Was Hitler right to invade Russia in 1941?

by Andrew Wright
Was Hitler right to invade Russia in 1941?
It is commonly believed that the invasion of Russia was one of Hitler's greatest strategic
blunders !" to that "oint the #erman war machine had con$uered and sub%ugated all her
enemies &e'ce"t for (ritain)* while at the same time Russia had been "roviding her with much
needed resources such as oil and wheat +ngland's "osition was deteriorating $uic,ly and the
!nited -tates was still neutral .he invasion of Russia cut off those "recious su""lies* and even
though the Russians too, un"recedented losses the #ermans ultimately failed to ta,e /oscow
and suffered heavily in the winter that followed While this event is usually %udged by the results*
it must be remembered how close the Russians came to colla"sing* and had Hitler had
concentrated on ta,ing /oscow instead of switching the a'is of advance during the cam"aign*
the #ermans would have li,ely won the war .he invasion of Russia in 1941 offered Hitler the
best chance of winning World War 0
.o understand why Hitler invaded Russia it is necessary to go bac, to the s"ring of 1941 and loo,
at the general situation in +uro"e After lightning cam"aigns against his enemies* Hitler
controlled Western +uro"e* 1entral +uro"e* -candinavia and most of +astern +uro"e A further
cam"aign against the (al,ans during the s"ring secured his southern flan, After witnessing its
continental allies fall one by one* +ngland was fighting for mere survival* never mind ta,ing the
fight to the enemy .his left #ermany with only two ma%or threats* the !nited -tates and the
-oviet !nion .he former was neutral and wanted nothing to do with what it saw as a "urely
+uro"ean conflict* but the latter was %ust across the border
and fielded the biggest army in the world
.hus it is obvious that Russia was not only the greatest threat to 2a3i #ermany* but also the last
ma%or obstacle to #erman domination of +uro"e It is li,ely that the only reason -talin never
attac,ed #ermany was because of the "athetic state of the Red Army at the time 4es"ite this
logic* some historians have alleged that -talin was bent on attac,ing #ermany during the
summer of 1941 and insists this is why so much of the Red Army was massed near the border
during the time of the #erman invasion +ither way* given certain strategic* economic and
ideological considerations* there is little doubt that war between the two "owers was inevitable
4uring the s"ring of 1941 time was not on #ermany's side Although isolated and nearing
ban,ru"tcy* +ngland was no closer to suing for "eace than she had been the year before
America* though neutral* was not only su""lying (ritain with much needed war materials* but
drifting closer into a state of war with #ermany Russia might have a""eared docile at the
moment* but that was not guaranteed to last As for #erman industry* after many years of
rearmament and war* it was showing signs of strain and running low on "recious resources*
es"ecially oil .hough #ermany was getting substantial oil from Russia and the 5loesti 6ilfields in
Romania* it was not enough
#iven her lac, of oil* and the "otential threat of fighting on two fronts* #ermany had to ma,e a
choice of whether to finish off +ngland* or attac, the Russia .his left the #ermans with two
strategic o"tions7
1) .he /editerranean o"tion7 +ssentially* Rommel would receive massive reinforcements and
su""lies and the A'is would attem"t to overrun +gy"t* the -ue3 1anal and finally the 6il Rich
countries of the /iddle +ast #ermany and Italy are much closer to 8ibya than +ngland is to
+gy"t and would therefore find it easier to su""ly their forces However* this could only be done
effectively if (ritish9held /alta* located between -icily and 8ibya* was either neutrali3ed or
invaded 1onsidering #ermany did neutrali3e /alta for long "eriods during World War 0* it is
"ossible the #ermans could have reinforced their army in 8ibya with enough men and resources
to ta,e over the /iddle +ast* fi' their oil shortages* and turn the /editerranean into an :A'is
8a,e:
0) .he Russian 6"tion7 An all9out attac, on Russia Russia's armies would be destroyed before
winter in huge battles of encirclement* /oscow would be ta,en and the #ermans would occu"y
Russia from Archangel on the White -ea to Astra,han on the 1as"ian -ea 4efeating Russia
