
standing all of the data underlying the hypothe-
ses, it can question the generalizability of any
research, as has been discussed. Social science
data/variables are historically embedded in time
and place. When the researcher has a complete
understanding of the data comprising the vari-
ables, the full extent of the generalizability of
results can be placed in perspective. These writ-
ers suggest that historiography does not limit
generalizability; it clarifies it.
Comparison With Other Methodologies
Because historiography is assumed to be quite
similar to other research methodologies, its po-
tential is frequently overlooked. Two such meth-
ods are strong inference testing and case re-
search. Although historiography is similar to
them, there are several significant differences.
Strong I nference Testing. Although strong in-
ference appears to be similar to historiography,
the latter is a broader method. I n 1959, Popper
offered an alternative to inductive research and
its increasingly confirmatory inference strategies.
He questioned whether any number of predic-
tions consistent with a specific hypothesis could
ever conclusively demonstrate the "truth" of the
hypothesis (Kern, Mirels, & Hinshaw, 1983). As
he discussed in The Logic of Scientific D iscovery:
There is no such thing as proof in science be-
cause some later alternative explanation may
be as good or better-so that science advances
only by disproofs. There is no point in making
hypotheses that are not falsifiable, because such
hypotheses do not say anything. I t must be possi-
ble for an empirical scientific system to be re-
futed by experience. (Popper cited in Platt, 1964,
p. 350)
Popper suggested that the goal of testing the-
ory should be to refute hypotheses. "I n contrast
to the gradually increasing confirmation of in-
duction, falsificationism substitutes the logical ne-
cessity of deduction" (Anderson, 1983, p. 20).
Thus, if deductively derived hypotheses can be
demonstrated to be false, the theory on which
they are based can be assumed to be false.
Popper's argument that greater explanatory force
could be attributed to disconfirmatory inference
influenced investigators to design research meth-
ods maximizing the likelihood of disconfirmation
(Kern et al., 1983).
MacKenzie and House (1978) argued that the
most effective way to improve a theory is to use
strong inference to identify counter examples
which challenge its fundamental tenets. (This is
similar to the way that quantitative historians
use the counterfactual or alternative hypothesis.)
I n strong inference, counter examples are used to
improve theory and to provide new ideas and
applications. Thus, a "cycle of continuing im-
provement related to both theory and practice
may be established" (D unbar, 1983, p. 139).
The effectiveness of strong inference testing
has been questioned. First, several researchers
have suggested that since empirical tests involve
assumptions about initial conditions, measure-
ment, and auxiliary hypotheses, it is almost im-
possible to conclusively refute a theory (Ander-
son, 1983; D uhem, 1953; Laudan, 1977). Second,
according to Anderson (1983), the history of sci-
entific advances has rarely coincided with Pop-
per's views. Rather, most major scientific theo-
ries have been advanced despite refutation by
empirical data. Third, the basic understanding
of many scientists of the propositional logic un-
derlying strong inference has been challenged
(Kern et al., 1983). Kern et al. concluded that
"perhaps disconfirmation is not the universally
effective inference technique that philosophy of
science believes it to be" (p. 144).
Strong inference and historiography are sim-
ilar because both enjoin researchers to bring
skepticism to data analysis and criticism to the-
ory developmeni. I n addition, historiography ad-
vocates that accepted theories be aggressively
challenged. Strong inference alone, however, is
insufficient. I n his classic article on strong in-
ference, Platt stated that "the difficulty is that
disproof is a hard doctrine. I f you have a hypo-
thesis and I have another hypothesis, evidently
one of them must be eliminated. The scientist
318
seems to have no choice but to be either soft-
headed or disputatious" (1964, p. 350).
I n order to effectively use disproof theory, it
must be both defended and criticized. Strong
inference, a younger method than historio-
graphy, only provides the skepticism necessary
to evaluate data and to question theory. Classi-
cal induction, the oldest of the methods, provides
a method for constructing arguments in defense
of theory. Historiography effectively incorporates
both elements within a balanced research meth-
od. By melding aspects of confirmatory induc-
tion with skepticism, a critical component of
strong inference, it provides for the rigorous
creation, critique, and defense of theory.
Classical Case Research. Historiography and
case preparation are similar because the period
of time described within each case is ex-post
rather than ex-ante. There are, however, major
differences. First, Culliton (n.d.) asserted that be-
fore data are collected for a management case,
as a researcher you should "know what you
want." He suggested that the best cases follow
previously developed written specifications. Few
researchers using historiography, other than
those with a logical positivist orientation, investi-
gate questions using written specifications of
what they expect to find. I t is the search for and
analysis of resources and evidence that shape
historiographical research. On the one hand,
even logically positivist-oriented social science
historiographers remain open in their search for
both supporting and disconfirming evidence.
The classical case writer, on the other hand,
appears to consider himself or herself to be a
recorder, rather than an interpreter, of facts.
