As-Sanusi - IMAM MOHD B YUSUF - THEOLOGY - KENNY

Joseph Kenny OP: MUSLIM THEOLOGY ... Muhammad b. Yūsuf ... http://www.diafrica.org/nigeriaop/kenny/Isltheology/Sanusi3.
htm
CHAPTER III
THE THEOLOGY OF AS-SANŪSĪ
A. Introduction
B. The science of kalām:
a. Blind-acceptance versus correct reasoning: definitions (N. 1)
b. The obligation of knowledge
c. The status of a blind-acceptor (muqallid)
d. The reality of faith
e. The position of this science
f. Method and preliminary notions (N. 2)
C. The existence of God:
a. Explanation of terms (Nos. 3-4)
b. The argument from the world’s having come into being (Nos. 4-5)
c. The argument from possibility
D. The essence of God and attributes in general:
a. Knowability of God’s essence
b. Kinds of attributes
c. existence as an attribute
E. Negative attributes:
a. Being from eternity (qidam) (N. 6)
b. Being everlasting (baqā’)
c. Otherness from things that come into being (mukhālafatuhu li-l-ḥawādith)
(Nos. 7-9)
d. Self-subsistency (qiyāmuhu bi-nafsihi) (Nos. 11-12)
F. The positive attributes:
a. Al-Ashàrī and no adjectival attributes (N. 13)
b. The Mu`tazilites and no substantive attributes
c. The Philosophers and no positive attributes
d. Power (qudra) (N. 14)
e. Will (irāda) Nos. 15-19)
f. Knowledge (ìlm) Nos. 20-21)
g. Hearing, sight, speech and perception (Nos. 22-23)
h. Outward anthropomorphisms (N. 24)
i. Life, and the eternity and unity of every attribute (Nos. 25-31)
G. Oneness (waḥdaniyya):
a. Procedure and meaning (N. 32)
b. Oneness in essence and attributes (N. 33)
c. Oneness in acting (Nos. 35-39)
H. What is admissible concerning God: providing what is good, being seen:
a. Principles (N. 40)
b. The good and the best (aṣ-ṣalāḥ wa-l-aṣlaḥ) (N. 41)
c. Seeing God (Nos. 42-43)
I. Prophecy in general:
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Joseph Kenny OP: MUSLIM THEOLOGY ... Muhammad b. Yūsuf ... http://www.diafrica.org/nigeriaop/kenny/Isltheology/Sanusi3.htm
Definition and distinctions (Nos. 44-45)

a. Proof of truthfulness from miracles (Nos. 45-56)
b. Immunity from defect (ìṣma) (N. 47)
c. Abrogation (Naskh)
J. The messengership of Muḥammad:
a. Proof from the miraculosity of the Qur'ān (N. 48)
b. Proof from announcing absent events
c. Proof from various extraordinary events
d. Proof from the books of previous prophets
e. Who is preferred after Muḥammad
f. Regarding saints, wonders and magic
K. Various revealed tenets:
a. The resurrection (N. 49)
b. The questioning and torment or delight in the grave]
c. The path
d. The scale
e. The basin
f. Intercession
g. Eternity of final reward or punishment
h. Repentance
i. Law enforcement
Introduction
This chapter takes the commentary on the Wusṭā as its point of departure, and its number
divisions parallel those of the Creed in Chapter II. Abbreviations to as-Sanūsī's works,
using the editions or manuscripts indicated in Chapter I, E, are as follows:
K = al-Àqīda al-kubrā and its commentary (works 2 and 3)

W = al-Àqīda al-wusṭā and its commentary (works 4 and 5), using the E1 manuscript
Ṣ = al-Àqīda aṣ-ṣughrā and its commentary (works 6 and 7)
J = Sharḥ al-Jazā'iriyya (work 16)
Ṣṣ = Ṣighrat aṣ-Ṣighra and its commentary (works 8 and 9)
M = al-Muqaddima and its commentary (works 10 and 11)
Before the actual text of the Creed, W contains an introduction which explains the aim of
the work [ff. 3b-5a; see Ch. II, A, a] and, while complaining that the state of religion has
deteriorated over the centuries [f. 3b], derives courage to go on teaching from the ḥadīth
that a remnant (ṭā'ifa) of believers will continue to the end of time. (1)
A. The science of kalām
a. Blind-acceptance versus correct reasoning, definitions:
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(N. 1) Blind-acceptance (taqlīd), according to the dictionary definition (fī l-lugha), says
W [f. 8b], is "acting upon the opinion of another without reason" (al-àmal bi-qawl
al-ghayr bi-lā ḥujja). This definition excludes from taqlīd accepting the opinion of a muftī
when one does not understand a problem, since there is reason for accepting his authority,
namely, the Qur'ān verse "Ask the professional recallers if you do not know" (16:43 =
21:7).
Ibn-Àrafa, in his Shāmil, gave as a technical definition "a firm belief in the opinion of
someone who is not infallible" (i`tiqād jāzim li-qawl ghary ma`ṣūm). This definition
includes under taqlīd accepting the opinion of a muftī. Ibn-al-Ḥājib, in his Mukhtaṣar, first
accepted the dictionary definition, then reconsidered when he saw this latter definition
generally accepted.
An objection to the definition of Ibn-Àrafa is that it does not include under taqlīd the case
of one who accepts the opinion of an infallible person that God exists, since this kind of
tenet cannot be accepted simply on the authority of another. The answer to this objection
is implied in the definition, since one must know the existence and attributes of God before
one can appreciate the value of a miracle in proving the infallibility of a person to speak on
other questions.
J [1b, f. 23b] returns to an equivalent of the dictionary definition, "accepting the opinion
of another without reason" (akhdh qawl al-ghayr bi-ghayr dalīl), and explains that this
excludes from taqlīd accepting what was communicated to the Messenger, after knowing
a proof for his truthfulness.
To define taqlīd and knowledge, K [pp. 37-38] and Ṣṣ [p. 9] proceed by way of division.
A judgement or determination is:
not firm (ghayr al-jazm), and:

more probable than its contrary = opinion (ẓann)
equiprobable with its contrary = doubt (shakk)
less probable than its contrary = suspicion (wahm)
firm, and:
based on a reason (dalīl) = knowledge (ìlm) or awareness (ma`rifa) (2)
not based on a reason = blind acceptance (taqlīd):
agreeing with the truth:
in branch sciences (furū`)
in fundamentals (uṣūl ad-dīn)
not agreeing with the truth = compounded ignorance (al-jahl al-murakkab)
(3)
Correct reasoning (an-naẓar aṣ-ṣaḥīḥ), says W [f. 10a], is "the reflection by which a
person considers the aspect which is intermediate between himself and that which is to be
proved" (at-ta'ammul allādhī yaṭṭali` ṣāḥibuhu àlā l-wajh allādhī baynahu wa-rayn
al-madlūl). Erroneous reasoning (an-naẓar al-fāsid) is that which does not look at the
proper aspect.
K [p. 17] first gave al-Bayḍāwī's definition of correct reasoning, "the arrangement of facts
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(umūr ma`lūmāt) according to the aspect which will dead to knowledge of what is not
known," but offers as a better definition "the placing of a fact, or arrangement of two or
more facts according to an aspect which will result in what is sought (al-maṭlūb) or in a
specification (at-tanwī`)." The latter definition includes definitions and descriptions,
whether complete or not, and syllogistic argumentation.
Aside from the Summanites, who denied the value of any reasoning, and the Mechanists
(muhandisūn), who denied its value in attaining God, various explanations of the
connection (rabṭ) between reasoning and knowledge are reported by W [f. 10a], K [pp.
18-19] and J [1d, f. 33a]. The Philosophers (ḥukamā') say that reasoning is an
independent cause (ìlla mustaqilla) of knowledge; the Mu`tazilites say that man has the
power of directly producing (iqtirā`) his reasoning, and that from his reasoning knowledge
is induced (al-ìlm mutawallad àn an-naẓar). These positions are refuted later.
Of the Sunnites, al-Ashàrī said that the connection is customary (`ādī); according to this
opinion, in an extraordinary case there could be correct reasoning without there resulting
any knowledge. Imām-al-Ḥaramayn said that the connection is of intelligibility (àqlī);
according to him, if there are no general liabilities (al-āfāt al-`āmma), such as death, there
cannot be correct reasoning without there also being knowledge of what is to be shown
(ìlm al-madlūl); correct reasoning does away with special liabilities (al-āfāt al-khāṣṣa),
such as ignorance, and there is no need to demand their absence as a condition for
knowledge. (4) In K as-Sanūsī says that the position of Imām-al-Ḥaramayn is the correct
one, but in W and J he makes no judgement. (5)
b. The obligation of knowledge
According to Ṣ [p. 55], the mass (jumhūr) of theologians agree that knowledge and
correct reasoning leading to it are necessary for the validity of faith. These theologians
include al-Ashàrī, al-Bāqillānī, Imām-al-Ḥaramayn, and Ibn-al-Qaṣṣār who quotes a
ḥadīth from Mālik for this opinion. W [f. 10b] repeats this ḥadīth and adds the authority of
al-Isfarā'inī.
A minority opinion [Ṣ, p. 57] is that knowledge and correct reasoning are neither a
condition of faith nor obligatory, but only desirable and a condition of the perfection of
faith. It is attributed to Ibn-a. Jamra, al-Qushayrī, Ibn-Rushd, and al-Ghazālī, although K
[p. 42] says that the apparent meaning in the Nawāzil of Ibn-Rushd is that only detailed
knowledge is non-obligatory.
Similar is the opinion of the Indians who hold that knowledge comes from inspiration
(ilhām) resulting from emptying the mind of distraction; thus reasoning is unnecessary [K,
pp. 84-85].
Other opinions are that teaching the masses tawḥīd disturbs the tranquillity of their faith -
which is refuted by the contrary, namely that it increases their peace with certitude, as
various ḥadīths illustrate [W, f. 13b] - or the opinion of the Ḥashwiyya who held that any
reasoning about the articles of faith was forbidden - which is contrary to all authoritative
tradition [W, f. 11a].
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Concerning the first obligation of one who has reached maturity, K [pp. 27-29], W [f.
10b] and J [2a, f. 36b] mention six opinions: 1) knowing-awareness of God (ma`rifat
Allāh), the opinion of al-Ashàrī; 2) reasoning leading to this (an-naẓar al-muwaṣṣil
ilayhā), attributed in J to al-Bāqillānī, but in K and W to al-Ashàrī as a second opinion of
his; 3) the first part of reasoning (awwal juz' min an-naẓar), an anonymous opinion in J,
but attributed to al-Bāqillānī in K and W; 4) the intention of correct reasoning (al-qaṣd ilā
n-naẓar aṣ-ṣaḥīḥ), explained in K and W as turning one's heart toward it and cutting off
contrary attachments, such as pride and resistance to teachers; this opinion is attributed in
J to al-Bāqillānī, Ibn-Fūrak and Imām-al-Ḥaramayn, but in K and W to al-Isfarā'inī and
Imām-al-Ḥaramayn; 5) blind acceptance (taqlīd), explained in K and W as "an
acknowledgement of (al-iqrār bi-) God and his messengers by a belief agreeing with the
truth (àn àqd muṭābiq) even without knowledge; and 6) doubt (shakk), the opinion of
the Mu`tazilite a. l-Qāsim al-Ka`bī and, according to W, of Ibn-Fūrak.
Of these opinions, K admits that knowing-awareness of God is the first obligation in

intention, but chooses correct reasoning (the second opinion) as the first obligation in
execution, because of the insistence on it in the Qur'ān and Sunna. W makes no change,
but J rejects the second opinion as weak, because correct reasoning is not an aim
(muqṣad), and even as a means (sabīl) is preceded by intention (qaṣd). Therefore the
fourth opinion, together with the first, is preferred.
The obligation, as-Sanūsī insists in K [pp. 15-16], stems from revealed-law (shar`), and
not intelligibility (àql) as the Mu`tazilites maintained. something can be obligatory even if
the person ahs not learned the obligation. Ṣ [pp. 63-66] quotes Ibn-Àrabī for advocating
calling men not directly to faith (imān) but to reasoning. If they defer believing because of
lingering doubts they should be given time to understand, but if they are merely stubborn,
their stubbornness should be removed by the sword.
A person is encharge (mukallaf), or subject to legal obligations, when he has reached

maturity (bulūgh). J [1e, f. 14a] gives opinions as to when maturity occurs; the answers
generally center around puberty.
c. The status of a blind-acceptor (muqallid)
K [pp. 39-42] and W [ff. 8b and 10b] give a list, which K attributes to Ibn-Àrafa, of three
opinions concerning the status of a muqallid. J [1b, f. 23b] gives the same three opinions
in different order and adds a fourth. Ṣ [pp. 55-57] gives the three and also some variants
of them.
According to Ṣ, among the theologians who agree that knowledge and the correct
reasoning leading to it are obligatory there is disagreement concerning whether a muqallid
is:
a believer, but disobedient simply (muìn illā annahu `āṣ)
a believer, but disobedient only if he has the capabiltiy (ahliyya) of correct reasoning; this
is the second opinion in K and W and the third in J, and is attributed in K to al-āmidī,
reporting from various theologians, and in W to a. Yy. ash-Sharīf at-Tilimsānī, who argues
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that correct reasoning is very difficult, and revealed-law does not enjoin the impossible
(mā lā yuṭāq).
not a believer at all (lays bi-mu'min aṣlan); this is the third opinion in K and W, and the
first in J, and is attributed to Abū-Hāshim b. al-Jubbā'ī, Ibn-at-Tilisānī, and the Shāmil of
Imām-al-Ḥaramayn.
The latter, according to Ṣ, distinguishes four cases: 1) a person who has time after
maturity for correct reasoning and does so; he is a believer; 2) one who has time and does
not do so; his faith is invalid; 3) one who does not have time, but in the little he has tries to
reason correctly; his faith is valid; 4) one who does not have time, and does not try in the
little he does have; opinion is divided, but the more valid opinion (al-aṣaḥiḥ), that of
al-Bāqillānī, is that his faith is not valid. (6)
According to W, the opinion that a muqallid is a kāfir is held by the mass of theologians.
(7) W continues with a passage from Ibn-Dahhāq's commentary onf the Irshād in support
of this opinion. (8) W [f. 10b] also argues against a. Yy. ash-Sharīf at-Tilimsānī and says
"We do not concede that encharging with the impossible never happens" (fa-lā nusallim
ann at-taklīf bi-mā lā yuṭāq ghayr wāqi`). Moreover, al-Qarāfī, "who was very severe"
(wa-qad shaddad tashdīdan àẓīman), said that even if a person tried all he could and
failed to understand the fundamentals of religion, he is an unbeliever and destined for hell.
Even in regions where intelligence is low, as in the distant parts of Turkey and Black
Africa (as-Sūdān), people remain encharged.
Besides the previous opinions which agree that knowledge is obligatory, the minority
opinion of those who say that it is not obligatory also say that there is no disobedience in
neglecting to study. This is the first opinion in K and W, and the second in J.
A similar opinion is the fourth in J, which says that blind acceptance of something free
from errors (ma`mūn al-khaṭāyā), such as the Qur'ān, is legitimate, but not blind
acceptance of any teacher. Ibn-Dahhāq attributes this opinion to the Ḥashwiyya. As-Sanūsī
rejects it because correct reasoning is necessary both to know the truth of the Qur'ān and
to avoid anthropomorphic interpretations (tajsīm). For the same reason, in W [f. 10b] he
rejects the idea that simple reading of the Qur'ān and ḥadīths is enough for understanding
the tenets of faith.
In preparing an answer, as-Sanūsī emphasises several distinctions. The first, in W [f. 11b],
is that there is agreement that knowledge of the branch sciences (al-furū`) is not necessary
for the validity of faith, and error in them is pardonable; only knowledge of what is
fundamental (aṣīI) is indispensable.
The second distinction, in W [f. 45b - in N. 32] and Ṣ [p. 67] is between knowledge in
general (jumlī or ijmālī) and knowledge in detail (tafṣīlī). There is agreement that the
latter, the science of kalām with its analyses and arranging of proofs, is not obligatory on
every individual (farḍ al-a`yān), but is only a communal obligation (farḍ al-kifāya) to be
satisfied by certain learned men in every region (qaṭr). (9)
The third distinction concerns knowledge only of what is referred to (madlūl) by the
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shahāda or knowledge also of the proof (dalīl). W [f. 44b - in N. 32] refers to a fatwā
given by the learned men of Bijāya (Bougie) "at the beginning of this century or shortly
before," who judged that someone who did not know the meaning of the two statements
of the shahāda, for instance by thinking that Muḥammad was a deity, had no part in Islam
(lā yuḍrab la-hu fī l-Islām bi-naṣīb). All agree with this fatwā. "The differences among
learned men concern the person who knows what the two statements of faith refer to
(madlūl ash-shahādatayn) and without doubting firmly holds the tentets professing God's
unity which they contain (wa-jazam bi-mā taḍammanat-hu min àqā'id at-tawḥīd min
ghasyr taraddud); only the motive of his resoluteness is blind acceptance (taqlīd) and the
simple fact of having been raised among a people of believers, without knowing any
demonstration of these tenets whatsoever." K [p. 88] praises Ibn-a. Zayd al-Qayrawānī
and Ibn-al-Ḥājib for their short works on the tenets of faith, which, though they do not
contain proofs (adilla), at least bring the common people one step towards knowledge;
but they are not sufficient.
As-Sanūsī's position on the status of the latter type of muqallid, who understands the
meaning of the fundamental propositions of faith in a general way but does not knwo a
proof for these propositions, differs in his various works.
His earlier position, in K and W, was that such a person is not a believer. The reason is
that, as al-Ashàrī said, knowing awareness (ma`rifa) is faith itself (nafs al-īmān) [W, f.
14b; cf. f. 8b] or, as al-Bāqillānī said, a consequence of it and can be attained only by
correct reasoning (aw lāzima la-hu lā taḥṣul illā bi-n-naẓar aṣ-ṣaḥīḥ) [W, f. 14b]. K [pp.
43-44] also quotes some Qur'ān verses (11:14, 47:19, 65:12, 74:31, 12:108) and ḥadīths
in favor of this position, and [pp. 44-45] quotes al-Bāqillānī for an argument by division
into absurdities to prove that the commanding of taqlīd is impossible.
A number of objections to this position are considered. One [W, f. 45b - in N. 32] is that it
causes doubts and worries concerning the validity of one's own faith. The answer is that
every man knows himself best; if he can distinguish between the reality fo taqlīd and of
knowledge, he can look into his own consciousness and know whether he is affected by
taqlīd or not.
A second objection [W, f. 45b] is that this position leads to doubting the faith of others.
The answer is that we cannot suspect the faith of others because they cannot express the
reasons for it or argue against error (shibh). If many learned men are unable to express the
certain knowledge (al-ùlūm al-muḥaqqaqa) which is in their minds, what about ordinary
people? Therefore it is necessary to be kind in teaching them and curing their sickness.
A third objection [K, pp. 45-56], similar to the preceding, is that Muḥammad accepted
simply the pronouncement of the two statements of the shahāda by his opponents as
reason enough to stop fighting them, without trying to find out if they really believed. The
answer is that this action only concerns outward status (aẓ-ẓawāhir) in this world, and
does not spare the hypocrites (munāfiqūn) from an eternity of hell-fire.
A fourth objection [K, pp.l 47-50] is that many blind-acceptors (muqallidūn) have deeper
faith than many men of knowledge. The answer is that some such simple people have
divinely given knowledge, in which case they are not muqallidūn. If by faith is meant what
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is productive of good works (mā yansha' ànhu a`māl al-birr), the observation is that
knowledge of itself leads to good works, even though this may not be true of every
individual. Good works without knowledge are useless, as in the case of Christian monks.
A fifth objection [K, pp. 47, 51-64], based on tales of the Fathers and words of ar-Rāzī
and of Ù. b. Àbdalàzīz, is their commendation of the faith of simple people such as
children and old ladies. The answer is that the meaning of such exhortations is to keep to
what the Fathers agreed upon, and to avoid the innovations of the Qadarites, the
Murji'ites, the Jabarites, the Rāfiḍites and the Mu`tazilites. In early times even simple
people knew the reasons for their beliefs, while the learned were the walls of Islam,
protecting the faith of the simple in difficult moments; their jihād is greater than that of the
sword. (10)
W [f. 45b] refers to Ibn-Àrabī's description of the perfect knowledge many ordinary
people had in his time, and comments that if ordinary people of that time attained this even
though they lived late and very far from the time of prophecy and the flooding of its lights,
how much more did ordinary people in the time of the holy Fathers (as-salaf aṣ-ṣāliḥ);
as-Sanūsī goes on to complain of his own time.
A sixth objection [K, pp. 47, 64-77; W, f. 11a], proposed by the Ḥashwiyya, is that the
companions of Muḥammad did not know tawḥīd; for instance, they did not know what a
substance and an accidental were. The answer is that they knew these and other matters of
the science of kalām without knowing the technical terms; their closeness to Muḥammad
supplied for formal study. In fact they were the wisest of men in tawḥīd. (11) In early
times a formal science was unnecessary; but later heresies and strife (fitan) made it
necessary.
As-Sanūsī's position changed somewhat in Ṣ and J. J simply quotes the four opinions
mentioned above without giving a judgement. Ṣ wavers: Commenting on
Imām-al-Ḥaramayn's distinguishing of four cases and his declaring invalid the faith of a
muqallid, whether he had time for correct reasoning or not, as-Sanūsī says [p. 56]
"Perhaps this division refers only to those who have no firmness at all in the tenets of faith,
even by taqlīd" (wa-laàll hādhā t-taqsīm innamā huwa fī-man lā jazm ìndahu bi-àqā'id
al-īmān aṣlan wa-law bi-t-taqlīd). Later [p. 57] he says there is uncertainty (taraddud)
whether correct reasoning is a condition of the validity of faith, but it is more probable
(rājiḥ) that it is. Finally [p. 62], in a quotation from Ibn-Àrabī, the question is said to be
still open and undecided whether someone's faith is valid if he has the ability to reason and
does not do so.
Ṣṣ [pp. 10-11] admits that there are differences of opinion concerning the status of a
muqallid (fa-fI dhālik ṭuruq wa-aqwāl), but says the best (aṣaḥḥu-hā) is that a person is
obliged to search for a demonstration until he reaches knowing-awarness, no matter what
his capacity for understanding it is (yajib àlayhi l-baḥth àn al-burhān ḥattā taḥṣul la-hu
l-ma`rifa ànhu mahmā kānat fīhi qābiliyya li-fahm dhālik). Al-Ashàrī is then quoted for
saying that knowing-awareness is faith, or, according to al-Bāqillānī, is a consequence of
it. Thus Ṣṣ seems to revert back to the unqualified position of K and W. (12)
M [f. 208a] changes position radically. Distinguishing between bad (radī`) or erroneous
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taqlīd and good (ḥasan) taqlīd, that is, agreeing with the truth, it says "There is a
difference of opinion concerning whether the taqlīd of the mass of believers towards
learned Sunnites in the fundamentals of religion is sufficient or not. Most sound
theologians say that it is sufficient if they have resolutelness concerning the truth,
especially those who have difficulty in underwstnaind the proofs" (wa-khtulif fī taqlīd
`āmmat al-mu'minīn li-ùlamā' ahl as-sunna fī uṣūl ad-dīn hal yakfī dhālik am lā
wa-l-akthar min al-muḥaqqiqīn qālū ann dhālik yakfī dhā waqa` min-hum at-taṣmīm àlā
l-ḥaqq lā siyyamā fī ḥaqq an ya`sur àlayhi fahm al-adilla).
No reasons are given for this position, but it harmonizes with a suppler position, based on
al-Ghazālī, in the same work towards Christians and Jews and those who hold opinions
which imply a denial of the fundamentals, but the implication is not obvious to them [ff.
205b-206b].
d. The reality of faith
J [31b, ff. 337b-338b] says that faith (īmān) is an acknowledgement of truthfulness (taṣdīq
ḥaqīqatihi). There are various opinions as to what this acknowledgement of truthfulness
consists in:
1) Al-Ashàrī, as has been seen, identified it with knowing-awareness (ma`rifa).

Ibn-at-Tilimsānī denied this, and at-Taftāzānī, in his Sharḥ Àqīdat an-Nasafī, attributes
this opinion to the Qadarites, and rejects it because the Jews and Christians (ahl al-kitāb)
had knowledge of the prophecy of Muḥammad, but did not have faith.
2) Another opinion of al-Ashàrī was that it is an interior statement that something is

certain (qawl an-nafs àlā taḥqīq), accompanied by knowledge. Similar to this is the
definition, in W [f. 14b] and K [p. 42], given by Ibn-al-Ḥājib (or al-Bāqillānī) that faith is
an acknowledgement of truthfulness, which is a condition of the soul following upon
knowing-awareness (inn al-īmān huwa t-taṣdīq wa-huwa ḥadīth an-nafs at-tābi`
li-l-ma`rifa). (13) This definition is acceptable as a general statement, but, says
at-Taftāzānī, there is disagreement as to whether an acknowledgement of truthfulness is a
matter of choice or not:
Some shaykhs said that it is a matter of choice, and defined it as "an attachment of the
heart to the message it knows from an announcer" (rabṭ al-qalb àlā māàlim min khbār
al-mukhbir), and said that it is something to which one gains title (wa-huwa amr kasbī).
But the difficulty with this opinion is that acknowledging truthfulness is a type of
knowledge (min aqsām al-ìlm), which is a characteristic of the soul which is not chosen
(wa-huwa min al-kayfiyyāt an-nafsiyya dūn al-ikhtiyāriyya).
Therefore the opinion adopted is that acknowledging truthfulness is a characteristic which

comes indirectly from choice, but the choice concerns directly the activating-links (asbāb)
of knowledge, such as applying one's thought, and repelling obstacles. Unbelief (kufr) is
resistance to the causes of knowledge.
As-Sanūsī adds that according to a well known opinion (al-mashhūr) it is necessary for
faith to have also verbal profession by saying the two statements of the shahāda, but this
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is so only for one who is able (qādir).
At-Taftāzānī asks if faith can increase, and says that since it is an accidental it has no
duration, but each instant is succeeded by its like; (14) therefore the question is really
whether the faith of one instant is greater than that of a preceding instant. In fact, Qur'ān
verses, such as 8:2 and 9:124, which speak of an increase of faith, should be understood as
referring to the works which follow upon faith.
e. The position of this science
J [1e, f. 14a] distinguishes religious sciences on the basis of revealed determinations

(al-aḥkām ash-sharìyya). Those which concern action (àmal) are the subject of the
branch sciences (farìyya); those which concern belief (i`tiqād) are the fundamental
sciences (aṣliyya). According to at-Taftazānī's Sharḥ Àqīdat an-Nasafī, the former
include the sciences of laws (sharā'i`) and judgements (aḥkām), and the latter the science
of declaring God one (tawḥīd) and of his attributes (ṣifāt).
The latter science, called ìlm al-kalām, is defined in K [pp. 96-98] and W [f. 16b - in N.
2] according to Ibn-Àrafa as "knowledge of the determinations pertaining to the Divinity
and the sending of messengers, their truthfulness in all that they announce, and anything
that is specially relevant ot the foregoing, with the establishment of proofs thereto by a
power which is a locus for refuting errors and dissolving doubts" (al-ìlm bi-aḥkām
al-ulūhiyya wa-risāl ar-rusul wa-ṣidqihā fī kull ikhbārihā wa-mā yatawaqqaf shay' min
dhālik àlayhi khāṣṣan bi-hi wa-taqrīr adillatihā bi-quwwa hiya muẓinna li-radd
ash-shubahāt wa-ḥall ash-shukūk). The definition of Ibn-at-Tilimsānī is also proposed:
"knowledge of the sure (existence) of the Divinity, and of messengership, and what is
related to awareness of that, such as the admissibility of the world and its having come
into being, and the refutation of what contradicts this" (al-ìlm bi-thubūt al-ulūhiyya
wa-r-risāla wa-mā tatawaqqaf ma`rifatuhā àlayhi min jawāz al-`ālam wa-ḥudūthihi
wa-ibṭāl mā yunāqiḍ dhālik). But Ibn-Àrafa criticizes this definition because it does not
include the life to come (al-ma`ād), and is therefore not convertible.
The subject of this science is "the essence of possible things under the aspect of their
pointing to the necessary existence of him who caused them to exist, and his attributes and
acts" (māhiyyāt al-mumkināt min ḥayth dalālatihā àlā wujūb wujūd mūjidihā wa-ṣifātihi
wa-af`ālihi).
This science, according to J [1e, f. 14a], is the most noble science because: 1) it is the
foundation of revealed determinations and the leader of sciences (li-kawnihi asās
al-aḥkām ash-sharìyya wa-ra'īs al-ùlūm); 2) its objects are the tenets of Islam (li-kawn
ma`lūmātihi l-àqā'id al-islāmiyya); W [f. 15b], quoting Ìzzadīn Àbdassalām, (15)
explains that those who are aware of God (al-`ārifīn bi-llāh) are superior to those who
know only his (legal) determinations; knowledge of the attributes of perfection which are
necessary to God and the defects which are impossible to him is superior to knowledge of
the branch sciences and (legal) fundamentals (al-furū` wa-l-uṣūl), because knowledge
takes its dignity from the things which are known (al-ma`lūmāt); 3) the third reason given
by J is that the aim of this science is winning religious happiness (wa-ghāyatuhu l-fawz
bi-s-sa`āda ad-dīniyya).
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W. [f. 15b] continues to explain that knowledge of the different attributes of God results
in corresponding dispositions of the soul (aḥwāl). (16) The difference between theologians
(al-mutakallimūn) and those who are aware (al-`ārifūn) is that a theologian's knowledge
of the (divine) essence and attributes is absent from him most of the time, and therefore
those dispositions are not lasting in him. Were they lasting he would be among those who
are aware, since he shares with them the cognition which demands uprightness (fī l-ìrfān
al-mūjib li-l-istiqāma). (17)
f. Method and preliminary notions
(N. 2) J [1e, f. 14a] says that the demonstrations of this science are arguments of
intelligibility, confirmed for the most part by proofs of authority (wa-barāhīnuhu l-ḥujaj
al-àqliyya al-muàyyad aktharuhā bi-l-adilla as-samìyya).
By a demonstration (burhān), says W [f. 17a - in N. 3], is meant any (argument) which is
composed of certain premises (kul mā tarakkab min muqaddimāt yaqīna). Demonstration
is to be distinguished from dialectics (jadal), rhetoric (khaṭāba), poetry (shi`r), and
sophistry (mughālaṭa or sufusṭa). (18)
As for the determinations of intelligibility mentioned in the Creed, M [ff. 194b-199b]

places them in a wider context, giving the definition and kinds of determination: A
determination (ḥukm) is the affirmation or denial of a thing (ithbāt amr aw nafyuhu), and
is:
of revealed-law (shar`ī) = a declaration of God related to the acts of encharged

