ISSN 1751-8229

Volume Five, Number Two

Graduate Special Issue iek & Badiou
The Question of !"!ni!n #ntolo$%& '!(iou
!n( )i*e+ !s ,es-onses to Seminar XI
Michael Austin - Memorial University of
Newfoundland
Intro(u"tion
It is no question that metaphysics and ontology are making something of a comeback in
mainstream philosophy. Along with the emerging speculative realism! movement" a
decidedly different form of ontology has been quietly brewing in the work of Alain #adiou
and $lavo% &i'ek" both heavily indebted to and informed by (acan. )he relation of
psychotherapy and metaphysics dates back to the origins of dynamic psychiatry and its
own foundings in *omanticism and +erman Idealism.
1
In the ,-
th
.entury there was no
question that psychotherapy was grounded in the metaphysical unconscious" be it that of
$chelling" $chopenhauer" /echner or .arus. After /reud the problem seems reversed0 no
longer do we attempt to ground our therapeutic practice in metaphysical speculation but
quite the opposite" drawing metaphysical conclusions from the work of the therapist. )his
is seen clearly in the after effects of the (acan-event1 from 2eleu3e" to #adiou" to &i'ek we
1
can see philosophers grappling with the structural form of psychoanalysis" not on the
grounds of therapeutics" but taking (acan as having produced works of metaphysics" or at
least" of metaphysical import. In this essay I will suggest that it is in light of the question of
(acanian ontology" that question posed bluntly enough by 4acques-Alain Miller to (acan"
5hat is your ontology6! that we should read both #adiou and &i'ek. 5hile it could be
argued how satisfactorily (acan answered the question of ontology" it seems clear that
both #adiou and &i'ek" if they are not attempting both to answer the question for (acan"
are at least answering the question in some way. It will be shown that not only do they
present two different possible answers to the question of (acanian ontology" but that in
doing so they present us with two different ways of viewing and reading (acan.
5hile many if not all of (acan7s works could perhaps be labelled as transitional"!
there is something almost mercurial about the eleventh of (acan7s seminars 8held in ,-9:;.
<erhaps it is the fact that it was the first to be held at the =cole Normale $up>rieure 8with a
larger audience;" or his e?communication from the I<A" but beyond this Seminar XI marks
the beginnings of (acan7s famously difficult later work with its focus on diagrammatics"
knots" and locks. 5hat this later work signifies is a move beyond language towards
topology and structure-as-such" but it begins in this seminar" with its focus on the *eal in
opposition to the $ymbolic. )he question of ontology forces (acan to re-evaluate the
structure of the Imaginary-$ymbolic-*eal system and focus in a new way on the *eal as
that which shrugs off the $ymbolic. Seminar XI 8,-@A; should be read as a kehr in (acan7s
work" being the beginning of the end of the reign of linguistics as the dominant model for
(acanianism and the first effort to move towards a formal theory" with structures used not
for the sake of modeling or appro?imating the truth but because the truth of (acanianism
becomes structure-as-such.
The Question of #ntolo$%
In the section of the eleventh seminar titled Bf the $ub%ect of .ertainty"! (acan begins by
discussing Miller7s e?cellent outline! of his own thought as grounded in the structuring
function of a lack! 8(acan ,-@A1 CA;. (acan then says that Miller questioned DhimE as to
DhisE ontology! 8Ibid;. Fis response is to maintain that while speaking of this gap he is
dealing with an ontological function"! the unconscious cannot be questioned in ontological
terms because it is pre-ontological.! )his suggests first that the gap qua ontological
function! is not the gap in sub%ectivity 8the unconscious;. Interestingly enough" a section of
2
the seminar is devoted to his own refutation of idealism" maintaining a ground for
psychoanalysis outside of the merely! sub%ective" and also complicating the relation
between the gap in sub%ectivity and the gap qua ontology. Nevertheless" he seems to be
responding to the question in two ways throughout the seminar" giving us perhaps the two
sides! of (acan" what I will term the formal and the phenomenological.
