Meeting Opposites: The Political Theologies of Walter

Benjamin and Carl Schmitt

Marc de Wilde
Philosophy and Rhetoric, Volume 44, Number 4, 2011, pp. 363-381 (Article)
Published by Penn State University Press
DOI: 10.1353/par.2011.0023
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Philosophy and Rhetoric, Vol. 44, No. 4, 2011
Copyright 2011 Te Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA
Meeting Opposites: Te Political
Teologies of Walter Benjamin and
CarlSchmitt
Marc de Wilde
a bs t r a c t
Tis article analyzes the critical dialogue between Walter Benjamin and
Carl Schmitt, to which a letter and several references in their work testify.
It shows how anities and dierences between their respective positions
can be explained from a shared theologico-political approach. Both authors
believe that, in spite of secularization, political phenomena can only be
adequately understood in light of certain theological concepts, images,
and metaphors. However, they explain these theologico-political analogies
dierently. Whereas Schmitt advocates the authoritarian state, which he
compares to Gods omnipotence, Benjamin endorses the proletarian revo-
lution, in which he recognizes traces of a divine law-destroying violence.
Challenging existing interpretations, this article shows how the political
theologies of Benjamin and Schmitt are not static but developed in the
course of their dialogue, in which both authors respond to each others crit-
icism by changing and correcting their own positions in signicant ways.
int r oduct ion
On 9 December 1930, Walter Benjamin sent a copy of his book Te Origin
of German Tragic Drama to Carl Schmitt, accompanied by a letter in which
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he expressed his indebtedness to Schmitt: You will very quickly recognize
how much my book is indebted to you for its presentation of the doctrine
of sovereignty in the seventeenth century. Perhaps I may say, in addition,
that I have also derived from your later works, especially Die Diktatur, a
conrmation of my modes of research in the philosophy of art from yours
in the philosophy of the state. If the reading of my book allows this feeling
to emerge in an intelligible fashion, then the purpose of my sending it to
you will be achieved (qtd. in Weber 1992, 5). As Benjamin suggested in his
letter, he had not only been inuenced by Schmitt while developing his
views on the doctrine of sovereignty but had also applied a methodology
that showed anity with Schmitts. Benjamins book did indeed contain
several references to Schmitts theory of sovereignty and also testied to
the kind of methodological extremism characteristic of Schmitts work.
1
When Gershom Scholem and Teodor Adorno rst published an
extensive selection of Benjamins correspondence in 1966, they left out the
letter to Schmitt. Apparently, they did not want the memory of Benjamin,
who had taken his life while eeing National Socialism, to be associated
with the conservative lawyer, who had actively supported Hitlers Tird
Reich. Jacob Taubes describes how, having come across the letter, he called
Adorno to ask him why it had not been included in the correspondence:
A letter like that doesnt exist, was the answer. I say, Teddy, I know the
handwriting, I know the typewriter Benjamin wrote with, dont tell me
stories, Ive got it right here! Cant be. Typically German answer. So I
made a copy and sent it to him (Taubes 2004, 98).
2
Regrettable though
Scholem and Adornos decision might seem in hindsight, it is understand-
able in its contextboth had been close friends of Benjamin, and they
probably wanted to protect his philosophical inheritance from what they
considered dubious political ideas. In fact, it was Schmitt himself who
actively distributed Benjamins letter after the war, hoping that it would
contribute to his intellectual and political rehabilitation.
3
Te initial suppression of Benjamins letter to Schmitt and its sub-
sequent rediscovery have probably contributed much to the scandal
that has surrounded the letter ever since it was rst published in 1974.
4

Taubes himself characterized the letter as a mine that can blow to pieces
our conception of the intellectual history of the Weimar period (1987, 27).
He thereby suggested that the clear-cut political distinctions that were
meant to make sense of Weimars intellectual history had missed their pur-
pose and that contacts and inuences between intellectuals on the far left
and the extreme right had in fact been more frequent and substantial than
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365
one was prepared to admit after the war. In 1987, Ellen Kennedy concluded
in a well-argued article that the anities between Schmitt, Benjamin, and
the other Frankfurt School members had indeed been much deeper and
more problematic than had been acknowledged in the literature, because,
in spite of their very dierent political ideals, they had shared an aversion
to liberalism and parliamentary democracy (1987, 66). Kennedys essay met
with highly critical responses from Martin Jay, Ulrich Preuss, and others,
who admitted that there were indeed similarities between various Frankfurt
School positions and those of Schmitt, yet claimed that these positions
were ultimately irreconcilable ( Jay 1987;Preuss 1987).
Te anities between Schmitt and Benjamin were thus subject to
controversy from the start: Benjamins apparent endorsement of Schmitts
theory of sovereignty and methodology was either believed to indicate a
signicant anity between intellectuals of the far left and right or declared
incidental or supercial. However, with the passing of time, more nuanced
interpretations were proposed, and the relationship between Schmitt and
Benjamin was judged more often on its own merits. Tese readings sought
to reveal a critical dialogue in their writings, testifying to shared meth-
odological presuppositions and a critical engagement with each others
positions. Tus, authors such as Norbert Bolz, Samuel Weber, and Giorgio
Agamben showed that although Benjamin had borrowed Schmitts con-
cepts, he injected them into new contexts in which their original mean-
ings were challenged and opposed (Bolz 1989, 8594; Weber 1992,518;
Agamben 2005,5264). In her turn, Suzanne Heil argued that the writings
of Schmitt and Benjamin could be read next to and as answers to each
other, even though it was not always possible to ascertain whether they
were indeed meant as interventions in a dialogue (Heil 1996, 8).