persons (khiṭāb Allāh ta`ālā l-mutaàlliq bi-af`āl al-mukallafīn) by way of:
asking (ṭalab), which includes:
obliging (ījāb) = asking for an act firmly (ṭalaban jāziman)
recommending (nadb) = asking for an act without firmness
forbidding (taḥrīm) = asking firmly to desist (kaff) from an act
disapproving (kirāha) = asking not firmly to desist from an act
permitting (ibāḥa) = allowing either an act or its omission (idhn ash-shar` fī
l-fi`l wa-t-tark maàn)
instituting (waḍ`) = the law-revealer's setting up of a sign for one of those five
determinations (naṣb ash shāri` amāra àlā ḥukm min tikl al-aḥkām
al-khamsa); the signs are:
an activating-link (sabab) (19) = what essentially entails existence from
its existence and non-existence from its non-existence (mā yalzum min
wujūdihi l-wujūd wa-min àdamihi l-àdam li-dhātihi)
a condition (sharṭ) = what essentially entails non-existence from its
non-existence, but neither existence nor non-existence from its
existence
an impeding-agent (māni`) = what essentially entails non-existence
from its existence, but neither non-existence nor existence from its
non-existence
of custom (`ādī) = the affirmation of a connection between two things as to
existence or non-existence by means of regularity with the possibiltiy of exception
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(ithbāt ar-rabṭ bayn amr wa-amr wujūdan aw àdaman bi-wāsiṭat at-takarrur maà
ṣiḥḥat at-takhalluf) and non-effectiveness of one to the other; it is of four kinds:
existence with existence
non-existence with non-existence
existence with non-existence
non-existence with existence
of intelligibility (àqlī) = the affirmation or denial of a thing without depending upon
regularity or the instituting of anyone. Its three kinds are necessity, impossibility,
and admissibility.
W [f. 16b] (20) distinguishes across each of these three last categories of determination
those which are self-evident (ḍarūrī) and those which are evident only after thinking
(naẓarī), that is, requiring reflection (taàmmul). In the Creed only examples which are
self-evident are mentioned, for the sake of clarity. Examples of determinations which are
evident only after thinking are that God is necessarily from eternity, and that it is
admissible for him to reward the evil and punish the good - which the Mu`tazilites deny -
or to raise the dead to life - which the Philosophers deny.
K [pp. 508-509] lists four kinds of authorities:
the Book, that is, the Qur'ān, which descended upon Muḥammad
the Muḥammadan norm (Sunna), which includes the words (aqwāl), deeds (af`āl),
and decisions (taqārīr) of Muḥammad which are not dictated revelation (lays
bi-matlū)
consensus (ijmā`), which is the agreement of Muslim thinkers (mujtahidīn) of a
certain age (àṣr) on a matter; some would add to this definition "until the age
passes away (ilā nqirāḍ al-àṣr); others would add the proviso "without a
continuous previous disagreement of thinkers (lam yasbiqhu khilāf mujtahid
mustaqirr)
analogy (qiyās), which is the equivalating of a branch proposition to a principle in
the grounds of its determination (musāwāt far` li-aṣl fī ìlla ḥukmihi) (21) because
of its complexity, this work is usually done by imām thinkers; the science of it is
called "principles of law" (uṣūl al-fiqh).
In addition to following these four authorities, K also warns people to follow the
Companions of Muḥammad and their followers, the good Fathers (as-salaf aṣ-ṣāliḥ). J
[32a, ff. 339b-343b] identifies these as the learned men of the first three centuries after
Muḥammad. After this learned men and right guided imāms become fewer and fewer as
time brings deterioration; so that one ḥadīth says "There is no year without the previous
one having been better than it."
Among authorities who continue the line of orthodoxy, W [f. 13a] mentions the Shaykh of
Sunnism a. l-Ḥ. al-Ashàrī and his companions, such as al-Ustādh a. Isḥāq al-Isfarā'inī, the
sword of Sunnism al-Qāḍī a. B. al-Bāqillānī, Imām-al-Ḥaramayn, and their followers.
As for learning this science, at least in a general way, K [p. 28] asserts that it is possible
without a teacher (muàllim), contrary to the opinion of the Ismā`īlites; (22) but it is
extremely difficult without a teacher. In any case, W [f. 21a - in N. 4] (23) insists with the
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Ṣūfīs (ahl al-ishāra) on the necessity of God's guidance. Ibn-Dahhāq's commentary on the
Irshād, commenting on the divine name al-hādī, said that God's first gift to a person is to
open his heart to Islam by removing prejudices against it. The second step is positive
guidance (hudā), which is variously interpreted. Some say it is faith (īmān); others say that
it is knowledge (ìlm), or proof (dalīl), or the Book (al-kitāb), or explanation (bayān).
Even those who maintain that guidance is faith admit that faith requires another light
which is guidance itself, and this is knowledge. The Ṣūfīs say that one who is aware (`ārif)
would be led by reason to praise God even if revealed-law had not instructed him. In the
Qur'ān verse "light upon light" (nūr àlā nūr - 24:35), the second light is interpreted as
intelligence or sight, and the first as revealed-law or brightness (ḍaw'). Someone who does
not know any principles of intelligibility cannot believe in revealed-law, just as a blind
person cannot see brightness. Piety (tuqā) depends upon knowledge of intelligible and
revealed truths, which in turn depends upon thinking (fikr), which supposes an
intelligence.
B. The existence of God
a. Explanation of terms
(N. 3) By the "world", W [f. 17a] says, is meant everything besides God; this is a generic
term (ism jins) which is applied to various collections of things, such as the world of
plants or to the world of animals.
(N. 4) W [f. 20b], in a first remark (tanbīh), explains certain terms used in the Creed:
Gayri-himā, "whatever else", in the phrase "accidentals of motion, rest and whatever
else", refers to colors and the like. Al-azal, "the eternal past", means the same as
al-qidam, "being from eternity". (24) Its correlative is mā lā yazāl, "unending time". The
word mukhaṣṣiṣ, "particularizing agent", has the same meaning as fāìl, "agent"; the
former word was chosen in order to show that even rest requires an agent.
Among other terms defined by K [pp. 98-101] is akwān (plural of kawn), "states" or
"modes", which are particular accidentals, namely, motion, rest, conjunction (ijtimā`) and
separation (iftirāq). Jawhar, a "substance", is "that whose mass takes up space and is
impenetrable" (mā kān jirmu-hu yashghal firāghan bi-ḥayth yamtani` an yaḥull
ghayru-hu ḥayth ḥall); an equivalent is mutaḥayyiz, "something taking up space". If it is
indivisible (yā yaqbul al-inqisām), it is called jawhar fard, a "simple substance"; if it is
divisible, it is called jism, a "body". (25)
Relative to the existence of a simple subtance, J [2o, f. 85a] discusses the meaning of spirit
(rūḥ): Al-Bayḍāwī's Tafsīr simply said it was a breath (nafkh). Some Sunnites wondered
whether it was legitimate to raise the question (al-khawḍ fī ḥaqīqati-hi), because when
some Jews asked Muḥammad about the men of the cave (aṣḥāb al-kahf) (26) the man
with two horns (dhū-l-qarnayn), (27) and the spirit, he answered about the first two, but
not about the spirit. Others allow investigation, and the opinion of sound Sunnite
theologians is that it is a body (jism) within a body (in the case of man); others say that it
si an accidental, and others, such as the Phiosophers and al-Ghazālī, say that it is neither a
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body nor an accidental.
In W [f. 21a] the beings posited by the Philosophers and al-Ghazālī are called separated
substances (al-jawāhi al-mufāraqa). (28) As-Sanūsī says that the reasons of the
theologians for denying the existence of these substances are weak, and the reasons of the
Philosophers for affirming them are wrong (bāṭil). Recent theologians prefer to abstain
from judgement (waqf) on the question. (29)
J [2o, f. 85a], however, has recourse to revealed-law to reject the concept of a simple
substance to explain the spirit world. The descriptions of the spirit going out of the body,
going up to heaven and down, bowing and bending under the throne etc. can only apply to
a body. The Qur'ān verse "They ask you about the spirit; say 'The spirit is from by Lord's
command'" [17:85] is variously interpreted. In any case, a spirit is distinguishable from the
rest of creation by what is consequential (lawāzim) to it, namely, thought (fikr) and
speculative sciences (al-ùlūm an-naẓariyya).
b. The argument from the world's having come into being
K develops two arguments to prove that the world came into being. (30) The first [pp.
102-126] shows that man came into being as the result of a voluntary agent which is
neither the essence of man nor a part of him; the conclusion is then extended to the whole
world because of the inter-likeness of everything in it. The second argument [pp. 126-145]
starts right from the world as a whole and its possessing of attributes which have come
into being. This argument is a somewhat more elaborate version of that found in W. (31)
W [ff. 18a-19a] and J [3c, ff. 107a-112a] boil the argument down to four principles
(arkān): 1) that bodies are qualified by adjuncts (accidentals) (Ithbāt zā'id tattaṣif bi-hi
l-ajrām); 2) that these adjuncts came into being (ithbāt ḥudūth dhālik az-zā'id); 3) that
bodies cannot shake off these adjuncts (ithbāt al-ajrām lā tanfakk àn dhālik az-zā'id);
(32) and 4) that it is impossible for there to be coming-into-being with no beginning
(ithbāt istiḥāla ḥudūth lā alwwal la-hā). The point of this argument is to show that
because of one of two interdependent things (an accidental) has a beginning, so has the
other (the body-subject).
The second principle above is expanded into four other principles upon which it depends;
these are substituted for it in a final list of seven principles: 1) that bodies are qualified by
adjuncts; 2) that these adjuncts cannot stand by themselves (ibṭāl qiam dhālik az-zā'id
bi-nafsi-hi); 3) that they cannot jump subjects (ibtāl intiqāli-hi)-otherwise they would be
subjects standing by themselves; 4) that they cannot hide and reappear in a subject (ibṭāl
kumūni-hi wa-ẓuhūri-hi)-otherwise contraries would exist together; 5) that non-existence
is impossible for something from eternity (ithbāt istiḥāla àdam al-qadīm)-otherwise it
would be admissible, not necessary; 6) that bodies cannot shake off these adjuncts; and 7)
that it is impossible for there to be coming into being with no beginning.
To prove the last point as-Sanūsī refers the reader to the arguments given in K, especially
the second one given there. K [p. 134] explains that this point is against the position of the
Philosophers, who held that the upper world of the stars is eternal and subject only to
eternal local motion, while in the sublunar world matter (hiyūlā = ) is eternal, and is the
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subject of an eternal flux of substantial forms and accidentals.
Four arguments are given against an infinite series. The first [K, pp. 135-138] is that it
supposes a contradiction, the termination or depleting (farāgh) of what has no end. To the
objection that th4e joys of heaven will have no end, as-Sanūsī answers that an infinite
series with no final point is possible, but no one with no beginning.
The second argument [pp. 138-139] is that if each individual of the seris had a beginning,
then the whole series must have been preceded by non-existence. Then the existence of the
supposed eternal series would be simultaneous with its non-existence.
The third argument [K, pp. 139-141 = W (N. 18), f. 32a, translated here] is that called
"cutting and measuring" (burhān al-qaṭ wa-ta-taṭbīq).
Suppose we take the things which came into being until the time of the flood as one
group, and the things which came into being until our time as another group. Then we
place the ends of the two groups together. There will either be a difference or not. It is
impossible for there not to be, because the group which lacks something cannot be equal
to the group which has something in addition. The group which is lacking should then be
divided by the difference. Then it is finite, because a starting point and an end are reached.
But if the first group is finite, then the second group must also be finite, because the
second group exceeded the first group by only a finite distance, which is the time from the
flood to our time, and what exceeds something finite by a finite distance is itself finite.
The fourth argument [K, pp. 141-145] is that something from the eternal past (azalī)
would precede something else from the eternal past, that is, the events from the eternal
past to a certain past date would precede those from eternity to the present date. (33)
W [f. 22b] remarks that the demonstration of the world's having come into being is
basically the same as the Qur'ānic story of Abraham in his query whether a star, the moon,
or the sun is a deity [6:75-78].
An objection to the demonstration in K [pp. 125-126] and W [f. 21a] is the possible
existence of simple substances, which supposedly are neither accidentals nor the subject of
accidentals; the demonstration does not apply to them. In K as-Sanūsī prefers recourse to
the authority of a ḥadīth to show that they are not from eternity: "There was God, and
nothing was with him" (kān Allāh wa-lā shay' ma'a-hu). W says that in any case a simple
substance cannot be a deity, since there is only one god, as will be shown later. W adds
"And only God is from eternity," whereas K said that it cannot be proven from
intelligibility that simple substances are not from eternity.
(N. 5) Once it is understood that the world has come into being, the question remains,
says W [f. 23a], whether the knowledge of the existence of God is self-evident (ḍarūrī) or
evident only after reasoning (naẓarī). Some (= ar-Rāzī in his Ma`ālim, according to K[pp.
95 and 103-105]) say that it is self-evident, and point to the fact that if you strike a child
or even an animal, they know that someone caused their pain. On the contrary,
Imām-al-Ḥaramayn and others hold that God's existence is known only after thinking
about the essence (dhāt) of a thing that came into being, to see that it is not determined to
exist at any certain time or in any certain manner, and therefore needs a particularizing
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agent (mukhaṣṣiṣ). As-Sanūsī opts for the latter position, with the qwualification that very
little reasoning is needed to conclude to God's existence. Even children are capable of
doing so, but animals are not, because they do not understand the principle of causation,
but react only because their imaginations are trained by experience (alf).
W goes on to explain the argument in the Creed: Non-existence is more in keeping with
the essence of the world for two reasons: The first is the priority (aṣāla) of non-existence;
were existence to follow upon non-existence without an agent (fāìl) it would have to be
stronger than (rājiḥ), and not equal (musāw) to non-existence as was supposed.
The second reason is that non-existence has no need of an activating link (sabab). This is
so because something needs an agent if it is not only possible (mumkin) but also comes
into being (ḥādith). but non-existence does not come into being and is not adventitious
(ṭāri'), that is, it is not renewed after not having been. Therefore it has no need of an
agent, and is stronger than existence.
c. The argument from possibility
According to K [p. 101], any proof for the existence of God must proceed from what is
activated to the activating link (bi-l-musabbab àlā s-sabab) or from the effect to the
producer of the effect (bi-wujūd al-athar àlā wujūd al-mu'aththir). Within this
procedure, he quotes from Ibn-at-Tilimsānī (34) several ways of proving God's existence,
each of which he says is valid. The first is based on the possibility (imkān) of the world,
and is preferred by al-Bayḍāwī and others; the second is the world's having come into
being (ḥudūth), and is the way of most theologians; others base their proof on possibility
and coming into being taken together, or on possibility with the condition that it comes
into being; Imām-al-Ḥaramayn combined possibility and coming into being.
The difference between the way based on mere possibility and the other ways is that in the
former knowledge that the world came into being follows upon knowledge of the Creator,
but in the latter it precedes. The argument from possibility proceeds from determining that
the world is possible, that is, as far as its essence is concerned existence and non-existence
are equal, and neither is stronger. Therefore existence is not from its essence, but from
without. Dependence upon another for existence leads necessarily to one who produces
existence, and possesses existence necessarily by his essence. (35)
C. The essence of God and attributes in general
a. Knowability of God's essence
K [pp. 241-250], followed by J [6i, ff. 145a-148b], inquires about the most particular
characteristic (akhaṣṣ waṣf) of God's essence. The Mu`tazilites said that it is
being-from-eternity (qidam); but being from eternity is a negative attribute and cannot be
the most particular characteristic. (36) Others said that it was a disposition (ḥāl) making
God living, powerful and willing; but they do not explain very well what this disposition is.
An opinion attributed to al-Ashàrī is that the most particular characteristic is the power of
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creating (qudrat al-ikhtirā`). Ar-Rāzī chose this opinion in some of his writings, citing as
proof Moses' reply to Pharaoh that the meaning of "Lord of the worlds" (rabb al-`ālamīn)
is "the Lord of heaven and earth and what is between them" (rabb as-samāwāt wa-l-arḍ
wa-mā bayna-humā). (37) Ibn-at-Tilimsānī rejected this reason, saying that Moses' reply
only needed to distinguish God from other possible things (sāìr al-mumkināt). The
opinion of al-Ashàrī may only have been to show the Mu`tazilites that God's power of
creating belongs to him alone and is not shared by any creature, not that power is the most
particular characteristic of his essence. After all, power is an attribute added to the already
constituted essence.
The best opinion is that of al-Bāqillānī, Imām-al-Ḥaramayn, al-Ghazālī, and ar-Rāzī in

most of his writings-but not in his Kitāb al-ishārāt, one of his earliest writings-that the
most particular characteristic of God's essence is unknown.
As for whether it is unknown absolutely or only in the present life, it is admissible for us to
know it later. Al-āmidī attributes to al-Ghazālī the opinion that it is absolutely
unknowable, and to al-Bāqillānī and Ḍirār b. Àmr an abstaining from judging. some say
we know the most particular characteristic of God since we make judgements concerning
his essence. but they are refuted by the fact that a judgement concerning something is only
a sort of knowing an aspect of a thing (far` ash-shu`ūr bi-hi bi-wajhin mā), even an
external, general aspect; it is not a knowledge of its essence.
Ar-Rāzī's argument from intelligibility that the most particular characteristic of God's
essence is unknwon [K, p. 243] is that we know only four things about God:
existence
ways of existence (kayfiyyāt al-wujūd), which are:
being from the eternal past (azaliyya)
being forever (abadiyya)
necessity (wujūb)
negations (sulūb), that is, he is not a body or a substance (jawhar) nor an accidental
(àraḍ)
attributions (iḍāfāt), such as knowingness (`ālimiyya).
But none of these things are God's essence. Therefore it is unknown.
Another argument of ar-Rāzī is that each attribute of God that we know can be
understood as belonging to one or many subjects, and a further proof is necessary to show
that they belong only to God. Therefore, by knowing the attribute, we do not know the
most particular characteristic of the essence of God, which can be understood only as
belonging to him.
An answer to the latter argument is that the attributes we know of God do distinguish him
from other beings; the question is only whether they distinguish him according to his
reality (ḥaqīqa) or something consequent (lāzim) to his reality.
To ar-Rāzī's first argument Ibn-at-Tilimsānī answered that his terminology was weak. The
examples given of ways of existence are merely negative attributes. What he calls
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attributions, in the terminology of a. l-Ḥ al-Baṣrī, are really either realities endowed with
attributions (ḥaqā'iq dhawāt iḍāfāt) (i.e. substantive attributes) or determinations of stable
substantive attributes which are endowed with attributions (aḥkām li-ma`ān thābita
dhawāt iḍāfāt) (i.e. adjectival attributes). Ar-Rāzī's reasoning is also weak: It is not right
to conclude that no one knows the most particular characteristic of God because many
people do not. An argument to the contrary of his assertion is the experience of the ṣūfīs.
The ṣūfīs claim that their exercises (riyāḍa) (38) are an activating-link for God's willing
(for them) an increase in understanding, as two Qur'ān verses show: "Those who struggle
for us we guide on our paths" [29:69] and "He wrote faith in their hearts and confirmed
them with a spirit from himself" [58:22]. These refer to God's creating in them knowledge
which is not demonstrable or expressable, but is given by way of pure and extraordinary
favor (in`ām) and inspiration (ilhām) which is known only by those who possess it, not by
anyone else, just as someone born blind (akmah) cannot see colors. It cannot be
communicated to others by speech (qawl), but only by the beckoning (ishāra) of one who
is aware (`ārif) to another who is aware. This knowledge is not an indwelling (ḥulūl), nor
an anticipated vision of God (ru'ya `ājila), nor as great as prophecy, nor is it a
comprehensive knowledge (ìlm iḥāṭa) of God. But as God creates in his servants a visual
perception (idrāk) of himself in the next life, so he creates now in their hearts a perception
of himself, related to the essence of God in one way or another (bi-wajhin) or to a
superior kind of knowledge (taraqq fī l-ìlm) of his attributes and names. Therefore
ar-Rāzī is wrong in restricting man's knowledge of God as he did.
Note that W [in N. 10, f. 26a] denies the intellect's ability not only to encompass God's
inner being (iḥāṭa bi-kunhi-hi) and to define (taḥdīd) or determine the manner of (takyīf)
of God's existence, but also to perceive him (idrāku-hu). K also [p. 167] denies the ability
of man to perceive God, quoting verses of Abū-l-Fatḥ in support of this denial, and
elsewhere [pp. 212-213] says that only God knows his own essence. Ṣ [p. 114] says that
God's essence and attributes are screened (maḥjūb) from the intellect, and that no one can
delve into his inner being (lays li-aḥad an yakhūḍ fī l-kunh) after knowing what is
necessary for his essence and attributes. Other similar statements are explained as a denial
only that ordinary, demonstrable knowledge can attain God positively. (39)
b. Kinds of attributes
Of the early theologians, K [p. 210] says that Imām-al-Ḥaramayn and al-Bāqillānī held for
three kinds of attributes, those related to:
themselves = existent substantive attributes (ma`ān), e.g. "knowledge"

something else:
in its essence = dispositions of essential-property (al-ḥāl an nafsiyya)
in what inheres in the essence = adjectival dispositions (al-ḥāl al-ma`nawiiya), e.g.
"knowing".
Al-Ashàrī, however, in denying dispositions, (40) held that the substantive attributes are
the only attributes.
Ṣ [p. 97] explains these three kinds more clearly from as-Sanūsī's own point of view:
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Substantive attributes (ṣifāt al-ma`ānī) are those which are existent in themselves,
whether they come into being, as the whiteness or blackness of a body, or are from
eternity, as God's knowledge and power. Thus every attribute existing in itself is
technically called a substantive attribute.
If the attribute is not existent in itself, and is necessary to the essence as long as the
essence lasts, and doesn't result from any cause (wājib li-dh-dhāt mā dāmat adh-thāt
ghayr muàllala bi-ìlla), it is called an attribute or disposition of essential property (ṣifa
nafsiyya aw ḥāl nafsiyya). An example of it is occupying space (taḥayyuz) for a body, and
its being capable of accidentals. (41)
If the attribute is not existent in itself, but is the result of a cause and is necessary for the
essence only as long as the cause continues to inhere in the essence, it is called an
adjectival attribute or disposition (ṣifa ma`nawiyya aw ḥāl ma`nawiyya). An example of it
is an essence's being knowing or powerful.
K [p. 211] adds that later theologians distinguished six kinds of attributes. M [f. 213b],
followed here, corrects and adds certain points to this list. The attributes are:
1) of essential-property (nafsiyya). K offers several definitions amounting to the same

thing, yet reduces examples such as God's being necessarily existent, from the eternal past,
and forever (kawnu-hu wājib al-wujūd azaliyyan abadiyyan) to negative attributes, since
sound theologians say that nothing is known of essential attributes, for that would amount
to knowing God's essence; but only God knows his essence. M, however, as Ṣ, does not
eliminate this kind of attribute, and defines it as "one by which God's very essence is
expressed" (mā yuàbbar bi-hi àn nafs adh-dhāt al-àliyya). The only example of it in
God is existence.
2) negative (salbiyya) = the negation of an imperfection which it is impossible for God to

be qualified with. There are five of these: being from eternity (qidam), being everlasting
(baqā'), otherness from things that come into being (mukhālafatu-hu li-l-ḥawādith),
self-subsistency (qiyāmu-hu bi-nafsi-hi), and unity (waḥdāniyya).
3) substantive (al-ma`ānī) = positive attributes inhering in the essence and causing a

determination (ḥukm) or disposition (ḥāl). These are seven: power (qudra), will (irāda),
knowledge (ìlm), life (ḥayāt), hearing (sam`), sight (baṣar), and speech (kalām); some
add an eighth, perception (idrāk) of other sensibles.
4) adjectival (ma`nawiyya) = attributes of the essence which are dispositions or

determinations caused by substantive attributes inhering in the essence. These are seven,
being powerful (qādir), etc., corresponding to the substantive attributes.
5) of acts (ṣifāt al-af`āl) = the implementive relationship between power and will with
regard to possible things (at-taàlluq at-tanjīzī bayn al-qudra wa-l-irāda). (42) These are
of two kinds:
positive (wujūdiyya), such as creating, vivifying, moving etc.

negative (salbiyya), such as forgiving (àfw) sinners as he wishes; the meaning of
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this is omitting to punish someone who deserves punishment.
6) mixed (aṣ-ṣifa al-jāmià li-jamī` al-aqsām), such as God's majesty, greatness and
divinity (ulūhiyya).
c. Existence as an attribute
Ṣ [pp. 74-75] lists existence (wujūd) among the twenty attributes of God, but explains that
this is only by way of tolerance (tasāmuḥ) in the opinion of al-Ashàrī, since according to
himi existence is the essence (dhāt) itself and not an adjunct to it (zā'id àlay-hā); this
applies to things which come into being as well as to God. (43) Nevertheless verbally (fī
l-lafẓ) God's essence is said to be existent; so it is legitimate to place existence among the
attributes in a general way (àlā l-jumla).
But for those who make existence an adjunct of essence, as ar-Rāzī, counting existence
among the attributes is proper (ṣaḥīḥ), not a toleration. The Philosophers identified
essence and existence only in what is from eternity, but said essence was an adjunct of
things that come into being.
Those who make existence an adjunct of essence, Ṣ later adds [pp. 93-95], say that it is an
attribute of essential-property (ṣifa nafsiyya). But to those who identify existence with
essence the same excuse for listing it among the attributes has to be made for calling it an
attribute of essential-property. (44)
D. Negative attributes
a. Being from eternity (qidam)(45)
(N. 6) Al-qidam, says W [f. 24a], can have two meanings: One is a long passage of time
over something, even if it has come into being, such as an old (qadīm) foundation or
building, or the movement of the stars from of old. this is not the meaning when we say
God is from eternity (qadīm), because he is aloof from place, direction and change, and it
is impossible for anything of the world to be part of him.
The second meaning refers to something whose existence has no beginning, that is, is from
the eternal past (azalī) and not preceded by non-existence. this meaning applies to God
and to him alone.
Being from eternity is a negative attribute (salbiyya) because, Ṣ [p. 95] explains, it is the
denial of preceding non-existence, or in other words, the denial of a beginning to
existence. K [p. 150] explains that it is not an attribute of essential-property (nafsiyya),
since the latter cannot be separated from the essence, whereas qidam-with the meaning of
"old"-is absent from a substance (jawhar) in the first moment of its existence. Nor is
qidam a substantive attribute (ṣifa ma`nā), since this attribute would require another
qidam to make it to be from eternity, and so on in a continuous regress.
K [p. 152] parenthetically defines a continuous regress (tasalsul) as "an arrangement of
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things which do not end" (tarattub umūr ghayr mutanāhiya), and a circle (dawr) as "the
dependence of something upon that which depends upon itself by one or many steps"
(tawaqquf ash-shay' àlā mā yatawaqqaf àlay-hi immā bi-martaba aw bi-marātib).
The question is raised in Ṣ [p. 78] whether it is legitimate to use the adjectival form qadīm
of God, or only the substantive form qidam. The problem arises because qadīm is a name,
and is not mentioned in the Qur'ān, but all God's names must be authoritatively established
(tawqīfiyya). (46) Al-Ìrāqī's Sharḥ Uṣūl as-Subkī is quoted for a mention of the name in
the Sunan of Ibn-Māja, who counted it among the ninety-nine names.
b. Being everlasting (baqā') (47)
Al-baqā', says W [f. 24b], also has two meanings. The first is "the correlation of existence
to two times and so on upwards" (muqāranat al-wujūd li-zamānayn fa-ṣā'idan). This is
not the meaning when the word is applied to God, since he is not measured by time.
The second meaning, "the negation of an end to existence" (salb al-ākhiriyya li-l-wujūd),
that is, non-existence cannot reach it, applies to God and to him alone.
Ṣ [pp. 79-81] says that some imāms explain baqā' as the continuation of existence in the
future without end (istimrār al-wujūd fī l-ustaqbal ilā ghayr nihāya), and qidam likewise
as the continuation of existence in the past without end (ghāya), as if these attributes were
of essential-property (nafsiyyatān), being existence itself prolonged in the past and future,
without which essence is not real. This opinion is weak, because it entails that the essence
should have no intelligibility apart from these two attributes. But the existence of essence
has its own intelligibility (adh-dhāt yu`qal wujūdu-hu), and only afterwards is a
demonstration sought for its being from eternity and everlasting.
Others said that these are positive attributes like power and knowledge. But if this were
so, they would require other attributes of qidam and baqā' for them to be from eternity
and everlasting, and so on in a continuous regress.
A weaker opinion yet is that which says that qidam is negative, but baqā' is positive. But
the truth is that both are negative, and have no existing meaning outside the mind (lays
la-hu ma`nā mawjūd fī l-khārij àn adh-dhihn).
K [pp. 153-155] adds another reason offered by theologians for God's being everlasting:
Something from eternity could cease to be only by a compelling factor (uqtaḍ), not by
itself. Eliminated by division, such a factor cannot be:
voluntary, since something voluntary cannot produce non-existence, since this is not
an act
(lā yafàl al-àdam idh lays bi-fi`l)
non-voluntary:
the non-existence of a condition:
which is from eternity, since its non-existence would have to be
referred to another condition in a continuous regress
which came into being, since that would necessitate the existence of
something from eternity without its condition
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the coming of a contrary (ṭaryān aḍ-ḍidd):

before the eternal thing ceased to exist, since this would entail the
co-existence of two contraries
after the eternal thing ceased to exist, since this would be of no use
also, because no contrary would be stronger than or equal to its eternal
contrary
and even if the contrary inhered in the eternal thing, this would entail
the co-existence of two contraries.
Regarding the lastingness (baqā') of things which come into being, K continues to say that
the same proof as the preceding is used to show that accidentals cannot have any
lastingness, since if they had they could not cease to exist. Substances, on the other hand,
continue to exist, but only so long as God continues to create accidentals in them.
Al-Bāqillānī thought accidentals might continue to exist, since if they necessarily ceased
every moment, their ceasing to exist would be outside the area of the possible, and
therefore outside the scope of God's will. Ar-Rāzī, in his Ma`ālim, maintained that
accidentals can continue in existence. The old Ashàrites held that they could not, but for
the wrong reason that they thought that baqā' was a substantive attribute which would
inhere in accidentals, and this is impossible.
c. Otherness from things that come into being (mukhālafatu-hu li-l-ḥawādith
(N. 7) The first point in this section of the Creed, God's otherness from things that come
into being, W [f. 25a] explains, is in answer to the Ḥashwiyya, who attributed to God
corporeity, direction and place. The second and third points, God's not uniting with
anything else and his self-subsistency, are against the Christians and the Bāṭinites, who
said it was possible for God to unite with something else and be one thing with it. Some
Christians said that the Divinity unites with a humanity, that is, the Deity with the body of
Jesus. Others of them said that the Deity is not a self-subsistent substance (dhāt yaqūm
bi-nafsi-hi), but is an attribute inhering in something else; thus some Christians maintained
that the Deity inheres in Jesus as an attribute in the subject it qualifies. Some of the
Bāṭinites held a similar position regarding themselves. (48)
Relative to the meaning of "otherness" (ukhālafa), K [p. 167] says that every two existing
things are either equal in essential attributes (ṣifāt an-nafs), in which case they are alike
(mithlān), or they are not equal in essential attributes; then it is either impossible for the to
concur, in which case they are contraries (ḍiddān), or it is permissible for them to concur,
in which case they are other, or different (khilāfān).
Ṣ [pp. 82-83] explains God's otherness, saying that nothing is like him in any way
(muṭlaqan), neither in his essence nor in his attributes nor in his acts, quoting in support of
this the Qur'ān verse "There is nothing like him; he is the hearing and the seeing one"
[42:11].
(N. 8) W [f. 25a] explains that an attribute of a bodily-mass (jirm) is an accidental (àraḍ);
God is other than them both.
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K [pp. 158-159] gives three reasons why God is not a bodily-mass. The first is that if he
were one he would be subject to motion and rest, and therefore-as argued in N. 4 of the
Creed-would have to have come into being. The second reason is that if God were a
bodily-mass, he could be bigger and smaller, and therefore would need a
particularizing-agent, and would have come into being. The third argument states that
bodies are divisible into parts, and asks which parts shall possess the attributes of divinity.
(49)
(N. 9) Uniting (ittiḥād), says W [f. 25a; cf. K, pp. 161-162], is "asking two things one
thing" (ja`l ash-shay'ayn shay'an wāḥidan). It is altogether impossible, whether for
something from eternity or something which has come into being. As-Sanūsī explains
further that there is no unity by the decisive factor that the existence of the one thing is not
the very other thing. It is certain that every essence (māhiyya) must contain the negation
of everything besides itself.
(N. 10) God is not in a direction (jiha) and only bodies are, W [ff. 25b-26a] explains,
because being in a direction supposes motion or rest, and therefore coming into being.
Also a particularizing-agent would be necessary to account for his being in one direction
rather than another. This point is against the literalism of the Ḥashwiyya and the
Karrāmites when they said that God was above (fawq). The Ḥashwiyya, K [pp. 166-167]
distinguishes, maintained the outward meaning and abstained from interpretation. But
some Karrāmites said that God who is above fits into (mumāsh li-) his throne; others said
that he is incommensurate with it (ubāyin la-hu), by either a finite stretch (bi-masāfa
mutanāhiya) or an infinite one.
W goes on to blame some Sunnites for being tainted with the opinion of the Ḥashwiyya.
They possibly thought that the opinion was that of A. b. Ḥanbal, which is preposterous,
but even granted that he held such an opinion, erroneous blind-acceptance in this matter is
inexcusable. A similarly erroneous allegation is that Ibn-a. Zayd al-Qayrawānī and a.
Ìmrān b. Àl. and some of the Fathers (as-salaf) were tainted with this opinion. It was
imagined that their abstention from interpreting verses such as "He mounted the throne"
was equivalent to their acceptance of the outward impossibilities which were not intended
by the verse.
The second point, that there are no directions within God, is clear in the Creed.
Error concerning either point comes from limiting existence to imaginable bodies and their
accidentals, and measuring the invisible by the visible. The logical conclusion of this is that
God has come into being by another agency or that the world came into being by itself and
needs no agency to bring it into being.
The anthropomorphist (mushabbih) is dim-sighted (a`shā) and affirms corporeity of God;

the negator (bāṭil) however is blind (a`mā) and is content simply to deny. The unitarian
(uwaḥḥid) affirms God's existence, but recognizes his inability to perceive him
(indrāku-hu).
d. Self-subsistency (qiyāu-hu bi-nafsi-hi)
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(N. 11) W [f. 27a] explains that the difference between the two definitions of
self-subsistency, that is, "independence from a subject" and "independence from a subject
an a particularizing agent", is simply a matter of technical terminology (iṣṭilāḥ), since even
those who define it merely as independence from a subject agree that God is not a
substance (jawhar).
In line with the second definition, al-Isfarā'inī said that something self-subsistent is "what
needs nothing else to exist" (mā lā yaftaqir wujūdu-hu ilā amr ākhar). A substance stands
in the greatest need of an agent to particularize it with existence rather than its previous
non-existence, and with the dispositions and attributes it has rather than others. Then it
needs God to continue to exist, since if he did not cause beings to remain (law lā
ibqā'u-hu ta`ālā li-l-kā'ināt) until the term he wishes, they would all immediately cease to
exist.
Arguing for the same point, Ṣ [p. 87] explains the Qur'ān verses "You stand in need of
God, but God is the non-needy (ghanī) and praiseworthy one" [35:15] and "God is the
one who holds out (aṣ-ṣamad); he neither gives birth nor is born, nor has any match"
[112:2-4] by saying that all else is in need of him and holds onto him (yaṣmud ilay-hi).
Ṣṣ [pp. 17-18] reduces errors concerning God's self-subsistency to two principles: 1) that
anything which is not a body is an attribute; thus the Christians and the Bāṭinite ṣūfīs ad
God an attribute inhering in man-against this it is said that God is independent of a subject;
2) that any essence qualified with attributes is a body; thus the Ḥashwiyya and the Jews
made God a body, while others were led to the negation (ta`ṭīl) of God altogether, saying
that the world arose by chance (ittifāqī), because every active principle (fāìl) is a
body-against this it is said that God is independent of an active principle; thus he is distinct
from other essences, which come into being.
(N. 12) The reasons for God's independence from a particularizing agent and a subject are
clear enough in the Creed.
W [ff. 27b-28b] (50) then goes on to argue against "Christian errors": "By this you know
how impossible is the assertion of the Christians-may God destroy them-concerning three
hypostases (aqānīm), that is, three principles of the existence of the world from which it
comes into being; these are the source of the Deity's existence of which he is composed,
according to the-God be elevated far from what the wrong-doers (ẓālimūn) say. The three
are the hypostasis of knowledge (uqnūn al-ìlm), the hypostasis of existence, and the
hypostasis of life. The Christians say that these are three deities, although attributes. In
spite of that, they say that the three hypostases together are one deity, thus asserting the
combination of two contraries, unity and plurality. They have the divine essence composed
either of pure dispositions which have no existence or of aspects and expression which
exist only in the imagination, which is without intelligibility."
K [pp. 159-160] blames the Christians for making "their deity" (ilāha-hu) and "their object
of worship" (ma`būda-hum) a substance (jawhar), that is, the root of hypostases (aṣl
al-aqānī). Asked why they limit the hypostases to three, they answered that the three are
necessary for creation (al-khalq wa-l-ibdā'). Asked what about will and power, they then
admitted five hypostases.
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W continues: "They also assert that the hypostasis of knowledge, which is called the word
(kalima), united with the humanity of Jesus, that is, his body, and thereupon he was a
deity (wa-min thamma kān ilāhan), according to them. They are divided concerning the
meaning of the uniting of the word with him:
1) Some of the interpret it as the inhering of the word in him as an accidental inheres in a
substance." K [pp. 162-164] has a fuller answer:
a) This interpretation would mean that the Trinity loses a member and
becomes only a part of a deity, which according to them is a collection
(majmū`) of three hypostases; likewise only a part of the deity inheres in
Jesus; therefore he does not become a deity in full. The Christians answer that
the word united with the humanity of Jesus without separating from the
essence of the substance; but it is self-evident that one attribute (ma`nā)
cannot inhere in two essences.
b) If attributes which are accidentals (aṣ-ṣifāt al-àraḍiyya) cannot jump

subjects, this is all the more true of those of essential-property (nafsiyya), as
in the case of divinity.
c) A particularizing agent is needed to determine why the word rather than

the holy spirit, which is the hypostasis of life, or rather than the substance
itself should unite with the humanity.
d) If the uniting is necessary, the humanity would have to be from eternity; if

it is admissible, then a particularizing agent is needed; also in this case the
divinity of Jesus would be admissible to him, but that is impossible for
divinity, which necessarily exists.
e) If this uniting is a perfection of God it is necessary and eternal; if it is an

imperfection it is impossible of God.
f) Why assert divinity of Jesus alone? As-Sanūsī quotes a story from ar-Rāzī
[Here continues the version of W, f. 28a] of how once he met a priest (ba`ḍ
aḥbāri-him) and with much difficulty convinced hi that an effect proves the
existence of a cause, but not vice versa. He then asked him on what basis he
held that the hypostasis of knowledge united with the humanity of Jesus, so
that Jesus is a deity. The priest answered, "on the basis of his miracles, such
as raising the dead, which can only come from the Deity." Ar-Rāzī answered
that on the same basis the priest should hold the divinity of Moses, since he
too performed miracles, and, as was agreed, an effect-the miracle-proves the
existence of the cause-divinity. Ar-Rāzī then asked him whether it is
admissible that beetles and other bugs could be deities, and to the priest's
denial replied that the absence of an effect does not prove the absence of a
cause. "Such is the logical conclusion of the unbeliever's tenets."
2) "Some of them interpret this uniting as a mixture and a blending (al-ikhtilāṭ wa-l-mazj),
like the mixture of wine and water and such liquids. But how can one conceive of a
mixture, which is an attribute of bodies, in the word, which is one of the substantive
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attributes (ma`nā min al-ma`ānī), or, according to them, a disposition and characteristic
(ḥāla wa-khāṣṣiyya) of the eternal essence.
3) "Some of them interpret it as an impression (inṭibā`), as the impression of the shape of

