Asymmetric warfare

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Asymmetric_warfare

Asymmetric warfare is war between belligerents whose relative military power differs significantly,
or whose strategy or tactics differ significantly.
Asymmetric warfare can describe a conflict in which the resources of two belligerents differ in essence
and in the struggle, interact and attempt to exploit each other's characteristic weaknesses. Such
struggles often involve strategies and tactics of unconventional warfare, the weaker combatants
attempting to use strategy to offset deficiencies in quantity or quality.
[1
Such strategies may not
necessarily be militari!ed.
["
#his is in contrast to symmetric warfare, where two powers have similar
military power and resources and rely on tactics that are similar overall, differing only in details and
execution.
#he term is frequently used to describe what is also called $guerrilla warfare$, $insurgency$,
$terrorism$, $counterinsurgency$, and $counterterrorism$, essentially violent conflict between a formal
military and an informal, less equipped and supported, undermanned but resilient opponent.
Outline of war
Eras [show]
enerations of warfare[show]
!attlespace [show]
Weapons [show]
"actics [show]
#perational [show]
$trategy [show]
rand strategy [show]
#rgani%ation [show]
&ogistics [show]
'elated[show]
&ists [show]
(
t
e
Contents
) *e+nition and di,erences
- $trategic .asis
/ "actical .asis
0 1se of terrain
2 War .y pro3y
4 Asymmetric warfare and terrorism
5 E3amples of asymmetric warfare
o 5.) "he American 'e(ol6tionary War
o 5.- -7th cent6ry asymmetric warfare
o 5./ After World War 88
o 5.0 -)st cent6ry
9 $ee also
: 'eferences
)7 F6rther reading
o )7.) !i.liographies
o )7.- !ooks
o )7./ Articles and papers
Defnition and diferences
#he popularity of the term dates from %ndrew &.'. (ack's 1)*+ article $,hy -ig .ations /ose Small
,ars$ in World Politics, in which $asymmetric$ referred simply to a significant disparity in power
between opposing actors in a conflict. $0ower,$ in this sense, is broadly understood to mean material
power, such as a large army, sophisticated weapons, an advanced economy, and so on. (ack's analysis
was largely ignored in its day, but the end of the 1old ,ar sparked renewed interest among academics.
-y the late 1))2s, new research building on (ack's insights was beginning to mature, and, after "223,
the 4.S. military began once again to seriously consider the problems associated with asymmetric
warfare.
[citation needed
5iscussion since "223 has been complicated by the tendency of academic and military communities to
use the term in different ways, and by its close association with guerrilla warfare, insurgency,
terrorism, counterinsurgency, and counterterrorism. (ilitary authors tend to use the term $asymmetric$
to refer to the indirect nature of the strategies many weak actors adopt, or even to the nature of the
adversary itself 6e.g., $asymmetric adversaries can be expected to ...$7 rather than to the correlation of
forces.
[citation needed
%cademic authors tend to focus more on explaining the pu!!le of weak actor victory in war8 if
$power,$ conventionally understood, conduces to victory in war, then how is the victory of the $weak$
over the $strong$ explained9 :ey explanations include 617 strategic interaction; 6"7 willingness of the
weak to suffer more or bear higher costs; 6<7 external support of weak actors; 637 reluctance to escalate
violence on the part of strong actors; 6+7 internal group dynamics
[<
and 6=7 inflated strong actor war
aims. %symmetric conflicts include both interstate and civil wars, and over the past two hundred years
have generally been won by strong actors. Since 1)+2, however, weak actors have won a ma>ority of
all asymmetric conflicts.
[3
Strategic basis
?n most conventional warfare, the belligerents deploy forces of a similar type and the outcome can be
predicted by the quantity of the opposing forces or by their quality, for example better command and
control of their forces 6c<7. #here are times where this is not true because the composition or strategy
of the forces makes it impossible for either side to close in battle with the other. %n example of this is
the standoff between the continental land forces of the @rench army and the maritime forces of the
4nited :ingdom's 'oyal .avy during the @rench 'evolutionary and .apoleonic ,ars. ?n the words of
%dmiral &ervis during the campaigns of 1A21, $? do not say, my /ords, that the @rench will not come. ?
say only they will not come by sea$,
[+
and a confrontation that .apoleon -onaparte described as that
between the elephant and the whale.
[=
Tactical basis
#he tactical success of asymmetric warfare is dependent on at least some of the following
assumptions
[citation needed
8
#ne side can ha(e a technological ad(antage which o6tweighs the n6merical
ad(antage of the enemy; the decisi(e English long.ow at the !attle of <r=cy is an
e3ample.
[citation needed]
"echnological inferiority 6s6ally is cancelled .y more (6lnera.le infrastr6ct6re
which can .e targeted with de(astating res6lts. *estr6ction of m6ltiple electric
lines, roads or water s6pply systems in highly pop6lated areas co6ld ha(e
de(astating e,ects on economy and morale, while the weaker side may not ha(e
these str6ct6res at all.
[citation needed]
"raining and tactics as well as technology can pro(e decisi(e and allow a smaller
force to o(ercome a m6ch larger one. For e3ample, for se(eral cent6ries the reek
hoplite>s ?hea(y infantry@ 6se of phalan3 made them far s6perior to their enemies.
"he !attle of "hermopylae, which also in(ol(ed good 6se of terrain, is a wellA
known e3ample.
[citation needed]
8f the inferior power is in a position of selfAdefense; i.e., 6nder attack or
occ6pation, it may .e possi.le to 6se 6ncon(entional tactics, s6ch as hitAandAr6n
and selecti(e .attles in which the s6perior power is weaker, as an e,ecti(e means
of harassment witho6t (iolating the laws of war. Berhaps the classical historical
e3amples of this doctrine may .e fo6nd in the American 'e(ol6tionary War,
mo(ements in World War 88, s6ch as the French 'esistance and $o(iet and
C6gosla( partisans. Against democratic aggressor nations, this strategy can .e
6sed to play on the electorate>s patience with the conDict ?as in the Eietnam War,
and others since@ pro(oking protests, and conseF6ent disp6tes among elected
legislators.
[citation needed]
8f the inferior power is in an aggressi(e position, howe(er, and/or t6rns to tactics
prohi.ited .y the laws of war ?jus in bello@, its s6ccess depends on the s6perior
power>s refraining from like tactics. For e3ample, the law of land warfare prohi.its
the 6se of a Dag of tr6ce or clearly marked medical (ehicles as co(er for an attack
or am.6sh, .6t an asymmetric com.atant 6sing this prohi.ited tactic to its
ad(antage depends on the s6perior power>s o.edience to the corresponding law.
$imilarly, laws of warfare prohi.it com.atants from 6sing ci(ilian settlements,
pop6lations or facilities as military .ases, .6t when an inferior power 6ses this
tactic, it depends on the premise that the s6perior power will respect the law that
the other is (iolating, and will not attack that ci(ilian target, or if they do the
propaganda ad(antage will o6tweigh the material loss. As seen in most conDicts of
the -7th and -)st cent6ries, this is highly 6nlikely as the propaganda ad(antage
has always o6tweighed adherence to international law, especially .y dominating
sides of any conDict.
[citation needed]
As noted .elow, the 8sraelABalestinian conDict is one recent e3ample of asymmetric
warfare. Gansdorf and Hedar
[5]
o6tline how 8slamist warfare 6ses asymmetric
stat6s to gain a tactical ad(antage against 8srael. "hey refer to the IpsychologicalI
mechanisms 6sed .y forces s6ch as Je%.ollah and Jamas in .eing willing to
e3ploit their own ci(ilians as well as enemy ci(ilians towards o.taining tactical
gains, in part .y 6sing the media to inD6ence the co6rse of war.
Use of terrain
#errain can be used as a force multiplier by the smaller force and as a force inhibitor against the larger
force. Such terrain is called difficult terrain.
#he contour of the land is an aid to the army; si!ing up opponents to determine victory, assessing
dangers and distance. $#hose who do battle without knowing these will lose.$ B Sun #!u, The Art of
War
#he guerrillas must move amongst the people as a fish swims in the sea. B (ao Cedong.
% good example of this type of strategy is the -attle of #hermopylae, where the narrow terrain of a
defile was used to funnel the 0ersian forces, who were numerically superior, to a point where they
could not use their si!e as an advantage.
@or a detailed description of the advantages for the weaker force in the use of builtDup areas when
engaging in asymmetric warfare, see the article on urban warfare.
War by proxy
,here asymmetric warfare is carried out 6generally covertly7 by allegedly nonDgovernmental actors
who are connected to or sympathetic to a particular nation's 6the $state actor's$7 interest, it may be
deemed war by proxy. #his is typically done to give deniability to the state actor. #he deniability can
be important to keep the state actor from being tainted by the actions, to allow the state actor to
negotiate in apparent good faith by claiming they are not responsible for the actions of parties who are
merely sympathi!ers, or to avoid being accused of belligerent actions or war crimes. ?f proof emerges
of the true extent of the state actor's involvement, this strategy can backfire; for example see ?ranD
contra and 0hilip %gee.
Asymmetric warfare and terrorism
#here are two different viewpoints on the relationship between asymmetric warfare and terrorism. ?n
the modern context, asymmetric warfare is increasingly considered a component of fourth generation
warfare. ,hen practiced outside the laws of war, it is often defined as terrorism, though rarely by its
practitioners or their supporters.
[A
@or example, terrorists often use women and children as human
shields,
[)
which practise is not considered either moral or part of traditional symmetrical warfare.
#he other view is that asymmetric warfare does not coincide with terrorism. #he use of terror by the
much lesser (ongol forces in the creation and control of the (ongol empire could be viewed as
asymmetric warfare. #he other is the use of state terrorism by the superior .a!i forces in the -alkans,
in an attempt to suppress the resistance movement.
[citation needed
xamples of asymmetric warfare
The American Revolutionary War
@rom its initiation, the %merican 'evolutionary ,ar was, necessarily, a showcase for asymmetric
techniques. ?n the 1)"2s, Earold (urdock of -oston attempted to solve the pu!!le of the first shots
fired on /exington Freen, and came to the suspicion that the few score militia men who gathered
before sunrise to await the arrival of hundreds of wellDprepared -ritish soldiers were sent specifically
to provoke an incident which could be used for propaganda purposes.
[12
#he return of the -ritish force
to -oston following the search operations at 1oncord was sub>ect to constant skirmishing, using
partisan forces gathered from communities all along the route, making maximum use of the terrain
6particularly trees and stone field walls7 to overcome the limitations of their weaponsD muskets with an
effective range of only about +2G*2 metres. #hroughout the war, skirmishing tactics against -ritish
troops on the move continued to be a key factor in 'ebel success; however, they may also have
encouraged the occasional incidents, particularly in the later stages, where -ritish troops used alleged
surrender violations as a >ustification for killing large numbers of captives 6e.g., ,axhaw and Froton
Eeights7.
