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A Review of William Alstons A Realist Conception of Truth

"lusegun Ste(en Samuel
'
)*inola +ohammed )*omola,e
2
'. -epartment o, Philosoph.& /ni(ersit. o, 0agos& )*o*a& 0agos& Nigeria
2. -epartment o, Philosoph.& 0agos State /ni(ersit.& "1o& 0agos& Nigeria
2
3mail o, corresponding author4 meetseggsus5.ahoo.com

A Realist Conception of Truth has 6een generall. praised as a serious and insight,ul wor* on epistemolog.. 7his
8illiam P. )lston9s te:t is directed at those who are concerned with epistemological studies& those interested in
how to contemplate on truth& and those epistemologists see*ing ,or 1usti,ication o, 6elie,s& statements& sentences
and propositions. In this te:t& the pro6lem o, truth recei(es a critical e:ploration in )lston9s polemic o, realism.
)lston9s goal is to de,end a (ersion o, realism. /ltimatel.& he argues that the most de,ensi6le (ersion o, realist
theories is alethic realism& which suggests simpl. that& ;) statement is true i, and onl. i, what the statement is
a6out is as the statement sa.s it is. )lternati(el. in terms o, propositions& the conception is such that the schema
<it is true that p i, and onl. i, p .ields a (necessar.& conceptuall.& anal.ticall.) true statement ,or an. su6stitution
instance= ()lston& '>>4 '). )s a matter o, ,act& the author9s (iew is a cross re,erence to the issue o, truth
discussed ,rom the da.s o, Socrates to 3dmund ?ettier@ then to our time.

Arom )ncient to Bontemporar. epoch& philosophers are continuall. raising Cuestions concerning the nature o,
truth and how it can 6e cogitated. 8hile it is a truism that there is no monolithic idea on how truth can 6e
deri(ed& there is nonetheless a consensus that truth is in(alua6le. )lston9s 6oo* argues that the traditional
epistemic accounts o, truth (correspondence& pragmatic and coherence theories) are misguided approaches to
truth. 8hat is truthD )nd& how is truth to 6e disco(eredD 7hese Cuestions though appear simple& ha(e generated
contro(ersies in di,,erent philosophical Cuarters. 7hus& )lston thin*s that it is appropriate that one considers
them anew. Euestions that should 6e pounding on a critic9s mind include4 8hat does this 6oo* see* to e:plainD
8hat is truth to )lstonD How is )lston9s theor. o, truth di,,erent ,rom other theories o, truthD Is )lston
a,,irming or den.ing the idea o, truthD In short& what is the 6oo* all a6outD

)ccording to )lston& the discourse on truth is a crucial aspect o, *nowledge. Howe(er& he thin*s that pri(ilege
theories on truth that we ha(e toda. ha(e not adeCuatel. (or perhaps& ha(e not correctl.) e:plored the nature and
meaning o, truth. In a sense& )lston is suggesting that traditional accounts o, truth& which he callsFepistemic
conceptions o, truth& are theoreticall. misguided. 3:amples o, epistemic theories o, truth that )lston identi,ies
include coherence and pragmatic theories o, truth. 7hese theories& according to him& consider the issue o, truth
,rom epistemic angles& wherein notion such as 1usti,ication& (eri,ication& certaint.& rationalit.& *nowledge or
general consensus is considered as the criterion o, truth. Howe(er& )lston re1ects these epistemic notions as
6ases ,or truth. )lston ('>>4 ) notes thus4 ;)s ,or epistemic accounts& the. ta*e the truth o, a statement or
6elie, to consist o, some positi(e epistemic status o, the statement or 6elie,Fits 6eing 1usti,ied (in conditions o,
some idealised sort)& or 6eing adeCuatel. supported 6. e(idence& or 6. 6eing <warranta6l. asserta6le9& or
cohering with some s.stem o, 6elie,s. 7raditional coherence and pragmatist theories o, truth ,all under this
ru6ric& as well as some recent (iews.=

)pparentl.& the author maintains that& ;In particular& and loo*ing ,orward to the main alternati(e to this account
o, truth& there are no epistemic reCuirements ,or the truth o, an. statement= ()lston& '>>4 5). He presents alethic
realism as an alternati(e to epistemic theories o, truth. Ha(ing noted that there is no need ,or epistemic standards
,or a 6elie,& statement or proposition to 6e ad1udged true& )lston goes on to e:plore how truth is to 6e considered.
0et us s*etch what )lston is re,uting and what he is a,,irming in his 6oo* 6e,ore we consider his ma1or
arguments and conclusions.

