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8-9:

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GO OCCO & CO V. DE LA COSTA
(G.R. No. 45116 September 17, 1936)

DOCTRINE:
Where, therefore, the pleading is, as in the case, vague, and uncertain, courts will not allow
themselves to be led to the commission of error or injustice by exploring in the midst of
uncertainty and divining the intention of the parties of their counsel

EMERGENCY RECIT:
GO OCCO & CO (GOC) filed an action to recover P467.25 from People's Bazar. At
the same time, the estate of Antonio filed an intervention complaint claiming the sum
of P1,380. GOC objected to the admission of the intervention complaint. The court
dismissed the intervention complaint.
Peoples Bazar appealed from the judgment in the CFI, paying P16 for docket fee
instead of P20 for the docket fee. Despite this, De la Costa, the judge in CFI, entered
an order declaring GOC in default on the intervenor's intervention complaint.
De la Costa entered a judgment declaring that People's Bazar was in debt to the said
estate in its claim was superior.
GOC filed a motion asking for the reinstatement of the case and for the dismissal of
the intervenor's appeal. To assure its right of appeal, GOC filed an amended motion
for reconsideration and for dismissal of intervenor's appeal.
De la Costa denied the motion for reconsideration and ordered the execution of the
judgment.
The SC found that the petition in this case is vague and indefinite given that various
orders (order declaring the plaintiff therein in default, resolving in favor of the Peoples
Bazar claim, and disallowing the motion for reconsideration ).
The petition does not state which of these orders is assailed, nor does it contain a
general averment that the Court of First Instance of Cebu in taking cognizance of the
civil case aforementioned acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction.
While pleadings should be liberally construed with a view to substantial justice
between the parties, courts should not be left to conjectures in the determination of
issues submitted by the parties litigant or their attorneys. In cases where the pleading
is vague and uncertain, courts will not be led to the commission of error or injustice by
exploring in the midst of uncertainty

FACTS:
This is a petition for a writ of certiorari.
GO OCCO & CO (GOC) filed an action to recover P467.25 (the purchase price of
goods taken on credit) against People's Bazar. A writ of preliminary attachment and
the merchandise belonging to the defendant was levied upon and taken in possession
of by the provincial sheriff of Cebu.
The estate of Antonio, through its administrator Reyes, filed an intervention complaint
claiming the sum of P1,380 (unpaid rent). GOC objected to the admission of the
intervention complaint on the ground that the intervention complaint amount of P1,380
was beyond its jurisdiction.
The court dismissed the intervention complaint.
Peoples Bazar appealed from the judgment, paying the amount of P16 for docket fee
on that same day. The clerk of Court of First Instance of Cebu informed Peoples
Bazar that it still had to pay the amount of P4 (docket fee was P20). Peoples Bazar
did not pay the said P4.
This intervention complaint was not reproduced by the Peoples Bazaar on appeal in
the Court of First Instance.
Even with the unpaid P4 docket fee, De la Costa, the judge, entered an order
declaring GOC in default on the intervenor's intervention complaint. On the same date
the said defendant judge entered a judgment declaring that People's Bazar was in
debt to the said estate in its claim was superior to any other credit.
GOC filed a motion asking for the reinstatement of the case and for the dismissal of
the intervenor's appeal. The hearing of the motion was postponed, even with GOCs
objection due to the concern that the right to appeal might lapse.
To assure its right of appeal, GOC filed an amended motion for reconsideration and
for dismissal of intervenor's appeal.
De la Costa denied the motion for reconsideration and ordered the execution of the
judgment.

ISSUE:
1. WON the complaint filed GOC was vague.

