Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-24396 July 29, 1968
SANTIAGO P. ALALAYAN, ET AL., u!"# !" $! %&$'l( '") (o* +$& %&"&(!+ o( 'll o+$&* ,&*o" $'-!"# .o//o" o*
#&"&*'l !"+&*&+ 0!+$ $!/ !" '..o*)'".& 0!+$ S&.. 12, Rul& 3, Rul& o( Cou*+, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
NATIONAL PO1ER CORPORATION '") A2MINISTRATOR O3 ECONOMIC
COOR2INATION, respondents-appellees.
Alafriz Law Offices for petitioners-appellants.
The Government Corporate Counsel and Office of the Solicitor General for respondents-appellees.
3ERNAN2O, J.:
This declaratory relief proceedin !as started in the lo!er court by petitioners, Alalayan and Philippine Po!er and
"evelop#ent Co#pany, both franchise holders of electric plants in $auna, to test the validity of a section of an
a#endatory act,
%
e#po!erin respondent National Po!er Corporation &in any contract for the supply of electric po!er to
a franchise holder,& receivin at least '() of its electric po!er and enery fro# it to re*uire as a condition that such
franchise holder &shall not reali+e a net profit of #ore than t!elve percent annually of its invest#ents plus t!o-#onth
operatin e,penses.& Respondent, under such provision, could li-e!ise &rene! all e,istin contracts !ith franchise
holders for the supply of electric po!er and enery,& so that the provisions of the Act could be iven effect.
.
This statutory
provision !as assailed on the round that, bein a rider, it is violative of the constitutional provision re*uirin that a bill,
!hich #ay be enacted into la!, cannot e#brace #ore than one sub/ect, !hich shall be e,pressed in its title,
0
as !ell as the
due process uarantee, the liberty to contract of petitioners bein infrined upon. The lo!er court sustained its validity.
1e sustain the lo!er court in this appeal.
2n the petition for declaratory relief, after the usual alleations as to parties, it !as stated that respondent National Po!er
Corporation &has for so#e years no! been, and still is, by virtue of si#ilar, valid and e,istin contracts entered into by it
!ith one hundred and thirty seven 3%045 natural persons and corporations distributed all over the country, supplyin,
distributin, servicin and sellin electric po!er and enery at fi,ed rites schedules to the latter !ho have for so#e years
no! been and still are, leally enaed in resupplyin, redistributin, reservicin and resellin the said electric po!er and
enery to individual custo#ers !ithin the coverae of their respective franchises.&
6
Petitioners are included a#on the
said %74 natural persons and entities.
'
Then, reference !as #ade to the particular contracts petitioners entered into !ith
respondent, the contracts to continue indefinitely unless and until either party !ould ive to the other t!o years previous
notice in !ritin of its intention to ter#inate the sa#e.
8
After !hich, it !as noted that on 9une %:, %78(, an act authori+in
the increase of the capital stoc- of the National Po!er Corporation to P%(( #illion too- effect.
4
A year later, on 9une %4,
%78%, it !as alleed that the challened leislation beca#e a la!, purportedly to increase further the authori+ed capital
stoc-, but includin the alleed rider referred to above, !hich, in the opinion of petitioners, transressed the constitutional
provision on the sub/ect #atter and title of bills as !ell as the due process clause.
:
Mention !as then #ade of the National
Po!er Corporation approvin a rate increase of at least %4.'), the effectivity of !hich, !as at first deferred to Nove#ber
%, %78., then subse*uently to 9anuary %', %780, !ith the threat that in case petitioners !ould fail to sin the revised
contract providin for the increased rate, respondent National Po!er Corporation !ould then cease &to supply, distribute
and service electric po!er and enery to the#.&
7
That !ould be, in the opinion of petitioners, violative of their rihts, proceedin fro# leislation sufferin fro#
constitutional infir#ities.
