Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION



G.R. No. 106087. April 7, 1993.
ROLITO GO Y TAMBUNTING, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HON. BENJAMIN V. PELAYO, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH
168, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, NCJR, PASIG, METRO MANILA and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Law Firm of Raymundo A. Armovit for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for public respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; BAIL; NATURE OF BAIL PROCEEDINGS.
Respondent judge is correct in appreciating the nature of the bail proceedings. "[T]he hearing of an
application for bail should be summary or otherwise in the discretion of the court. By 'summary
hearing' [is] meant such brief and speedy method of receiving and considering the evidence of guilt
as is practicable and consistent with the purpose of the hearing which is merely to determine the
weight of the evidence for the purpose of bail. In such a hearing, the court 'does not sit to try the
merits or to enter into any nice inquiry as to the weight that ought to be allowed to the evidence for or
against accused, nor will it speculate on the outcome of the trial or on what further evidence may be
therein offered is admitted.' . . . The course of the inquiry may be left to the discretion of the court
which may confine itself to receiving such evidence as has reference to substantial matters avoiding
unnecessary thoroughness in the examination and cross-examination of witnesses and reducing to a
reasonable minimum the amount of corroboration particularly on details that are not essential to the
purpose of the hearing."
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; PROCEDURE IN GRANT OF BAIL IS SIMILAR TO PROCEDURE IN
CANCELLATION OF BAIL. Although the proceedings conducted by respondent judge were not
for an application for bail but to cancel that which was issued to petitioner, the principles and
procedure governing hearings on an application for bail were correctly applied by respondent judge
in the cancellation of bail proceedings since the bail was issued by this Court in G.R. No. 101837
without prejudice to any lawful order which the trial court may issue in case the Provincial Prosecutor
moves for the cancellation of the bail. The grant of bail was made without prejudice because where
bail is not a matter of right, as in this case, the prosecution must be given the opportunity to prove
that there is a strong evidence of guilt. In the cancellation of bail proceedings before him, the judge
was confronted with the same issue as in an application for bail, i.e., whether the evidence of guilt is
so strong as to convince the court that the accused is not entitled to bail. Hence, the similarity of the
nature and procedure of the hearings for an application for bail and the cancellation of the same.
3. LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS; DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES; ESSENCE OF RULE ON
DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES. The Constitution commands that in all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right to have "a speedy, impartial, and public trial." This right is a
derivation and elaboration of the more fundamental right to due process of law. The rule on the
disqualification of judges is a mechanism for enforcing the requirements of due process.
4. ID.; ID.; REASON FOR REQUIREMENT OF IMPARTIALITY ON PART OF JUDGE. "It is now
beyond dispute that due process cannot be satisfied in the absence of that degree of objectivity on
the part of a judge sufficient to reassure litigants of his being fair and being just. Thereby there is the
legitimate expectation that the decision arrived at would be the application of the law to the facts as
found by a judge who does not play favorites." The "cold neutrality of an impartial judge," although
required primarily for the benefit of the litigants, is also designed to preserve the integrity of the
judiciary and more fundamentally, to gain and maintain the people's faith in the institutions they have
erected when they adopted our Constitution. The notion that "justice must satisfy the appearance of
justice" is an imposition by the citizenry, as the final judge of the conduct of public business,
including trials, upon the courts of a high and uncompromising standard in the proper dispensation of
justice.
5. ID.; ID.; EFFECT OF MOTION FOR INHIBITION, DENIAL OF MOTION FOR INHIBITION, AND
PETITION CHALLENGING DENIAL OF MOTION FOR INHIBITION. Hence, if the trial judge
decides to deny a motion for inhibition based on Rule 137, Sec. 1, par. 2, he shall proceed with the
trial, unless of course restrained by either the Court of Appeals or by this Court. The mere filing of a
motion for inhibition before the trial court or a petition before either the Court of Appeals or the
Supreme Court challenging an order of the trial judge denying a motion for inhibition will not deprive
the judge of authority to proceed with the case. Otherwise, by the expedient of filing such motion or
petition, although the same be lacking in merit, a party can unduly delay the trial.
6. ID.; ID.; EVIDENCE REQUIRED IN DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGE; BIAS AND PREJUDICE
NOT PRESUMED. While bias and prejudice, which are relied upon by petitioner, have been
recognized as valid reasons for the voluntary inhibition of the judge under Rule 137, Sec. 1, par. 2,
the established rule is that mere suspicion that a judge is partial is not enough. There should be
clear and convincing evidence to prove the charge. Bare allegations of partiality and prejudgment
will not suffice. Bias and prejudice cannot be presumed especially if weighed against a judge's
sacred obligation under his oath of office to administer justice without respect to person and do
equal right to the poor and the rich.
7. ID.; ID.; IN CASE AT BAR, THE ACT OF RESPONDENT JUDGE OF NOT SUSPENDING
HEARING OF CASE AFTER DENIAL OF PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR RECUSATION AND
DURING PENDENCY OF PETITION CHALLENGING HIS ORDERS DENYING THE MOTION FOR
RECUSATION AND THE MOTION TO SUSPEND PROCEEDINGS AND TRANSFER VENUE
OUTSIDE METRO MANILA NOT PROOF OF PARTIALITY. In the case at hand, respondent
judge acted in accordance with the Rules and prevailing jurisprudence when he proceeded with the
trial after denying petitioner's Motion for Recusation. Petitioner cannot, therefore, cite the fact that
respondent judge did not suspend hearing the case during the pendency of this petition as proof of
his claim that the judge is partial.