HELD/RATIO:
1.Yes, the petition in this case is vague and indefinite.
The court below issued various orders, including the order declaring the plaintiff
therein in default, resolving in favor of the Peoples Bazar claim, and disallowing the
motion for reconsideration presented by the plaintiff therein and ordering the issuance
of a writ of execution.
The petition does not state which of these orders is assailed or was issued by the
inferior court in excess or extra imitation of its jurisdiction or with manifest abuse of its
discretion. Worse than this, the petition does not even contain a general averment
that the Court of First Instance of Cebu in taking cognizance of the civil case
aforementioned acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction. It simply alleges,
paragraph 8 thereof that "there is no appeal nor any other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy for the plaintiff."
The administration of justice is not a matter of guess work. While pleadings should be
liberally construed with a view to substantial justice between the parties, courts
should not be left to conjectures in the determination of issues submitted by the
parties litigant or their attorneys. Where, therefore, the pleading is, as in the case,
vague, and uncertain, courts will not allow themselves to be led to the commission of
error or injustice by exploring in the midst of uncertainty and divining the intention of
the parties of their counsel.

.
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SANTOS V. LIWAG
(G.R. No. L-24238 November 28, 1980)

DOCTRINE:
The allowance of a motion for a more definite statement or bill of particulars rests within the
sound judicial discretion of the court and, as usual in matters of a discretionary nature, the ruling
of the trial court in that regard will not be reversed unless there has been a palpable abuse of
discretion or a clearly erroneous order.

EMERGENCY RECIT
(Very short case please refer to the facts below)

FACTS:
June 8, 1964: Jose Santos filed a complaint against Lorenzo Liwag with the CFI of
Manila, which seeks to annul certain documents which were alleged to be done with
malice, threats, false pretenses, machination, misrepresentations, and other
fraudulent means, with damages and costs.
July 4, 1964: Santos filed a motion asking the court to order Liwag (petitioner) to
submit bill of particulars on certain allegations of the complaint believed to be vague
and conflicting, and that he be informed of the charges filed against him to prepare an
intelligent and proper pleading necessary and appropriate in the premises
Liwag opposed the said motion and said that the allegations in the complaint filed are
sufficient and contains the facts needed for a cause of action to exist and Santos
motion is indeed evidentiary in nature
Trial Court
Granted the motion and directed the plaintiff to submit a bill of particulars with respect
to the paragraphs specified in defendants motion
When plaintiff failed to comply with the order of the court, the complaint was
dismissed with costs against the plaintiff

ISSUE:
1. WON the trial court erred in granting the motion for bill of particulars filed by Liwag.

HELD/RATIO:
1. NO.
BILL OF PARTICULARS ARE DISCRETIONARY UPON THE COURTS
o The allowance of a motion for a more definite statement or bill of particulars
rests within the sound judicial discretion of the court and, as usual in
matters of a discretionary nature, the ruling of the trial court in that regard
will not be reversed unless there has been a palpable abuse of discretion or
a clearly erroneous order.
o Complaint was indeed drawn and suffers from vagueness and
generalization to enable the defendant properly to prepare a responsive
pleading and to clarify issues and aid the court in an orderly and
expeditious disposition in the case.
RULES ON BILL OF PARTICULARS ON THE GROUND OF VAGUE COMPLAINT
o If an action (like this case) is one for the annulment of documents that have
been allegedly executed by reason of deceit, machination, false pretenses,
misrepresentation, threats, and other fraudulent means.
o Deceit, machination, false pretenses, misrepresentation, and threats,
however, are largely conclusions of law and mere allegations thereof
without a statement of the facts to which such terms have reference are not
sufficient. The allegations must state the facts and circumstances from
which the fraud, deceit, machination, false pretenses,
misrepresentation, and threats may be inferred as conclusions.
! In his complaint, the appellant merely averred that all the
documents sought to be annulled were all executed through the
use of deceits, machination, false pretenses, misrepresentations,
threats, and other fraudulent means without the particular-facts
on which alleged fraud, deceit, machination, or
misrepresentations are predicated.
FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH A COURT ORDER TO FILE OF A BILL OF
PARTICULARS RESULTS IN DISMISSAL OF COMPLAINT
o Hence, it was proper for the trial court to grant the defendant's motion for a
bill of particulars, and when the plaintiff failed to comply with the order, the
trial court correctly dismissed the complaint

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FILIPINAS FABRICATORS & SALES INC. V. MAGSINO
(GR L 47574, 1998)

DOCTRINE:
A filed motion for bill of particulars which is sufficient in form and substance renders
the running of the reglementary period to answer SUSPENDED
Failure to comply with the mandatory requirements of motions in the motion for bill of
particulars is fatatl to the motion
Where the motion for bill of particulars did not contain the notice of hearing and proof
of service and proof of service required by the Rules, the motion is nothing but a
MERE SCRAP OF PAPER
A defective motion does not interrupt the running of the period within which to file
answer
Fact that the court had taken cognizance of the defective motion did not cure the
defect nor alter the nature of the defective motion.