would de"end on the successful use of (lit3,rieg7 4estroying or neutrali3ing the enemy's air
force in the first few hours of attac,* "araly3ing the enemy's command and communications*
$uic, advances behind the enemy's frontline designed to surround and destroy their armies* etc
(oth o"tions offered a solution to the oil "roblem* and both had the "otential to defeat one of
#ermany's enemies .he only $uestion is which one had the most "otential for safeguarding the
Reich
It is a sound strategic "rinci"le that when it comes to war* the strongest enemy should be dealt
with first (etween* Russia and (ritain* there can be no doubt that the Russians were the bigger
threat to #ermany .he Russian army alone had the man"ower and resources to challenge the
#erman army +ven if (ritain was bac,ed by a "owerful American army she would have little
chance of defeating #ermany With hindsight it is $uestionable whether or not even Russia could
have defeated #ermany on its own* but it is very "robable that (ritain and America could not
have
Another consideration is whether it would have been easier to defeat +ngland after Russia had
been subdued* or easier to defeat Russia after +ngland had been defeated
If the #ermans would have attac,ed (ritain via the /iddle +ast in 1941 and managed to ,noc,
them out of the war* Russia's "osition would have been worse off* but not ho"eless -he would
still have all her territory* all her armies and more time to "re"are Additionally* it is "ossible that
America would have been so frightened by (ritain's colla"se she would have sent as much
military aide to Russia as "ossible It should also be remembered that -talin and his #enerals
were im"lementing many wide9ranging reforms during 1941 that would have borne fruit in 1940
and the Russian army would have dis"layed much more com"etence and s,ill than it managed to
do when the #ermans actually invaded With these considerations in mind* it is li,ely that Russia
would have been in a better "osition to resist the #ermans in 1940 than 1941
(ut what chance would (ritain have had if Russia had been attac,ed and defeated first? -he
would have had no allies on the continent to su""ort* and even if the !- would have %oined the
war and fielded an army* the two combined would not have been able to land on the continent
and defeat the #ermans It is even li,ely that the intervention of the !nited -tates would not
have been enough to avert the defeat of +ngland in the case of Russia being defeated in 1941 It
would have ta,en years &as it did) for the !- to build forces in the !nited ;ingdom to any
significant degree In that "eriod of time* #ermany could either have built a large enough air
force to defeat the RA< and invade +ngland* built a big enough !9(oat fleet to starve +ngland
into submission* or maybe even both It is even "ossible the defeat of Russia could have
convinced the (ritish to give in* assuming 1hurchill was ,ic,ed out of office
+ven if we com"letely disregarded the sound strategic and economic reasons for the invasion of
Russia* the ideological differences between the two states alone could have been enough to
ma,e war inevitable It is ironic that 2a3i #ermany and the -oviet !nion* li,ely the two most
wic,ed and amoral regimes in the world at the time* were "oles a"art in their "olitics* beliefs and
values <ascists and 1ommunists are sworn enemies and the feelings of the leaders and "eo"le
on both sides towards each other ran from indifference at best* to undying hatred at worst (oth
countries wanted to become the sole arbiter of +uro"e .he Russians signed the /olotov9
Ri""entro" 5act so they could secure territories in +astern +uro"e while #ermany fought what
-talin believed would be a war of attrition against <rance and (ritain He ho"ed that the
combatants would wear each other down to the "oint where Russia could defeat them and
dominate +uro"e Hitler* for his "art* had clearly laid out his "lans for +uro"ean Hegemony in
:/ein ;am"f: In his boo,* Hitler s"o,e about securing :8ebensraum: &living s"ace) in the east*
which could only mean invading Russia Additionally* there was no attem"t on the "art of the
2a3is to mas, their venomous hatred of the -lavs* 1ommunists and =ews .hough the Russians
never dis"layed the same amount of hatred for other races* they certainly did not li,e the
