BROWNV.

YAMBAO
G.R. No. L-10699, October 18, 1957

In our jurisdiction, marriage is recognized as something more than a merecontact; it is an inviolable social
institution.t in the maintenance of which inits purity the public is deeply interested. As stated in one case,
when the legalexistence of the parties is merged into one by marriage, the new relation is1 Civil Code,
Article 52.686 PHILIPPINB LAW JOuRNAL Vol. 32]regulated and controlled by the state or government upon
principles of public policy for the benefit of society as well as the parties.2It is the policy of the law,
therefore, to look upon legal separation withdisfavor. To that end, various safeguards are provided for in
order that thedecree may not be obtained with ease. Thus, the court in every case must takesteps, before
granting the legal separation, toward the reconciliation of thespouses.I Several grounds exist for the
dismissal of the action for legal separation.s Furthermore, nodecree can be granted upon a stipulation of
facts or byconfession of judgment.f In its desire to preserve marriages validly entered into, the State must
beever vigilant to ensure that no collusions between the parties is present. And because a grant of
legal separation in case of default of one of the parties isfraught with danger of connivance or collusion,
the law provides that "in caseof non-appearance of the defendant, the court shall order a prosecuting
attorneyto inquire whether or not a collusion between the parties exists. If there is nocollusion, the
prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State in order totake care that the evidence for the plaintiff is
not fabricated."? The extentto which the fiscal is permitted to make inquiries is illustrated in the
instantcase.On July 14, 1955, William Brown filed an action to obtain legal separationfrom his lawful
wife, Juanita Yambao. He alleged that while he was under internment during the Japanese occupation, his
wife engaged in adulterous relations with one Field, of whom she begot a baby girl; that he learned of
hiswife's infidelity only upon his release in 1945; that thereafter the spouses livedseparately and later
executed a document liquidating their conjugal partnership. The wife failed toanswer the summons in due
time, and upon petitionof the plaintiff, the court declared her in default. However, the Court, inaccordance
with article 101 of the new Civil Code, directed the City Fiscal toinvestigate whether or not a collusion
existed between the parties. The examination by the AssistantCity Fiscal during the trial elicited the fact
that after liberation, Brown had lived maritally with another woman and had begottenchildren by her.
Thereafter, the court rendere djudgment denying the legalseparation granted on the ground that, while the
wife's adultery was established,Brown had incurred a similar misconduct, thus barring his right of action
under Article 100 of the new Civil Code, which provides that where both spouses areoffenders, a legal
separation cannot be claimed by either of them. Furthermore,the action had prescribed because Brown,
although he had learned of his wife'sinfidelity in 1045, only filed action in 1955. Plaintiff appealed.The
decision was affirmed. In disposing of appellant's contention that thefiscal's authority is limited to finding
out whether or not there is collusion and