"Watch out, therefore, as a recorder of facts that
you do not become an editorial writer. I t is the
function of the case writer to present the situation,
not to interpret it or pass judgement upon it"
(D avis, n.d.).
Historiographers are not satisfied merely to re-
cord facts. "The business of an historian is to
make judgments and to [attempt to] establish
causal relationships between facts; [therefore] he
must place them in some significant pattern in
order and not simply be a reporter" (Canter &
Schneider, 1967, p. 19). Further, the questions
asked by those developing cases are more nar-
row than the questions asked by those using
historiography.
There is evidence that organization research-
ers do not always perceive any difference be-
tween historiography and the case method. For
example, Chandler's (1962) Strategy and Struc-
ture is often described as case studies of four
companies. I t is not four classical management
cases, however, but an example of the applica-
tion of historiography to management research.
Chandler's study includes data from over 100
companies, and his research questions are
broader than "What happened at Sears?" (the
classical case writer's question). Chandler de-
scribed his goals this way:
Using these data, I have attempted to say some-
thing about the history of the large industrial
enterprise as a basic, modern American institu-
tion. I n doing so, this book also provides infor-
mation about the history of business administra-
tion in the United States and about the changes
in the larger American economy. (p. 4)
He continued, "the book attempts to provide
this information by focusing on the innovation
and spread of the modern 'decentralized' form of
organization in American industry" (p. 4). A ques-
tion such as "What caused the spread of the mod-
ern decentralized [divisionalized] form of organi-
zation in American industry?" is the question of
a business or an economic historian, not a classi-
cal case writer. Chandler used data about corpo-
rations to formulate a historical interpretation.
His only interest in a particular firm is as a source
for evidence to answer his questions.
Although Chandler (1962, 1977) is a historian
who uses historiography to develop theory,
managerial case writers rarely use historio-
graphical techniques to prepare cases. They de-
liberately limit their search for evidence and in-
terpret their endeavors as recording facts, not
explaining what has happened or why. I n gen-
eral, they do not formulate questions after ana-
319
lyzing their data, and they appear to lack the
innate skepticism advocated by historiography.
An example is the classic Harvard strategy
case, A. G. Brown and Son, Ltd. (Uyterhoeven,
Ackerman, & Rosenblum, 1977). Brown, Ltd. is a
food wholesaler in the maritime provinces of
Canada, founded by A. G. Brown, who spends
most of his time in politics. He tells the case writer
that he is concerned about a steady decline in
profits that has accompanied large increases in
revenues. The case writer emphasizes that the
company will soon face serious operating diffi-
culties due to the decline in profit margins.
Yet, when the firm's financial statements, in-
cluded in the case, are examined, it is evident
that through various accounting policies (e.g., a
sale/leaseback of the building to Brown and de-
duction of expenses such as clubs and cars) A.
G. Brown is minimizing profits to avoid paying
taxes. Further, Brown's political ambitions influ-
ence this strategy because he does not wish to
appear too successful to his constituents. This
interpretation was confirmed by A. G. Brown in
a 1981 interview with an investigator who was
updating the case. This might have been discov-
ered sooner had the case writers employed the
skepticism advocated by historiography, or had
they been aware of the potential difficulties in-
herent in interviews and oral history (see Good-
man & Pryluck, 1974, for a review of this litera-
ture). Historiography is appropriate for the pre-
paration of management cases, even those that
have only pedagogical value (i.e., those that ask,
"What should happen in this company given
these facts?").
The Potential of Historiography
for Management Research
Management transpires within a linear time
frame as organizations evolve in response to vari-
ous internal and external forces. For example,
researchers describe growth, competitive, end-
game, and life-cycle strategies, each with a
genesis and, ultimately, a history. As a linear
and, thus, historical concept, the management of
organizations can be studied using evidence of
past events and decisions. Therefore, both a his-
torical perspective (Lawrence, 1984) and histor-
iography are appropriate for management re-
search.
Historiography has three potential applications
in management research: (a) variable selection
and evaluation, (b) theory construction, and (c)
hypothesis generation.
Variable Selection and Evaluation
Historiography can make significant contribu-
tions to the identification and evaluation of data
sources and the selection of research variables
in management research. I t forces the researcher
to question the authenticity, informational value,
and merit of each datum as evidence before it is
used to construct and support hypotheses (Barzun
& Graff, 1977).
I n strategic management research there has
been little in-depth discussion of the merits and
limitations of data and sources with the notable
exception of skirmishes over PI MS and portfolio
analysis (e.g., Anderson & Paine, 1978; Raman-
ujam & Venkatraman, 1984; Wensley, 1982). The
attitude of most researchers has been to recog-
nize the shortcomings of these and other data
sources, but to accept them as the best available.