8. ID.; ID.; IN CASE AT BAR, THE ACT OF RESPONDENT JUDGE OF OVERRULING
PETITIONER'S OBJECTION TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF THE EXTRAJUDICIAL STATEMENT OF
A PROSECUTION WITNESS WHO DID NOT TESTIFY THEREON, NOT PROOF OF BIAS;
REASON. The first of these allegedly "palpably biased and hostile orders" was that issued by
respondent judge on August 14, 1992 overruling petitioner's objection to the admissibility of an
affidavit of Geronimo Gonzaga offered by the prosecution. Petitioner contends that respondent judge
should not have admitted the extrajudicial statements of Gonzaga because the latter did not take the
witness stand to affirm the statements contained in the document presented by the prosecution.
Petitioner suspected that respondent judge was trying to bolster the evidence for the prosecution.
This contention is without merit. The mere fact that the trial judge overruled petitioner's objection to
the admissibility of a particular piece of evidence is not proof of bias. In Jandionco v. Pearanda, it
was held that "[d]ivergence of opinions between a judge hearing a case and a party's counsel, as to
applicable laws and jurisprudence, is not a sufficient ground to disqualify the judge from hearing the
case on the ground of bias and manifest partiality." If petitioner disagrees with the judge's ruling, he
may still question the admissibility of the evidence when he files an appeal, in case a judgment of
conviction is rendered. To conclude, however, that respondent judge, by overruling the objection
raised by petitioner's counsel, was trying to strengthen the prosecution's evidence is not only
baseless because there was no evidence given to support this conclusion, but also premature
because at that stage, the judge was not yet appreciating the merits and weight of the particular
piece of evidence in question but was merely ruling on its admissibility. Petitioner's conclusion that
"the offer and admission of Gonzaga's hearsay 'eyewitness' statement suggest a sinister concert to
simulate evidential strength" is, if not suggestive of paranoia, at the very least, an overreaction.
9. ID.; ID.; IN CASE AT BAR, THE ACT OF RESPONDENT JUDGE OF CONSIDERING THE
CANCELLATION OF BAIL PROCEEDINGS RIPE FOR RESOLUTION AND REFUSING TO ALLOW
PETITIONER'S COUNSEL TO PRESENT ANYMORE WITNESSES, NOT MOTIVATED BY BIAS;
REASON. The other supervening event allegedly demonstrating the judge's partiality occurred
during one of the hearings concerning the prosecution's motion for the cancellation of petitioner's
bail. On September 28, 1992, after eleven (11) witnesses had been presented for the prosecution
and two (2) for the defense, respondent judge considered the cancellation of bail proceedings ripe
for resolution and refused to allow petitioner's counsel to present anymore witnesses. The reasons
given by respondent judge for his ruling were: (1) the proceeding in the cancellation of bail is
summary and different from the hearing on the merits; (2) the court need not receive exactly the
same number of witnesses from both the prosecution and the defense; and (3) the counsel for
petitioner previously limited himself to two (2) witnesses as borne out by the record of the case . . .
Having determined that respondent judge made a proper appreciation of the nature of the bail
proceedings before him, we likewise hold that it was within his discretion to limit the number of
witnesses for petitioner. The power of the court in the bail proceedings to make a determination as to
whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong "implies a full exercise of judicial discretion." If the trial
judge believes that the evidence before him is sufficient for him to rule on the bail issue, after giving
both parties their opportunity to present evidence, it is within his authority to consider the bail
proceedings ripe for resolution. In any case, respondent judge acceded to petitioner's request and
allowed him to present more witnesses in the bail proceedings. In fine, the Court holds that the
respondent judge's ruling on September 28, 1992 considering the prosecution's motion for
cancellation of bail ripe for resolution on the basis of the evidence already presented was not
motivated by bias or prejudice.
10. ID.; ID.; IN CASE AT BAR, RESPONDENT JUDGE'S ORDER ALLOWING PETITIONER'S
ARRAIGNMENT AND TRIAL WITHOUT BENEFIT OF PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION, NOT
NECESSARILY PROOF OF PARTIALITY. Petitioner, in this Motion for Reconsideration, restates
his argument in the Petition that the respondent judge is biased, as evidenced by his Order dated
July 17, 1991 which in effect allowed petitioner's arraignment and trial without the benefit of a
preliminary investigation. It is true that in Go v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 101837, February
11, 1992, a divided Court nullified respondent judge's July 17, 1991 Order and ordered that a
preliminary investigation be conducted. But the erroneous Order of respondent judge is not
necessarily proof of partiality. In People v. Lacson, we held that erroneous rulings do not always
constitute evidence of bias. In Luciano v. Mariano, we made the pronouncement that "[t]he mere fact
that the judge has erroneously ruled against the same litigant on two or more occasions does not
create in our minds a decisive pattern of malice on the part of the judge against that particular
litigant. This is not an unusual occurrence on our courts . . ." Moreover, the fact that the erroneous
order issued by a judge can be remedied and was actually corrected, as in this case, militates
against the disqualification of the judge on the ground of bias or partiality.