%nother feature of the long march from 1oncord was the urban warfare technique of using buildings
along the route as additional cover for snipers. ,hen revolutionary forces forced their way into
.orfolk, Hirginia, and used waterfront buildings as cover for shots at -ritish vessels out in the river,
the response of destruction of those buildings was ingeniously used to the advantage of the rebels, who
encouraged the spread of fire throughout the largely /oyalist town, and spread propaganda blaming it
on the -ritish. Shortly afterwards they destroyed the remaining houses, on the grounds that they might
provide cover for -ritish soldiers. In the sub>ect of propaganda, it should be borne in mind that,
contrary to the impression given in the popular %merican film The Patriot, -ritish forces never
adopted a popular response to partisanDstyle asymmetric warfare J retribution massacres of groups
selected on a semiDrandom basis from the population at large.
#he rebels also adopted a form of asymmetric sea warfare, by using small, fast vessels to avoid the
'oyal .avy, and capturing or sinking large numbers of merchant ships; however the -ritish responded
by issuing letters of marque permitting private armed vessels to undertake reciprocal attacks on enemy
shipping. &ohn 0aul &ones became notorious in -ritain for his expedition from @rance in the little sloop
of war Ranger in %pril 1**A, during which, in addition to his attacks on merchant shipping, he made
two landings on -ritish soil. #he effect of these raids, particularly when coupled with his capture of
the 'oyal .avy's HMS Drae J the first such success in -ritish waters, but not &ones's last J was to
force the -ritish government to increase resources for coastal defence, and to create a climate of fear
among the -ritish public which was subsequently fed by press reports of his preparations for the 1**)
!onhomme Richard mission.
@rom 1**=, the conflict turned increasingly into a proxy war on behalf of @rance, following a strategy
proposed in the 1*=2s but initially resisted by the idealistic young :ing /ouis KH?, who came to the
throne at the age of 1) a few months before /exington. @rance also encouraged proxy wars against the
-ritish in ?ndia, but ultimately drove itself to the brink of state bankruptcy by entering the war6s7
directly, on several fronts throughout the world.
[11
20th century asymmetric warfare
Second Boer War
%symmetric warfare featured prominently during the Second -oer ,ar. %fter an initial phase, which
was fought by both sides as a conventional war, the -ritish captured &ohannesburg, the -oers' largest
city, and captured the capitals of the two -oer 'epublics. #he -ritish then expected the -oers to
accept peace as dictated by the victors in the traditional Luropean way. Eowever instead of
capitulating, the -oers fought a protracted guerrilla war. -etween twenty and thirty thousand -oer
commandos were only defeated after the -ritish brought to bear four hundred and fifty thousand
troops, about ten times as many as were used in the conventional phase of the war. 5uring this phase
the -ritish introduced internment in concentration camps for the -oer civilian population and also
implemented a scorched earth policy. /ater, the -ritish began using blockhouses built within machine
gun range of one another and flanked by barbed wire to slow the -oers' movement across the
countryside and block paths to valuable targets. Such tactics eventually evolved into today's counter
insurgency tactics.
#he -oer commando raids deep into the 1ape 1olony, which were organi!ed and commanded by &an
Smuts, resonated throughout the century as the -ritish and others adopted and adapted the tactics used
by the -oer commandos in later conflicts.
World War I
&awrence of Ara.ia and !ritish s6pport for the Ara. 6prising against the #ttoman
Empire. "he #ttomans were the stronger power, the Ara.s the weaker.
A6striaAJ6ngary (s. $er.ia, A6g6st ):)0. A6striaAJ6ngary was the stronger power,
$er.ia the weaker.
ermany (s. !elgi6m, A6g6st ):)0. ermany was the stronger power, !elgi6m
the weaker.
Between the World Wars
A.d elAHrim led resistance in Gorocco from ):-7 to ):-0 against French and
$panish colonial armies ten times as strong as the g6erilla force, led .y eneral
Bhilippe B=tain.
"8', the +rst antiAfascist nationalAdefensi(e organi%ation in E6rope, fo6ght
against !enito G6ssolini>s regime in northeast 8taly.
AngloA8rish War ?War of 8rish 8ndependence@ fo6ght .etween the 8rish 'ep6.lican
Army and the !lack and "ans/A63iliaries. &loyd eorge ?!ritish Brime Ginister at
the time@ attempted to pers6ade other nations that it was not a war .y ref6sing to
6se the army and 6sing the !lack and "ans instead .6t the conDict was cond6cted
as an asymmetric g6errilla war and was registered as a war with the &eag6e of
Kations .y the 8rish Free $tate.
World War II
Winter War L Finland opposed an in(asion .y the $o(iet 1nion
$o(iet partisans L resistance mo(ement which fo6ght in the erman occ6pied
parts of the $o(iet 1nion.
Warsaw 1prising L Boland ?Jome Army, Armia HraMowa@ rose 6p against the
erman occ6pation.
ermany in C6gosla(ia, ):0)L02 ?ermany (s. "ito>s Bartisans and Gihailo(ic>s
<hetniks@.
Britain
!ritish <ommandos and E6ropean coastal raids. erman co6ntermeas6res and the
notorio6s <ommando #rder
&ong 'ange *esert ro6p and the $pecial Air $er(ice in Africa and later in E6rope.
$o6th East Asian "heatre: Wingate, <hindits, Force )/4, E Force
$pecial #perations E3ec6ti(e ?$#E@
United States
#Nce of $trategic $er(ices ?#$$@
<hina !6rma 8ndia "heatre: Gerrill>s Gara6ders and #$$ *etachment )7)
After World War II
1nited $tates Gilitary Assistance <ommand $t6dies and #.ser(ations ro6p ?1$
GA<AE $#@ in Eietnam
1nited $tates s6pport of the Kicarag6an <ontras
Cold War
#he end of ,orld ,ar ?? established the two most powerful victors, the 4nited States of %merica
64S%, or >ust the 4nited States7 and the 4nion of Soviet Socialist 'epublics 64SS', or >ust the Soviet
4nion7 as the two dominant world superpowers.
Cold War examples of proxy wars
$ee also: pro3y war
?n Southeast %sia, specifically Hietnam, the Hiet 1ong and other communist insurgencies engaged in
asymmetrical guerilla warfare with @rance, at first, then, later, the 4nited States during the period of
the Hietnam ,ar.
/ikewise, the war between the mu>ahideen and the 'ed %rmy during the Soviet invasion of
%fghanistan has been claimed as the source of the term $asymmetric warfare$,
[1"
although this war
occurred years after (ack wrote of $asymmetric conflict,$ it is notable that the term became well
known in the ,est only in the 1))2s.
[1<
#he aid given by the 4.S. to the mu>ahadeen during the war
was only covert at the tactical level, the 'eagan %dministration told the world that it was helping the
$freedomDloving people of %fghanistan$. #his proxy war was aided by many countries including the
4S% against the 4SS' during the 1old ,ar. ?t was considered cost effective and politically
successful,
[13
as it gave the 4SS' a military defeat which was a contributing factor to its collapse.
[citation needed
21st century
Israel/Palestinians
#he battle between the ?sraelis and some 0alestinian organi!ations 6such as Eamas and ?slamic &ihad7
is a classic case of asymmetric warfare. ?srael has a powerful army, air force and navy, while the
0alestinian organisations have no access to largeDscale military equipment with which to conduct
operations; instead, they utili!e asymmetric tactics, such as8 small gunfights, crossDborder sniping,
rocket attacks,
[1+
and suicide bombing.
[1=
Sri Lanka
#he Sri /ankan 1ivil ,ar, which raged on and off from 1)A< to "22), between the Sri /ankan
government and the /iberation #igers of #amil Lelam 6/##L7 saw largeDscale asymmetric warfare.
#he war started as an insurgency and progressed to a largeDscale conflict with the mixture of guerrilla
and conventional warfare. #he /##L pioneered the use of suicide bombing and perfected it with the
use of maleMfemale suicide bombers both on and off battlefield; use of explosiveDfilled boats for
suicide attacks on military shipping; use of light aircraft targeting military installations.
Kashmir
0akistan claims territorial rights to the region of :ashmir, where it has been engaged in a proxy war
with ?ndia since 1)AA.
Iraq
#he victory by the 4SDled coalition forces in the 1))1 0ersian Fulf ,ar and the "22< invasion of ?raq,
demonstrated that training, tactics and technology can provide overwhelming victories in the field of
battle during modern conventional warfare. %fter Saddam Eussein's regime was removed from power,
the ?raq campaign moved into a different type of asymmetric warfare where the coalition's use of
superior conventional warfare training, tactics and technology were of much less use against continued
opposition from the various partisan groups operating inside ?raq.
Syria
(uch of the "21"D"21< Syrian civil war has been fought asymmetrically. #he Syrian .ational
1oalition along with the (u>ahideen and :urdish 5emocratic 4nion 0arty, has been engaging with the
forces of the Syrian government through asymmetric means. #he conflict has seen largeDscale
asymmetric warfare across the country, with the forces opposed to the government unable to engage
symmetrically with the Syrian government so other tactics such as suicide bombings
[1*[1A
and targeted
assassinations have been put to effective use.
See also
<i(ilian cas6alty ratio
<o6nterAterrorism
Fo6rth generation warfare
6errilla warfare
8rreg6lar military
&ist of g6errillas
&awfare
War on "error
&ow intensity conDict
Gilitary 6se of children
Gillenni6m <hallenge
Beople>s war
Bartisan ?military@
Bolitical Warfare
'eagan *octrine
'esistance mo(ement
1ncon(entional warfare
1nrestricted Warfare
US organisations
<enter for Asymmetric Warfare ?<AW@
Asymmetric Warfare ro6p
$pecial Acti(ities *i(ision
!ocuments
Management of Savagery
!eferences
). "omes, 'o.ert ?$pring -770@. I'elearning <o6nterins6rgency WarfareI.
Parameters ?1$ Army War <ollege@.
[dead link]
-. $tepano(a, E. 2008 Terrorism in asymmetrical confict: SIPI e!ort 2"
?B*F@. #3ford 1ni(. Bress.
/. Ohao, et al. ?- #cto.er -77:@. IAnomalo6sly $low Attrition "imes for
Asymmetric Bop6lations with 8nternal ro6p *ynamicsI. P#ysical evie$ %etters
&0"' &(8)0& *200+, ?AB$@.
0. Arreg6PnA"oft, 8(an. IJow the weak win wars A A theory of asymmetric
conDictI. 'etrie(ed )5 $eptem.er -7)-.
2. Andidora, 'onald ?-777@. Iron -dmirals: .aval %eaders#i! in t#e T$entiet#
/entury. reenwood B6.lishing ro6p. p. /. 8$!K 7A/)/A/)-44A0.
4. Kicolson, Adam ?-772@. Men of 0onor: Trafalgar and t#e making of t#e
1nglis# 0ero. Jarper<ollins. p. 5/. 8$!K 7A77A5):-7:A4.
5. Gansdorf, 8.Q. and Hedar, G. "he Bsychological Asymmetry of 8slamist
Warfare. Giddle East R6arterly, -779, )2?-@, /5A00
9. 'eshaping the military for asymmetric warfare /enter for 2efense
Information
:. William <. !anks. -7)). .e$ 3attle4elds' 5ld %a$s: /ritical 2ebates on
-symmetric 6arfare. <ol6m.ia 1ni(ersity Bress. is.n 7-/)2-424/
)7. "o6tellot, A.!. IJarold G6rdock>s I"he Kineteenth of April )552I American
Jeritage Gaga%ine Eol )7 8ss6e 2 A6g6st ):2:
)). !icheno, J6gh ?-77/@. ebels 7 edcoats. &ondon: Jarper<ollins. 8$!K 7A
77A5)24-2A).