In these interpretations, the theologico-political convictions of
Schmitt and Benjamin play a key role. Teir authors suggest that the shared
theologico-political approaches of Schmitt and Benjamin explain both the
similarities and dierences between their respective positions (see also Figal
1992,252).Tus, Benjamin and Schmitt believe that, in spite of seculariza-
tion, political phenomena are to be understood primarily in light of certain
theological concepts and images. However, whereas Schmitt starts from
a Catholic perspective on the political, emphasizing the necessity of the
existing legal-political order, Benjamin takes a messianic perspective that
regards the legal-political order as destined to wither away. Teir shared
theologico-political approaches can thus explain their dierent philosophi-
cal and political positions: whereas Schmitt advocates the authoritarian
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state, because he compares it with Gods omnipotence, Benjamin sides with
the revolutionaries in whose anarchistic violence he recognizes traces of a
divine law-destroying violence.
I too believe that the relationship between Schmitt and Benjamin
can be characterized best as a critical dialogue on the question of political
theology. However, I also believe that this dialogue has not been adequately
understood for two reasons. First, I submit that the nature of political
theology as Schmitt and Benjamin understand it has been misrepresented.
Interpretations of their work tend to represent their theologico-political
analogies as simple identities, but their political theologies are postsecular,
which implies, among other things, that direct identications of the politi-
cal with the theological have become impossible. Suzanne Heil, for exam-
ple, claims that Schmitts political theology comes down to an identity
of political and theological concepts, which liquidates theologys critical
potential with regard to existing power relations (1996, 10910).However,
by treating the structural analogies to which Schmitt and Benjamin refer as
identities, Heil disregards their specic, postsecular nature. Political theol-
ogy in their writing refers not to an identity of theology and politics but
to the (re)appearance of theological gures of thought in a political sphere
that has become exposed to processes of secularization and neutralization.
As a result, it has become inadmissible or even impossible to refer directly
to theological categories in the public sphere, even though they continue
to haunt our understanding of the political. Here, we have left the sphere
of direct and explicit identications and entered into that of an indirect
language, of translations and analogies.
Secondly, I criticize the existing interpretations for ignoring develop-
ments in the theologico-political views of Benjamin and Schmitt, resulting
in a too static image of their dialogue. Agamben, for instance, claims that
the whole debate between the two thinkers can be summarized in terms of
reformulations: While Schmitt attempts every time to reinscribe violence
within a juridical context, Benjamin responds to this gesture by seeking
every time to assure itas pure violencean existence outside of the law
(2005, 59, emphasis mine). However, a close examination of their work
shows important developments and shifts in their theologico-political
positions. For instance, in his later writings, Schmitt no longer compares
the sovereigns unlimited power to Gods omnipotence but to the restrain-
ing force described by Saint Paul (1997, 2832). He thereby seems to have
given up his earlier view, according to which something of Gods eternity
reected on the sovereign. I believe that the shifts and developments in
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367
Schmitt and Benjamins theologico-political views can, at least in part, be
explained by their attempts to answer each others criticism and objections.
In what follows, I start by examining the nature of political theology as
Schmitt and Benjamin understand it. Ten, I explore the main claims and
arguments that constitute their critical dialogue.
pol it ica l t heol ogy: a post secul a r concept
As Jan Assmann has argued, the concept of political theology tradition-
ally is understood as the ever-changing relationships between political
community and religious order, in short between power [or: authority:
Herrschaft] and salvation [Heil] (2000, 15). Yet, in the work of Benjamin
and Schmitt, the concept acquires a somewhat dierent meaning: for them,
political theology covers more than politics and less than theology. Politi-
cal theology does not refer to what is usually called politics, that is, those
issues that concern politicians but to the political [das Politische]. Both
Benjamin and Schmitt, independently of each other but using similar
words, suggest that the political is no longer limited to the traditional polit-
ical arenas, such as government and parliament, but has become omnipres-
ent: in modern societies the political is potentially at work in every social
domain, in the media, economy, culture, and so on. Each of these domains
can suddenly become politically charged when a fundamental opposition
takes shape that determines the experience of the political.
Moreover, what is usually called theology, that is, comments on rev-
elation and theories of the religious, can scarcely be found in their work.
Hence, for Schmitt and Benjamin, the concept of political theology
does not refer to a theologization of politics nor to a theology by other
means.
5
As usual, Schmitt expresses this idea polemically: Today, every-
thing is theology, with the exception of that which the theologians put
forward (qtd. in Taubes 1987, 37).
6
In a similar vein, Benjamin suggests that
traditional theology, in both its theoretical and dogmatic form, has become
obsolete. Terefore, thinking can only relate to theology as a blotting pad
is related to ink (2002, 471).Although it is saturated with theology, it can
no longer express itself in an explicitly theological language. For Benjamin
and Schmitt, then, political theology refers to a postsecular theology that
seems to have erased its own traces.