A Realist Conception of Truth ,ocuses on re,uting the ,ollowing4 (') de,lationar. accounts o, truth (which den.
that truth has a propert.)@ (2) +ichael -ummett and Hilar. Putnam9s anti-realist epistemic theories (which
suggest that the mind must add structure and content to the world& leading to the thesis that o61ecti(it. o, the
e:ternal world is impossi6le)& (G) epistemic accounts o, truth ((eri,icationist& relati(ist& coherentist& and
pragmatist theories) and epistemic standards ,or truth-(alue& and (4) the use o, sentences& 6elie,s and statements
as 6earers o, truth.

8hat is it that the 6oo* is a,,irmingD )ccording to )lston9s theor.& there are at least ,i(e dimensions o, alethic
realism. Hence& the 6oo* is aimed at arguing that4 (a) epistemic notions such as (eri,ication& rationalit. and
certaint. are crucial as regards to *nowledge and its (alidation& 6ut these do not ,orm part o, the conception o,
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truth. 7o )lston ('>>4 !)& ;It is 6. (irtue o, the meaning o, <true9 that a statement is true i, and onl. i, what the
statement sa.s is the case actuall. is the case=& (6) the discussions o, epistemic 1usti,ication should 6e
discontinued since man. people would 6e remo(ed ,rom discourse on truth i, no corro6oration can 6e made
concerning their 6elie,s (rather& he notes that when our 6elie,s are ,ormed in a <relia6le wa.9 and we ha(e
<adeCuate grounds9 ,or them& these are enough or desira6le ,or our purpose o, cognition than rel.ing on
1usti,ication)& (c) truth has a propert. (that is& )lston 6elie(es that propositions are the primar. 6earers o, truth-
(alue in the sense that it is propositions that one has in mind when one sa.s that a statement& 6elie, or sentence is
true. In other words& ;Aor what is asserted or what is 6elie(ed& the content o, an assertion or a 6elie,& is a
proposition= ()lston& '>>4 '5)& (d) we cannot ha(e 1usti,ication without truth in the same wa. that we cannot
ha(e *nowledge without truth (hence truth is the most ,undamental propert. in epistemolog.)& (e) there is a need
to demarcate the concept o, truth ,rom its propert.. ()lston ('>>4 G) notes that& ;Hthe propert. o, truth ma.
ha(e (arious ,eatures that are not re,lected in our concept o, truth=)& and (,) the truth ma*er is to 6e made *nown
6. the truth 6earer. 7hus& )lston posits that& ;Hthe truth ma*er is something that is o61ecti(e (is-a-(is the truth
6earer. It has to do with what the truth 6earer is a6out& rather than with some <internal9 or <intrinsic9 ,eature o,
the truth 6earer& such as its epistemic status& its place in a s.stem o, propositions& or the con,idence with which it
is held= ()lston& '>>4 -$). In this last stance& )lston seems to argue that truth has to do with a potential truth
6earer to a realit. or state o, a,,air 6e.ond it (this is <,act9 that is e:ternal to the *nower).

)s a realist& )lston (entures into a discourse on alethic realism and truth 6. identi,.ing that there are di,,erent
shades o, realism. 7hese include naI(e (direct) realism& critical realism& scienti,ic realism& moral realism& among
others. NaI(e realism holds that our senses pro(ide us with immediate awareness o, the e:ternal world. 7his
position suggests that o61ects ha(e siJe& shape& te:ture& colour and weight& and that we can o61ecti(el. percei(e
them as the. are. 7hat is& o61ects retain their content (properties) independent o, whether we percei(e them or
not. Britical realism posits that properties o, o61ects such as primar. sense data (weight& shape& siJe& etc) are
inherent in o61ects& whereas secondar. Cualities such as odour& colour& etc. are not part o, the o61ect (that is&
secondar. sense data do not actuall. represent an. e:ternal o61ects). Scienti,ic realism notes that certain o61ects
are real. )lston ta*es realism to 6e a 6etter e:ploration o, the state o, a,,air& although he di,,erentiates his stance
(alethic realism) ,rom the a,orementioned realist postures. His realism ,ocuses more on truth& than 1usti,.ing the
e:ternal world. 7hat the e:ternal world and o61ects e:ist independent o, the *nowing mind& to )lston& are not
something that a reasona6le theor. will den. since truth deals with the e:istence o, what is asserted. 7hus )lston
('>>4 $) sa.s that& ;Hi, our concept o, truth is a realist one& then all our 6elie,s owe their truth (alue to the ,act
that the. are related in a certain wa. to a realit. 6e.ond themsel(es.= 0ater on& )lston shows the a,,inities
among di,,erent segments o, realism& and a,,irms that it is the distinguishing ,eatures o, alethic realism that
;He(er.thing we 6elie(e can 6e assessed ,or truth (alue= and that& ;H realism is more widel. and more
naturall. used ,or a (ariet. o, positions that ta*e something or other to reall. e:ist= ()lston& '>>4 $).