)-. <hris !ray, T#e Media and 8I 9oe, in eason ?Fe. -77-@
)/. #3ford English *ictionary
)0. Anonymo6s ?Gichael $che6er@, Im!erial 0ubris : 6#y t#e 6est is %osing t#e
6ar on Terrorism, Washington *<, !rassey>s ?-770@ 8$!K )A25099A90:A9, <hap. -
)2. IJamas claims responsi.ility for attackI. 4 Gay -77:. 'etrie(ed -77:A72A
74.
)4. Gc<arthy, 'ory ?) Qan6ary -779@. I*eath toll in Ara.A8sraeli conDict fell in
-775I. "he 6ardian. 'etrie(ed -779A7-A)9.
)5. http://www...c.co.6k/news/worldAmiddleAeastA-7-720/-
)9. http://www.c.snews.com/9/7)A)924/_)4-A25052-:5/syrianAre.elsA
em.oldenedAafterAassassinations/
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200( @$$$=inss=org=ilAu!loadA*BI%1,&&+02)C(DC=!dfE
$o.elman, *aniel, >Ji%.ollahTfrom "error to 'esistance: "owards a Kational
*efence $trategy' in /live 9ones and Sergio /atignani *eds=,' Israel and 0i>bolla#
-n -symmetric /onfict in 0istorical and /om!arative Pers!ective,'o6tledge, -7)7
?pp. 0:L44@
Articles and #a#ers
!ryant, . Q. IAsymmetric Warfare: "he !ritish E3perience in EighteenthA<ent6ry
8ndia,I 9ournal of Military 0istory ?-770@ 49U- pp 0/)L04:. in BroMect G6se
8(an Arreg6inA"oft, IJow the Weak Win Wars: A "heory of Asymmetric <onDictI,
International Security, Eol. -4, Ko. ) ?$6mmer -77)@, pp. :/L)-9.
Q. Ba6l *6nne, et al., IGanaging Asymmetric <onDict,I 5Fford 1conomic Pa!ers,
Eol. 29 ?-774@, pp. )9/L-79.
Fowler, <. A. I!ertI ?Garch -774@. IAsymmetric Warfare: A BrimerI. I111 S!ectrum.
Garc6s <or.in es#a!ing t#e Military for -symmetric 6arfare /2I $ebsite 5ctober
D' 200&=
Eincent Q. o6lding, Qr. 3ack to t#e Buture $it# -symmetric 6arfare at the
Way.ack Gachine ?archi(ed Garch )7, -77)@ From Barameters, Winter -777L7),
pp. -)L/7.
Andrew Q.'. Gack, IWhy !ig Kations &ose $mall Wars: "he Bolitics of Asymmetric
<onDictI, 6orld Politics, Eol. -5, Ko. - ?Qan6ary ):52@, pp. )52L-77.
Gontgomery <. Geigs <nort#odoF T#oug#ts about -symmetric 6arfare
@dead linkE

?B*F@
'ichard KortonA"aylor -symmetric 6arfare: Military Planners -re 5nly 3eginning to
8ras! t#e Im!lications of Se!tember && for Buture 2eterrence Strategy, in T#e
8uardian, #cto.er /, -77)
Gichael Ko(ak, G-symmetrical 6arfareG 7 9ust 6ar: - Moral 5bligation in K'#,
Fe.r6ary )7, -77/
"oni Bfanner, IAsymmetrical Warfare from the Berspecti(e of J6manitarian &aw
and J6manitarian ActionI, International evie$ of t#e ed /ross Eol. 95 Ko. 925
?Garch -772@, p. )0:L)50.
$6lli(an, Batricia. -775. IWar Aims and War #6tcomes: Why Bowerf6l $tates &ose
&imited WarsI, 9ournal of /onfict esolution, 2) ?/@:0:4L2-0.
Qonathan !. "6cker -symmetric 6arfare, a 4Apage analysis, $6mmer ):::.
Asymmetry and other fa.les
[dead link]
, Qane>s *efence Weekly, )9 A6g6st -774
*a(id !6,aloe >*e+ning Asymmetric Warfare> @2E
@dead linkE
$eptem.er -774
ates Assails Bentagon on 'eso6rces for !attle+elds Washington Bost April --,
-779
Gandel, 'o.ert. I'eassessing Eictory in Warfare.I -rmed Borces 7 Society, Q6l
-775; (ol. //: pp. 04)L0:2. http://afs.sagep6..com/cgi/content/a.stract////0/04)
Gandel, 'o.ert. I"he Wartime 1tility of Brecision Eers6s !r6te Force in Weaponry.I
-rmed Borces 7 Society, Qan -770; (ol. /7: pp. )5)L-7).
http://afs.sagep6..com/cgi/content/a.stract//7/-/)5)
Asymmetrical Threat %once#t and its
Reflections on International Security
"y &ichael Ru"in
Strategic Research and Study Center
&ay '1( 200)
Print Send RSS Share
Presentation to the Strategic Research and Study Center (SAREM) under the Turkish General
Staff, Istanul!
/ess than three weeks after alDNaeda terrorists crashed hi>acked passenger >ets into the ,orld #rade
1enter, the 0entagon, and a field in rural 0ennsylvania, thenDSecretary of 5efense 5onald 'umsfeld
issued his first Nuadrennial 5efense 'eview 6N5'7 'eport.[1 Ee wrote that it was imperative that
the 4.S. military plan not only for conventional wars, but that it should also develop strategies to
$deter and defeat adversaries who will rely on surprise, deception, and asymmetric warfare to achieve
their ob>ectives.$[" 'ather than plan for large military operations, or even small wars limited to
specific nationDstates, the 0entagon should develop strategies to tackle unconventional threats from
both state and nonDstate actors who might seek to attack 4.S. interests.
%symmetric threats are not new, nor are strategists' attention to them. ?n every era, from the preD
modern to the present day, weak forces utili!e surprise, technology, innovative tactics, or what some
might consider violations of military etiquette to challenge the strong. #he 1))1 ?raq ,ar and
subsequent alDNaeda terrorism shattered notions that the collapse of the Soviet 4nion would usher in
an age of peace or an end to history. ?n order to ensure cohesion in both appropriations and strategy,
1ongress in 1))= passed legislation[< requiring the 0entagon to conduct quadrennial defense reviews.
?n the first report the following year, thenDSecretary of 5efense ,illiam 1ohen identified $asymmetric
challenges$ and $asymmetric means$ as a ma>or component of future threats. %dversaries, the report
found, $are likely to seek advantage over the 4nited States by using unconventional approaches to
circ"m#ent or "ndermine our strengths while exploiting our vulnerabilities.$[3
?dentifying the existence of asymmetrical threats is far easier than to define them. ,hile asymmetry
focuses on how to place one strengths against an adversary's weaknesses, even where the overall
correlation of forces may favor the adversary, there remains no consensus about the nature of the
asymmetric threat concept. Stephen &. /ambakis, a senior analyst in space power and policy studies at
the .ational ?nstitute for 0ublic 0olicy, questions the usefulness of the concept, given the lack of
consensus over its meaning.[+ Such logic, however, falls flat. %fter all, that there exists no consensus
about the definition of terrorism does not mean that government should not develop counterDterrorism
strategies.
Still, the breadth of asymmetrical threats undercuts the notion that there can be any unified response to
them. ,hile, in general terms, the asymmetrical threat concept describes how the weak might battle
the strong, discussions diverge when discussing asymmetrical threats from states versus those posed
by nonDstate actors.
The inter#lay "etween technology and asymmetry
1ontrol of technology is among the most important factors in determining state power. Eistory is
replete with centrali!ed states seeking to consolidate control and peripheral forces resisting it.
@racturing of central control marked the decline of the %bbasid Lmpire. %uthorities might have paid
nominal heed to the caliph in -aghdad, but local dynasties held sway. #hey controlled the military
necessary both to ensure obedience from local residents and to counter pretensions to control from
-aghdad. #hese city states and small polities became easy pickings for the (ongol hordes who swept
through %sia and Lurope in the 1<
th
century. .o sooner had they departed, though, than centrifugal
forces again fractured %sia and Lurope. ,ith no central monopoly over the most advanced weaponry
Jbows, arrows, and ironJthey could not overcome challenges to control of vast and farDaway
territories.
#he components of military balanceDofDpower changed, though, in the fifteenth century. Fovernments
monopoli!ed gunpowder technology and found their relative power over the periphery to increase
when they controlled artillery which smaller states could not master or afford. 'ulers could control far
broader swaths of territory than had earlier been possible. ?n the early sixteenth century, the Ittoman,
Safavid, and (ughal statesJthe soDcalled $Funpowder Lmpires$Jtogether stretched from Lastern
Lurope to Southeast %sia.[=
#heir monopoly faded over time. -oth internal and external challenges eroded the empire's control
over its periphery. #he Ittoman sultan lost control over large chunks of .orth %frica, the Safavid
Lmpire disintegrated into rival states on the ?ranian plateau, and the (ughal Lmpire disintegrated.
Luropean armies, though deficient in numbers compared to their (iddle Lastern and %sian
counterparts, made vast inroads, if not formally coloni!ing territory, than nevertheless exerting
informal influence over it.
,hile the ?slamic world never again rose to challenge Lurope, within the context of their own
societies, (uslim rulers soon regained advantage over their periphery. #he communications revolution
swung the balance of power in favor of the central government. ,hile weak within, for example, the
Na>ar dynasty in ?ran experienced a resurgence of power when it invested in the telegraph to bolster
communications among government officials dispersed across the nation. @or a few decades in the
latter half of the nineteenth century, they consolidated control over restive provinces. #hey had a
technological advantage and reDestablished an asymmetric relationship. Eowever, with time, they lost
their comparative advantage. Ipponents used the communications technology to coordinate a mass
movement to check the government's power. #he result was a period of upheaval and mass
movements, culminating in the 1)2+D1)11 1onstitutional 'evolution. #echnology not only enables
asymmetry in power relations, but can also be used to overcome it.
The American *+#erience
?f asymmetry involves merely a conflict of weak against strong, or nonDtraditional versus traditional,
then the %merican 'evolutionary ,ar is an example of asymmetrical warfare. Feneral Feorge
,ashington did not confine himself to confront the -ritish headDon in battle, but rather engaged in
guerilla operations, hitDandDrun attacks, and tactical surprise.
4pon winning its independence, the new 4.S. government, still weak relative to Luropean powers,
sought benefit in its isolation. Speaking before 1ongress on 5ecember ", 1A"<, the nation's fifth
president &ames (onroe outlined what would become called the (onroe 5octrine8 #he 4.S. would
remain neutral with regard to Luropean conflicts, but would consider any Luropean military
involvement among the independent states of the ,estern hemisphere to be dangerous and contrary to
4.S. peace and safety.
,ashington did not envision a role as a global power until difficulties pro>ecting force simultaneously
against 1uba and the 0hilippines during the 1A)A SpanishD%merican ,ar forced reassessment. %s
military technology advanced, the security borne by distance declined. %butting two oceans doubled
naval needs. #hroughout the 1)<2s, the 4.S. .avy sought to determine how much force they needed to
pro>ect power in the %tlantic and 0acific Iceans.[* ,orld ,ar ?? cemented the 4nited States as a
global superpower.