)wo themes dominate Seminar XI" the first is the relation of psychoanalysis to
science" whether psychoanalysis is a science or can be a science. )he second is the
relation between the $ub%ect" the $ymbolic and the *eal" as seen in (acan7s development
of objet a from its origin as part of schema L" to the matheme of fantasy 8GHa;" to the ob%ect
of desire" here becoming identified with the remainder! of symbolic castration" that which
is severed from the $ub%ect through their introduction into the $ymbolic Brder and which
they continually seek out of a sense of incompleteness. Objet a here becomes a structural
necessity of sub%ectivi3ation" the source of the structuring lack itself. )hese two themes
could be said to be the two dominant themes of the whole of (acan7s corpus" the attempt
to phenomenologize the sub%ect of the unconscious by understanding the nature and
ground of sub%ectivity and its relation to language" and the attempt to construct and
elaborate a purely formal theory through the use first of (acanian algebra and subsequent
elaboration in the topological work of the various schemas" ending famously in the work of
the ,-@Is on knot theory.
(acan" like /reud before him" is very much concerned with the scientific status of
psychoanalysis. 5hile /reud concentrated on the empiricism of analysis along with
speculative biology and anthropology
2
to achieve this" (acan first hedges his bet that it is
through structural linguistics that psychoanalysis will be shown to be scientific. /rom
linguistics" (acan is able to also connect his work to the structural anthropology of (>vi-
$trauss" further formali3ing psychoanalytic theory before moving to the hyper-formalism of
topology1 #orromean knots" the torus" and the moebius strip. )he move here is not
arbitrary but is best thought of in terms of the question of ontology posed above" the
search for a way to think structure-as-such. )his is the end goal of (acan7s formal
ontology" as (acan remarked in Seminar XX: Encore1 mathematical formali3ation is our
goal" our ideal! 8(acan ,--A1 ,,-;. 4ean-.laude Milner notes that the famous phrase the
unconscious is structured like a language! is actually redundant since Jlanguage7 here
simply means structure 8Milner ,--K1 ,I:;. It is not the case that the unconscious is
structured similarly to language" but that it is simply structured" as is language. 5e should
simply say then that the unconscious is structured.! )he formali3ation of psychoanalysis
3
means the study of structure. Lspecially during the ,-@Is" (acan attempted to formali3e
psychoanalytic theory so as to make it indistinguishable from mathematics" transforming it
from an art that critics contended was based more on charisma than science" into a formal
logic of relations" in other words" the study of structure. )his set of logical relations
depended first on the familiar (acanian algebra and the various schemata before the
attempt was made to move from language altogether" as seen in the infamous seminars of
the J@Is that had (acan in almost complete silence as he constructed knots and drew
diagrams. )his attempt to move away from linguistics is evident in the schemata of the
JKIs but becomes clearer in light of the seminar of ,-9:. It is here that (acan begins to
fully articulate the importance of the *eal as the residue of castration and therefore as
necessary for the formation of sub%ectivity. In order to understand the structure of the
$ub%ect" one must grasp the non-lingual" the e?tra-$ymbolic. In the formal theory of the
J@Is" (acan grounds his topological theory in mathematical structures that are based on a
hollow centre" that we could say are grounded in the void. )his void is the structuring gap
which the $ymbolic Brder envelops. /rom this we understand the relation of the $ymbolic
to the *eal and the $ub%ective in purely formal terms. )his purely formal theory of relations
should be understood in relation to the other side of (acan" to the phenomenological
understanding of sub%ectivity.
#y phenomenological" I mean (acan7s writings as they pertain to the e?perience of
sub%ectivity" the sensation of the *eal as trauma and the e?perience of the limits of
language. In Seminar XI" there is a clear engagement with phenomenology through his
discussion of Merleau-<onty and the ga3e. #eyond this engagement with phenomenology
properly understood" much of (acan7s work could 8and should; be understood as a variety
or species of phenomenology" not in the vein of Fusserl or Feidegger" but rather in the
Mantian-Fegelian tradition. Much of (acan7s work on the relation between the $ymbolic
and the *eal" that is" on the limits of linguistic symboli3ation and the trauma that comes
with bumping against these limits" mirrors the Mantian demand to e?haustively account for
the limitations of thought. In the case of (acan" it is an account of the limitations of
language and e?perience qua symbolic representation. )he encounter with the *eal sheds
light on the very structure of representation since it is that which fails at representation
either through lack or e?cess. It is this (acan that $lavo% &i'ek attaches himself to" to the
modernity of critique and the investigation of limits and transgressions. 5hile he may not
align himself as closely to structural linguistics as (acan" he remains faithful to the
e?position of the limitations of symbolic representation" especially in his e?amples drawn
4
from film such as those related to the death drive and partial ob%ects" the undead being his
most horrifying case. In Seminar XI" this horror of the unrepresentable shows itself in
(acan7s myth of the lamella"!
