Central Capiz v. Ramirez G.R. No. 16197.

March 12, 1920

Facts: In July 1, 1919, Ana Ramirez contracted with the Central Capiz to supply to it for a term of
30 years all sugar cane produced upon her plantation. Knowing her obligation, Ramirez refused
to do so upon the fact that more than 61% of the capital stock of the petitioner is held and
owned by persons who are not citizens of the Philippines or of United States. The land involved
is a private agricultural land.
Issue: Whether or not Act No. 2874, also known as Public Land Act is applicable t agricultural
lads which are privately owned
Held: Public Land Act is inapplicable to the lands of the respondents. The title of the act was
An Act to Amend and Compile the Laws Relating to Lands of the Public Domain and Other
Purposes. Section 1 of the act provides that the short title of the act shall be The Public Land
Act. Section2 provides that the provisions of this act shall apply to lands of the public
domain. The and for other purposes in the title is non-existent. Agricultural lands in private
ownership constitute no part of the public domain.
StatCon: The title may indicate the legislative intent to extend or restrict the scope of the law
and a statute couched in a language of doubtful import will be construed to conform to the
legislative intent as disclosed in its title.
Ebarle v. Sucaldito, G.R. No. L-33628. December 29, 1987

FACTS:
The petitioner, then provincial Governor of Zamboanga del Sur and a candidate for reelection in
the local elections of 1971, seeks injunctive relief in two separate petitions, to enjoin further
proceedings of his criminal cases, as well as I.S. Nos. 1-70, 2-71, 4-71, 5-71, 6-71, and 7-71 of
the respondent Fiscal's office of the said city, all in the nature of prosecutions for violation of
certain provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and various provisions of the
Revised Penal Code. Principally, the petitioner relies on the failure of the respondents City Fiscal
and the Anti-Graft League to comply with the provisions of Executive Order No. 264,
"OUTLINING THE PROCEDUE BY WHICH COMPLAINANTS CHARGING GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
AND EMPLOYEES WITH COMMISSION OF IRREGULARITIES SHOULD BE GUIDED," preliminary to
their criminal recourses.

ISSUE:
Whether or not EO 264 is applicable in the case at bar.

HELD:
No. It is plain from the very wording of the Order that it has exclusive application to
administrative, not criminal complaints. The very title speaks of "COMMISSION OF
IRREGULARITIES." There is no mention, not even by implication, of criminal "offenses," that is to
say, "crimes." While "crimes" amount to "irregularities," the Executive Order could have very
well referred to the more specific term had it intended to make itself applicable thereto.
Clearly, the Executive Order simply consolidates these existing rules and streamlines the
administrative apparatus in the matter of complaints against public officials. It is moreover
significant that the Executive Order in question makes specific reference to "erring officials or
employees ... removed or otherwise vindicated. If it were intended to apply to criminal
prosecutions, it would have employed such technical terms as "accused", "convicted," or
"acquitted." While this is not necessarily a controlling parameter for all cases, it is here material
in construing the intent of the measure.

Ebarle v. Sucaldito G.R. No. L-33628. December 29, 1987
Facts: Ebarle, the petitioner, was then provincial governor of Zamboanga and a candidate for
re-election in 1971 local elections. The Anti-Graft League of the Philippines filed complaints
with the city fiscal against the petitioner for violations of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft Law) and Articles
171, 182,183, 213, and 318 of the Revised Penal Code. The petitioner filed petitions for
prohibition and certiorari in CFI but they were dismissed. He petitioned to the Supreme Court
and alleged that the City Fiscal and Anti-Graft League failed to comply with the provisions of EO
264, which outlined the procedure how complainants charging the government officials and
employees with the commission of irregularities should be guided.
Issue: Whether or not EO 264 is exclusively applicable to administrative charges and not to
criminal complaints
Held: Petition dismissed.
Ratio: The title of the EO 264 is of Commission of Irregularities. It speaks of commission of
irregularities and not criminal offenses. Had the order intended to make it applicable thereto, it
could have been referred to the more specific terms like accused, convicted, and the like.

People v. Purisima G.R. No. L-42050, Nov. 20, 1978

FACTS: These twenty-six (26) Petitions for Review were filed by the People of the Philippines
charging the respective accused with "illegal possession of deadly weapon" in violation of
Presidential Decree No. 9. On a motion to quash filed by the accused, the three Judges issued
an Order quashing or dismissing the Informations, on a common ground, viz, that the
Information did not allege facts which constitute the offense penalized by Presidential Decree
No. 9 because it failed to state one essential element of the crime.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Informations filed by the petitioners are sufficient in form and
substance to constitute the offense of illegal possession of deadly weapon penalized under
PD No. 9.

