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Sternhell
The Founding Myths of Israel: Nationalism, Socialism, and the Making of the Jewish State.
by Zeev Sternhell
Review by: Nachman BenYehuda
American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 104, No. 6 (May 1999), pp. 1817-1819
Published by: The University of Chicago Press
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Book Reviews
Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condi-
tion Have Failed. By James C. Scott. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univer-
sity Press, 1998. Pp. xiv445. $35.00.
Michael Mann
University of California, Los Angeles
The power and pleasure of this polemical book come from its case studies,
90% of the text. The rst describes 18th-century Prussian forestry, impos-
ing regimented reforesting plans, riding roughshod over existing complex
ecologies, producing environmental degradation followed by reduced tim-
ber yields. The last case study is of high modernist agricultural methods
imposed during 194575, regardless of terrain, ignoring the practical
knowledge of local farmers. This led to overreliance on fertilizers, sterile
hybrid plant strains, and vulnerable monoculture, ultimately worsening
the farmers lot. The other case studies attack modernist city planners,
from Haussmann to Le Corbusier, and scientic socialists, from the
Leninist vanguard party through Soviet collective farms and the Chi-
nese Great Leap Forward to compulsory village resettlements in Tan-
zania.
James Scott detects four causes of disaster in these schemes: forcing
administrative order on a nature and society that are highly variegated,
relying on state coercive power to effect innovation, a civil society too
weak to resist, and high modernist Enlightenment ideology seeing scien-
tic rationality as the only source of truth. The main villain is the modern
state, falsely believing it exists above society, able to perceive and make
legible the contours of nature and society laid out beneath it and able
to grandly reorganize them with its standardized formulas.
So the book is part of the global reaction against early and mid-20th-
century theories, seeing the state as the bringer of social, economic, and
moral improvement to the world. Yet, it is not written from the political
Right. Scotts sympathies lie with the poor farmers of the global South,
the true purveyors of practical rationality, their experiments strongly dis-
ciplined by their need to survive by respecting their small piece of nature.
Their practical reason is thus a superior form of knowledge to that of
high modernist science.
Scotts scholarship is formidable, his insights many, his rich detail usu-
ally stilling criticism. I did groan at poor old Diderot and his 18th-century
Parisian friends being blamed yet again for the follies of the 20th century.
I groaned again as Jane Jacobss city of spontaneous self-diversication
was lauded yet again over Le Corbusiers city as a machine for living
Permission to reprint a book review printed in this section may be obtained only from
the author.
AJS Volume 104 Number 6 1813
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American Journal of Sociology
and as Rosa Luxemburgs working-class spontaneity was again lauded
over Lenins vanguard partyboth being given a feminist slant here,
good gal versus bad guy. Actually, when Lenin thought the workers were
supporting him, he reversed his position. Lenin was more opportunist
than high modernist. And when modernist city planning included gar-
dens and generous living space, as in the British Garden Cities and
New Towns movements (denigrated by Scott), it improved the quality
of life for large numbers of peopleas did welfare states in general. But
these are empirical quibbles.
Yet, I also have more theoretical doubts. Scott exaggerates the indepen-
dence of the state. Like the states he criticizes, his state seems to oat
above society (as in simpler elite theories of the state). Who actually runs
such states so that modernist plans can be implemented? He does mention
that the market, large-scale bureaucratic capitalism, and the prot mo-
tive may also be instruments of high modernist folly. But he presents no
case studies on their role, and to do so might force revision of his title
and his four main arguments. In all the non-Communist case studies,
though capitalism looms in the background, it is absent from the fore-
ground. His Third World peasants and laborers seem exploited by state
elites but not by landlord classes. He blames not large capitalist farmers
but agricultural engineers (i.e., modernist technocrats) for the fetish of
industrial farming taking hold of American agriculture during the period
191030. He discusses urban planning as if it was run by state elites.
But sociologists like Castells and Molotch have shown that planning is
dominated by city growth machines centrally involving developers, cor-
porations, and banks. We learn about legibility tools of the state (like
censuses and maps) but not about those of capitalism (like the organiza-
tion chart or accountancy).