Assmann proposes a distinction between two types of political theol-
ogy, a structural and a genealogical type (1995,26, 35).Te structural type can
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be found in the writings of both Schmitt and Benjamin. Benjamin refers,
to a structural resemblance between political and theological concepts in
several texts, noting, for instance, the resemblance between the proletarian
general strike and divine law-destroying violence, between the sovereign
and the martyr, and between the revolutionary ght for an oppressed past
and the messianic arrest of happening (1996, 252;2003a, 69; 2003b, 396).
Schmitt, in his turn, argues that all signicant concepts of the modern
theory of the state correspond to certain theological concepts with respect
to their systematic structure [systematische Struktur] (2005, 36). As
examples he mentions the analogy between the legal state of exception and
the miracle in theology, between the sovereigns unlimited authority and
Gods omnipotence, and between the sovereign decision that emanates
from nothingness and the theological creatio ex nihilo (2005,32, 36,49).
Contrary to Benjamin, Schmitt claims to be describing a political the-
ology of the genealogical type as well, explaining that all signicant con-
cepts of the modern theory of the state are secularized theological concepts
(2005,36). He thereby suggests that some of the qualities originally attrib-
uted to God have, in the process of secularization, been transferred [ber-
tragen] to the secular ruler. Yet, as Hans Blumenberg has rightly observed,
nowhere in his work does Schmitt in fact attempt to analyze these redis-
tributions (1974, 106).In response to this criticism, Schmitt will later back
o from his genealogical claim: Everything I have said about the topic of
political theology consists of the remarks of a lawyer about a systematic
structural anity [eine systematische Struktur-Verwandtschaft] of theologi-
cal and political concepts that presents itself in legal theory and practice
(1996, 79n1).In other words, Schmitt no longer defends his original, genea-
logical claim that political concepts are secularized theological concepts but
focuses on the structural claim instead.
l aw, viol ence, a nd t he divine
Giorgio Agamben has argued that Schmitts Political Teology (1922), an
important early work, can be read as a precise response to Benjamins 1921
1922 essay Critique of Violence (2005,54).He cites several historical facts
to support this view. For instance, Benjamins essay was published in issue 47
of the Archiv fr Sozialwissenschaften und Sozialpolitik, a journal of which
Schmitt, at the time, was a regular reader.
7
Moreover, Schmitt is believed
to have congratulated Benjamin on his essay. However, proof that Schmitt
read Benjamins essay is lacking (as is evidence that he congratulated him
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369
on itno letter of congratulation, for instance, has surfacedand so this
appears to be no more than a persistent rumor that probably originated
with Jrgen Habermas, who may have confused Benjamins letter of
congratulation to Schmitt of December 1930 with a letter of Schmitt to
Benjamin).
8
Still, with regard to content, the anities between both essays
are striking: both seek to examine the relationship between law and vio-
lence in light of certain theologico-political gures of thought. Terefore,
I believe that Schmitts Political Teology can, indeed, be read as a response
to Benjamins Critique of Violence, even though it remains uncertain
whether it was written as a response.
In his Critique of Violence, Benjamin criticizes the interdependence
of law and violence. In the legal order, he perceives traces of an immediate
violence that does not refer to any purpose outside of itself and that, in
consequence, cannot be understood by its normative meaning or function.
Benjamin identies this violence as a lawmaking violence [rechtsetzende
Gewalt], to be distinguished from a law-preserving violence [rechtser-
haltende Gewalt] (1996, 24041). Lawmaking violence is said to reside in
the force of law, guaranteeing the laws applicability. Te legal order betrays
its dependence on lawmaking violence, for instance, when it imposes capital
punishment. As Benjamin suggests, capital punishment shows a kind of
lawlessness at work in the legal order, an immediate violence that escapes
attempts at legal regulation. Confronted with this violence, the laws prove
to be powerless and fragile, incapable of checking the excess on which their
applicability seems to depend. Terefore, capital punishment is said to reveal
something rotten in the law [etwas Morsches im Recht]: originating in a
lawless violence, the law itself is always already destined to decay, exposed
to the possibility of its own internal corruption (1996, 242, 251).
According to Benjamin, lawmaking violence and its corrupting eects
can be countered only by an unalloyed violence that has broken all ties
to the law. He calls this violence law destroying. It is law destroying in
that it interrupts the workings of lawmaking violence and questions the
laws dependence on violence. Benjamin argues that this unalloyed, law-
destroying violence can under certain conditions take the shape of a revo-
lutionary strike. Following the French anarcho-syndicalist Georges Sorel,
he distinguishes between a political general strike, which uses the threat
of violence as a means of forcing the state into accepting compromises, and
a proletarian general strike, which categorically rejects the use of violence
and aims at the complete abolition of the state. Whereas the rst form
of work interruption is said to be the means of a lawmaking violence, the
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second is described as the medium of a law-destroying violence: it destroys
the law without creating a new law of its own and can therefore bring the
corrupting dialectic of lawmaking and law-preserving violence to an end.