%(
A declaration of unconstitutionality !as therefore souht by the#. 2t !as prayed; &3%5 To ive
due course to this petition< 3.5 To issue a !rit of preli#inary in/unction, upon the postin of the re*uisite bond, en/oinin
respondent NPC fro# carryin or prosecutin its threat to enforce the provisions of the rider or =ection 0 of Republic Act
No. 0(60 ... in the #anner stated in pararaph %: of this petition until this >onorable Court shall have finally decided or
disposed, by final /ud#ent, of the issues raised in this petition< 305 After due hearin, to declare the rider or =ection 0 of
Republic Act No. 0(60 null and void for bein illeal and unconstitutional, and to issue a per#anent in/unction re*uirin
respondent NPC to refrain fro# enforcin or i#ple#entin the provisions of the sa#e la!.&
%%
=oon after, petitioner Philippine Po!er and "evelop#ent Co#pany #oved that insofar as it !as concerned, the case be
dis#issed, !hich #otion !as ranted by the lo!er court on 9anuary .', %780.
%.
The sole petitioner is therefore =antiao P.
Alalayan, suin in his behalf and for the benefit of all other persons havin co##on or eneral interest !ith hi#.
Respondent National Po!er Corporation filed an opposition on ?ebruary %', %780, opposin the issuance of a !rit for
preli#inary in/unction.
%0
@n March .%, %780, the lo!er court, considerin that there !as &no sufficient round for the
issuance of the !rit for preli#inary in/unction,& denied the sa#e.
%6
There !as in the ans!er, dated March .7, %780, an ad#ission of the #ain facts alleed, !ith a denial of the leal
conclusion !hich petitioner !ould deduce therefro#, respondent National Po!er Corporation upholdin the validity of
the challened provision. Then, ca#e a partial stipulation of facts sub#itted on @ctober %, %786, consistin of a resolution
of the Philippine Electric Plant @!ners Association to ta-e the necessary steps to stop respondent National Po!er
Corporation fro# enforcin its announced increase, sa#ples of contracts bet!een electric plant operators on the one hand
and respondent National Po!er Corporation on the other, the contract !ith petitioner Alalayan, dated May .8, %7'8,
sho!in that he did purchase and ta-e po!er and enery as follo!s; &=i,ty 38(5 -ilo!atts and of not less than %6(,(((
-ilo!att-hours in any contract year at the rate of P%.(.(( per -ilo!att per year& payable in t!elve e*ual #onthly
install#ents, &plus an enery chare of P(.(%0 per -ilo!att hour, payable on the basis of #onthly delivery&< a letter of
9une .., %78. of respondent National Po!er Corporation to petitioner approvin his %4.') rate increase of po!er so that
beinnin 9uly %, %78., the de#and chare !ould be P%(.(( per -ilo!att per #onth and the enery chare !ould be
P(.(. per -ilo!att hour< a letter of Auust %', %78., !herein respondent National Po!er Corporation notified petitioner
that it deferred the effectivity of the ne! rates, but it !ill be enforced on Nove#ber %, %78.< a letter of 9une .', %780
enforcin respondent National Po!er Corporation deferrin once aain the effectivity of the ne! rates until 9anuary %,
%786< as !ell as the conressional transcripts on >ouse Bill No. '044 and =enate Bill No. 8%0, no! Republic Act No.
0(60.
%'
2n an order of Nove#ber ', %786, the lo!er court ave the parties a period of t!enty days !ithin !hich to sub#it
si#ultaneously their respective #e#oranda. After the sub#ission thereof, the lo!er court, in a decision of 9anuary 0(,
%78', sustained the validity and constitutionality of the challened provision. >ence, this appeal.
As !as set forth earlier, this appeal cannot prosper. 1e share the vie! of the lo!er court that the provision in *uestion
cannot be i#puned either on the round of its bein violative of the constitutional re*uire#ent that a bill cannot e#brace
#ore than one sub/ect to be e,pressed in its title or by virtue of its alleed failure to satisfy the due process criterion.
%. 1e consider first the ob/ection that the statute in *uestion is violative of the constitutional provision that no bill &!hich
#ay be enacted into la! shall e#brace #ore than one sub/ect !hich shall be e,pressed in AitsB title ... &
%8
This provision is
si#ilar to those found in #any A#erican =tate Constitutions. 2t is ai#ed aainst the evils of the so-called o#nibus bills
and lo-rollin leislation as !ell as surreptitious or unconsidered enact#ents.
%4
1here the sub/ect of a bill is li#ited to a
particular #atter, the la!#a-ers alon !ith the people should be infor#ed of the sub/ect of proposed leislative #easures.
This constitutional provision thus precludes the insertion of riders in leislation, a rider bein a provision not er#ane to
the sub/ect #atter of the bill. Petitioner Alalayan asserts that the provision ob/ected to is such a rider.
