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Coates v.

Brief Fact Summary. Appellant Coates was involved with several other individuals in a demonstration and picketing in a labor
dispute. They were later convicted for violating a Cincinnati city ordinance prohibiting assembly on public sidewalks if the assembly
annoyed other individuals. Appellant claims that such a statute violates his right to free assembly.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. An ordinance or statute that restricts First or Fourteenth Amendment rights is unconstitutional if i t is overly
vague and restricts protected speech and assembly in addition to unprotected actions.

Facts. Appellant was a student involved in a demonstration and the other Appellants were pickets involved in a labor dispute. They
were later convicted of violating a Cincinnati, Ohio, ordinance that makes it a criminal offense for three or more people to assemble
on any of the sidewalks of the city and there conduct themselves in a manner annoying to passers by. The Ohio Supreme Court
upheld Appellants convictions.

Issue. Whether the Cincinnati, Ohio ordinance making it a criminal offense for three or more people to assemble on a public
sidewalk and conduct themselves in a manner annoying to passing individuals is a violation of Appellants First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights?
Held. Yes. The ordinance is unconstitutionally vague because it subjects the exercise of the right of assembly to an unascertainable
standard, and unconstitutionally broad because it authorize the punishment of constitutionally protected conduct. In fact conduct
that annoys some people, does not annoy others. Therefore it causes guessing as to what the meaning of the standard of conduct is.
Although the city argues that the breadth of this statue allows the prevention of lawless conduct on the sidewalks, it could do so
with an ordinance that gives reasonable specificity as to what is prohibited. As this ordinance punishes not only lawless, unprotected
conduct, and lawful protected assembly, this ordinance is an unconstitutional restriction of the First and Fourteenth Amendment
rights to assemble.

Dissent. Any man of average intelligence should know that some kinds of conduct are annoying and covered by the ordinance, while
others are not and not covered by the ordinance. Would prefer to deal with the ordinance as with any criminal statute. The statute
is not infirm on its face, and since no information was given as to what conduct was charged against the Appellants, the Court is in
no position to judge the statute as applied. The fact that the ordinance confers wide discretion in a wide range of circumstances is
irrelevant when dealing with conduct at its core.

Discussion. The majority in this case clearly states that it will not uphold regulations that vaguely limit an individuals right to
peaceful speech and assembly, even if that regulation also protects the public against violent actions. A regulation must clearly
outline what conduct is allowed, and what conduct is prohibited if it involves restricting an individuals First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights. The dissent prefers leaving the decision of what conduct is allowed, and what is prohibited to a jury, while the
majority believes that it is every citizens right to clearly know what conduct is allowed and what is prohibited before they act, and
not leave it up to a jury that could reach a different conclusion depending on the members of the panel.

Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corp. vs NLRC, 163 SCRA 71; G.R. No. L-74156
(Labor Standards - COLA, payment of wage in unworked days)

Facts: Wage Order No. 6 increased the cost-of-living allowance (COLA) of non-agricultural workers in the private sector.

Petitioner Corporation complied with said Order by paying its monthly-paid employees the mandated P3.00 per day COLA. In its
computation, Petitioner Corporation multiplied the P3.00 daily COLA by 22 days, which is the number of working days in the

Respondent Union disagreed with the computation alleging that prior to the effectivity of the Wage Order, Petitioner Corporation
had been computing and paying the COLA on the basis of 30 days per month and that this constituted an employer practice, which
should not be unilaterally withdrawn.

The Labor Arbiter sustained the position of Petitioner Corporation by holding that the monthly COLA should be computed on the
basis of 22 days, since the evidence showed that there are only 22 days in a month for monthly-paid employees in the company.

The NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter on appeal, holding that Petitioner Corporation was guilty of illegal deductions considering that
COLA should be paid and computed on the basis of 30 days since workers paid on a monthly basis are entitled to COLA on days
unworked; and the full allowance enjoyed by Petitioner Corporations monthly-paid employees before the CBA executed between
the parties constituted voluntary employer practice, which cannot be unilaterally withdrawn.