In what can be considered the central passages of the text, Benjamin
denes the distinction between lawmaking and law-destroying violence in
theologico-political terms. He thus calls lawmaking violence mythical,
and law-destroying violence divine. Benjamin argues it is characteristic
of mythical violence that it demands the sacrice of life with the goal of
preserving life itself; for instance, capital punishment requires the sacrice
of the convicts life to protect the lives of others. By contrast, divine vio-
lence is said to accept the sacrice of life only for the sake of justice itself
(1996, 24950).Te meaning of these phrases is dicult to fathom. I believe
that by arguing that divine violence does not demand but only accepts
the sacrice of life, Benjamin intends to articulate a kind of responsibil-
ity, namely, the political actors own responsibility to decide, in exceptional
cases, whether he is prepared to sacrice life itself to secure the righteous-
ness of life. In my reading, then, while divine violence will refuse to accept
the sacrice of life if it is enforced under the law, it will accept those sac-
rices that originate in a responsibility before the law (Butler 2006, 205;
Wilde 2006, 198).
Whereas Benjamin argues that the proletarian general strike bears wit-
ness to a divine violence, Schmitt, in Political Teology, claims the exact
opposite: sovereign lawmaking violence, not the general strike, is compared
to the divine. Like Benjamin, Schmitt acknowledges the existence of an
immediate lawmaking violence that escapes attempts at legal regulation.
Tis violence shows itself in the state of exception [Ausnahmezustand],
when the laws are temporarily suspended in order to enable the sovereign
to counter a threat to the legal order, for example, a revolution or foreign
invasion. As Schmitt points out, the proclamation of the state of excep-
tion is not without risk, for the emergency powers established to defend
the legal order could end up eroding it instead. Te sovereign, for instance,
could seize on the emergency as a pretext for creating a situation in which
fundamental norms can be ignored with impunity. Schmitt believes that
there are no constitutional guarantees to prevent this from happening.
Like the lawmaking violence Benjamin describes, the sovereign violence
Schmitt has in mind is immediate and beyond legal regulation.
Schmitts account of lawmaking violence can be considered a response
to Benjamins criticism in that he proposes an interpretation contrary
to Benjamins: although both refer to an immediate lawmaking violence,
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benjamin and schmitt
371
Benjamin calls it mythical, whereas Schmitt compares it to the divine.
However, in this case, the anities between Schmitt and Benjamin prove
to be even more signicant than the dierences. Most importantly, both
Benjamin and Schmitt relate divine violence to a notion of responsibil-
ity. Tis has remained unnoticed in literature, but is, I believe, essential to
the interpretation of their early political theologies: like Benjamin, Schmitt
suggests that it is the denial of an immediate violence, that is, the reality
of violence as such, that makes redemption impossible. Hence, according
to Schmitt, attempts to repress the notion of the radical exception and
the reality of violence it reveals are to be regarded as a method of circum-
venting responsibility [eine Methode die Verantwortung zu umgehen]
(2005,63). For both Schmitt and Benjamin, then, a notion of responsibility
is at the heart of what they regard as divine violence as it manifests itself
in the legal and political sphere.
Schmitt and Benjamin concur not only in their emphasis on respon-
sibility but also in the nature they ascribe to it, for, as it turns out, both
dene it in relation to a possible sacrice. Tus, in the state of exception, the
revolutionary and sovereign respectively are expected to take responsibil-
ity for putting mere life at stake for their political beliefs. Only this can
prove the seriousness of their beliefs. Yet, for both Schmitt and Benjamin,
the very logic of the sacrice presupposes the possibility of the worst. Tis
possibility threatens to actualize as soon as the relation between the politi-
cal and the divine is no longer understood in terms of responsibility but in
terms of a direct identication. Terefore, Benjamin and Schmitt propose a
dierent notion of divine violence: it does not directly manifest itself in the
legal-political sphere but only indirectly, as an appeal to the political actors
own responsibility, a silent call to engage with the reality of violence.
Tis notion of responsibility will reappear in their later writings, for
instance, in Schmitts Concept of the Political, in which the possibility of sacrice
is identied as the foundation of the political (2007, 78), and in Benjamins
Origin of German Tragic Drama, in which the sovereign is compared to the
martyr, who is prepared to sacrice life itself for his beliefs (2003a, 69).
t he t heat er of power
While in their early essays on law and violence, the dialogue between
Schmitt and Benjamin remains implicitneither of them mention-
ing the name of the otherBenjamin, in Te Origin of German Tragic
Drama, explicitly acknowledges his indebtedness to Schmitt. In a letter to
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the Frankfurt sociologist Gottfried Salomon, written in December 1923,
Benjamin mentions that he is reading a book on the concept of sover-
eignty (qtd. in Kambas 1982,609). He is probably referring to Schmitts
Political Teology, the subtitle of which is Four Chapters on the Concept
of Sovereignty; the book had appeared a year earlier (see Bredekamp 1999,
249). In September 1924,Benjamin reports to Gershom Scholem that he
has completed the chapter on the king in tragic drama (Witte 1991,73).
Tis chapter is the only one in which he explicitly and repeatedly refers
to Schmitts Political Teology (2003a, 239nn14, 16, and 17). In line with
Schmitts main thesis, Benjamin argues that the concept of sovereignty is
to be dened in relation to the state of exception. Arming Schmitts
interpretation that the sovereign, in the state of exception, is no longer
constrained by the laws, Benjamin observes that the ruler in tragic drama is
designated from the outset as the holder of dictatorial power if war, revolt,
or other catastrophes should lead to a state of exception (2003a,65,transla-
tion modied).