EMERGENCY RECIT:
Filipinas Fabricator purchased several products of Atlas through a dealership.
The petitioners defaulted from their payments. The petitioners and the sureties filed a
motion for extension. However, they were still not able to pay
They filed a motion for bill f particulars, however, it was lacking in form and substance
as it did not include a notice for hearing which is required by the rules. Hence, the
motion for bill of particulars cannot be granted. The order of default by Judge Magsino
is sustained. The bill of particulars without proper notice of hearing is to be treated as
a mere scrap of paper
FACTS:
By a dealership agreement, Filipinas Fabricators and Sales, Inc. purchased on
credit several products of Atlas Copco.
Filipinas had accumulated on outstanding balance. To settle that account, Filipinas,
with Pestano and Unchuan acting as sureties, entered into an agreement with Atlas
assigning with recourse in favor of the latter some of its accounts receivables from
personal debtors amounting to P361, 745.98, the same to be deducted from its
outstanding balance
Filipinas and surety Felipe Y. Pestano were duly served with summons for their
collection of money while that summon issued to surety Benito Unchuan was returned
unserved. Counsel for Filipinas, et. Al., requested a ten-day extension to file
answer.
However, before respondent Judge Magsino could act on said motion, the petitioners
filed a motion for bill of particulars alleging insufficiency of the complaint and
requested for a more precise statement of the matters alleged therein.
The lower court resolve the petitioners motion for extension and gave them ten (10)
days from March 4, 1997 within which to file answer.
In its order dated April 6, 1977, the respondent court required the petitioners to set for
hearing the motion for bill of particulars with notice to adverse party, otherwise said
motion shall be treated!as a mere scrap of paper. The petitioners received this
order on April 20, 1977.
On April 21, 1977, summons was served on the other surety, Benito Unchuan and on
that same day, private respondent Atlas filed an ex parte motion to declare
defendants Filipinas and surety Pestano in default, with a prayer to present its
evidence ex-parte.
Another ex parte motion to declare all the defendants in default was filed by
respondent Atlas alleging that petitioner Benito Unchuans period to file answer had
already expired on May 6, 1977, and therefore, all the defendants (could) now be
properly declared in default.
The petitioners subsequent motion to set aside the above order with prayer to
reconsider their motion for bill of particulars was denied by the court
The Motion for Bill of Particulars was filed without any notice of hearing was a
mere scrap of paper and did not produce any legal effect; that when herein
defendants attempted on April 16, 1977 to cure the defect of its Motion for Bill
of Particulars by setting the motion hearing, the plaintiff herein on April 25, 1977
had filed its motion to declare defendants Filipinas Fabricators & Sales, Inc. and
Felipe Pestano in default, and the period granted to them to file their responsive
pleading had already expired on March 14, 1977 without their having filed any
responsive pleading, the Court denies the aforesaid motion to set aside the order of
default for lack of merit.

ISSUE:
1. WON the motion for bill of particulars is valid.

HELD/RATIO:
1. NO. The motion for bill of particulars is not valid. The order of default is sustained.
Section 1 (b), Rule 12 of the Revised Rules of Court which provides:
Stay of period to file responsive pleading
After service of the bill of particulars or of a more definite pleading, or after notice of
denial of his motion, the moving party shall have the same time to serve his
responsive pleading, if any is permitted by these rules, as that to which he was
entitled at the time of serving his motion, but not less than five (5) days in any event.
o A filed motion for bill of particulars renders the running of the
reglementary period to answer suspended. This statement is, of
course, accurate only if the filed motion is sufficient in form and
substance. The petitioners motion for bill of particulars filed did not
contain the notice of hearing and proof of service required by the
Rules. This kind of motion, as we have already held in several cases
is nothing but mere scrap of paper. A defective motion of this kind
does not interrupt the running of the period within which to file answer.
As the motion filed by the petitioners was nothing but a useless scrap
of paper which did not affect at all the running of reglementary period
to answer, the petitioners, who had not filed their answer to the
complaint of respondent Atlas should have been declared in default.
The petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The questioned
orders are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