4.S. victory in the war ushered in an era of optimism. #he 4nited States was an industrial
powerhouse. %nd, as the nuclear bombings of Eiroshima and .agasaki demonstrated, ,ashington
controlled unrivaled technological superiority. -ut outbreak of the 1old ,ar and the 1)+* launch of
Sputnik shook 4.S. confidence. #he Soviet 4nion had not only achieved technological parity, but also
had surpassed it. #hroughout the 1old ,ar, both 5emocrats and 'epublicans considered Soviet
expansionism an existential threat.
#he ,orld ,ar ?? rocket race between .a!i Fermany and the ,est, and the subsequent 1old ,ar arms
race characteri!ed by the development of bigger nuclear bombs, convinced ma>or powers that military
victory depended upon technological advancement.
-ut while ,ashington and (oscow engaged in a race to build larger and more lethal weaponry,
insurgents developed their own doctrine in order to amplify the impact of their inferior forces. %fter
the &apanese invasion of 1hina, revolutionary leader (ao Cedong sought to trade space for time,
forcing his &apanese adversaries to stretch their supply lines thin. ?nsurgents elsewhere favored
pinpoint attacks on troops or critical infrastructure.
,hile the 4.S. military fought a conventional army that occasionally employed irregular tactics in the
:orean ,ar, its engagement in Hietnam was a different and more formidable experience. #hroughout
the war, the 4.S. maintained air superiority. ?nitial 4.S. strategy prepared the terrain to maximi!e 4.S.
strengths. ?n 1)=A, Fen. ,illiam ,estmoreland established the (arine base at :he Sanh to lure Hiet
1ong and decimate them from above.[A #he tactic had mixed success. ,hile 4.S. forces inflicted
high casualties, the Hiet 1ong consolidated control of the terrain, eventually forcing :he Sanh's
evacuation. %ir power did not substitute for ground control. 4.S. airpower may have disrupted Hiet
1ong supply lines, but it did not interdict them. Soviet provision of surfaceDtoDair missiles helped to
blunt 4.S. air superiority at a relatively low cost. Hiet 1ong casualtiesJmore than three million
killed[) in comparison to +A,222 %merican deathsJwas a cost Eanoi considered acceptable. @aced
with an opponent willing to suffer so many casualtiesJa price many ,estern countries and
democracies were unwilling to payJ,ashington could do little, while the Hiet 1ong could simply
achieve victory by outlasting its opponents. 5onald &. (ro!ek, a :ansas State 4niversity military
historian, concluded, $%lthough willing to accept the occasional tactical gain, all the .orth Hietnamese
and Hiet 1ong really needed to accomplish while 4.S. forces remained in Hietnam was to avoid
catastrophic loss while ensuring political instability throughout the south.$[12 Inly after Eanoi split
Saigon from its superpower sponsor did they revert to a conventional, tankDled force to capture the
South.
1hechen nationalists and their foreign supporters pursued the same strategy in their war against
'ussia. #heir willingness to suffer immense casualtiesJor, at least to permit the civilian population to
sufferJmay not have won an independent state, but they have both denied the 'ussian military the
victory which (oscow sought and eroded international unwillingness to offer them concession in
response to violence.[11 ?n &uly and %ugust "22=, Ee!bollah survived a withering ?sraeli air
bombardment to claim victory amidst the rubble.[1" 1areful planning and battlefield preparation
coupled with a willingness to sacrifice /ebanese infrastructure paid off for the ?ranianDtrained group.
[1< Ead Serb officials shown the same morbid stamina in :osovo, they might still control that
territory. #he question boils down to a battle between coercion and resilience. ,hile the Serbs and
many industriali!ed societies are unwilling to suffer unlimited civilian casualties, alDNaeda, Eamas,
and Ee!bollah assign no such value to civilians in their areas of operation or control.
?nternational legal constraints adopted by ,estern governments shift the balance in favor of resilience
and so empower liberation movements, guerilla groups, and terrorists. (any %frican and (iddle
Lastern states augment their power relative to ,estern countries simply by eschewing legal
responsibilities. #he trend among Luropean 4nion officials, 4.S. military lawyers, and nonD
governmental organi!ations to apply maximal Feneva 1onvention protections universally, regardless
of enemy combatant adherence to the accords, furthers this trend. ?f adversaries have no incentive to
abide by international law, knowing that they are afforded universal protection regardless, then there is
no consequence to utili!ing terror or endangering the civilian population.
Terrorism !emocracy,s Achilles, -eel
#errorism becomes a tactic of choice when its potential to achieve political aims outweighs the costs of
its use. (isapplication of international law among ,estern societies encourages terrorism by
decreasing its cost while increasing its effectiveness. In %pril 1+, "22", for example, six Luropean
4nion countries endorsed a 4nited .ations Euman 'ights 1ommission resolution that endorsed the
use of violence as a means to achieve 0alestinian statehood.[13 #he result, in practice, created a
precedent in which terrorists could argue that international humanitarian law >ustified their embrace of
suicide bombing.
#he 4nited .ations' mendacity is enabled by a lack of consensus over the meaning of terrorism. %
1)AA study found that professionals utili!ed more than 122 different definitions of terrorism.[1+ #he
4. Feneral %ssembly defined terrorism in part as $1riminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a
state of terror in the general public,$[1= and, in "22+, 4. Secretary Feneral :ofi %nnan defined
terrorism as any act $intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or nonDcombatants
with the purpose of intimidating a population or compelling a Fovernment or an international
organi!ation to do or abstain from doing any act.$[1* .either definition, however, en>oys codified
status or the status of law.
#errorism by nature is irregular, although not always asymmetric. %lDNaeda and its affiliates, for
example, have since "223 concentrated their attacks on the 4.S. military in ?raq, where the
concentration of 4.S. weaponry and air support gives 4.S. forces a comparative advantage over softer
targets elsewhere, like undefended schools, shopping centers, or public transportation.[1A
.or are all terrorist groups weak. #errorism is a tactic. 5uring the 1old ,ar, the Soviet 4nion
sponsored both terrorist and separatist groups. %nalysts might consider the terrorist groups weak only
if they took them out of their full context. -ut, as proxies of a larger unit, they were no less weak than
the states supporting them. #he Freek government helped support and supply the :urdistan ,orkers
0arty [0artiya :arkerOn :urdistan, 0:: not because %thens was weak in comparison to %nkara, but
rather because it simply sought to act by terrorist proxy to weaken a competitor. Stephen Sloan, a
terrorism expert at the 4niversity of Iklahoma, noted that while terrorism traditionally aimed at
resisting state oppression from within, today states use terrorism to amplify force.[1) ,ith state
sponsorship, terrorists become more lethal.
#errorism combines surprise and shock to amplify effect and demorali!e the broader public. ?t is
asymmetric only so far as it $attack[s vulnerabilities not appreciated by the target.$["2 #he 4.S.
government remains illDprepared to counter such surprise. (ost 4.S. strategic planning with regard to
terrorism focuses on replication of past activities. ,hile a few exercises had considered the possibility
of hi>acked aircraft used as weapons, these were exceptions. ?ndeed, the 5efense 5epartment canceled
one drill simulating a hi>acked plane crash into the 0entagon because the scenario seemed too farD
fetched.["1 (ost thinking was more conventional. 4.S. officials increased perimeter security around
ma>or public buildings after the 1))< ,orld #rade 1enter attack and the bombing of the %lfred 0.
(urrah federal building in Iklahoma 1ity two years later.
(any analysts see alDNaeda as an asymmetric threat. So too does the 0entagon.["" -ut, whether
terrorism is stateDsponsored, stateDdirected, or panD?slamist, its goals are similar and consistent with
traditional psychological operations. #errorists and traditional state enemies both seek to affect change
by demorali!ing the public and winning through psychological operations what they cannot win in
conventional battle. 5emocracies are especially vulnerable because of the power their public holds. %
former .orth Hietnamese commander explained, $#he conscience of %merica was part of its warD
making capability, and we were turning that power in our favor. %merica lost because of its
democracy; through dissent and protest it lost the ability to mobili!e a will to win.$["<
#he .orth Hietnamese strategy was little different than that of Somali militiamen who dragged the
body of a mutilated %merican soldier through the streets of (ogadishu, permitting the international
media to broadcast the incident in gruesome detail, or Ee!bollah terrorists who carefully stageD
managed the international media during the summer "22= /ebanon war. $#he camera and computer
have become weapons of war,$ (arvin :alb, senior fellow at Earvard 4niversity's Shorenstein 1enter,
observed in his analysis of the ?sraelDEe!bollah conflict.["3
Eow effective a terrorist attack may be is inversely proportional to ,ashington's own perceptions of
its interests. Ee!bollah's 1)A< suicide truck bombing of the 4.S. (arine barracks succeeded because
the 'eagan administration >udged perseverance in the peacekeeping operation not worth further
casualties.["+ #he 1linton administration made similar calculation after Somali militiamen downed
two 4.S. (ED=2 -lack Eawk helicopters on Ictober <, 1))<. 4sama -in /adin has acknowledged the
issue when, on (ay "A, 1))A, he told an %merican interviewer that $#he %merican soldiers are paper
tigersP %fter a few blows [in (ogadishu, they forgot about being the world leader and the leader of
the new world order. #hey left, dragging their corpses and their shameful defeat.$["=
#errorism aims to affect its opponents psychologically more than militarily. (odern media enables this
ob>ective. 0rior to establishment of satellite news networks, terrorists seldom en>oyed a sustained
global audience, with the 0alestinian sei!ure and murder of ?sraeli athletes at the 1)*< (unich
Ilympics perhaps the only exception. #he proliferation of satellite television networks across the
globe wins terrorists a global audience for every hi>acking, car bomb, or kidnapping.
5emocracies are especially susceptible to such media manipulation. ?n the "22= ?sraeliDEe!bollah war,
satellite channels broadcast bombing damage in both ?srael and /ebanon. #he openness of ?sraeli
society enabled >ournalists to access better the &ewish state's internal political debate and handD
wringing. $% closed society conveys the impression of order and discipline; an open society, buffeted
by the crosswinds of reality and rumor, criticism and revelation, conveys the impression of disorder,
chaos and uncertainty, but this impression can be misleading,$ :alb observed.["*
Halidation also bolsters terrorism. #error sponsors and leaders calculate cost and benefit. Lvery
terrorist attack and every propaganda statement creates forensic evidence which may increase the
vulnerability of terrorist leaders or provide evidence to link them with their sponsors. #he willingness
of satellite television providers to distribute terror propaganda both bolsters terrorist propaganda and
bestows an image of legitimacy.["A #he Lgyptian government's willingness to host Ee!bollah's alD
(anar on its .ilesat television provider alongside the state television of -ahrain, Sudan, :uwait,
Syria, and the 4.S.Dfunded alDEurra legitimi!es its incitement and support for terrorism, >ust as the
5anish government's licensing of 'o> #H, the 0::'s media channel, does.[") ?t was to prevent such
legitimacy that the @rench government eventually removed alD(anar from its Lutelsat.[<2
(ore serious, the willingness of ,estern diplomats to negotiate with terrorists or engage with their
sponsors bolsters their legitimacy, validates their tactics, and shields them from consequence. #he
impact of such engagement creates precedent which empowers a wide range of terrorist groups.