a carving on wax. But it is known that a carving does not take on existence (lam yaḥṣul)
in what it impresses, but only its likeness does."
4) Another interpretation quoted from al-Muqtaraḥ by K [pp. 164-165] is that as the light
of the sun shines upon us without separating from the sun, so the divinity unites with the
humanity of Jesus. The answer is that the light of the sun is a multitude of luminous bodies
which reach everything it shines upon without any questing of uniting.
W [f. 28a] concludes: "Let us limit ourselves to this in exposing their shamefulness, since
it does not fit the purpose of this abridgement to swell upon it at length. The defectiveness
of this people has been made plain, and its principles indicate its consequences. Their
position (madhhab) is without intelligibility, and they are the filthiest sect (akhass al-firq)
of all and more despicable than any similar difficult sect with regard to understanding and
perceiving the truth."
W [f. 28b] then takes up the crucifixion: "Look at their enormous stupidity in the wisdom
(ḥikma) they imagine to exist in Jesus'-upon him be peace- uniting with the divinity so that
according to them he became a deity, and after that, as they maintain, was crucified.
They-may God place them far away and free the earth from them-say that the wisdom of it
is that when Adam, the father of mankind-peace be upon him-ate from the tree, disobeying
the order of his Lord, he merited punishment fro his Lord, but for our Lord who is so
great and majestic to punish someone who is not his equal in majesty would be a defect in
him. They say that when the word united with Jesus-upon him be peace-and because of it
he became a deity (raja` ilāhan), he offered himself (hakarram bi-nafsi-hi), and changed
the punishment due into forgiveness (li-l-àfw), taking the place of his father Adam-upon
him be peace. by the infliction of punishment upon him there was no defect in the Deity,
because of his likeness to him, since he is also a deity. They say this is the wisdom of his
being killed and crucified.
"In answer to them it can be asked, was this killing and crucifixion, which you maintain to
have happened to him, isolated to the humanity without the divinity, or did it happen to
them both together? If you say that it was isolated to the humanity of Jesus only, this is
contrary to what you said before, that for the Deity to inflict punishment upon someone
who is not his equal is a defect in him. There is no doubt that the humanity, which is the
body of Jesus, is decidedly not a deity. Also, how could that killing and crucifixion be
isolated to the humanity, when it is said that it is blended with the divinity?
"But if you say that the killing and crucifixion affected the composite of divinity and
humanity, then the Deity must be affected by death and suffering and the like which affect
created things; and that clearly demands that he have come into being, which is decidedly
impossible. Also this would lead to the Deity's ceasing to exist, since according to them
the Deity is composed of three hypostases, and a composition ceases to exist when one of
its parts ceases to exist. But the part of the divinity which dwelt in Jesus did cease to exist
by being killed with him. Therefore the Deity ceased to exist, and there remains no Deity
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and longer.
"Away with the minds of these asses. They are no less filthy than small dirty minds carried
by big bodies. If you see them you like their bodies, but if they speak, their speech sounds
as if they were pieces of wood fixed on the back of a beast (khushub mustadda bi-qaws
bahīma) and borne by human shapes. They are only like livestock; moreover they have
gone astray..."
"Also the supposition that the punishment of being killed and crucified reached the divinity
and humanity leads to the conclusion that the Deity avenged himself upon himself, and
punished himself for a crime committed by his servant. See the madness, the folly, the
delirium with which these people are affected..."
K [p. 165] argues against the divinity of Jesus from the words of Jesus in "their gospel": "I
am going to my Father and your Father, my God and your God' [John 10:17]. These
words express subjection to God as other than himself, and equality with other men.
K [pp. 165-166] then takes up the allegation, reported by some authors, that some ṣūfīs
claimed to be united with God. (51) This is because of the theopathic utterances
(shaṭaḥāt) reported from them, such as "There is only God in my forehead" (mā fī l-jibha
illā llāh), (52) and "I am the Truth" (anā l-ḥaqq).
Some ṣūfic scholars (ùlamā' aṭ-ṭarīq) explain this away by saying that a state (ḥāla)
comes over such persons in which they pass out (fanā') as if drunk or overcome, and see
nothing but God, being oblivious of themselves and everything else. Words then form on
their lips which they would not say when they come to their senses. This is excusable
according to these scholars.
Others hold it against them and condemn them to death, as in the case of al-Junayd's
decision concerning al-Ḥallāj.
E. The positive attributes
a. Al-Ashàrī and no adjectival attributes
(N. 13) W [f. 29a] raises the question of the reality of the determinations (aḥkām) or
dispositions (aḥwāl), such as "knowing" (`ālim), resulting from substantive attributes such
as "knowledge" (ìlm). Imām al-Ḥaramayn and al-Bāqillānī asserted that the dispositions
are additional to the substantive attributes; a disposition, according to the, is "a positive
attribute which inheres in something existent, but is itself neither existent nor non-existent"
(ṣifat ithbāt taqūm bi-mawjūd wa-laysat hiya mawjūda wa-lā ma`dūma).
But al-Ashàrī, denying dispositions, said there is no third meaning (ma`nā thālith)
inhering in the essence, which is neither existent nor non-existent. According to him, the
only meaning in an essence knowing (`ālim) something is that knowledge (ìlm), related to
and perceiving what is known, inheres in the essence.
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K [pp. 214-216] was not sure which position to take. An argument is proposed that
dispositions must be an intermediate reality (wāsiṭa ḥaqīqa) between existence and
non-existence because existence is undifferentiatedly common and additional (mushtarak
zā'id) to essence; therefore the existence (of a dispositions) would require another
existence, and that another in a continuous regress. Non-existence, on the other hand, is
an imperfection and cannot qualify anything. To this argument as-Sanūsī reports an answer
that existence is the very essence of the existing thing, while its differentiation (tamyīz)
from anything else is a negation (salb); therefore there is no continuous regress in the
existence of a dispositions.
A second argument for dispositions neither existing nor not existing is that an attribute
such as black (sawād) is qualified by colorness (lawniyya) and blackness (sawādiyya). If
these two were existent, there would be the impossibility of an accidental inhering in an
accidental; if they were non-existent, there would be the impossibility of something
non-existent entering into composition with something existent. An answer to this
argument is that maybe it is possible for an accidental to inhere in another; this is a matter
of speculation (fī-hi naẓar).
Other shaykhs defend the fact (thubūt) of dispositions, saying that to deny the bars the
way to affirming causality, definitions or general propositions in demonstrations. (53)
A choice is made in W [f. 29a-b]: "I (wa-n-nafs) am inclined to the first opinion-the
affirmation of dispositions neither existing nor not-existing-because if the subject did not
acquire from knowledge, for example, its likeness-to be knowing-there would be no
difference between the subject and anything else in which knowledge does not inhere,
since by this supposition knowledge itself, and not the subject, is the perceiver. But the
evidence of seeing and feeling is that definitely the subject in which knowledge inheres
acquires by the inhering of knowledge in it a disposition additional to the mere inhering of
knowledge in it. The additional factor is that the subject knows the object of the
knowledge inhering in it.
"In summary, this question is famous for its diversity of opinions, and the reasons for
either side are expatiated upon in long treatises. Surmising (wahm) about it is strongly
counter to intelligibility, and ignorance of it does not hurt the tenets of faith."
b. The Mu`tazilites and no substantive attributes
The Mu`tazilites, says K [p. 216], affirmed the adjectival attributes, but denied the
substantive ones, saying that the adjectival attributes are due to God because of his
essence, not because of any substantive attributes. One exception they made was that God
speaks by speech, but this speech is not an eternal attribute, but something created, and
made up of letters and sounds. The Mu`tazilites of Baṣra also admitted a will which came
into being and is not in a subject (maḥall).
Yet consequences of positing a will and speech which came into being are: 1) the renewal
of dispositions coming into being in what is from the eternal past (tajaddud al-aḥwāl
al-ḥāditha àlā l-azalī), which demands God's having come into being; 2) a substantive
attribute's self-subsistency, which is impossible; 3) attributing to God the adjectival
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determination of a substantive attribute without a particularizing reason; 4) the

inconsistency of saying that God knows because of himself, but wills because of a will;
they said so to avoid having God will disobedience; 5) that a will which came into being
would require a continuous regress of other wills to particularize it; 6) having inhere in
God's essence the adjectival determinations of a will which began to be.
Therefore [K, p. 219] al-Ka`bī and an-Najjār and their followers denied the attribute of
will altogether, interpreting authoritative references to it as God's creating or not being
opposed.
In answer to the Mu`tazilites [K, pp. 221-222], the Sunnites give four bases of transferring
to God (al-ghā'ib) the assertion true of the experiential world (ash-shāhid) that where
there are adjectival attributes there are also corresponding substantive ones: 1) joint reality
(jam` al-ḥaqīqa) of the two, and 2) the connection that one is evidence (dalīl) or 3) a
condition (sharṭ) or 4) a cause (ìlla) of the other. The first basis is that invoked by those
who deny dispositions; the fourth is used by those who affirm them.
Another argument against the Mu`tazilite position [K, pp. 223-226] is that if God had no
substantive attributes, his very essence would have to be power, knowledge etc. But from
this would follow: 1) that an essence would have an opposite, for instance ignorance, since
the essence is knowledge; but an essence has no opposites; 2) that an essence, because
identified with a substantive attribute, would require a subject of inherence, which is
impossible; 3) that the essence would unite with the substantive attribute; but the uniting
of two things is impossible; (54) 4) that the substantive attributes identified with the
essence would be identified with each other; then, as al-Muqtaraḥ explained regarding the
question of sawād ḥilāwa), not only would a single attribute be opposed to its opposite,
e.g. knowledge to ignorance, but every other attribute, e.g. power, would be opposed to
ignorance as well.
The Mu`tazilites objected [K, pp. 226-232; cf. J, 8b, f. 163a] that the assertion of
substantive attributes implies that they are causes of the adjectival ones, in which case the
adjectival attributes would not be necessary but admissible. The Sunnite answer is that the
connection is not one of causality (ta`līl), (55) but of inter-consequence (talāzum), such as
between a substance and an accidental. The latter are crated by God simultaneously, each
following upon the other without causal influence, as al-Muqtaraḥ explains.
c. The Philosophers and no positive attributes
The Philosophers, K[pp. 219-220 and 232-234] continues, denied all the attributes of God
but the negative ones, interpreting the others as negations (salb) or the ascription of
created effects to him (iḍāfa) or a combination of these two.
There reason is that the attributes' need (iftiqār) of an essence and of other attributes as a
condition-e.g. power requires life-is a denial of their being necessary. The Sunnite answer
is that the inter-consequence of an attribute with the essence or with another attribute is
not one of need, unless by "need" is meant inseparability (àdam infikāk). There is no
ground for saying that one necessary thing cannot follow necessarily upon another.
Ibn-at-Tilimsānī remarked [K, pp. 234-235] that ar-Rāzī was influenced by the
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Philosophers and said in his Ma`āli ad-dīniyya) [J, 8b, f. 163a, names the book] that the
composition (tarkīb) of the attribute with God's essence makes the attributes possible
(mumkin) with regard to their own essences, but necessary by the necessity of God's
essence. He went as far as to reduce the attributes of God to a ere relative or nominal
reality (mujarrad nasab wa-iḍāfāt), or, on the other hand, to say they were separate and
distinct (mughāyara) from God's essence. But the Sunnite imāms reject both the
distinctness of the attributes from God's essence-because this implies separability-and
identity (ka-mā yamna`ūn an yuqāl hiya huwa).
On this point J [8c, f. 168a] notes that al-Ashàrī and one opinion of al-Bāqillānī do not
allow the term ikhtilāf, "difference", for the relation of the attributes to the essence and to
one another; another opinion of al-Bāqillānī allows it. It is neither permitted to say that the
attributes are other than the essence (ghayr adh-dhāt) nor that they are the essence itself
(àyn adh-dhāt) or united with the essence (ittiḥādu-hā maà dh-dhāt).
K [pp. 235-236] refers again to Ibn-at-Tilimsānī, who says that ar-Rāzī's attempt to avoid
composition in God is not successful, since the various attributes are distinct
(mutamayyiza) fro one another in intelligibility. Some have no object; others have an
object without an effect on it; others have an effect (yu'aththir) on their objects. If they are
distinct and different from one another (idhā tamāyazat wa-khtalafat), this supposes
different aspects (wujūhan mukhtalifa). This forced the Philosophers to explain away the
reality of the attributes; for example they said that knowledge is nothing but incorporeity.
Related to the problem of composition within God is the Mu`tazilites' further argument
[K, pp. 236-237] that the existence of substantive attributes would mean that what is from
eternity is multiple. The answer is that the attributes, whatever their number, do not imply
any composition or multiplicity in their subject (mawṣūf) any more than in the case of a
simple substance (jawhar fard) with its many attributes. The consensus that what is from
eternity is one does not exclude more than one reality (ḥaqīqa), that is the subject and the
attributes, from being from eternity.
Another argument of the Mu`tazilites [K, pp. 236-237] that, since being from eternity is
the most particular characteristic of God, anything which is from eternity must also share
in the other ore general attributes of God. Therefore any of God's attributes which are
from eternity, such as knowledge, must also be powerful, living etc., which results in a
multiplication of deities, even ore than the three hypostases of essence, life and knowledge
posited by the Christians. The answer is that being from eternity is a negative, not a
positive attribute, and therefore cannot be the most particular characteristic. As-Sanūsī
quotes here at-Taftāzānī's Ḥāshiya àlā l-Kashshāf, (56) which says that the Christians do
not err in asserting attributes, but in making three deities of them.
The Mu`tazilites also argued [K, pp. 240-241] that if God had knowledge, it would have
to be like our knowledge, since both are related to the same objects. Therefore both would
have to be either from eternity or have come into being, and this is impossible. A
dialectical answer (jawāb jadalī) is that God`s knowingness (`ālimiyya), which the
Mu`tazilites assert, would have to be like our knowingness; therefore the same difficulty
applies to their position. The proper answer is that knowledge is completely particularized
as to its essence before it is determined as being from eternity or having come into being.
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d. Power (qudra)
(N. 14) Someone powerful (qādir), says W [ff. 29a-30a; cf. K, pp. 168-172], is he who
can either do or omit an act according to his will (huwa llādhī yaḥṣul min-hu l-fi`l
wa-t-tark bi-ḥasab irādati-hi). This excludes both a cause (ìlla) and nature (ṭabīà),
which do not have a will, and cannot omit to produce an effect, were they to do so.
The difference between a cause and nature, according to the apostates who hold that these
produce an effect, is that the influence of a cause does not depend upon anything, and it is
impossible for a cause to exist without its effect, for example the movement of a finger in
relation to the movement of a ring placed on it. But for nature to produce its effect it
depends upon the presence of a condition and the absence of an impediment, as in the case
of fire in burning, according to them, since it depends upon the condition of the fire
touching the thing which is to be burned, and the absence of the impediment of it being
wet.
Thus there are three kinds of active principles (fāìl) according to their supposed ability to
act: 1) one who is able or powerful (qādir), who can act or not act, and is said to be
freely-choosing (mukhtār), 2) a cause, and 3) a nature. All these exist, say the Philosopher
apostates-may God destroy them. But the Sunnites are unanimous in denying the
effectivity (ta'thīr) of the last two types, so that only the first remains. Then, the Sunnites
admit the existence of the latter only in God, because of the impossibility of anything
besides him all together or separately of having any effectivity whatsoever.
God is powerful because he could have omitted creating the world. If he were obliged to
create it, he would be a cause or a nature, and the world would have to be eternal, as will
be seen later. The fact of the world's dependence upon God proves that he has the power
to act.
An objection is raised that God's power does not extend to omitting an act, because
omitting (tark) is a pure negation, whereas power must be related to a positive effect;
were non-acting a positive effect, the world would have to be eternal. Also, continued
non-acting does not require a power. The answer is, first of all, that omitting is not a pure
negation; rather it is a positive refusal to act, yet does not take place from eternity, but in
never-ending-time (fī mā lā yazāl). Besides, one possessing power need not produce
omission; his power of omitting means that he does not bring an act into existence, not
that he brings a non-act into existence.
The second point in the Creed, that God must have a power (qudra) which is in addition
to (zā'ida àlā) his essence, is against the Mu`tazilites, who denied the distinction between
God's essence and attributes. Their position goes against intelligibility, since anyone who is
powerful must have power, either as a condition of being powerful, or as a cause of it, or
as something proved by it, or as a part of its reality, since someone powerful is he who has
power. This is to speak in terms of supposing dispositions, since powerfulness (qādiriyya)
is a disposition inhering in an essence. But for al-Ashàrī, powerfulness simply means that
power inheres in the subject.
The third point in the Creed, W [f. 30b] continues, that this power is not united with God's
essence, is against the position of the Philosophers. A reply has already been given to the
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in the demonstration of the impossibility of God's uniting with something other than
himself. (57) The reply to them in the Creed is an abridged statement of the argument that
in uniting a whole must become its very part, or something numerous must become
precisely few, which is without intelligibility. This is what is meant by "It would follow
that two are one", that is, because the power and the essence are two realities (ḥaqīqatān
ithnatān), were they to unite, that is, become one, then there would clearly result the
absurdity mentioned.
In the fifth point of the Creed, that God's power is related to all things possible, the word
"things possible" (mumkināt) is the equivalent of things admissible (jā'izāt). Necessary and
impossible things are excluded as objects of the divine power because to be an object of
power implies that the thing can be or not be.
The phrase "all things possible" is pointed against the Mu`tazilites, who excepted human
voluntary acts from the objects of divine power, and said that men create these acts
(ikhtara`ū-hā) by their will. Were some possibilities outside the range of God's power, the
reason would have to be either in God's power, which was limited by a particularizing
agent-which has been disproven-or in the possibilities themselves-which also cannot be so,
since they are all equally possible.
As an example of an impossible supposition outside God's power, Ṣ [pp; 104-105] rejects

the reported opinion of Ibn-Ḥazam in his al-Milal wa-n-niḥal that if God could not take a
son he would be impotent (`ājiz). Likewise al-Isfarā'inī explained the assertion of Idrīs that
God could make the world pass through the eye of a needle, saying that God could make
the world small enough to do so, but could not make it pass through with the size it has.
A definition of God's power given by Ṣ [p. 99], Ṣṣ [p. 21], and M [f. 213a] is "an attribute
which is effective in bringing any possible thing into existence or non-existence" (ṣifa
tu'aththir fī ījād al-mumkin wa-i`dāmi-hi/ ṣifa yata'attā bi-hā kull mumkin
wa-i`dāmu-hu). Particularizing further the objects of God's power, M [ff. 214b-215a]
agrees with al-Bāqillānī and disagrees with Imām-al-Ḥaramayn that adventitious
non-existence (al-àdam aṭ-ṭāri'), that is, coming upon something already existent, is
included among the objects of God's power. This is so if we accept as the formal basis
(uṣaḥḥiḥ) of God's power either possibility together with the coming into being (al-imkān
maà l-ḥudūth), or possibility on condition of coming into being, or coming into being
alone.
Some imāms go further and say that even the non-existence which precedes existence is
among the objects of God's power. According to them the formal basis of God's power is
possibility alone, apart from coming into being. Their reason is that linguistic usage
(al-lugha wa-l-'urf) permit expressions to the effect that God has power to keep
something non-existent. Therefore to exclude previous non-existence from God's power
would see like an impropriety (sū' al-adab) and the construing of a defect (īhām an-naqṣ).
The objects of God's power, according to W and M, can be summarized as concerning:
omitting (tark)
acting (fi`l):
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to bring something into existence (ījād)

to cause non-existence (i`dām):
subsequent to existence (ṭāri', lāḥiq)
previous to existence (sābiq).
e. Will (irāda)
(N. 15) The will, says W [f. 31b] is "an attribute by which there comes about the
prevailing of the actuality of one of two possible alternatives" (ṣifa yata'attā bi-hā tarjīḥ
wuqū` aḥad ṭarafay al-mumkin), or it is "intending the actuality of one of two possible
alternatives" (al-qaṣd li-wuqū` aḥad ṭarafay al-mumkin). M's definition [f. 215a] is also
illustrative: "an attribute by which there comes about the particularization of something
possible with some of what is admissible to it" (ṣifa yata'attā bi-hā takhṣīṣ al-mumkin
bi-ba`ḍ mā yajūz àlay-hi).
(N. 16) The will is necessary to particularize the effect of God's power. J [11a, f. 177b]
and M [f. 212b] distinguish six kinds of possible alternatives (al-mumkināt
al-mutaqābilāt) which require a particularizing agent: 1) existence and non-existence, 2)
sizes (maqādīr), 3) attributes (ṣifāt), 4) times (azmina), 5) places (amkina) and 6)
directions (jihāt).
The particularizing factor, K [p. 172] observes, cannot be the fact that one of the two
possibilities serves a greater good, since that is a Mu`tazilite position disproven elsewhere.
W [f. 31b] eliminates power as the particularizing agent because power has one relation
(nisba) to all possible things in every time and every disposition. Also, the function of
power is to produce existence. But an agent of existence (mūjid) as such is not the same
as an agent of prevalence (murajjiḥ) as such, because the production of existence (ījād)
depends upon the particularization of prevalence (tarjīḥ).
Likewise knowledge cannot be the particularizing agent, because to particularize a thing

with something its possibility admits is to produce an effect on it. But knowledge is not an
attribute which produces an effect; otherwise it would not have among its objects what is
necessary and what is impossible. Besides, knowledge of actuality (wuqū`) follows upon
actuality; were actuality to follow upon knowledge, there would be a circle.
It is also evident that life, speech, hearing and seeing cannot be particularizing agents,
because life has no object, and its is like power in its indifference of relation (fī tasāwī
n-nisba). Hearing and seeing are like knowledge in the order of what they follow upon,
while speech has no relation to producing an effect.
Therefore there must be another attribute whose special function is to give prevalence and
particularization, and it is called the will.
K [pp. 172-173] mentions an objection to the necessity of a will from the fact that many of
man's acts occur apart from his will. The answer is that this is true only of man, who is not
the agent of his acts. But God's particularization of possibilities must proceed from his
will.
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(N. 17) K [pp. 174-177] amplifies the arguments given in W why God acts by choice of
will, and not as a cause or a nature. If there were no divine will the world would either be
from eternity or it would not exist at all. The former alternative would result if the nature
or cause came into being, since their coming into being depends upon an impossible
continuous regress or a circle.
Another reason why God is not a cause or a nature is that if these principles were from
eternity, an infinite number of things would have to exist, since these principles have only
one relation to all things possible, and possible things are infinite.
Another argument is that all possible things would have to exist all at once, even if the
cause or nature were not from eternity.
A further argument [K, pp. 182-183] is drawn from the intricate determination of star
locations and movements.
(N. 18) The objections raised in this number are clear enough in the Creed, and are also
taken up elsewhere. (58)
(N. 19) On the question of God's willing evil, Ṣ [pp. 101-102] explains that the
Mu`tazilites said that God wills only what he commands, such as belief and obedience,
whether these are actualized or not. But for Sunnites Abū-Jahl was commanded to believe,
but God did not will him to believe; in fact, all that happens does so by God's will.
W [f. 33a] proceeds: Although all Sunnites agree that everything happens only by the will
of God, whether belief or unbelief, obedience or disobedience, or any other possible thing,
they differ on whether to use the term "the will of God" when speaking explicitly of
unbelief and disobedience. Some forbid it on the grounds of propriety (àlā ṭarīq al-adab)
only, lest anyone imaging that unbelief and disobedience are predicated (iḍāfa) of God.
But that is not the case. Rather, the name unbelief or disobedience is predicated of the act
created by God who wills its existence in the essence of a man. The act is predicated of
man, since he is the one qualified by unbelief or disobedience, even though he is not the
producer (mukhtari`) of these acts. God is not qualified by them, even though he produces
them.
Likewise for other acts, God is only qualified as creating and willing them without being
qualified by the acts themselves at all, because of the impossibility of the essence of God
to be qualified by anything which comes into being. An illustration of this is for you to
place something with a bad smell and color into a pan. The pan would be the acquirer
(muktasib) of the bad thing and would be qualified by it, and not you who put the thing
into it.
In summary, all God's acts are good (ḥasana), but only differ in their existence in men
according to what they acquire by revealed-law and custom (sharàn wa-ùrfan), even
though they have no effect at all on any of these acts.
Another aspect of the opinion that it is improper to say explicitly that God wills unbelief or
disobedience is that to refer (isnād) these acts to the will of God without mentioning good
acts is a quasi begging pardon (shibh al-i`tidhār)for God's creating them by throwing the
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consequent blame upon the one who disbelieves or disobeys, whereas the referral of these
acts to God's will in revealed-law is not an excuse, nor is God to be asked about what he
does or decides. According to this opinion, the proper way of expression is that all beings
in general should be expressed when referring to God's will. A general expression
(ta`mīm) will include unbelief and disobedience, while guarding propriety of expression.
One may, however, say explicitly that God wills acts of obedience, but only if there is no
one listening who would understand thereby that acts of disobedience are not willed by
God. If there are such people listening, then one may only state the generalization, nothing
more. Verses from the Qur'ān [1:6-7 and 72:10] are adduced by supporters of this
opinion.
A second opinion allows explicit reference to God's willing of evil acts without fear of
impropriety, because the difference between creating something and being qualified by it
should be clear.
A third opinion places no restriction on explicit speech in teaching and explaining, but
elsewhere requires respect for propriety. This opinion, as-Sanūsī says, is best.
To show that God does not act for the sake of objectives (aghrāḍ), W [f. 33b] offers the
general reason that the objective must either be from eternity-in which case his act would
have to be from eternity or else he would be frustrated from his objective-or it must have
come into being-in which case the objective must have come into being through another
objective, and so on in a continuous regress. K[pp. 242-245] adds variations to these
arguments.
An objection is considered in K [pp. 426-429] that if God does not act for an objective his
acts are stupidity (safah). The ordinary meaning of this term is ignorance of one's own
welfare and light-mindedness, so that a stupid person does things which hurt him without
knowing it, or if he does know it, he prefers a passing pleasure to avoiding its severe
consequences. Futility (àbath) ordinarily refers to doing something unawares or without
intention (qaṣd). Neither of these terms can be equated with not acting for an objective.
Likewise God's wisdom (ḥikma) requires acting with knowledge and will, but not for an
objective.
The Mu`tazilites, W [f. 34a] continues, held that God's determinations (aḥkām) are
motivated by objectives; for example, they said that drinking wine is prohibited because it
damages the intellect.
One point against this position is that drinking is an act of God on which man has no
effect; damaging the intellect is merely a sign (amāra) set up by God to indicate that man
deserves punishment.
A second point is that there is no connection between drinking and damaging the intellect,
since God produces every effect directly without any intermediate influence of a creature.
The same holds for killing an enemy; God causes death; the blow, whether it is deliberate
or not, does not; the distinctions between deliberate and non-deliberate are set up by God's
free willing.
Thus you know how wrong is the position of the Mu`tazilites, who said that the intellect
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alone can arrive at knowledge of God's determinations without the intermediacy of

prophets. This question is entitled "judging good and evil" (at-taḥsīn wa-t-taqbīḥ), or
simply "good and evil". The professors of truth say that before revealed-law there is no
good unless revealed-law says "Do it", and no evil unless revealed-law says "Do not do
it"; there is no cause in the particularization of either.
K [pp. 429-434] explains and argues against the Mu`tazilite position further. They held
that there is good and evil in human acts which can be determined apart fro revealed-law.
According to them, the goodness or evil of some acts is immediately evident, such as the
goodness of truthfulness and faith, and the evil of lying and unbelief; for other acts
revealed-law is necessary, such as the goodness of fasting on the last day of Ramaḍān and
the evil of fasting on the first day of Shawwāl; in these cases the legislator explains what is
good, but does not constitute it.
The older Mu`tazilites said that acts were good or evil because of their essence, while
others said they were so because of an attribute attached to them, such as the evil of
adultery because of the resulting confusion of relationships and claims. Still others said
that goodness is essential to the act and comes from God, whereas evil is an attribute of it.
Al-Jubbā`ī said that the same act can be good or bad according to different aspects, such
as striking an orphan to train him or for another reason.
One answer to the Mu`tazilites is to divide into absurdities their assertion that it can be
known from intelligibility that thanking God for his benefits is good. There would have to
be some advantage in thanking God. But there is none:
for man:
in this world, because here all he gains is tiredness
in the next world, because nothing can be known about it without
revealed-law
for God, because he gains nothing from it.
To the objection that thanking God preserves man from God's punishment, and this can be
known without revealed-law on the supposition that God acts for objectives, there is the
answer that on this basis God could equally punish him for two reasons: 1) that the man
tires himself in thanking God without God's permission, and 2) that if God gave him only a
little of what in his riches he could give him, thanking him is equivalent to mocking him.
The causes of determinations mentioned by Sunnite professors of revealed-law, W [f. 34b]

continues, are not to be understood literally as causes impelling the legislator to make a
certain determination, as the Mu`tazilites maintain, but by these causes are meant signs
(amārāt) set up by revealed-law as a result of pure choice. Or else, these causes mean
advantages which revealed-law looks out for (rā`ā-hā) through these determinations by
way of favor, not decisive necessity. An example of this is the Qur'ān verse "I have created
jinn and men only that they may worship me" (51:56), which must be interpreted as for the
advantage of jinn and men, not of God. The Mu`tazilites erred doubly in interpreting this
verse. First, they interpreted the lām in "li-ya`budū-nī" as a lām at-ta`līl rather than as a
lām aṣ-ṣayrūra, making worship the objective sought by God. Secondly, they restricted
God's will to what agrees with his commands, excluding evil acts.
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Another legitimate interpretation of the lām in this verse is that it is metaphorically a lām
at-ta`līl, in which the quasi-command to worship implied in the verse is expressed as a
final cause (al-ìlla al-ghā'iyya), which in technical terminology means "what impels in
action according as it is perceived, even if it is posterior in existence to the act" (mā
yabùth bi-ḥasab taṣawwuri-hi àlā fi`l shay' wa-in kān yata'akhkhar wujūdu-hu àlā
dhālik ash-shay'), such as gain with respect to trading. A final cause is the usefulness of a
thing (fā'idat ash-shay'), and is always first in mind (dhihn) but last in outside existence (fī
l-khārjij). As the Philosophers say, what is first in intention is last in operation (awwal
al-fikra ākhir al-àmal). In the case at hand it expresses a quasi-command to worship,
indicating a pure relating (muṭlaq at-tartīb) of the existence of jinn and men towards
worship, without God being impelled either to create them for the sake of worship or to
reward them for it.
f. Knowledge (ìlm)
(N. 20) Ṣ [pp. 106-108] and M [f. 215a-b] define knowledge in nearly the same terms as
"an attribute by which its object is disclosed exactly as it is" (ṣifa yankashif bi-hā mā
tataàllaq bi-hi nkishāfan lā yaḥtamil an-naqīḍ bi-wajh min al-wujūh/ ṣifa yankashif
bi-hā l-ma`lūm àlā mā huwa bi-hi). M explains once more the difference between
knowledge and doubt etc., as was seen above. (59)
(N. 21) K [pp. 185-193] distinguishes two arguments for God's having knowledge. The
first is that of the work of wisdom (iḥkām) found in creation. Regarding this, W [f. 35a]
says that one would have to fight the truth and resist plain evidence to say that the marvels
of the world came from someone ignorant. As-Sanūsī goes into long detail explaining the
intricacies of the eye as an example of God's wisdom, though noting that God causes or
prevents seeing on the occasion of (ìnd) the presence or absence of the proper conditions
for sight, not through (bi) them.
K [pp. 186-187] mentions the objection that a bee can make a hive which is an engineering
marvel without an intellect. The answer is that while the effect comes from God, he
inspires the bees with knowledge of how to make a hive, even though they are not
properly-endowed (ahl) with any knowledge.
Imām-al-Ḥaramayn [pp. 187-188] objected to the argument from wisdom, saying that all it
means is that substances have been lined up in a determined way, and this is no proof of
knowledge. Ibn-at-Tilimsānī answered him in his Sharḥ al-Ma`ālim, saying that the
argument from wisdom does not mean simply the particularization of substances with
states of motion or rest or situation (akwān), but also with a particular modality (kayfiyya)
and measure (miqdār) of attributes and accidentals. As-Sanūsī then [pp. 190-193]
expatiates on the wise measurements of the parts of the human body and how they serve
its functions, referring also to the wisdom of the rest of the universe.
The second argument for knowledge [K, p. 189] is that proposed by Imām-al-Ḥaramayn,
which Ibn-at-Tilimsānī says requires reasoning, whereas the first is self-evident. The
argument is that God acts by choice, as has been proven; but acting by choice supposes
intending (qaṣd) what is to be done; but intending something supposes knowing it. Men
can intend on the basis of belief (i`tiqād), opinion or suspicion, but this is impossible of
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God, since it is an imperfection. Therefore he intends by knowledge. Also, since God