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DUMANON V. BUTUAN CITY RURAL BANK
(G.R. No. L-27675 December 15, 1982)

DOCTRINE:
When one files a motion for a bill of particulars, the running of the period to answer is thereby
suspended. It is resumed upon the amended complaint being filed in compliance with the
court's order granting the motion for a bill of particulars. As the time to answer the amended
complaint has not yet lapsed, the filing of a motion to dismiss the said complaint is equally still
within the reglementary period.

EMERGNECY RECIT:
Petitoners (appellants) allege a fraudulent donation of land has been made by Rufo
and Paula Dumanon in 1933 in favor of Fermin Dumanon whose children then sold
the land to spouses Carlos Curilan and Rufina Naranjo (appellees).
Appellees moved for a motion for a bill of particulars, which was then granted. A
motion to dismiss was also filed by Appellees, which was granted by the trial court
because the action was barred by laches and the statute of limitation; hence, the
present appeal.
On the face of the complaint, it is manifest that the deed of donation, having been
executed in 1933, the action to annul the deed on the ground of fraud, as is the
essence of the cause alleged for its nullity, is already barred by prescription, as well
as by laches, when the complaint was filed on January 26, 1965, after the lapse of 32
years.
It has been held that an action to annul an extrajudicial settlement upon the ground of
fraud should be filed within four (4) years from the discovery of the fraud. An action to
annul a contract of sale for lack of consideration also prescribes in 10 years.
Appellants also contend that the ground invoked by appellees in their motion to
dismiss and sustained by the lower court, was already available with the
original complaint, even before it was amended, as a result of the granting of
the motion for a bill of particulars which defendants filed; hence, in not filing
the motion to dismiss seasonably the same should be denied, or that the
ground therefor should not be sustained for not having been raised within the
time to file the answer.
The time to file a motion to dismiss is coterminous with the period to answer. This is
as expressly provided by the Rules of Court, Section 1, Rule 16
Hence, as long as the time to file the answer has not lapsed, a motion to dismiss may
be filed within such time, instead of an answer.
It must be borne in mind that in the present case, defendants below filed a
motion for a bill of particulars. The running of the period to answer was thereby
suspended.
It is resumed upon the amended complaint being filed in compliance with the
court's order granting the motion for a bill of particulars. As the time to answer
the amended complaint has not yet lapsed, the filing of a motion to dismiss the
said complaint is equally still within the reglementary period.
There is, therefore, no occasion to speak of the ground invoked for the motion to
dismiss as already barred for failure to invoke it, since it was being invoked in the first
and only motion to dismiss filed with demonstrated timeliness.