To lend approval to such a plea is to construe the above constitutional provision as to cripple or i#pede proper leislation.
To i#part to it a #eanin !hich is reasonable and not unduly technical, it #ust be dee#ed sufficient that the title be
co#prehensive enouh reasonably to include the eneral ob/ect !hich the statute see-s to effect !ithout e,pressin each
and every end and #eans necessary for its acco#plish#ent. Thus, #ere details need not be set forth. The leislature is not
re*uired to #a-e the title of the act a co#plete inde, of its contents. The provision #erely calls for all parts of an act
relatin to its sub/ect findin e,pression in its title.
%:
More specifically, if the la! a#ends a section or part of a statute, it
suffices if reference be #ade to the leislation to be a#ended, there bein no need to state the precise nature of the
a#end#ent.
%7
2t !as in %70:, in Government v. Hongong ! Shanghai "an#
.(
!here, for the first ti#e after the inauuration of the
Co##on!ealth, this Court passed upon a provision of that character. 1e held there that the Reorani+ation
$a!,
.%
providin for the #ode in !hich the total annual e,penses of the Bureau of Ban-in could be rei#bursed throuh
assess#ent levied upon all ban-in institutions sub/ect to inspection by the Ban- Co##issioner !as not violative of such
a re*uire#ent in the 9ones $a!, the previous oranic act. 9ustice $aurel, ho!ever, viorously dissented, his vie! bein
that !hile the #ain sub/ect of the act !as reorani+ation, the provision assailed did not deal !ith reorani+ation but !ith
ta,ation. This case of Government v. Hongong ! Shanghai "an !as decided by a bare #a/ority of four /ustices aainst
three. Thereafter, it !ould appear that the constitutional re*uire#ent is to be iven the liberal test as indicated in the
#a/ority opinion penned by 9ustice Abad =antos, and not the strict test as desired by the #inority headed by 9ustice
$aurel.
=uch a trend is #ade #anifest in the cases beinnin !ith =u#ulon v. Co##ission on Elections,
..
up to and
includin $elwa v. Salas,
.0
a %788 decision, the opinion co#in fro# Chief 9ustice Concepcion. There is nothin
inLidasan v. Commission on %lections#
.6
!here a statute
.'
!as annulled on this round, to indicate the contrary. As aptly
e,pressed by 9ustice =anche+; &@f course, the Constitution does not re*uire Conress to e#ploy in the title of an
enact#ent, lanuae of such precision as to #irror, fully inde, or cataloue all the contents and the #inute details therein.
2t suffices if the title should serve the purpose of the constitutional de#and that it infor# the leislators, the persons
interested in the sub/ect of the bill, and the public, of the nature, scope and conse*uences of the proposed la! and its
operation. And this, to lead the# to in*uire into the body of the bill, study and discuss the sa#e, ta-e appropriate action
thereon, and, thus, prevent surprise or fraud upon the leislators.&
1e thus hold that there is no violation of the constitutional provision !hich re*uires that any bill enacted into la! shall
e#brace only one sub/ect to be e,pressed in the title thereof.
.. Nor is petitioner any#ore successful in his plea for the nullification of the challened provision on the round of his
bein deprived of the liberty to contract !ithout due process of la!.
2t is to be ad#itted of course that property rihts find shelter in specific constitutional provisions, one of !hich is the due
process clause. 2t is e*ually certain that our funda#ental la! fra#ed at a ti#e of &surin unrest and
dissatisfaction&,
.8
!hen there !as the fear e,pressed in #any *uarters that a constitutional de#ocracy, in vie! of its
co##it#ent to the clai#s of property, !ould not be able to cope effectively !ith the proble#s of poverty and #isery that
unfortunately afflict so #any of our people, is not susceptible to the indict#ent that the overn#ent therein established is
i#potent to ta-e the necessary re#edial #easures. The fra#ers sa! to that. The !elfare state concept is not alien to the
philosophy of our Constitution.
.4
2t is i#plicit in *uite a fe! of its provisions. 2t suffices to #ention t!o.
There is the clause on the pro#otion of social /ustice to ensure the !ell-bein and econo#ic security of all the people,
.:
as
!ell as the plede of protection to labor !ith the specific authority to reulate the relations bet!een lando!ners and
tenants and bet!een labor and capital.