#urkish 0rime (inister 'ecep #ayyip LrdoQan's decision to welcome representatives of Eamas to
%nkara in @ebruary "22=, undercut #urkish efforts to deDlegitimi!e the 0::, which like the
0alestinian terrorist groups, >ustifies its actions in national liberation.[<1
.ormal diplomatic practice also shields terrorists. 0remature recourse to diplomacy can validate the
decision to utili!e terrorism. 5iplomats and >ournalists both condemned &erusalem's disproportional
military response to the conflict initiated by Ee!bollah. 5isproportionality, however, is a deterrent to
terrorism. 5iplomatic linkage between equitable distribution of casualties and legitimacy of conflict
has no basis in international law.
Sympathy for a cause often amplifies concern about disproportionality. #errorism cannot be successful
without sympathi!ers. #he -eider (einhof Fang conducted several terrorist operations in the 1)*2s,
but failed to win support. #hey may have en>oyed Soviet patronage, but their ideology did not resonate
nor could they translate terrorism into recruitment success. #heir membership dwindled as ,est
Ferman authorities captured or killed operatives. ?n contrast, the ?rish 'epublican %rmy, the L#%
6-asque Eomeland and @reedom, Luskadi #a %skatasuna7, or, for that matter, Eamas and alDNaeda
espouse an ideology popular enough to enable replacement through recruitment. 5aniel -yman,
director of Feorgetown 4niversity's security studies program was correct to note, $,e continue to
pour money into intelligence, homeland defense and the military, but this spending is primarily to
defeat today's terrorist cells. (ore spies and better defenses do little to defeat a hostile ideology.$[<"
?t is an observation which the "22= $"adrennial Defense Re#iew seconded. $Hictory will come when
the enemy's extremist ideologies are discredited in the eyes of their host populations and tacit
supporters,$ the report argued.[<<
,hile it is necessary to combat the ideologies underpinning contemporary terrorism, if the ,est is to
counter the terrorist challenge, it is also important to treat terrorism as a military matter rather than
simply a criminal matter. Such a determination is important. ?f terrorism is a criminal problem, then it
should be dealt with by law enforcement. #his not only makes prevention difficult, but it also glosses
over ideological motivations and the state sponsorship which bolster terrorists' reach and lethality. ?f
terrorism is >ust a criminal matter, then states cannot use military force to counter it. #he 0entagon
perceives terrorism as a military matter. $#his is both a battle of arms and a battle of ideas,$ the N5'
declares. #he report continued to argue that defeat of terrorist networks depended upon augmenting
human intelligence, surveillance, special operations, and willingness to conduct irregular warfare.[<3
A Revolution in &ilitary Affairs.
(any of 'umsfeld's arguments appear tied to the idea that there has been a 'evolution in (ilitary
%ffairs. #his concept, which argues that technological advances supplant past emphasis on manpower,
received a boost from 4.S. dominance over ?raq in Iperation 5esert Storm.[<+ (any commentators
at the time expressed concern about the mission8 ?raq had the fifth largest army in the world, raising
fears among %mericans of a quagmire or, at the least, a high price for success.[<= 4.S. dominanceJ
memoriali!ed with video of precision bombs going down chimneysJreinvigorated the notion that
technology would dominate future warfare.
%lso impacting the debate was the notion of @ourth Feneration ,arfare. % construction first voiced in
1)A), military expert ,illiam S. /ind led a team of army and marine officers who posited that there
had been three distinct generations of warfare, emphasi!ing in turn, manpower, firepower, and
maneuver. #hey argued that ideology andMor technology would underpin a fourth generation in
warfare, and predicted that this could blur both chain of command and the distinction between civilian
and military. (aneuver would trump logistics which, they argued, would become less important than
the ability of troops to live off the land. ,hereas troop concentration was once an asset, /ind and his
colleagues theori!ed that, in the future, it could become a liability, more vulnerable to attack. 'ather
than destroy opponents on the battlefield, a new generation of enemies might try to collapse their
adversaries from within.[<* ?n such an age, the idea of front and rear lines may be outdated.[<A
,hile the @ourth Feneration ,arfare theory fits events ranging from the rise of alDNaeda to the ?raqi
insurgency, critics point out that the generation division is artificial, somewhat arbitrary, and that it
does not elucidate strategies to conduct war against nonDconventional forces. .or are many @ourth
Feneration ideas new. Sun #!u, the sixth century -.1. military strategy described similar strategies in
The Art of War.[<) %ncient Freeks, 0ersians, and later the (ongol hordes mastered the art of
demorali!ing enemies to collapse societies from within.[32 (ore recently, ,estern states and their
proxies eschewed convention and logistics. ?n 1)3A, for example, the 0hilippine 1onstabulary formed
@orce K, a group which infiltrated 0anay as a fake Euk unit, with the aim to sabotage the Euk
rebellion from within by sabotaging ammunition while conducting surveillance. #he -ritish conducted
similar operations during the (alaya Lmergency and in :enya during the (au (au insurgency.[31
5efenders of the @ourth Feneration thesis may conclude that the attrition that characteri!ed early and
midDtwentieth century warfare will not reoccur,[3" but this may be a hasty conclusion. Stalemate and
attrition characteri!ed the ?ranD?raq ,ar 61)A2D1)AA7, even though both sides en>oyed highly educated
publics whose militaries had access to missiles, >ets, and chemical weaponry. -etween 1))A and "222,
Lthiopia and Lritrea fought to a stalemate in a border war that cost, according to some estimates,
*2,222 lives.[3<
.or is irregular warfare necessarily superior to traditional methods. ?n his analysis of the "22= ?sraelD
Ee!bollah war, %ndrew Lxum, a 4.S. %rmy 'anger platoon leader in both %fghanistan and ?raq, noted
that Ee!bollah's decentrali!ation prevented its units from supporting each other in the same way that
the more structured ?sraeli 5efense @orces did.[33
@ormer ,est 0oint professor and %merican Lnterprise ?nstitute military historian @rederick ,. :agan
issued an important correction to the popular but mistaken notion that technology can alter the human
investment necessary in warfare. Ee observed that between 1)A) and "22<, there were eight ma>or
4.S. military operations, five of which resulted in longDterm deployments in hostile or semiDhostile
environments. Such commitments require large ground forces, irrespective of technological advances.
[3+ $(ilitary planning during 5onald 'umsfeld's terms as secretary of defense rested on three basic
assumptions about the nature of future conflict,$ :agan wrote. $@uture wars will be short, sharp
affairs; their outcomes will turn heavily on the opponents' relative levels of technology; and the 4nited
States can and should rely increasingly on using indigenous forces instead of its own ground troops.
%ll three assumptions have been badly undermined by recent operations.$[3=
#he casualty rates subsequent to Feorge ,. -ush's declaration of the end of ma>or combat in ?raq[3*
show :agan to be correct. ,hile 4.S. forces defeated the ?raqi army in >ust three weeks at a cost of
1+A coalition lives, the battle against insurgents, terrorists, and militias cost has since cost more than
"2 times as many 4.S. lives.
,hile 'umsfeld directed the 0entagon to expand Special Iperations @orces and 0sychological
Iperations and 1ivil %ffairs units and tasked the %ir @orce to establish an 4nmanned %erial Hehicle
Squadron,[3A such technological prowess has yet to neutrali!e the improvised explosive devices
6?L5s7 and vehicleDborne improvised explosive devices 6H-?L5s7, relatively lowDtechnology devices
responsible for the bulk of 4.S. casualties.
The Wea#ons of &ass !estruction threat
,hile a disparate network of adversaries may utili!e lowDtechnology remedies to neutrali!e 4.S.
power in ?raq, opposing states may pursue other means to neutrali!e 4.S. military might. ?n the wake
of the 1))* Nuadrennial 5efense 'eview, the 0entagon's strategy directorate tasked '%.5 scholars
-ruce ,. -ennett, 1hristopher 0. #womey, and Fregory @. #reverton to identify asymmetric threats
facing the 4nited States. #hey agreed that airpower was the 4nited States' chief military asset and
focused upon how adversaries might counter it. #hey predicted adversaries might use a combination of
theater missiles and chemical or biological weapons. .orth :orea, for example, might utili!e S145
missiles equipped with chemical or biological payloads. Ither threats they listed included mines,
diesel submarines, terrorism, and information warfare.[3)
#he "22= Nuadrennial 5efense 'eview updated concern about asymmetric challenges to recogni!e
that the most lethal challenges might not come directly from states, but rather that there might be
$conflicts in which enemy combatants are not regular military forces of nationDstates$ and in which
adversaries conduct $catastrophic terrorism employing weapons of mass destruction.$[+2
Such concern about weapons of mass destruction has grown with time. ?nternational inspections do not
provide a credible antidote. ?raqi 0resident Saddam Eussein managed to hide a covert nuclear program
for more than a decade despite ?nternational %tomic Lnergy %gency 6?%L%7 inspections. Eans -lix,
who had certified -aghdad's compliance at the time, later admitted that $the ?%L% was fooled by the
?raqis.$[+1
.or do multilateral organi!ations provide security. ?n "22=, 1harles 0rimmerman, assistant head of the
Sensor Systems 5ivision at the 0entagonDfunded /incoln /aboratory, analy!ed asymmetric threats to
the 4nited States. ,hile most revolved around weapons of mass destruction, 0rimmerman suggested
an adversary's pursuit of asymmetric strategies might include not only use of a weapon of mass
destruction, but also deception. In one hand, this might include insincere treaty negotiation as cover
to develop such weapons, something the Soviet 4nion did with regard to biological weapons and the
?slamic 'epublic did with regard to its .uclear .onD0roliferation Safeguards %greement. In the other,
he suggested, an adversary might turn such weaponry against its own citi!ens for the purpose of
blaming the other party.[+" %n adversary absorbing a conventional air strike on its nuclear, chemical,
or biological weapons facilities might, for example, spread contamination in order to blame the
attacker for killing its civilians.
#actical nuclear weapons also enhance threats. #he Soviet 4nion's collapse and the subsequent
deterioration in 'ussian conventional forces led (oscow to place greater emphasis on 'ussia's tactical
nuclear arsenal. %nalysts might consider this an asymmetric strategy. ?t amplified 'ussian prestige and
influence beyond what its economic and military strength might normally presage. ?ndeed, 'ussian
threats to deploy extra missiles in -elarus have caused Luropean 4nion bureaucrats to reconsider the
desire of 0oland and the 1!ech 'epublic to host early warning sites and antiDballistic missiles shields.