particularizes every aspect of creation, he must intend and know every aspect and detail.
Thus the Philosophers are wrong in limiting him to general knowledge.
W [f. 36b] takes up the point that God's knowledge is above constraint and reasoning.
Knowledge constrained by its object (ḍarūrī) is that which is accompanied by pain or need
(ḍarar aw ḥāja), such as our knowledge of our own pain or hunger. There is no doubt
that knowledge of this kind is impossible for God, since all agree that it is impossible for
him to suffer pain or need.
Yet the word ḍarūrī is sometimes applied to knowledge which is had without reasoning
(naẓar). This meaning can legitimately be applied to God's knowledge, but to avoid
misunderstanding revealed-law forbids the use of the word ḍarūrī to describe God's
knowledge.
It is impossible for God's knowledge to come from reasoning (naẓarī), because reasoning
is opposed to knowledge, since knowledge coming from reasoning is had only when
reasoning is finished (bi-nṣirām an-naẓar), and does not coexist (lā yajtami`) with it.
Such knowledge comes into being, and as such is impossible for God.
Here K [pp. 258-261] accepts the opinion of Imām-al-Ḥaramayn that knowledge is not
essentially dependent upon previous reasoning, (60) since the capability of a substance for
knowledge is of essential-property (nafsī) and needs no condition.
In Qur'ān verses such as 29:3, where God is said to cause trials in order to know who are
true and who are liars, "to know" must be interpreted as "to announce reward or
punishment". (61)
As-Sanūsī then quotes al-Muqtaraḥ on the kinds of ḍarūrī knowledge, and in summary
says that there are three kinds of knowledge which come into being: 1) self-evident, or
constrained (ḍarūrī), 2) spontaneous (badīhī), (62) and 3) acquired (kasbī); (63) all of
these are impossible of God.
g. Hearing, sight, speech and perception
(N. 22 contains nothing of note.)
(N. 23) Hearing (sam`) and sight (baṣar), W [f. 36b] says, are types of perception (idrāk)
additional to knowledge. In God they are not limited to sounds or colors, but he sees and
hears from eternity and forever his own essence and positive attributes as well as our
essences and positive attributes, without limit as to object or time. Nevertheless it is
sensibly apparent that the disclosure (inkishāf) of each of these powers is not the same,
and they differ in reality (ḥaqīqa). Also, in God these powers cannot be linked to ears or
eyes or directions.
K [pp. 195-196] quotes some Qur'ān verses affirming God's hearing and seeing (20:46,
17:1 etc., 96:14, 26:218, 19:42), and says they are to be taken literally on the principle
that interpretation (ta'wīl) is permitted only on the condition that the context justifies it.
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Al-Jubbā`ī and his son (Mu`tazilites), says K [pp. 200-201], said that someone hearing and
seeing is merely one who is living without defect. This position is wrong because, first,
hearing and seeing are related to objects, while life is not; secondly, man perceives that he
is hearing and seeing without perceiving this absence of defect; thirdly, by the same reason
power and knowledge should be reduced to life.
The Philosophers [K, pp. 201-204] explained hearing and seeing as something physical,
saying that what is seen is the immaterial impressed image (al-mithāl al-muṭabi` al-khālī
àn al-mādda) of an external object, or, according to another opinion, the external object
itself through the mediacy of the image impressed in the common sense (al-ḥass
al-mushtarak) located in the front of the brain. There are two similar opinions concerning
hearing. The Sunnite position, however, is that these perceptions require only a subject,
without conditions, since the capability of the subject is of essential-property; any other
factors are simply customary concomitants of God's acting. Ar-Rāzī objected to even the
possibility of an impress image, but as-Sanūsī answers his arguments, quoting from
Ibn-at-Tilimsānī.
Ṣṣ [p. 23] explains that God's hearing and seeing, unlike ours, have as their objects all
existing things, whether they are from eternity or came into being, since their formal object
(muṣaḥḥiḥ taàlluqi-himā) is existence. If their objects were restricted in any way, a
particularizing agent would be required; then these attributes and God would have come
into being. Thus K [pp. 284-285; cf. M, f. 216a] approves the opinion of al-Ashàrī,
rejecting the opinion of older theologians (qudamā') such as Àl. b. Sa`īd al-Kullābī and
al-Qalānasī who restricted hearing to sounds and said that God does not hear his eternal
speech, but only knows it.
Regarding seeing, the difficulty is raised [K, pp. 286-289; M, ff. 2161-b] that we cannot
see our own sight; therefore it does not extend to all existing things. Al-Bāqillānī answered
that this is because of an impediment which is invisible to the person concerned, but is
visible to others. Thus everything is essentially visible.
The Mu`tazilites [K, p. 206], who say that God hears and sees himself, reduce this
perception to knowledge. Other Mu`tazilites say that God neither sees nor is seen, on the
basis that sight is a matter of emitting rays, as will be seen later. (64) Abū-l-Q. al-Ka`bī
and a. l-Ḥ al-Baṣrī (Mu`tazilites) [K, pp. 204-205] said that hearing and seeing are only
knowledge related particularly to visible and audible objects. Ar-Rāzī objected to their
opinion on the basis of the evident experiential difference between these perceptions and
knowledge. Ibn-at-Tilimsānī, however, said that ar-Rāzī's position does not conclude to a
specific difference, but the difference could be simply a matter of a greater or smaller
number of objects; for instance, seeing includes more than knowing in the case of an
absent object. Or the difference could be one of subject, such as the eye for seeing and the
heart for knowing.
Al-Ashàrī [K, pp. 205-206] had two opinions. The first is that hearing and seeing are
generically different from knowledge, although they are all attributes disclosing objects as
they actually are. The second is that they are of the genus of knowledge, but are related
only to existing objects, whereas knowledge is related also to non-existing ones and to
things both simply and determinedly (wa-l-muṭlaq wa-l-muqayyad). Al-Ashàrī opposed
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reducing hearing and seeing to knowledge, in the same way as ar-Rāzī did. But
Ibn-at-Tilimsānī commented that the same difficulties remain.
M [f. 216b] faces directly the difficulty that if the objects of hearing and seeing are the
same as those of knowledge they are superfluous (taḥṣīl al-ḥāṣil wa-jtimā` al-mithlayn).
As-Sanūsī's answer is that the objects are the same-all existing things-but the reality
(ḥaqīqa) of these perceptions is not one, just as the reality of their relations to their
objects (taàlluqātu-hā) is not one, but each has a particular disclosure (la-hu ḥaqīqa min
al-inkishāf takhuṣṣu-hu) different from that of the others. This is true whether we say
hearing and seeing are species (anwā`) of knowledge or not.
As for seeing's (mushāhada) being a stronger and more detailed perception of an object
than knowledge, this is not true of God, whose knowledge is all embracing of every object
in general and in detail.
God's speech (kalām), says Ṣ [p. 113] is related to (mutaàlliq ay dāll àlā) all that he
knows, which is infinite. M [ff. 218a-221a] discusses in detail the various kinds of speech
(khabar, inshā' etc.) as they apply to God. The statement that God's speech is without
letters, sounds and sequence, M [f. 217a] explains, is against the position of the
Ḥashwiyya, who affirmed material speech as an attribute inhering in God, and the
Mu`tazilites, who asserted material speech, but as a creation, not an attribute of God.
K [pp. 264-265] says that the Ḥashwiyya are of two kinds: One holds that God occupies
space, but has no shape, and that his speech is from eternity, of any language, and
consisting of letters and sounds, but not in an outward way (lā àlā makhārij al-ḥuruf).
The other kind holds that God occupies space with the shape of a man, and speaks in any
language according to the outward sounds of the letters; his speech is from eternity, but is
sometimes quiet (ṣamat) and covered up. According to them, whenever anyone reads the
Qur'ān, he hears the eternal speech of God which exists in him as in a subject (wujid fī
maḥall hādhā l-qāri') without leaving God. Likewise the letters of a copy of the Qur'ān
are the very speech of God without leaving his essence.
Abū-Ḥāmid (65) and Ibn-Dahhāq [K, pp. 265-268 and 273-274] are quoted in refutation
of them: The Ḥashwiyya have the anthropomorphism of the Jews, the Christian idea of
God's speech (word) dwelling in men, but not just in Jesus but in everyone who reads the
Qur'ān, and the Mu`tazilite belief that God's speech consists of sounds and letters.
To show that speech is not just outward sounds, the Sunnites [K, pp.l 268-273] point to
the fact that commanding and forbidding are interior acts manifested in many various
ways. After refuting Mu`tazilite objects to this, the question is raised whether speech is
properly interior or exterior or both. Al-Ashàrī says that it is common to both, while the
Mu`tazilites say that it is properly exterior and only metaphorically interior. But the
Sunnites interpret the Father's dictum "The speech of God is memorized in the heart,
recited with the tongue and written in copies " (kalām Allāh maḥfūẓ bi-ṣudūr wa-maqrū'
bi-l-alsina wa-maktūb fī l-maṣāḥif) (66) as the application of the name of something
referred to (madlūl) to something referring to it (dāll), since a thing has four existences:
1) in actual individuals (a`yān), 2) in the mind (adhhāh), 3) on the tongue (lisān), and 4)
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on fingertips (banān), that is in writing. The last three only refer to, but are not the actual
eternal speech of God; what is recited or written is from eternity, but not the recitation or
writing. Thus M [f. 218a] says that God's speech is in the Qur'ān as understood and
known, not as indwelling (fahman wa-ìlman lā ḥulūlan) [cf. Ṣ. p. 114].
K then [pp. 275-279] discusses Qur'ān verses referring to God's speaking to Moses [4:164
and 7:144], saying that he did not hear created words, but the interior eternal speech of
God; otherwise he could not be singled out as the interlocutor (kalīm) of God. W [f. 37b],
Ṣ [p. 114] and M [f. 217b] point out that the inner being (kunh) of speech as well as God's
essence and other attributes is veiled (maḥjūb) from the intellect, but W [f. 37b] adds that
any knowing-awareness of it must be attained by way of (mystic) taste (wa-àlā taqdīr
at-tawaṣṣul ilā ma`rifa shay' min dhālik fa-huwa dhawqī), which can be expressed only
by the beckoning (ishāra) of one person who has it (min ahli-hi) to another who has it.
Ṣ [pp. 114-115] notes also that because God's speech is beyond intellectual
comprehension the comparison by theologians of God's speech to our is true only to the
extent that ours, as God's, is not necessarily dependent on letters and sounds; but our
interior speech (kalāmu-nā n-nafsī) comes into being and is marked by parts, priority and
posteriority, and has no positive resemblance to God's speech.
M [f. 217a] gives an argument from intelligibility (dalīl al-àql) that God has speech
because if someone knows something he can speak about it, and God knows everything.
W [f. 38a] and K [pp. 193-194] offer a general argument for hearing, seeing and speech
that a subject which is capable of an attribute must be qualified with either the attribute or
its like or its opposite. God is living, and is therefore capable of hearing, sight and speech.
Therefore he must possess them, since he cannot be qualified with their opposites:
deafness (ṣamam), blindness (àmā) and dumbness (bakam).
But the weight of authority as-sam` ay an-naql), namely the Qur'ān (al-kitāb), the
Muḥammadan norm (as-sunna) and consensus (ijmā`) is greater than that of intelligibility
in this question, because if these attributes are perfections in this world (shāhid), it does
not necessarily follow that they are perfections in what is beyond (ghā'ib). For example,
pleasure and pain are perfections of a living thing in this world, but they are impossible of
God. Therefore by intelligibility alone one cannot be sure that if God does not possess
these attributes he necessarily possess their opposites. K [pp. 198-200] argues similarly,
quoting Ibn-at-Tilimsānī against the arguments proposed by al-Isfarā'inī. Ṣṣ remarks [p.
23] that the existence of these three attributes is settled by authority, but the relation of
hearing and seeing to their objects and the fact that God's speech has no letters, sounds or
temporality are known by a reason of intelligibility.
An objection is raised in K [pp. 196-198] and Ṣṣ [p. 23] that if the authority of a prophet
is needed to assert that God speaks, the authority of a prophet in turn depends upon a
miracle, which presupposes that God speaks in affirming the truthfulness of the prophet;
thus the argument runs in a circle. Ibn-at-Tilimsānī answered that the act of a miracle
indicates the truthfulness of the prophet without a separate verbal declaration of his
truthfulness; the question of whether God can speak or not is left open.
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We know God's attributes, W continues [f. 38a], either by his acts which prove the
existence of these attributes, or, if we do not find a proof from his acts, by having recourse
to authority. If authority says nothing, then we refrain from judging (waqf). In the case of
the above attributes authority is decisive.
Perception (idrāk), says W [f. 38a], includes perception of odors (mashmūmāt), tastes
(madhūqāt) and things palpable (malmūsāt). As-Sanūsī does not discuss the extent of the
objects of each of these, except to mention in K [p. 286] and M [f. 216a] that the
Companions differed as to whether things which can be seen, such as motion-and-situation
(akwān), can also be felt. Al-Muqtaraḥ is cited for the affirmative. In the present world
(shāhid), continues W [f. 38a], the three perceptions just mentioned are perfections
additional to knowledge, the same as hearing and seeing. There are three opinions
concerning their affirmation of God:
1) Those who hold for the proof from intelligibility for hearing, seeing and speech, such as
Imām-al-Ḥaramayn and, according to J [14a, f. 211b], al-Bāqillānī, maintain the same
proof for the remaining perceptions, but exclude from these attributes any sense organ
(jāriḥa), contact (ittiṣāl) or coming into being. Their argument is that if God did not
possess these attributes he would lack perfection.
K [pp. 206-209] adds, in line with this opinion, that consensus forbids the use of
expressions such as "God smelt", because of the physical contact and change this
ordinarily suggests. But the perceptions of odors, tastes and palpable objects are distinct
from smelling, tasting and touching; and God can create the one without the other. Yet
because some theologians say that the two are essentially linked, these perceptions cannot
be absolutely asserted.
2) Others, W continues, deny the distinction of these perceptions from God's knowledge.
3) The best position is that of al-Muqtaraḥ and Ibn-at-Tilimsānī, who said that we should
refrain from judgement, meaning that we do not know whether these perceptions are in
addition to God's knowledge or part of it.
h. Outward anthropomorphism
(N. 24) The eight attributes referred to in the Creed, says W [f. 38b], are the positive
substantive attributes: knowledge, power, will, life, hearing, sight, speech and perception.
The first four are known by intelligibility; the next three depend upon an authoritative text
(naṣṣ); on the last, judgement was suspended.
There are various opinions concerning things mentioned in revealed-law which are
opposed to (muḍādda li-) God. These things are his mounting (upon the throne), his hand,
his eye and his face. By intelligibility and consensus God is decidedly above the outward
impossible meanings of these things. Accepting the outward meanings, says K [p. 264], is
the position of the Ḥashwiyya who, for example, associate with "mounting on the throne"
(istiwā') the story that every Friday night God descends to heaven for a third of the night
and before dawn goes back up to his throne.
Al-Ashàrī, continues W, said that the added descriptions are names of attributes other
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than the eight mentioned. His reason for affirming them is authority (sam`), not
intelligibility; therefore in his teaching they are called authoritative attributes (ṣifāt
samìyya). God knows best. J [15a, ff. 212b-214b] adds, quoting al-āmidī, that this is also
the opinion of al-Isfarā'inī, al-Bāqillānī and some Fathers; according to them these
attributes are of essential property (nafsī). Al-Amidī added that al-Ashàrī had a second
opinion similar to that of Imām-al-Ḥaramayn.
Imām-al-Ḥaramayn, continues W, held for interpreting them (ta'wīlu-hā) as referring to

recognized attributes, as mentioned in the Creed.
The Fathers (salaf) opted for suspending judgement (waqf) regarding the interpretation to
be adopted (fī ta`yīn ta'wīli-hā). They said we hold for sure (naqta`) that their outward
impossibilities are not what is meant, but after that we entrust their exact meaning (àyn
al-murād min-hā) to God because the terms can have several legitimate applications,
whereas revealed-law has not determined which of them is meant. Therefore, according to
al-Qarāfī, to determine the meaning without authority (naql) is to surmount the wall of the
beyond without a guiding reason (at-tasawwur àlā l-ghayb min ghayr dalīl). This is the
best and safest (aḥsan wa-aslam) opinion of all.
Al-Ashàrī explained the Qur'ān verse "He mounted upon the throne" (7:54 etc.) by
discounting both the impossible meaning of his taking position and sitting down, and the
interpretation that God took possession of the throne by his power, since there is no
reason for singling out the throne among all other possible things which are equally
dependent upon God's power. Therefore this verse must refer to a special attribute
befitting God.
Al-Ashàrī's reason for asserting the attribute called the "hand" is the verse in which God
says to the devil "What prevented you from adoring what my hand created" (38:75).
Likewise if the "hand" were interpreted as power, there would be no use in singling out
the creation of man as the work of God's hand.
The verse referring to God's eye is "and that you be made under my eye" (20:39), while
that referring to God's face is "The face of your Lord remains full of glory and honor"
(55:27).
Imām-al-Ḥaramayn [W, f. 39a] interpreted the "mounting upon the throne" as taking
possession of it by force (al-istīlā' àlay-hā bi-l-qahr) and determining (tadbīr) that it
neither move nor stand still nor occupy any determined place nor be qualified with any
other attribute except by the will of God who creates these attributes. The reason for
singling out the throne with a special expressing is not that it differs from other creatures
in dependence upon the creator, but that it is the greatest of creatures, and compared to it
all other creatures are like a ring tossed in the desert, so that someone might imagine that
it has a power and dignity to take care of itself (fī tadbīr nafsi-hi) independently of God. If
it is pointed out that the throne cannot help or hurt itself or anything else, then the same is
all the more true for the rest of creation. This is one of several well known interpretations
of this verse.
Imām al-Ḥaramayn interpreted God's "hand" as his power, on the basis of the verse "We
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built the heavens with hands" (51:47) and the usage of Arabic speech. The term "hand"
was used in the verse concerning Adam's creation in order to honor him over all other
creatures. As-Sanūsī illustrates this interpretation by various ḥadīths, and explains the
purpose (ḥikma) of the usage "two hands" of God by having one hand refer to God's
power and the other to his favor (ni`ma). Another interpretation of the dual is that it is
simple metaphor (majāz), similar to the use of the plural to intensify (ta`ẓīm) something.
Imām-al-Ḥaramayn [W, f. 40b] interpreted the term "eye" as God's knowledge or

watchfulness and protection (al-kilāà wa-l-ḥafẓ). In the verse "It (the boat of Noah) runs
before our eyes" (54:14), "our eyes" (a`yūn) can be interpreted in four different ways: 1)
as knowledge, 2) as watchfulness and care (al-kilāà wa-r-ri`āya), while the plural can be
for intensification (ta`ẓīm), or for the number of passengers on the boat or for the number
of angels God ordered to accompany the boat; 3) as the several fountains (a`yūn) of water
which burst upon the earth, or 4) as the individual men (a`yūn) who were on the boat.
God's "face" is interpreted as his essence or his existence, since this is the root of his being
everlasting and the subject of glory and honor.
i. Life, and the eternity and unity of every attribute
(N. 25) Life (ḥayāt), says Ṣ [p. 108-109], differs from the other positive attributes in that
it is not related to any object besides inhering in the subject; for instance, knowledge
requires something to be known. both inhering in an essence (al-qiyām bi-dh-dhāt) and, in
the case of other attributes, being related to an object (at-taàlluq) are essential-properties
(nafsī) of the attributes.
W [f. 41a] says that it places life last among the attributes because it is the condition
(sharṭ) of the others and is known (madlūl) through the others. W is followed by Ṣṣ [p.
23], but K [p. 193], Ṣ [p. 108] and M [f. 215b] place life before hearing, sight and speech.
(N. 26) The keystone of the argument for the attribute of life is that it is a condition of the
other attributes from which they cannot be separated. If the other attributes are from
eternity and everlasting, then life also must be from eternity and everlasting.
(N. 27) After showing that life and the preceding attributes are from eternity and
everlasting, says W [f. 41b], this is the place to show in general that all God's attributes,
those we know and those we do not know, likewise are from eternity and everlasting, so
that it is impossible for God's essence to be qualified with anything which comes into
existence. Towards this conclusion there are three demonstrations [Nos. 27, 28 and 29
respectively]:
Regarding the first demonstration, to suppose that anything possesses an attribute requires
that it have a capability for it. But if something has a capability for an attribute, it is
legitimate for it to be qualified with the attribute as long as it exists (muṣāḥibatan
li-wujūdi-hi), since its capability for the attribute is essential (nafsī, dhātī) and does not
come upon the subject after the subject's existence. For God to have the capability for an
attribute demands that he have the attribute, but this is not true of creatures, because in
them an attribute is admissible, not necessary, and therefore not always existent.
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(N. 28) The second demonstration is clear enough in the Creed.
(N. 29) Regarding the third demonstration, W [F. 43a] notes that whether the supposed
attribute is a perfection or an imperfection in itself, it is an imperfection and an
impossibility for God by the fact of its having come into being.
(N. 30) This number is an objection to the third demonstration, and is clear in the Creed.
(N. 31) In the argument for the unity (waḥda) of each attribute, says W [f. 43b], the
impossibility of the conjunction of two like things applies to attributes not related to
objects. The impossibility of achieving what has been achieved is a special argument for
the unity of the attributes related to the objects.
Attributes differ only according to a difference in subjects, or objects to which they are
related, or times. Otherwise they must be one. For example, knowledge is related to an
infinite number of things knowable, but knowledge can only be one, since an infinite
number of knowledges is a superfluous multiplication of what is alike, whereas a finite
number of knowledges is incommensurate with the infinite number of objects.
K [pp. 289-300] discusses the same question and gives similar explanations and
arguments. The objection is considered [p. 296] that speech has only a generic unity,
containing the seven species of commanding, forbidding, announcing, requesting
information, promising, threatening and appealing. This is said to be the opinion of Àl b.
Sa`īd b. Kullāb, but another opinion of his is that these seven are acts of the one attribute
of speech, which alone is from eternity. The latter opinion was criticized because there
cannot be speech from eternity without one of the seven; also requesting information,
promising and threatening are reducible to announcing. Others defend this opinion, saying
that speech is called a commanding or a forbidding only when something commanded or
forbidden exists, not that speech has these for an object only when they exist.
Al-Isfarā'inī reduced all seven kinds of speech to forms of announcement of reward or

punishment. This is in opposition to al-Bāqillānī who insisted that there is no necessary
connection between commanding or forbidding and rewarding or punishing.
F. Oneness (waḥdāniyya)
a. Procedure and meaning
(N. 32) Explaining the procedure, W [f. 44b] says: "The treatment of God's oneness has
been put in this last place because its proof depends upon much of what has preceded.
Thus the formula of unity (kalimat at-tawḥīd) 'There is no deity but God' (lā ilāha illā
llāh) is composed of a denial and an affirmation; what is denied of everything other than
God and affirmed exclusively of him is divinity and its properties (al-ilāhiyya
wa-khawāṣṣu-hā), so that the formula 'There is no deity but God' includes the meaning
that there is nothing from eternity in its essence and attributes but God, and there is
nothing whose essence and attributes are necessarily everlasting but God, and there is
nothing other from all things that come into being but God-that is, he is not a body nor
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inhering in a body, nor in a direction or having directions within himself, nor modified
(wa-lā yukayyaf) or imaginable (wa-lā yatawahham)-and there is nothing
self-subsistent-that is, in no need of a subject or a particularizing agent-but God, and there
is nothing possessing power over everything possible with a power from eternity but God,
and there is nothing knowing an infinite number of things knowable with a single
knowledge which is from eternity but God. The same applies to everything which
necessarily belongs to God. (67)
"Therefore the best order to follow (al-lā'iq/ al-alyaq/ fī t-tartīb) is to explain first how
the existence of the Deity of the world is known, then what he is fittingly qualified with,
and afterwards that he who is known necessarily to possess these qualifications can only
be one. Therefore we placed first the affirmation of its characteristics (khawāṣṣi-hā).
Then, in this chapter, we began to explain God's uniqueness (infirād) in that." (68)
W parenthetically defines divinity (ulūhiyya) as an expression of God's existence as

necessary and in no need of an agent, while everything else is in need of him. Or, if you
like, divinity is God's freedom from need of anything else, while everything else is in need
of him (istighnā' mawlā-nā àn ghayri-hi wa-ḥtiyāj kull mā siwā-hu ilay-hi). (69)
K [pp. 321-331] asks whether God's oneness can be proved from authority as well as from
intelligibility. Imām-al-Ḥaramayn and ar-Rāzī said it could, but Ibn-at-Tilimsānī,
commenting on ar-Rāzī's Ma`āmil, said that it couldn't, since if God's unity is not known it
is not certain that a miracle proving a prophet's truthfulness comes from God or from
elsewhere.
A contemporary (= Ibn-Zakrī), in his commentary on the Àqīda of Ibn-al-Ḥājib, objected

to Ibn-at-Tilimsānī on the grounds that 1) a miracle is an essential proof of truthfulness
inseparable from what it proves, and 2) even granted that a miracle's proving the
truthfulness of a prophet depends upon knowing God's unity, the miracle can prove them
both at once.
The first reason is based on the opinion of al-Isfarā'inī and is weak, as even ar-Rāzī
pointed out in his Ma`ālim, because one of the bases of a miracle's being a proof is
knowledge of God's unity, as is also explained by al-Muqtaraḥ in his commentary on the
Irshād.
The second reason is wrong on four counts: 1) A miracle does not prove the unity of God
directly, but only after reasoning that there could be no effect in the world if there were
more than one deity. 2) This argument depends purely upon intelligibility and not on
authority as he wishes to show. 3) A miracle obviously does not prove the oneness of God
and the truthfulness of a prophet from the same aspect; but if it proves them from two
different aspects the one depends upon the other in a circle. 4) The latter circle comes
back to the circle of authority and intelligibility which was supposed to be avoided.
For a definition of unity (waḥda), K [p. 300] rejects al-Bayḍāwī's definition "the state of a
thing so as not to be divisible into things with the same essence as the other" (kawn
ash-shay' bi-ḥayth lā yanqasim ilā umūr mutashārika fī l-māhiyya), since it is too wide,
and accepts the definition of Imām-al-Ḥaramayn in his Irshād: "a thing which is
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indivisible" (ash-sahy' allādhī lā yanqasim), that is, at all. This is a theological definition
as opposed to that of the Philosophers. "Thing" is distinguished from non-being.
"Indivisible" merely explains the meaning of "thing", since something divisible, according
to Sunnites, is two things, not one. Al-Bāqillānī and Imām-al-Ḥaramayn are to have said
that unity is an attribute of essential-property (nafsiyya), but the opinion that it is a
negative one is correct.
As for the kinds of unity [K, pp. 302-304], something one is:
indivisible in every way = truly one (al-wāḥid al-ḥaqīqī

divisible in some way:
but unapplicable to many = one in individuality (bi-sh-shakhṣ); such an
individual is divisible into parts:
which are equal in name and definition = one in continuity (bi-l-ittiṣāl)
which are different, as bodily members = one in assemblage (ijtimā`) or
composition (tarkīb) or binding (irtibāṭ)
applicable to many:
as their very essence (māhiyya) = one in species (bi-n-naw`)
as a part of their essence:
inclusive of two or more realities = one in genus (bi-l-jins)
restricted to one reality = one in specific difference (bi-l-faṣl)
as extraneous to them = one in an accidental (àraḍ):
where the uniting factor is borne by several things, such as
whiteness by cotton and snow = one in the thing borne
(bi-l-maḥmūl)
where the uniting factor is the subject of diverse elements, such
as a man who laughs and writes = one in subject (bi-l-mawḍū`).
b. Oneness in essence and attributes
(N. 33) Oneness in essence (waḥdāniyyat adh-dhāt), says W [f. 46a], means the denial of
multiplicity whether continuous or discrete (nafy at-taàddud muttaṣilan kān aw
munfaṣilan), that is, his essence is not composed in itself nor can there exist another
separate essence which is its like. In this number of the Creed only the negation of
continuous multiplicity was mentioned.
Oneness in attributes means that God alone possesses them, while it is impossible for any
other essence to be qualified with attributes like them.
Oneness in acts means that God alone causes the existence of all things that are, without
any intermediacy, while nothing else has any effect whatsoever.
Ṣ [pp. 90-92] has a clearer distinction of the points involved, combining oneness in
attributes with the negation of discrete quantity: The first point is the denial of multiplicity
within God's essence, and concerns continuous quantity (al-kam al-muttaṣil). (70) The
second is the denial of any peer (naẓīr) to God in his essence or attributes, and concerns
discrete quantity (al-kam al-munfaṣil). (71) The third is God's uniqueness (infirād) in
acting, that is, he alone causes existence and produces all effects without any
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intermediacy. (72)
(N. 34) This section of the Creed gives two reasons to show that there exists no one like
God. According to the first demonstration, says W [f. 47a], two things cannot be separate
unless they have something to differentiate them. If the difference is necessary, the two are
not essentially alike; if the difference is admissible, it has come into being, and then they
both are in need of a particularizing agent and cannot be divine.
An objection to the second demonstration is to suppose a third possibility: that the

collectivity (majmū`) of the two deities acts, and not each separately-which would be
repeating what has been achieved (taḥṣīl al-ḥāṣil)-nor only one of the two-which would
require one of the two equals to be stronger than the other.
The answer to this objection is that each of the two in the collectivity must have a certain
effect. If the effect of each is the same, we once again have a repetition of what has been
achieved; if it is different, we have a distinction of activity, which is impossible. Or if we
suppose that neither member of the collectivity has any effect, then the collectivity itself
cannot have any effect.
Besides, such a collectivity would have to be composed of two numerically distinct

essences; but even a composition of two conjoined essences is impossible in God.
Besides, the collectivity would have to possess several partial powers and wills; but that is
splitting a substantive attribute, which is obviously impossible.
The example of several people putting their energy together to lift something heavy proves
nothing, because their power has no effect; only God works, and according to the
circumstances he chooses.
A second objection is that the two deities could each have their separate worlds in which
both agree not to interfere with each other. The answer is that the supposition that God
can voluntarily limit his power is impossible, because divine power necessarily extends to
all things.
K [pp. 331-333] gives another demonstration for there being one God: It has been proven
that each of God's attributes is one. But if there were several deities the attributes would
consequently be infinite, according to the number of possible things-and this is
impossible-or finite-and would then need an agent to determine their number.
An objection is that existing things are in fact finite; therefore an infinite number of deities
does not follow. The answer is that this makes non-existent possibilities impossible by
making the corresponding extension of the number of divine makers impossible. The
infinite number of possibilities in question is not the never ending future (bi-ḥasab àdam
al-inqiṭā`), such as the joys of heaven, but an actual infinite (bi-ḥasab al-ijtimā`), because
the deity is from eternity.
K [pp. 308-317] gives other arguments similar to those in W, and by way of corollary
quotes Ibn-at-Tilimsānī in rejecting the position of the dualists (ath-thanawiyya), who
maintained a principle of good and a principle of evil, a position also common to the
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Mu`tazilites, who limited God to doing good.
c. Oneness in acting:
(N. 35) This section, says W [f36. 48b], shows the oneness of God in his acts, using the
same reason for the oneness of his essence an attributes. Since one effect cannot come
from two agents (il-stiḥāla wuqū` athar wāḥid bi-mu'aththirayn), for a creature to
produce an effect its power would have to be stronger (murajjiḥ) than the power of God
with regard to that effect, which is impossible.
As-Sanūsī then expatiates on the conclusion that no creature produces any effect,
repeating basically what was said in the Creed and elsewhere.
Induction (tawallud) is an act which exists outside the subject of voluntary motion, for
instance the motion of a key or a sword upon the motion of the hand. According to the
Qadarites and induced act is produced indirectly, by the mediacy (bi-wāsiṭa) of voluntary
motion which is produced directly in the hand by the created power of the person.
According to them the reality of induction is the existence of something which comes into
being from something subject to a power which has begun to exist (wujūd ḥādith àn
maqdūr bi-l-qudra al-ḥāditha). The thing subject (maqdūr) to the power which has come
into being is, in this case, the hand.
The answer to the hypothesis of induction is, briefly, that if a created power has no effect
whatsoever on the acts of its own subject, by much greater reason it has no effect on
motion which occurs outside its subject, such as in a sword. As-Sanūsī refers the reader to
K for more on the subject.
Speaking of induction, K [pp. 361-373] specifies the Qadarites as the Mu`tazilites. They
said that the act created (mukhtara`) by man in himself is the activating-ling (sabab) of
acts outside himself. The only case of an act induced within himself is knowledge, which is
induced via reasoning. As-Sanūsī blames them for taking the idea of induction from the
Philosophers, and merely to have given it a new name.
Imām-al-Ḥaramayn, in his Shāmil, said that the Mu`tazilites were in agreement that an
induced act is the act of the agent of the activating-link (al-mutawallad fi`l fāìl as sabab),
but al-Muqtaraḥ gives examples of exceptions, such as an-Naẓẓām, who said these acts
are predicable (muḍāf) of God, although without being his. Another exception is Ḥafṣ
al-Fard, who said that non-intended results were not the act of the agent of the
activating-link.
A related problem K [pp. 364-365] discusses is the time in which a power is related to an
induced act. Some say that the person has control over it only until the activating-link is
produced, but when this is produced the induced act becomes necessary and is out of the
person's control. Others say that the person has control beyond the production of the
activating-link until the induced act takes place.
Another problem was whether colors and tastes could be induced. Thumāma b. Ashrash
said these had no agent. Muàmmar said that all accidentals arise from the nature of bodies
except the will; his position was that there are four ways of induction: 1) pressure
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(i`timād), 2) proximity, under certain conditions, 3) reasoning, with regard to knowledge,

and 4) weakness, resulting in pain. Al-Jubbā`ī gave motion as an inducing principle
(muwallid), while Abū-Hāshib gave pressure.
The Mu`tazilites also differed as to whether there could be induction in the acts of God.
Some said this was impossible, since God's powerfulness (qādiriyya) extends to
everything outside himself by one relationship. Others, more in accord with the Mu`tazilite
position, allowed it on the grounds that there was no obstacle to it.
In refuting these positions, K [pp. 366-368] refers to the previously established principle
that every effect comes immediately from God, and then shows some consequences of the
Mu`tazilite position, such as having one effect come from two agents, and attributing an
effect to an agent who may not know or will the effect, and may even have died before the
effect takes place; also they attribute power to effect life or death to a creature instead of
to God.
There follows [K, pp. 368-370] the refutation of special objections, such as the
appearance of induced motion in nature. This is merely God's customary way of acting,
while some of the examples given, such as striking fire by flint, are not attributable to
man's power at all.
The Mu`tazilites differed as to how much pressure (i.e. force) is required to move
something. The older Mu`tazilites said an equal pressure is required to push something
right or left as to lift it. Abū-Hāshim rightly rejected this, but the basic assumption of both
positions is wrong in that a body can be at rest while it receives some partial movement
(ḥaraka - equated with force), even though inadequate according to them.
Regarding several people lifting something, al-Ka`bī and Àbbād aṣ-Ṣaymarī said that each
person carries a part which the others do not, but most Mu`tazilites said that all share in
carrying the same weight. The former are wrong because it is impossible to determine
which part would be carried by each single person; the latter are wrong because they
suppose one effect coming from two agents.
(N. 36) This section [W, f. 49b] is a particular application of the preceding, and shows
that God has no associate (lā sharīk) in his acts of rewarding and punishing. Not only do
men have no effect in producing their acts of obedience or disobedience, but also there is
no connection of intelligibility between these acts of God's rewarding or punishing. The
relation between them comes simply from revealed-law and God's choice, while his
determination to reward or punish someone precedes the existence of the person and the
existence of the sign (amāra). There is no defect in God's will or power because he
punishes someone. As-Sanūsī ends this section with a description of hell and a prayer.
K [pp. 354-360] takes up the objection of the Qadarites and Mu`tazilites that people are
rewarded or punished for acts they have no control over. After an answer similar to what
is said in this section of W, the prayer of one condemned and complaining that he had no
control over his acts [p. 357] is countered by the prayer of one condemned and
complaining that God had done wrong to give him the power to disobey [p. 358]. The
compulsion the Mu`tazilites sought to avoid traps them again when they leave the
determination of choice to activating-links such as cupidity (shahwa) or firm resolution
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(taṣmīm al-àzm), which are all created by God. God's driving (imdād) of a person in
accord with the person's will and the appearance of liberty is called destining-to-happiness
(tawfīq) or abandonment (khidhlān).
(N. 37) The tenet that God alone produces all acts applies also to acquisition (kasb),
where revealed-law states that a person gains title to (yaktasib li-) his good and bad acts.
Moreover revealed-law encharges him and rewards or punishes him only for what he has
control over (bi-ma yaqdir àlay-hi), and does not impute to him the acts which he does
not will or has no control over.
Acquisition is limited by the scope or object of a person's power (maqdūr), even though
this power is without effect, and is the subject (maḥall) of the five categories of
enchargement, namely, obligatory, forbidden, disapproved, recommended, and permitted
acts. What falls outside these categories, such as the color of one's skin, is not something
one can gain a title to.
An objection is that revealed-law commands some things, such as striking non-believers,