HELD: No. The Informations filed by petitioner are fatally defective. The two elements of the
offense covered by P.D. 9(3) must be alleged in the Information in order that the latter may
constitute a sufficiently valid charged. The sufficiency of an Information is determined solely by
the facts alleged therein. Where the facts are incomplete and do not convey the elements of
the crime, the quashing of the accusation is in order.

In the construction or interpretation of a legislative measure, the primary rule is to search for
and determine the intent and spirit of the law. Legislative intent is the controlling factor, for
whatever is within the spirit of a statute is within the statute, and this has to be so if strict
adherence to the letter would result in absurdity, injustice and contradictions. Because of the
problem of determining what acts fall within the purview of P.D. 9, it becomes necessary to
inquire into the intent and spirit of the decree and this can be found among others in the
preamble or, whereas" clauses.

It is a salutary principle in statutory construction that there exists a valid presumption that
undesirable consequences were never intended by a legislative measure, and that a
construction of which the statute is fairly susceptible is favored, which will avoid all
objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil, and injurious consequences.



People v. Echaves G.R. Nos. L-47757-61. January 28, 1980

FACTS:
On October 25, 1977 Fiscal Abundio R. Ello filed with the lower court separate information
against sixteen persons charging them with squatting as penalized by Presidential Decree No.
772. The information provides that sometime in the year 1974 continuously up to the present,
the above-named accused, with stealth and strategy, enter into, occupy and cultivate a portion
of a grazing land physically occupied, possessed and claimed by Atty. Vicente de la Serna,
accused's entrance into the area has been and is still against the win of the offended party; did
then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously squat and cultivate a portion of the said
grazing land; said cultivating has rendered a nuisance to and has deprived the pasture applicant
from the full use thereof for which the land applied for has been intended, that is preventing
applicant's cattle from grazing the whole area, thereby causing damage and prejudice to the
said applicant-possessor-occupant, Atty. Vicente de la Serna, Jr. Five of the information were
raffled to Judge Vicente B. Echaves, Jr. who dismissed the five information on the grounds (1)
that it was alleged that the accused entered the land through "stealth and strategy", whereas
under the decree the entry should be effected "with the use of force, intimidation or threat, or
taking advantage of the absence or tolerance of the landowner", and (2) that under the rule
of ejusdem generis the decree does not apply to the cultivation of a grazing land.

ISSUE:
Whether or not by Presidential Decree No. 772 applies to agricultural lands.

HELD:
No. The court agrees to the lower court that the decree does not apply to pasture lands
because its preamble shows that it was intended to apply to squattingin urban communities or
more particularly to illegal constructions in squatter areas made by well-to-do individuals. The
squating complained of involves pasture lands in rural areas. It should be noted that squatting
on public agricultural lands, like the grazing lands involved in this case, is punished by Republic
Act No. 947.The rule of ejusdem generis invoked by the trial court, however, does not apply to
this case. The decree is intended to apply only to urban communities, particularly to illegal
constructions. The rule of ejusdem generis is merely a tool of statutory construction which is
resorted to when the legislative intent is uncertain.

Florentino v. PNB G.R. No. L-8782. April 28, 1956

FACTS: The petitioners and appellants filed a petition for mandamus against Philippine National
Bank to compel it to accept the backpay certificate of petitioner Marcelino B. Florentino to pay
an indebtedness in the sum of P6,800 secured by real estate mortgage plus interest. The debt
incurred on January 2, 1953, which is due on January 2, 1954. Petitioner is a holder of Backpay
Acknowledgment No. 1721 dated October 6, 1954, in the amount of P22,896.33 by virtue of
Republic Act No. 897 approved on June 20, 1953. Petitioners offered to pay their loan with the
respondent bank with their backpay certificate, but the respondent bank, on December 29,
1953, refused to accept the latter's backpay certificate. Under section 2 of Republic Act No.
879, respondent-appellee contends that the qualifying clause refers to all the antecedents,
whereas the appellant's contention is that it refers only to the last antecedent.

ISSUE: Whether or not the clause who may be willing to accept the same for settlement
refers to all antecedents mentioned in the last sentence of section 2 of Republic Act No. 879.