"ne o, the 6oo*9s strengths is the opportunit. it a,,ords us to e:amine the issue o, the 6earer o, truth-(alue&
there6. nulli,.ing the use o, sentences and statements as the 6earers o, truth. )lston argues that the reasons wh.
sentences cannot 6e emplo.ed as truth 6earers include4 (a) a single sentence ma. ha(e di,,erent truth-(alues or
di(erse meanings& and (6) e(en a gi(en sentence with one and the same meaning ma. 6e used to ma*e di,,erent
statements. Aor instance& the author opines that when a sentence such as ;Harold Stassen is still running= is
uttered& there is an am6iguit. on whether <running9 should 6e interpreted as Stassen is mo(ing or he is contesting
,or an o,,ice in an election. )lston ('>>4 '#) puts this thus& ;7hat sentence can 6e used to state that Stassen is
still locomoting 6. mo(ing his legs rapidl.& and also to state that Stassen is still o,,ering himsel, as a candidate
,or an election. It ma. well 6e that at a certain moment@ one o, these statements is true and the other ,alse.= 7o
him& it is essential that a 6earer o, truth should ha(e onl. one de,inite truth (alue. 8hile he argues that sentence
cannot 6e a truth 6earer& he nurses the opinion that& ;7he attri6ution o, truth (alues to statement-ma*ing sentence
to*en escapes= ()lston& '>>4 '') all the o61ections accrua6le to sentence or sentence t.pe. 7he author ('>>4 '')
sa.s that& ;) sentence t.pe is what is ordinaril. called a <sentence9& a unit o, language that can 6e uttered& used&
inscri6ed on man. di,,erent occasions. ) sentence to*en can 6e thought o, as one o, those utterances or
inscriptions o, the sentence t.pe.= 3(en at that& he argues that onl. indicati(e sentence t.pe or sentence to*en
can 6e used as a 6earer o, truth. )gainst this 6ac*drop& per,ormati(e and e(aluati(e sentences are e:cluded as
truth 6earers. )lston ('>>4 24) a(ers that& ;7he 6asic reason has to do with the ,act that we spea* o, statements
(assertions) as true or ,alse 6ut that we do not ascri6e truth (alues to reCuests& promises& appointing& e:pressions
o, gratitude& hopes& dou6ts& or wonderings. Nor is this selecti(it. ar6itrar.. 7he reason ,or it is that in ma*ing
statements and holding 6elie,s& we commit oursel(es to the propositional contents 6eing true.=

+oreo(er& he re1ects the use o, 6elie,s and statements as the 6earers o, truth-(alue. )lston 6elie(es that when the
notions o, <true9 and <,alse9 are applica6le to the contents o, 6elie,s and statements& then their truth-(alues can 6e
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deduced ,rom 6elie,s and statements as 6earers o, truth. Kut )lston thin*s that there is am6iguit. also in what
6elie,s and statements connote. He sa.s that statements (assertions) and 6elie,s (1udgments) e:hi6it what can 6e
depicted as act-o61ect am6iguit.. He writes that& ;)n <assertion9 can either 6e an act o, asserting or what is
asserted. ) 6elie, can also 6e a certain ps.chological state one is inFperhaps a certain neural disposition or
pattern o, acti(it.For what the statement is <directed onto9& what is 6elie(ed= ()lston& '>>4 '4). Since there is
an uncertaint. o, meaning o, 6elie,Lstatement as acts or o61ects (that is& the act o, asserting or ps.chological state
on the one hand& and the o61ect that is asserted or 6elie(ed on the other hand)& )lston thin*s that the notion o,
proposition can 6etter resol(e this am6iguit.. )lston ('>>4 '4) reiterates that& ;It is clear to me that truth (alues
attach primaril. to what is 6elie(ed (asserted)& and secondaril.& i, at all& to the state o, 6elie, or the act o,
asserting.= In this respect& there,ore& he maintains that it is on the content o, a 6elie, that truth is 6ased. ;Aor what
is asserted or what is 6elie(ed& the content o, an assertion or a 6elie,& is a proposition= ()lston& '>>4 '5).
)pparentl.& he holds that nothing can 6e a proposition unless it has a single or determinate truth-(alue ()lston&
'>>4 ').