.7
This particulari+ed reference to the rihts of !or-in #en !hether in industry and
ariculture certainly cannot preclude attention to and concern for the rihts of consu#ers, !ho are the ob/ects of solicitude
in the leislation no! co#plained of. The police po!er as an attribute to pro#ote the co##on !eal !ould be diluted
considerably of its reach and effectiveness if on the #ere plea that the liberty to contract !ould be restricted, the statute
co#plained of #ay be characteri+ed as a denial of due process. The riht to property cannot be pressed to such an
unreasonable e,tre#e.
2t is understandable thouh !hy business enterprises, not unnaturally evincin lac- of enthusias# for police po!er
leislation that affect the# adversely and restrict their profits could predicate alleed violation of their rihts on the due
process clause, !hich as interpreted by the# is a bar to reulatory #easures. 2nvariably, the response fro# this Court,
fro# the ti#e the Constitution !as enacted, has been far fro# sy#pathetic. Thus, durin the Co##on!ealth, !e
sustained leislation providin for collective barainin,
0(
security of tenure,
0%
#ini#u# !aes,
0.
co#pulsory
arbitration,
00
and tenancy reulation.
06
Neither did the ob/ections as to the validity of #easures reulatin the issuance of
securities
0'
and public services
08
prevail.
?or it is to be re#e#bered that the liberty relied upon is not freedo# of the #ind, !hich occupies a preferred position, nor
freedo# of the person, but the liberty to contract, associated !ith business activities, !hich, as has been so repeatedly
announced, #ay be sub/ected, in the interest of the eneral !elfare under the police po!er, to restrictions varied in
character and !ide ranin in scope as lon as due process is observed. 2n Calalan v. 1illia#s,
04
this Court found no
ob/ection to an enact#ent li#itin the use of and traffic in the national roads and streets as aainst the assertion that the
e,ercise of such an authority a#ounted to an unla!ful interference !ith leiti#ate business and abrid#ent of personal
liberty. The opinion by 9ustice $aurel e,plains !hy such an aru#ent !as far fro# persuasive. Thus; &2n enactin said
la!, therefore, the National Asse#bly !as pro#pted by considerations of public convenience and !elfare. 2t !as inspired
by a desire to relieve conestion of traffic, !hich is, to say the least, a #enace to public safety. Public !elfare, then, lies at
the botto# of the enact#ent of said la!, and the state in order to pro#ote the eneral !elfare #ay interfere !ith personal
liberty, !ith property, and !ith business and occupations. Persons and property #ay be sub/ected to all -inds of restraints
and burdens, in order to secure the eneral co#fort, health, and prosperity of the state ... &
0:
The above doctrine, valid then
and e*ually valid no!, constituted #ore than sufficient /ustification for statutes curtailin the liberty en/oyed by business
enterprises, !hether conducted by natural or /uridical persons, to satisfy the needs of public !elfare.
=o it continues to be under the Republic. This Court has invariably iven the seal of approval to statutes intended to
i#prove the lot of tenants,
07
!ho thereafter !ere iven the option to transfor# their relationship !ith lando!ners to one of
lease, !hich rant of authority !as sustained in %786.
6(
Retail trade !as nationali+ed, the #easure receivin /udicial
approval as aainst due process ob/ection,
6%
a decision foreshado!ed earlier !ith the favorable action ta-en on leislation
rantin preference to ?ilipino citi+ens in the lease of public #ar-et stalls.
6.
2t is easily understandable !hy the reulation
of practice of #edicine<
60
li#itation of the hours of labor<
66
i#position of price control<
6'
re*uire#ent of separation pay for
one #onth
68
as !ell as a social security sche#e
64
cannot be i#puned as unconstitutional. 1hile not e,haustive, the above
decisions #anifest in no certain ter#s the inherent difficulty of assailin reulatory leislation based on alleed denial of
due process.