3
as clear an attempt as any to convey the unrepresentable in
almost (ovecraftian fashion" creating an image that becomes almost impossible to
represent e?cept by way of confusion and horror. )he image of a large single-celled
organism that comes and envelops your face as you are quietly asleep! 8(acan ,-@A1
,-@; is perhaps the polar opposite of what we will outline first" the formal theory of
ontology of #adiou and its relation to (acan7s use of structure in the form of algebra"
mathemes" schemata and topoi in the quest for a purely formal presentation of the
structure of the psyche.
'!(iou !n( the Form!l #ntolo$% of .!them!ti"s
It is perhaps no accident that both !eing an E"ent 8CII9N,-AA; and Logics of #orls
8CII-NCII9; end with a discussion of (acan. $ince his first book in ,-9- #adiou has
shown himself to be a philosopher who takes (acan more seriously than most and this is
only furthered in his two big books.! !eing an E"ent presents us with the beginnings of
#adiou7s formal ontology" #eing understood as pure multiplicity" continued through the
logic of appearance in Logics of #orls. )here are essentially two forces at play in
#adiou7s minimalist metaphysics" two names that we could say ground #adiou7s
ontological thought. I am thinking here of (acan and Feidegger.
4

/rom (acan" we can see the basic structure of #adiou7s ontology1 grounded in the
void" the state of affairs maintains a relative stability until an e?cessive or deficient
puncture forces itself upon the situation" causing a localised chaos until sub%ectivity is able
to organi3e the emergent novelty and ground it into a new present. $uch a vague
presentation could be a description either of the relation of the *eal and the $ymbolic"
whereby the latter maintains stability until the former thrusts itself into the scene until it is
properly re-organi3ed as part of the $ymbolic Brder" or" it could be a description of how
events burst in to the system and create sub%ects who" out of their fidelity to the event"
endeavour to universali3e it in the form of a new present. #eyond this basic structure of a
gap functioning as ground for structure-as-such" we can see the #adiouian sub%ect7s
relation to the (acanian sub%ect1 both are grounded in a gap and are thus conditioned by
that which is not only outside of themselves but outside of being. )his is clear for instance
in Meditation )hirty-$even! of !eing an E"ent where #adiou discusses the (acanian
5
reading of 2escartes7 cogito as being primarily topological. #adiou shares (acan7s drive to
formali3ation" and it is here that Feidegger should be viewed as #adiou7s chief antagonist.
Feidegger serves in many ways as the ground of (acan7s psychoanalytic theory.
5hile the model of language in (acanian theory is structuralist" the emphasis on language
as the ground of the human comes from Feidegger 8language is of course the house of
#eing0 we could say that language is the hori3on of 2asein" following +adamer" who
makes language the ground of tradition and thus history;.
5
)he problem with (acan" from
the #adiouian perspective" is precisely this allegiance with linguistics" which lacks the
universality of mathematical logic. Feideggerian poetry is a recurring foil for #adiou
8matheme or poem6; and it is the connection between language and e?istence that serves
as the battle cry of the Feideggerian.