Although Benjamin borrows Schmitts concepts of sovereignty and
the state of exception, the context he applies them in, that is, that of the
baroque play of mourning, changes their meanings decisively. According to
Benjamin, the baroque play of mourning shows how the theory of sover-
eignty that focuses on the state of exception tends to complete the image
of the sovereign as tyrant (2003a, 69, translation modied). Schmitt had
never claimed any such thing. For him, the orientation toward the excep-
tional case did not legitimize tyranny but merely served to prove the sov-
ereigns authority and responsibility. But according to Benjamin, the focus
on the state of exception in which the laws have been suspended means
that the Schmittian sovereign will eventually transform into a tyrant who
indulg[es] in the most violent display of power (2003a, 70). It will inevi-
tably lead to a sovereign who is no longer forced to justify his decisions and
deeds and who can govern beyond all accountability.
Benjamin avoids expressing his criticism of Schmitts doctrine of
sovereignty explicitly; it is implied in a discussion of its theologico- political
backgrounds. He starts by conrming Schmitts idea that the modern
doctrine of sovereignty has its roots in the Counter- Reformation. More par-
ticularly, he argues that the modern doctrine of sovereignty originates in the
Counter-Reformations ideal of a complete stabilization and longing for
an ecclesiastical and political restoration (2003a,65).From this perspective,
the sovereigns task is to guarantee law, order and security and to avert
the state of exception (2003a, 65). Several commentators have interpreted
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benjamin and schmitt
373
Benjamins phrasinghe uses the word averting [ausschliessen] in
contrast to Schmitt, who uses suppressing [niederhalten]as implying
a criticism of Schmitts theory. Samuel Weber, for instance, recognizes a
slight but decisive modication, for, in Schmitts interpretation, the
sovereigns task was to suppress the state of exception but only in each
particular case, never as such (1992,12). Horst Bredekamp considers this
shift of nuance to be of the utmost signicance, for, while Schmitt
views the state of exception as the conditio sine qua non for the establish-
ment of sovereignty, Benjamin sees sovereignty as existing in order to avoid
the state of exception in the rst place (1999,260). According to both, then,
Benjamin subtly changes the meaning of Schmitts theory by describing
the sovereigns task as averting the state of exception instead of merely
suppressing it.
What both commentators appear to ignore, however, is that Benjamin,
while emphasizing the need to avert the state of exception, refers only
to a particular interpretation of sovereignty, that is, that of the Counter-
Reformation. In view of the Counter-Reformations ideal of a complete sta-
bilization and restoration, the sovereigns task must indeed be to avert the
state of exception. But, as Benjamin suggests, this desire for perfect restora-
tion does not adequately characterize the modern doctrine of sovereignty.
Instead, this doctrine is said to originate in an antithesis: it is based not
only on the Counter-Reformations ideal of a complete stabilization and
restoration but also on the baroque representation of history as a perma-
nent catastrophe (2003a, 66). From this perspective, the sovereigns task is
still to avert the state of exception, yet it becomes doubtful whether, faced
with a continuing catastrophe, he will actually succeed in fullling his task.
It seems more likely that, instead of averting the state of exception, the
sovereign will declare it indenite in order to counter a catastrophe that
has become equally permanent.
In this context, Benjamin evokes the tragic image of a sovereign who
is faced with a permanent catastrophe and proves unequal to his task.
Te sovereign fails to cope with the situation that presents itself in the
state of exception, falling victim to doubt and despair instead. Benjamins
image of an indecisive, even despairing, sovereign seems to be polemically
aimed against Schmitts notion of sovereignty. In Political Teology, Schmitt
had dened the sovereign as he who decides on the exception (,5).
Quoting Schmitts denition, Benjamin argues that the prince, who is
responsible for making the decision to proclaim the state of exception,
reveals, at the rst opportunity, that he is almost incapable of making a
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decision (a, 71). Whereas Schmitt sees the state of exception as
demonstrating the sovereigns unlimited authority, Benjamin suggests that
it reveals the sovereigns impotence and indecisiveness.
Although in his letter of December 1930, Benjamin enthusiastically
expressed his indebtedness to Schmitts theory of sovereignty, he turns out
to reject its central claims: on Benjamins reading, the Schmittian state of
exception does not allow for a sovereign decision but leads to an indecisive-
ness that threatens the legal order from within. By placing Schmitts theory
of sovereignty into a dierent theologico-political context, that is, that of
an antithesis, Benjamin implicitly but fundamentally changes its meaning
and rejects it on theologico-political grounds: a sovereign is not he who
decides the exception, but he who proves unable to decide when faced with
the eschatological vision of a continuing catastrophe.
t he power of myt h
Whereas Benjamins criticism of Schmitt has attracted quite a lot of atten-
tion (see Heil 1996, 12735;Weber 1992,1215; Bredekamp 1999, 25961;
Figal 1992, 26165),Schmitts response to it has been largely ignored.