Nor are states as coherent as Scott (or, indeed, class theory of the state)
believes. Scott emphasizes the inuence of German planning during
World War I, especially on Lenin. Yet it coordinated three distinct
groups, of which state bureaucrats were less signicant than generals and
the heads of large capitalist enterprises. Scott names Walter Rathenau as
the prototype of the rational bureaucrat of this planning system. But
Rathenau was a capitalist, not a bureaucrat. His family owned the electri-
cal giant AEG, of which he was chairman. The generals, Ludendorff
above all, were indeed technocrats, formally employed by the state and
in the military realm modernists. Yet otherwise they were reactionaries,
drawn from the Prussian landowning nobility. Their modernist goal (as
with many of the Red Army and PLO elites important in communist
statist disasters) was less to improve humanity than to kill people more
efciently.
Militarism has been a distinctive form of disastrous modernism yet
makes no explicit appearance in this book. Nor does nationalism, which
(far more than modernism) has been focused on the state. And Scotts
expose s often depend heavily on citations from critical government scien-
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Book Reviews
tic reportseven opponents of high modernism inhabit states. States
have many rooms and many constituencies.
Of course, when disasters are driven not by singular states but by mar-
kets or complex congeries of dominant elites or classes exerting diffuse
political inuence, they are generally less visible. The inefciency and
inequity of the U.S. corporate market system of health care, when com-
pared to the statist heath care systems of Europe, is not often seen as a
disaster comparable to Scotts case studies. Yet, it systematically results
in the earlier death of poorer and minority Americans, and we may rea-
sonably attribute it more to class and ethnic exploitation than to Ameri-
can government. Consider the more obvious disaster of the extermination
of the native peoples of North America, legitimated by some of the mod-
ernist rationality noted by Scott. The declaration that the land was
empty (terra nullis)and so could be cleared of its peoplesenabled
surveyors to lay out the rational grid system that still dominates the entire
land surface of the United States. But here genocide was mainly the re-
sponsibility of a white settler society rather than a state. Thus, the sources
and forms of anything we might wish to call high modernism, and its
attendant disasters, were more plural than in Scotts narrative. High
modernist disasters have involved states, armed forces, markets, corpora-
tions, classes, nationalist movements, and so on, all interacting in com-
plex, confused, and often unanticipated ways.
Perhaps it is not states in general but particular types of states that
are implicated in modernist folly. One type is visible in Scotts most terri-
ble case studies: states in backward countries where elites believed that
the future could be plannedsince it was visible in more modern coun-
tries abroad. State-centered late development projects preceded the En-
lightenment proper, as in Peter the Greats reforms (his rebuilding of St.
Petersburg is here cited as part of modernist architecture). Late develop-
ment inspired the industrializing plans of Marxists in Russia, China, and
Tanzania and of nationalists elsewhere. Thus, elites in developing coun-
tries like Brazil sought to build Le Corbusier high modernist capital
cities. Perhaps neither statism nor modernism per se but subtypes might
be the main culprits.
This is a book of powerful case studies and weaker theory. The case
studies allow Scott to attribute many appalling disasters to modernism
overdosing on statism. But the attribution really requires a better theory
of modern states than he possesses.
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American Journal of Sociology
The Therapeutic State: Justifying Government at Centurys End. By
James L. Nolan, Jr. New York: New York University Press, 1998.
Pp. xiv395. $45.00 (cloth); $18.95 (paper).
John R. Hall
University of California, Davis
Reading about therapeutic legitimations of the U.S. state, I felt a very
strong emotional identication with James Nolans claim that in the lat-
ter part of the 20th century, a therapeutic ethos has seeped into the
nexus of government and politics. How else could one explain that a
family in Hawaii recovered $1,000 in compensation for the emotional dis-
tress incurred from the negligent death of their dog, Princess (p. 62)? On
the other hand, evaluating The Therapeutic State rationally, I found cer-
tain methodological, theoretical, and substantive problems in the analy-
sis. In his defense, Nolan can point to a parallel alternationbetween
the emotional and the utilitarianin the state itself. My own reaction is
anticipated by Nolans analysis of the discourse about which he writes.
Nolan keys his inquiry to David Beethams decomposition of Max We-
bers concept of legitimate domination into three analytic components
technical validity, justication of laws via cultural codes, and popular
consent. In effect, Nolan narrows the problem of legitimation to the ques-
tion of justication. He tackles that issue not by asking about some over-
arching justication, but by exploring the specic justications that state
agents and politicians employ. Quibbles to one side, Nolan convinces that
there has been a fundamental shift in how government justies certain
activities and, concomitantly, carries them out. The transformative code
is the therapeutic ethoscentered in the victim pathologies of the emoti-
vist self interpreted for us by the priestly practitioners of the therapeutic
vocations (p. 17). The state becomes the therapist of last (or sometimes
rst) resort. Convicted drug users, for instance, no longer simply receive
punishment; they often become the targets of counseling, rehabilitation,
and emotional support by people who care. Even courtroom trials be-
come therapeutic encounters. And in prison, inmates are encouraged to
voice their feelings about parents who jacked you around and screwed
you up (p. 122).