He descri6es propositions as states o, a,,airs that ma. or ma. not o6tain. In other words& a proposition ma. 6e
used to claim that something is the case. 7hat is& it ma. 6e used to argue that a state o, a,,airs is or is not. In this
case& ;) state o, a,,airs that o6tains can 6e called ,act= ()lston& '>>4 '$). )lston insists that when a state o,
a,,airs is actuall. what it was claimed to 6e& then such a proposition is true& otherwise it is ,alse. 7o 6e more
e:plicit& )lston gi(es an e:ample thus4 <?old is mallea6le9. Proposition has 6oth su61ect and predicate terms.
?old is the su61ect& which claims to ha(e the content or propert. o, mallea6ilit.. 7he point that he stri*es here is
that i, <mallea6ilit.9 is the propert. attri6uted to <gold9& the truth,ulness o, the proposition that <?old is mallea6le9
can 6e shown 6. esta6lishing whether the said propert. is actuall. in gold or not. 7his is what is reCuired in the
esta6lishment o, a proposition9s truth-(alue. 7he author ('>>4 2') then su6mits that& ;+. central concern here
is the articulation and de,ense o, a realist conception o, truth& in opposition to epistemic conceptions.= Hence&
the ma:im o, truth is captured thus4 ;) proposition is true i, and onl. i, what the ma*er o, a statement with that
proposition as content is attri6uting to what the statement is a6out& in ma*ing that statement& does actuall. what
the statement is a6out= ()lston& '>>4 2!). 7his ma:im is called the 7-schema (where 7 stands ,or <truth9)
alluding to 7ars*i9s (iew.

Aollowing 7ars*i9s propositional truth which suggests that <M is true i, p9 (which )lston calls the 7-schema)& he
()lston) ,ormulates an instance (7-statement) thus4 <grass is green i, and onl. i, grass is green9. 7he author gets
an instance o, 7ars*i9s 7-schema 6. replacing p with a declarati(e sentence& and <M9 with an e:pression
re,erring to that sentence. )lston& then& argues that& ;7he 7-schema is not a statement 6ut a statement schema& a
,orm o, statement. )nd each instantiation thereo,& each 7-statement& pro(ides a condition ,or the truth o, a
particular proposition& not a general statement o, what it is ,or a proposition to 6e true= ()lston& '>>4 2-2$).
)ccordingl.& he notes that i, ;Hwe understand that an. 7-statement is conceptuall.& anal.ticall. true& true 6.
(irtue o, the meanings o, the terms in(ol(ed& in particular the term <true9& then we there6. understand what it is
,or a proposition to 6e true= ()lston& '>>4 2) in a realist sense.

7he pro6lem with 7ars*i9s (iew is that true is ,ormulated using sentence& rather than proposition. 7hus& to ma*e
7ars*i9s 7-schema wears a uni(ersal appeal@ the author suggests that this can 6e done in two wa.s. Airstl.& it is
important to ma*e the 7-sentence not to re,er to an. entit.@ hence he sa.s that we can uni(ersall. generalise the
7-schema thus4 ;7he proposition that p is true i, p= ()lston& '>>4 2$). In this case& the uni(ersal generalisation
o, the 7-schema is true i, and onl. i, su6stitution instances are true. 7he 6asic idea o, the realist conception o,
truth is to speci,. when the content (propert.) o, a position is realised (or not) 6. asserting what would ma*e the
position the case. 8hile )lston a,,irms largel. that 7ars*i9s semantic conception o, truth though does not ,ace
the criticisms le(eled against sentences as 6earers o, truth& .et he does not see an. good reason wh. the latter
held that the material criterion o, adeCuac. is rele(ant ,or the de,inition o, truth in the 7-schema.

)pparentl.& )lston presents a minimalist account o, truth which& to him& contrasts with correspondence&
pragmatic& coherence and epistemic theories o, truth. 8hile these latter theories (pragmatism& coherentism& etc.)
are minimalist accounts& his criticisms are directed against correspondence theor. in the main. Airstl.& the
connections 6etween realist conception o, truth (minimalist theor.) and correspondence theor. o, truth are
shown. 7hese include the ,act that (a) ;Ha true proposition is made true 6. a ,act= ()lston& '>>4 G2) and (6)
;Hthere is an identit. o, content 6etween proposition and ,act= ()lston& '>>4 GG) Howe(er& )lston raises a
num6er o, criticisms against what he descri6es as ,ull-dress correspondence theor. when he notes that4 (a) in the
7-schema ;7he proposition that p is true i, and onl. i, p= is not a de,inition o, truth& whereas scholars li*e
Russell and 8ittgenstein who are ad(ocates o, correspondence theor. seem to de,ine truth& and (6) his
minimalist account does not claim that the meaning o, a sentence is s.non.mous with the ,act& whereas the
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ad(ocates o, correspondence theor. hold that ,acts are s.non.mous to meaning. )lston ('>>4 G4) writes that&
;7he meaning o, <7he proposition that lemons are sour is true9 cannot 6e the same as that o, <0emons are sour9.
7he ,ormer has conceptual content which is a6sent ,rom the latter. "ne could understand <lemons are sour9
per,ectl. well without an. concept o, truth whate(er.= 7hough& he a,,irms that minimalism is a matter o, degree&
.et he thin*s that his position that <7he proposition that is true that p i, p= ,its well into the minimalist
,ramewor*.