HELD: No. Grammatically, the qualifying clause refers only to the last antecedent; that is, "any
citizen of the Philippines or any association or corporation organized under the laws of the
Philippines." It should be noted that there is a comma before the words "or to any citizen, etc.,"
which separates said phrase from the preceding ones. But even disregarding the grammatical
construction, to make the acceptance of the backpay certificates obligatory upon any citizen,
association, or corporation, which are not government entities or owned or controlled by the
government, would render section 2 of Republic Act No. 897 unconstitutional for it would
amount to an impairment of the obligation of contracts by compelling private creditors to
accept a sort of promissory note payable within ten years with interest at a rate very much
lower than the current or even the legal one. It was also found out in the Congressional Record
that the amendatory bill to Sec. 2 was made which permits the use of backpay certificates as
payment for obligations and indebtedness in favor of the government. Another reason is that it
is matter of general knowledge that many officials and employees of the Philippine
Government, who had served during the Japanese Occupation, have already received their
backpay certificates and used them for the payment of the obligations to the Government and
its entities for debts incurred before the approval of Republic Act No. 304.

Florentino incurred his debt to the PNB on January 2, 1953. Hence, the obligation was
subsisting when the Amendatory Act No. 897 was approved. Consequently, the present case
falls squarely under the provisions of section 2 of the Amendatory Act No. 897.















G.R. Nos. 48886-88 July 21, 1993
COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF TAX APPEALS and LITONJUA SHIPPING COMPANY represented by Granexport
Corporation as sub-agent, respondent.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc & De los Angeles Law Offices for private respondent.