Issue: WON the computation and payment of COLA on the basis of 30 days per month constitute an employer practice which should
not be unilaterally withdrawn.

Held: No. Section 5 of the Rules Implementing Wage Orders Nos. 2, 3, 5 and 6 provides that all covered employees shall be entitled
to their daily living allowance during the days that they are paid their basic wage, even if unworked. The primordial consideration
for entitlement of COLA is that basic wage is being paid. The payment of COLA is mandated only for the days that the employees are
paid their basic wage, even if said days are unworked. On the days that employees are not paid their basic wage, the payment of
COLA is not mandated.

Moreover, Petitioner Corporation cannot be faulted for erroneous application of a doubtful or difficult question of law. Since it is a
past error that is being corrected, no vested right may be said to have arisen nor any diminution of benefit under Article 100 of the
Labor Code may be said to have resulted by virtue of the correction.

Basbacio vs. DOJ [G.R. No. 109445. November 07, 1994] Ponente: MENDOZA, J.

FACTS: Petitioner Felicito Basbacio and his son-in-law, Wilfredo Balderrama, were convicted of frustrated murder and of two counts
of frustrated murder. Petitioner and his son-in-law were sentenced to imprisonment and ordered immediately detained after their
bonds had been cancelled. Petitioner and his son-in-law appealed. The Court of Appeals rendered a decision acquitting petitioner on
the ground that the prosecution failed to prove conspiracy between him and his son-in-law. Based on his acquittal, petitioner filed a
claim under Rep. Act No. 7309, Sec. 3(a), which provides for the payment of compensation to any person who was unjustly accused,
convicted, imprisoned but subsequently released by virtue of a judgment of acquittal. The claim was filed with the Board of Claims
of the Department of Justice, but the claim was denied on the ground that while petitioners presence at the scene of the killing was
not sufficient to find him guilty beyond reasonable doubt, yet, considering that there was bad blood between him and the deceased
as a result of a land dispute and the fact that the convicted murderer is his son-in-law, there was basis for finding that he was
probably guilty. Petitioner brought this petition for review on certiorari as a special civil action under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is entitled of the claim under R.A. No. 7309.

HELD: NO. Petitioners contention has no merit. Verba legis non est recedendum from the words of a statute there should be no
To say then that an accused has been unjustly convicted has to do with the manner of his conviction rather than with his
innocence. An accused may on appeal be acquitted because he did not commit the crime, but that does not necessarily mean that
he is entitled to compensation for having been the victim of an unjust conviction. If his conviction was due to an error in the
appreciation of the evidence the conviction while erroneous is not unjust. That is why it is not, on the other hand, correct to say as
does respondent, that under the law liability for compensation depends entirely on the innocence of the accused.

JMM Promotions and Management Inc. vs. NLRC and Delos Santos [G.R. No. 109835. November 22, 1993] Ponente: CRUZ, J.
FACTS: Petitioners appeal was dismissed by the respondent National Labor Relations Commission citing the second paragraph of
Article 223 of the Labor Code as amended and Rule VI, Section 6 of the new Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, as amended. The
petitioner contends that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in applying these rules to decisions rendered by the POEA. It
insists that the appeal bond is not necessary in the case of licensed recruiters for overseas employment because they are already
required under Section 4, Rule II, Book II of the POEA Rules not only to pay a license fee of P30,000 but also to post a cash bond of
P100,000 and a surety bond of P50,000. In addition, the petitioner claims it has placed in escrow the sum of P200,000 with the
Philippine National Bank in compliance with Section 17, Rule II, Book II of the same Rule, to primarily answer for valid and legal
claims of recruited workers as a result of recruitment violations or money claims. The Solicitor General sustained the appeal bond
and commented that appeals from decisions of the POEA were governed by Section 5 and 6, Rule V, Book VII of the POEA Rules.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is still required to post an appeal bond to perfect its appeal from a decision of the POEA to the
HELD: YES. Petitioners contention has no merit. Statutes should be read as a whole. Ut res magis valeat quam pereat that the
thing may rather have effect than be destroyed.
It is a principle of legal hermeneutics that in interpreting a statute (or a set of rules as in this case), care should be taken that every
part thereof be given effect, on the theory that it was enacted as an integrated measure and not as a hodge-podge of conflicting
provisions. Under the petitioners interpretation, the appeal bond required by Section 6 of the POEA Rule should be disregarded
because of the earlier bonds and escrow money it has posted. The petitioner would in effect nullify Section 6 as a superfluity but
there is no such redundancy. On the contrary, Section 6 complements Section 4 and Section 17. The rule is that a construction that
would render a provision inoperative should be avoided. Instead, apparently inconsistent provisions should be reconciled whenever
possible as parts of a coordinated and harmonious whole.