)he structural development of #adiou7s philosophy mirrors that of (acan1 #adiou
begins his mature work with the claim that set theory is equivalent to ontology because
only set theory deals with pure multiplicity as such 8#eing qua #eing;. )his account of pure
multiplicity has moved in recent years to account for appearance through an engagement
with category theory. .ategory theory further abstracts #adiou7s work" no longer even
relying necessarily on algebraic or logical variables as his work utili3ing set theory does"
but relies solely on points" arrows and geometric shapes. )he parallel with (acan7s move
toward topology is clear0 abstraction here is equated with formali3ation" it transforms the
discourse in order to eliminate any possible contamination from cultural-linguistic bias or
influence. Moving from language to mathematics means moving away from Feidegger and
hermeneutics" and further attempts to distance theory from the e?clusively human realm.
6

#eing is a consistent multiplicity" the multiplicity of pure multiples. Bntology" as the
study of #eing qua #eing" is structured presentation"! 8#adiou CII91 CK; that is to say" the
presentation of structure-as-such. 5hat is presented is multiplicity. $et theory provides us
with a method of apprehending pure multiplicity" of grasping infinity" without positing a
totali3ing vantage point" without a move to transcendence. *ather" ontology is an entirely
abstract" immanent ac-counting for #adiou" the grouping of multiplicities into sets.
7
$et
theory is" however" only grounded for #adiou by the empty set" the structuring gap that
allows for the situating of all situations. It is from this gap that emerges the second half of
#adiou7s first big book" the e"ent.
)he event serves as the in%ection of novelty into the situation which" by its nature"
remains the same. It is only when nothingness breaks into #eing that anything new can
happen. )his evental happening is also the source of sub%ectivity for #adiou" and it is here
6
where (acan is e?plicitly cited in !eing an E"ent" in the final meditation dealing with
(acan7s reading of the .artesian cogito 8#adiou CII91 :O,-:OK;. (acan plays with the
cogito in multiple ways" deconstructing it and reconstructing it" turning it inside out and
refashioning it. It should be noted that there is an important connection between (acanPs
cogito and his re-reading of the /reudian #o es $ar"! as both convey the same
ontological statement" that ultimately the Lgo is false and grounded on the nothingness of
the *eal" the core of our being! 8%ern unseres #esen; 8(acan CII91 KC9;. (acan will
continue by telling us that this core is more my whims" aberrations" phobias" and fetishes
than... my more or less civili3ed personage! 8Ibid;.
5hen 2escartes says I think therefore I am"! we should read this in light of the
unconscious. 5hat 2escartes is concerned with is the Lgo" the thinking thing that is the
human sub%ect as entirely transparent and transcendental. I am thinking" therefore I am"!
that is" insofar as I think" I am Q absolutely. 5e can add further1 cogito ergo sum ubi
cogito& ibi sum&! I think therefore I am" where I think" there I am"! or perhaps better still" I
think therefor I am... where I think I am! both in the sense that I am where I think" but also I
am only where I think I am in the illusory sense of merely thinking it. Br as (acan will say"
this limits me to being there in my being only insofar as I think that I am in my thought!
8Ibid1 K,9;. )o take 2escartes at his word is to deny the psychoanalytic work of the
unconscious" that there is at least a part of me 8perhaps the only part that is truly me!;
that escapes my thinking" that in fact only shows itself" only has being" when I am not
thinking. /or this reason (acan proposes a re-reading of 2escartes in light of the truth of
psychoanalysis. )he cogito is transformed then" the foundational phrase becoming I am
thinking where I am not" therefore I am where I am not thinking! 8I am thinking
unconsciously in the void in my being" therefore I am most myself there where I am not
thinking at all; or I am not" where I am the plaything of my thought0 I think about what I am
where I do not think I am thinking! 8Ibid1 K,@;.
/or #adiou" this topology of the sub%ect" the fact that the sub%ect is grounded in the
void" in not only what they are not 8/reud; but in what is not. )he $ymbolic Brder is thus
connected with the *eal via sub%ectivity for (acan in the same way that sub%ectivity
connects #eing and the event for #adiou. $tructure emerges from the void" the count-as-
one only being possible with the emergence of a novel multiplicity in the form of the event.
8

)his structuring is the fundamental act of sub%ective fidelity" the act of fidelity 8by say"
participating in a revolution; is a restructuring of an unstable situation" in the same way the
(acanian sub%ect of analysis must cope with trauma 8like the death of a loved one; by
7
restructuring their symbolic world with reference to the gap that has taken them hostage.