11. ID.; ID.; IN CASE AT BAR, MOTION FOR RECUSATION IS ANOTHER DILATORY MOVE. In
the case at hand, the Motion for Recusation filed by petitioner must be viewed in the light of his
lawyers' many attempts to suspend the proceedings before the respondent judge. Before the trial
court, petitioner tried at least eight (8) times, not merely to reset the scheduled hearings, but to
suspend the trial of the case itself. The following pleadings filed by petitioner before respondent
judge all prayed either to suspend the proceedings entirely or for the respondent judge to delay the
disposition of a particular issue . . . Before this Court, petitioner has already filed three (3) petitions
assailing various orders of respondent judge in connection with the single murder case pending
against him. Apart from the present petition which is docketed as G.R. No. 106087, petitioner has
previously filed two (2) other petitions docketed as G.R. Nos. 101837 and 105424. In all three (3)
petitions, petitioner applied for a temporary restraining order to have the proceedings before the trial
court held in abeyance. The murder case involving only one accused, the petitioner, has become
unnecessarily complicated and the proceedings before the trial court protracted, as can be gleaned
from the fact that between the filing of the information on July 11, 1991 and the end of last year or
December 31, 1992, the records of the case now consist of four (4) volumes and the transcript of
stenographic notes have reached a total of one thousand five hundred and twenty three (1523)
pages. Hearings are still being conducted. When taken in the light of petitioner's repeated attempts
to have the proceedings in the murder case suspended and his lawyers' transparent maneuvers for
the needless protraction of the case, the Motion for Recusation can only be viewed as another
dilatory move and the present Motion for Reconsideration a further ploy to stall hearings.
12. ID.; CONDUCT REQUIRED OF A LAWYER BEFORE COURTS AND JUDICIAL OFFICERS.
The Rules of Court commands members of the bar "[t]o observe and maintain the respect due to the
courts of justice and judicial officers." Reinforcing this rule of conduct is the Code of Professional
Responsibility which states in Canon 11 the following: "A lawyer shall observe and maintain the
respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others." Rule
11.03 of the Code further states: "A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing
language or behaviour before the courts." The next succeeding rule, Rule 11.03 adds: "A lawyer
shall not attribute to a judge motives not supported by the record or having materiality to the case."
13. ID.; ID.; REASON FOR THE REQUIREMENT. To be sure, the adversarial nature of our legal
system has tempted members of the bar, in pursuing their duty to advance the interests of their
clients, to use strong language. But this privilege is not a license to malign our courts of justice.
Irreverent behavior towards the courts by members of the bar is proscribed, not so much for the
sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but more importantly, for the maintenance of
respect for our judicial system, so necessary for the country's stability. "Time and again, this Court
has admonished and punished, in varying degrees, members of the bar for statements, disrespectful
or irreverent, acrimonious or defamatory, of this Court or the lower courts . . . To be sure, lawyers
may come up with various methods, perhaps more effective, in calling the Court's attention to the
issues involved. The language vehicle does not run short of expressions, emphatic but respectful,
convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive."
14. ID.; ID.; AN INSTANCE OF HIGHLY DEROGATORY, OFFENSIVE AND CONTEMPTUOUS
LANGUAGE TOWARD A JUDGE. Indeed, in the Motion for Reconsideration, counsels for
petitioner describe as "unparalleled for sheer malevolence" respondent judge's allegedly erroneous
assumptions. Petitioner's lawyers further stated: "Petitioner's counsel, citing the above proceedings,
contested the trial judge's baseless, nay despotic attempt to muzzle his right to be heard in his
defense. . ." The trial judge's actions were also branded as an "obviously unholy rush to do petitioner
in . . ." In the Urgent Motion filed by petitioner on December 16, 1992, respondent judge is alleged to
have: (a) "generated belief of his being under contract to do the prosecution's bidding;" (2) "evinced
contempt for Supreme Court case law;" and (3) "dishonored his judicial oath and duty to hear before
he condemns, proceed upon inquiry, and render judgment on a man's liberty only after a full trial of
the facts." . . . In light of the above doctrines and jurisprudence, as well as the inherent power and
authority of this Court to cite members of the Bar in contempt and to discipline them, we are of the
opinion that the language used by petitioner's lawyers is highly derogatory, offensive and
contemptuous.
R E S O L U T I O N
ROMERO, J p:
This is a Motion for Reconsideration of this Court's Resolution dated September 23, 1992 denying
petitioner's Petition and affirming the Decision and Resolution promulgated on March 9, 1992 and
June 26, 1992, respectively, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 26305. 1 The CA Decision
and Resolution upheld the following: (1) respondent Judge Benjamin V. Pelayo's Order dated
September 4, 1991 which denied petitioner's Motion for Recusation; and (2) respondent judge's
Order dated September 17, 1991 denying petitioner's Motion to Suspend Proceedings and to
Transfer Venue Outside Metro Manila.
A review of the antecedent facts of this case, particularly those wherein respondent Judge
participated, is in order to arrive at a just and correct assessment of his acts vis-a-vis the petitioner.
On July 2, 1991, Eldon Maguan was shot inside his car along Wilson Street, San Juan, Metro
Manila. After conducting an investigation of the shooting incident, the police identified petitioner
Rolito Go as the prime suspect in the commission of the crime. On July 8, 1991, petitioner,
accompanied by two lawyers, presented himself before the San Juan Police Station. He was
arrested and booked for the shooting of Maguan. The police filed a complaint for frustrated homicide
with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal.
On July 11, 1991, an information for murder was filed against petitioner before the Regional Trial
Court, Pasig, Metro Manila, the victim Eldon Maguan having died on July 9, 1991.
On the same day, July 11, 1991, counsel for petitioner filed with the Prosecutor an omnibus motion
praying for petitioner's immediate release and for a preliminary investigation. Provincial Prosecutor
Mauro Castro interposed no objection to petitioner's being granted provisional liberty on a cash bond
of P100,000.00.
The case was raffled to the sala of respondent judge, the Hon. Benjamin V. Pelayo, who, on July 12,
1991, approved the cash bond posted by petitioner and ordered his release.