[+< Eowever, (oscow's strategic calculations have wider repercussions on other nations' threat
perceptions and create a cascading threat. Funnar %rbman, director of research at the Swedish 5efense
'esearch %gency, and 1harles #hornton, a research fellow at the 1enter for ?nternational and Security
Studies, explain, $#he deterioration of its conventional forces means 'ussia must rely more heavily on
its tactical nuclear weapons; and yet, the deteriorated state of the military's morale, readiness, and
reliability means that there is an increased internal threat of the accidental or unauthori!ed launch, or
the proliferation of a nuclear weapon.$[+3
#he "22= $"adrennial Defense Re#iew recogni!ed that possession of weapons of mass destruction
was an attractive asymmetric strategy for 4.S. adversaries. $#hey may brandish nuclear, chemical and
biological weapons to ensure regime survival, deny the 4nited States access to critical areas, or deter
others from taking action against them,$ the report read.[++ #echnological advancement increases the
threat, not because weapons may get more sophisticated, but rather because they become more
accessible.[+=
Sur#rise and !ominance
Surprise enhances the effectiveness of asymmetric challenge. Eistory is replete with weaker powers
seeking to transform surprise attack into advantage.[+* &apan, for example, launched surprise attacks
against both 'ussia in 1)23 and the 4nited States in 1)31. #he 1)+2 1hinese intervention in :orea
surprised ,estern officials, as did the 1)=+ 0akistani incursion into :ashmir. @ew in /ondon expected
%rgentina's 1)A" invasion of the @alkland ?slands.
#he 0eoples' 'epublic of 1hina continues to embrace surprise as mechanism to sidestep comparative
weakness on other fronts. (ichael 0illsbury, a former 0entagon official and expert on 1hinese military
doctrine, noted that -ei>ing's strategic thinkers consider the ?sraeli destruction of the Lgyptian air force
in the opening hours of the 1)=* SixD5ay ,ar to be a model of inferior forces triumphing over the
superior because of surprise. #he 1hinese navy, likewise, sees submarine warfare as a means to enable
its inferior forces to, by stealth, triumph over the superior.[+A
?nterwoven into surprise is mastery of the information battlefield. 1hang (engxiong, former senior
engineer of the 1hinese military's -ei>ing ?nstitute of System Lngineering, argued that the key to
1hinese success in "1
st
century asymmetric warfare would be -ei>ing's development of technologies to
attack satellites, electronic warfare aircraft, and ground command sites.[+) 5ominance of the
information battlefield might level the playing field and might enable smaller, weaker militaries to
enhance their range of operation.
Eere space technology may coincide with others aspects of battle strategy. 1hief among -ei>ing's
political and, perhaps, military ob>ectives are reunification with the island nation of #aiwan. Eowever,
the 0eoples' 'epublic lacks the naval assets to ensure victory.[=2 Eere, -ei>ing might use satellite
technology to overcome its relative weaknesses. #his is reflected in 1hinese naval doctrine. $#he
mastery of outer space will be a prerequisite for naval victory, with outer space becoming the new
commanding heights for naval combat,$ writes the 1hinese .aval 'esearch ?nstitute's 1aptain Shen
Chongchang.[=1 ?n this context, the destruction on &anuary 1A, "22*, of a 1hinese weather satellite by
a 1hinese antiDsatellite missile is worrisome.[="
1hinese military thinkers have argued that their strategy should center less on conventional battles
where troop concentrations are susceptible to remote attack, and more on striking enemy information
systems while ensuring -ei>ing's capacity for information warfare.[=< ,hile antiDsatellite weaponry
might be one method to level or establish dominance over the information field, it is not the only
mechanism. 1hinese strategist 1hen Eu'an explains, $#he operational ob>ectives of the two sides on
attack and defense are neither the sei!ing of territory nor the killing of so many enemies, but rather the
paraly!ing of the other side's information system and the destruction of the other side's will to
resist.$[=3 4.S. defense strategists are particularly concerned about electromagnetic pulse weapons.
#he "22= $"adrennial Defense Re#iew explains, $Lxpanded reliance on sophisticated electronic
technologies by the 4nited States, its allies and partners increases their vulnerability to the destructive
effects of electromagnetic pulse 6L(07, the energy burst given off during a nuclear weapons
explosion.$[=+ /ess destructive strategies might involve increasingly sophisticated efforts to disrupt
computer networks, especially given greater 4.S. reliance on netDcentric warfare.[==
/reem#tion or !i#lomacy.
,hile there may be no unified asymmetric threat, technological advancement coupled with access to
and lethality of weapons mandate that every state be prepared to counter threats before they develop
fully. .o longer can states count on strategic depth to absorb a first blow. .or, in an age of ideological
terror, can strategists assume that mutually assured destruction is an adequate deterrent to the use of
nuclear weapons.
#he ,hite Eouse outlined its concern about the threat posed by terrorists utili!ing weapons of mass
destruction in its "22" .ational Security Strategy. $#he gravest danger our .ation faces lies at the
crossroad of radicalism and technology. Iur enemies have openly declared that they are seeking
weapons of mass destruction, and evidence indicates that they are doing so with determination,$ the
president wrote in a letter accompanying its unveiling.[=* #he strategy emphasi!ed preDemption. $,e
must be prepared to stop rogue states and their terrorist clients before they are able to threaten or use
weapons of mass destruction against the 4nited States and our allies and friendsP ,e cannot let our
enemies strike first.$[=A
#he "22" .ational Security Strategy was controversial from its inception because critics saw it as
blurring the line between defense and aggression. (any analysts pointed out that 4.S. >ustification for
its own first strikes might create a precedent for other countries to stage surprise attacks. $,hat is
sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander,$ Ixford 4niversity professor %dam 'oberts told the
Washington Post. $? have to say it pu!!les %merica's allies that that danger doesn't seem to be fully
grasped.$[=) ?ndeed, much of the international hostility toward 4.S. policy in ?raq reflected less
disagreement about the perceived danger posed by ?raqi 0resident Saddam Eussein than the fear that
successful regime change in ?raq might create a precedent for forceful regime change. #he subsequent
difficulties encountered by 4.S. forces in ?raq, however, cooled enthusiasm for preDemption. #he "22=
.ational Security Strategy emphasi!ed multilateralism, with chapters emphasi!ing the strengthening
of alliances, cooperation to defuse regional conflicts, and development of common agendas $with the
other main centers of global power.$[*2
5iplomacy is important, but the rush to abandon preDemption in favor of multilateral affirmation can
be irresponsible. ?f citi!ens elect political leadership transparently and democratically, then it is the
responsibility of that government to guarantee their security, not multilateral organi!ations whose
officials are not directly accountable to any citi!enry. #he 1)A1 ?sraeli air strike on ?raq's Isirak
nuclear reactor illustrates this issue. #he 4nited .ation Security 1ouncil $strongly$ condemned
?srael's actions[*1 and, yet, hindsight shows that the ?sraeli leadership made the correct decision.
?nternational organi!ations often discuss problems, but they seldom solve them. #here is often an
inverse relationship between the si!e of any coalition or multilateral organi!ation, and its
effectiveness.
Fovernments should always first consider the diplomatic option to counter a threat. #he costs
incumbent in diplomacy are almost always lower than those expended in military conflict. Eowever,
diplomacy misapplied can amplify rather than resolve asymmetric threats, especially if they legitimi!e
terrorist violence.
#he :urdistan 'egional Fovernment of ?raq, for example, arms and provides safeDhaven to the 0::.
,hile ?raqi :urdish leader (asud -ar!ani condemns terrorist violence, he ties any peshmerga
crackdown on the 0:: to #urkish political concessions. ?t is a strategy of blackmail. Should %nkara
make political concessions in the face of terror, then it legitimi!es -ar!ani's support for terrorism and
will likely convince the ?raqi :urdish leader that his best asymmetric strategy is further terror support.
-oth #ehran and 5amascus have sought to leverage hostageDtaking into diplomatic concession,[*"
and the 0alestinian %uthority under Rasir %rafat's leadership was quite transparent in its strategy. ?n a
public 1))= conference, 0alestinian %uthority 0lanning (inister .abil Sha'ath said that ?srael should
not dismiss any 0alestinian demands since, $,e will return to violence. -ut this time it will be with
<2,222 armed 0alestinian soldiersP.$[*<
,hile 0rimmerman spoke of treaty violation as an asymmetric strategy, insincere engagement is as
much a threat. @or more than a decade, the foundation of Luropean policy toward the ?slamic 'epublic
of ?ran has been critical dialogue. ?n a @ebruary ), "22" interview, L4 Lxternal %ffairs 1ommissioner
1hris 0atten explained, $#here is more to be said for trying to engage and to draw these societies into
the international community than to cut them off.$[*3 Luropean officials saw in ?ranian president
(uhammad :hatami a worthy partner who spoke the words they wanted to hear. -etween "222 and
"22+, L4 trade with ?ran almost tripled. ?nstead of liberali!ing society or curtailing its terror support,
#ehran invested the resulting hard currency windfall in a clandestine nuclear program. #he lesson is
clear8 1onditioning rogue regimes to expect reward for defiance exacerbates rather than mitigates
conflict.
5espite the highDminded rhetoric of the 4nited .ations and other international bodies, coercionJthe
threat of force and, if necessary, its useJwill remain a critical element of 4.S. foreign policy.[*+ ?f
states are to counter threats, they must remain willing to use brute force, even if it means engaging in a
war of attrition or multiyear counterinsurgency. %ny conflict from which a state shirks will become the
asymmetric strategy of choice for its adversary. #he idea that the long war can be abandoned with a
turn of phrase is both naSve and dangerous.
%onclusions
,hile the -ush administration and its policies are unpopular through much of the world,[*= the
necessity for ,ashington to address asymmetric threats will transcend administrations. ,hereas once
the 0entagon concerned itself with fulfilling the ability to fight two ma>or wars simultaneously,[**
today it must also worry about counteracting and, if necessary, preDempting weapons of mass
destruction attacks against 4.S. targets.[*A ?t must be prepared to face wellDdeveloped militariesJfor
example, to defend #aiwan against 1hinese invasionJand also counter uncompromising ideologies.
5istance is no longer a defense nor, as the )M11 terrorist attack showed, is an adversary's lack of
ballistic missile capability.
#here is no unified asymmetric threat, however. %ll states and adversaries will ad>ust their strategies to
maximi!e advantage and minimi!e weakness. % 1hinese attack on 4.S. satellites, communications
infrastructure, or shipping might look very different from an alDNaeda or Eamas attack on tourists,
shopping malls, or military bases.
,hile a dictatorship's unity of purpose and a terrorist group's decentrali!ation might appear
advantageous against the inefficiency of democracy, democratic governance is itself an asymmetric
advantage. @ew individuals relish dictatorship. 5ecisionDmaking in -ei>ing and (oscow, 0yongyang
and Eavana may be streamlined, but they fear their own citi!enry in a way democracies do not.
1ommunication and linesDofDcontrol in democracies tend to be more flexible than in terrorist groups.
5emocracies can fight either regularly or irregularly; terrorist groups have no such choice and, when
successful, have difficulty controlling territory.
,hile the 4.S. army today teaches that victories combine both military and political components,[*)
,ashington should recogni!e that an opponent's strategy will incorporate nonDmilitary components as
well. ?nformation warfare and influence operations should be an important component of any strategy
to counter asymmetric threats. ,hile, in the 4.S. context, free speech should be absolute, politicians
should recogni!e some responsibility for how foreign audiences interpret their words.
?f there is any unifying concept that democracies might consider to counter the asymmetric threats
they face, it is flexibility. ?f opponents eschew international norms and the laws of warfare without
consequence, can ,estern nations afford to abide by their most liberal interpretations9 0erhaps rather
than hold states unilaterally to the broadest interpretations of international and humanitarian law,
,estern governments must calibrate their interpretations to those of their adversaries. ?ronically, this is
not an innovation, but rather the original intent of the Feneva 1onventions.