#ermans or even =ews &des"ite their huge numbers in Russia)> though it should be remembered
that anti9-emitism was rife all over +uro"e at the time
2ow that it has been established that war between the #ermans and Russians was inevitable*
and that the best chance for #ermany to defeat Russia was in 1941* the $uestion remains* could
they have won? /ost countries at the time certainly thought so 1hurchill's #enerals estimated
the Russians would colla"se in si' wee,s> the Americans gave a similar figure If there ever was
a stunning mismatch of forces in the history of warfare* it is the Wehrmacht and the Red Army in
1941
.he Wehrmacht was une$uivocally the best army in +uro"e at the time* while the Red Army was
li,ely the worst .he Russians may have had more men and tan,s* but the #ermans were better
trained* better e$ui""ed and better led Hitler may not have been the greatest commander in
chief* but at least he did not shoot the flower of his army li,e -talin did during the "urges .he
#ermans were also taught to thin, and ta,e the initiative* while the Russian soldiers were
"araly3ed by rigid "rocedures and "olitical commissars who could overrule commanders on the
s"ot #erman communications and coordination between the services were harmonious* while
the Russian systems were "rimitive or non9e'istent .he only advantages the Russians en%oyed
&su"erior numbers and a vast country) were wasted when -talin insisted that his armies were
not to retreat and would fight to the last man #iven the #erman su"eriority listed above* there
was only one li,ely result
/ore advantages that the #ermans en%oyed were the loyalty of the "o"ulace and the confidence
of their army Hitler remains the most "o"ular leader in #erman History &this is not to say he is
still "o"ular in #ermany today* %ust that he was more "o"ular during his time than any other
#erman leader was during his) 6""osition to Hitler was always very small* while most #ermans
fought loyally to the bitter end .he fact remains* as long as you were not a =ew* a #y"sy* a
Homose'ual* a 1ommunist &the list goes on)* in other words* as long as you were a normal
#erman* life was good in the .hird Reich* and it is a sad fact that whenever life is good for the
ma%ority of citi3ens in any country* they will tend to turn a blind eye to the evils of the state ?et
ha""y citi3ens ma,e good soldiers* and good soldiers with battlefield e'"erience ma,e confident
soldiers
.he same cannot be said of the Russians* or at least of all the "eo"les of the -oviet !nion -talin
was a bloodier dictator than normal While most dictators do not shy away from bloodshed to
maintain their gri" on "ower* -talin's e'cesses went far beyond the reaches of real"oliti, It is
estimated that he is res"onsible for the murder of 14 million -oviet 1iti3ens While many "eo"le
in the -oviet !nion were either na@ve about the communist dream* felt that the sacrifices were
worth it* or were used to living under a brutal leader &Russia is not ,nown for soft leaders)* a
great deal of the masses were scared of -talin and so des"erate to esca"e his wrath that even
Hitler loo,ed li,e a savior When the #ermans invaded* most "eo"le from the !,raine and the
(altic -tates saw them as liberators /any willingly fed and su""lied the #ermans* and many
even volunteered to fight against Russia 4uring the war more than one million -oviet 1iti3ens
too, u" arms against their former leaders
.he "lanning of :6"eration (arbarossa*: the Invasion of Russia* reflected the confidence of the
#ermans It was assumed the Red Army could be destroyed in huge battles of encirclement and
that most of Russia west of the !ral /ountains could be occu"ied before winter
.he "lan was sim"le* but as 1lausewit3 says :everything in strategy is sim"le: #iven the si3e of
Russia* the #erman army would be divided into A grou"s Army #rou" 2orth would advance
through the (altic -tates towards 8eningrad* Army #rou" -outh would move into the !,raine
and then the 1aucasus to ta,e the wheat and oil fields of Russia* and Army #rou" 1enter would
advance through White Russia towards /oscow While all the Army #rou"s would move
inde"endently and all had their own ob%ectives* there were only enough resources* es"ecially
5an3er 4ivisions* to ensure that only one of the grou"s received "riority to com"lete their final
ob%ectives at any one time <or e'am"le* although Army #rou" 2orth and Army #rou" -outh