There has been a surprising lack of creativity in
identifying and using data to construct variables,
although the recent interest in event study meth-
odologies has led to the use of finance models
that utilize a firm's stock price as an indicator of
performance in some studies (e.g., Bettis, Chen,
& Mahajan, 1984; Lubatkin & Shrieves, 1986;
Singh & Montgomery, 1984).
Glueck and Willis (1979) championed the use
of historical evidence in strategic management
research and recommended that the orientation
of historians be adopted when examining docu-
ments and constructing variables. They asserted
that historians are the most attuned of any re-
searchers to the dangers of bias, inaccuracy,
and distortion in documentary sources, and they
urged that strategic management researchers
should approach their sources with similar cau-
tion. Unfortunately, the authors' evaluation of the
320
Securities and Exchange Commission's financial
reporting form (the 10-K) as a documentary
source exemplifies the need for such caution.
They stated that:
D ue to the legal sanctions for deliberate distor-
tion, many of the problems with documentary
evidence are mitigated. I t is possible that they
are conservatively drawn but there is no evi-
dence for this at present. . . . I t is not likely that
most corporations would deliberately distort the
data provided. (p. 97)
This assertion appears to be a reasonable in-
terpretation of the evidence presented. Seplaki
(1982), however, indicated that:
Mergers generate an accounting environment
conducive for dressing upcorporate earning
predicaments. . . As long as accountants fol-
low a generally accepted accounting practice,
no one questions the fairness of the records. Ac-
counting techniques can be used to inflate the
earnings per share ratio through the applica-
tion of at least four techniques. (p. 387)
The four techniques mentioned by Seplaki are
designed obscurity, distribution of common stock
outstanding, generation of "instant earnings,"
and so-called pooling methods.
The 10-K, therefore, may reflect "creative" ac-
counting practices that, although legal, misrep-
resent the financial position of the firm and vary
among firms so widely that the ceteris paribus
condition is inoperative. Further, existing legal
standards lack stringency and may result in re-
porting infractions. I n discussing the propensity
for business executives to fix prices illegally, Er-
ickson (1969) indicated that enforcement of the
U.S. antitrust laws was so lax, fines levied were
so small, and the chances of executives ever
being caught were so minuscule that there was
practically no situation in which an executive
would stand much chance of being found guilty
of price fixing in a court of law. Nor would poten-
tial fines and imprisonment that could result de-
ter illegal action.
I f executives have such little chance of being
caught fixing prices where penalties are great
and the government has extensive investigative
resources, what is the likelihood of their deliber-
ately providing inaccurate or misleading infor-
mation on the 10-K where the penalties are less
stringent? The issue is perhaps more subtle than
whether or not executives are likely to lie in pre-
paring the 10-K. Rather, the researcher must be
constantly aware that if some executives prevari-
cate and some do not, the worth of the 10-K as a
reliable data source is further thrown into ques-
tion because he or she can never be certain when
to accept the data as accurate. I n view of these
arguments, it appears that the informational
value of the 10-K is questionable.
I n historiographical research, investigators
should never accept a source without question.
They are advised to continue their search until
either all resources have been examined or their
ingenuity is exhausted. Naturally, this applies to
an ideal world in which time and resources are
unlimited. Nevertheless, in the real world in
which decisions are based on time constraints
and scarce resources, researchers should not ig-
nore viable data. Management research can
benefit from historiography's evaluation of multi-
ple sources.
Theory Construction
The most obvious use of historiography is to
assemble and analyze data and to build theory.
Green (1968) summarized this function succinctly:
"[Non quantitative] historians, instead of being
less theoretical should see themselves as the true
pioneers of theory. They are pressing at the fron-
tiers of our present theoretical knowledge, intu-
itively combining and exploring models from all
of the social sciences" (p. 114).
The historiographical process, which includes
question formulation, data analysis and criticism,
and inductive reasoning, generates theories and
hypotheses. Chandler is the best example of a
management researcher who has used historio-
graphy to generate theories. The relevance of
his theories for explaining modern organizational
phenomena and their generalizability can be ex-
amined using a variety of research methods in-
cluding historiography. I ndeed, Chandler's the-
ory of corporate strategy and structure has pro-
321
vided the impetus for an entire stream of strate-
gic management research (see Galbraith & Na-
thanson, 1978, and Chandler & D eems, 1980,
for a review of this literature). Similarly, Mintz-
berg (1978) used historical data to generate a
theory of strategy formulation.
Harrigan (1983) placed Chandler's research on
the midpoint of a continuum which included fine-
grained research methods at one end and course-
grained research methods at the other. Although
her discussion is limited to those aspects of busi-
ness strategy research methods designed for hy-
pothesis testing, placing Chandler's work at the
midpoint visually illustrates the potential of histor-
iography for theory development. Harrigan sug-
gested that the fine-grained method of classical
management cases captures "the complexities
of corporate strategy, competition, and uncon-
trollable environmental factors surrounding strat-
egy formulation" (p. 399). The case method,
however, by definition, does not developman-
agement theory; it merely assembles and records
these complexities, and it makes no attempt to
explain them. At the opposite end of the continuum,
coarse-grained methods are specifically de-
signed to test hypotheses, not to generate theor-
ies.