Michael R"bin% a resident scholar at the American &nterprise 'nstit"te% is editor of the (iddle Last
Nuarterly. He is gratef"l for the "sef"l comments and insights pro#ided by A&' colleag"es Dan
!l"menthal% Tom Donnelly% (rederic W. )agan% and *ary Schmitt.
[1 4.S. 5epartment of 5efense. $"adrennial Defense Re#iew Report. September <2, "221. %vailable
at8 www.defenselink.milMpubsMqdr"221.pdf. Eereafter $DR 6"2217.
[" $DR 6"2217, p. iv.
[< 0ublic /aw 123D"21, Sept. "<, 1))=. http8MMwww.dod.milMdodgcMolcMdocsM1))*.5%%.pdf
[3 $DR 61))*7, http8MMwww.fas.orgMmanMdocsMqdrMsec".html; and
[+ Stephen &. /ambakis. $'econsidering %symmetric ,arfare.$ +oint (orces $"arterly, @ebruary
"22+, pp. 12"D12A. 1.%. 0rimmerman also observed that many definitions of $asymmetric threat$
stand up neither to historical nor logical scrutiny [1.%. 0rimmerman, $#houghts on the (eaning of
'%symmetric #hreats.'$ 6/exington, (assachusetts8 /incoln /aboratory, "22=7, 1,
http8MMstinet.dtic.milMcgiDbinMFet#'5oc9%5T%3331)"U/ocationT4"UdocTFet#'5oc.pdf
[= (arshall F.S. Eodgson. The ,ent"re of 'slam- ,ol"me .- The *"npowder &mpires and Modern
Times. 61hicago8 4niversity of 1hicago 0ress, 1)*37, p. 1*.
[* @or an excellent review of the history of 4.S. defense posture, see8 Fary &. Schmitt and #homas
5onnelly, $.umbers (atter$ in Schmitt and 5onnelly, eds. /f Men and Material- The 0risis in
Military Reso"rces. 6,ashington8 #he %merican Lnterprise ?nstitute 0ress, "22*7, pp. +D").
[A 5onald &. (ro!ek, $%symmetric 'esponse to %merican %ir Supremacy in Hietnam,$ in8 /loyd &.
(atthews, ed. 0hallenging the 1nited States Symmetrically and Asymmetrically- 0an America !e
Defeated2 61arlisle -arracks, 0ennsylvania8 4.S. %rmy ,ar 1ollege, 1)AA7, pp. )=.
[) $HietnamDanniversaire.$ %gence @rance 0resse, %pril 3, "22+.
[12 (ro!ek, 12<.
[11 @or an example of weakening consensus, see8 'ichard 0ipes, $Five the 1hechens a /and of their
Iwn.$ The 3ew 4or Times, September ), "223.
[1" %lD(anar #elevision 6-eirut7, September "", "22=.
[1< See %ndrew Lxum. Hi5ballah at War- A Military Assessment. 6,ashington8 #he ,ashington
?nstitute, "22=7, pp. <D3.
[13 Steven Ldwards. $4. backs 0alestinian violence8 %rab, Luropean nations pass resolution
supporting use of 'armed struggle.'$ 3ational Post, %pril 1=, "22".
[1+ %lex 0. Schmid, %lbert &. &ongman et al., Political Terrorism- A 3ew *"ide to Actors% A"thors%
0oncepts% Data !ases% Theories% and 6iterat"re 6.ew -runswick, .ew &ersey8 #ransaction -ooks,
1)AA7, pp. +D=, as cited in &effrey 'ecord. !o"nding the *lobal War on Terrorism. 61arlisle -arracks8
4.S. %rmy ,ar 1ollege, "22<7, p. =. @or the 1)*3 ?nternational %ssociation of 1hiefs of 0olice
definition and the 1)*= .ational %dvisory 1ommittee on &ustice, 1riminal Standards, and Foals
definition, see8 Stephen Sloan, $#errorism and %symmetry,$ in 0hallenging the 1nited States
Symmetrically and Asymmetrically, p. 1*3.
[1= 4.F% %M'LSM3)M=2 65ecember ), 1))37, V?<.
[1* $?n /arger @reedom8 #owards 5evelopment, security and human rights for all.$ 'eport of the
Secretary Feneral. (arch "1, "22+. 1hapter <, V)<. http8MMwww.un.orgMlargerfreedomMchap<.htm
[1A @or this point, ? am grateful to %merican Lnterprise ?nstitute resident scholar @rederick ,. :agan.
[1) Stephen Sloan, $#errorism and %symmetry,$ in 0hallenging the 1nited States Symmetrically and
Asymmetrically, p. 1*=.
["2 -ruce ,. -ennett, 1hristopher 0. #womey, and Fregory @. #reverton, What Are Asymmetric
Strategies2 6,ashington8 '%.5, 1)))7, p. <.
["1 Steven :omarow and #om Squitieri. $.I'%5 had drills eerily like Sept. 11.$ 1SA Today, %pril
1), "223.
["" ,hile neither the "221 or "22= N5' reference alDNaeda directly, both refer to the September 11,
"221 attacks as the start of the new war [$DR 6"2217, pg. iii; $DR 6"22=7, pg. v.
["< %s quoted in 1harles &. 5unlap, &r., $0reliminary Ibservations8 %symmetrical ,arfare and the
,estern (indset,$ in 1ol. /loyd &. (atthews 64.S. %rmy, ret.7. 0hallenging the 1nited States-
Symmetrically and Asymmetrically. 61arlisle -arracks, 0ennsylvania8 4.S. %rmy ,ar 1ollege, 1)AA7,
p. *
["3 (arvin :alb. $#he ?sraeliDEe!bollah ,ar of "22=8 #he (edia as a ,eapon in %symmetrical
1onflict.$ @aculty ,orking 0aper Series, &ohn @. :ennedy School of Fovernment, Earvard 4niversity,
@ebruary "22*.
["+ -ennett et al., p. *.
["= $4sama bin /adin8 '%merican Soldiers are 0aper #igers.'$ Middle &ast $"arterly. 5ecember
1))A. http8MMwww.meforum.orgM3<+MusamaDbinDladinDamericanDsoldiersDareDpaperDtigers
["* :alb, p. +.
["A 5oreen 1arva>al. $-anning channgel accused of hate speech could be difficult8 @rance finds
-eirut station a turnoff.$ 'nternational Herald Trib"ne, 5ecember 12, "223.
[") $5anish 'esistance, #urkish anger in row over 'o> #H,$ 7aman, %pril 1+, "22*.
[<2 5oreen 1arva>al. $@rench ban %l (anar #H channel.$ 'nternational Herald Trib"ne, 5ecember
13, "223.
[<1 $#urkey, ?srael patch up ties after Eamas tension.$ T"rish Daily 3ews, @ebruary "", "22=.
[<" 5aniel -yman. $Eow to @ight #errorism.$ The 3ational 'nterest. Spring "22+.
[<< $DR 6"22=7, pg. "1.
[<3 $DR 6"22=7, pg. "<.
[<+ See, for example, &ohn %rquilla and 5avid 'onfeldt, eds. 'n Athena8s 0amp- Preparing for
0onflict in the 'nformation Age. Santa (onica8 'and, 1))).
[<= See, for example, $#he /arger 0atriotism.$ The 3ew 4or Times, &anuary 12, 1))1. 0g. %"3.
[<* ,illiam S. /ind et al. $#he 1hanging @ace of ,ar8 ?nto the @ourth Feneration.$ Marine 0orps
*a5ette, Ictober 1)A), pp. ""D"=.
[<A #his was the conclusion in the official 4.S. army history of Iperation ?raqi @reedom. See8 1ol.
Fregory @ontenot, /t. 1ol. L.&. 5egen, and /t. 1ol. 5avid #ohn. /n Point- The 1nited States Army in
/peration 'ra9i (reedom. 6%nnapolis8 .aval ?nstitute 0ress, "22+7, pg. 313.
[<) SunD#!u 6'oger %mes, trans.7, The Art of Warfare. .ew Rork8 -allantine -ooks, 1))<.
[32 See, for example, %ntulio &. Lchevarria ??, (o"rth:*eneration War and /ther Myths. 1arlisle,
0ennsylvania8 Strategic Studies ?nstitute, 4.S. %rmy ,ar 1ollege, "22+.
[31 /awrence L. 1line. Pse"do:/perations and 0o"nterins"rgency- 6essons from /ther 0o"ntries.
61arlisle8 Strategic Studies ?nstitute, "22+7, pp. 1D=.
[3" 1apt. &ohn ,. -ellflower, $3
th
Feneration ,arfare,$ Small Wars +o"rnal, @ebruary "22=.
www.smallwars>ournal.comMdocumentsMsw>magMv3Mbellflower.htm
[3< ?an @isher. $@rom an IldD@ashioned ,ar, a Hery (odern 1alamity.$ The 3ew 4or Times, &une 3,
"222. V3, 0g. +.
[33 Lxum, pg. 12.
[3+ @rederick ,. :agan, $0rotracted ,ars and the %rmy's @uture,$ in Schmitt and 5onnelly, /f Men
and Material, pp. <2D+2.
[3= :agan, p. <<.
[3* $'emarks by the 0resident from the 4SS %braham /incoln,$ Iffice of the 0ress Secretary, the
,hite Eouse, (ay 1, "22<. http8MMwww.whitehouse.gpvMnewsMreleasesM"22<M2+M"22<2+21D1+.html
[3A $DR 6"22=7, p. +.
[3) -ennett et al., pp. =D*.
[+2 4.S. 5epartment of 5efense. $"adrennial Defense Re#iew Report, @ebruary =, "22=, p. 1. @ull
report available at8 www.defenselink.milMqdrMreportM'eport"22=2"2<.pdf. Eereafter, $DR 6"22=7.
[+1 &ulian -orger. $?nside Story8 #he %nthrax Eunter.$ The *"ardian 6/ondon7, %pril 12, "22".
[+" 0rimmerman, pp. AD).
[+< Hago (uradian. $'ussia 'esists 0olish (issile 5efense 'ole.$ Defense 3ews, September "+,
"22=. http8MMdefensenews.comMstory.php9@T"123+<)U1Tairwar
[+3 Funnar %rbman and 1harles #hornton. R"ssia8s Tactical 3"clear Weapons. 6Stockholm8 Swedish
5efense 'esearch %gency, .ovember "22<7, pg. *.
[++ $DR 6"22=7, pg. <".
[+= $DR 6"22=7, pp. <"D<<.
[+* @or a thorough discussion, see8 #.H. 0aul. Asymmetric 0onflicts- War 'nitiation by Weaer
Powers. .ew Rork8 1ambridge 4niversity 0ress, 1))3.
[+A (ichael 0illsbury. 0hina Debates the ("t"re Sec"rity &n#ironment. 6,ashington8 .ational
5efense 4niversity 0ress, "2227, pp. "A).
[+) 0illsbury. 0hina Debates the ("t"re Sec"rity &n#ironment, p. ")".
[=2 See 0iers (. ,ood and 1harles 5. @erguson, $Eow 1hina (ight ?nvade #aiwan,$ The 3a#al War
0ollege Re#iew, %utumn "221, pp. ++D=A.
[=1 0illsbury. 0hina Debates the ("t"re Sec"rity &n#ironment, p. ")<.