2t !ould thus appear that unless this Court is prepared to overturn a doctrine so fir#ly adhered to in a nu#ber of cases
notable for the unani#ity of their response to an ob/ection si#ilar to the one here raised, petitioner Alalayan cannot
prevail. Certainly, this Court is not prepared to ta-e that step. ?or in the face of a constitutional provision that allo!s
deprivation of liberty, includin liberty of contract, as lon as due process is observed, the alleed nullity of a leislative
act of this character can only be sho!n if in fact there is such a denial. The relevant *uestion then is, !hat does due
process re*uireC
The holdin of this Court in %rmita-&alate Hotel and &otel Operators Asso. v. Cit' &a'or,
6:
sheds so#e liht. Thus;
&There is no controllin and precise definition of due process. 2t furnishes thouh a standard to !hich overn#ental action
should confor# in order that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each appropriate case, be valid. 1hat then is the
standard of due process !hich #ust e,ist both as a procedural and as substantive re*uisite to free the challened
ordinance, or any overn#ental action for that #atter, fro# the i#putation of leal infir#ity sufficient to spell its doo#C
2t is responsiveness to the supre#acy of reason, obedience to the dictates of /ustice. Neatively put, arbitrariness is ruled
out and unfairness avoided. To satisfy the due process re*uire#ent, official action, to paraphrase Cardo+o, #ust not outrun
the bounds of reason and result in sheer oppression. "ue process is thus hostile to any official action #arred by lac- of
reasonableness. Correctly has it been identified as freedo# fro# arbitrariness. 2t is the e#bodi#ent of the sportin idea of
fair play. 2t e,acts fealty &to those strivins for /ustice& and /udes the act of officialdo# of !hatever branch &in the liht
of reason dra!n fro# considerations of fairness that reflect Ade#ocraticB traditions of leal and political thouht.& 2t is not
a narro! or &technical conception !ith fi,ed content unrelated to ti#e, place and circu#stances,& decisions based on such
a clause re*uirin a &close and perceptive in*uiry into funda#ental principles of our society.& Duestions of due process
are not to be treated narro!ly or pedantically in slavery to for# or phrases.& .
The due process ob/ection is souht to be bolstered by an alleation that such po!er conferred in the challened
leislation to li#it the net profits to &%.) annually of ApetitionerEsB invest#ents plus t!o-#onth operatin e,penses& has a
confiscatory aspect. This aru#ent has the rin of futility. Precisely, in &anila %lectric Co. v. (u)lic Service
Commission,
67
this Court in an opinion by the present Chief 9ustice upheld such a fiure as aainst the contention that it
!as rather too enerous to the public utility. To spea- of it as confiscatory then is to e#ploy the lanuae by hyperbole.
Moreover, in the absence any evidence to de#onstrate the alleed confiscatory effect of the provision in *uestion, there
!ould be no basis for its nullification, in vie! of the !ell--no!n presu#ption of validity that every statute has in its
favor.
'(
2n the liht of the above, there is thus clearly no occasion for yieldin assent to the clai# of petitioner that the leislation
assailed contravenes the due process clause. *+wph,*.-.t
0. 1hile not e,plicitly avo!ed by petitioner, there is the inti#ation that to apply the challened leislation to contracts
then in e,istence !ould be an infrine#ent of the constitutional prohibition aainst any la! i#pairin the obliation of
contracts.
'%
No such fear need be entertained. A citation fro# a %76( decision of this Court, in(angasinan Transportation
Co. v. (u)lic Service Commission,
'.
is particularly relevant. 2n the lanuae of 9ustice $aurel, spea-in for the Court;
&Fpon the other hand, statutes enacted for the reulation of public utilities, bein a proper e,ercise by the state of its
police po!er, are applicable not only to those public utilities co#in into e,istence after its passae, but li-e!ise to those
already, e,istence established and in operation.&
'0
=uch a doctrine !as follo!ed in the case of a tenancy leislation, the
Conress undoubtedly havin in #ind and not havin failed to ta-e notice &of the e,istence of contracts& !hich stipulated
a division of the crops on a '(-'( basis and therefore #ust have intended to reulate the sa#e. There !as thus no
i#pair#ent of an obliation of contract, such an enact#ent under the police po!er bein re#edial in nature, the non-
applicability of !hich to e,istin conditions !ould be self-defeatin in character.