Radiola Toshiba Philippines Inc. vs. The Intermediate Apellate Court
G.R. No. 75222, July 18, 1991

Facts: The petitioner obtained a levy on the attachment against the properties of Carlos Gatmaytan and Teresita Gatmaytan un Civil
case o. 35946 for collection of sum of money before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch II, Pasig, Metro Manila. A few months
later three creditors filed another petition against Gatmaytan and Teresita Gatmaytan for involuntary insolvency, docketed as
special proceedings No. 1548 of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga and Angeles city.
A favorable judgment was obtained of by the petitioner in Civil case No. 35946. The court ordered for the consolidation of
ownership of petitioner over said property but respondent sheriff of Angeles City refused to issue a final ceritificate of sale because
of the pending insolvency proceedings.
Court of First Instance of Angeles City and Intermediate Appellate Court rules against petitioner

Issue: Whether or not the levy on attachment in favor of petitioner in dissolved by the insolvency proceedings against respondents
commenced for months after the said attachment.

Held: Section 32 (of the Insolvency Law). As soon as an assignee is elected or appointed and qualified, the clerk of court shall, by an
instrument under his hand and seal of the court, assign and convey to the assignee all the real and personal property, estate and
effects of the debtor with all his deeds, books and papers relating thereto, and such assignment shall relate back to the
commencement of the proceedings in insolvency, and shall relate back to the acts upon the adjudication was founded, and by
operation of law shall vest the title to all such property, estate and effects in the assignee, although the same is then attached in
mesne process, as the property of debtor. Such assignment shall operate to vest in the assignee all of the estate of the insolvent
debtor not exempt by law from execution. It shall dissolved any attachment levied within one month next preceding the
commencement of the insolvency proceedings and vacate and set aside any judgment entered in any action commenced within
thirty days immediately prior to the commencement of insolvency proceedings and shall set aside any judgment entered by default
or consent of the debtor within thirty days immediately prior to the commencement of insolvency proceedings.
Section 79. When an attachment has been made and is not dissolved before the commencement of proceedings in
insolvency, or is dissolved by an undertaking given by the defendant, if the claim upon which attachment suit was commenced i s
proved against the estate of the debtor, the plaintiff may prove the legal costs and disbursements of the suit, and in keeping of the
property, and the amount thereof shall be a preferred debt.
There is no conflicts between the two provisions.
Statutory Construction; where a statute is susceptible of more than one interpretation, court should adopt such reasonable and
beneficial construction as will render the provision thereof operative and effective and harmonious with each other. but even
granting that such conflicts exists, it may be stated that in construing a statute, courts should adopt a construction that will give
effect to every part of the statute, if at all possible. This rule is expressed in the maxim, ut magis valeat quam pereat or that
construction is to be sought which gives effect to the whole of the statute its every word, hence when a statute is susceptible of
more than one interpretation, the court should adopt such reasonable and beneficial construction as will render the provision
thereof operative and effective and harmonious with each other.

Serana vs Sandiganbayan, GR 162059, January 22, 2008
(Public Officer, Student Regent)

Facts: Accused movant charged for the crime of estafa is a government scholar and a student regent of the University of the
Phillipines, Diliman, Quezon City. While in the performance of her official functions, she represented to former President Estrada
that the renovation of the Vinzons Hall of the UP will be renovated and renamed as Pres. Joseph Ejercito Estrada Student Hall and
for which purpose accused requested the amount of P15,000,000.00.

Petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over her person because as a UP student regent, she was not a public
officer due to the following: 1.) that being merely a member in representation of the student body since she merely represented her
peers; 2.) that she was a simple student and did not receive any salary as a UP student regent; and 3.) she does not fall under Salary
Grade 27.

The Ombudsman contends that petitioner, as a member of the BOR is a public officer, since she had the general powers of
administration and exercise the corporate powers of UP. Compensation is not an essential part of public office.

Moreover, the Charter of the University of the Philippines reveals that the Board of Regents, to which accused-movant belongs,
exclusively exercises the general powers of administration and corporate powers in the university. It is well -established in
corporation law that the corporation can act only through its board of directors, or board of trustees in the case of non-stock

Issue: WON a government scholar and UP student regent is a public officer.

Held: Yes. First, Public office is the right, authority, and duty created and conferred by law, by which for a given period, either fixed
by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of
the government, to be exercise by him for the benefit of the public. The individual so invested is a public officer. (Laurel vs Desierto)

Delegation of sovereign functions is essential in the public office. An investment in an individual of some portion of the sovereign
functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public makes one a public officer.

Second, Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606 explicitly vest the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over Presidents, directors or trustees,
or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations. Hence, it
is not only the salary grade that determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

As the Sandiganbayan pointed out, the BOR performs functions similar to those of a board of trustees of a non-stock corporation. By
express mandate of law, petitioner is a public officer as contemplated by P.D. No. 1606 the statute defining the jurisdiction of the

Third, it is well established that compensation is not an essential element of public office. At most, it is merely incidental to the
public office.

Hence, Petitioner is a public officer by express mandate of P.D.No. 1606 and jurisprudence.

Comendador v De Villa 200 SCRA 80 (1991)
Facts: This is a consolidated case of members of the AFP who were charged with violation of Articles of War (AW) 67 (Mutiny), AW
96 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman) and AW 94 (Various Crimes) in relation to Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code (Murder). The petitioners were questioning the conduct of the pre-trial investigation conducted where a motion to bail was
filed but was denied. Petitioner applied for provisional liberty and preliminary injunction before the court which was granted.
However De Villa refused to release petitioner for provisional liberty pending the resolution of the appeal they have taken before
the court invoking that military officers are an exemption from the right to bail guaranteed by the Constitution. Decision was
rendered reiterating the release for provisional liberty of petitioners with the court stating that there is a mistake in the
presumption of respondents that bail does not apply among military men facing court martial proceeding. Respondents now appeal
before the higher court.
Issue: Whether or not military men are exempted from the Constitutional guarantee on the right to bail.

Held: The SC ruled that the bail invoked by petitioners is not available in the military as an exception to the general rule embodied in
the Bill of Rights. Thus the right to a speedy trial is given more emphasis in the military where the right to bail does not exist.
Justification to this rule involves the unique structure of the military and national security considerations which may result to
damaging precedents that mutinous soldiers will be released on provisional liberty giving them the chance to continue their plot in
overthrowing the government. Therefore the decision of the lower court granting bail to the petitioners was reversed.

Chua vs. CSC and NIA [G.R. No. 88979. February 07, 1992] Ponente: PADILLA, J.

FACTS: Republic Act No. 6683 provided benefits for early retirement and voluntary separation from the government service as well
as for involuntary separation due to reorganization. Deemed qualified to avail of its benefits are those enumerated in Sec. 2 of the
Act. Petitioner Lydia Chua believing that she is qualified to avail of the benefits of the program, filed an application with respondent
National Irrigation Administration (NIA) which, however, denied the same; instead, she was offered separation benefits equivalent
to one half (1/2) month basic pay for every year of service commencing from 1980, or almost fifteen (15) years in four (4) successive
governmental projects. A recourse by petitioner to the Civil Service Commission yielded negative results, citing that her position is
co-terminous with the NIA project which is contractual in nature and thus excluded by the enumerations under Sec.3.1 of Joint
DBM-CSC Circular Letter No. 89-1, i.e. casual, emergency, temporary or regular employment. Petitioner appealed to the Supreme
Court by way of a special civil action for certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to the benefits granted under Republic Act No. 6683.