could ma,e much "rogress on their own* they could not sei3e their final ob%ectives &8eningrad or
the 1aucasus 6il <ields) without the massive 5an3er forces which we assume would be
concentrated in Army #rou" 1enter for the main effort against /oscow
.his limitation became the cause of many heated debates between Hitler and his #enerals and
"roved disastrous for :6"eration (arbarossa: When a country goes to war* it is only sensible
that the #overnment and the /ilitary have already determined the enemy's :1enter of #ravity:*
and have already "lanned on how to neutrali3e it .he enemy's :1enter of #ravity: can be their
armed forces* their ca"ital* a "owerful ally* etc
Hitler and his #enerals disagreed from the start about what Russia's :1enter of #ravity: was .he
#enerals thought it was /oscow* while Hitler thought it was !,raine and the 6il fields of the
1aucasus
Hitler's reasoning* if it can be called that* was based on history 2a"oleon had ta,en /oscow* but
the Russians had not given in* and in the end 2a"oleon had to retreat* with disastrous results for
his +m"ire Hitler was determined not to re"eat that mista,e> he was going to head south* ta,e
the !,raine and the 6il fields* and deny the Russians the resources he felt they needed to
continue the war
His #enerals could not have disagreed more .hey argued that Russia was so vast* and ca"able
of re"lacing whole armies* that only the ca"ture of /oscow would destroy the -oviet Regime
.hey argued that /oscow was the "olitical and logistical hub of +uro"ean Russia* and if it was
ta,en* the Russians would not be able to continue the war west of the !rals A sim"le glance at
any world atlas will indeed show that in Western Russia* :all roads lead to /oscow: -ince most
of Russia's "o"ulation* resources and industry are located west of the !rals* even if the Russians
elected to fight on* it would be a lost cause <inally* they argued that -talin was so feared and
des"ised* that if the Red Army was destroyed* and /oscow ta,en* the "eo"le would overthrow
him and sue for "eace
While Hitler was the head of state and commander in chief* and therefore had the last word* in
this case he was absolutely wrong .he attem"t to sei3e of !,raine in 1941 was by itself
ambitious* but to try and ta,e the 1aucasus oilfields as well was truly blind o"timism* at least as
long as there was a Russian #overnment in /oscow +ven if the #ermans had ta,en !,raine and
all of the oilfields* the -oviet Regime would still be intact and worse* given the still considerable
Russian armies to the north and the long lines of communications the #ermans would have in the
south* the Russians could have "ossibly cut off the #erman army in southern Russia as they
actually did in late 1940
(ut the sei3ure of /oscow would have been decisive 2ot only would the Russians have "ut every
available soldier in front of it giving the #ermans the o""ortunity to destroy the Red Army* but as
listed above* its ca"ture would have li,ely s"elt ruin for -talin and his regime* or at least
destroyed it as an effective entity
2ow all that remains is to show what ha""ened when the #ermans invaded* and why they failed
to defeat Russia in 1941
2a3i #ermany invaded the -oviet !nion on =une 00* 1941 4es"ite the fact that all the
intelligence given to -talin "ointed to a #erman attac,* "lus the obvious "re"arations the
#ermans were ma,ing* the Wehrmacht achieved com"lete sur"rise In the first day alone more
then 1BBB "lanes were caught on the ground and destroyed &more "lanes than the #erman Air
force managed to destroy during the whole :(attle of (ritain:)* while the #erman 5an3ers were
already slicing through the Russian lines* beginning the first of many encirclements of the
Russian Armies -ince a large "art of the Red Army was massed along the border* the #erman
Army managed to ca"ture or destroy whole armies 6n the 0Cth of =une they too, /ins, and
managed to surround 1D -oviet 4ivisions* which later surrendered 6n =uly the 1Dth* the
#ermans too, -molens,* and on August Dth they ca"tured the 0DB*BBB9ABB*BBB Russians
soldiers encircled around it -imilar "rogress was made by Army #rou" 2orth in the (altic
-tates* while Army #rou" -outh's advance was slow but steady
While the battle around -molens, had been hard fought and too, longer to clear u" then the