On July 16, 1991, respondent judge issued an Order granting leave for the Provincial Prosecutor of
Rizal to conduct a preliminary investigation.
However, on July 17, 1991, respondent judge motu proprio issued an Order 2 which: (a) recalled the
July 12, 1991 Order granting bail; (b) directed petitioner to surrender within 48 hours from notice; (c)
cancelled the July 16, 1991 Order granting leave for the Provincial Prosecutor to conduct a
preliminary investigation; (d) treated petitioner's omnibus motion for immediate release and
preliminary investigation dated July 11, 1991 as a petition for bail.
On July 19, 1991, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus questioning the
July 17, 1991 Order of respondent judge. On the same day, petitioner filed before the trial court a
motion to suspend all the proceedings pending the resolution of the petition filed before the Supreme
Court. 3 This motion was denied by respondent judge. 4
On July 23, 1991, petitioner voluntarily surrendered to the CAPCOM. Upon motion 5 by petitioner,
the respondent judge issued an Order 6 directing "the accused's continued detention at the
CAPCOM until such time as the Court shall have properly determined the place where accused
should be detained."
On July 29, 1991, the National Bureau of Investigation wrote a letter 7 to the trial court requesting
that custody of petitioner be transferred to the Bureau in view of an investigation for illegal
possession of firearms involving petitioner.
On the same date, July 29, 1991, the trial court issued an Order 8 granting the NBI temporary
custody of petitioner subject to the following conditions: (a) the petitioner is to be accorded his
constitutional rights during the investigation; (b) the NBI investigation is to be conducted only during
office hours and petitioner is to be returned to the custody of the CAPCOM at the end of each day;
and (c) the NBI should report to the trial court the status of the investigation.
On July 30, 1991, petitioner filed a motion 9 before the trial court praying that the Order dated July
29, 1991 be nullified and recalled.
The following day, July 31, 1991, the NBI filed a motion 10 praying that it be granted full custody of
petitioner pending the investigation of the case involving illegal possession of firearms.
An Order 11 was issued by the trial Court dated August 1, 1991 setting for hearing the issue
concerning the proper venue of petitioner's detention.
After the hearing on petitioner's custody, the trial court issued an Order 12 dated August 2, 1991
ordering the CAPCOM to bring the person of petitioner to the court not later than August 5, 1991 so
that a commitment order for his detention at the Rizal Provincial Jail could be issued. The
Commitment Order 13 ordering the Provincial Warden of the Provincial Jail of Pasig to take custody
of petitioner was issued on August 5, 1991.
On August 8, 1991, petitioner filed a Motion for Recusation 14 praying that respondent judge inhibit
himself from hearing the case. The motion was denied by respondent judge in his Order dated
September 4, 1991. 15
On August 22, 1991, petitioner filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings and Transfer Venue Outside
Metro Manila which was denied by respondent judge on September 17, 1991. 16
Petitioner was arraigned on August 23, 1991. In view of his refusal to enter a plea, a plea of "Not
Guilty" was entered for him by the trial court. 17
In the meantime, this Court, by Resolution dated July 24, 1991, remanded to the Court of Appeals
the petition filed by petitioner assailing the July 17, 1991 Order of the trial court.
On August 27, 1991, petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus before the Court of Appeals.
On September 23, 1991, the Court of Appeals rendered a consolidated decision dismissing the two
petitions. However, upon petition by petitioner, this Court by an 8-6 vote in G.R. No. 101837 issued a
decision reversing the, CA decision and ordering (a) the Provincial Prosecutor to conduct a
preliminary investigation; and (b) the release of petitioner without prejudice to any order that the trial
court may issue, should the Provincial Prosecutor move for cancellation of bail at the conclusion of
the preliminary investigation.
After conducting a preliminary investigation pursuant to this Court's decision in G.R. No. 101837, the
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor issued a Resolution dated February 27, 1992 finding probable cause
to charge petitioner with the crime of murder. The Resolution was approved by the Provincial
Prosecutor who filed with the trial court a motion to cancel the bail of petitioner and a motion to set
the criminal case for resumption of the trial on the merits.
Petitioner attempted to have the Resolution of the Prosecutor reversed by appealing to the
Department of Justice, and filing petitions with the Court of Appeals (CA, G.R. SP No. 27738) and
finally to this Court (G.R. No. 105424), but his efforts did not meet with success.
On October 1, 1991, petitioner filed another petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus before
this Court seeking to annul: (1) the Order of the trial court dated September 4, 1991 denying
petitioner's Motion for Recusation; and (2) the Order dated September 17, 1991 denying petitioner's
Motion to Suspend Proceedings and Transfer Venue Outside Metro Manila. The petition, docketed
as G.R. No. 101772, was remanded to the Court of Appeals.
On March 9, 1992, the Court of Appeals (13th Division) rendered a decision dismissing the petition.
As to the denial of petitioner's Motion for Recusation, the Court of Appeals held in part:
"On the basis of the allegation of the petition, the Court is not inclined to strike down the denial of
petitioner's motion for recusation as a grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent judge
absent any clear showing of such grave abuse of his discretion. The allegation of petitioner in
support of his motion for recusation are conclusions based on his own fears and are therefore
speculations than anything else.
In order to warrant a finding of 'prejudicial' publicity as urged by the petitioner, there must be
allegation and proof that the judge has been unduly influenced, not simply that he might be, by the
"barrage" of publicity (Martelino vs. Alejandro, 32 SCRA 106; emphasis supplied). While there is
such allegation in the petition, the Court has however found no proof so far adduced sufficient to
accept the petitioner's claim that the respondent judge has been unduly influenced by the alleged
publicity.