(ike (acan however" #adiou is able to formali3e the sub%ect"
9
to make him or her part of
the formal presentation of situations or worlds. Lven the void is able to be formali3ed for
#adiou" the event made a part of his algebra" its trace written R. )he sub%ect" despite being
grounded in the nothingness of the event" is symbolised" is structured. Indeed" we could
connect here the various structures of sub%ectivity put forward by (acan" the obsessional
neurotic for instance being a structure of sub%ectivity rather than a set of symptoms and the
famed Jbarred sub%ect7 8G; of (acan having a place. In this formal presentation" nothing
resists representation. )his is what separates it from the phenomenological theory" which
deals e?plicitly with the parado? of the presentation of the unspeakable.
)i*e+ !n( the Inform!l #ntolo$% of /!r!(o0
)he key to understanding &i'ek on the relation between the $ymbolic and the *eal is
evident from his first Lnglish work" 'he Sublime Object of Ieology 8,-A-;. Fere" &i'ek
connects Mar?ist ideology critique with the practice of psychoanalysis" though not in the
way proposed by the /rankfurt school or many other /reudo-Mar?ists who claim that what
/reud is doing at the small scale of the individual can be e?trapolated to larger populations
as a whole" eventually to whole societies and civili3ations. Instead &i'ek connects the
structural method of ideology critique with that of psychoanalysis0 the analyst" like the
critic" is tasked with the %ob of revealing to the analysand 8the believer; what is impossible
to see from their present vantage point0 to articulate what they don7t know that they know.
&i'ek is not concerned with the structure of representation-as-such" as is perhaps the case
with #adiou" but is concerned with the limits of these structures. Fe is concerned primarily
with the repressed" that which is e?cluded from consciousness" representation" the
$ymbolic Brder" etc" and the tendency inherent in the repressed to return" to haunt that
order that e?cludes it.
&i'ek7s ontology is" as I would say is the case for both (acan and #adiou" structured
on a gap" a structuring gap. )he difference is seemingly slight but has great
consequences. )he emphasis for &i'ek is not on the structuring but on that which is not
structured or represented" the *eal. )he *eal dominates &i'ek7s thought" from his work on
political ideology to his recommencement of the sub%ect of +erman Idealism in
psychoanalytic" materialist clothing. Unlike #adiou" who only draws on anything like the
*eal 8the void" the event; in terms of sub%ectivity" it seems to have real import to ontology
8
for &i'ek" as seen especially in his readings of $chelling and Fegel" as well as his version
of the dialectic found in 'he (aralla) *ie$ 8CII9;.
As mentioned above" Seminar XI features a novel return of the objet a in the form of
the remainder! of symbolic castration" what is seen by the sub%ect as having been
removed from them upon entering the $ymbolic Brder. )his lost ob%ect! is the central
drama of sub%ectivity as he or she aims for wholeness" attempting to fill the gap within
themselves. )his fundamental truth of sub%ectivity is found to have its origin in the work of
/.5.4. $chelling.
10
As &i'ek7s title for his monograph on $chelling indicates" the central
concept of $chellingian speculative metaphysics for &i'ek is the indivisible remainder.!
Against the common view of Fegel7s totali3ing system whereby all entities are subsumed"
$chelling presents us with a non-totali3ing system" a system that is in fact grounded on a
fundamental split or gap. In any attempt to systematically represent the whole of the
cosmos" there is always a remainder" always a repressed or e?cluded. )his indivisible
remainder is none other than the (acanian objet a. )he objet a is the inaccessible Jhard
kernel7 around which the symboli3ation turns" which eludes it" the cause of its failure" an
the "ery space of symbolization" its condition of possibility! 8&i'ek ,--91 ,:K;.