After a long and dicult genesis, Benjamins Origin of German Tragic
Drama nally appeared in 1928.Te same year, Schmitt published what
would become his most inuential and controversial text, Te Concept of the
Political. Based on an article he had written the year before, it would take on
its denite form in 1932, when it appeared in a thoroughly revised second
edition. According to Heinrich Meier, it is the only revised text by Schmitt
in which the changes are not limited to polishing style, introducing minor
shifts in emphasis, and making opportunistic corrections, but reveal con-
ceptual interventions and important clarications of content (1995,7). It is
not unlikely that in the meantime, Schmitt had become acquainted with
Benjamins Origin of German Tragic Drama.
A notable change in the revised second edition is Schmitts redenition
of his concept of sovereignty: he now argues that the sovereign has to
seek not only stabilization and restoration but also to accept the real
possibility of violent death. Whether consciously or not, Schmitt thereby
appears to endorse Benjamins criticism: he no longer believes the sovereign
capable of creating a completely stabilized order but, instead, describes his
task as restraining a catastrophe that can never be completely overcome.
Consequently, after 1932, Schmitts theory of sovereignty is no longer
exclusively focused on the ideal of a complete stabilization and restoration
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benjamin and schmitt
375
but is equally marked by the baroque vision of history as a permanent
catastrophe.
In other respects, however, Schmitt rejects Benjamins criticism,
formulating his own objections to Benjamins reading. For example, by
transferring the concept of sovereignty to the context of the baroque
play of mourning, Schmitt argues, Benjamin undermines its seriousness
[Ernst]. Tis criticism is implicit in his Concept of the Political, particu-
larly in his notion of the Ernstfall, but he makes it explicit in his 1956 book
Hamlet or Hecuba. Again, he prefaces his criticism with words of admira-
tion, citing Benjamins Origin of German Tragic Drama as one of the few
books to which I am particularly indebted for valuable information and
essential insights (1999, 7).
9
Yet what follows is, in fact, sharp criticism:
In his book (pages 5556,64, and the notes on page 241), Walter
Benjamin refers to my denition of sovereignty; in 1930, he
expressed his gratitude to me in a personal letter. I have the
impression, though, that he underestimates the dierence between
the English-insular and the European continental condition. . . .
Te dierence can be characterized most quickly and adequately
with a brief antithesis. . . . It is the antithesis between barbarism
and politics. (1999,64)
What is most striking in Schmitts formulation is that, now, he too places
the doctrine of sovereignty in the context of an antithesis. But the particular
antithesis he refers to, between barbarism and politics, diers from the one
Benjamin had proposed between the ideal of a complete stabilization and
restoration and the experience of catastrophe. Tis dierence has important
consequences for their interpretations of sovereignty: whereas Benjamin
had emphasized the gap between, on the one hand, the sovereigns task of
stabilizing and restoring order, and, on the other, his actual capacity to rule
(as a nite human being, faced with catastrophe), leading to indecision and
despair on the part of the sovereign, Schmitt, by contrast, suggests that the
sovereign might succeed in transforming a desperate moment of catastro-
phe and crisis into a powerful and politically eective myth (1999, 32). He
points out that faced with the hopelessness of the spiritual situation, the
monarch may appeal to the divine right of the kings instead of falling vic-
tim to indecision and despair as Benjamin had suggested (1999, 67).
Schmitt thus responds to Benjamins critique by arguing that the
sovereign uses the very antithesis on which Benjamin had grounded his
PR 44.4_04_de Wilde.indd 375 05/11/11 10:37 AM
ma r c de wi l de
376
critique to legitimize his claims to an unlimited authority. Instead of falling
prey to indecision and despair, the sovereign turns out to be capable of
transforming a desperate moment of catastrophe and crisis into a powerful
myth that supports his claims to power: the myth of the divine right of
the kings. Te vision of a permanent catastrophe is invoked to legitimize
an essentially unlimited authority: faced with a permanent catastrophe, the
sovereign must remain exempted from the laws, because he has to be capable
of coping with threats that can occur at any time. Schmitt thus criticizes
Benjamin for having underestimated the power of myth: although Benjamin
was right to relate the doctrine of sovereignty to the vision of a perma-
nent catastrophe, he did not acknowledge the power of myth that made this
vision instrumental to the sovereigns claims to legitimacy and power.
a ngel of hist or y a nd r est r a ining f or ce
Te tradition of the oppressed teaches us that the state of exception in
which we live is not the exception but the rule. We must attain to a concep-
tion of history that accords with this insight. Ten we will clearly see that it
is our task to bring about a real state of exception, and this will improve our
position in the struggle against Fascism (2003b, 392, translation modied).
Te words are Benjamins from his essay On the Concept of History, the
last text he completed before his death in 1940. It is not without signi-
cance that Benjamin puts the words state of exception between quotation
marks. Once more, he addresses Carl Schmitt. In the meanwhile, much had
happened in their lives. As an adviser to the Weimars last governments,
Schmitt had been personally involved in the republics downfall (Kennedy
2004, 16369). He had advised President Paul von Hindenburg to declare
a state of exception to counter the danger of anticonstitutional parties. Te
president had used his emergency powers to govern without parliamentary
consent; after three years of so-called presidential cabinets, he appointed
Adolf Hitler as chancellor of the Reich. In May 1933,Schmitt became a
member of the National-Socialist Workers Party; by then, Benjamin had
been forced to ee.