Additionally, We quote hereunder the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in the case of Aparicio
vs. Andal, 175 SCRA 569 where, citing the case of Pimentel vs. Salanga, 21 SCRA 160, it said:
Efforts to attain fair, just and impartial trial and decision, have a natural and alluring appeal. But, we
are not licensed to indulge in unjustified assumptions, or make a speculative approval to this ideal. It
ill behooves this Court to tar and feather a judge as biased or prejudiced, simply because counsel for
a party litigant happens to complain against him. As applied here, respondent judge has not as yet
crossed the line that divides partiality and impartiality. He has not thus far stepped to one side of the
fulcrum. No act or conduct of his would show arbitrariness or prejudice. Therefore, we are not to
assume what respondent judge, not otherwise legally disqualified, will do in a case before him. We
have had occasion to rule in a criminal case that a charge made before trial that a party 'will not be
given a fair, impartial and just hearing' is 'premature.' Prejudice is not to be presumed. Especially if
weighed against a judge's legal obligation under his oath to administer justice without respect to
person and to equal right to the poor and the rich.' To disqualify or not to disqualify himself then, as
far as respondent judge is concerned, is a matter of conscience." 18
The Court of Appeals also sustained the trial court's denial of petitioner's Motion to Suspend
Proceedings and Transfer Venue Outside Metro Manila with the following pronouncement:
"On the question of the denial by the respondent court of petitioner's motion to suspend proceedings
and transfer venue outside of Metro Manila, suffice it to say that the respondent court was correct in
denying petitioner's motion. For indeed, the authority to order a change of venue or place of trial to
avoid a miscarriage of justice is vested in the Supreme Court by Article VIII, Section 5, paragraph 4
of the Constitution. Neither the respondent court nor this Court has the authority to grant petitioner's
motion for transfer of venue. The cases cited by petitioner in support of this issue were all decided
by the Supreme Court before the advent of the 1973 Constitution where the provision on transfer of
venue was first adopted, hence not applicable to the instant case." 19
Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the CA decision having been denied, 20 a petition under
Rule 45 was filed before this Court on July 29, 1992 assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals.
On September 9, 1992, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing respondent People of
the Philippines, filed a Comment on the Petition.
On September 23, 1992, the Court, after considering the allegations contained, issues raised and
the arguments adduced in the Petition, as well as the Comment filed by the OSG, issued a
Resolution denying the Petition on the ground that the respondent Court of Appeals committed no
reversible error in its assailed decision.
On October 12, 1992, the present Motion for Reconsideration 21 was filed in which petitioner
reiterates his position that respondent judge should inhibit himself from the case.
On December 16, 1992, petitioner filed a pleading captioned "Urgent Motion (for preliminary
mandatory injunction)." In said Motion, petitioner questioned the Order of the trial court dated
December 9, 1992 denying petitioner's Motion to Reopen Hearing (of the cancellation of bail
proceedings) and to Present Last Witness. It appears that after the presentation of eleven (11)
witnesses by the prosecution and six (6) by the defense, the trial court considered the question
concerning the cancellation of petitioner's bail ripe for resolution. Thereafter, petitioner filed a Motion
to Reopen and Present Last Witness. 22 But the trial court issued an Order 23 dated December 9,
1992 which, among other things, denied the Motion. In the Urgent Motion filed with this Court on
December 16, 1992, petitioner prayed "for the issuance forthwith and ex parte of a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction directing respondent judge to allow petitioner to complete his defense evidence
by presenting his last witness on the bail issue . . ." 24
On December 29, 1992, the Court passed a Resolution 25 issuing a temporary restraining order
(TRO) restraining respondent judge from resolving the bail issue and directing him to allow petitioner
to present his last witness. This Resolution was clarified and the TRO confirmed in another
Resolution issued by the Court on January 11, 1993. 26
On January 8, 1993, the OSG filed a Comment on petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
At the outset, it is noteworthy to observe that petitioner in this Motion for Reconsideration no longer
raises the question of change of venue. Moreover, the Motion for Reconsideration is predicated on
what petitioner alleges are "the supervening events demonstrating partiality to the prosecution, on
one hand, and hostility against petitioner, on the other." 27 Perforce, this Resolution shall only
consider the allegations and issues raised in this Motion for Reconsideration and in the Comment
thereon filed by the OSG.
Petitioner's Motion for Recusation filed before the trial court is based on Rule 137, sec. 1, par. 2 of
the Rules of Court on disqualification of judges.
The Constitution commands that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to
have "a speedy, impartial, and public trial." 28 (Emphasis supplied) This right is a derivation and
elaboration of the more fundamental right to due process of law. 29 The rule on the disqualification
of judges is a mechanism for enforcing the requirements of due process. "It is now beyond dispute
that due process cannot be satisfied in the absence of that degree of objectivity on the part of a
judge sufficient to reassure litigants of his being fair and being just. Thereby there is the legitimate
expectation that the decision arrived at would be the application of the law to the facts as found by a
judge who does not play favorites." 30
The "cold neutrality of an impartial judge," 31 although required primarily for the benefit of the
litigants, is also designed to preserve the integrity of the judiciary and more fundamentally, to gain
and maintain the people's faith in the institutions they have erected when they adopted our
Constitution. The notion that "justice must satisfy the appearance of justice" 32 is an imposition by
the citizenry, as the final judge of the conduct of public business, including trials, upon the courts of a
high and uncompromising standard in the proper dispensation of justice.