11
)his hard
kernel! is the necessarily e?ternali3ed of sub%ectivity" or is it the other way around6 )he
problem with /ichte is that the Bther 8+nsto,-& the impetus of self-kno$lege an thus
ethical responsibility is entirely self-posite. If $e $ere to try to rea this in Lacanian
terms& it $oul suggest that the Ego posits the /eal as its o$n limitation to be o"ercome in
the name of justice. 'his is not the case& an gi"es us some clue as to $hy Schelling is
superior to 0ichte on this point. +t the beginning of 'he (aralla) *ie$& 1i2ek remarks that
after the publication of 'he 'icklish Subject he has frequently been aske $ho or $hat is
tickling the subject 31i2ek 4556: 78-. It is precisely the tickling object. 0or Schelling an
1i2ek& the remainer is equiprimorial $ith the subject& the t$o emerge simultaneously
an only e"er together. Objet a is not a self-limitation place by the subject to be
o"ercome& it is the impossibility of self-ientity& the impossibility of the subject to account
for a reality that inclues itself. In Lacanian terms& the subject 39- is ne"er encapsulate by
any signification 3S
7
- an so must be also represente by the object assume to complete
this representation 3a-. +s soon as the subject is able to articulate herself& it becomes
impossible 31i2ek 7::6: ;6-. One is not ientical $ith oneself& someone only e"er
resembles themself 31i2ek 4556: ;;-. 'his is precisely the point of objet a in Seminar XI& it
is that $hich in some $ay guarantees aequate& accurate representation an yet& oes
not e)ist 3Lacan 7:8<: 7:<-7::-.
9
In the closing section of Seminar XI" (acan relates the objet a" to the agalma of
Seminar *II devoted to transference. )his connection is brought together through the
discussion of love and gives us a clear view of the relation between the sub%ect and objet
a. )he sub%ect is tickled by the ob%ect 8a;0 what does this mean for ontology6 )he
difference is to be found in the divergence between /ichte and $chelling. /or /ichte
remember that the impasse 8a; is posited by the sub%ect. $chelling7s break with /ichte is to
say that transcendental philosophy need not begin with sub%ectivity but with Nature
8=aturphilosophie;" that is" with the ob%ect. )his is to say" change in the sub%ect can be the
result of a change in the ob%ect" thus the roles are reversed 8in terms of the standard
notion of the active sub%ect working on the passive ob%ect;1 the sub%ect is defined by a
fundamental passivity" and it is the ob%ect from which movement comes! 8&i'ek CII91 ,@;.
/or (acan" this signifies the impossibility of love" since to love someone is to love the objet
a within them" the promise of wholeness" when I say I love someone I say I lo"e you& but&
because ine)plicable I lo"e in you something more than you>the ob%et petit a>I mutilate
you! 8(acan ,-@A1 C9A;. I am motivated entirely by the prospect of wholeness for myself"
for completion" and not at all for the person standing before me. 5hat I love is that which I
see as missing from myself" the ob%ect of desire. $chelling is superior to /ichte because he
emphasi3es the incompleteness of the self" of the cosmos" of +od. It is not that I posit
myself as incomplete" but that I move in relation to the ob%ect" to Nature. My ground is the
ground of the objet a" this gap before me that promises to 8ful;fill me. Bntologically" this
places primacy on the gap rather than the system around it. It is not that we are to
systematically integrate the gap within representation" as (acan attempted in his
topological works" but should rather concentrate on the gap itself as parado?.
)he primacy of parado? finds its place in &i'ek7s work as the decisive element of the
dialectic. Against the common o)a of Fegelianism" &i'ek contends that the purpose of the
dialectic is not to reconcile opposition by transforming the two sides into a new third term.
)he truth of the dialectic is to be found in Mant7s antinomies 8&i'ek CII91 :" CI-CA;. )he
Mantian antinomies of reason present us with two opposing and irreconcilable answers to
a question" are we free or determined6! for instance. (ogically" neither shows itself to be
superior and the sub%ect is confronted with an impasse to the most important questions of
human e?istence" relating to freedom" +od" life after death" the nature of the universe" etc.
According to &i'ek" this is precisely how the dialectic functions1 the truth of the antinomy is
not one side against the other" or both" or some third term that encompasses both in a
systematic whole0 the truth is the gap itself" the parado?" the irreconcilability 8Ibid1 O9;.