In On the Concept of History, Benjamin suggests that the state
of exception had decisively contributed to the triumphal march of fas-
cism. Although theoretically meant to protect the legal order, the state of
exception had, in fact, contributed to the establishment of a totalitarian
dictatorship. More particularly, Schmitts understanding of the state of
exception had enabled him to represent Hitlers violent transgression of
PR 44.4_04_de Wilde.indd 376 05/11/11 10:37 AM
benjamin and schmitt
377
rights as a realization of the law. Tereby, fascism had shown its true face:
as a regime of lawlessness, veiled with the appearance of legality. Schmitt
had argued that the state of exception was necessary to protect the existing
legal order, but Benjamin observed that it was mobilized instead to legalize
an essentially unrestricted and lawless violence. To counter Schmitts doc-
trine of the state of exception and the fascist turn it had taken, Benjamin
now advocated the creation of a real state of exception through which the
laws dependence on violence would be brought to an end once and for all.
In their post-1933 writings, Schmitt and Benjamin introduce new
theologico-political motifs to articulate the various tasks and responsi-
bilities of the sovereign and the revolutionary respectively. Schmitt now
compares the sovereign to the theological gure of the restraining force
[katechon] mentioned by Saint Paul (1997, 2832; see also Meuter 1994 and
Grossheutschi 1996). In his Second Letter to the Tessalonians, Saint Paul
describes a restraining force that prevents the coming of the antichrist and
thereby postpones the arrival of the end -time. In these verses, the antichrist
is characterized as the lawless one [ho anomos] (2:68).In line with an
age-old tradition (see Metger 2005,1548), Schmitt proposes a theologico-
political reading of Pauls verses: thus, with the image of the restraining
force in mind, the sovereign has to protect the existing order and suppress
lawlessness at all costs, even if it requires violating the laws. By so doing,
he acquires a theological legitimacy, justifying state violence as a temporary
measure to prevent the worst, that is, the revelation of the antichrist.
Like Schmitt, Benjamin, in his nal essay, introduces a theological
gure to articulate the revolutionarys responsibility: he evokes the gure of
an angel of history, who, his face turned toward the past, sees one single
catastrophe, which he seeks to end in vain: Te angel would like to stay,
awaken the dead, and make whole what has been smashed. But a storm is
blowing from Paradise and has got caught in his wings; it is so strong that
the angel can no longer close them. Tis storm drives him irresistibly into
the future, to which his back is turned, while the pile of debris before him
grows toward the sky. What we call progress is this storm (2003b, 39293).
With the image of the angel in mind, the revolutionary is expected to turn
against the existing order, it being the embodiment of an ongoing catastro-
phe. Te catastrophe is caused by the storm of progress, which condemns
every aspect of the past that does not directly contribute to a legitimization
of the present to oblivion (Wilde 2009, 17794). It is the revolutionarys
task to revive the memory of the oppressed by destroying the order to
which they have been sacriced.
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378
Benjamins allegory of the angel can be understood as a critical response
to Schmitts theologico-political notion of the restraining force: while
Schmitt, by invoking the gure of the restraining force, legitimized state
violence as necessary in order to prevent a future catastrophe, Benjamin,
with the image of the angel, invited him to look over his shoulder to see the
catastrophe that had already taken place.
Faculty of Law
University of Amsterdam
not es
1. References to Schmitt can be found in Benjamin 2003a, 239, nn14, 16, and 17.
Samuel Weber coined the term methodological extremism (1992,7).
2. Taubes probably received a copy from Schmitt himself, whom he visited in the
1970s in his hometown of Plettenberg. On the relationship between Schmitt and Taubes,
see Taubes 1987, .
3. Schmitt rst referred to the letter in Hamlet oder Hekuba; oder, Der Einbruch
der Zeit in das Spiel (1999, 64). He also distributed copies of the letter to friends and
students (Lethen 1999, 56). Schmitts biographer, Joseph Bendersky, who interviewed
Schmitt several times in Plettenberg in the 1970s,told me that Schmitt kept Benjamins
letter in a special le, which also contained letters from Ernst Jnger and Rudolf Smend.
His impression was that Schmitt kept the le with the specic purpose of showing it to
visitors.
4. Te letter was rst published by Rolf Tiedemann and Hermann Schweppenhuser
in their edition of Benjamins complete works. Agamben observes that the letter has
always appeared scandalous (2005,52).
5. Te characterizations are Suzanne Heils and Hans Blumenbergs respectively
(Heil 1996, 16061;Blumenberg 1974, 113).
6. As Mathias Eichorn argues, it is remarkable that Schmitt often uses the concept
of theology and that he is even considered as the representative of a particular political
theology, even though he never wrote about theology and abstained from every theological
remark or argumentation (1994,24).
7. In footnotes and bibliographies, Schmitt cites the issues immediately preceding
and following the one containing Benjamins essay. Agamben concludes that as an avid
reader of and contributor to the Archiv, Schmitt could not easily have missed a text
like Critique of Violence, which . . . touched upon issues that were essential for him
(2005,5253).