"n the Cuestion4 what it is ,or a truth-(alue 6earer to 6e trueD )lston stresses that his realist conception o, truth
de,ends a di,,erent thesis when compared with epistemic theories. 7he author maintains that his idea o, truth
(and proposition) goes to e:amine ,eatures that are captured in the concept as well as outside the concept used in
e:pressing a gi(en statement. 7his& he thin*s& is not the case in epistemic theories. So& he re,ormulates his
minimalist account o, truth thus4 ;7he proposition is that p is true i, it is a ,act that p= ()lston& '>>4 G$) and
thus argues then that it is onl. 6. the (irtue o, the same content can a proposition and ,act 6e related ()lston&
'>>4 G>). Nonetheless& he grants that correspondence theor. is minimalist in this respect since truth and
correspondence are tightl. connected& though he re1ects the claim that ,act is dependent on language. It seems
aptl. to thin* in this respect& )lston imagines that there are ;Hno reason to suppose that ,acts are not o61ecti(el.
real= ()lston& '>>4 4'). He goes on to separate his minimalist realism ,rom de,lationar. theories. He sees his
position to 6e a minimalist account that is committed to arguing that truth has a propert.& whereas de,lationar.
stance is a contra-position. 7he author ('>>4 42) re1ects the position o, de,lationists 6ecause ;Hde,lationists
t.picall. emplo. the 7-schema to argue that since <7he proposition that p is true9 is eCui(alent to <p9& in sa.ing
the ,ormer one is asserting onl. that p. Hence it is a mista*e to suppose that the ,ormer in(ol(es the predication
o, a propert. o, truth to a proposition or to an.thing else.= He notes that this critiCue against his position is called
the redundanc. theor. and it is suggested Cuite clearl. 6. A.P. Ramse.9s counter-position which opines that& ;<It
is true that Baesar was murdered9 means no more than that Baesar was murdered= ()lston& '>>4 42). "ther
criticisms against )lston9s position are considered 6. him& especiall. Strawson9s stance that the statement <it is
true that p= (the 7-schema) does not ser(e a sentence-ma*ing role or does not ma*e an. statement on its own
right or that it is not applied to an.thing. )lston& to 6e sure& pro(ides good reasons how such criticism can 6e
nulli,ied. Airst& )lston argues that when one a,,irms a statement as true one does so 6. attri6uting the notion o,
truth to a thingFwhat is asserted. Secondl.& he argues that a 6elie, counts as *nowledge onl. i, it is true. 7hirdl.&
he argues that utterances do ha(e concessi(e ,orce.

7he 6oo*9s greatest (alues are its trans-disciplinar. nature and concern ,or practical implantation o, truth in
epistemological and other intellectual parlance& as well as in e(er. aspect o, li,e. 8ithout a paradigm shi,t in 2#
th

centur. epistemological posture& we stand to lose ,ar more 6ene,its o, *nowledge9s ingredients than
epistemologists would imagine. Aor )lston9s epistemological guide6oo* to help pre(ent such losses& its adoption
o, proposition as 6earer o, truth is unCuestiona6le. Howe(er& we dou6t that there could 6e a monolithic wa. o,
deciding what the propert. o, truth is i, we do not grasp a language correctl.. 7his ma*es the emphasis on
language 6. the (eri,icationist crucial to identi,.ing the propert. o, truth. 8hile we consider )lston9s position
more tena6le when compared to se(eral 2#
th
centur. perspecti(es on truth& we should not o(er-e:aggerate its
logical import. ) ,urther reading and a contentious engagement with the ,ull chapters o, the 6oo* will show
whether )lston succeeds or not in his epistemological pro1ect.

Reference
)lston& 8. P. ('>>)& A Realist Conception of Truth& New Nor*4 Bornell /ni(ersit. Press.






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Journal of Developing Country Studies DCS@iiste.org
Journal of Arts and Design Studies ADS@iiste.org