The core of the book is a set of case studies exploring justications of
state action in civil law, criminal justice, public education, welfare policy,
and the rhetoric of political debates. For each venue, Nolan examines
how the therapeutic ethos develops historically and how it articulates
with utilitarianism and three classically important strands of justica-
tion in the United Statescivic republicanism, natural-law liberalism,
and Protestant Christianity. Thus, for child welfare policy, The Therapeu-
tic State contrasts religious rhetorics of the early 20th century (e.g., about
the sacredness of the home) with contemporary emphases on the childs
identity, self-esteem, and quality of interpersonal relations (p. 213).
In his conclusion, Nolan contemplates the admixtures by which a ther-
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Book Reviews
apeutic ethos and a utilitarian ethos become conjoined and how these
admixtures mediate the relationships between a Giddensian high mod-
ern state and an increasingly postmodern culture. Given countertenden-
cies such as the backlash among religious fundamentalists against thera-
peutic intrusions, Nolan is no doubt wise to hedge his conclusions about
how long therapeutic justications of the state will endure. Instead, he
closes by invoking Michel Foucault and expressing concern about a post-
modern padded cage (p. 306).
Nolan writes well and within a distinguished tradition of analysts who
have sought to discern the basic cultural contours of American life, from
Tocqueville to Daniel Bell, Philip Rieff, and Robert Bellah and his col-
leagues. Yet readers will want to reect carefully on how far his analysis
shows the therapeutic ethos to have infused the modern American state,
thus offering the state an alternative source of legitimation (p. 21). Nolan
rightly poses this as a question, not a claim. Yet The Therapeutic State
sometimes portrays the therapeutic ethos as an almost free-oating geist,
to be discerned in various discourses that invoke it, but having an autono-
mous telos of its own. Though Nolan shows the agency of people who
employ therapeutic discourse, he does not much explore the kinds of
power gained (and by whom) when it is invoked (for this question, bring-
ing in Foucault more strongly and much earlier would have been useful).
Moreover, justication is a slippery concept that can slide away from
legitimation: therapeutic discourse within government programs is differ-
ent from the rhetorics of justication for those programs, and these local
rhetorics of government do not always work as proxies for justicatory
legitimation of the nation state as a whole. On this front, the choice of
sites in which to examine legitimating discourse loads the analysis in fa-
vor of demonstrating the rise of therapeutic discourse. The book gives
scant attention to state legitimations in commerce, geopolitics, national
security, environmental pollution credits, and corporate antitrust law
arenas that do not seem especially prone to therapeutic justications. But
these considerations should not overshadow the substantial contribution
of Nolans book. The Therapeutic State documents an important emer-
gent underpinning of legitimation in emotions talk. Anyone interested in
state power today ought to read it.
The Founding Myths of Israel: Nationalism, Socialism, and the Making
of the Jewish State. By Zeev Sternhell. Translated by David Maisel.
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1998. Pp. xiii419. $29.95.
Nachman Ben-Yehuda
Hebrew University
Sternhells book presents a passionate (he does not shy from expressing
his views or from grading politicians) and sympathetic yet critical history
of the ideological and political disputes that have accompanied the cre-
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American Journal of Sociology
ation, and shaping, of Israel. The analysis focuses on how the newly
emerging state blended socialism with nationalism, thus creating an
interesting ideological concoction in which nationalism quickly gained
ascendancy over everything else. This meant that both socialism and cap-
italism were manipulated into playing a role in the main drama that was
the national revival of the Jewish state. Sternhell reveals that while those
I call the Totemic Fathers of the state used an external rhetoric of
equality and socialism (but not freedom), the translation of this rhetoric
into reality culminated in at least two contradictory directions.