HELD: YES. Petition was granted. Petitioner was established to be a co-terminous employee, a non-career civil servant, like casual
and emergency employees. The Supreme Court sees no solid reason why the latter are extended benefits under the Early
Retirement Law but the former are not. It will be noted that Rep. Act No. 6683 expressly extends its benefits for early retirement to
regular, temporary, casual and emergency employees. But specifically excluded from the benefits are uniformed personnel of the
AFP including those of the PC-INP. It can be argued that, expressio unius est exclusio alterius but the applicable maxim in this case is
the doctrine of necessary implication which holds that what is implied in a statute is as much a part thereof as that which is

*T+he Court believes, and so holds, that the denial by the respondents NIA and CSC of petitioners application for early reti rement
benefits under R.A. No. 6683 is unreasonable, unjustified, and oppressive, as petitioner had filed an application for voluntary
retirement within a reasonable period and she is entitled to the benefits of said law. In the interest of substantial justice, her
application must be granted; after all she served the government not only for two (2) years the minimum requirement under the
law but for almost fifteen (15) years in four (4) successive governmental projects.

City of Manila and City Treasurer vs Judge Amador E. Gomez, Et Al.
GR No. L-37251, August 31, 1981
Statutory rule: Doctrine of necessary implications. What is implied in a statute is as much a part thereof as that which is expressed.

Facts:The Revised Charter of Manila fixes the annual realty tax at 1.5%. On the other hand, the Special Education Fund Law imposed
an annual additional tax of 1% on the assessed value of real property in addition to the real property tax regularly levied thereon
but the total real property tax shall not exceed 3% Since the maximum limit imposed is 3%, the municipal board of Manila imposed
an additional .5% to fix the total imposable tax on real property at 3% which is divided into the following: 1.5% as per charter of
Manila, 1% as per Special Education Fund law and .5% as per order of the municipal board. Private respondent Esso Philippines paid
the additional one-half percent realty tax under protest and later filed a complaint for recovery of the said amount. It contended
that the additional one-half percent is void because it is not authorized by the city charter or any law.

Issue: W/N the additional one-half percent imposed by the City of Manila is valid or legal.

Held:Yes. The Real Property Tax Law imposes that a city council, by ordinance, may impose a realty tax of not less than one-half
perfect but not more than two percent of the assessed value of real property. The additional one-half percent then is legal.
Furthermore, the doctrine of implications sustains the contention of the City of Manila that the additional one-half percent is
sanctioned by the Special Education Fund Law when the same states that the total real property tax shall not exceed a maximum of
three per centum. The doctrine of necessary implications means that that which is plainly implied in the language of a statute is as
much a part of it as that which is expressed.

People vs. Guillermo Manantan [G.R. No L-14129. July 31, 1962]

FACTS:[D]efendant Guillermo Manantan was charged with a violation Section 54 of the Revised Election Code in the Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan. The defense moved to dismiss the information on the ground that as justice of the peace the defendant is
one of the officers enumerated in Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. The lower court denied the said motion. A second motion
was filed by defense counsel who cited in support thereof the decision of the Court of Appeals in People vs. Macaraeg applying the
rule of expressio unius, est exclusion alterius. The lower court dismissed the information against the accused upon the authority of
the ruling in the case cited by the defense. The issue was raised to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not a justice of the peace was included in the prohibition of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code.

HELD: YES. The order of dismissal entered by the trial court should be set aside and this case was remanded for trial on the merits.

The application of the rule of casus omissus does not proceed from the mere fact that a case is criminal in nature, but rather from a
reasonable certainty that a particular person, object or thing has been omitted from a legislative enumeration. In the present case,
and for reasons already mentioned, there has been no such omission. There has only been a substitution of terms. On law reason
and public policy, defendant-appellees contention that justices of the peace are not covered by the injunction of Section 54 must be
rejected. To accept it is to render ineffective a policy so clearly and emphatically laid down by the legislature.