#ermans had ho"ed for* the road was now clear for an advance on /oscow !nfortunately for
Hitler's #enerals* 2a3i #ermany* and in the end Hitler himself* it was not to be Instead of
ordering Army #rou" 1enter to continue its advance on /oscow* Hitler ordered that the 5an3ers*
and thus the a'is of advance* be switched towards the !,raine When Hein3 #uderian* the main
commander of the 5an3er Armies* flew to visit Hitler and "leaded to let him advance on /oscow*
Hitler re"lied :my generals ,now nothing about the economic as"ect of war: What followed is
"robably the greatest e'am"le of gaining a magnificent tactical victory* at the cost of strategic
success #uderian's 5an3ers advanced south* too, ;iev on -e"tember the 19th* and netted
EDB*BBB more "risoners on the 0Fth At the time* it was the greatest defeat ever suffered by an
army (ut for #ermany* it was a hollow victory
6nce the !,raine had been secured* Hitler finally relented and continued the advance to /oscow
on 6ctober the 0nd (etween the 0nd and the ABth of 6ctober* when the advance had to be
halted* the #ermans too, more than EBB*BBB Russian "risoners Although the #erman army had
scored another significant victory* they had still not reached /oscow A final* last ditch offensive*
:6"eration .y"hoon*: began on 2ovember 0Dth and by the time it finally wore out* the #ermans
were within 0B miles of /oscow* or 0 days march according to many of the commanders In fact*
<edor von (oc,* the 1ommander of Army #rou" 1enter* could see the -"ires of the ;remlin
through his binoculars
(ut it was too late 6n 4ecember the Dth* 1941* the -oviets* reinforced with fresh forces from
-iberia and commanded by the able #eneral Ghu,ov launched a massive counteroffensive While
the #erman army did not disintegrate li,e 2a"oleon's :#rande ArmHe: before it* it too, horrific
losses and had to retreat a significant distance from the ste"s of /oscow 2ever again did the
#ermans threaten /oscow* and it is li,ely that from there on the war was lost
In 1941* Hitler gambled that he could defeat the -oviets* and lost (ut does the result by itself
mean he was wrong to have tried* or that he was doomed to fail? 1onsidering the losses suffered
by the Russian Army* and how close the #ermans came to ta,ing /oscow* surely not
4uring 1941* the Russian Army lost somewhere around 4*DBB*BBB casualties 6f this* at least
0*4BB*BBB were "risoners of war .heir total losses sur"assed the amount of men they had in
arms when the invasion began 4uring the cam"aign the #ermans inflicted casualty ratios on the
Russians from 1B91 to 0B91 .he #ermans ca"tured around half of Russia's industry and two
fifths of their "o"ulation .o suggest that #ermany had no chance of winning is absurd
(ut #ermany did not win* and it is necessary to as, why Why did they not succeed after
destroying countless armies* sei3ing im"ortant cities and overrunning vital economic and
industrial sectors? How could an army so su"erior to its enemy in almost every way not defeat
them? How was it "ossible that a "eo"le so confident in their soldiers and their leaders fail to
con$uer a disillusioned "eo"le scared of its own soldiers and leaders?
.he answer is remar,ably sim"le7 Hitler's failure to observe the sound strategic "rinci"le of
:maintenance of the ob%ective: .he #ermans had to defeat the Russians before winter arrived
As e'"lained above* the only way to decisively beat them would be the sei3ure of /oscow In the
summer of 1941* wherever the #erman army advanced* it destroyed everything in its "ath What
sto""ed the #ermans from ta,ing /oscow was the arrival of winter Had Hitler let his #enerals
advance on /oscow after the :(attle of -molens,: it is "robable that /oscow would have been
ca"tured and the -oviet Regime destroyed It was Hitler's decision to switch the :A'is of
Advance: to the !,raine during the middle of the cam"aign that ultimately saved /oscow
1onsidering how close the #ermans came to ta,ing it in 6ctober and 2ovember* it is more than
li,ely they could have ta,en /oscow in -e"tember if they would have advanced on it instead of
;iev
Whether or not Hitler would have ta,en /oscow and won the war if he had continued the
advance to it after the :(attle of -molens,: is one of the big :what ifs: of military history
However* +uro"e* the free world* and es"ecially Russia are all eternally grateful that they never
had to find that out