While bias and prejudice, which are relied upon by petitioner, have been recognized as valid
reasons for the voluntary inhibition 33 of the judge under Rule 137, sec. 1, par. 2, 34 the established
rule is that mere suspicion that a judge is partial is not enough. There should be clear and
convincing evidence to prove the charge. 35 Bare allegations of partiality and prejudgment will not
suffice. 36 Bias and prejudice cannot be presumed especially if weighed against a judge's sacred
obligation under his oath of office to administer justice without respect to person and do equal right
to the poor and the rich. 37
In the Motion for Reconsideration now before the Court, petitioner, to prove his allegation of bias on
the part of respondent judge, takes the latter to task for continuing with the trial during the pendency
of this petition stating that:
"Even as the instant petition for the trial judge's recusation pends, the latter did not see fit to suspend
the hearings. Indeed the trial judge has been conducting marathon hearings which, in the context of
his questioned fairness and impartiality, roars out as a railroad rush to make official a pre-
determined verdict of guilt." 38
The Court draws the attention of petitioner and his counsels 39 to the procedure to be followed by
the judge before whom a motion for disqualification has been filed. Rule 137, sec. 2 provides:
"If it be claimed that an official is disqualified from sitting as above provided, the party objecting to his
competency may, in writing, file with the official his objection, stating the grounds therefor, and the
official shall thereupon proceed with the trial, or withdraw therefrom, in accordance with his
determination of the question of his disqualification . . ." (Emphasis supplied)
In People v. Moreno, 40 we stated that if a judge denies the motion for disqualification and rules
favorably on his competency to try the case, it becomes a matter of official duty for him to proceed
with the trial and decision of the case. He cannot shirk the responsibility without the risk of being
called upon to account for his dereliction. Although this case was decided prior to the introduction of
par. 2 of Rule 137, sec. 1, there is no reason why the procedure laid down in Rule 137, sec. 2 and
applied in People v. Moreno should not likewise apply to a motion for inhibition filed pursuant to Rule
137, sec. 1, par. 2. 41 In fact, in Genoblazo v. Court of Appeals, 42 the Court applied the procedure
prescribed in Rule 137, sec. 2 when the trial judge denied a party's motion for inhibition under Rule
137, sec. 1, par. 2, thus:
"Moreover, the trial judge acted correctly in proceeding with the case by setting it for pre-trial since it
is within her sound discretion, after her decision in favor of her own competency, to either proceed
with the trial or refrain from acting on the case until determination of the issue of her disqualification
by the appellate court [Section 2 of Rule 137 of the Revised Rules of Court; De la Paz v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, supra, at 76]. 43
Hence, if the trial judge decides to deny a motion for inhibition based on Rule 137, sec. 1, par. 2, he
shall proceed with the trial, unless of course restrained by either the Court of Appeals or by this
Court. The mere filing of a motion for inhibition before the trial court or a petition before either the
Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court challenging an order of the trial judge denying a motion for
inhibition will not deprive the judge of authority to proceed with the case. Otherwise, by the expedient
of filing such motion or petition, although the same be lacking in merit, a party can unduly delay the
trial.
In the case at hand, respondent judge acted in accordance with the Rules and prevailing
jurisprudence when he proceeded with the trial after denying petitioner's Motion for Recusation.
Petitioner cannot, therefore, cite the fact that respondent judge did not suspend hearing the case
during the pendency of this petition as proof of his claim that the judge is partial. This Court has not,
in connection with the petition, issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) enjoining respondent
judge from further hearing the case. The TRO which this Court issued on December 29, 1992 after
the petition was denied and pending this Motion for Reconsideration ordered the judge to desist from
resolving the question on the cancellation of bail until the last witness of petitioner was heard. The
TRO did not restrain the judge from hearing the case. On the contrary, the judge was ordered to
hear petitioner's last witness in the cancellation of bail proceedings. 44 Because it was his duty to
continue trying the case and there was no order from this Court not to do so, respondent judge
committed no impropriety evincing partiality when he continued hearing the case during the
pendency of the petition before this Court.
Petitioner, in this Motion for Reconsideration, claims that since the issuance of the Court Resolution
dated September 23, 1992 denying his Petition, there have been "supervening events demonstrating
partiality to the prosecution on one hand, and hostility against petitioner, on the other hand." 45
Petitioner alleges:
"Pursuing his unconstitutional bent first evinced when, without benefit of preliminary investigation,
petitioner's arraignment and trial, then arrest and detention for almost a year was peremptorily
ordered which this Court reversed and rebuked (G.R. no. 101837, promulgated 11 February
1992) the unchastened trial judge let out yet with two palpably biased and hostile orders, infra,
clearly and unmistakably demonstrating an unconstitutional prejudgment of petitioner's culpability."
46
The first of these allegedly "palpably biased and hostile orders" was that issued by respondent judge
on August 14, 1992 overruling petitioner's objection to the admissibility of an affidavit of Geronimo
Gonzaga offered by the prosecution. Petitioner contends that respondent judge should not have
admitted the extrajudicial statements of Gonzaga because the latter did not take the witness stand to
affirm the statements contained in the document presented by the prosecution. Petitioner suspected
that respondent judge was trying to bolster the evidence for the prosecution.