First, an unequal distribution of resources (and a limited form of capi-
talism) and a replacement of socialist ideas with nationalistic concepts
took place. The name of the book reects these astute observations: the
rhetoric used (the myth) versus the reality that was as far from the
rhetoric as one could possibly imagine (Sternhell even shows how Israels
famous sociologist S. N. Eisenstadt accepted the myth [p. 288]). In this
respect, Sternhells book presents a powerful and successful debunking
of popular misconceptions about Israels ideological and political past.
Still, one must remember that most of those Totemic Fathers were not
philosophers or university professors; they were people of action, deeply
immersed in the act of creating a new state with new national and per-
sonal identities. Nationalism may have been the only route to statehood.
Second, Sternhell provides a penetrating and sobering look at the per-
sonal practices of some of the early Totemic Fathers (e.g., Ben-Gurion),
showing not only that genuine democracy and tolerance never gained
priority on their main agenda but that they were personally corrupt and
cynical in their abuse of public funds. Chapter 6 is utterly fascinating
and amazing. For example: In the best traditions of nationalist socialism,
the lowest sector of society received psychological compensation. Its ex-
alted status was supposed to compensate for difcult living conditions,
low income, exploitation . . . and its lack of social mobility (p. 296). Thus,
while preaching equality, purity, and modesty for and above all, empha-
sizing the supremacy of agricultural work and downplaying the role of
good quality education, Ben-Gurion never saw any inconsistency in the
fact that his apartment . . . with its four large, attractive rooms . . . cost
him two or three times the monthly salary of an agricultural worker. . . .
His children attended the prestigious Gymnasia Herzliya where fees were
[very high] . . . and took piano lessons (p. 295). This, at a time when
very few could afford any of the above and when the ofcial ideology
preached exactly against the lifestyle Ben-Gurion was practicing.
Sternhell denitely mastered the relevant history. His view is impres-
sively informative, and this meticulous book is packed with information,
anecdotes, insights, and quotations, almost to the point of creating an
effect of fatigue and exasperation on the part of the reader. Moreover,
appreciating this book certainly requires prior (and reasonably good)
knowledge of (not to mention interest in) Israels ideological history.
Sternhells contextualization of Israels ideological and political history
within major ideologists and movements in Europe integrates its argu-
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Book Reviews
ments within a larger global view. Along the way, we have to master a
decent amount of terms (e.g., nationalist socialism, romantic nationalism,
constructive socialism, democratic socialism, experiential socialism, tribal
nationalism, integral nationalism, etc.). Eventually, I found this concep-
tual forest too distracting.
Sociologically speaking, I missed the translation of the political/ideo-
logical dimension to other dimensions. Since the book is focused on the
ideological and political history of an emerging state, it turned a blind eye
to many other important developments that may have been inuenced by
the disputes in the ideological dimension. For example, the military, po-
lice, higher education, crystallizing personal and collective identities out-
side the ideological/political complexities, authentic music, poetry, litera-
ture, ethnicity, sport, popular culture, gender, and the worst internal
conict facing Israel nowthat between religious and seculars. More-
over, the translation of the nationalistic ideology to such everyday prac-
tices as living accommodations, marriage, divorce, food, transportation,
and dress and to institution building (e.g., political, the law, civil service)
or to social construction (and substitution) of elites is missing altogether.
While Sternhell uses the term myth as a central device, his only refer-
ence to theories of myths in the political context is to ancient Sorel. This
innocently blithe disregard for the rich (and relevant) scholarly literature
about myth (and collective memory) since Sorels work is irritating (e.g.,
Henry Tudors Political Myth [Macmillan, 1972]).
Knowledgeable students of Israel, interested in its political and ideolog-
ical history, will nd Sternhells book both highly useful and indispens-
able. While reading the book requires time and patience, it is a rewarding
experience. At Israels ftieth birthday, ending with a quote from
Sternhells sobering introduction seems highly appropriate: Those who
wish Israel to be a truly liberal state or Israeli society to be open must
recognize the fact that liberalism derives . . . [from separating] . . . religion
from politics. A liberal state can be only a secular state, a state in which
the concept of citizenship lies at the center of collective existence (p. xiii).
Governing with the News: The News Media as a Political Institution.
By Timothy E. Cook. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998.
Pp. xi289. $48.00 (cloth); $17.97 (paper).
John Zaller
University of California, Los Angeles
Journalists view themselves as members of an autonomous profession
that serves the public by reporting information impartially and by pro-
viding an independent check on government. In Governing with the
News, Tim Cook argues that the news media are a political institution
that relies on government subsidies for much of the information it reports
and is an integral part of the process of governance. For these and other
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American Journal of Sociology
reasons, Cook maintains that news is biased in ways that often make for
bad public policy.