FACTS:
Appeal from the order dated September 10, 1966 of the CFI of Agusan dismissing
Civil Case No. 1029 of said court on a motion to dismiss filed by defendants Carlos
Curilan and Rufina Naranjo
In its order granting the motion to dismiss, the court held that the action was barred
by laches and the statute of limitation.
A motion for reconsideration was filed of the dismissal order, the same was denied.
Plaintiffs then interposed the present appeal.
On January 26, 1965 plaintiffs (now herein appellants) filed a complaint, which was
amended, after a motion for a bill of particulars had been granted, with prayer as
follows:
Wherefore, it is most respectfully prayed that judgment issue in favor of plaintiffs, as
follows:
1. That upon filing of this case, let an order immediately issue directing (if still
required) the appointment of defendant Feliza Azote Vda. de Dumanon as
guardian ad litem for minors, namely: Racquel, Rosario and Ernesto
Dumanon for the purpose of this case;
2. That plaintiffs aforesaid be declared absolute owners of the property in
question ordering Carlos Curilan and Rufina Naranjo to vacate the
premises and turning over the possession thereof to plaintiffs hereof and
that said defendants be ordered to reconvey the property in question to
plaintiffs hereof;
3. That TCT No. RT 82 and RT 479 in the names of Fermin Dumanon and
Carlos Curilan and Rufina Naranjo, respectively, be cancelled and declared
null and void and without force and effect;
4. That the deed of donation mentioned in the complaint and all the other
documents which may be found in this case be likewise declared void and
inexistent;
5. That the mortgage by defendants Carlos Curilan and his wife Rufina
Naranjo be declared also as null and void and without force and effect;
6. That the illegal annotation entered on TCT RO 82 in 1951 re: the void
donation be likewise declared null and void and that the defendant Register
of Deeds be directed to issue to plaintiffs hereof their new Transfer
Certificate of Title;
7. That defendants except the Butuan City Rural Bank and Register of Deeds
be ordered to pay jointly and severally to the plaintiffs the value of the
house destroyed by defendants Carlos Curilan and Rufina Naranjo, P700 a
month from January, 1958 and up to the date this case is finally terminated,
attorney's fees and expenses of litigation up to the present stage of the
proceedings and that all said fees and expenses that may be incurred later
be determined and fixed by this court or by the appellate court concerned in
case of appeal, and for moral and exemplary damages that the plaintiffs
suffered in the amount that this court or the appellate court concerned may
fix in the final judgment of tills case at the court's discretion.