This contention is without merit. The mere fact that the trial judge overruled petitioner's objection to
the admissibility of a particular piece of evidence is not proof of bias. In Jandionco v. Pearanda, 47
it was held that "[d]ivergence of opinions between a judge hearing a case and a party's counsel, as
to applicable laws and jurisprudence, is not a sufficient ground to disqualify the judge from hearing
the case on the ground of bias and manifest partiality." 48 If petitioner disagrees with the judge's
ruling, he may still question the admissibility of the evidence when he files an appeal, in case a
judgment of conviction is rendered. To conclude, however, that respondent judge, by overruling the
objection raised by petitioner's counsel, was trying to strengthen the prosecution's evidence is not
only baseless because there was no evidence given to support this conclusion, but also premature
because at that stage, the judge was not yet appreciating the merits and weight of the particular
piece of evidence in question but was merely ruling on its admissibility. Petitioner's conclusion that
"the offer and admission of Gonzaga's hearsay 'eyewitness' statement suggest a sinister concert to
simulate evidential strength" 49 is, if not suggestive of paranoia, at the very least, an overreaction.
The other supervening event allegedly demonstrating the judge's partiality occurred during one of
the hearings concerning the prosecution's motion for the cancellation of petitioner's bail. On
September 28, 1992, after eleven (11) witnesses had been presented for the prosecution and two
(2) for the defense, respondent judge considered the cancellation of bail proceedings ripe for
resolution and refused to allow petitioner's counsel to present anymore witnesses. The reasons
given by respondent judge for his ruling were: (1) the proceeding in the cancellation of bail is
summary and different from the hearing on the merits; (2) the court need not receive exactly the
same number of witnesses from both the prosecution and the defense; and (3) the counsel for
petitioner previously limited himself to two (2) witnesses as borne out by the record of the case. 50
Respondent judge is correct in appreciating the nature of the bail proceedings. "[T]he hearing of an
application for bail should be summary or otherwise in the discretion of the court. By 'summary
hearing' [is] meant such brief and speedy method of receiving and considering the evidence of guilt
as is practicable and consistent with the purpose of the hearing which is merely to determine the
weight of the evidence for the purpose of bail. In such a hearing, the court 'does not sit to try the
merits or to enter into any nice inquiry as to the weight that ought to be allowed to the evidence for or
against accused, nor will it speculate on the outcome of the trial or on what further evidence may be
therein offered is admitted.' . . . The course of the inquiry may be left to the discretion of the court
which may confine itself to receiving such evidence as has reference to substantial matters avoiding
unnecessary thoroughness in the examination and cross-examination of witnesses and reducing to a
reasonable minimum the amount of corroboration particularly on details that are not essential to the
purpose of the hearing." 51
Although the proceedings conducted by respondent judge were not for an application for bail but to
cancel that which was issued to petitioner, the principles and procedure governing hearings on an
application for bail were correctly applied by respondent judge in the cancellation of bail proceedings
since the bail was issued by this Court in G.R. No. 101837 without prejudice to any lawful order
which the trial court may issue in case the Provincial Prosecutor moves for the cancellation of the
bail. 52 The grant of bail was made without prejudice because where bail is not a matter of right, as
in this case, the prosecution must be given the opportunity to prove that there is a strong evidence of
guilt. 53 In the cancellation of bail proceedings before him, the judge was confronted with the same
issue as in an application for bail, i.e., whether the evidence of guilt is so strong as to convince the
court that the accused is not entitled to bail. Hence, the similarity of the nature and procedure of the
hearings for an application for bail and the cancellation of the same.
Having determined that respondent judge made a proper appreciation of the nature of the bail
proceedings before him, we likewise hold that it was within his discretion to limit the number of
witnesses for petitioner. The power of the court in the bail proceedings to make a determination as to
whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong "implies a full exercise of judicial discretion." 54 If the
trial judge believes that the evidence before him is sufficient for him to rule on the bail issue, after
giving both parties their opportunity to present evidence, it is within his authority to consider the bail
proceedings ripe for resolution. In any case, respondent judge acceded to petitioner's request and
allowed him to present more witnesses in the bail proceedings.
In fine, the Court holds that the respondent judge's ruling on September 28, 1992 considering the
prosecution's motion for cancellation of bail ripe for resolution on the basis of the evidence already
presented was not motivated by bias or prejudice.
Finally, petitioner, in this Motion for Reconsideration, restates his argument in the Petition that the
respondent judge is biased, as evidenced by his Order dated July 17, 1991 55 which in effect
allowed petitioner's arraignment and trial without the benefit of a preliminary investigation.