10
&i'ek7s ontology is not an attempt to systematically represent the world in purely formal
terms. In 'he (aralla) *ie$" he contends that Mierkegaard should be read as a Fegelian
8Ibid1 @K-@@; but the reverse might actually present us with a clearer view of &i'ek7s
ontology. Mierkegaard7s contention with Fegelianism is that it forgets singularity" in its
grand synthesis of everything into the .oncept" it forgets what it is to e?ist. &i'ek7s dialectic
though is entirely about this" it is a reading of Fegel based on the trinity of Mant-
Mierkegaard-(acan" where the emphasis is precisely on this finitude. &i'ek7s ontology is
grounded entirely on limits" the limits of knowledge" of representation" of articulation. 5hat
is primary is this gap" this inability of the sub%ect to take account of itself in its entirety. Any
attempt at a formal ontology" even one grounded and structured by a gap is doomed to fail
because it presumes too much.
To 1on"lu(e& The Two Si(es of !"!n 23n"ore4
5hat" finally" are we to conclude of this opposition between formal coherence and informal
parado?6 It is well-known that after the publication of +nti-Oeipus" (acan solicited a
meeting with +illes 2eleu3e" seemingly in an attempt to convince him to become
something of a disciple.
12
5hy did (acan want 2eleu3e6 2eleu3e presents us with an
interesting case0 through his work with +uattari 8which is first and foremost" indebted to
(acan and not a renunciation of him;" we can see what is possible with (acanian theory"
we learn how to use it. 2eleu3e neither accepts nor denies (acan" but use him. A quarter
of a century ago" (acan wanted a disciple" someone who was not purely a yes-man. Now"
he has two. &i'ek and #adiou present us with two different ontologies based on the
question of (acanian ontology" but first and foremost they show us how to read (acan and
even more" show us what is possible when one uses (acanian theory for one7s own ends.
11
,
Notes
/or an overview of this history see Nicholls and (iebscher 8CI,I;. )his great work covers many
overlooked thinkers in the history of the unconscious like ..+. .arus and +.). /echner as well as
more well-known thinkers like $chelling" $chopenhauer" Niet3sche and /reud.
2 I am thinking here of works such as #eyond the <leasure <rinciple! and )otem and )aboo.! In
the former" /reud constructs a myth of the origin of life in order to e?plain the conservative nature
of the drives" leading to the postulation of the eath ri"e in opposition to the more well-known
pleasure principle. )his opposition of drives provides /reud the ground for his topological model of
the mind of Id" Lgo" and $uper-Lgo" revolutioni3ing psychoanalytic theory. )otem and )aboo! on
the other hand provides a speculative anthropology of early humans in order to ground the Bedipal
comple?. In both cases" /reud is working to ground psychoanalytic principles in biology or
anthropology.
3 &i'ek provides us with two of the best commentary on (acan7s myth in two essays 8,--K1 CIK-
CCI0 CII@;.
4 I reali3e this is a contentious claim. 5hy not <lato or 2eleu3e6 2escartes or Fegel6 5hat of
Mar?6 5hile there is certainly a canon of figures that #adiou situates himself with and against" I
will outline why I think we should understand #adiou as allying primarily with (acan and as being
primarily against Feidegger.
5 )his is true of the work up to ,-9O" after which (acan begins the process of moving away from
language as the form of structure and begins to deal with structure-as-such. /or a clear e?ample of
the debt to Feidegger in the early (acan" see (acan 8CII91 CO@-OCC;. All page numbers from ?crits
refer to the /rench pagination.
6 5hile 4ohn Mullarkey7s criticism of #adiou on animals holds for !eing an E"ent" it is not clearly
applicable to Logics of #orls. Mullarkey maintains that #adiou7s account of sub%ectivity and its
relation to the event via truth procedures limits sub%ectivity to human beings despite the fact that
his criteria is mathematical 8the count-as-Bne; and that #adiou should" in theory" have an account
of non-human sub%ectivity. In Logics of #orls" #adiou will relate his theory of truth to $pino3a7s
account of attributes" claiming that we will say that there are perhaps an infinity of types of truth
but we humans only know four Dart" science" politics" and loveE"! 8#adiou CII-1 @,;. /or Mullarkey7s
critique see Mullarkey 8CII@1 ,,A-,C,;.