Although it was observed that both the Court of Appeals and the trial court applied the rule of expressio unius, est exclusion
alterius in arriving at the conclusion that justices of the peace are not covered by Section 54, the rule has no application. If the
legislature had intended to exclude a justice of the peace from the purview of Section 54, neither the trial court nor the Court of
Appeals has given the reason for the exclusion. Indeed, there appears no reason for the alleged change. Hence, the rule of expressio
unius est exclusion alterius has been erroneously applied.
JM Tuason and Co. Inc. et. al. vs. Mariano et. al. [G.R. No. L-33140. October 23, 1978] Ponente: AQUINO, J.
FACTS: The case began when Manuela Aquial and Maria Aquial filed a complaint in forma pauperis in the Court of First Instance of
Rizal Pasig Branch X, wherein they prayed that they be declared the owners of a parcel of land located at Balara, Marikina, Rizal,
docketed as Civil Case No. 8943. They alleged that sometime in 1960, or after J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had illegally entered upon that
land, they discovered that it had been fraudulently or erroneously included in OCT No. 735 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal. They
further alleged that transfer certificates of title, derived from OCT No. 735, were issued to J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc., J.M. Tuason
& Co., Inc. filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction, improper venue, prescription, laches and prior judgment.
The plaintiffs opposed that motion. The lower court denied it. The grounds of the motion to dismiss were pleaded as affirmative
defenses in the answer of Tuason and J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. They insisted that a preliminary hearing be held on those defenses.
The Tuason and J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed the instant civil actions of certiorari and prohibition praying, inter alia, that the trial
court be ordered to dismiss the complaint and enjoined from proceeding in the said case, and a writ of preliminary injunction was

ISSUE: Whether or not OCT No. 735 and the titles derived therefrom can be questioned at this late hour by respondents Aquial and

HELD: NO. The trial court was directed to dismiss Civil Case 8943 with prejudice and without costs.
Considering the governing principle of stare decisis et non quieta movere (follow past precedents and do not disturb what has been
settled), respondents Aquial and Cordova cannot maintain their action in Civil Case No. 8943 without eroding the long settled
holding of the courts that OCT No. 735 is valid and no longer open to attack.It is against public policy that matters already decided
on the merits be relitigated again and again, consuming the courts time and energies at the expense of other litigants.
Tala Realty Services Corporation, et al. v. Honorable Court of Appeals and Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank
G. R. No. 130088, 7 April 2009, SECOND DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.)

No right is created where the purchase is made in violation of an existing statute and in evasion of its express provision.

FACTS: Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank (Banco Filipino) filed before 17 Regional Trial Courts (RTC) 17 complaints for
reconveyance of different properties against Tala Realty Services Corporation (Tala Realty) et al. Banco Filipinos complaints
commonly alleged that in 1979, expansion of its operations required the purchase of real properties for the purpose of acquiring
sites for more branches; that as Sections 25(a) and 34 of the General Banking Act limit a banks allowable investments in real estate
to 50% of its capital assets, its board of directors decided to warehouse some of its existing properties and branch sites. Thus, Nancy
L. Ty, a major stockholder and director, persuaded Pedro Aguirre and his brother Tomas Aguirre, both major stockholders of Banco
Filipino, to organize and incorporate Tala Realty to hold and purchase real properties in trust for Banco Filipino; that after the
transfer of Banco Filipino properties to Tala Realty, the Aguirres sister Remedios prodded her brother Tomas to, as he did, endorse
to her his shares in Tala Realty and registered them in the name of her controlled corporation, Add International.

Thus, Nancy, Remedios, and Pedro Aguirre controlled Tala Realty, with Nancy exercising control through her nominees Pilar, Cynthia,
and Dolly, while Remedios exercised control through Add International and her nominee Elizabeth. Pedro Aguirre exercised control
through his own nominees, the latest being Tala Realtys president, Rubencito del Mundo.

In the course of the implementation of their trust agreement, Banco Filipino sold to Tala Realty some of its properties. Tala Realty
simultaneously leased to Banco Filipino the properties for 20 years, renewable for another 20 years at the option of Banco Filipino
with a right of first refusal in the event Tala Realty decided to sell them.