MELO, J.:
This refers to a petition for review of the decision dated July 28, 1978 of the Court of Tax
Appeals in C. T. A. Cases No. 2785, 2831 and 2832 which was promulgated prior to the issuance
on February 27, 1991, of Circular No.
1-91 to the effect that appeals from a final order or decision of the Court of Tax Appeals shall
be to the Court of Appeals.
The undisputed facts of the case as established by the evidence and as found by respondent
Court of Tax Appeals, are as follows:
The berthing facilities of Iligan Bay Express Corporation at Kiwalan were constructed and
improved and are operated and maintained solely by and at the expense of Iligan Express
Corporation, a private corporation.
The MS "Chozan Maru", MS "Samuel S", MS "Ero", MS "Messinia", MS "Pavel Rybin", MS
"Caledonia", and MS "Leonidas" are vessels engaged in foreign trade and represented in the
Philippines by private respondent Litonjua Shipping Company Granexport Corporation as its
sub-agent.
On various date, berthing facilities of the Iligan Bay Express Corporation at Kiwalan, Iligan City
were used by the above vessels and were assessed berthing fees by the Collector of Customs
which were paid by private respondent under protest, to wit:
a) June 27, 1973, MS "Chozan Maru" P2,551.00 paid on April 17, 1973;
b) April 27, 1973, MS "Samuel S" P8,000.00 paid on May 9, 1973;
c) May 27, 1973, MS "Ero" P5,000.00 paid on June 4, 1973;
d) June 2, 1973 MS "Messinia" P5,000.00 paid on June 11, 1973;
e) March 22-26, 1975, MS "Pavel Rybin" P4,000.00 paid on April 3, 1975;
f) April 26-May 3, 1975 MS "Caledonia" P7,000.00 on May 7, 1975; and
g) May 25-June 3, 1975, MS "Caledonia" P9,000.00 paid on June 7, 1975.
Private respondent filed cases before the Bureau of Customs for refund of the berthing fees
paid under protest. The Collector of Customs of the City of Iligan denied the protest, prompting
private respondent to appeal to the Commissioner of Customs who, however, affirmed the
decision of the Collector of Customs.
Private respondent then resorted to the Court of Tax Appeals. Consolidating the protests, the
tax court, thereafter rendered a decision on July 28, 1978, the dispositive portion of which
reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the decisions appealed from are hereby reversed and respondent
Commissioner of Customs is ordered to refund to petitioner the amount of
P40,551.00. No costs. (p., 51, Rollo)
Hence, the present recourse by the Commissioner of Customs.
The only issue involved in this petition for review is: Whether a vessel engaged in foreign trade,
which berths at a privately owned wharf or pier, is liable to the payment of the berthing charge
under Section 2901 of the Tariff and Customs Code, which, as amended by Presidential Decree
No. 34, reads:
Sec. 2901. Definition. Berthing charge is the amount assessed against a vessel
for mooring or berthing at a pier, wharf, bulk-head-wharf, river or channel
marginal wharf at any national port in the Philippines; or for mooring or making
fast to a vessel so berthed, or for coming or mooring within any slip, channel,
basin, river or canal under the jurisdiction of any national port of the
Philippines:Provided, however, That in the last instance, the charge shall be fifty
(50%) per cent of rates provided for in cases of piers without cargo shed in the
succeeding sections. The owner, agent, operator or master of the vessel is liable
for this charge.
Petitioner Commissioner of Customs contends that the government has the authority to impose
and collect berthing fees whether a vessel berths at a private pier or at a national port. On the
other hand, private respondent argues that the right of the government to impose berthing
fees is limited to national ports only.
The governing law classifying ports into national ports and municipal ports is Executive Order
No. 72, Series of 1936 (O.G. Vol. 35, No. 6, pp. 65-66). A perusal of said executive order
discloses the absence of the port of Kiwalan in the list of national ports mentioned therein.
Furthermore, Paragraph 1 of Executive Order No. 72 expressly provides that "the improvement
and maintenance of national ports shall be financed by the Commonwealth Government, and
their administration and operation shall be under the direct supervision and control of the
Insular Collector of Customs." It is undisputed that the port of Kiwalan was constructed and
improved and is operated and maintained solely by and at the expense of the Iligan Express
Corporation, and not by the National Government of the Republic or any of its agencies or
instrumentalities.
Petitioner insists that Kiwalan is a national port since it is within the jurisdiction of the
collection district and territorial limits of the national port of Iligan City. The claim is put
forward that "Kiwalan simply cannot claim to be an independent port within a national port
without infringing on the territorial jurisdiction of the Port of Iligan", citing the support thereof
Customs Administrative Order No. 1-76 dated February 23, 1976. However, a reading of said
administrative order shows that it was issued merely for administrative purposes redefining the
jurisdictional limits of each Customs Collection District "based on the approved staffing
pattern." It has nothing to do with the collection of berthing fees. On this point we quote with
approval the following conclusions of respondent Court of Tax Appeals:
. . . we see no significance therefore in the stand of respondent, as averred as
affirmative and special defenses of his answers, that it is not necessary to list
Kiwalan as a national port being already an integral part of the national port of
the city of Iligan, within its territorial limits, jurisdiction or collection district.
Such an assertion, besides being violative of the legal basis for the classification
of ports into national or municipal under Executive Order No. 72, series of 1936,
as implemented by subsequent Republic Acts and Executive Orders, would make
all ports in the Philippines national ports. A port is not classified as a national
port just because it is located within the territorial limits or boundaries of a city
or municipality where a national port is situated, much less within the
jurisdiction or collection district of a national port; otherwise, all ports in the
Philippines would be classified as national ports without any municipal ports.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . Customs Administrative Order No. 1-72 dated September 21, 1971, which is
entitled as defining the jurisdictional limits of customs collection districts,
divided the entire Philippines into thirty-four (34) collection districts. It bears
emphasis that no point or locality in the Philippines is not covered by a collection
district, or does not fall within the territorial jurisdiction or limits of a collection
district, with a principal port of entry which is always national port properly,
classified and listed as such by law or executive order. (pp. 47-48, Rollo)