Harrigan argued that medium-grained meth-
ods (such as historiography) benefit from the de-
tail of fine-grained methods that provide "metic-
ulous attention to detail, relevance to business
practice, and access to multiple viewpoints"
(p. 399) and the generalizability of coarse-grained
methods intended for large statistically oriented
studies. We add that when the two approaches
are distilled into medium-grained methods, the
dual emphasis on both analysis of sources and
data to answer the questions "What happened?"
"What is?" and/or "What was?" and generaliz-
ability to answer the question "To what extent?"
create the conditions necessary for theory devel-
opment which addresses the question "Why?"
This is historiography's goal.
Hypothesis Generation
Because of its unique perspective of contex-
tual analysis in which theory is the result of a
careful reconstruction of events and the identifi-
cation of all variables and their interactions,
historiography has exciting potential for hypoth-
esis generation. I ts broad view of the relation-
shipbetween events and theory suggests both
multiple causes and multiple perspectives. One
of the major research questions addressed by
Chandler (1977), "What were the factors respon-
sible for the rise of the modern business enter-
prise in the United States?" can be fully ad-
dressed only by examining issues such as tech-
nological development, transportation infrastruc-
ture, economic growth, and political considera-
tions.
The historiographical approach to assessing
facts naturally results in multiple hypotheses. Al-
though it may be impossible to test all variables
and hypotheses, by being forced to articulate
them the researcher avoids emphasizing empiri-
cism to the detriment of theory development and
hypothesis generation. Empirical research is con-
ducted only after careful consideration of mediat-
ing variables, the impact of excluded variables,
and the implications of testing selected hypothe-
ses. The researcher has artificially restructured
ci theory in order to test a small segment. This is
the task of normal science (Kuhn, 1962). Yet, it
should be accomplished with full recognition that
limited variables and hypotheses may be insuffi-
cient to support or reject theory.
The historiographical orientation, with its em-
phasis upon multiple causes and hypotheses,
enables the researcher to carefully and creatively
envision research hypotheses within the larger
context of theory. Rumelt (1974) demonstrated
this approach when he formulated a series of
hypotheses from Chandler's theory of strategy
and structure. The hypotheses identified multi-
ple dependent and independent variables incor-
322
porating the complexities of the theory. Whether
or not individual hypotheses were "accepted" is
not as important as the way in which Rumelt
used theory to generate his hypotheses and the
way in which the hypotheses taken as a group
reflect the totality of the theory.
Major Limitation of Historiography for
Management Research
Although the applicability of historiography for
nonhistorical research is advocated, it has one
major limitation. Frequently, due to the nature
of the research questions asked and the vari-
ables employed, quantitative research tech-
niques provide the most efficient and effective
methods of testing hypotheses about relationships
between multiple variables. Thus, the impor-
tance of statistical hypothesis testing under these
circumstances can only be emphasized. I t should
be remembered, however, that statistical hypoth-
esis testing is the final methodological step, not
the first. What we have discussed in this paper,
then, is the way that historiography can contrib-
ute to the many other steps in the research
process. Table 1 presents a summary of these
contributions.
Conclusion
This paper has critically examined historio-
graphy's utility for selected stages of manage-
ment research. The method's advantages are in
variable evaluation and selection, theory con-
struction, and hypothesis generation. Criticisms
of subjectivity, limited generalizability, and data
dredging as well as the method's inappropriate-
ness for most hypothesis testing have been ad-
dressed.
I n keeping with recommendations for the use
of multiple methodologies, historiography has
great potential for management research. I t
should be considered a supplement to more tra-
ditional research techniques, especially those
areas in which methods are required to assess
multiple causes from multiple perspectives. I n-
deed, management researchers may even bene-
fit from the creativity, skepticism, and humility
demanded by historiography.
Table 1
Applicability of Historiography to
Management Research
Contributions of
Research Stage Historiography
Research question D efinition of a general question
development to guide and focus research;
avoidance of data dredging.
Analysis and evaluation I dentification and critical
of sources analysis of all possible
sources in terms of content,
suitability, and reliability:
explanation of context.
Variable selection Recognition of data limitations.
and evaluation
Theory construction Construction of a theory
reflecting the totality of
context.
Hypothesis generation Generation of multiple
hypotheses and multiple
variables.
I mplication of testing selected
hypotheses with selected
variables understood.
Hypothesis testing No major contribution.
Formulation Generalizability placed in
of conclusions perspective. Relationshipof
the research and conclusions
to theory clarified.
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