where the blow occurs in the non-believer, outside the subject of the person's power. The
answer is that the blow happens because of what a person has acquired (huwa wāqi`
bi-l-muktasab li-l-àbd), such as his movements, on the occasion of which God creates the
effect.
K [pp. 342-344] quotes al-Muqtaraḥ to explain that a person's power, like all accidentals,
has no permanence in time, but each moment is succeeded by its like. The difficulty of an
act being related to a power which ceased to exist is resolved by its being related directly
to the power which exists simultaneously with it, and by extension to the likes of this
power which preceded it.
There are two proofs for the existence of a power concomitant to a person's voluntary
action. The first, as has been indicated, is from revealed-law, which encharges a person
only with acquirable acts (innamā kallaf bi-l-muktasab min al-af`āl).
The second proof is from intelligibility, which is our perception of the self-evident
difference between compulsory and voluntary motion (bayn ḥarakat al-iḍṭirār... wa bayn
ḥarakat al-ikhtiyār). K [p. 347] attributes these two terms to the Irshād of
Imām-al-Ḥaramayn, which was followed by al-Muqtaraḥ. But as-Sanūsī says that the
expression "motion to which one gains title" (ḥarakat al-iktisāb) would be better than
"voluntary motion".
The "complete examination", continues W, to account for the difference between the two
kinds of motion rules out first of all the reality of motion itself, which in the two cases is
the same (li-farḍ tamāthuli-hā). Secondly, the difference cannot be the very essence of the
one who is in motion (nafs dhāt al-mutaḥarrik), since this remains the same in the case of
either kind of motion. Therefore the difference must be an additional attribute (ṣifa
zā'ida).
Among attributes we must rule out a disposition (ḥāl), since a disposition does not come
upon a substance by itself along (lā taṭra' bi-mujarradi-hā àlā l-jawhar). If the difference
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is therefore an accidental (àraḍ), it must have life as its condition, since only something
living can have voluntary motion. But it cannot be knowledge or life or speech, since these
exist even in the event of compulsory motion or in the absence of motion altogether. Nor
can it be the will, since voluntary motion is found even where there is no will, as in
absent-mindedness (dhuhūl) and sleep, which certainly are not compulsory acts, and
therefore must be voluntary; besides, in these states a person still has mastery over
(yatamakkan min) doing or omitting an act. Also the difference cannot be the bodily
health of the one in motion (ṣiḥḥa bunyat al-mutaḥarrik), since this is not lost in the case
of compulsory motion, as when someone else moves your hand.
Therefore there must be another attribute (ma`nā) from the preceding attributes which is
technically called power (qudra). This attribute is absent in compulsory acts.
(N. 38) The Jabarites [W, f. 51b] are wrong not only in denying the distinction between
voluntary and compulsory acts, but also, by this fact, in denying any subject of
enchargement, which is a created power, as the Qur'ān verse says: "God encharges a soul
only with what it is capable of" (2:286).
The Qadarites likewise go against intelligibility and authority in denying the exclusiveness
of God's power. K [p. 352] argues against them saying that to make an act result from the
power of man changes this act from something possible to God to something impossible to
him. Also what is weaker, the power of man would prevail over God, who is stronger
(tarjīḥ al-marjūḥ).
The Sunnite position [W continues] steers a middle course in saying that a man with
power is someone forced but is in the mould of one who chooses (al-àbd al-qādir...
majbūr fī qālib mukhtār). Choice is especially noticeable in the case of revulsion
(karāhiyya) from an act, or strong resolution (àzm wa-taṣmīm) for an act.
Because [W, f. 52a] the Sunnites hold that in appearance (bi-ḥasab aẓ-ẓāhir) man has
choice, but inwardly and according to intelligible reality (fī l-ma`nā wa-l-ḥaqīqa
al-àqliyya) he is forced, the Mu`tazilites called the Sunnites too Jabarites. But whereas
the Sunnites say that the intellect alone can perceive that man is actually forced in his
apparent choice, the true Qadarites say that both feeling (ḥass) and the intellect know this.
Yet, say the Sunnites, because God creates the principles of acting (mabādi' li-l-fi`l), that
is, a power which is related to acts without effect on them, it is legitimate to demand or
forbid acts, as is clear from Qur'ān verses such as 3:70-71, 2:28, 10:34 etc. (fa-annā
tu'fakūn), and 10:32 etc. (fa-annā tuṣrafūn).
The term "Magi of this people" (majūs hādhihi l-umma) [W, f. 53a] is from the ḥadīth
reported by Àl. b. Ùmar. The Magi asserted an agent of good and another agent of evil;
likewise the Qadarites denied that evil comes from God (mana`ū nisbat ash-sharr ilā
llāh), and said that it comes from the devil by motivation and instigation (tasabbuban
wa-sa`yan), but from men directly and in fact (mubāsharatan wa-fi`lan). Thus the
meaning of Qadarites in the ḥadīth applies to the Mu`tazilites as well as those ordinarily
called Qadarites.
In a remark (tanbīh) W adds that some authorities are quoted for maintaining a position
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contrary to what has been established above. Al-Bāqillānī is to have said that a power
which has come into being produces the most particular characteristic of an act (tu'aththir
fī akhaṣṣ waṣf al-fi`l), such as its being prayer (ṣalāt) or robbery (ghaṣb) or adultery
(zinā), but not the existence of the act basically (Lā fī wujūd aṣl al-fi`l). K [pp. 337-339]
lists ash-Shahrastānī as accepting this opinion because it avoids the difficulty of the
Mu`tazilite position which had man create the existence of an act, which is undifferentiated
and has nothing to do with gaining title to the act, whereas al-Bāqillānī's position allows
man to effect the moral specification of an act.
At-Taftāzānī [W continues], in his Sharḥ al-Maqāṣid ad-dīniyya, relates the same position
from al-Isfarā'inī, except that in denying dispositions (aḥwāl), al-Isfarā'inī refers to the
most particular characteristic of an act as its face and expression (al-wajh wa-l-i`tibār),
and said that this is effected by a power which comes into being.
Imām-al-Ḥaramayn, moreover, is to have said at the end of his life that a power which has
come into being produces the existence of an act according to the will of God (àlā
mashī'at Allāh).
What is wrong with these opinions is that they are all varieties of (mutasha`ìba àn) the
Qadarite position. Ibn-at-Tilimsānī (73) refuted what was attributed to al-Bāqillānī and
al-Isfarā'inī by saying that whatever is attributed to man's effectivity must either be
possible - and as such must be referred to God's power like everything else possible - or
not possible - and as such is outside the reach of any power. Besides, their theory that the
most particular disposition of an act is effected by man does not save them from the fact
that the act is forced, since if God does not create the essence (dhāt) of the act, nothing
can come from man; but if he does create the essence of the act, man cannot omit the act.
Al-Isfarā'inī is to have defended his theory by saying that the face and expression of an act
are in the intellect (yakūn fī l-àql). But how can something be intended which has no
external existence?
As for the alleged opinion of Imām-al-Ḥaramayn [W, f. 53b], the power which came into
being either produces the act by itself - in which case it would have to overcome the
power of God - or its produces it by reason of an inhering attribute (ma`nā yaqūm bi-hā) -
in which case the same question must be asked, or the effect is referred to another quality
in a continuous regress. Nor is it possible for a creature's producing an effect to be in
accord with the will of God, because to will something means to intend something
particularly (fa-l-irāda takhṣīṣ..., al-qaṣd allādhī huwa ma`nā l-irāda...). But if the
ultimate particularization of an act comes from man, as was maintained, the willing of a
thing belongs to man, and not to God.
The opinions [W, f. 54a] which have been attributed to the above mentioned imāms are
not authentically theirs. If they spoke of such theories it was only in disputation and
research, not to affirm them, as a. Yy. ash-Sharīf at-Tilimsānī observed in his Sharḥ
al-Asrār al-àqliyya. At-Taftāzānī also, in his Sharḥ al-Maqāṣid ad-dīniyya, denies that
Imām al-Ḥaramayn ever held the opinion attributed to him; this is also clear from what
Imām-al-Ḥaramayn teaches in his Irshād.
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Another reason for the defence of al-Bāqillānī and al-Isfarā'inī is that in refuting the
Jabarites they used metaphor and exaggeration (majāz wa-mubālagha) to affirm the
existence of a created power in man. They said that if this power has no effectivity in
making the act exist, nevertheless it has an important legal value in determining voluntary
acts to which a person gains title. In legal science, talk of causes or grounds (ìlal) of laws
in the chapter of analogy has been the occasion of similar misconceptions.
Satan [W, f. 54b] slipped erroneous opinions (aqwāl fāsida) into the books of some
learned imāms, such as the Iḥyā' of al-Ghazālī, seeking scandal or envious to draw men to
their imitation (li-qaṣd al-fitna aw ḥasadan li-tazhīd li-n-nās fī l-iqtidā` bi-him) and to
devotion to the precious jewels (al-jawāhir an-nafīsa) contained in their writings, the
sighting (tasdīd) of which is considered a wonder (karāma). Such writers also distorted
the ḥadīths. Rather than seeking fancy theories, men should be content with the received
doctrine.
(N. 39) This section [W, f. 55a] contains details in which the Philosophers and natural
scientists erred. Many people followed them who were ignorant of this science [kalām],
but claimed to know other sciences which made them superior to the common mass of
Muslims. The text is clear and needs no commentary. The demonstration for all of it is the
same as the demonstration for God's being alone in producing any effect. K [pp. 179-180],
nevertheless, quotes detailed arguments from Ibn-at-Tilimsānī's Sharḥ al-Ma`āmil in
refutation of Ibn-Sīnā's ar-Risāla aṭ-ṭibbiyya on some of the examples mentioned in this
section of the Creed. W then says that the last point, on whether error in this question
makes one an unbeliever, is well known and documented (manṣūṣ) in the books of the
learned.
W then quotes, as did K [pp. 183-185], a passage from Ibn-Dahhāq's commentary on the
Irshād which sums up the teaching thus far established by listing and refuting three ways
in which people err concerning God. These are:
the opinion that the world came from God as an effect (ma`lūl) from a cause (ìlla)
the opinion that the Creator cannot be distinct from the world
association (shirk), or saying that God is multiple, and this is four ways:
asserting the multiplication (taàddud) of the essence of God, which is the

error of the Christians in asserting hypostases; these are three, creating by
their threeness, yet they are three and one (wa-inna-hā thalātha takhluq
bi-thalāthati-hā wa-hiya thalātha wāḥid)
asserting deities the serving and honoring of whom brings one close to God;
this is the worship of idols and angels
the attribution (iḍāfa) of acts to things other than God:
to heavenly bodies (aflāk) effectivity on the processes of nature
to natural bodies, such as fire and food, the natural effects which
accompany them, whether the effect is supposed to result from the
nature of the body by itself or from a power which God created in the
body
to man the creation of his acts, which is the position of the Mu`tazilites.
There is a difference of opinion whether this position makes one an
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unbeliever; the more probable opinion (al-aẓhar), which is that of

al-Bāqillānī, is that it does.
saying, as do the Bāṭinites, that God has a modification (kayfiyya)
which only he knows. but if this modification is in his essence, God
must have a shape (shakl), which is contrary to his oneness. If it is in
his attributes, the only possible modification is to give it genus
(tajnīshu-hā) and species (tanwīù-hā); but what is from eternity is not
the genus of anything or the species of a genus.
In J [3d, f. 112b] and M [f. 202a] as-Sanūsī gives a different list of six kinds of association
(shirk), and the moral determination of each:
1. independence (istiqlāl), which is the affirmation of two independent deities, as the

association of the Magi - unbelief
2. partition (tab`īḍ), which is saying that the Deity is composed of deities, as the
association of the Christians - unbelief
3. approximation (taqrīb), which is worshiping something other than God in order to

come close to him, (74) as the association of the earlier representatives of the
Jāhiliyya - unbelief
4. blind-acceptance (taqlīd), which is worshiping something other than God by

following another, as the association of the later representatives of the Jāhiliyya -
unbelief
5. activating-links (asbāb), which is attributing effectivity to customary

activating-links, as the association of the Philosophers and natural scientists and
their followers - the moral determination is distinguished, as in the Creed
6. objectives (aghrāḍ), which is doing something for someone other than God -
disobedience only.
J [33b, ff. 347b-350b] has a still more detailed discussion of various errors and differing
opinions on their moral determinations, based on al-āmidī, Ibn-Àrafa and al-Qarāfī's
Qawā'id. As-Sanūsī's own remark (qultu) is that the differences of opinion arise from a
person's maintaining an opinion which he believes to be flawless (qāl qawlan ya`taqid fī-hi
bi-za`mi-hi anna-hu kamāl), but in fact has a logical conclusion (lāzim) which is unbelief.
Should the person be regarded as maintaining the conclusion or not? Or should one
distinguish between an obvious and an hidden conclusion (bayn al-lāzim al-jalī
wa-l-khafī). The more probable opinion (al-aẓhar) is to refrain from judgement, since that
is safer - unless there is a decisive text or a consensus concerning a case of unbelief.
The question of God's provision (rizq) and the term (ajal) of living things, which is related
to God's oneness in acting, is discussed in J [18, ff. 225b-228a].
Provision (rizq) [J, 18a, ff. 2255b-226a] is defined in the Irshād of Imām-al-Ḥaramayn as
"anything from which someone derives benefit, even if he does so by transgression" (kull
mā ntafa` bi-hi untafi` wa-law kān bi-taàdd). This definition is basically against the
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Mu`tazilites, who said that there is no provision for animals, since they do not possess
anything. But this is clearly against the Qur'ān verse "There is no animal on earth but that
God provides for it" (11:6).
The Mu`tazilites also insisted that provision be of what is licit (ḥalāl). At-Taftāzānī's
Sharḥ Àqīdat an-Nasafī is quoted against this and its being based on the false principle
that God must choose what is good.
The term ajal [J, 18b, ff. 226b-228a], in ordinary usage (ùrfan), is the end of the time of
life (muntahā zaman al-ḥayāt). The main point is that the term of one's life is decreed
(muqaddar) and known by God and cannot be changed. This is, says at-Taftāzānī, in
opposition to Mu`tazilites as al-Ka`bī, who said that man has two terms, death and being
killed; likewise the Philosophers said that animals have a natural term (ṭabīìyyan) and a
term when they are the object of prey (iftirāsiyyan). The Irshād of Imām-al-Ḥaramayn
says that according to many Mu`tazilites one's term is cut short by a killer; others say that
if the person were not killed he would have died then anyway.
The Mu`tazilites posed several objections:
1. There is a ḥadīth which promises a longer life because of certain acts of obedience.
The answer is that God knew a person's acts of obedience in decreeing his term;
these acts are signs (amārāt) of God's decree.
2. If a person's term is decreed, then a killer is doing God's will, and should not be
punished. The answer is that the killer's act is not a cause of God's punishing.
3. There is the Qur'ān verse that after God created man "then he decreed a term, and
there is a designated term with him" (6:2). The answer is that there are not two
terms for one person, but the first term is that of the individual, and the second is
that of the world.
4. There is also the Qur'ān verse "No one's life is lengthened or shortened but that it is
in a book". The answer is that lengthening and shortening refer to what is
customarily long or short, not that there is any change in God's decree. Or
lengthening and shortening concern the written sheets (ṣuḥuf) held by the angels.
G. What is admissible concerning God: providing what is good, being seen:
a. Principles
(N. 40) W [f. 56b] claims that its rendering (tarjama) "what is admissible concerning God"
(mā yajūz fī ḥaqqi-hi ta`ālā) is better than that of Imām-al-Ḥaramayn in the Irshād, where
he has the hcapter "what is admissible of God" (al-qawl fī-mā yajūz àlā llāh), because the
latter causes one to imagine (īhām) that God is qualified with an admissible attribute. But
admissibility touches God's acts only in so far as they have a relation to some of his
attribues (wa-ljawās innamā yataṭarraq ilā af`āli-hi min ḥayth inna-hā mutaàlliqa
li-ba`ḍ ṣifāti-hi), but does not touch his essence or even an attribute inhering in it in any
wya whatsoever. Ṣṣ [p. 24] explains that admissibility touches only the implementive
relationship (at-taàlluq at-tanjīzī) of God's power and will; this relationship is not from
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eternity, and refers (wa-marjiù-hu) only to the emanation (ṣudūr) of beings from his
pwoer and will.
b. The good and the best (aṣ-ṣalāḥ wa-l-aṣlaḥ)
(N. 41) The good (ṣalāḥ), says W [f. 57a], is the opposite of the bad (fasād), while the
best (aṣlaḥ) is the opposite of the good the way what is particular is opposed to what is
general. The reason for considering this question separately is to answer the Mu`tazilites;
the Bahgdadians among them said that God necessarily provides what is best for men both
in the next world (dīn) and this (dunyā), while those from Baṣra said he necessarily
provides what is best only for the next world. K [pp. 417-418] explains this postion as
obliging God to kindness (luṭf), that is, to create for an encharged person what will make
the side of obedience preponderate, yet not to the point of coercing him.
Their remote principle (al-ùmda al-quṣwā), continues W, is to judge what is absent by

what is present (qiyās al-ghā'ib àlā sh-shāhid) without a basis of comparison (bi-ghayr
jāmi`). Thus they maintain that if a wise man (ḥakīm) wants obedience and decides to give
him the means to obey, then doesn't do so, he will be condemned as stupid; likewise if an
enemy wishes to return to obedience, one must treat him with neither harshness (ghilāẓ)
nor softness (līn) but in a way to win him. Or if a man invites someone to dinner and
knows that if he meets him cheerfully and with a smile he will accept, it is necessary for
him to do this and not the opposite.
In answer we say that their position rests on the false principle that to command
something entails willing what is commanded; but that is false, since God commands
unbelievers to believe, bu he does not will that they should believe. Even if we grant that
God wills everythging that he commands, it is not necessary for God to do always what is
best for men, since he is in no need of friends or enemies and gains nothing from the
perfection of creation.
A stronger indication of the fact that God does not necessarily do what is best for men is
the fact of evil in this world and the next. If the Mu`tazilites object that enchargement,
difficult trials and scandals (at-taklīf aw al-ibtilā' bi-sh-shadā'id wa-l-miḥan) are the best
for men since by them they gain a higher rank and place in the next world, we answer that
God could give them all this without any trials, cand could create them in heaven from the
start.
Besides, it would be better for someone never to receive enchargement than to receive it
and be left to comit crimes and then spend eternity in hell only because he is a weak man
overcome by desires and appeals which he cannot resist.
Besides, if they say that enchargement is best for men, then why does God let children die
and never reach the age of enchargement? If they answer that he lets them die because he
knows that they will be unbelievers if they grow up, we say in return, whay does God let
other children reach the age of enchargement and in fact become unbelievers? K [pp.
429-420] gives this argument in full, which is none other than the famous dialogue
between al-Ashàrī and al-Jubbā`ī.
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Besides, continues W, according to the Mu`tazilite position God's causing holy men and
prophets to die, and Satan's tempting (tabhiya) of the erring until the day of the
resurrection would have to be the best for men.
Thus it is clear that God's determination cannot be measured by the standard (mīzān) of
the Mu`tazilites.
c. Seeing God
(N. 42) Qur'ān verses affirming the vision (ru'ya) of God, says W [f. 58a-b], are:
"On that day their faces shall be bright, looking to the Lord" (75:23); on this verse, K [p.
374] rejects al-Jubbā`ī's interpretation of ilā as the singular of ālā'.
Moses said "Lord show me, and I will look at you" (7:143), which supposes that the
vision of God is possible, since it is forbidden to ask for what is impossible, and the saints
are infallible.
"Those who do good shall have what is good and more" (10:26), where "what is good" is
interpreted as heaven (janna), and "more" is interpreted as vision of God.
"You will recognize in their faces the brightness of bliss" (83:24), where "brightness" is
interpreted as vision.
"Certainly not! On that day they will be screened from their Lord" (83:15), which implies
that the others, the believers will see God.
W also quotes several ḥadīths with the same purport. K [pp. 376-388] quotes from
Ibn-at-Tilimsānī on the meaning of the Qur'ān verse "Eyes do not perceive him" (6:103).
The Mu`tazilites used this verse to deny the fact and the possibility of seeing God. Ar-Rāzī
gave two answers: 1) that the word "perceive" here means comprehensive knowledge
(iḥāṭa), which is impossible; 2) that the negative is a negation of generality (salb
al-ùmūm min bāb al-kull), not a general negation (ùmūm as-salb min bāb al-kulliyya);
thus it denies that God is seen in this world or that unbelievers will see him, but does not
deny that believers will see him in the next world.
Ibn-at-Tilimsānī says that the second answer is very weak, and argues against it from a
logical and grammatical basis [p. 381]. As-Sanūsī's contemporary in Tilimsān (=
Ibn-Zakrī), in his commentary on the Àqīda of Ibn-al-Ḥājib, argued against
Ibn-at-Tilimsānī. As-Sanūsī replies to Ibn-Zakrī [pp. 383-388], attacking his reasoning and
referring to the grammatical authorities al-Qazwīnī, following as-Sakkākī, and
at-Taftāzānī's long commentary on the Talkhīṣ of al-Qazwīnī.
W [ff. 58b-59a] gives a well known (mashhūr) proof from intelligibility for the
admissibility of seeing God; K [p. 388] attributes it to Ibn-at-Tilimsānī. Since vision has
for its object both substances and accidentals, and its object must be existent, there must
be a cause (ìlla) for vision being related to both substances and accidentals, since there
cannot be two reasons for one thing. The unity of vision cannot be sought in the fact that
the object has come into being (al-ḥudūth), since this presupposes non-existence, which is
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outside the scope of vision. Therefore the cause for the possibility (ṣiḥḥa) of vision being
related to these diverse objects is their existence. But God exists. Therefore he is visible.
Many late theologians, such as ar-Rāzī, dismiss this reasoning as weak. He offered many
arguments against it, most of which at-Taftāzānī rejects (yandafi` akthara-hā) with
Imām-al-Ḥaramayn's observation that the meaning of cause (ìlla) here is only what
permits (yuṣliḥ) vision to be related to its objects, not that it produces any effect, as most
others understood.
K [p. 390], quoting Ibn-at-Tilimsānī, sates two objections from ar-Rāzī`s Ma'ālim: 1) that
substances and accidentals have in common their having been created; but God does not
share in this. 2) By touch we can perceive dimensions and temperatures; but by the logic
of the above proof we should extend palpability to include God.
The answer of al-Isfarā'inī to the second objection, that touch entails being affected by
contact but sight does not, is dismissed because this is only a customary, not an essential
difference. Imām-al-Ḥaramayn accepts the conclusion that all five senses can attain God,
and claimed the authority of al-Ashàrī for his position. Àl. b. Sa`īd al-Kullābī and
l-Qalānasī, however, admitted only vision of God.
Ibn-at-Tilimsānī [pp. 396-403] summarizes twelve other objections of ar-Rāzī from his
Arba`īn and elsewhere, remarking that his answers to them are provisional, and that his
master al-Muqtaraḥ said that it is not possible to give a satisfactory answer to all of them.
(N. 43) The Mu`tazilite position, says W [f. 59a], was that the eye sends out rays
(ashi`à), or luminous bodies (ajsām muḍī'a) which contact the object and cause it to be
seen. Distance and screening limit the effectiveness of these rays, and thereby limit vision.
Since God is not a body, these rays cannot reach him, and he therefore cannot be seen.
Likewise these rays must be sent out in a certain direction; but God is not in a direction,
and therefore cannot be seen.
But for Sunnites vision is not the emission of rays but a perception (idrāk) created by God
in the one who perceives. There are various sorts of perception according to the various
sense organs, while the perception called knowledge is in the heart. But the
paricularization (ikhtiṣāṣ) of each of these perceptions in a determined subject (maḥall) is
by God's pure choice. Also the need for contact (mumāssa wa-ltiṣāq) and being in a
certain direction without an obstacle is merely customary (`ādī) and not from intelligibility
(àqlī); God creates perceptions directly, and can dispense with these ordinary
concomitants, just as he does in the case of knowledge. Seeing God occurs in the present
world (fī sh-shāhid) in the case of prophets and saints, and it will occur in the case of all
the believers in our final home (fī d-dār al-ākhira).
W [f. 59b] refers to K [pp. 404-414] for a longer refutation of the Mu`tazilite theory of
sight by the emission of rays, and merely recalls two false consequences of their theory:
One is that man's scope of vision should only be as wide as his eye, since the rays are only
that wide. The second is that when he opens his eyes he should see distant things after he
sees nearer things, which isn't the case.
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The meaning of "it doesn't require a determined structure (bunya)" refers to the pupil
(ḥadaqa) and its seven layers (ṭabaqāt) which are recognized by doctors; neither the
existence nor the power of the eye's structure have any effect on vision. Rather, vision is
an accidental which requires by intelligibility only a simple substance (jawyhar fard) in
which to inhere. All substances and any part of the body are equally capable of being the
subject of vision; only God has chosen to create vision by way of custom in the substance
of the eye. To be the subject of an attribute (ma`nā), a substance does not require as a
condition to be surrounded by other substances (iḥāṭat al-jawāhir), since an intelligibility
condition (ash-sharṭ al-àqlī) must exist in the subject of that for which ti is a condition (fī
maḥall al-mashrūṭ). But a substance cannot inhere in a substance, nor can the
determinations of the attributes of the other substances be made necessary for something
they do not inhere in.
As knowing is multiple [W, f. 60a] according to the number of things known, so vision is
multiple according to the number of things seen. If the perception of something visible
does not inhere in the subject of vision, then its opposite must inhere in it. In the technical
language of the Unitarians (fī ṣṭilāḥ al-muwaḥḥidīn) this opposite is called an obstacle
(māni`), and is multiple according to the number of visible things not seen. Both vision
and its corresponding obstacles are finitely multiple, since the number of actual existing
things is finite.
According to K [pp. 414-416], the Mu`tazilites denied that an obstacle to seeing

something is the attribute opposite to seeing the thing, and said that it was a fault in the
structure of the eye. Abū-Hudhayl al-Àllāf is an exception to the Mu`tazilites on this
question, although he admitted the possiblity of the subject being devoid of both sight and
its opposite obstacle.
K [p. 416] also said that there is uncertainty (taraddud) as to whether there is one
embracive obstacle for everything which is not seen, or if there are as many obstacles as
things not seen. The former is the opinion of al-Bāqillānī and al-Isfarā'inī; the latter is the
truth (taḥqīq).
W [f. 60a] has a remark (tanbīh) that there is a difference of opinion as to whether the
attributes of God can be seen, but the general opinion (fa-qāl al-jumhūr) is that they can,
since they are existent, although there is no reason to say they actually are seen (lā dalīl
àlā l-wuqū`).
The perceptions of the other senses are also related to existence, but there is no question
of God's being smellable (mashmūm) or tastable (madhūq) or palpable (malmūs), since
this is proper to bodies and accidentals. There is an argument (nizā`) on whether God can
be perceived by smell (shamm), taste (dhawq) and touch (lams) without the contact of the
senses (min ghayr ittiṣāl bi-l-ḥawāss). Yet as these senses do not require perception in
order for me legitimately to say "I smelt, tasted and touched the apple-but I did not
perceive its smell (rā'iḥata-hu), its taste (ṭa`ma-hu) and its quality (kayfiyyata-hu),"
likewise the kinds of perceptions which occur on the occasion of (al-ḥāṣila ìnd) smelling,
taste and touch do not require these senses, but can occur without them and be related to
what is other than bodies or accidentals. But since there is no indication of the fact of such
perceptions, it is preferable to be content with affirming vision, and to refrain from judging
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whether these perceptions are admissible or actually happen. Ṣṣ [p. 24], however, adds
without hesitation that hearing God's eternal speech is among admissible things. But since
there is no indication of the fact of such perceptions, it is preferable to be content with
affirming vision, and to refrain from judging whether these perceptions are admissible or
actually happen. Ṣṣ [p. 24], however, adds without hesitation that hearing God's eternal
speech is among admissible things.
H. Prophecy in general
a. Definition and distinctions
(N. 44) W [f. 60a] refers the reader to the beginning of the book, in the commentary on
the opening invocations (fī sharḥ al-khuṭba), for the meaning of prophecy (nabū'a) and
messengership (risāla) and the difference between them.
In that section [f. 7b] al-Qāḍī Ìyāḍ is quoted for the possible verbal meanings of prophet
and messenger. The root of the word prophet is:
with a hamza (n-b-'), meaning to announce; then the word nabī' (or with the hamza
dropped for euphony) has:
the passive meaning of having received revelation
the active meaning of transmitting it
without a hamza (n-b-y), meaning to be high, referring to the status of a prophet.
A messenger (rasūl) means one who is sent (mursal), but the active aspect of repeatedly
announcing something by the command of God is more prominent.
K [p. 436] and W [f. 7b] list various opinions as to the difference between a prophet and a
messenger. These opinions are:
1. that they are equivalent (mutatābi`ān);

2. that prophecy and messengership can be combined in man, but there are angels who
are messengers and not prophets, and there are men who are prophets and not
messengers-an opinion given only by K;
3. that both share in the two verbal meanings of prophet given above, but a messenger
has the added note of giving warning (indhār)-an opinion given only by W;
4. that messengers are distinguished by books or inaugurating a revealed-law (shar`)
while prophets only make use of books or a revealed-law descended upon others,
even though they themselves receive revelation (yuḥā ilay-him);
5. that prophecy is being characterized by hearing revelation from God, whether
through the mediacy of an angel or not (ikhtiṣāṣ bi-samā` waḥy min Allāh
bi-wāsiṭa malak aw dūna-hu), and if there is a command to communicate (tablīgh)
this there is messengership (risāla)-this is the opinion K accepts.
W [ff. 7b-8a] implicitly rejects the last opinion when it rejects al-Qarāfī's definition of
prophecy simply in terms of revelation (bi-mujarrad al-waḥy), since this applies to some
who are not prophets, such as Mary, to whom God sent his spirit. (75) Similarly the story
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told by Muslim that an angel told someone going to visit his brother that God loves him
because he loves his brother in God is not an example of prophecy. (76)
Sound theologians say that prophecy is God's bringing into existence in a man an
action-directed determination (ḥukm inshā'ī) (77) pertaining to himself (yakhtaṣṣ bi-hi),
such as the Qur'ān verse "Recite in the name of your Lord" (9:61). This was an
enchargement (taklīf) pertaining to himself (Muḥammad) at that time, and was therefore
prophecy. But when the verse descended "Rise and warn (andhir) (74:2), there was
messengership (risāla), since this enchargement is related to others (li-taàlluq hādhā
t-takhlīf bi-ghayri-hi). Thus a prophet is encharged with what pertains to himself (kullif
bi-mā yakhuṣṣu-hu), whereas a messenger is encharged with that and with communicating
to others (bi-tablīgh ghayri-hi).
If the latter position resembles the third and fifth opinions given above, this section of W
[f. 60a] reports, and apparently adopts, a different position, resembling the fourth opinion:
One imām says that prophecy is a man's being sent from the Truth to creatures (kawn
al-insān mab`ūth min al-ḥaqq ilā l-khalq), and a prophet (nabī) is a man sent by God to
communicate what God has revealed to him (li-tablīgh mā ūḥiya ilay-hi). A messenger
(rasūl) is this, and is also characterized by being given a law and a book (sharīà
wa-kitāb), and is therefore more particular (akhaṣṣ) than a prophet.
To the objection that a ḥadīth numbers more messengers than there are revealed books, it
can be answered that if that is so (ḥīna'idhin) a messenger is one who has a book or an
abolition of some determination of a previous law (naskh li-ba`ḍ aḥkām ash-sharīà
as-sābiqa), while a prophet does not have that, as in the case of Joshua (Yūsha`).
Ṣ does not discuss the question, but [p. 175] adopts the same as the latter position of W:
"A prophet is a man whom God has sent to men to communicate to them what was
revealed to him; a messenger is, moreover, restricted to one who has a book or a law or
an abolition of some determination of a previous law."
J [21a, f. 241a] returns to the first position of W, defining a messenger in terms of a

command to communicate (al-amr bi-tablīgh), making no mention of a book or a law.
Ṣṣ [p. 26], finally, (78) defines a messenger as a man whom God has sent to his servants
and handmaids (li-àbīdi-hi wa-imā'i-hi) (79) to communicate from him to them his
encharging and institutive determinations (aḥkāma-hu t-taklīfiyya wa-l-waḍìyya) and the
threats or promises and the like which are consequent upon these determinations. There
are various opinions as to whether a condition of a messenger is to have a new law (shar`)
or a particular book (kitāb makhṣūṣ) or the abolition of a previous law, or whether none
of these things are required.
(N. 45) The sending of messengers (ba`th ar-rusul), says W [f. 60b], is admissible, that is,
it is not necessary, as the Mu`tazilites maintained according to their principle that God
must provide what is best (aṣlaḥ) for men, nor is it impossible, as the Barāhima
maintained. K [pp. 435-436] adds that it is not an essential attribute (ṣifa dhātiyya) of the
prophet, as the Karrāmites said, nor one acquired through purity of soul, as the
Philosophers said.
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W then explains the phrase of the Creed "to explain what God commands, forbids and
permits". This refers to the greatest, noblest and primarily intended advantage of sending
messengers, which is to explain God's encharging and institutive determinations. (80)
Encharging determinations are the five: obliging, forbidding, disapproving, recommending
and permitting. Institutive determinations are determinations that something is an
activating-link, condition or obstacle to one of the above determinations, such as the
determination that afternoon (zawāl) is an activating-link (sabab) of the obligation of the
prayer of ẓuhr or that the beginning of Ramaḍān is a cause of the obligation of fasting or
that causing intoxication (al-iskār) is the activating-link for prohibiting intoxicants
(al-muskir) or that the transpiring of a year (murūr al-ḥawl) is a condition for giving zakāt
or that menstruation (ḥayḍ) is an obstacle to the obligation of ṣalāt and to the validity of
fasting (ṣiḥḥat aṣ-ṣawm).
Related to these determinations are the promises and threats (al-wa`d wa-l-wa`īd) which
revealed-law attaches to obedience or disobedience. Related too are the conditions of the
next life (aḥwāl al-ākhira) and the terrifying conditions of former peoples (mā khuwwif
bi-hi min aḥwāl al-umam al-māḍiya).
K [p. 437] adds another advantage of sending messengers, that they clarify and guide to
proofs from intelligibility for tenets which the intellect by itself could come to know only
with great difficulty.
b. Proof of truthfulness from miracles
W [f. 60b] explains the phrase of the Creed "what proves their truthfulness in what they
communicate" as referring to what is technically called a miracle (mu`jiza). This word
comes from àjz, "inability", which is the opposite of power (qudra). The reality of
miraculosity (i`jāz) is the affirmation of the inability (ithbāt al-àjz), that is, in the
borrowed sense of manifesting it (ustas`īr li-iẓhāri-hi); then the word was transferred by
metaphorical usage to what is ordinarily an activating-link of inability, and was made a
noun.
Imām-al-Ḥaramayn observes that there is another use of metaphor (tajawwuz akthar) in

the word mu`jiza, and that is the use of àjz, "inablility", which has a positive meaning
contrary to qudra, "power", in place of àdam al-qudra, "privation of power". The
inability of a sick person to sit up (àjz az-zāmin àn al-qu`ūd), for example, is forced
(wujid min-hu iḍṭirāran), and is accompanied by resistance (mu`āraḍa). But in the
privation of ability caused by a miracle there is no resistance. K [p. 439] attributes to
Imām-al-Ḥaramayn another use of metaphor, which is to attribute to the miracle rather
than to God the causing of inability.
W [f. 61a], followed by Ṣ [p. 176], gives a theological definition of a miracle as