It is true that in Go v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 101837, February 11, 1992, a divided Court
nullified respondent judge's July 17, 1991 Order and ordered that a preliminary investigation be
conducted. But the erroneous Order of respondent judge is not necessarily proof of partiality. In
People v. Lacson, 56 we held that erroneous rulings do not always constitute evidence of bias. 57 In
Luciano v. Mariano, 58 we made the pronouncement that "[t]he mere fact that the judge has
erroneously ruled against the same litigant on two or more occasions does not create in our minds a
decisive pattern of malice on the part of the judge against that particular litigant. This is not an
unusual occurrence in our courts . . ." Moreover, the fact that the erroneous order issued by a judge
can be remedied and was actually corrected, as in this case, militates against the disqualification of
the judge on the ground of bias or partiality. 59
We have earlier underscored the importance of the rule of disqualification of judges, not only in
safeguarding the rights of litigants to due process of law but also in earning for the judiciary the
people's confidence, an element so essential in the effective administration of justice. The rule
should, therefore, not be used cavalierly to suit a litigant's personal designs or to defeat the ends of
justice. "While We are exacting on the conduct of judges confronted with motions for
disqualification's, We cannot, however, tolerate acts of litigants who, for any conceivable reason,
seek to disqualify a judge for their own purpose, under a plea of bias, hostility, prejudice or
prejudgment . . . [T]his Court does not approve the tactic of some litigants of filing of baseless motion
for disqualification of the judge as a means of delaying the case and/or of forum-shopping for a more
friendly judge." 60
In the case at hand, the Motion for Recusation filed by petitioner must be viewed in the light of his
lawyers' many attempts to suspend the proceedings before the respondent judge. Before the trial
court, petitioner tried at least eight (8) times, not merely to reset the scheduled hearings, 61 but to
suspend the trial of the case itself. The following pleadings filed by petitioner before respondent
judge all prayed either to suspend the proceedings entirely or for the respondent judge to delay the
disposition of a particular issue:
CAPTION OF PLEADING DATE OF FILING
1. Urgent Ex-Parte Motion July 19, 1991
2. Motion to Hold in Abeyance August 2, 1991
3. Motion for Recusation August 8, 1991
4. Motion to Suspend Proceedings
and Transfer Venue Outside
Metro Manila August 22, 1991
5. Motion to Suspend Proceedings March 4, 1991
6. Second Motion to Inhibit March 2, 1992
7. Motion to Suspend Action on
Formal Offer of Evidence and on
Submission of Memorandum Dec. 21, 1992
8. Motion to Reopen Hearing and
Present Last Witness Dec. 1, 1992
Before this Court, petitioner has already filed three (3) petitions assailing various orders of
respondent judge in connection with the single murder case pending against him. Apart from the
present petition which is docketed as G.R. No. 106087, petitioner has previously filed two (2) other
petitions docketed as G.R. Nos. 101837 and 105424. In all three (3) petitions, petitioner applied for a
temporary restraining order to have the proceedings before the trial court held in abeyance.
The murder case involving only one accused, the petitioner, has become unnecessarily complicated
and the proceedings before the trial court protracted, as can be gleaned from the fact that between
the filing of the information on July 11, 1991 and the end of last year or December 31, 1992, the
records of the case now consist of four (4) volumes and the transcript of stenographic notes have
reached a total of one thousand five hundred and twenty three (1523) pages. Hearings are still being
conducted.
When taken in the light of petitioner's repeated attempts to have the proceedings in the murder case
suspended and his lawyers' transparent maneuvers for the needless protraction of the case, the
Motion for Recusation can only be viewed as another dilatory move and the present Motion for
Reconsideration a further ploy to stall hearings.
In sum, after a careful examination of the records of the case, including the transcript of
stenographic notes, and considering the applicable law, the pertinent rules and prevailing
jurisprudence, we reiterate our holding in the Court Resolution dated September 23, 1992 that the
Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in affirming the respondent judge's Order which
denied petitioner's Motion for Recusation. This extended Resolution should put an end to petitioner's
obvious attempts at deferring the trial of his principal case by dwelling on incidental matters. The
motion for reconsideration must, perforce, be denied with finality.
In the Comment on the petitioner's Motion for Recusation, the Solicitor General prays that Attys.
Raymundo A. Armovit, Miguel R. Armovit and Rafael R. Armovit, be disciplinarily dealt with by this
Court for allegedly using abusive and intemperate language against respondent judge which betrays
disrespect to the trial court.
Indeed, in the Motion for Reconsideration, counsels for petitioner describe as "unparalleled for sheer
malevolence" 62 respondent judge's allegedly erroneous assumptions. Petitioner's lawyers further
stated: "Petitioner's counsel, citing the above proceedings, contested the trial judge's baseless, nay
despotic attempt to muzzle his right to be heard in his defense . . ." 63 The trial judge's actions were
also branded as an "obviously unholy rush to do petitioner in . . ." 64
In the Urgent Motion filed by petitioner on December 16, 1992, respondent judge is alleged to have:
(1) "generated belief of his being under contract to do the prosecution's bidding;" (2) "evinced
contempt for Supreme Court case law;" and (3) "dishonored his judicial oath and duty to hear before
he condemns, proceed upon inquiry, and render judgment on a man's liberty only after a full trial of
the facts." 65
The Rules of Court commands members of the bar "[t]o observe and maintain the respect due to the
courts of justice and judicial officers." 66 Reinforcing this rule of conduct is the Code of Professional
Responsibility which states in Canon 11 the following: "A lawyer shall observe and maintain the
respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others." Rule
11.03 of the Code further states: "A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing
language or behaviour before the courts." The next succeeding rule, Rule 11.03 adds: "A lawyer
shall not attribute to a judge motives not supported by the record or having materiality to the case."
To be sure, the adversarial nature of our legal system has tempted members of the bar, in pursuing
their duty to advance the interests of their clients, to use strong language. But this privilege is not a
license to malign our courts of justice. Irreverent behavior towards the courts by members of the bar
is proscribed, not so much for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but more
importantly, for the maintenance of respect for our judicial system, so necessary for the country's
stability. "Time and again, this Court has admonished and punished, in varying degrees, members of
the bar for statements, disrespectful or irreverent, acrimonious or defamatory, of this Court or the
lower courts . . . To be sure, lawyers may come up with various methods, perhaps more effective, in
calling the Court's attention to the issues involved. The language vehicle does not run short of
expressions, emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive."
67
In light of the above doctrines and jurisprudence, as well as the inherent power and authority of this
Court to cite members of the Bar in contempt and to discipline them, we are of the opinion that the
language used by petitioner's lawyers is highly derogatory, offensive and contemptuous.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the motion for reconsideration is DENIED with FINALITY.
Attys. Raymundo A. Armovit, Miguel R. Armovit and Rafael R. Armovit are hereby ordered to pay a
FINE of P500.00 each with a stern WARNING that a repetition of this or similar act and language will
be dealt with more severely. Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to their records.
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano, Bidin, Davide, Jr. and Melo, JJ ., concur.