ISSUE:
1. WON the order granting the motion to dismiss is proper, valid or legal

HELD/RATIO:
1. YES!
It is alleged in the first amended complaint that a deed of donation of the land in
question was executed by Rufo and Paula Dumanon dated January 3, 1933, but
claimed to be void because same was fraudulently executed, the supposed donors
being illiterate, unable to read and write, and could not have signed the document, as
they appear to have done so, and that they could not have parted with the land
donated since they (donors) claimed the same as their own in the Cadastral
proceedings and obtained OCT No. RO-23 (1242) in their name in equal shares, free
from any encumbrance, not even the supposed donation.
This deed of donation is sought to be declared void and inexistent by the plaintiffs-
appellants.
With respect to the above cause of action as ground for the annulment of the
donation, the order dismissing the complaint is perfectly valid and legal.
On the face of the complaint, it is manifest that the deed of donation, having been
executed in 1933, the action to annul the deed on the ground of fraud, as is the
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essence of the cause alleged for its nullity, is already barred by prescription, as well
as by laches, when the complaint was filed on January 26, 1965, after the lapse of 32
years.
It has been held that an action to annul an extrajudicial settlement upon the ground of
fraud should be filed within four (4) years from the discovery of the fraud. An action to
annul a contract of sale for lack of consideration also prescribes in 10 years.
From the allegation of the complaint, it can be deduced with certitude that appellants
had discovered the fraud, at the latest, when the deed of donation was registered,
because registration is notice to the whole world of such fact.
Appellants, in effect, had by the allegations of the complaint admitted knowledge of
the fraud in the execution of the deed of donation upon knowing that there exists such
a deed, for their allegation is that the supposed donors could not have parted with the
land, knowing them to be illiterate, unable to read and write, and, therefore, could not
have signed the document as they appear to have done, and they had in fact claimed
the land in the cadastral proceedings where they obtained a certificate of title in their
name.
Appellants, however, contend that the real and principal action in their complaint is
the annulment of the registration of the deed of donation on November 21, 1951,
which led to the cancellation of TCT No. 82 in the name of Fermin Dumanon, the
donee in the aforementioned donation.
From the allegations of the complainant, it would appear that the registration of the
deed of donation sought to be annulled as expressly prayed for in the complaint took
place on November 16, 1951.
At the time, one of the donors, Rufo Dumanon, was still alive, as could clearly be
implied from the allegation of the complaint. Again, on the basis of the allegation of
the complaint itself on this particular matter, prescription lies to bar the action for the
annulment of the registration of the document, exactly 14 years having elapsed from
the time of said registration on November 16, 1951 to the filing of this action on
January 26, 1965.
Another theory deducible from the allegation of the complaint is that the allegedly
unlawful registration of the deed of donation created an implied trust in favor of the
plaintiffs-appellants as the real owners of the land.
The defendants in whose name the land was registered became, by the principle of
implied trust, the trustees with the plaintiffs-appellants as cestrui que trust. Even so,
prescription will lie to bar the present action to enforce the trust, for as held by
prevailing jurisprudence, such action, held to be imprescriptible by earlier decisions,
prescribes in 10 years, or even in only 4 years, if fraud had been committed, as when
there is a breach of the fiduciary relation.
While the rule of imprescriptibility of action to recover property held in trust may
possibly apply to resulting trust as long as the trustee has not repudiated the trust, the
allegation of the complaint itself shows on its face what may, be considered an
unequivocal act of repudiation.
It is the act of registration by which the registrants obtained title in their names
thereafter claiming the property as their own to the exclusion of all others, with a right
to dispose of the property as they did dispose of it when the defendants Feliza Azote
Vda. de Dumanon, widow of Fermin Dumanon who became the registered owner of
the land when the deed of donation was registered, with TCT No. 80, and their
children sold the property to their co-defendants, spouses Carlos Curilan and Rufina
Naranjo, appellees herein, who obtained TCT No. 479 in their name, thereby serving
notice to appellants of the transaction, who accordingly could not claim ignorance of
the sale of the property.
Even assuming that a trust resulted by the registration of appellees of their deed of
sale, action for the annulment of the sale has also prescribed because the complaint
itself alleged fraudulent conspiracy in the sale between the heirs of Fermin Dumanon
and appellees spouses, in which case the prescriptive period is four years from the
discovery of the fraud, which should be when the sale was registered in the Registry
of Deeds in 1957.
It is evident, from what has been said, that plaintiffs-appellants' action is barred by the
lapse of ten years from the time their cause of action accrued thereof, with a view to
asking for the reconveyance of the property to them, as is the ultimate relief prayed
for.
With respect to appellees, Carlos Curilan and Rufina Naranjo, who filed the motion to
dismiss in question, prescription was properly pleaded as ground for their motion,
because if the action has prescribed as against their vendors, logically it has
prescribed also as against them, as the vendees of the land.
RELEVANT ISSUE: MOTION FOR BILL OF PARTICULARS
o Appellants also contend that the ground invoked by appellees in their
motion to dismiss and sustained by the lower court, was already
available with the original complaint, even before it was amended, as
a result of the granting of the motion for a bill of particulars which
defendants filed; hence, in not filing the motion to dismiss seasonably
the same should be denied, or that the ground therefor should not be
sustained for not having been raised within the time to file the answer.
o The time to file a motion to dismiss is coterminous with the period to
answer. This is as expressly provided by the Rules of Court, Section 1,
Rule 16
o Hence, as long as the time to file the answer has not lapsed, a motion to
dismiss may be filed within such time, instead of an answer.
o It must be borne in mind that in the present case, defendants below
filed a motion for a bill of particulars. The running of the period to
answer was thereby suspended.
o It is resumed upon the amended complaint being filed in compliance
with the court's order granting the motion for a bill of particulars. As
the time to answer the amended complaint has not yet lapsed, the
filing of a motion to dismiss the said complaint is equally still within
the reglementary period.
o There is, therefore, no occasion to speak of the ground invoked for the
motion to dismiss as already barred for failure to invoke it, since it was
being invoked in the first and only motion to dismiss filed with demonstrated
timeliness.
o WHEREFORE, the errors assigned against the order appealed from having
been found to be unfounded, the order appealed from should be as it is
hereby affirmed. Costs against appellant.