8. Derrida writes: Carl Schmitt . . . congratulated him for his essay (1994,69, trans-
lation mine). Te source of Derridas remark is probably an essay by Jrgen Habermas, who

I believe that Benjamins allegory of the angel of history, though

probably not conceived in reaction to Schmitts theory of the restraining
force, can be read as an answer to it.
10
Although Schmitt does not share
the belief in progress that Benjamin criticizes, he does seek to justify the
continuing violence in light of a future event, that is, the end-time that,
announced by a period of anarchy and lawlessness, is to be restrained at all
costs. Schmitt therefore tends to represent the suering of past generations
as a meaningful episode in the history of salvation: it appears as a necessary
sacrice to prevent the threatening catastrophe. By contrast, Benjamin, by
evoking his allegory of the angel, suggests that the worst is already taking
place, not despite but because of the willingness to accept state violence
as a temporary measure. In Benjamins view, then, it is the very attempt to
found the present order on violence that has caused the catastrophe, which
Schmitt believed had been avoided by the state of exception.
concl usion
When Taubes characterized Benjamins 1930 letter to Schmitt as a mine
that can blow to pieces our conception of the intellectual history of the
Weimar period, he was suggesting that the anities between these think-
ers had been both more substantial and more problematic than had been
acknowledged in literature. My analysis of this relationship, however, leads
to a dierent conclusion: the dialogue between Schmitt and Benjamin
turns out to have been critical from the start. One should, for instance, not
be misled by Benjamins praising words in his 1930 letter, for it was intended
to accompany a copy of his Origin of German Tragic Drama, in which an
implicit criticism of the Schmitts theory of sovereignty could already
be found. Although Schmitt appears to have taken Benjamins criticism
seriously, his remark in Hamlet or Hecuba that he had been particularly
indebted to Benjamin should not mislead us either, for it did not pre-
vent him from formulating sharp objections to Benjamins interpretation of
sovereignty instead.
Beginning in the mid-1930s, both thinkers seem to have distanced
themselves from each other even further. Tus Benjamin, in On the
Concept of History, described the Schmittian state of exception as an
instrument of state oppression, calling for a real state of exception that
would bring the oppression to an end. In this context, he evoked the
allegory of the angel of history, who sought to redeem the past, ending
oppression and repairing what had been smashed. As I have explained,
PR 44.4_04_de Wilde.indd 378 05/11/11 10:37 AM
benjamin and schmitt
379
Benjamins allegory of the angel can be understood as a critical response
to Schmitts theologico-political notion of the restraining force: while
Schmitt, by invoking the gure of the restraining force, legitimized state
violence as necessary in order to prevent a future catastrophe, Benjamin,
with the image of the angel, invited him to look over his shoulder to see the
catastrophe that had already taken place.
Faculty of Law
University of Amsterdam
not es
1. References to Schmitt can be found in Benjamin 2003a, 239, nn14, 16, and 17.
Samuel Weber coined the term methodological extremism (1992,7).
2. Taubes probably received a copy from Schmitt himself, whom he visited in the
1970s in his hometown of Plettenberg. On the relationship between Schmitt and Taubes,
see Taubes 1987, .
3. Schmitt rst referred to the letter in Hamlet oder Hekuba; oder, Der Einbruch
der Zeit in das Spiel (1999, 64). He also distributed copies of the letter to friends and
students (Lethen 1999, 56). Schmitts biographer, Joseph Bendersky, who interviewed
Schmitt several times in Plettenberg in the 1970s,told me that Schmitt kept Benjamins
letter in a special le, which also contained letters from Ernst Jnger and Rudolf Smend.
His impression was that Schmitt kept the le with the specic purpose of showing it to
visitors.
4. Te letter was rst published by Rolf Tiedemann and Hermann Schweppenhuser
in their edition of Benjamins complete works. Agamben observes that the letter has
always appeared scandalous (2005,52).
5. Te characterizations are Suzanne Heils and Hans Blumenbergs respectively
(Heil 1996, 16061;Blumenberg 1974, 113).
6. As Mathias Eichorn argues, it is remarkable that Schmitt often uses the concept
of theology and that he is even considered as the representative of a particular political
theology, even though he never wrote about theology and abstained from every theological
remark or argumentation (1994,24).
7. In footnotes and bibliographies, Schmitt cites the issues immediately preceding
and following the one containing Benjamins essay. Agamben concludes that as an avid
reader of and contributor to the Archiv, Schmitt could not easily have missed a text
like Critique of Violence, which . . . touched upon issues that were essential for him
(2005,5253).
8. Derrida writes: Carl Schmitt . . . congratulated him for his essay (1994,69, trans-
lation mine). Te source of Derridas remark is probably an essay by Jrgen Habermas, who

PR 44.4_04_de Wilde.indd 379 05/11/11 10:37 AM

ma r c de wi l de
380
claims that Carl Schmitt was . . . forced to congratulate the young Walter Benjamin with
his essay on G. Sorel (1987, 112).
9. Te translations from Hamlet or Hecuba are mine.
10. Although Schmitt claims he had developed his theory of the katechon as early
as 1932, he rst mentions it explicitly in a 1942 article (1995, 43536). Benjamin mentions
the image of the angel of history in 1940, in his ninth thesis on the concept of history
(2003b, 392).
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