"something extraordinary, accompanied by a challenge and the lack of resistance" (amr
khāriq li-l-`āda maqrūn bi-t-taḥaddī maà àdam al-mu`āraḍa).
The word "something" (amr) is used to include both an act and the absence of an act; an
example of the latter is fire not burning something. Those who define a miracle as an act
(fi`l) interpret the latter example as the fire turning into coolness or safeness (kawn an-nār
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bardan aw salāman) or the body's remaining as it was without being burned.
K [p. 438], in defining a miracle, said it was an act of God. This phrase is to distinguish a
miracle from something that is from eternity. According to one opinion, it includes what is
within the scope of a created power, such as the Prophet's reciting the Qur'ān, and what is
beyond it, such as raising the dead. But according to others, all miracles, even reciting
(tilāwa) the Qur'ān by the Prophet-not mere repeating it (ḥikāya) by others-must surpass
created power. Of these two opinions mentioned by Ibn-Dahhāq in his commentary on the
Irshād, the second is better (aẓhar). Imām-al-Ḥaramayn said that a miraculous act, such as
walking on water, is related to the power of man and is acquired (muktasab) by him, but
the miraculous aspect of it is God's act, and is not acquired by man.
To the difficulty that some miracles are the absence of an act, continues K [pp. 441-443],
al-Ashàrī replied that a miracle is an act or what takes the place of an act (fi`l aw mā
yaqūm maqām al-fiàl). Ibn-Dahhāq said that the miracle is the announcing (ikhbār) that
an act will not take place, but against his position is the fact that a person challenged that
an act would not take place, not that he had foreknowledge of its not taking place.
Imām-al-Ḥaramayn said that the absence of the act is the miracle, but the same objection
holds against this position as against Ibn-Dahhāq, with the added objection that
non-existence is not within the scope of power according to him; neither is the "attributed
non-existence" (al-àdam al-iḍāfī) of al-Bāqillānī. We must either accept al-Ashàrī's
position or modify Ibn-Dahhāq's answer and say that the challenge must concern the
miracle directly or something related to it, such as knowledge and announcement of it.
The position of W and Ṣ, as explained above, is that of al-Ashàrī. Ṣṣ [p. 26] avoids the
word miracle, and merely says that God produces an extraordinary act in answer to the
messenger's challenge, thus proving his truthfulness.
The phrase "accompanied by a challenge", W explains, is to distinguish a miracle from the

wonders of the saints (karāmāt al-awliyā') and the presages (al-àlāmāt al-irhāṣiyya)
which precede the sending of the prophets; it also distinguishes a miracle from a liar's
appropriating the miracle of a past prophet as an argument (ḥujja) for himself. K [pp. 438
and 449] and Ṣṣ [p. 26] add the qualification that the challenge must be made before the
act happens. K [p. 449] says that it is not a condition of a miracle explicitly to invite
opposition, but it suffices to say "This is a sign of my truthfulness". Ṣ [p. 178] defines this
challenge (at-taḥaddī) as "a call for something extraordinary as proof of the claim (to
messengership) either by the tongue of circumstance or the tongue of speech" (da`wā
l-khāriq dalīlan àlā d-da`wā immā bi-lisān al-ḥāl wa-immā bi-lisān al-maqāl).
The phrase "and the lack of resistance", says W, distinguishes a miracle from magic and
trickery (as-siḥr wa-sh-shu`ūdah). (81)
The theological definition given above is that of ar-Rāzī, and has been objected to from
many aspects. Three objections are raised and answered by at-Taftāzānī in his Sharḥ
al-Maqāṣid ad-dīniyya: (82)
1) Two qualifications should be added:
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that the miracle appear coming from the one who claims to be a messenger (min yad
al-mudda`ī wa-min jihati-hi); this is so that none of his contemporaries can claim
his miracle for themselves or say "My miracle is what appeared from me in past
years", whereas this is unacceptable;
that the miracle be in accord with the claim (al-muwāfiqa li-d-da`wā), to avoid
anyone's saying "My miracle is the speech of this mineral", and then the mineral's
answering that he is a forger and liar. Therefore al-Ashàrī says that a miracle is an
act from God or something taking the place of an act, and adds "by such is intended
the affirmation of truthfulness" (yuqṣad bi-mithli-hi t-taṣdīq); some of his
companions defined a miracle as "something by which is intended the manifestation
of the truthfulness of one who claims messengership" (amr quṣid bi-hi iẓhār ṣidq
man idda`ā r-risāla).
To this objection at-Taftāzānī said that the mention of a challenge implies the two
qualifications (mushìr bi-l-qaydayn), since the meaning of the challenge is inviting
opposition to what he produced as witness to his claim and disabling anyone from bringing
forward something similar to what he displayed (ṭalab al-mu`āriḍa fī mā jaàla-hu
mushāhidan li-da`wā-hu wa-ta`jīz al-ghayr àn al-ityān bi-mithl mā abdā-hu). The
challenge is the connection (rabṭ) between the claim and the miracle, so that if a person
claims to be a messenger, and a wonder (āya) appears from him, but he has made no
challenge, this wonder is not a miracle.
K [pp. 463-466] considers the possibility of a miracle giving counter-testimony. If the

challenge was to raise someone from the dead, and the person raised said that the claimant
is not a prophet, al-Bāqillānī said that this voids the miraculosity of the event, unless the
person dies again right away. Imām-al-Ḥaramayn said that it does not void the
miraculosity, because the challenge was not that the raised person would verify the man's
messengership, but simply that the person would rise; but if the challenge was that
minerals would speak, then the speech must verify the claimant's messengership. Among
later theologians, however, Ibn-Dahhāq, in his commentary on the Irshād, said that even
in this case it makes no difference whether the minerals verify or deny the man's
messengership, since the challenge was simply that the minerals would speak.
Al-Muqtaraḥ, on the other hand, said that if the minerals denied the man's messengership
the event would not give self-evident knowledge of his messengership, and would be
insufficient.
2) The second objection is that people consider miracles things that have no relation to a
claim (da`wā), such as the appearance of clouds to shade Muḥammad and his being
greeted by the rocks and the soil (iẓhār al-ghamām wa-taslīm al-ḥajar wa-l-madar).
Therefore al-Imām (Imām al-Ḥaramayn?) stipulates (sharaṭ) that there must be an
association (iqtirān) of the miracle with the claim.
At-Taftāzānī answers that presages (irhāṣāt) preceding the sending of messengers are
miracles only by way of exaggeration (taghlīb - sic) and simile (tashbīh). Whether such
extraordinary events appear from him before he begins his life as a messenger or they
appear from another, if they were foretold as an announcement (ikhbār) of the messenger
they are a presage (irhāṣ), that is, the founding of the basis of his being sent (ta'sīs
li-qā'idat al-ba`tha). If they are not foretold, they are simply a wonder (karāma) if
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prophecy is claimed. But if divinity is claimed, they are a trial (ibtilā'), since that is against
decisive proofs.
3) The third objection is that a miracle can come well after the challenge (qad
tata'akhkhar àn at-taḥaddī), as when a claimant says "My miracle is what will appear
from me on a certain day" (mu`jizat-ī mā yaẓhur minnī yawm kadhā), and it appears. The
difficulty is the same as the previous objection, that the miracle may not be related to the
claim.
At-Taftāzānī answers that a miracle coming after a small delay is counted as

accompanying (muqārin) the challenge. If the interval is long, then the miracle - for those
who stipulate accompaniment-is the accompanying statement, since it is the announcement
of what is absent (ikhbār al-ghayb). But knowledge of this statement's miraculosity is
delayed (ìlm al-ījāz yatarākhā) until the foretold event happens. But those who make the
foretold event the miracle stipulate that it accompany the challenge.
Whether the interval is long or short, after a miracle and the knowledge of it have
disappeared it is not legitimate for a prophet to encharge men by enjoining a revealed-law
(taklīf an-nās bi-ilzām ash-shar`), but simply to explain its determinations and relate their
obligation to the happening of that event (law bayyan aḥkāma-hā wa-àllaq iltizāma-hā
bi-wuqū` dhālik al-amr) is legitimate according to Imām-al-Ḥaramayn, but not legitimate
according to al-Bāqillānī.
K [pp. 450-453] considers the problem of whether a miracle can be postponed until after
the death of the messenger. The Mu`tazilites said that it could not, because in that case
God would not be doing what is best for men. The answer to them is that he is not obliged
to do what is best for them; also it may be better for them to postpone the miracle.
Al-Bāqillānī also said that the miracle could not be postponed, but because it is linked to
proving a messengership, that is, the pronouncement (khiṭāb) of a messenger, which
ceases with his death. The answer to him is that as a certain delay is legitimate within his
lifetime, so also after his death; the miracle then proves the previous claim. Al-Bāqillānī
may have feared that a postponed miracle might be taken for the wonder of a saint, and
doubt would be cast on the truth of a wonder. In answer, the fact is that a wonder is not a
decisive proof of sainthood.
Another objection of al-Bāqillānī is that if the miracle were postponed until after the death
of the messenger there would be no reason to remember what he taught. The answer is
that his teaching could be written and learned later.
W [f. 61b] remarks that some add another qualification to the definition of a miracle, that
it must be in the time of enchargement, since the extraordinary things of the next life are
not miracles; also what happens when the conditions for the end of time appear (ìnd
ẓuhūr ishtirāṭ as-ṣāà) does not witness to the truthfulness of a claim, since the ordinary
course of events no longer holds and patterns change (li-kawni-hi zamān naqḍ al-`ādāt
wa-taghayyru ar-rusūm).
The phrase of the Creed "so that it is equivalent to the Most High's saying 'My servant is
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true in all that the latter communicates from him'" includes (yataḍamman) all the
conditions of a miracle and points to the probative aspect of a miracle (ashār bi-hi ilā
bayān wajh dalālat al-mu`jiza), which is illustrated by the parable of the following
section.
(N. 46) The parable given in the Creed, says W [f. 63a], is clearer and more
understandable for showing the truthfulness of the messengers than a mere mentioning of
the conditions of miracle. K [pp. 197, 445-446 and 459-460], Ṣ [p. 178], J [21b, f. 246a]
and Ṣṣ [p. 26] give résumés of this parable and K attributes it to Ibn-at-Tilimsānī [p. 197]
and his teacher al-Muqtaraḥ [pp. 459-460].
The probative aspect of a miracle (wajh dalālat al-mu`jiza), continues W, is to show the
truthfulness of the person on whose part (àlā yadi-hi) the extraordinary event occurs.
Consequent upon a miracle (àqībata-hā) God creates self-evident knowledge of the
truthfulness of the prophet.
An objection to the use of this parable in arguing is that it is pictorial and judges what is
absent on the basis of what is present (bi-ann hādhā tamthīl wa-qiyās li-l-ghā'ib àlā
sh-shāhid). If there were a common denominator (àlā taqdīr al-jāmi`) such a process
would serve opinion (ẓann), but you have used it without a common denominator to serve
certainty (yaqīn) in establishing matters of revealed law (sharā'i`), while there is nothing in
common (qarā'in al-aḥwāl) between the absent and the present worlds.
The answer is that this parable was not used as an analogy or argumentation (li-l-qiyās
wa-l-istidlāl), but only to clarify and make the matter more understandable (li-t-tawḍīḥ
wa-t-taqrīb). If someone knows the unity of God and what is necessary, impossible and
admissible concerning him and understands the bases (arkān) of a miracle and its probative
aspect and then sees a miracle or hears widespread tradition of one that happened, he will
have self-evident knowledge of the truthfulness of the prophet. Through the parable
beginners who are not used to reasoning can understand what a miracle is and recognize
one. Thus the knowledge which he attains is not through equating the conditions (bi-`tibār
qarā'in al-aḥwāl) of the absent and the present worlds.
Apostates (mulḥida) [W, f. 64a] objected in many ways to the probative value of a
miracle:
1) The first is that the miracle does not come from God, but from the person who claims
messengership, either by a person al quality (khāṣṣiyya) or bodily complex or by making
use of elements, angels, jinn or stars.
The answer to this is, as has been said before, that creatures can produce no effect
whatsoever. Also the messengers never delved in tricks (ḥiyal).
2) The second objection is that it is possible (yaḥtamil) that the event is not our of the
ordinary (khāriq li-l-`āda), but God's beginning of a new ordinary process (ibtidā' `āda)
or the restoration of an ordinary process of bygone ages.
The answer is that the events we refer to, such as raising the dead, do not answer such
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descriptions.
3) The third objection is that the absence of resistance (mu'āraḍa) can also occur because
news of the event did not reach someone who could resist or because of the people's
docility (muwādaà) or agreement to advance his cause (muwāfaqa fī i`lā' kalimati-hi) or
their fear of him or because they considered it a simple matter and did not care much
about it (li-stis'hāl wa-qilla mubālāt) or because they were occupied with more important
things; or they did resist and something prevented this from being told (wa-lam yunqal
li-māni`).
The answer is that the messengers were known everywhere in the east and west (jamī`
al-mashāriq wa-l-maghārib) and their enemies tried their best to disprove them. This has
all been reported and has reached even us at the end of time, at the end of the ninth
century (fī ākhir az-zamān fī ākhir al-qarn at-tāsi`). Each prophet had a special kind of
miracle to over come the specialty to the adversaries of his time: Moses overcame the
magicians, David the musicians, Jesus the physicians and Muḥammad the masters of
eloquence.
4) The fourth objection is that the purpose of a miracle can be other than to prove the
truthfulness of a messenger. It can be, as some maintain, to accomplish God's own
objective (gharaḍ) or an objective for men; or it can be a miracle for another prophet or a
trial (ibtilā') for men.
The answer is that God cannot act moved by any objective. Regarding the appearance of a
miracle on the part of (àlā yad) a liar, K [pp. 455-461] gives a fuller answer. There are
three opinions concerning the connection between a miracle and its proving the
truthfulness of a messenger:
The first is that the connection is of intelligibility (àqlī); this is the opinion of
al-Isfarā'inī, who said that testification of truthfulness (taṣdīq) is an attribute of the
extraordinary event and a created indication of God's announcing the truthfulness of
a messenger; it can be separated from the extraordinary event if one of the
conditions of a miracle is absent. But Imām-al-Ḥaramayn said that the testification
of truthfulness is part of the intelligibility of the extraordinary event and inseparable
from it. Al-Muqtaraḥ replied to him that the simple existence of an extraordinary
event does not testify to the truthfulness of a messenger, but is happening in answer
to his challenge.
The second opinion is that the connection is instituted (waḍ`ī), so that the event
after the challenge is equivalent to God's speaking. al-Muqtaraḥ observes that this
opinion is practically the same as the first.
The third opinion is that the connection is customary (`ādī). W attributes this
opinion to al-Bāqillānī.
According to the first opinion a miracle cannot appear from a liar because this is against
the essence of a miracle; according to the second opinion it is against God's announcing
(khabar). W adds that according to the opinion that the connection is only customary a
miracle appearing from a liar would not prove his truthfulness, since that would be to
prove the impossible.
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K [pp. 464-466] says that the Mu`tazilites objected that if, as the Sunnites say, God is not
obliged to provide what is best, he should be able to produce extraordinary events in
answer to a liar's claim to prophecy. The first two opinions mentioned above are a clear
answer to this objection. The third opinion, which said that the probativity (dalāla) of the
extraordinary event is only customary, conceded the admissibility of God's doing so, but
denied that this every happened. Regarding the future, we have the assurance that
Muḥammad is the seal of the prophets; anyone who claims prophecy after him has the
choice only of Islam or the sword, and his words should not be paid attention to, even if
extraordinary events appear from him.
5) The fifth objection is that even if it is granted that a miracle proves the truthfulness of
the one who claims prophecy, how can we be sure that God does not lie in his announcing
(fī ikhbāri-hi)? Authority (sam`) is no guide, since that has not yet been established.
Intelligibility too, according to the objector's principles, does not show that lying is
despicable (qabīḥ).
The answer [W, f. 65a] is that God's testifying to the messenger's truthfulness is not
through any announcement (ikhbāran), but by working the miracle which constitutes
(inshā'an) a person a prophet.
There are also reasons from intelligibility to exclude the possibility of God's lying:
The first, that of al-Isfarā'inī and, according to K [p. 361], of Imām-al-Ḥaramayn, is

that anyone who knows anything must have a statement in himself (ḥadīth fī
dhāti-hi) corresponding to what he knows. This is the reality of the predicate of
truthfulness (ḥaqīqa khabar aṣ-ṣidq). Therefore God, who knows all things, is
truthful. The fact that men can know something and lie deliberately is no objection,
because the seat (maḥall) of lying is the tongue, while knowledge and truthfulness
remain in the mind. But since God is not composed, he can only be truthful.
Another reason is that al God's attributes are necessary and their contraries
impossible; therefore if he could lie truthfulness and knowledge would be impossible
for him.
A third reason, given by K [pp. 462-463], is that lying is a defect of perfection,
whereas God is perfect.
In a final remark (tanbīh), W [f. 65b] cites at-Taftāzānī's Maqāṣid for saying that
prophecy can be ascertained by the creation of self-evident knowledge, such as was had by
aṣ-Ṣiddīq (Abū-Bakr), or by the infallible passages of the Tawra and the Injīl in
announcing the prophecy of Muḥammad, or by Moses in announcing the prophecy of
Aaron and Joshua (Hārūn wa-Yūsha`). Imām-al-Ḥaramayn's requirement of a miracle and
its implied conditions holds for proving prophecy absolutely speaking and in a way to
refute adversaries (àlā l-iṭlāq wa-ḥujja àlā l-munkirīn) without regard to any previous
prophet or book. But Muḥammad's character and dispositions (akhlāq wa-aḥwāl) are
equivalent to (`ā'id ilā) a miracle in proving his prophecy.
c. Immunity from defect (ìṣ>ma)
(N. 47) K and W have a similar presentation of a messenger's being immune from defect.
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But in Ṣ [p. 173], J [21c, f. 447a] and Ṣṣ [pp. 25-28] the distinguishing of three necessary
marks-truthfulness (ṣidq), faithfulness (amāna) and communicating (tablīgh) what was
commanded to be communicated-becomes the standard pattern of presenting this
question. M [ff. 219b-224a] too, apart from an explicit treatment of prophecy, considers
the definitions of the three marks together.
K [pp. 466-469] takes up the question in general and asks first if prophets are immune
from defect before their becoming prophets. Some Mu`tazilites admitted that before
becoming a prophet a man could commit even big acts of disobedience. Sunnites, such as
al-Qāḍī Ìyāḍ, said that he could not. Some Sunnites said that this could not be known
from intelligibility, but only from authority. But the Rāfiḍites and most Mu`tazilites said
that it could be known from intelligibility by its intrinsic evil (at-taqbīḥ al-àqlī), which is
false.
As for after receiving prophecy, there is consensus that a prophet cannot deliberately lie in
his determinations. As for lying by mistake or forgetfulness (ghalatan aw nisyānan),
al-Isfarā'inī and many other Sunnites said that he could not, but al-Bāqillānī said that this is
admissible, since a miracle only proves what comes from the prophet by deliberate
intention, although revealed-law says that in fact it does not happen. Thus al-Qāḍī Ìyāḍ
said that there is a consensus in the fact that a prophet does not lie by mistake or
forgetfulness.
As for acts of disobedience apart from untruthfulness in his message-which are contrary to
faithfulness-there is consensus, except for some Khārijites, that a prophet is immune from
any deliberate big act of disobedience and small acts which are reproachable. As for
committing them by mistake or forgetfulness, al-āmidī said that, except for some Rāfiḍites,
there is consensus that this is admissible. But he is wrong, since there is consensus to the
contrary. Al-Bāqillānī and other sound theologians said that this is proved from authority,
but al-Isfarā'inī and many Mu`tazilites said that it could be proved from intelligibility also.
As for committing small sins which are not reproachable (lā khissa fī-hā), most, such as
Abū-Ja`far aṭ-Ṭabarī, a Sunnite, admit the possibility, whether they are deliberate or not.
Other lawyers and theologians deny the possibility of both deliberate and non-deliberate
sins of this type, since, according to most Mālikites, Shāfiìtes and Ḥanafites, men are
commanded to imitate the prophets. Thus, as W [f. 65b] also says, the immunity of the
prophets includes freedom from doing anything forbidden or disapproved, and even from
doing anything permitted because of passion (shahwa) or without the sole intention of
approaching and obeying God and seeking his help thereby to obey him (bal illā bi-niyyat
al-qurba wa-l-imtithāl wa-l-isti`āna bi-hā àlā ṭāàt al-Mawlā).
Ṣ [p. 180] quotes Qur'ān verses (3:31, 6:55 and 7:157) in support of the proposition that
men are commanded to imitate the prophets, and elaborates [pp. 180-183] on the Muslim
practice of imitating Muḥammad in every detail. For example, A. b. Ḥanbal refused to eat
watermelon because he was not sure in what way Muḥammad ate it.
Ṣṣ [pp. 33-43], moreover, devotes a major section to interpreting Qur'ān verses which
seem to say that Muḥammad and other prophets committed sin. These are 43:2, 47:19,
94:3, 9:43, 8:68, 80:1, 10:121, 7:190, 7:23, 21:87, 38:24-25, 33:37, 2:24, 28:15 and 48:2.
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The third mark of a messenger, communicating what he is commanded to communicate,

says Ṣ [p. 184] is necessary for the same reason as his faithfulness, namely, that men are
commanded to imitate them. Moreover the Qur'ān (2:159) curses those who hide God's
message, and it commands (5:67) Muḥammad to deliver the divine message.
Ṣṣ [pp. 28-29] gives a summary of the relation between the three marks:
Truthfulness adds to:

faithfulness freedom from lying inadvertently (sahwan)
communication freedom from deliberate or forgetful addition to the message.
Faithfulness adds to:
truthfulness freedom from disobeying in ways other than by the tongue
communication freedom from disobeying in ways other than in
communicating.
Communicating adds to:
truthfulness freedom from deliberate or forgetful omitting of anything they
were commanded to communicate
faithfulness freedom from forgetful omitting of anything they were
commanded to communicate.
Besides considering the opposites of these three marks which are impossible for the
messengers, Ṣ [pp. 185-190], J [21c, f. 447a] and Ṣṣ [pp. 30-33] consider what is
admissible concerning the messengers. These are human accidentals (al-a`rāḍ
al-bashariyya) which do not detract from their high station, such as sickness, hunger,
poverty, eating, drinking marriage, forgetting after communicating their message or in
what they were not commanded to communicate, and sleep, although their hearts stay
awake. The proof of these accidentals happening to them is our witnessing them
(mushāhada), and their purpose is to increase their rewards or to set revealed rules of
action (li-t-tashrī`), or to distract from this world and call attention to its vileness before
God and his lack of pleasure in it in the house of recompense to his saints.
The word "accidentals" [Ṣṣ, p. 31] is to guard against the opinion of the Christians, who
described Jesus with an eternal attribute. The word "human" is to guard against the
representatives of the Jāhiliyya, who said that these accidentals are contrary to
messengership. The phrase "which do not detract from their high station" is to guard
against the Jews and many ignorant historians and exegetes who describe the prophets
with the defect of committing disobedience and disapproved acts.
d. Abrogation (naskh)
At this point K [pp. 469-472] takes up the objection to Muḥammad's messengership by

some Jews represented by Ibn-ar-Rāwandī that the revealed-law of Moses cannot be
abrogated. J [20, f. 236a-240b] takes up the question in general terms and distinguishes
between two kinds of determinations of revealed-law. There is the self-evident kind (ḍarb
ḍarūrī), which God preserves in every sect (milla) from Adam through Muḥammad until
the end of time; determinations of this sort never change. And there is another kind which
varies among different revealed-laws. Types of determinations which are never abrogated
are those which have to do with preserving:
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religion (dīn); thus all must profess God's unity

lives (nufūs), in protecting the innocent
fighting (qatl), in enforcing rights
kinship (nasab), in regulating marriage
property (māl) and livelihood (ma`āsh), to support life
the accidentals which maintain religious and worldly life (al-a`rāḍ allātī fī-hā ṣiyānat
ad-dīn wa-d-dunyā), such as forbidding defamation (qadhf) and slander (ghība).
Abrogation in other matters does not mean that God corrects something which he forgot
in the previous legislation, but that he changes his ordinances to suit the era, just as one
prescribes differently for a sick person and a healthy person.
There is abrogation even within the revealed-law of Moses, for example:
God said to Noah after he came out of the ark "I am making every animal food for
you and your descendants; I make that legitimate to you as well as all plants-except
for blood." (83) But later many things were forbidden. (84)
The law of Adam legitimized marrying one's sister, but this was later forbidden. (85)
The law of Jacob permitting marrying two sisters, (86) but this was later forbidden.
(87)
Also Moses prohibited work on the Sabbath, (88) which was previously permitted.
Another argument against Ibn-ar-Rāwandī's assertion that Moses claimed that his law
would not be abrogated is the fact that the Jews did not bring up this tradition (naql) at
the time of Muḥammad, for all its value to them.
J concludes that the law of Muḥammad has three approaches to the determinations of
previous revealed-laws:
1) Some determinations differ from what preceded-there is no doubt that these abrogate
the previous determinations.
2) Some agree with previous determinations-there is no doubt that these contain no

abrogation.
3) There is silence on some matters determined in a previous revealed-law. A

determination of this sort remains in force under three conditions:
that it was revealed (uḥiya) to Muḥammad that it was part of their revealed-law; if
it is only said by people (who follow the previous revealed-law) to be there or if it is
only written in their scriptures (fī maṣāḥifi-him) the determination need not be
followed, because their speech is not to be believed and their sacred books have
been corrupted (qad waqa` t-taḥrīf fī-hā) and they are untrustworthy
that the revelation of it to Muḥammad be by way of simple announcement
(mujarrad ikhbār), (otherwise it is part of Muḥammad's law)
that it neither agrees with nor differs from what is in Muḥammad's law, since if it
agrees it is his; if it is different it is abrogated.
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I. The messengership of Muḥammad
a. Proof from the miraculosity of the Qur'ān
(N. 48) J [21i, f. 276a] distinguishes first between proofs for the messengership of
Muḥammad from intelligibility and those from authority (naql). The latter are texts from
the books of the previous prophets. Among the proofs from intelligibility the first is the
miraculosity of the Qur'ān.
W [f. 65b] says that while all agree that the Qur'ān is miraculous, there are different
opinions regarding the aspect of its miraculosity (fī wajh i`jāz al-Qur'ān):
1) The versifiers (nuẓẓām), many Mu`tazilites and al-Murtaḍā of the Shīìtes said that the
miraculosity of the Qur'ān is a deterrence (ṣarfa), that is, the opponents could have
resisted and imitated the Qur'ān, but God deterred their concern (himma) to do so by
removing either their power or their motives (dawā`ī) or the necessary knowledge. The
last possibility, the removal (salb) of knowledge of the Qur'ān's word-pattern (naẓm) and
how to reproduce its like is that favored by al-Murtaḍā.
An argument for this theory is that the Arabs were certainly able to imitate words and
short phrases of the Qur'ān; therefore they could imitate a whole sūra.
The answer to this is that the determination (ḥukm) of a sentence differs from that of its
parts. Were the preceding argument true, then anyone could imitate a poet like
Imru'-al-Qays, for example.
Another argument for the deterrence theory is that when the Qur'ān was being compiled
(ìnd jam` al-Qur'ān) the Companions referred judgement on certain sūras and verses to
the testimony of reliable persons, and Ibn-Mas`ūd hesitated about the Fātiḥa (sūra 1) and
the Muàwwidhatān (sūras 113 and 114). This would not be so if the eloquence (faṣāḥa)
of the Qur'ān's word-pattern were the miracle and not God's deterrence of imitation.
In answer to this, a first remark is that these historical facts are true (ṣiḥḥat ar-riwāya),
and the Qur'ān was compiled after the death of Muḥammad. But each sūra is an
independent miracle. The care of the companions was to prevent the least change in the
verses; their hesitation is understandable, since the miraculosity of every sūra is not
evident to everyone from the star.
At-Taftāzānī [W, f. 67a] gave other replies to the deterrence theory: First, the Arabs
admired and took notice of the excellent word-pattern and eloquence of the Qur'ān and
tried to oppose it. Secondly, were the miraculosity of the Qur'ān deterrence from
imitation, there would be no need for eloquence, and the deterrence would be more
miraculous if the Qur'ān were easier to imitate. Thirdly, the verse "Say 'If men and jinn
should combine together to bring the like of this Qur'ān, they could not bring the like of it,
though they conspired together'" (17:88) implies that a single person could not imitate the
Qur'ān, and would not have to be deterred.
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2) Other Mu`tazilites [K, p. 475] said the miraculosity is its method and unusual
word-pattern (naẓm), which is different from ordinary Arabic speeches, letters and poems.
An answer to this opinion [W, f. 66b] is that the foolish lines (ḥamāqāt) of Musaylima and
his like also have unusual word-patterns.
3) Others [K, p. 475] said that it is its eloquence (faṣāḥa, jazāla) only.
An answer to this and the previous opinion is that if a challenge is made to imitate
something which contains two elements, then both must be present in the imitation. For
instance, an eloquent and well versed poem cannot be answered by an eloquent speech or
by a well versed poem which is not eloquent.
4) Imām-al-Ḥaramayn and al-Bāqillānī held that the miraculosity is the combination of

eloquence and unusual word-pattern.
5) Some said that it is the Qur'ān's freedom from inconsistency and defect (as-salāma àn
al-ikhtilāf wa-t-tanāquḍ).
An answer to this opinion is that many polished writers (bulaghā') also are free from
inconsistency and defect.
6) Some said that it is its containing details of science and true statements of wisdom and
goodness (li-shtimāli-hi àlā daqā'iq al-ùlūm wa-ḥaqā'iq al-ḥikma wa-l-maṣāliḥ) or [K,
p. 375] its agreement with intelligible judgements (muwāfaqatu-hu li-qaḍāyā l-ùqūl).
An answer to this is that the speech of wise men often contains science and truth too.
7) Some said that it is its telling of things absent (li-ikhbāri-hi àn al-mughayyabāt).
An answer to this opinion is that only a very few verses tell of things absent; therefore the
others would not be miraculous. Besides, to opinions 5, 6 and 7, K [p. 176] answers that
the challenge was not made to imitate these aspects.
8) some said [K, pp. 175-176] that it is the fact that the Qur'ān is from eternity.
9) Others [K, p. 176] said that it was the fact of the Qur'ān's expressing God's eternal
speech.
The answer to this is that nothing prevents God's speech from being expressed by words
(lafẓ) which are not miraculous.
W [f. 66b] quotes at-Taftāzānī in defending the opinion of Imām-al-Ḥaramayn and

al-Bāqillānī (opinion 4). The combination of eloquence with the word-pattern is the
miraculous aspect of the Qur'ān, because the masters of eloquence could imitate either one
separately. Al-Bāqillānī added that telling absent events of the past and future (opinion 7)
is also a miraculous aspect of the Qur'ān.
By naẓm, "word-pattern", is meant the arrangement of words (tartīb al-kalimāt), or,
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according to Àbdalqāhir, the grammatical structuring of words to serve the purposes of

speech. K [p. 479], in opposition to Ibn-at-Tilimsānī, restricts the meaning of balāgha,
"eloquence" to excellence of speech (kalām), or meaning, and of the speaker
(mutakallim), whereas faṣāḥa, also "eloquence", is a wider term including also excellence
in words (kalimāt) or word-pattern. The highest degree of balāgha is miraculosity (i`jāz),
which is determined by taste (wa-l-ḥukm fī-hi dh-dhawq), and the lowest degree is that
which distinguishes speech from animal sounds.
Objections to the miraculosity of the Qur'ān are:
1) [K, p. 478] If there is so much difference of opinion concerning what constitutes the
miraculosity of the Qur'ān, then how can it be miraculous, since a miracle must be plain
and without doubt to everyone?
The answer is that there is no doubt that a sūra cannot be produced like one in the Qur'ān;
the differences of opinion concerning the aspect of its miraculosity do not make this fact
less plain.
2) [W, f. 67a] Some verses are more eloquent than others, while they should all be of the
highest degree of eloquence.
The answer is that this is in accord with the purpose of the Qur'ān, just as a good artist
produces something which is neither too big nor too small. As it is, the arabs could not
produce its like, and they recognized that it is not like speeches or poetry.
More recent opponents proposed other stupid objections:
3) There are non-Arabic words in the Qur'ān, such al-istabrāq (18:31 etc.), as-sijill
(21:104), al-qisṭās (17:35) and al-maqālīd (26:63 and 42:12). How then can it claim to be
"plain Arabic" (Qur'ān 16:103 and 26:195)?
The answer is that these words are Arabic, even though another language shares them. Or
the meaning of "plain Arabic" is that the word-pattern and arrangement of the words is
Arabic; therefore the whole is called Arabic.
4) There are mistakes of word-form in it (khaṭa' min jihat al-i`rāb), as in 20:63, 5:69 and
4:162.
The answer is that the so-called mistakes are correct, and the objectors do not know
Arabic well.
5) The smallest sūra is of three verses. But Moses, even while saying that his brother is
more eloquent than himself, was able to produce eleven verses, told in 20:25-35.
The answer is that what is told (maḥkī-Moses' original words) does not have to be in the
very same word-pattern. Also, the accepted opinion (al-mukhtār) is that the challenge
means to produce one long sūra or ten intermediate ones. K [pp. 477-478] says that most
Sunnites (al-jumhūr min aṣḥābi-nā) say that to answer the challenge it suffices to imitate
the shortest sūra, such as al-Àṣr (113) or al-Kawthar (108), but al-Bāqillānī said in his
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Kitāb an-naqḍ, approved by al-Isfarā'inī, that some length is required to prove the
imitator's capability.
6) There are ambiguous passages (mutashābihāt), such as God's mounting upon the
throne.
The answer is that the purpose (ḥikma) of difficult passages is to stimulate reasoning and
effort to attain the meaning and other benefits, and thus have a greater reward. Also, God
does what he likes, and creates occasions of corruption and error (asbāb al-fasād
wa-ḍ-ḍalāla).
7) There are repetitions of stories and phrases.
The answer is that these repetitions suit the style (aḥwāl al-kalām), and literary experts
(ùlamā' al-badī` wa-fursān al-ma`ānī) have made this completely certain (qarrara-hā
akmal taqrīr).
8) There are vocalization variants which amount to over 12,000 (fī-hi min al-ikhtilāf
al-masmū` bayn aṣḥāb al-qirā'a mā yazīd àlā thnay àshar alfan).
The answer is that a rejected variant (al-ikhtilāf al-manfī) is of a different level of

eloquence (at-tafāwut fī marātib al-balāgha), in that some readings are less miraculous
(bi-ḥayth yakūn ba`ḍu-hu qāṣiran àn martabat al-i`jāz).
9) There are contradictions. For example, 55:39 says men will not be questioned on the
last day, but 15:92-93 says they will be. Also 88:6 says the only food of the damned will
be thorns (ḍarī`), but 69:36 says that their only food will be garbage (ghislīn).
The answer is that in the first reference sinners will not be questioned about their sins in
the sense of God's seeking knowledge. In the second example the thorns and the garbage
ar either explanations one of the other, or one group of damned will eat one and another
the other, or the two words mean the same thing. The exegetes have explanations for
other difficulties.
10) There are plain lies (al-kadhb al-maḥḍ), such as in 7:11, where the command to the
angels to adore Adam is placed after our creation; but we did not yet exist.
The answer is that the descendants of Adam were a part of him by way of metaphor, and
in adoring him the angels adored us too. Or the creation (al-khalq wa-t-taṣwīr) refers to
the creation of Adam's descendants (dhurriyya) when they came out of Adam as particles
(dharr); this interpretation would be in accord with the outward meaning of the verse.
11) Every poetic meter is found in it, even though in 36:69 it claims not to be poetry. An
example of ṭawīl is 18:29, of madīd 11:37, of basīṭ 8:42, of wāfir 9:14, of kāmil 2:213, of
hazaj 12:91, of rajaz 76:14, of ramal 34:13, of sarī` 20:95, of munsariḥ 76:2, of khafīf
107:1, of muḍāri` 40:32-33, of muqtaḍab 2:10 and following, of mujtathth 9:79 and of
mutaqārib 7:183.
The answer is that the fact of an expression (lafẓ) falling into a meter does not make it
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poetry, but the meter must be intended by the speaker. Others require also rhyme (taqfiya)
for there to be poetry. Besides, many of the above verses deviate from the meter.
b. Proof from announcing absent events
Another miracle of Muḥammad [W, f. 68b] is his announcing absent events of the past and
the future (ikhbāru-hu àn al-ghuyūb al-māḍiya wa-l-mustaqbala).
Some of the past events he told are the long and detailed stories (qiṣaṣ) of Moses,
Pharaoh, Joseph, Abraham, Noah, Lot and others, without every having heard them from
anyone or learnt them from a book, as is stated in the verse "These are announcements of
what is absent which we reveal to you. You did not know them, neither you nor your
people, before this" (11:49). He also announced many similar events which are not in the
Qur'ān.
Examples of announcements of the future in the Qur'ān are 48:20 concerning a victory of
the Muslims, 30:2-6 concerning the victory of Byzantium (Rūm), 3:151, 54:45, 48:16,
24:55, 48:27 and 9:33 concerning victories of Islam, 17:88 and 2:24 that none shall
imitate the Qur'ān, and 28:85 on returning to the next life (al-ma`ād).
W then lists a number of ḥadīths foretelling events in the development of the Islamic
community, as also does K [p. 483].
c. Proof from various extraordinary events
Another type of miracle [W, f. 69a] are the thousands of extraordinary acts which
appeared in him, from him (àlā yadi-hi) or for his sake. some of these were presages
(irhāṣiyya), appearing before his claim to prophecy and others were testimonials of this
truthfulness (taṣdīqiyya) appearing after his claim. They are of three kinds:
1) those concerning his essence (umūr thābita fī dhāti-hi), such as:
the light which appeared in the days before he was born

his being born circumcised, happy and lifting his eyes to heaven
the seal of prophecy (khātam an-nabuwwa) that was between his shoulders
his being able to change his height as he wished, so to be tall with a tall person and
short with another
his being able to see from behind as well as from in front,
2) those related to his attributes (umūr mutaàllaqa bi-ṣifāti-hi), such as:
his absolute truthfulness, in that he never lied in his life