Cooks purpose, however, is not to disparage journalism. It is to estab-
lish the political character of the news media as a basis for new and, as
he believes, more sensible government policies toward them. In Cooks
view, these would-be policies encourage journalists to be more open to
alternative sources of news and the media to be more accessible to ordi-
nary citizens.
The rst of the books three main sections traces interactions between
press and government from prerevolutionary times to the present. The
key argument here is that American journalism has never been as inde-
pendent of government and governing elites as it would like to believe.
In the 20th century, Washington has, as a favor to the big players, consis-
tently used regulation to hold down the level of competition among news
providers. Most important, government has developed a public relations
infrastructure in the form of press ofces and media events that, in ef-
fect, subsidize journalists efforts to ll their daily quotas for the produc-
tion of news.
The second section of the book works its way (somewhat tediously)
through the elements of a standard denition of political institution to
make the point that the news media qualify as one. It also makes the case
that the news values of journaliststimeliness, drama, conict, among
otherslead to biased news. The production values of the news direct
[reporters]and ustoward particular political values and policies: not
so much pushing politics either consistently left or right as toward of-
cialdom and toward standards of good stories that do not make for
equally good political outcomes (p. 91).
The third section of the book, Government by Publicity, shows how
each of the major institutions of national government attempts to achieve
its goals by using the news media to convey its story to the public. The
theoretical point is how deeply journalism is implicated in the normal
process of governance. Even the Supreme Court, according to Cook, has
a media strategy, since how decisions are communicated matters for the
impact of the court (p. 160). This section ventures the hypothesis that
media strategies become increasingly useful means for political actors to
pursue governance . . . as the disjuncture between the power of those
actors and the expectations placed on them grows (p. 119).
If the news media are a political institution sustained in signicant part
through government policy, and if media performance is problematic, it
is, as Cook argues in his concluding chapter, both legitimate and prudent
to consider adopting new policies that promise better performance. One
suggestion is that subsidies to the news media should be continued, but
increasingly expanded and targeted toward more economically vulnera-
ble news outlets and news organizations (p. 187). For example, he argues
that the federal government should auction off access to the new digital
TV frequencies to the big media players and use the proceeds to subsidize
smaller ones, especially ones that promise to empower ordinary citizens.
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Book Reviews
Because politicians regard news policy as a hot potato, and because
they want to keep big media around for their own purposes, I would
be surprised if Cooks argument leads policymakers to promote further
fragmentation of the mass audience than is already occurring. But I
would not be surprised to nd scholars of mass communication, many
of whom are as critical of big media as anyone, to take up Cooks general
argument. Citizen access to the media is the tame child of the 1960s
slogan of power to the people, and academics are ocking to it.
I would like to mention one dissent from Cooks argument. Cook is
not the rst to argue that the news values of journalists lead to bias, and
he is one of a vast legion of critics decrying the inuence of the prot
motive on news. Yet he also wants journalists to be more responsive to
what the public wants. I see a contradiction here. What Cook and others
pejoratively call journalistic values or production values are, in many
cases, barely disguised rationalizations for giving the public what it wants
out of the news. Similarly, the pressure to maximize prots is not so dif-
ferent from pressure to make the news interesting to as many people as
possible. Cook closes by writing that it is now time to work toward get-
ting the kind of news, and the kind of politics, that we want and that
we deserve. But it seems quite possible that much of what Cook sees
as wrong with the news is precisely that the public already is getting
what it wants and deserves from the news.
Language Policy and Social Reproduction: Ireland, 18931993. By Pad-
raig O
Riaga in. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997. Pp. xv297.
$80.00.
Monica Heller
University of Toronto
This is an interesting, challenging contribution to studies of language pol-
icy and language planning in general, as well as to our understanding
of Irish-English bilingualism in Ireland. O
Riaga ins own data show that what is important now is some form
of credentialization of knowledge of Irish, for a certain, mainly middle-
class, segment of Irish society. What we need to understand is why this
is so and what implications it has for relations of power within Irish soci-
ety and between Ireland and the rest of the world. In order to accomplish
this, it is necessary to move beyond the use of surveys and to engage
in more anthropologically informed research based on ethnography and
analysis of situated language practices. It is also useful to compare this
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Book Reviews
case to that of other linguistic minorities; O