7 .f. (acan" 8,--O1 ,AO;1 a structure is in the first place a group of elements forming a covariant
set.!
8 Bn this see especially Mediations ,9 and ,@ in !eing an E"ent.
9 $ee for instance #ook I of Logics of #orls" which does %ust that.
10 /or the historical connection between $chelling and psychoanalysis" see Mc+rath 8CI,,;.
11 Italici3ed in the original.
12 Bf the encounter with (acan" 2eleu3e writes1 My only great encounter with him was after the
appearance of +nti-Oeipus D,-@CE.I7m sure he took it badly. Fe must have held it against us" />li?
and me. #ut finally" a few months later" he summoned meSthere7s no other word for it. Fe wanted
to see me. And so I went. Fe made me wait in his antechamber. It was filled with people" I didnPt
know if they were patients" admirers" %ournalists.... Fe made me wait a long timeSa little too long"
all the sameSand then he finally received me. Fe rolled out a list of all his disciples" and said that
they were all worthless DnullsE 8the only person he said nothing bad about was 4acques-Alain
Miller;. It made me smile" because I recalled #inswanger telling the story of a similar scene1 /reud
saying bad things about 4ones" Abraham" etc. And #inswanger was shrewd enough to assume that
/reud would say the same thing about him when he wasnPt there. $o (acan was speaking" and
everyone was condemned" e?cept Miller. And then he said to me" J5hat I need is someone like
you.7! Tuoted in $mith 8CII:1 9OK-9O9;.
,eferen"es
#adiou" A. 8CII9N,-AA; !eing an E"ent" trans. Bliver /eltham" (ondon1 .ontinuum.
#adiou" A. 8CII-NCII9; Logic of #orls" trans. Alberto )oscano" (ondon1 .ontinuum.
(acan" 4. 8,-@A; 'he Seminar of @acques Lacan !ook XI 3'he 0our 0unamental
Aoncepts of (sychoanalysis 7:6;-7:6B-" trans. Alan $heridan" New Uork1 5.5.
Norton V .o.
(acan" 4. 8,--O; 'he Seminar of @acques Lacan !ook III: 'he (sychoses 7:BB-7:B6"
trans. *ussell +rigg" (ondon1 *outledge.
(acan" 4. 8,--A; 'he Seminar of @acques Lacan !ook XX 3Encore 7:84-7:8C-" trans.
#ruce /ink" New Uork1 5.5. Norton V .o.
(acan" 4. 8CII9; ?crits" trans. #ruce /ink 8New Uork1 5.5. Norton V .o.
Mc+rath" $.4. 8CI,,; 'he Dark-Eroun of Spirit: Schelling an the Fnconscious" (ondon1
*outledge.
Milner" 4-.. 8,--K; LGoeu"re claire: Lacan& la science& la philosophie" <aris1 =ditions du
$euil.
Mullarkey" 4. 8CII@; (ost-Aontinental (hilosophy: +n Outline" (ondon1 .ontinuum.
Nicholls" A. and (iebscher" M. 8eds;" 8CI,I; 'hinking the Fnconscious: =ineteenth-
Aentury Eerman 'hought" .ambridge1 .ambridge University <ress.
$mith" 2. 8CII:; )he Inverse $ide of the $tructure1 &i'ek on 2eleu3e on (acan"! in
Ariticism :9.:1 9OK-9O9.
&i'ek" $. 8,-A-; 'he Sublime Object of Ieology" (ondon1 Werso.
&i'ek" $. 8,--K; )he (amella of 2avid (ynch! in /eaing Seminar XI" eds. *ichard
/eldstein" #ruce /ink" and Maire 4aanus" New Uork1 $UNU <ress.
&i'ek" $. 8,--9; 'he Ini"isible /emainer: On Schelling an /elate Hatters" (ondon1
Werso.
&i'ek" $. 8CII9; 'he (aralla) *ie$" .ambridge" MA1 MI) <ress.
&i'ek" $. 8CII@; )roubles with the *eal1 (acan as a viewer of +lien"! available online at
http1NNwww.lacan.comN3i3alien.htm