his faithfulness s(amāna), so that he was called "the faithful" (al-amīn)
his chastity (àfāf)
his courage (shujāà), so that he never turned and fled
his forbearance (samāḥa)
his abstemiousness (zuhd) regarding everything of this world:
Having been offered the choice in revelation to be a king-prophet or a
servant-prophet (nabiyyan àbdan), he chose the latter
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Having been offered by Gabriel that Mount Tahāma should turn to gold and
accompany him wherever he went without detriment to his high rank, he said
"Gabriel, the world is the home of those who have no home, and those
without intelligence run after it"
And he chose to fast every other day so he could pray and thank God
(li-yataḍarra` wa-yashkur)
his condescension to the poor (at-tawāḍu` li-ahl al-maskana)
his kindness to the nation (ash-shafaqa àlā l-umma)
his endurance of the hardships of being a messenger (al-muṣābara àlā matāìb
ar-risāla)
his perseverance in noble virtues (al-muwāẓaba àlā karā'im al-akhlāq)
his attainment of the limits of divine knowledge and awareness
his settling of religious and worldly matters
his answering the call of many very tiring problems,
3) those outside himself (al-umūr al-khārija àn an-nafs), such as:
the wonders that occurred throughout the world upon his birth, which as-Sanūsī
relates in detail
the cloud's shading him, the moon's being split, the rocks' greeting him and trees'
bending to him
his satisfying people with little food, or his multiplication of it by placing his hand on
it
the calming of a screaming goat (jadh`) by his presence
his asking a tree whether it wanted to be a large fruit bearing tree on earth or an
ordinary tree planted in heaven (janna), and receiving the answer that the tree
preferred to be an ordinary tree in heaven to be close to Muḥammad
the complaint of the she-camels (nūq) and their prostration before him and hurrying
to him when he was slaughtering their companions
the testifying of the roasted lamb the time of the battle of Khaybar that it was
poisoned
a dry ewe's teats being made to flow with milk upon his touch
the transformation of some individuals from blameworthiness to a most excellent
disposition by his blessing
his turning a wooden flute into a hard sword
his raising of the dead
a wolf's saying that Muḥammad is telling the truth
Sawād b. Qārib's receiving verses from the jinn testifying to Muḥammad; and other
miracles and wonders beyond numbering.
One miracle in particular treated by J [21h, ff. 272a-275b] is the isrā', Muḥammad's night
right to Jerusalem, and the mi`rāj, his ascent to heaven on that occasion. Opinions differ
as to whether this occurred in his sleep or while he was awake. As-Sanūsī refers the reader
to the two Ṣaḥīḥs (of al-Bukhārī and Muslima) for the manner (kayf) in which these
events took place, and quotes at-Taftāzānī's Sharḥ Àqīdat an-Nasafī, M. b. Marzūq's
commentary on the Burda of al-Buṣīrī and al-Qāḍī Ìyāḍ's Shifā' for certain details.
K [pp. 483-485] gives a list of six kinds of miracles, with subdivisions, which overlaps and
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varies somewhat from what W has. J [21i, ff. 276a and following] repeats the same list,
attributing it to al-Qāḍī Ìyāḍ. W [f. 70b] resumes some of these under the heading "other
aspects which confirm the miraculous character of Muḥammad's life". These are:
his possession of every virtue and good quality of body and soul that only a prophet
could possess altogether and to such a degree
The perfection of his revealed-law in every matter, so that it could only have come
from revelation to a prophet
that with his meager resources he managed to inaugurate conquests of powerful
kingdoms east and west, while powerful opposition over the centuries has not been
able to extinguish Islam
the fact that Islam came to a world which was as far as could be from correct
religious understanding and morals. Each region and religion had its own form of
corruption-which as-Sanūsī speaks of in particular-Then Muḥammad restored true
religion.
d. Proof from the books of previous prophets
For proof from authority of Muḥammad's messengership W [f. 71b] takes up the texts
(nuṣūṣ) concerning Muḥammdad in the books of previous prophets which have been
passed on to villages and are well known in the circles of their peoples (al-manqūla ilā
l-qurā l-mashhūra fī-mā bayn umami-him). K [pp. 485-492] gives a series of Scriptural
texts which partly overlap and partly differ from those given in W. J [21i, ff. 281a-289a]
gives still a different series combining the texts given in K and W, without adding any
others. Ṣṣ [pp. 43-47] repeats W exactly, except for the omission of two texts which will
be noted. The texts as-Sanūsī gives are: (89)
1) From the Tawrāt in the fifth book [W, f. 71b; K, pp. 486-487] is "God came from
Mount Sinai and looked down from Saìr and shone from Faran" (Deuteronomy 33:2).
This is a reference to the descent of the Tawrāt upon Moses in Sinai, of the Injīl upon
Jesus in Saìr, which is in Syria, and of the Furqān upon Muḥammad in Fārān, which is
Mecca or a road near it. The resplendence (isti`lān) refers to Muḥammad's many miracles
and the triumph of his religion over all others.
2) Likewise in the fifth book [W, f. 71b; K, p. 487] God says to Moses "I am raising up a
prophet for the sons of Israel from the sons of their brothers, one like you, and I will make
my words flow in his mouth, and he will tell them what I command them" (Deuteronomy
18:18-19) (90)
The "sons of their brothers" are the sons of Ishmael, since Israel is a son of Isaac the
brother of Ishmael. Other prophets are from the sons of Israel, while the only prophet
raised up from the sons of Ishmael is Muḥammad (91) In explaining this text, K [p. 486;
cf. p. 470] quotes from "a teacher of Cordova" in rejecting the `īsawiyya idea that
Muḥammad was sent only to the Arabs.
3) The Tawrāt also says [K, p. 487] "God settled Hagar and her son Ishmael in Faran"
(Genesis 21:21).
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This text is to show that Faran means Mecca.
4) In the first book of the Tawrāt [W, f. 71b; K, p. 487] God says to Abraham "Hagar will
give birth, and from her children will be one whose hand will be over all and the hand of
all will be extended to him in subjection" (Genesis 16:11-12). (92)
But Muḥammad is the only son of Hagar sent in triumph over the whole world after most
other prophets' having been from the sons of Israel who is Jacob son of Isaac.
5) In the fourteenth chapter (maṣḥaf) of the Injīl [W, f. 72a] Jesus says "I will ask my
Father for you to accord to you and give you a Paraclete to be with you forever. The
Paraclete is the spirit of truth and certitude" (John 14:16-17).
In the fifteenth (sic) chapter he says "But the Paraclete, the spirit of holiness, whom the
Father will send in my name, will teach you and give you all things and will remind you of
what I told you" (John 14:26).
Then he says "I have announced this (one) to you before he comes to be (qabl an yakūn),
so that when he comes you may believe in him" (John 14:29). (93)
The meaning of "my Father" is my Lord and my Deity (rabbī wa-ilāhī). The meaning of
"paraclete" is a prophet disclosing hidden things. These are truth, certitude and justice,
which are like a dead person-motionless, buried, hidden and unspoken-until the
Paraclete-blessing and peace be upon him-is sent; he is like a spirit to them and they return
to life and vigor because of him. Thus when truth died out on the earth after Jesus,
Muḥammad came and brought it to life again.
6) In the sixteenth chapter [W, f. 72a] Jesus says "I now tell you a certain truth. It is better
for you that I go away from you, because if I do not go away from you to my Father, the
Paraclete will not come to you. but if I go away I will send him to you, and when he
comes he will be of advantage to the people of the world and will judge them, rebuke
them and instruct them concerning sin and justice" (John 16:7-8).
He also says "When the spirit of truth and certitude comes, he will guide you and teach
you and conduct you in every virtue (yudabbiru-kum bi-jamī` al-khulq), since he does not
speak novelty from himself" (John 16:13). (94)
K [p. 488] has a slightly different version of these texts from "the Injīl related by John":
"The Paraclete will not come to you until I go. When he comes he will rebuke the world
because of sin.l He will not say anything from himself, but will speak to you what he hears;
he will reconcile you to the truth and announce to you things happening and things absent,
and he will glorify me."
The meaning of his going away to the Father is his going to a place where he is honored,
revered and given a rest from men by directing his heart to walking in the glory and might
of God, as the Qur'ān verse says, "O Jesus, I will take you and will lift you up to myself"
(3:55). The sending of a prophet is attributed to Jesus because of his desire expressed to
God, or because his being lifted up is a sign (amāra) of the sending of Muḥammad.
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7) Also in John [K, pp. 488-489] Jesus says of the Paraclete "He will bear witness to me
as I bore witness to him" (cf. John 15:26). (95)
He then said "Who hates me hates the Lord" (John 15:23), (96) and further on "I must
fulfil the word of revealed-law that they hated me without cause. Would that
Manḥamannā came whom God will send to you from the Lord, the spirit of holiness, for
he is a witness to me, as you also are. But you have been with me a long time. This is what
I say to you so that when he comes you may not complain" (John 15:25-16:1).
The word Manḥamannā, as as-Sanūsī says, is a Syriac word meaning Paraclete in Greek,
and Muḥammad in Arabic. (97)
8) And in the Injīl [K, p. 489] Jesus says "The world is like a man who planted a
vineyard." As-Sanūsī says that Jesus continues this story and then refers the story to
prophets, to himself and finally to Muḥammad, the last custodian of the vineyard, where
Jesus says "He will remove the kingdom of God the most high from you and give it to the
common nation (al-umma al-`āmma) who obey" (Luke 20:9-16).
Jesus then said "Who falls upon this stone will be broken; the one whom it falls upon will
be smashed" (Luke 10:18). As-Sanūsī says that Muḥammad is the stone.
9) The Psalms (az-zabūr) too [K, p. 487] are to have described Muḥammad: "He will rule
from sea to sea, and from far-off rivers to far-off rivers. Peoples of the islands will bow
before him on their knees and his enemies will sit in the dust. Their kings will bring him
gifts and prostrate before him. Nations will be subject to him in obedience and submission,
because he will save the desperate and miserable man from those who are stronger. He
will rescue the weak man who has no helper and will be kind to the weak and the
destitute" (Psalm 72:8-13,15,17).
10) There is also the Psalm verse [K, p. 487] "God has manifested from Zion a
praiseworthy (maḥmūd) crown" (Psalm 50:2). The crown refers to leadership, and the
name Maḥmūd to Muḥammad.
11) The Psalms again say [K, pp. 487-488] "Let Israel rejoice in its Creator with the sons
of Zion, because God has chosen a people for them and given them victory. He has
strengthened with honor the good among them; they praise God on their beds and glorify
him with raised voices. In their hands are two-edged swords in order to take revenge on
the nations which do not serve God. They bind the nations with bonds, and their nobles
with shackles" (Psalm 149:2,4-8). This passage is to describe the Muslim community.
12) From the Psalms too [W, f. 72a; K, p. 488] is "Put on your sword, O mighty one, for
your law and your statutes are joined with the fearsomeness of your right hand. Your
arrows are sharpened, and peoples are prostrate under you" (Psalm 45:4-6). (98)
The meaning is that peoples will be reduced before Muḥammad so that they enter Islam
whether they like it or not, (99) or pay the jizya in a state of subjection. (100)
13) Also from the Psalms (sic) [W, f. 72a; K, p. 488] is God's word to David "A son will
be born to you by whom I will be called 'father', and he will be called a son by me" (2
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Samuel 7:14 = 1 Chronicles 17:13).
David answered "O God, send someone to maintain tradition, so that people will know
that he is human" (possibly an interpreted reading of 2 Samuel 7:19 = 1 Chronicles 17:17).
In these passages, David's son is Jesus, while Muḥammad maintained tradition, teaching
that Jesus is a servant of God and not a son.
The Injīl has a similar passage where Jesus says "O God, send the Paraclete to teach men
that the son of man is human" [This verse does not resemble anything in the New
Testament; it is omitted in Ṣṣ].
14) From Isaiah the prophet [W, f. 72b; K, p. 489] is the word of God "As for my servant
in whom my soul is well pleased, I will send down my revelation upon him. He will make
my justice appear among the nations and will give them commands. He will not laugh or
make his voice heard in the markets. He will open the eyes of the one-eyed, give hearing
to deaf ears and give life to uncircumcized hearts. What I give him I give to no one more
praiseworthy and praising God intensely (aḥmad yaḥmad Allāh ḥamdan)" (Isaiah
42:1-2,7). (101)
Also from Isaiah, indicating that Muḥammad's town is Mecca, is "The desert shall rejoice,
and its inhabitants praise God on every high place and glorify him on every hill. He will
not be weak nor be conquered nor turn to heretical winds. He will not make his voice
heard in the markets, nor will he humiliate the just, who are like a weak reed; but he will
strengthen the weak. He is the support of the weak, and the light of god which will not be
put out. he will not be defeated until my authority is established on earth, excuses are
refuted and truth is brought to his Tawrāt" [The first two sentences are not in Isaiah; the
rest is a loose paraphrase of Isaiah 42:2-4].
The phrase "He will give commands to the nations" indicates the Muḥammad is sent to all,
whereas the Injīl says of the Messiah "I was not sent to the gentiles, but only to the resting
sheep of the sons of Israel" (Matthew 15:24 and 10:5). (102)
The word aḥmad, "more praiseworthy", refers to the name of Muḥammad, while "the
desert" refers to Mecca.
15) Also from Isaiah [W, f. 73a; K, p. 490] is "Let the people of the dry steppes and the
deserts and the open lands rejoice, because they will produce the most praiseworthy
(aḥmad) valuables of Lebanon, and things like good villages and gardens" [a paraphrase
of Isaiah 35:1-2].
In this passage Mecca is again described, and Muḥammad mentioned under the name
Aḥmad. the meaning of "dry" is the absence of prophets in that land since Ishmael.
16) Again from Isaiah [W, f. 73a; K, p. 490] is "The days of visitation have come; the days
of enduring perfection have come" [no definite passage], and "Know, O ignorant sons of
Israel, that he whom you call erring is endowed with prophecy. You are indifferent to that
because of your many sins and great dissoluteness" [an echo of Isaiah 59:2].
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17) From Isaiah also [K, p. 490] is "It was said to me 'Rise and look, and tell me what you
see.' I said 'I see two riders coming, one of them on an ass, the other on a camel. One said
to the other "Babel has fallen with its decadent idols"'" (Isaiah 21:9). (103)
As-Sanūsī identifies the riders respectively with Jesus and Muḥammad.
18) Ezekiel [W, f. 73a; K, p. 491], after speaking of the past history of the sons of Israel
and having likened them to a vine, said "Before long that vine will be torn up by his rage
and thrown upon the ground, and the hot winds will burn its fruits. Then a seedling will be
planted in the desert in waste and dry land, and from its abundant branches will come a fire
which will eat that vine until no strong sap or twig is left in it" [a loose paraphrases of
Ezekiel 17:9-10 and 22-24, with the element of fire borrowed from 15:6].
In this passage, the desert represents Mecca, the seedling Muḥammad, and the vine the
Jews whom he laid hold of by devastating battle, captivity and the humiliation of the jizya
in all the land of Islam.
19) From Daniel [W, f. 73a; K, p. 491] is the passage describing liars "Their prayer will
not be extended nor their sacrifices finished. The Lord has sworn by his arm that neither
lies nor the cause of a false claimant will appear for more than thirty years" [There is
nothing like this in Daniel; it is omitted in Ṣṣ]. (104)
Muḥammad's claim lasted more than thirty years, and is now near 900 years.
20) From Daniel also [W, f. 73a; K, p. 491] is his interpretation of the dream of
Nebuchadnezzar: "Daniel said 'O King, you have seen a statue of excelling beauty, whose
upper part is gold, its middle part of silver, its lower part of brass, its thighs of iron and its
feet of clay. While you were looking at it with pleasure, a stone came down from heaven
and broke it, striking its head and grinding it to dust, so that the gold, silver, copper, iron
and clay were all mixed together. Then the stone grew big and mighty until it filled the
whole earth.' Thereupon Nebuchadnezzar said 'You have spoken truly; now interpret it for
me.' Then Daniel said 'The statute is various nations at the beginning, middle and end of
time. You are the head of gold, O King, and the silver is your son after you. The brass is
Byzantium, and the iron Persia, while the clay are two weak nations ruled by women in
Yemen and Syria. The stone which came from heaven is the religion of an everlasting
prophet and king who will come at the end of time, conquering all nations. Then he will
grow mighty until he fills the whole earth, as this stone filled it'" [an interpreted reading of
Daniel 2:31-45; in Daniel there is no identification of the kingdoms].
Such a description fits Muḥammad, who was sent to all nations made up of different races,
languages and religious, and made them one race (jins), with one language, which is
Arabic and one religion, which is Islam.
21) And from Habakkuk [K, p. 490] is "God came from at-Tīn and shone from the
mountains of Fārān, and the whole earth was filled with praising Aḥmad and declaring his
holiness. He filled the earth with his fear." There follows "At your order, Muḥammad, the
pestilential hot wind (sahām) is watered" [an elaboration of Habakkuk 3:3].
Regarding the fulfilment of these texts, K [p. 492] says that very few, seven to be exact,
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had the name Muḥammad before the prophet, and none of them claimed prophecy.
W [f. 73b] concludes that the previous books testify to the prophecy of Muḥammad. He
occupies the highest rank among the prophets, and is the last of them, and his
revealed-law will never change or be abrogated.
e. Who is preferred after Muḥammad
W [f. 74a], in a first remark (tanbīh) and Ṣṣ [p. 48] quote at-Taftāzānī's Sharḥ
al-Maqāṣid ad-dīniyya which says that all agree that Muḥammad is the most preferred
(afḍal) prophet, but there are different opinions as to who comes after him. some say
Adam, because he is the father of humanity, others Noah, because of his long worship and
hard work, others Abraham, because of his great dependence upon God and trust, others
Moses, because he spoke to God and was his confidant (li-kawni-hi kalīm Allāh
wa-najiyya-hu), and others Jesus, because he was the spirit of God and his intimate
(li-kawni-hi rūḥ Allāh wa-ṣafiyya-hu).
K [pp. 511-514] and J [32b, ff. 344a-345a], discussing the same question, say that the
Rāwandites preferred al-Àbbās, while the Shīìtes preferred Àlī. Al-Qurṭubī's
commentary on Muslim says that for Sunnites Abū-Bakr and Ùmar occupy the first and
second places after Muḥammad. Al-Qāḍī Ìyāḍ, depending on a. Manṣūr al-Baghdādī,
says that the first four caliphs are preferred in their order of succession. Al-Ashàrī, Mālik
b. Anas as quoted in the Mudawwana, and Imām-al-Ḥaramayn, says Ibn-Rushd, are to
have held the same opinion or to have suspended judgement. Ibn-Àrabī quotes his master
al-Fihrī (a. B. aṭ-Ṭurṭūshī l-Andalusī) in favor of Ùmar, but disagrees with him. Others
quote al-Ashàrī and Mālik, again from the Mudawwana, for saying that Abū-Bakr is
decidedly preferred, while al-Bāqillānī says it is doubtful. Still others distinguish between
outward (ẓāhir) and inward (bāṭin) preference.
In any case, preference (tafḍīl) is defined [K, p. 513] as abundance of reward and elevated
rank (kathrat ath-thawāb wa-raf` ad-daraja), and cannot be decided by measuring
outward deeds, but only by authority. Ṣṣ [pp. 48-50] quotes a long passage from a. Àl.
M. b. Àbbād to the same effect. God's preferring someone is a matter of his free choice,
and is not caused by some quality or a greater or lesser degree of perfection in the person.
That is why the comparisons which some authors make between Muḥammad and other
prophets, showing how his miracles or characteristics are better than theirs, even though
they may be true, give a wrong impression, because these points of excellence do not
make him preferred by God. That is why Muḥammad discarded boasting (fakhr) about
anything and contented himself with the title of servant (àbd).
f. Regarding saints, wonders and magic
J [22, ff. 289b-297a] distinguishes four questions: 1) the reality of a saint and a wonder, 2)
determining whether wonders are admissible and happen, 3) the relation of a saint to a
prophet, 4) the reality of magic. These questions are the subject of the second and third
remarks (tanbīh) in W [ff. 74a-76a].
1) W [f. 74a] says that the reality of a saint (walī) is "a person who is aware of God and
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his attributes, is dedicated to obedience, turns away from disobedience and avoids being
absorbed by pleasures and cravings" (al-`ārif bi-llāh ta`ālā wa-ṣifāti-hi l-muwāẓib àlā
ṭ-ṭā`āt al-mujtanib àn al-ma`āṣī l-mu`riḍ àn al-inhimāk fī l-ladhdhāt wa-sh-shahawāt).
His wonder (karāma) is the manifestation of something extraordinary from him,
unaccompanied by the claim of prophecy. Not claiming prophecy makes a wonder
different from a miracle.
K [pp. 446-447] cites "one of our imāms" for making the difference between a miracle and
a wonder consist in the fact that a messenger chooses and intends his miracle, whereas a
saint does not choose or intend his wonder, but only desires and hopes for it. Other imāms
say that the difference is in the kind of act: that raising the dead, curing the leprous and the
like are miracles, but finding something in the desert and the like are only wonders;
messengers can have both miracles and wonders. But the opinion of sound theologians is
that any kind of event can appear from a saint, and the difference is the absence of a claim
of messengership.
W continues to say that the fact that the extraordinary act comes from a person of correct
belief, good works and resolution to follow the Prophet distinguish a wonder from the
enticements (istidrāj) and sure indications of a liar, as in the case of Musaylima, who tried
to cure a person's blind eye and made the other eye blind also; such an act is called an
affront (ihāna).
God sometimes causes extraordinary things to appear from ordinary Muslims (min qibal
al-àwwām al-muslimīn) in order to free them from the scandals and adversities of the
world (min miḥan ad-dunyā wa-makārihi-hā), even if they are not qualified with
saintliness (wilāya). These extraordinary things which appear from them are called an
assistance (ma`ūna).
K [p. 448] says that the fact that a person will not be a prophet in the future distinguishes
a wonder from a presage (irhāṣ). This distinction, says J, is that of at-Taftāzānī in his
Sharḥ al-Maqāṣid, as opposed to Ibn-Àrafa in his Shāmil, who included a presage and an
assistance (ma`ūna) under wonders (karāma).
At-Taftāzānī concludes [W, f. 74a] that extraordinary events are of four kinds:
a miracle (mu`jiza)
a wonder (karāma)
an assistance (ma`ūna)
an affront (ihāna)
But as-Sanūsī adds three other kinds:
a presage (irhāṣ), which is an extraordinary event appearing before a claim of

prophecy to give it foundation (ta`sīsan l-hā); K [p. 448] says that the origin of the
word is rihṣ, which is the foundation of a wall.
an enticement (istidrāj), which is something extraordinary appearing from someone
whose religion is not sound
a trial (ibtilā'), such as the extraordinary things which will appear from the
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Antichrist (dajjāl).
Ibn-Dahhāq [W, f. 75a; J, 22, on this point] said in his commentary on the Irshād that
there are four conditions for a saint:
that he be aware of the principles of religion

that he be aware of the determinations of revealed-law by understanding, not
blind-acceptance
that he know created things, so that he knows what revealed-law forbids or
commands, and knows what will provide his intellect with a demonstration of God's
existence and attributes and consequently does not fear or wish for anything apart
from what God has destined (qaddar)
his having a constant fear of not being among the blessed or of not being able to
fulfil God's commands.
J says that al-Qushayrī, in his Risāla, stipulated also that a saint be active or activated
(fa`īl), that is, that God should produce wonders from him.
2) [W, f. 74a] The mass (jumhūr) of Muslims agree that it is admissible for wonders to
appear on the part of saints. The Mu`tazilites disagree, and al-Isfarā'inī, according to
Imām-al-Ḥaramayn, is close to their position.
At-Taftāzānī [W, f. 74b] said that proof for the fact (wuqū`) of wonders is found first of
all in the Qur'ān, for example:
the divine provisionment of Mary in the temple (3:37)

the episode of men remaining in a cave many years without food or drink (sūra 18)
Āṣif's bringing of the throne of Balqīs to Solomon before the twinkling of an eye
(27:40). (105)
These extraordinary acts are not presages, because their aim was not the verification of a
claim to prophecy.
A second proof is in the wonders which happened to the companions of Muḥammad and
their followers. Al-Imām an-Nasafī admitted the possibility of reported bilocations of
saints who were seen in their own town and at the same time in Mecca.
Objections to the possibility of wonders are:
that a saint from whom wonders appear would not be distinguished from a prophet.
This has already been answered.
that if they appeared for a purpose other than proving truthfulness, then we could
not verify prophecy by a miracle, since it could admit of another purpose. The
answer, as has been said before, is that a miracle is accompanied by a claim to
prophecy.
that for saints to have wonders diminishes the dignity of prophets and people's
admiration of them. The answer is that the opposite is true. People will honor and
follow the prophets more if they know that by following them they can achieve a
like rank (mithl hādhihi d-daraja).
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Many saints have been distinguished by announcing things absent (ikhbār

al-mughayyabāt). This is not contrary to the Qur'ān verse (72:26) which says that only a
messenger shares God's knowledge of the absent (al-ghayb), since in the context the
meaning of this word is the day of resurrection; or only a messenger can be admitted to
knowing the generality of absent things, but some absent things can be revealed to
ordinary individuals.
3) [W, f. 75b] Muslims agree that a saint is less than a prophet, since a saint is immune
from disobedience (ma`ṣūm min al-ma`āṣī), but a prophet also has revelation (waḥy) for
the benefit and renewal of the world. This is contrary to the error of some Karrāmites,
who say that they are equal, and the error of some Bāṭinites, who say that a saint is
preferred (afḍal) to a prophet. Doubts on this question arose, at-Taftāzānī says, because a
prophet is characterized by intermediacy between God and men, while a saint is
characterized by nearness to God.
Muslims also agree that a saint is obliged by revealed-law, contrary to the opinion of the
libertines (ahl al-ibāḥa), the Bāṭinites and other heretics. They say that once a saint
reaches the perfection of love and purity of heart and perfect sincerity, he is no longer
bound by commands or prohibitions, and then sin does not hurt him nor will he be
punished in fire for his sins. After refuting them, at-Taftāzānī says that the prophets are the
most perfect in love and sincerity (al-maḥabba wa-l-ikhlāṣ). They are also always subject
to revealed-law, since this is a consequence of possessing an intellect and they follow
revealed-law most perfectly.
4) [W, f. 76a] The reality of magic (siḥr) is something extraordinary appearing from an
evil and filthy soul, directly by certain works which involve learning and teaching (iẓhār
amr khāriq li-l-`āda min nafs sharīra khabītha bi-mubāshara a`māl makhṣūṣa tajrī fi-hā
t-taàllum wa-t-ta`līm).
K [p. 446] quotes Ibn-Àrafa for saying that magic is something extraordinary bound to a
particular activating-link; so that al-Qarāfī said that it was not even extraordinary, but its
strangeness is due to causes unknown to most men.
Magic, W continues, differs from a miracle or a wonder because of the character of the
person from whom it appears, because it is not spontaneous (bi-mujarrad iqtirāḥ
al-muqtariḥīn), because it is restricted to particular times, places and conditions, and
because it runs into opposition and efforts to produce its like.
Intelligibility admits the possibility of magic, while authority (sam`) and the fact of the evil
eye (al-iṣāba bi-l-àyn) show that it happens. The Mu`tazilites said that magic is mere will
and imagination and is on the same level as juggling (sha`badha), whose activating-link is
simple sleight of hand. The Sunnites say that it is admissible because of its intrinsic
possibility and the generality of God's power, which produces the effect on the occasion
of, and not by means of magical practices which themselves have no effectivity at all.
It may be objected that the Qur'ān verse in the story of Moses "It was made to seem to
him by their magic that they (their cords) were running" (20:66) means that there is no
reality to magic, but it is merely imaginary. The answer is that it could be true that the
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effect was created by God only in the imagination on the occasion of the magicians' hand
motions. But this imaginative effect (takhyīl) is itself a reality.
The evil eye is a characteristic of certain souls so that if they regard something as good
evil will reach it (huwa an yakūn li-ba`ḍ an-nufūs khāṣṣiyya anna-hā idhā staḥsanat
shay'an laḥiqat-hu l-āfa). This too happens only by God's creation, while the eye
produces no effect, but is merely a sign (amāra) of what customarily happens. The fact of
it is almost something that happens before our eyes, and needs no demonstration
(fa-thubūtu-hā yakād yajrī majrā l-mushāhadāt allātī lā taftaqir ilā ḥujja).
J. Various revealed tenets
a. The resurrection
(N. 49) [W, f. 76b] Among the tenets which depend upon the fact of Muḥammad's
messengership and his immunity from error is the resurrection. J [26a, f. 312b]
distinguishes two steps: the resurrection (ba`th), which is vivifying the dead and taking
them out of their tombs, and the assembling (ḥashr) of all men to the formidable stopping
place (al-mawqif al-hā'il). There is agreement, says W, in the Qur'ān, Sunna and
consensus that Muḥammad taught that men shall return after their destruction, and there is
no need to discuss the proofs from intelligibility and authority.
There is, however, a difference of opinion whether the resurrection is a bringing into
existence (ījād) after non-existence or is a collection (jam`) of the parts which were
scattered. Ar-Rāzī [K, p. 496] said that no proof from intelligibility or authority could be
produced for either opinion. The best procedure, W continues, is that of
Imām-al-Ḥaramayn, which is to refrain from judgement, since intelligibility admits both
possibilities. What is sure is that both good and bad will be raised up with the same body
they had in the world, and their spirit will not reside (tarkub) in a different body which is
only a likeness of the one they had.
K [pp. 496-497] says there is also agreement that the body returns with the same
accidentals, as Ibn-Àrabī said in his Sirāj al-murīdīn. Some would even say that among
accidentals time also returns the same, but the Qur'ān verse (4:56) which speaks of God
changing the skins of those in hell each time their skins are burnt implies succession of
non-repeated times.
The objection is raised [K, p. 495] that if one man eats another they cannot have the same
body in the resurrection. The answer is that the body has original (aṣliyya) parts and
supplementary (faḍliyya) parts; the return to life (ma`ād) concerns the former.
J [26c, ff. 316a-317a] says that the teaching of the resurrection is against the Philosophers,
who denied the resurrection of the body while admitting the future life of the spirit, and
against the Dahrites, who denied the resurrection and future life altogether. Ar-Rāzī, in his
Arba`īn, said that one who denies the resurrection is an unbeliever, because he is denying
the Qur'ān. Al-Qarāfī said likewise.
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b. The questioning and torment or delight in the grave
There is consensus (ajma` al-islāmiyyūn), says W [f. 76b] and J [25a, ff. 309a-311a],
quoting at-Taftāzānī, concerning the fact of the questioning in the grave (su'āl al-qabar) ,
the torment (àdhāb) of unbelievers and some disobedient believers there and the delight
(na`īm) of others there. The only difference of opinion comes from the Mu`tazilites. some
late theologians say that the Mu`tazilites are innocent of denying this, and that the denial
originated with Ḍirār b. Àmr and was attributed to the Mu`tazilites because he mixed with
them. Other stupid people followed him.
In asserting the torment or delight of the grave, the Sunnites refer to Qur'ān verses as
50:45-46, where the family of Pharaoh is punished by fire morning and night, and this
before the resurrection, and 71:25, where the people in the time of Noah are said to have
drowned and entered the fire. In verse 40:11 one of the two lives referred to can only be in
the grave. In 3:169-170 those killed in a holy war are said not to be dead but living with
God and enjoying what he gives them. Various ḥadīths confirm the same. In particular
there is the ḥadīth of the two angels (Munkar and Nakīr) who question the dead person
about his religion and punish him if he does not have the right answer.
K [pp. 499-501] explains the positions of the opponents. Ḍirār and Bishr al-Marīsī denied
torment in the grave, saying that whoever is dead is dead in the grave until the day of the
resurrection, and the soul does not return to the body in the meantime. Abū-l-Hudhayl said
that someone who dies without faith is punished "between the two breaths" (bayn
an-nafkhatayn) [cf. Qur'ān 39:68] of the trumpet blasts. Al-Balakhī (al-Ka`bī) and
al-Jubbā`ī and his son admitted torment in the grave for unbelievers and denied the naming
of the two angels Munkar and Nakīr, which revealed-law affirms.
Ṣāliḥ Qubba said that torment in the grave is admissible without the soul returning to the
body. He is wrong, because sensation without the soul is contrary to what is self-evident.
Some of the Karrāmites and Mu`tazilites said that God punishes the dead in their graves
without their feeling anything, but they only feel it when they come to life again, as a
drunken person. But the Sunnite position is that they do feel something, yet they do not
cry and moan during it.
There is nothing in intelligibility impeding the return of life to some parts of the body and
the person's answering questions, even though we do not perceive this. It is not altogether
certain whether children are brought to life in the grave. The apparent meaning of
revelation (khabar) is that all, including children and those immune from sin, are brought
to life, but there must be a perfecting of children's understanding for them to know their
condition. To the objection that no life is apparent in the dead, it can be pointed out that
sleeping people experience many things in their dreams without an observer's being aware
of it.
J [25b, ff. 311b-312a] explains that God creates the accidentals of life or death in a body
without the spirit having any effectivity (ta'thīr) on this. The body returns to dust (turāb),
except that God preserves the bodies of prophets, learned men (ùlamā', martyrs
(shuhadā') and deserving mu'adhdhins.
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c. The path
The path (ṣirāṭ), says W [f. 77a] followed by J [29, ff. 321a-325b], is a bridge stretched
over hell (jisr mamdūd àlā matn jahannam) and is the only road to heaven. It is finer than
a hair and sharper than a sword, according to authentic ḥadīths with which Sunnites agree.
Ibn-Dahhāq, in his commentary on the Irshād, says that there is a difference of opinion
concerning its description. Some say that it is wide and all together men stand on it to
receive their judgement; this was the opinion of al-Ashàrī and Imām-al-Ḥaramayn. But
most learned men hold that it is finer than a hair and sharper than a sword and that it is a
bridge with one end in the land of the resurrection (arḍ al-qiyāma) and the other end in
the land of heaven (arḍ al-janna). Both the bridge and the land of the resurrection where
men will be gathered stand over the fire. The fire leaps up from below and grabs those
destined for it according to their different categories (aṣnāf).
Many Mu`tazilites denied the existence of the path in its outward sense, saying that it is
impossible or very difficult to cross such a bridge, and that the meaning is the path leading
to heaven [cf. Qur'ān 3:142] or hell [cf. Qur'ān 37:23] by doing or omitting the practices
of religion. Or the path, according to its length, refers to the number of sins which must be
answered for before entering heaven.
The answer to them is that a literal crossing of such a path is possible by the power of
God, who even now enables some birds to dart through the air with a speed beyond the
natural power of their wings, while the condition of the next life will consist for the most
part of extraordinary things.
d. The scale
The existence of the scale (mīzān), says W [f. 77b], is affirmed in the Qur'ān verses 21:47
and 101:6. Many commentators describe the scale as consisting of the two ends of a bar
(katafān = shoulders), a dial (lisān = tongue) and two pendulums (sāqān = legs).
Some Mu`tazilites oppose this description, saying that human acts are accidentals which
cannot be weighed when they exist, and much less so when they have passed away.
Rather, the meaning of the scale is justice established in everything (al-àdl ath-thābit fī
kull shay'). The reason for the use of the plural mayāzīn, "scales", is to indicate the
perceptions of each knowing power.
The answer to them is that acts themselves are not weighed, but papers which record them
or, as some say, specially created bright bodies to represent good acts and dark bodies to
represent bad acts. The use of the plural is for the sake of emphasising greatness
(isti`ẓām), or because of the many things weighed on it, or because there is one big scale
and a single little one for each person.
K [pp. 497-498] adds that the Mu`tazilite Ibn-al-Mu`tamar admitted the possibility of the
literal meaning of the scale, although he found no authoritative reason for asserting it.
Al-Jubbā`ī admitted the creation of substances which are weighted in representation of a
person's acts, which is close to the idea of weighing papers. There is uncertainty
(taraddud) whether there are separate scales for unbelievers and believers or there is one
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for everyone.
Ibn-Dahhāq, W continues, says there will be no settling of accounts (muqāṣa) between

man and his Lord, as al-Jubbā`ī, the Mu`tazilite, asserted in saying that good acts are
weighed against bad acts, and according to which are heavier the man goes to heaven or
hell. This is not true, because Muḥammad said that if heaven and earth were placed on one
side and the words "There is no deity but God" on the other, the latter would outweigh
the former. The Sunnite position is that if a man has a mountain of acts of obedience and
one act of deliberate disobedience, God can punish him for this and reward him for the
rest, or he can forgive this sin. Abū-l-Qāsim al-Junayd was asked what would happen to
someone who left the world with only a speck (qadr nawāt) of goodness. He answered
that it would be considered as a basis of reward or punishment, much or little, as God
wishes.
As for taking the book by the right hand, K [p. 507] says there is a difference of opinion
whether this gesture indicates that the person will escape punishment, and the best course
is to suspend judgement. W, however, says that this act is a sign that the person will not
remain in the fire eternally, or, says J [27, f. 318a], that he will have an easy reckoning.
At the reckoning (ḥisāb), says W, a person will know which of his good acts are accepted
(maqbūl) or rejected (mardūd), and which of his bad acts are forgiven (maghfūr) or held
against him (mu'ākhkhadh bi-hi). At the scale he will know how much reward or
punishment he will receive for his good or bad acts.
e. The basin
The Sunnites are unanimous, says W [f. 78a], as to the existence of the basin (ḥawḍ). It is
described as containing extremely white water, sweeter than honey, and is fed by two
pipes (mīzāb) from the river Kawthar with vessels (awānin) as numerous as stars. The sky
is its rim (ḥāfatu-hu); its smell is that of musk and its pebbles are pearls (lu'lu'). whoever
drinks from it will never thirst, and anyone who has substituted or changed tradition (man
baddal aw ghayyar) will be kept away from it. another ḥadīth reported by Suhaylī says
that if you put your fingers in your ears and hear a sound, that is the pipes bringing water
to the basin; this is literally possible, because for Sunnites sound, like sight, is not impeded
by long distances.
Ibn-Dahhāq says there is a difference of opinion concerning its location. some say that it is
beyond (khalf) the path, an opinion attributed to the companions of ash-Shāfi`ī. According
to them, those who drink from it will not enter the fire, whereas some believers will enter
the fire and be released by the intercession of Muḥammad; therefore it cannot be in the
stopping place (mawqif).
Yet other Shāfiìtes say that the basin is in the land of the resurrection (arḍ al-qiyāma)
[Like the stopping place, on this side of the path], while the believers who will enter the
fire have their cups reserved for them until they come out.
Most Sunnites (jamāhir ahl as-sunna) say that the basin is in the land of the resurrection,
and there people either drink from it or are turned away. Were it beyond the path, there
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would be no chance of anyone being turned away, since those who have crossed the path
can never turn back and enter the fire. It is possible for those who have drunk from the
basin before crossing the path to enter the fire, in which case their having drunk from its
waters is an assurity (amān) against their faces being burnt or their suffering hunger or
thirst. It is also related that the fire will not burn their stomachs or the places where they
washed for prayer (mawḍi` al-wuḍū') or the parts of their bodies where they prostrated
(mawāḍi` as-sujūd). Moreover only the upper part of the flames will touch them while
they are still on the path, and only the unbelievers will fall from the path into the fire and
remain there eternally, according to the Qur'ān verses 26:94 and 39:72. Being seared while
on the path sufficiently concords with the authentic traditions (akhbār) that the faithful
who have sinned will enter the fire and be removed from it by Muḥammad's intercession,
although another ḥadīth says that God kills them in the fire so that they do not feel its
pain; then they come out like ashes.
As-Sanūsī adds another opinion (qultu qīl) that there are two basins, one at this end and
one at the other end of the path. Those who have substituted or changed tradition are
turned away from the first, while no one is turned away from the second, since only those
saved from the fire reach it. God knows best.
The Mu`tazilites said that the basin is a relaxation from following the Muḥammadan norm
(kifāya àn ittibā' as-sunna). The answer to them is that in the next life people will not be
turned away from following the Muḥammadan norm, since there is no enchargement then;
rather they will be turned away from a sensible (maḥsūs) basin. This is confirmed by a
ḥadīth describing its dimensions.
Ibn-Dahhāq relates another tradition whereby each prophet has his own basin from which
his nation drinks. But some learned men say that there is no water or basin in the stopping
place but that of Muḥammad. Those who are turned away from it will not enjoy any
intercession. These are guilty of unbelief; equivalent to them are those who tamper with
tradition (man khālab as-sunna).
f. Intercession
K [p. 506] describes the Sunnite position:
that unbelievers will be forever in the fire

