The Incompetent Carmen Caniza v. Court of Appeals, Pedro and Leonora EstradaG.R. No.

110427;
February 24, 1997Facts:
Carmen Caniza (94), a spinster, a retired pharmacist, and former professor of the Collegeof
Chemistry and Pharmacy of the University of the Philippines, was declared incompetent by
judgment of the QC RTC in a guardianship proceeding instituted by her niece, Amparo
A.Evangelista. She was so adjudged because of her advanced age and physical
infirmitieswhich included cataracts in both eyes and senile dementia. Amparo A. Evangelista
wasappointed legal guardian of her person and estate. Amparo commenced a suit to eject
thespouses Estrada from the said premises. In their Answer, the defendants declared that
theyhad been living in Caiza's house since the 1960's; that in consideration of their
faithfulservice they had been considered by Caiza as her own family, and the latter had in
fact executed a holographic will by which she "bequeathed" to the Estradas the house
and lot inquestion.The MTC rendered judgment in favor of Caniza. The RTC reversed said
decision.The appellate court affirmed the RTC's judgment.
Issue:
Evangelista's authority.
Ruling:
The Estradas insist that the devise of the house to them by Caiza clearly denotes
herintention that they remain in possession thereof, and legally incapacitated her
judicialguardian, Amparo Evangelista, from evicting them therefrom, since their ouster
would beinconsistent with the ward's will.A will is essentially ambulatory; at any time prior
to the testator's death, it may be changedor revoked; and until admitted to probate, it has
no effect whatever and no right can beclaimed thereunder, the law being quite explicit: "No
will shall pass either real or personalproperty unless it is proved and allowed in accordance
with the Rules of Court" (ART. 838,id.). An owner's intention to confer title in the future to
persons possessing property byhis tolerance, is not inconsistent with the former's taking
back possession in the meantimefor any reason deemed sufficient. And that in this case
there was sufficient cause for theowner's resumption of possession is apparent: she needed
to generate income from thehouse on account of the physical infirmities afflicting her,
arising from her extreme age.Amparo Evangelista was appointed by a competent court the
general guardian of both theperson and the estate of her aunt, Carmen Caiza. Her Letters
of Guardianship clearlyinstalled her as the "guardian over the person and properties of
the incompetent CARMENCANIZA with full authority to take possession of the property of
said incompetent in any province or provinces in which it may be situated and to perform
all other acts necessaryfor the management of her properties . . " By that appointment, it
became Evangelista'sduty to care for her aunt's person, to attend to her physical and
spiritual needs, to assureher well-being, with right to custody of her person in preference to
relatives and friends. It also became her right and duty to get possession of, and exercise
control over, Caiza'sproperty, both real and personal, it being recognized principle that the
ward has no right to possession or control of his property during her incompetency. That
right to manage theward's estate carries with it the right to take possession thereof and
recover it fromanyone who retains it, and bring and defend such actions as may be needful
for thispurpose


TITLE OF THE CASE: PARISCHA V. DON LUIS DISON REALTYDATE OF PROMULGATION: March

FACTS:
Respondent Don Luis Dison Realty, Inc. and petitioners Parischa executed two Contracts
of Lease whereby theformer, as lessor, agreed to lease to the l atter Units 22, 24, 32, 33,
34, 35, 36, 37 and 38 of the San Luis Bui ldinglocated at Ermita, Manila. Petitioners, in turn, agreed
to pay monthly rentals.Peti tioners paid the monthly rentals unti l May 1992. After that, however,
petitioners refused to pay the rent.Petitioners assert that their refusal to pay the rent was
j ustified because of the internal squabbl e in respondentcompany as to the person
authori zed to receive payment. Also, petitioners alleged that they were prevented
fromus i ng t he uni t s r ent ed. Pet i t i oner s event ual l y pai d t hei r mont hl y r ent f or
Dec ember 1992 i n t he amount of P30,000.00, and claimed that respondent waived its right to
collect the rents for the months of July to November 1992since petitioners were prevented
from using some of the units. However, they again withheld payment startingJanuary 1993
because of respondents refusal to turn over Rooms 36, 37 and 38.A complaint for ejectment was filed
by private respondent through its representative, Ms. Bautista, before the MeTC.The MeTC considered
petitioners non-payment of rentals as unjustified. The court held that mere willingness to paythe rent did
not amount to payment of the obligation. The court did not give credence to petitioners claim that
privaterespondent failed to turn over possession of the premises. The court, however, dismissed the
complaint because of Ms. Bautistas alleged lack of authority to sue on behalf of the corporation. The
RTC of Manila reversed and set aside the MeTC Decision. It adopted the MeTC s fi nding on
petitioners unjustified refusal to pay the rent, which is a valid ground for ejectment. It, however, it upheld
Ms. Bautistas authorityto represent respondent notwithstanding the absence of a board
resolution to that effect, since her authority wasimplied from her power as a
general manager/treasurer of the company.