Tala Realty repudiated the trust, claimed the titles for itself, and demanded payment of rentals, deposits, and goodwill, with a threat
to eject Banco Filipino.

Thus arose Banco Filipinos 17 complaints for reconveyance against Tala Realty.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trust agreement is void

HELD: In Tala Realty Services Corporation v. Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank, the Court, by Decision dated November 22,
2002, ruling on one of several ejectment cases filed by Tala Realty against Banco Filipino arising from the same trust agreement in
the reconveyance cases subject of the present petitions, held that the trust agreement is void and cannot thus be enforced.

An implied trust could not have been formed between the Bank and Tala as the Court has held that "where the purchase is made in
violation of an existing statute and in evasion of its express provision, no trust can result in favor of the party who is guilty of the

The bank cannot use the defense of nor seek enforcement of its alleged implied trust with Tala since its purpose was contrary to law.
As admitted by the Bank, it "warehoused" its branch site holdings to Tala to enable it to pursue its expansion program and purchase
new branch sites including its main branch in Makati, and at the same time avoid the real property holdings limit under Secti ons
25(a) and 34 of the General Banking Act which it had already reached.

Clearly, the Bank was well aware of the limitations on its real estate holdings under the General Banking Act and that its
"warehousing agreement" with Tala was a scheme to circumvent the limitation. Thus, the Bank opted not to put the agreement in
writing and call a spade a spade, but instead phrased its right to reconveyance of the subject property at any time as a "first
preference to buy" at the "same transfer price." This agreement which the Bank claims to be an implied trust is contrary to l aw.
Thus, while the Court finds the sale and lease of the subject property genuine and binding upon the parties, the Court cannot
enforce the implied trust even assuming the parties intended to create it. In the words of the Court in the Ramos case, "the courts
will not assist the payor in achieving his improper purpose by enforcing a resultant trust for him in accordance with the clean
hands doctrine." The Bank cannot thus demand reconveyance of the property based on its alleged implied trust relationship wi th
G.R. No. 177127 October 11, 2010Del Castillo, J.
Doctrine:- The absence of the word zero rated on the invoices/receipts is fatal to a claim for credit/refund of input VAT.
- Stare decisis et non quieta movere. Courts are bound by prior decisions. Thus, once a case has been decided one way, courts have
no choice but to resolve subsequent cases involving the same issue in the same manner.
Facts:Petitioner, a PEZA Corporation, filed applications for tax credit/refund of unutilized input VAT on its zero-rated sales for the
taxable quarters of 2000. The claim for credit/refund, however, remained unacted by the respondent. Hence, petitioner was
constrained to file a petition before the CTA.
The CTA eventually denied the petition for lack of the word zero-rated on the invoices/receipts.
Issue:Whether or not the failure to print the word zero-rated on the invoices/receipts is fatal to a claim for credit/ refund of input
VAT on zero-rated sales
Held:Yes. The absence of the word zero rated on the invoices/receipts is fatal to a claim for credit/refund of input VAT. This has
been squarely resolved in Panasonic Communications Imaging Corporation of the Philippines (formerly Matsushita Business Machine
Corporation of the Philippines) v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (G.R. No. 178090, 612 SCRA 28, February 8, 2010). In that case,
the claim for tax credit/refund was denied for non-compliance with Section 4.108-1 of Revenue Regulations No. 7-95, which requires
the word zero rated to be printed on the invoices/receipts covering zero-rated sales.
From the abovementioned decision, the Court ruled that the appearance of the word zero-rated on the face of invoices covering
zero-rated sales prevents buyers from falsely claiming input VAT from their purchases when no VAT was actually paid. If, absent such
word, a successful claim for input VAT is made, the government would be refunding money it did not collect.
Stare decisis et non quieta movere. Courts are bound by prior decisions. Thus, once a case has been decided one way, courts have
no choice but to resolve subsequent cases involving the same issue in the same manner [Agencia Exquisite of Bohol, Incorporated v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. Nos. 150141, 157359 and 158644, February 12, 2009, 578 SCRA 539, 550].