[=" 1aitlin Earrington. $1hinese %S%# test rekindles weapons debate.$ +ane8s Defense Weely,
&anuary "3, "22*, p. 3.
[=< 1hen Eu'an. $#he #hird (ilitary 'evolution.$ 0ontemporary Military Affairs, (arch 11, 1))=, as
reproduced in (ichael 0illsbury, ed. 0hinese ,iews of ("t"re Warfare. 6Eonolulu8 4niversity 0ress of
the 0acific, "22"7, p. <)1.
[=3 Eu'an, p. <)<.
[=+ $DR 6"22=7, pg. <<.
[== @or 4.S. reliance on netDcentric warfare, see8 /t. Fen. Earry 5. 'aduege, &r. $.etD1entric ,arfare
is 1hanging the -attlefield Lnvironment,$ 0rossTal- The +o"rnal of Defense Software &ngineering.
&anuary "223. http8MMwww.stsc.hill.af.milMcross#alkM"223M21M2321'aduege.html
[=* The 3ational Sec"rity Strategy of the 1nited States of America. #he ,hite Eouse. September
"22". Eere after, 3SS 6"22"7.
[=A 3SS 6"22"7, pp. 13D1+.
[=) 0eter Slevin. $%nalysts8 .ew Strategy 1ourts 4nseen 5angers; @irst Strike 1ould be 0recedent
for Ither .ations.$ The Washington Post, September "", "22". 0g. %1.
[*2 The 3ational Sec"rity Strategy of the 1nited States of America. #he ,hite Eouse. (arch "22=.
http8MMwww.whitehouse.govMnscMnssM"22=Mnss"22=.pdf
[*14. SM'LSM3A* 6&une 1), 1)A17.
[*" 5aniel 0ipes highlighted the examples which follow in8 $%ssad's 1unning Fame.$ The
Washington Post. .ovember 3, 1)A=.
[*< $'P#he only way to impose our conditions is inevitably through our blood.'$ (iddle Last (edia
'esearch ?nstitute. Special 5ispatch .o. 1<". Ictober =, "222.
[*3 &onathan @reedland. $0atten lays into -ush's %merica.$ The *"ardian. @ebruary ), "22".
www.guardian.co.ukM%rchiveM%rticleM2,3"*<,3<+")"),22.html
[*+ 5aniel -yman and (atthew ,axman. The Dynamics of 0oercion. 61ambridge8 1ambridge
4niversity 0ress, "2227, pp. 1D<.
[*= #he 0ew Flobal %ttitudes 0ro>ect. 0onflicting ,iews in a Di#ided World% ;<<=. 6,ashington8 0ew
'esearch 1enter, "22=7, pp. )D1+.
[** $5efense Strategy,$ in ,illiam S. 1ohen. Report of the $"adrennial Defense Re#iew. (ay 1))*.
www.defenselink.milMpubsMqdrMsec<.htm . Eereafter8 $DR 61))*7.
[*A $DR 6"2217, p. <.
[*) See, for example, 0o"nterins"rgency. @ield (anual .o. <D"3. ,ashington8 5epartment of the
%rmy, "22=.
http://www.mefor6m.org/)4:4/asymmetricalAthreatAconceptAandAitsAreDections
Asymmetric warfare( a clear
and #resent threat
S>afrie S>amsoeddin, 5eputy 5efense (inister, &akarta W 'eview and Iutlook W (on, &anuary "* "213,
<822 0(
%ir power8 Eelicopters of the ?ndonesian (ilitary 6#.?7 fly over military aircraft on display during the
commemoration of the =Ath anniversary of the #.? on Ict. +, "21<, at Ealim 0erdanakusuma %irport.
.onDconventional threats such as terrorism, however, require more than traditional military
equipment.DD&0M0.&. /eo
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I4#/II: "213
,omenXs political representation8 0repare for "21)
#olerance caught between hybridity and purity
?nclude 0apuans in policyDmaking
/egal reform J for what9
1hinaXs strategic developments and their impact on relations with %SL%.
Iutlook "2138 % choice for change
#he year oligarchs try to steal democracy from the people
?n search of democratic platforms
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I4#/II: "213
1apital markets8 5arkest before dawn
1hallenging times ahead for the ?ndonesian mining sector
?nfrastructure investment8 Eow fast can it grow9
Frowth will slow, but inflation will improve
#he year of Lmbracing %d>ustment
#urning macroeconomic challenges into opportunities
?s the party over for national -anks9
Fuarding prudence amid election noise
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I4#/II: "213
&akarta needs regional development institution
Eealthy, quality life for all
Flobali!ation and technological advancement have generated more complex and multidimensional
security concepts that cover not only military but also nonDmilitary aspects. #he characteristics of
threat have also expanded with the appearance of nonDtraditional ha!ards.
Such conditions have influenced the character of warfare, as evident in the 'evolution in (ilitary
%ffairs that changed fourth generation warfare into asymmetric warfare. #he changes are an integral
part of the transformation of defense in many countries.
?ndonesia, given its vast territory and plural societies, is facing the risks of asymmetric warfare.
5omestic politics, terrorism and separatist movements in some regions will potentially trigger
asymmetric conflicts that deviate from the normal standards.
Flobali!ation has undeniably influenced the dynamics of world communities. #he publicXs view and
response to the impacts of globali!ation vary. Some accept globali!ation in a smart, creative and
critical way and therefore consider it a challenge, while others who re>ect it perceive it as a menace.
#hose who oppose globali!ation hold the phenomenon responsible for the rise of #EL survival of the
fittest, which separates Ythe winnerZ from Ythe loserZ. #he thrashing of Ythe loserZ creates Ythe angry
entityZ, which can lead to polari!ation and radicali!ation that manifests in transnational crimes,
separatism and even terrorism.
?n asymmetric warfare, the military faces not only state actors but also nonDstate actors, such as terror
groups, separatists and others. #hese groups benefit from technological advancement and globali!ation
in carrying out their actions, with support from the mobility of thoughtsMorders that know no
boundaries.
%symmetric warfare is often characteri!ed also by attacks on diverse fields, covering ideology,
politics, economy, socioDculture and the military from external 6international7 as well as internal
6domestic7 fronts.
-ased on this pattern of thought, the types of security threats facing ?ndonesia is charted in the table at
the next page8
#he variety of threats, both actual and potential, beg early anticipation, initiatives and proportional
responses, as well as extra or special capacity of mastering asymmetric warfare methods involving
technology, information, psychology and other things. #o surmount the threats, collaboration,
cooperation and nonDconventional patterns of thought should always come to the fore.
?n responding to asymmetric warfare, the military has four tendencies. @irst, accomplishment of
mission orders will tend to be even more determined by lowDlevel organi!ations. #herefore, mission
goals should be understood by the lowest level organi!ations so that they can quickly respond to
developments without having to compromise bigger mission orders.
Second, any shift of the smallest units should keep up their capability of independent operation
without relying on centrali!ed logistics. Lach unit should be able to survive with natural resources and
enemy resources already controlled. Eerein lies the necessity for high individual capacity.
#hird, maneuvering capability is increasingly important compared with the number of weapons or
firepower, considering that mass concentration and firepower is vulnerable to attack. ?n the future,
small troops with high maneuvering capacity, moving rapidly and agilely, will dominate battles
because asymmetric warfare is far from normative.
@urther, thereXs a tendency to attack opponents internally by diminishing their physical strength. #his
can be achieved, among other ways, by pressuring political, financial and logistical bases of opponents
that will force them to end their war.
@ourth, asymmetric warfare is devoid of any definite form. #he dividing line between war and peace
will be even more indistinct, with a nonDlinear front, perhaps even without a visible battle front.
#he dividing line between civilians and military members becomes even vaguer. ,ar will take place in
all dimensions, including the cultural dimension; therefore psychological war will be one of the very
dominant features. %t the level of strategy, the target of fourth generation war is the motivational
surrender of opponentsX policymakers.
Strategic victory is gained through a series of coordinated and symbolic attacks by different means to
destroy the economic, sociocultural and political infrastructure of a state, which demorali!es its
political leaders.
Strategic and innovative concepts are required through the development of tactics and techniques in
facing asymmetric warfare, particularly by developing the experiences of several countries already
undergoing such warfare. #he 4S, for instance, partly due to its global role, considers state actors such
as ?ran, .orth :orea and 1uba, as well as those with cyber capabilities such as 1hina and 'ussia, its
asymmetric threats. #he 4S also still deems insurgency forces it faces in Yhumanity operationsZ in
%fghanistan and ?raq as asymmetric threats. (eanwhile, 1hina and 'ussia consider domestic forces in
#ibet and 1hechnya their asymmetric threats, respectively.
?ndonesia, like the ,est, recogni!es asymmetric warfare as a war tactic of the weak against the strong.
-ut unlike the ,est, which tends to seek strategic solutions, ?ndonesia chooses to interpret asymmetric
warfare as a modern war that needs a comprehensive response, especially by strengthening state
defenses. 0artly because of its geostrategic and defenses historical construction, ?ndonesiaXs solution to
absorb asymmetric warfare is the strategy of welfare supported by security.
?t is therefore necessary for ?ndonesia to brace for imminent asymmetric warfare through various
measures now, or it will be too late. @irst, restructuring conventional war tactics and techniques as well
as updating to address the everDevolving war tactics, according to latest trends, is imperative. ?n
addition, capacity training and development of all components of the nation in facing any contingency
of asymmetric warfare is necessary.
@or the ?ndonesian (ilitary 6#.?7, ad>ustment of its doctrines, systems and methods as well as the
advancement of the capabilities and skills to deal with opponents launching nonDconventional attacks
deserve priority. ?n asymmetric warfare, no prediction can ever be made in regards to when, by what
means and where opponentsMenemies will attack, and what targets they will be aiming at.
Second, the role of territorial commands in empowering defense territories is vital. #erritorial
commands should be the vanguard of defense forces in the event of asymmetric warfare, be it the war
of ideology, politics, economy, socioDculture or security. #he commands could advise the defense
minister on concepts of action at the operational level and policies at the more strategic level, so that
the impact of the threats of asymmetric warfare could be promptly eliminated.
#hird, the policy and regulation level, and products of legislation related to national security should be
reali!ed as strategic direction in response to national issues on a broader scale.
@ourth, regional cooperation is the only feasible modality to face asymmetric warfare. Some forms of
security threats have for a long time been the concern of the %SL%. 'egional @orum, %0L1, Last
%sian Summit and %SL%.. -ut %siaD0acific solutions remain very limited, with the furthest results
being the confidence building measures 61-(7, preventive diplomacy and various forms of
cooperation to build state capacity 6involving legislation, law enforcement competence, exchanges of
information, coordinated cooperation, community building7. #o this end, it is necessary to improve the
formula of more favorable regional cooperation with neighboring countries on the basis of mutual
respect and equality.
@inally, in the era of asymmetric warfare, there is a tendency of the weak to show no fear of the strong,
as long as the former has the capability of enhancing skill levels, intelligence, and above all, strong
determination to win. -ut most importantly, we should prevent the emergence of asymmetric enemies.
?n the defense context, the most efficient move to cope with asymmetric warfare is to optimi!e
diplomacy, which is more productive than the use of violence like military force, although diplomacy
is not without a doubt desired by hardcore fanatics and fundamentalists.