The CA affirmed the RTC Decision but deleted the award of attorneys fees



ISSUE 1: WON RESPONDENT COMPANY HAS STANDING TO SUEDECISION: YesRATIO:
Although the SEC suspended and eventually revoked respondents certificate of registration on February
16, 1995,records show that it instituted the action for ej ectment on December 15,
1993. Accordingl y, when the case wascommenced, its registration was not yet revoked. Besides,
the SEC later set aside its earlier orders of suspensionand revocation of respondents certificate,
rendering the issue moot and academic.
ISSUE 2: WON MS. BAUTISTA HAS CAPACITY TO SUE IN BEHALF OF THE COMPANYDECISION: YesRATIO:
A corporation has no powers except those expressl y conferred on it by the Corporation
Code and those that areimplied from or are incidental to its existence. In turn, a
corporation exercises said powers through its board of directors and/or its dul y authori zed
officers and agents. Physical acts, like the signing of documents, can beperformed onl y
by natural persons dul y authori zed for the purpose by corporate by-laws or by a specific act
of theboard of directors. Thus, any person suing on behalf of the corporation should present proof of
such authority.Although Ms. Bautista initi all y failed to show that she had the capacity to sign
the verification and insti t ute theej ectment case on behal f of the company, when confronted
with such question, she immediatel y presented theSecretarys Certificate confirming her authority
to represent the company. There is ample jurisprudence holding thatsubsequent and substantial
compliance may call for the relaxation of the rules of procedure in the interest of justice.In
Novelty Phils., Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
the Court faulted the appellate court for dismissing a petition solely onpetitioners failure to timely submit
proof of authority to sue on behalf of the corporation. In
Pfizer, Inc. v. Galan
,

weupheld the sufficiency of a petition verified by an employment specialist despite
the total absence of a boardresolution authori zi ng her to act for and on behalf of the
corporation. Lastl y, in
China Banking Corporation v. Mondragon International Philippines, Inc,
we relaxed the rules of procedure because the corporation ratified themanagers status as an
authorized signatory. In all of the above cases, we brushed aside technicalities in the interestof
j ustice. This relaxation of the rules applies onl y to highl y meritorious cases, and when
there is substantial compliance.
ISSUE 3: WON THE DENIAL OF THE MOTION TO INHIBIT CA JUSTICE RUBEN REYES IS PROPER

DECISION: YesRATIO:

First,
the motion to inhibit came after the appellate court rendered the assailed decision, that is, after Justice
Reyeshad already rendered his opinion on the merits of the case. It is settled that a motion to inhibit shall
be denied if filedafter a member of the court had already given an opinion on the merits of the case, the
rationale being that a litigantcannot be permitted to speculate on the action of the court x x x
(onl y to) raise an obj ection of t his sort after thedecision has been rendered.
Second,
it is settled that mere suspicion that a j udge is partial to one of the parties is not enough;
there should beevidence to substantiate the suspicion. Bias and prejudice cannot be presumed,
especially when weighed against a j udges sacred pledge under his oath of office to administer
j ustice without regard for any person and to do rightequal l y to the poor and the rich. There
must be a showing of bi as and prej udice stemming from an extraj udicialsource, resulting in
an opinion on the merits based on something other than what the j udge learned from
hisparticipation in the case.

ISSUE 4: WON THE PETITIONERS MAY BE VALIDLY EJECTED FROM THE LEASED PREMISESDECISION:
YesRATIO:
Unlawful detainer cases are summary in nature. In such cases, the elements to be proved and resolved
are the factof lease and the expiration or violation of its terms. Specifically, the essential requisites of
unlawful detainer are: 1)the fact of lease by virtue of a contract, express or implied; 2) the expiration or
termination of the possessors right tohold possession; 3) withholding by the lessee of possession of the
land or building after the expiration or terminationof the right to possess; 4) letter of demand upon lessee
to pay the rental or comply with the terms of the lease andvacate the premises; and 5) the filing of the
action within one year from the date of the last demand received by thedefendant.[49] It is undisputed that
petitioners and respondent entered into two separate contracts of lease involving nine (9) roomsof the
San Luis Building. Records, likewise, show that respondent repeatedly demanded that petitioners vacate
thepremises, but the latter refused to heed the demand; thus, they remained in possession of the
premises. The onlycontentious issue is whether there was indeed a violation of the terms of the
contract.This issue involves questions of fact, the resolution of which requires the evaluation of the
evidence presented. TheMeTC, the RTC and the CA all found that petitioners failed to perform their
obligation to pay the stipulated rent. It issettled doctrine that in a civil case, the conclusions of fact of the
trial court, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are final and conclusive, and cannot be
reviewed on appeal by the Supreme Court.



Pet i t i oner s
j ust i f i c at i ons ar e bel i ed by t he evi denc e on r ec or d. As c or r ect l y hel d by t he CA,
pet i t i oner s communications to respondent prior to the filing of the complaint never mentioned their
alleged inability to use therooms.

What they pointed out in their letters is that they did not know to whom payment should be made.
Althoughpetitioners stated in their December 30, 1993 letter that respondent failed to fulfill its part of the
contract,

nowhere didthey specifically refer to their inability to use the leased rooms. Besides, at that time, they
were already in default ontheir rentals for more than a year. What was clearly established by the evidence
was petitioners non-payment of rentals because ostensibly they didnot know to whom payment
should be made. However, this did not j ustif y their failure to pay. They should haveavailed of
the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines on the consignation of payment and of the Rules of
Courton interpleader.In l ight of the foregoing disquisition, respondent has every right to
exercise his right to ej ect the erring lessees. Moreover, Article 1673

of the Civil Code gi ves the lessor the right to j udiciall y ej ect the lessees in case of non-
payment of the monthly rentals. A contract of lease is a consensual, bilateral, onerous and commutative
contract bywhich the owner temporarily grants the use of his property to another, who undertakes to pay
the rent therefor. For failure to pay the rent, petitioners have no right to remain in the leased premises.