that believers:
who are preserved from acts of disobedience for their whole life will go
straight to heaven
who commit:
small sins (ṣaghā'ir) only will go to heaven; J [31b, f. 335a] quotes
ar-Rāzī's Muḥaṣṣal for saying that small sins are removed before the
judgement and are not punished
big sins (kabā'ir), and:
repent will go to heaven, but perhaps after some frightening
experience (ahwāl) before being forgiven
do not repent will be punish or not, as God wills, but there is a
consensus that a group representing every kind of disobedience
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will be punished.
For the latter lot, W [f. 79a] says that written authority (naṣṣ) and consensus affirm that
intercession (shafāà) will save some of the disobedient from the fire either before or after
their entering it.
The Mu`tazilites are opposed to this, and limit intercession to those who obey or repent, in
order to raise their rank and increase their reward. But Sunnites say that it is admissible
also for those guilty of big acts of disobedience. At-Taftāzānī argues that if intercession
were limited to increasing benefits (ziyādat al-manāfi`) we could be said to intercede for
Muḥammad when we ask God to increase his honor; but such a consequence is false. An
objection to his argument is that an intercessor (shafī`) is of a higher status (ḥāl) than the
one he intercedes for (al-mashfū` la-hu), or that the increase of benefits is completely
unknown to his request or prayer (majhūla li-su'ālihi wa-ṭalabi-hi l-batta). The answer to
this objection is that an intercessor sometimes intercedes for himself, and that a benefit
requested is sometimes impossible (ghayr muṭā`) and is not granted.
The Mu`tazilites [W, f. 79b] posed many objections to Muḥammad's intercession:
1) The first are Qur'ān verses such as "Be on your guard against the day when one soul
will not avail another in the least, neither shall intercession on its behalf be accepted"
(2:48) and "The unjust shall have no helpers" (2:270).
The answer is that these verses refer specifically to unbelievers, which is the meaning of
ẓālim. Besides, the denial of help (naṣra) does not imply the denial of intercession, since
intercession is a request for submission (khuḍū`), whereas help can possibly imply defence
and victory (mudāfaà wa-mughālaba) for the disobedient.
2) As for the Qur'ān verse "They intercede only for him whom he approves" (21:28),
someone guilty of a big sin is not approved. Besides, the prayer of the angels who carry
the throne is "Pardon for those who have repented and follow your way" (40:7); and there
is no difference between the intercession of angels and that of prophets.
The answer is that one guilty of a big sin is approved (murtaḍā) from the point of view of
his having faith (īmān), even though he has no good words; only the unbeliever is not
approved, because he lacks the root of all goodness and perfection (aṣl al-ḥasanāt
wa-asās al-kamālāt), which is faith. The meaning of intercession for those who repent is
intercession for those who repent of association in the objects of their belief (shirk), since
if they repented from simple acts of disobedience and did good works they would have no
need of intercession, according to the Mu`tazilites.
3) If intercession is for those guilty of big sins, then we include ourselves among them by
saying the prayer "Lord make us worthy of the intercession of Muḥammad".
The answer is that although the prayer supposes acts of disobedience, its meaning is
"Make us believers and approved", since intercession is only for such. Consequently it is a
prayer for a happy death (ḥusn al-khātima). At-Taftāzānī explains the logic of such a
prayer in the same way.
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g. Eternity of final reward or punishment
The eternity of delight for believers and of fire for unbelievers, says W [ff. 79b-80a] is a
matter of consensus. Included among unbelievers (kāfirūn) are the hypocrites
(munāfiqūn), who are in the lowest level of hell. Among believers are included the
immoral (fussāq), since even if they do not repent before death, they will be eternally in
heaven, and that either immediately and without punishment at all by God's forgiveness
and the intercession of those who intercede, or after some punishment in the fire according
to the measure (qadr) of their sins. Nevertheless we hold for (naqṭa`) the carrying out of
the threat (nufūdh al-wa`īd) for an indefinite number of them (fī jamāà min-hum min
ghary ta`yīn) because of the texts concerning this.
Regarding punishment in the next life, there are the errors of:
the Bāṭinites [K, p. 503], who say that it is a mere fiction to scare people, and that it
is contrary to God's mercy
the Mu`tazilites and the Khārijites [W, f. 80a], who say that those guilty of big sins
who die without repentance will be forever in the fire
the Murji'ites, who say that God's forgiveness is complete for every disobedient
believer, and that only unbelievers will enter the fire.
The Sunnites hold a middle position between the last two extremes.
At-Taftāzānī observes that there is really a difference of opinion among the Mu`tazilites.
Al-Jubbā`ī, Abū-Hāshim and later Mu`tazilites held that:
if the punishment due is greater than (zād àlā) the reward due, the big sins cancel
out acts of obedience and cause a person to stay eternally in the fire; knowledge of
that is committed to God (mufawwaḍ ilā llāh)
if the reward due is greater, the person will not enter the fire at all
if the reward and punishment due are equal, the Mu`tazilites were confused
(iḍṭarabū); they said this is a question of authority (sam`), but that intelligibility
admits the possibility of punishment for all the big sins in such a case; but al-Ka'bī
disagreed.
In another place at-Taftāzānī says that Abū-Àlī al-Jubbā`ī said that whichever is greater
simply cancels out the other, but Abū-Hāshim said that the lesser is subtracted from the
greater, and the person has the reward or punishment which remains.
K [pp. 498-499] asserts that heaven and the fire already exist. The Mu`tazilites denied this,
since they serve no purpose until someone is admitted to them for reward or punishment.
The answer to them is that God does not act for objectives that he must justify his creation
by its usefulness. Besides, the present existence of heaven and the fire has the usefulness
of inciting hope or fear.
As-Sanūsī does not describe heaven, except for the section on the vision of God [above,
G, c]. In K [p. 496] he mentions that the pleasures of the next world are like some of the
pleasures of this world in appearance (ṣūra), but differ from them in reality (ḥaqīqa); so
that all they have in common is their names.
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h. Repentance
Immorality (fisq), says W [f. 80a], is a departure from obedience to God, either by
committing one bit sin or by committing many small sins over a long time or all at once.
The determination for immorality in this world is, by consensus, the obligation of
repentance (tawba) immediately. If a person delays repentance an hour, this delay (ta'khīr)
is another big sin, and so on by doubling; for two hours he has four sins, for three hours
eight, for four hours sixteen.
The reality of repentance (tawba) [W, f. 80b] in revealed-law is a regret for disobedience
because it is disobedience (an-nadam àlā l-ma`ṣiyya li-ajl anna-hā ma`ṣiyya), or if you
like, a regret for disobedience because of its foulness before revealed-law (li-ajl qubḥi-hā
sharàn). Regret for disobedience because it harms one's body or reputation (ìrḍ) or
esteem (ḥasab) or wealth is not repentance.
At-Taftāzānī says that there is uncertainty whether regret because of fear of the fire or
because of desire for heaven is repentance, since it is not certain whether this is because of
the legal foulness and disobedience of the act.
There is also doubt whether there is repentance in the case of regret because of foulness
before revealed-law and also because of another objective (gharaḍ).
The truth regarding both these cases is that if there were still regret if the aspect of
foulness of the act were isolated, then the regret is repentance; otherwise not.
The same principle holds in the case of repentance on the occasion of a serious illness
(marḍ mukhawwif). It is likely (ẓāhir), according to the words of Muḥammad, that such a
person's repentance is accepted as long as the forebodings (àlāmāt) of death have not yet
appeared.
The reality of regret (nadam) is sadness and pain over what one has done, and the wish
that one had not done it (taḥazzun wa-tawajju` àlā mā faàl wa-tamannī kawni-hi lam
yafàl). For repentance another qualification (qayd) is added: the resolution not to repeat
the act in the future (al-àzm àlā tark al-mu`āwada fī l-mustaqbal).
An objection is that in the future a person may not have possession of his mind or faculties
so that he can omit repeating the act. The answer is that the meaning of resolution implies
the supposition of being in control of oneself; such is the answer of Imām-al-Ḥaramayn.
To be exact, a resolution is not a separate qualification (taqyīd) of repentance, but only an

explanation of what is implied in regret for disobedience because of its foulness before
revealed-law. Many common people (al-àwāmm) define repentance simply as a resolution
not to commit the sin again, but this is not repentance at all, since it has no reference to
sorrow for the past. Al-Ghazālī observes in his Iḥyā', in the chapter on repentance where
he tells the story of David's repentance, that true repentance is rare, and few men attain it.
It is not necessary to renew repentance every time one remembers his disobedience, but
only if he remembers it with desire and pleasure (mushtahiyan la-hā fariḥan bi-hā). This
is in disagreement with al-Bāqillānī and Abū-Àlī al-Jubbā`ī, the Mu`tazilite, who say that
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one must renew one's repentance every time without exception.
Also, repentance is valid (taṣiḥḥ) if it is for some acts of disobedience without others; this
is in opposition to Abū-Hāshim of the Mu`tazilites. On the same principle that one can
fulfil some obligations where the attraction (dāìya) is strong, and omit others, so one can
repent of some foul acts because of their foulness and weakness of attraction while
persisting in another foul act.
To repent of all acts of disobedience a global repentance (ijmāl) suffices; this is in

opposition to some Mu`tazilites who demand a repentance for each sin in particular
(tafṣīlan).
At-Taftāzānī [W, f. 81a], in his Sharḥ al-Maqāṣid [says J, 23a, f. 297b], says that if the
act of disobedience:
concerns God, such as omission of prayer, regret suffices, unless revealed-law adds
some other compensatory act
concerns another person, and the sin was:
injustice (ẓulm), one must restore to him his loss or its equivalent (badala-hu)
leading the other person astray (iḍlāl), guidance (irshād) is due
an insult (badā`) or calumny (ghība), begging pardon (i`tidhār) is due, but it
is not necessary in begging pardon to recall specifically (tafṣīl) the matter of
the calumny, unless it was something abominable (àlā wajh afḥash).
It may be remarked that the obligation of restoration is additional to that of repentance.
Imām-al-Ḥaramayn said that if a killer's repentance is valid even if he does not give himself
up for reprisal (min ghayr taslīm nafsi-hi l-l-qiṣāṣ), but his not giving himself up is
another disobedience which requires a separate repentance.
Imām-al-Ḥaramayn also said that repentance is of doubtful validity (rubbamā lā taṣiḥḥ) if

one still possesses what belongs to another, as in the case of robbery (ghaṣb), since regret
is not valid if one's hand is still on the goods (maà idāmat al-yad àlā l-maghṣūb); thus
there is a difference between killing and robbing. In J [23a, f. 297b] Ibn-Àrafa is quoted
for reporting one opinion saying that such repentance is valid.
J [23c, f. 303a] asks if repentance for unbelief, that is, after having believed, is acceptable.
The Fathers are cited for saying that it is, but according to opinion (àlā ẓ-ẓann) and hope
(rajā`). But the Qur'ān verse "He is the one who accepts repentance from his servants"
(42:25) is quoted for the opinion that this repentance is decidedly accepted.
i. Law enforcement
Related to repentance, says W [f. 81a], is the question of commanding the acceptable and
forbidding the objectionable (al-amr bi-l-ma`rūf wa-n-nahy àn al-munkar). The meaning
of the acceptable is what is obligatory (wājib), and the meaning of the objectionable is
what is forbidden (ḥarām). There is no doubt that these are two obligations independent
of the appearance of the imām, contrary to what the Rāfiḍites maintain.
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Evidence for these obligations are Qur'ān verses such as 3:104 and 31:17, many ḥadīths,
and consensus, which is plain from the activity of the earliest Muslims.
At-Taftāzānī answers objections rising from Qur'ān verses, such as "O you who believe,
take care of yourselves; he who errs cannot harm you when you are guided" (3:105). The
answer regarding this verse is that the meaning of àlay-kum anfusu-kum, "Take care of
yourselves", is "Improve (aṣliḥū) yourselves by performing your obligations", which
include commanding the acceptable and forbidding the objectionable.
As for the verse "There is no compulsion in religion" (2:256), this is abrogated (mansūkh)
by the verse of battle (āyat al-qitāl) [9:5], although the meaning may be that the acts of
commanding the acceptable and forbidding the objectionable are not forced acts.
One condition [W, f. 82b] for the obligation of commanding the acceptable and forbidding
the objectionable is the possibility of this having some effect (tajwīz at-ta'thīr). Another
condition is there not resulting damage or evil greater than or equal to the objectionable
thing. Outside these conditions it is reportedly permissible (qālū bi-jawāz) to resist evil
even if one thinks he will be killed without inflicting any harm (nikāya), but he is also
allowed (yurakhkhaṣ la-hu) to be silent. There is a different of opinion which is preferred
(afḍal); the first alternative is the choice of the Mālikites, Ibn-Ḥanbal, Sa`īd b.
al-Musayyib and Sa`īd b. Jubayr.
Commanding the acceptable and forbidding the objectionable is not limited to governor
(wulāt), since in the beginning of Islam everyone concerned himself with it by word and
deed without permission. But if the matter develops into a war, then the responsibility
passes to the sultan, in order to avoid civil strife (fitna), as Imām-al-Ḥaramayn said. He
also said that in legal matters understood by everyone, everyone participates in
commanding the acceptable and forbidding the objectionable. But in matters understood
only by specialists (mujtahid), this belongs to the specialists only, although each specialist
has the right to his opinion in the case of differences in branch sciences. Some, however,
say that only one opinion is right (muṣīb), although it is not determined (muàyyan);
therefore the Muḥīṭ al-Ḥanafiyya says that t Ḥanafite, for example, must correct
(yaḥtasib) the mistakes of a Shāfiìte, and vice versa.
Nor is the obligation of commanding the acceptable and forbidding the objectionable
limited to those who do not commit such objectionable acts, since the obligation not to
commit them and the obligation to forbid them are distinct, and someone who omits one
obligation is not excused from omitting the other.
Moreover this is a communitarian obligation (farḍ kifāya), that is, it is an obligation of all,
but the obligation ceases if some in the area (ṣuq`) fulfil it. Sometimes one person,
commonly called a censor (muḥtasib), is designated for matters pertaining:
to God, yet without searching and spying (baḥth wa-tajsīs)

to men which are not of general concern (ghayr al-`āmm), such as disputes between
individuals
to the common welfare, such as public works, charities and seeing that religious
practices are correctly carried out, and that the mu'adhdhins, teachers, judges and
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imāms correctly perform their duties.
Thus commanding the acceptable and forbidding the objectionable goes beyond obligatory
and forbidden matters.
A censor should vary his reaction in steps from doing nothing (waqf wa-sukūn) to more
severe measures (al-aghlaẓ), according to the condition (ḥāl) of the objectionable thing.
The Muḥīṭ al-Ḥanafiyya, for example, says that one should object to a man whose knees
are uncovered by doing nothing, even if he persists (in lajj); but if his thighs are
uncovered, this calls for anger, and blows if he persists; if his secret parts are uncovered,
this calls for blows, and if he persists killing him.
J [24, ff. 303a-308b] takes up the question of the imāmate. There are two kinds: the
smaller (ṣughrā), which is in leading the ṣalāt prayers, and the larger (kubrā), which is
that considered here. The definition in the Nihāya is "the universal leadership of one
person in religious and worldly matters" (ri'āsa fī d-dīn wa-d-dunyā `āmma li-shakhṣ
wāḥid). The word "universal" excludes judges and the like; the phrase "one person"
excludes the whole people (kull al-umma) if the imām is removed. Al-Āmidī criticized this
definition because it has no reference to prophecy, and gave as his definition "the
caliphate-or succession-of a person to the Messenger in setting up revealed-law and
guarding the community, with the obligation of all men to follow him" (khilāfa shakhṣ
li-r-rasūl fī iqāmat ash-shar` wa-ḥifẓ al-milla àlā wajh yūjib ittibāù-hu kāffat an-nās).
Regarding the necessity of the imāmate, (106) there those who:
affirm it:
because of authority (sam`) only; this is the Sunnite position, as explained by
ar-Rāzī in his Arba`īn
because of intelligibility; this is the position of:
Mu`tazilites like al-Ḥu. al-Khayyāṭ and a. l-Q. al-Ka`bī
the Ismā`īlites and the heretics (malāḥida) who say that God must
necessarily set up an imām immune from defect (al-imām al-ma`ṣūm)
to guide men to the knowing-awareness of God
the Twelvers (Ithnāàshriyya), who had a similar position
deny it altogether; this is the position of the Khārijites
say that it is necessary only in time of civil strife (fitan), but not in times
of security and justice (waqt al-amn wa-l-àdl), but Sunnites deny this.
As-Sanūsī then [J, 24c, f. 304a] excuses himself for discussing the imāmate,
since it is not a principal tenet of faith (lays ruknan fī àqā'id al-īmān), but
only a derived obligation (wājib far`ī) for the good of religion and the world.
It is mentioned in books about the tenets of faith, only:
because the opinions of innovators, such as the Mu`tazilites and

Ismā`īlites, about it derive from their errors in the principal tenets of
faith
or because it has a resemblance (mushābaha) to the tenets of faith in its
well known belonging (inshāb) to religion and being obviously derived
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from it, as is the case also with repentance, intercession, the

questioning in the grave and the like.
Conditions for a candidate to the imāmate which are agreed upon [J, 24d, f.
305b] are:
Islam
justice (àdāla), the opposite of immorality (fisq)
being a male (dhakūriyya)
liberty (ḥurriyya), since one must be free from the occupation of
serving someone
the age of maturity (bulūgh)
intelligence (àql)
to be a specialist (mujtahid) in the principles and derivative elements of
religion, so that he can make right decisions
that he know how to conduct war and peace, being severe or lenient as
required.
The Ṭawāli` of al-Bayḍāwī says that there is consensus that it is clear when
the last three conditions are present or not, but Ibn-Àrafa, quoting al-Āmidī,
says that there is no consensus on this.
Other conditions are:
that he is able to carry out his determinations (infādh ḥukmi-hi); to the

objection that Ùthmān b. Àffān could not, al-āmidī answers that he
could, but riffraff (awbāsh) stormed about him, and he sought peace
and the cessation of strife
that he be of the tribe of Quraysh; this is in opposition to what the
Khārijites and some Mu`tazilites say. To an objection from the ḥadīth
"Obey the sultan, even if he is a young Ethiopian slave commanding
you" there is the answer that not every sultan is an imām.
There is agreement, except for the Shīìtes, that the imām does not have to be
a Hāshimite, since the two shaykhs-Abū-Bakr and Ùmar-were not. Likewise
immunity from defect (ìṣma) is not required, contrary to the Ismā`īlites.
As for deposing an imām [J, 24e, f. 307b], Ibn-Àrafa, in his Shāmil agreeing
with Imām-al-Ḥaramayn's Irshād, says that if he falls into:
unbelief:
openly (kufr), he is to be removed
privately and is a hypocrite (munāfiq), he is to be left
immorality (fisāq), and:
calls men to follow him in disobedience (ma`ṣiyya):
by words, he is not to be obeyed (lam yuta`)
by fighting, he is to be fought back (in qātal qūtil)
doesn't call men to follow him, and:
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can be deposed without bloodshed and violation of what is

sacred (in amkan dūn irāqa dimā' wa-kashf ḥaram), he is
to be deposed; opinions differ as to whether this is
obligatory
cannot be deposed in this way, he is to be left.
NOTES
1. For which a. Àl. b. al-Ḥājj is quoted; in this context there are also quoted verses of
Ibn-al-Mubārak and of Zayn-al-`ābidīn.
2. Note that in K and W, which condemn all taqlīd, the emphasis is on ìlm, scientific
knowledge, while in Ṣ (p. 54) and Ṣṣ , which come after some hesitation on the subject,
the emphasis is on ma`rifa, with its ṣūfic resonance.
3. These and yet further subdivisions of taqlīd are found in M, f. 208a.
4. Note that K, p. 258, switches Imām-al-Ḥaramayn and al-Ashàrī on these two positions.
In K al-Bāqillānī is said to have held both positions; in J he is mentioned only with
Imām-al-Ḥaramayn.
5. In K (pp. 21-22) as Sanūsī also takes up the logical point of whether knowledge of the
major and minor premises of an argument suffices for knowledge of theconclusion, and
quotes Ibn-Sīnā, Ibn-at-Tilimsānī and al-Bayḍāwī's Ṭawāli` for saying that a third
knowledge is necessary, the reference (indirāj) of the minor to the major. He also
considers (p. 23) the logical consequences of incomplete or incorrect form and of false
premises.
6. The position of al-Bāqillānī is considered in detail in K, pp. 89-94; a reference on p. 93

indicates that K is depending for its information on Ibn-at-Tilimsānī's Sharḥ al-Ma`ālim .
7. Thus in the E group of manuscripts. The A and the T groups add a contradictory
qualifying phrase: "according to some; but others deny, and say that a firmness agreeing
with the truth is sufficient for belief, and saving by the favor of God from remaining
eternally in hell-fire, even though many sound theolgians deny its (taqlīd's) existence
among the Sunnites, while others copy from a. Hāshim of the Mu`tazilites" (ind ba`ḍ ihim
wa-ankar ba`ḍuhum wa-qāl bal al-aṣaḥḥ ann jazm at-taqlīd al-muṭābiq kāf fī l-īmān
wa-mukhalliṣ bi-faḍl Allāh in al-khulūd fī n-nīrān wa-in kān kathīr min al-muḥaqqiqīn
ankarū wujūdahu li-ahl as-sunna wa-ba` ḍ uhum yanqul àn Abī-Hāshim min
al-u`tazila). Note that K, p. 85, rejects the contention that taqlīd does not exist among
Muslims.
8. F. 9a; K (pp.l 79-81) has the same passage, but has a few lines in the beginning not
given in W, and omits the illustrative material at the end.
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9. Cf. also W, f. 16b (in N. 2), where Ibn-Àrafa says the same.
10. K, pp. 53-54; instances in the lives of al-Isfarā'inī and Ibn-Fūrak illustrate this (pp.
56-57), while ar-Rāzī is attacked (pp. 61-62) for his supposed approval of taqlīd and his
being tainted with ideas of philosophpers; according to a. Àl. M. b. A. al-Maqqarī, he
tended more to accept than to reject error; other shaykhs warn against his writings.
11. To prove this as-Sanūsī quotes a number of ḥadīths and authorities such as az-Zabīdī's
Ṭabaqāt an-najāt , al-Bāqillānī, and Ibn-Àrafa.
12. This is in disagreement with Ùth. b. Fodio, who dwelt only on the statement "there
are differences of opinion" to conclude that as-Sanūsī takes a more tolerant position in this
work.
13. W attributes this statement to al-Bāqillānī, K to the Àqīda of Ibn-al- Ḥājib; the word
at-taṣdīq is found only in K.
14. Cf. below, D, b, towards the end.
15. Who is commenting on statements of al-Ghazālī and the Risāla of al-Qushayrī.
16. W describes several of these.
17. After this as-Sanūsī exhorts on the importance of knowledge, quoting from the Àqīda
of a. l-Q. Àbdaljalīl and Ibn-ar-Raḥḥāl's Sharḥ al-Barūn (thus in E; other mss. have
"al-Baràwī" or "al-Barwī" or "al-Badwī" or "al-Badhwī").
18. As-Sanūsī defines each of these. This division is simply the classical Aristotelian
division of the parts of logic.
19. Sabab in this sense is distinguished form a choosing agent (mukhtār). Both terms
come under the general term fāìl, "active principle", or "agent", but sometimes sabab is
used in a wider sense to include a choosing agent, as in N. 5 of the Creed. Sabab in the
strict sense includes a cause (ìlla) and nature (ṭabīà); cf. below, E, d, N. 14.
20. Cf. also Ṣṣ , pp. 9-14.
21. The definition in the note of al-Ḥāmidī is clarifying: "the referral of something
unknown to something known because of the equivalence of the former to the latter in the
determination of its grounds" (ḥaml majhūl àlā ma`lūm li-musāwātihi fī ḥukm ìllatihi).
22. Who held the necessity of an infallible hidden imām; as-Sanūsī generalizes their
opinion to represent the demand for any teacher.
23. The point is also raised in N. 10, f. 26a.
24. Cf. also K, p. 98. Nevertheless a different connotation and usage justifies a different
translation. Al-azal is a temporally past time or age (aeon), hypothetically without
beginning in the question of things which come into being. Al-qidam is used preferentially
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when speaking about God, and primarily in the adjectival form whose non-technical
meaning is "old" or "from of old"; cf. below, D, a, (N. 6).
25. Cf. also K, p. 157.
26. Cf. Qur'ān, sūra 18.
27. Cf. Qur'ān, 18:83.
28. That is, separated from matter. As-Sanūsī seems only to have vaguely understood the
notion, and the defintion "an indivisible substance" applies equally well to a Democritean
atom.
29. This is also the position of K, p. 125.
30. The difference between them is explained on p. 167.
31. Ṣ [pp. 147-154] and Ṣṣ [pp. 14-16] give a simplified version of the arguments of W.
32. E.g., bodies must possess either motion or rest, but not neither.
33. On these arguments as previously presented by al-Ghazālī, and their weaknesses, see
S. Laugier de Beaurecueil and G.C. Anawate, "Une preuve de l'existence de Dieu chez
Ghazzali et S. Thomas," Mélanges de l'Institute dominicain d'études orientales, 3 (1956),
pp. 207-258.
34. On p. 105, still from the commentary on ar-Rāzī's Ma`ālim; on p. 106 reference is also
made to ar-Rāzī's Arba`īn.
35. Apart form this mention of the way from possibiltiy, the main part of K develops the
proof based on the world's having come into being. The other works of as-Sanūsī do not
even mention the proof form possibility.
36. Cf. K, p. 238.
37. This is only a ḥadīth, but based on Qur'ānic phrases.
38. K, p. 246, mentions some of these.
39. Cf. E. g. (N. 23), on God's speech, and G, c (Nos. 42-43), on the vision of God.
40. On this subject see D, a (N. 13).
41. In K, p.l 150, concerning qidam, a ṣifa nafsiyya is said not to be an adjunct to the
essence-in contrast to a substantive attribute which is an adjunct to the essence-but in Ṣ ,
p. 95, it is said to be an adjunct to the essence. In either case it is said to be inseparable.
42. See also below, G, a (N. 40).
43. K, p. 398, in a quotation from Ibn-at-Tilimsānī, says that al-Ashàrī, al-Bāqillānī and
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Imām-al-Ḥaramayn did however admit that existence was not the same as the "what-it-is"
(māhiya) of the existent thing.
44. K, it was noted [p. 212; see above, b], reduced "necessarily existent" to a negative
attribute. Possibly the difference is that Ṣ is only concerned with existence as an attribute
in a general verbal sense, while K is concerned with the reality of it as we can know it. But
possibly too Ṣ -and M-came to regard God's existence as an attribute apart from the
assertion that there must be a God, and thought that at least it can be knwon that there is
such an attribute.
45. This attribute is discussed in K, pp. 145-152; W, f. 24a; Ṣ , pp. 76-78 and 155-157; J,
6a, ff. 135b-137b, and 6k, f. 151a-c (sic); and Ṣṣ , p. 16.
46. This is explained at length in J, 16, ff. 215a-b.
47. This attribute is discussed in K, pp. 151-156; W, f. 24b; J, 6a, ff. 135b-137b, and 6k, f.
151a-c; Ṣ , pp. 79-81 and 157-158; and Ṣṣ , p. 16.
48. The corresponding section in K, pp. 157-167, considers these points without
distinction under one naṣṣ and sharḥ centred on God's otherness from things which come
into being. After W reduced the material to the three points mentioned above, Ṣ, pp.
82-89, followed by Ṣṣ , pp. 16-17, dropped the second point, and made two distinct
negative attributes of the first-otherness from things that come into being- and the
third-self-subsistency.
49. This is another application of the argument found in N. 12 of the Creed.
50. Another version is in K, pp. 159-166; both are repeated more or less in J, 3d, ff.
112b-116b.
51. These are the Bāṭinites mentioned above, c, N. 7.
52. That is, the speaker's being is identified with God.
53. Cf. also K, p. 393.
54. As-Sanūsī here resumes the arguments against uniting given in N. 9; see above, D. c.
55. Although Ṣ, p. 97, uses this term; see above, C, b.
56. Cf. Ch. I, E, n. 21.
57. Cf. above, D, c, N. 9.
58. Above, N. 17, and in B, b, concerning an infinite series.
59. Cf. Ch. III, A, a.
60. Note that K, p. 18, attributes to Imām-al-Ḥaramayn the opposite opinion.
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61. In explaining this verse, as-Sanūsī quotes from az-Zamakhsharī and Ibn-Àṭiyya.
62. That is, self-evident, but without pain.
63. That is, resulting from reasoning.
64. N. 43.
65. According to a note of al- Ḥāmidī, this is al-Isfarā'inī, not al-Ghazālī.
66. Cf. Waṣiyyat a. Ḥanīfa, art. 9, Fiqh akbar II, art. 3, and Ṭaḥāwī, art. 3, in A. J.
Wensinck, The Muslim Creed, its genesis and historical development (Cambridge, 1932),
pp. 127 and 189.
67. Ṣ , pp. 190-219, develops the idea that all the attributes of God can be derived from
the first part of the shahāda.
68. K has the same position for oneness, but Ṣ, p. 89, and Ṣṣ, p. 19, take up oneness as
the last among the negative attributes.
69. Ṣ , p. 210, gives pretty much the same words as the latter definition.
70. This is the subject of N. 33 in W.
71. This is the subject of N. 34 in W.
72. This is the subject of Nos. 35-39 in W.
73. Evidently depending upon al-Muqtaraḥ; cf. K, p. 352.
74. The terminology used is that of Qur'ān 39:3.
75. Cf. Qur'ān 19:17.
76. Because the angel did not tell the man to do something, as the next paragraph
explains.
77. Technically one including commanding, forbidding, questioning and summoning

attention, all of which do not admit of truth or falsehood.
78. M does not take up the question.
79. Thus in ms. E1, f. 264a; the printed edition has "bi-īmāni-hi" instead of "wa-imā'i-hi".
80. Cf. above, A, f.
81. On magic etc., see below, I, f. (N. 48).
82. W, in fact, first lists the three objections and then gives the three answers.
83. Cf. Genesis 9:3-4.
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84. Cf. Leviticus, ch. 11.
85. Leviticus 18:9.
86. Liah and Rachel; cf. Genesis 29:15-30.
87. Leviticus 18:18.
88. Leviticus 10:8-11 etc.
89. All the texts given here, and many more, are to be found verbatim in a. l-Àbbās A. b.
Idrīs al-Qarāfī's al-Ajwiba al-fākhira fī r-radd àlā l-as'ila al-fājira (published in Cairo,
H. 1322, on the margin of Àr. Bak Afnadī Badjahji Zādeh, al-Fāriq bayn al-makhlūq
wa-l-khāliq), pp. 359 and following. As-Sanūsī no doubt had access to this or a similar
work. The Biblical references I give refer to the passages as-Sanūsī's texts resemble or
distort.
90. Instead of "from the sons of their brothers", the Hebrew has "from among (mi-qarab)
their brothers".
91. Al-Mallālī, ch. 3, ff. 25b-26a, gives a fuller version of as-Sanūsī's arguments on this
point.
92. Instead of "whose hand will be over all, and the hand of all will be extended to him in
subjection", the Hebrew has "whose hand will be against all, and the hand of all against
him" (yado bi-kol wa-yad kol bo).
93. The Greek omits the demonstrative and personal pronouns, and reads "I have now
spoken to you before it (the coming of the Paraclete) happens, so that when it happens
you may believe".
94. Khulq, "virtue" (or khalq, "creature"?) is the word in all the exemplars of this text
instead of the obvious ḥaqq, "truth".
95. John actually has "He will bear witness to me, and you will bear witness, because you
were with me from the beginning."
96. John has "Father" instead of "Lord".
97. On this word in Muslim usage see The Gospel of Barnabas, ed. and tr. by Lonsdale
and Lawra Ragg (Oxford, 1907), p. xxxii.
98. "Your law and your statutes" corresponds to a Syriac version. The Masoretic is
"toreka", "will teach, according to which the phrase reads "Your right hand will teach you
fearsome things".
99. Echoing Qur'ān 3:83.
100. Cf. Qur'ān 9:29.
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101. "Laugh" (yaḍḥaq) should be "cry out" (yatsàq). "Give hearing..." is not in Isaiah.
102. "Resting" (rābi ḍ a ) should be "Lost" (apolôlota).
103. Isaiah does not mention the ass or the camel, but cf. Zachariah 9:9 for a mention of
riding on an ass.
104. This omission by Ṣṣ and its omission of the spurious passage given above in n. 7 give
reason to think that as-Sanūsī somehow checked his material for authenticity between
writing W and Ṣṣ .
105. See the commentary of ar-Rāzī for an interpretation giving the names ā ṣ if and
Balqīs.
106. Remember that as-Sanūsī was writing at a time when the caliphate had passed from
the Arabs to the Turks, and had ceased to represent the function described here.
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As-Sanusi - IMAM MOHD B YUSUF - THEOLOGY - KENNY

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Joseph Kenny OP: MUSLIM THEOLOGY ... Muhammad b. Yūsuf ... http://www.diafrica.org/nigeriaop/kenny/Isltheology/Sanusi3.

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Definition and distinctions (Nos. 44-45)

K = al-`Aqīda al-kubrā and its commentary (works 2 and 3)

A. The science of kalām

a. Blind-acceptance versus correct reasoning, definitions:

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not firm (ghayr al-jazm), and:

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b. The obligation of knowledge

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Of these opinions, K admits that knowing-awareness of God is the first obligation in

A person is encharge (mukallaf), or subject to legal obligations, when he has reached

c. The status of a blind-acceptor (muqallid)

a believer, but disobedient simply (mu`in illā annahu `āṣ)

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d. The reality of faith

1) Al-Ash`arī, as has been seen, identified it with knowing-awareness (ma`rifa).

2) Another opinion of al-Ash`arī was that it is an interior statement that something is

Therefore the opinion adopted is that acknowledging truthfulness is a characteristic which

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is so only for one who is able (qādir).

e. The position of this science

J [1e, f. 14a] distinguishes religious sciences on the basis of revealed determinations

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f. Method and preliminary notions

As for the determinations of intelligibility mentioned in the Creed, M [ff. 194b-199b]

of revealed-law (shar`ī) = a declaration of God related to the acts of encharged

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K [pp. 508-509] lists four kinds of authorities:

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B. The existence of God

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body nor an accidental.

b. The argument from the world's having come into being

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subject of an eternal flux of substantial forms and accidentals.

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c. The argument from possibility

C. The essence of God and attributes in general

a. Knowability of God's essence

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The best opinion is that of al-Bāqillānī, Imām-al-Ḥaramayn, al-Ghazālī, and ar-Rāzī in

But none of these things are God's essence. Therefore it is unknown.

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themselves = existent substantive attributes (ma`ān), e.g. "knowledge"

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1) of essential-property (nafsiyya). K offers several definitions amounting to the same

2) negative (salbiyya) = the negation of an imperfection which it is impossible for God to

3) substantive (al-ma`ānī) = positive attributes inhering in the essence and causing a

4) adjectival (ma`nawiyya) = attributes of the essence which are dispositions or

positive (wujūdiyya), such as creating, vivifying, moving etc.

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this is omitting to punish someone who deserves punishment.

a. Being from eternity (qidam)(45)

K [p. 152] parenthetically defines a continuous regress (tasalsul) as "an arrangement of

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b. Being everlasting (baqā') (47)

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