The Bureau of Customs itself in its Customs Memorandum Circular No. 33-73 dated March 29,
1973, does not accord the status of national port to the port of Kiwalan, nor does the list of
national ports appended thereto include the port of Kiwalan. Moreover, said memorandum
circular indicates the specific law (Public Act, Commonwealth Act, Republic Act or Executive
Order) creating a particular national port. Petitioner has not cited or brought to our attention,
and we have found none, any law creating Kiwalan Port as a national port or converting it to
one.
It is a settled rule of statutory construction that the express mention of one person, thing, act,
or consequence excludes all others. This rule is expressed in the familiar maxim expressio unius
est exclusio alterius. Where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to certain matters, it may
not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to others. The rule proceeds from the
premise that the legislature would not have made specified enumerations in a statute had the
intention been not to restrict its meaning and to confine its terms to those expressly mentioned
(Agpalo, Statutory Construction, 2nd Ed., 1990, pp. 160-161, and the cases therein cited). The
port of Kiwalan not being included in the list of national ports appended to Customs
Memorandum Circular No. 33-73 nor in Executive Order No. 72, it follows inevitably as a matter
of law and legal principle that this Court may not properly consider said port as a national port.
To do otherwise would be to legislate on our part and to arrogate into ourselves powers not
conferred on us by the Constitution.
Even the Bureau of Customs in its Customs Memorandum Circular No. 47-73 held
It appearing that Banago Wharf in Bacolod City is not one of those listed as a
national port, the said part should be considered a municipal, pursuant to the
provisions of Executive Order No. 72 series of 1936. Berthing charges therefore
may not be collected from vessels docking thereat. (p. 3, Customs Memorandum
Circular No. 47-73)
Plainly, therefore, the port of Kiwalan is not a national port. However, petitioner maintains that
regardless of whether or not the port of Kiwalan is a national port, berthing charges may still be
collected by the Bureau of Customs from vessels berthing at said port, citing the case of Luzon
Stevedoring Corporation vs. Court of Tax Appeals and Commissioner of Customs (18 SCRA 436
[1966]), where it was held:
Adverting to the terms of the law, it is quite apparent that the government's
right to collect berthing charges is not planted upon the condition that the pier
be publicly owned. The statute employs the word pier without more. Nothing
there said speaks of private or public pier. Where the law does not exact the
nature of ownership as a condition, that condition should not be read into the
law. We are not to indulge in statutory construction. Because the law is clear.
Our plain duty is to apply the law as it is written. So applying, we rule that,
berthing or mooring charges here were properly collected. (at pp. 438-439.)
The above ruling, however, is no longer effective and can not apply in the case at bar for the
same was decided before the Tariff and Customs Code was amended by Presidential Decree No.
34 which took effect thirty days from October 27, 1972, the date of promulgation.
Section 2901 of the Tariff and Customs Code prior to its amendment and said section as
amended by Presidential Decree No. 34 are hereunder reproduced with the amendments duly
highlighted:
Sec. 2901. Definition Berthing charge is the amount assessed against a vessel
for mooring or berthing at a pier, wharf, bulkhead-wharf, river or channel
marginal wharf at any port in the Philippines; or for mooring or making fast to a
vessel so berthed; or for coming or mooring within any slip, channel, basin, river
or canal under the jurisdiction of any port of the Philippines (old TCC)
Sec. 2901. Definition Berthing charge is the amount assessed a vessel for
mooring or berthing at a pier, wharf, bulkhead-wharf, river or, channel marginal
wharf AT ANY NATIONAL PORT IN THE PHILIPPINES; for mooring or making fast
to a vessel so berthed; or for coming or mooring within any slip, channel, basin,
river, or canal under the jurisdiction of ANY NATIONAL port of the
Philippines; Provided, HOWEVER, THAT IN THE LAST INSTANCE, THE CHARGE
SHALL BE FIFTY (50%) PER CENT OF RATES PROVIDED FOR IN CASES OF PIERS
WITHOUT CARGO SHED IN THE SUCCEEDING SECTIONS.
It will thus be seen that the word "national" before the word "port" is inserted in the
amendment. The change in phraseology by amendment of a provision of law indicates a
legislative intent to change the meaning of the provision from that it originally had
(Agpalo, supra, p. 76). The insertion of the word "national" before the word "port" is a clear
indication of the legislative intent to change the meaning of Section 2901 from what it originally
meant, and not a mere surplusage as contended by petitioner, in the sense that the change
"merely affirms what customs authorities had been observing long before the law was
amended" (p. 18, Petition). It is the duty of this Court to give meaning to the amendment. It is,
therefore, our considered opinion that under Section 2901 of the Tariff and Customs Code, as
amended by Presidential Decree No. 34, only vessels berthing at national ports are liable for
berthing fees. It is to be stressed that there are differences between national ports and
municipal ports, namely: (1) the maintenance of municipal ports is borne by the municipality,
whereas that of the national ports is shouldered by the national government;
(2) municipal ports are created by executive order, while national ports are usually created by
legislation; (3) berthing fees are not collected by the government from vessels berthing at
municipal ports, while such berthing fees are collected by the government from vessels moored
a national ports. The berthing fees imposed upon vessels berthing at national ports are applied
by the national government for the maintenance and repair of said ports. The national
government does not maintain municipal ports which are solely maintained by the
municipalities or private entities which constructed them, as in the case at bar. Thus, no
berthing charges may be collected from vessels moored at municipal ports nor may berthing
charges be imposed by a municipal council (Tejam's Commentaries on the Revised Tariff and
Customs Code, p. 2486, citing Circular Letter No. 2981 dated September 30, 1958 quoting Op.
No. 122, s. of 1958 and Op. No. 373, s. of 1940, Sec. of Justice).
The subject vessels, not having berthed at a national port but at the Port of Kiwalan, which was
constructed, operated, and continues to be maintained by private respondent Iligan Express
Corporation, are not subject to berthing charges, and petitioner should refund the berthing fees
paid private respondent.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano, Bidin, Romero and Vitug, JJ., concur.