9
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BARITUA V. MERCADER
(G.R. No. 136048, 23 January 2001)

DOCTRINE: (Topic- Rule 12, Sec 1)
A motion for bill of particulars becomes moot and academic where, prior to its filing, the
defendant has already filed his answer and several other pleadings. A defendant has 10 days to
file his motion for Bill of Particulars, counted from the day a pleading is served. This is because
the defendant must also file such motion before responding to a pleading

EMERGENCY RECIT:
The original complaint was filed against JB Lines, Inc. One of the motions was for a bill of
particulars on the primary grounds that respondents failed to implead Jose Baritua as an
indispensable party and that the cause of action is a suit against a wrong and non-existent
party. Mercader boarded the bus of herein petitioner JB Line. The bus fell into the river and
Mercader died. His heirs sued petitioner for breach of contract of carriage. Petitioner denied the
allegations Respondents filed an amended complaint which the lower court admitted. It ruled in
favor of Mercaders heirs. CA affirmed. HELD: Since, petitioner filed the bill of particulars 11
days past deadline set by the trial court, the CA did not act with GAD when it remained silent
about the fact that RTC did not render judgment on their plea for a Bill of Particulars. Further,
the motion was already moot and academic because prior to its filing, they had already filed
their answer and several other pleadings to the amended complaint

FACTS:

The late Dominador Mercader is a businessman mainly engaged in the buy and sell
of dry goods in Laoang, N. Samar. He buys his goods from Manila and brings them to
Laoang, Northern Samar for sale at his store
Sometime on March 16, 1983, the late D. Mercader boarded petitioners' bus at
Manila Station/terminal, bound for Brgy. Rawis, Laoang Northern Samar as a paying
passenger; At that time, he had with him as his baggage, assorted goods (i.e. long
pants, short pants, dusters, etc.) which he likewise loaded in bus. He was not able to
reach his destination considering that on March 17, 1983 the said bus fell into the
river as a result of which the late Dominador Mercader died. The accident happened
because the driver negligently and recklessly operated the bus at a fast speed.
Petitioner denied the allegations (D Mercader did not board the bus, petitioner does
not have a Mla terminal, his driver has no connection with the death of D Mercader,
there was no actionable breach of contract, theres no basis for the claimed damages)
Trial court ruled in favor of the respondents (ordered petitioner to pay damages). This
was affirmed by the CA

ISSUE:
1. WON Court of Appeals (CA) gravely abuse its discretion when it allowed to pass sub silencio
the trial court's failure to rule frontally on petitioners' plea for a bill of particulars (related!)
2. WON CA likewise arbitrarily disregard petitioners' constitutional right to procedural due
process and fairness when it ignored and thrust aside their right to present evidence and to
expect that their evidence will be duly considered and appreciated;
3. WON CA and the trial court adhere to the rule that their assailed decision must state clearly
and distinctly the facts and the laws on which they are based?

HELD/RATIO:
1. NO (related to this topic!)
It must be noted that petitioners' counsel manifested in open court his desire to file a
motion for a bill of particulars. The RTC gave him ten days from March 12, 1985
within which to do so. He, however, filed the aforesaid motion only on April 2, 1985 or
eleven days past the deadline set by the trial court. Further, such motion was
already moot and academic because, prior to its filing, petitioners had already filed
their answer and several other pleadings to the amended Complaint based on
Section 1, Rule 12:
o Section 1. When applied for; purpose. -- Before responding to a pleading, a
party may move for a more definite statement or for a bill of particulars of
any matter which is not averred with sufficient definiteness or particularity to
enable him properly to prepare his responsive pleading. If the pleading is a
reply, the motion must be filed within ten (10) days from service thereof.
Such motion shall point out the defects complained of, the paragraphs
wherein they are contained, and the details desired.

2. NO
Petitioners argue that their right to present evidence was violated by the CA, because
it did not consider their contention that the trial judges who heard the case were
biased and impartial.
These arguments are not meritorious. First, judges cannot be expected to rely on the
testimonies of every witness. In ascertaining the facts, they determine who are
credible and who are not. In doing so, they consider all the evidence before them.
The mere fact that Judge Noynay based his decision on the testimonies of
respondents' witnesses does not necessarily mean that he did not consider those of
petitioners. Second, we find no sufficient showing that Judge Operario was
overzealous in questioning the witnesses. His questions merely sought to clarify their
testimonies. In all, we reject petitioners' contention that their right to adduce evidence
was violated.

3. YES
As can be gleaned from their Decisions, both courts clearly laid down their bases for
awarding monetary damages to respondents.