'6
2n A)e v. $oster /heeler Corp.,
''
9ustice Barrera, spea-in for the Court, too- note of the contention &that as the contracts
of e#ploy#ent !ere entered into at a ti#e !hen there !as no la! rantin the !or-ers said riht, the application as to
the# of the subse*uent enact#ent restorin the sa#e riht constitutes an i#pair#ent of their contractual obliations.&
Then he, #ade clear !hy the Court !as of a contrary vie! as, &the constitutional uaranty of non-i#pair#ent ... is li#ited
by the e,ercise of the police po!er of the =tate, in the interest of public health, safe, #orals and eneral !elfare.& Thus
!as reaffir#ed !hat previously had been announced as the rule. =uch a doctrine !as reiterated early this year
in (hilippine American Life 0nsurance Co. v. Auditor General,
'8
!here this Court found no ob/ection to the applicability
of the Marin $a!,
'4
even if it be assu#ed that a reinsurance treaty !as already in e,istence and had i#posed the
correspondin obliation on the parties prior to its enact#ent.
This is not to say that in each and every case the invocation of the protection of the non-i#pair#ent clause !ould be
unavailin once the leislation co#plained of is sho!n to be an e,ercise of the police po!er. @ther!ise, that !ould render
nuatory the constitutional uarantee of non-i#pair#ent, and for that #atter both the e*ual protection and due process
clauses !hich e*ually serve to protect property rihts. >ere, as in other cases !here overn#ental authority #ay trench
upon property rihts, the process of balancin, ad/ust#ent or har#oni+ation is called for.
1utter v. %ste)an
':
lends support to such an approach. 2n that leadin case, the continued operation and enforce#ent of the
Moratoriu# Act
'7
!hich allo!ed an eiht-year period of race for the pay#ent of pre-!ar obliations on the part of
debtors !ho suffered as a conse*uence of 1orld 1ar 22 !as, in a %7'0 decision, held &unreasonable and oppressive, and
should not be proloned a #inute loner& for bein violative of the constitutional provision prohibitin the i#pair#ent of
the obliation of the contracts &and, therefore, ... should be declared null and void and !ithout effect.&
8(
As of the date of
its enact#ent in %76:, the police po!er could be relied upon to sustain its validity, in vie! of the serious econo#ic
condition faced by the country upon liberation and the state of penury that then afflicted a reater portion of the ?ilipino
people. By %7'0 ho!ever, the Moratoriu# Act could be rihtfully considered as an infrine#ent of the non-i#pair#ent
clause, as the econo#y had in the #ean!hile considerably chaned for the better.
There is no clearer instance then of the process of har#oni+ation and balancin !hich is incu#bent upon the /udiciary to
underta-e !henever a reulatory #easure under the police po!er is assailed as violative of constitucess or e*ual
protection, all of !hich are intended to safeuard property rihts. Three leadin decisions of the Fnited =tates =upre#e
Court, >o#e Buildin G $oan Astional uarantees, !hether of non-i#pair#ent, dueprosociation v. "laisdell,
8%
2e))ia v.
2ew 3or,
8.
and 2orman v. "altimore and Ohio 1ailroad Co.#
80
spea- si#ilarly.
Even if, therefore, reliance be had on the non-i#pair#ent clause by petitioner and the process of ad/ust#ent or
har#oni+ation be underta-en to ascertain !hether the applicability of the statutory provision assailed to e,istin contracts
!ould run counter to such a uarantee, still the sa#e conclusion e#eres. There is a failure to #a-e out a case for its
invalidity.
1>ERE?@RE, there bein no sho!in that =ection 0 of Republic Act No. 0(60 is unconstitutional, the decision of the
lo!er court, dis#issin the petition, is affir#ed. 1ith costs aainst petitioner Alalayan.
Concepcion# C.4.# 1e'es# 4.".L.# 5izon# &aalintal# 6aldivar# Sanchez# Castro and Angeles# 44.# concur.
3oo+"o+&
%
=ection 0, Republic Act No. 0(60, approved 9une %4, %78%, entitled &An Act to ?urther A#end Co##on!ealth
Act Nu#bered @ne >undred T!enty, as A#ended by Republic Act Nu#bered T!enty =i, >undred and ?orty
@ne.&
.
=ection 0 of Republic Act No. 0(60 reads thus<
&=EC. 0. The National Po!er Corporation is hereby authori+ed to represent and transact for the benefit
and in behalf of the public consu#ers, and it shall in any contract for the supply of electric po!er to a
franchise holder re*uire as a condition that the franchise holder, if it receives at least fifty percent of its
electric po!er and enery fro# the National Po!er Corporation, shall not reali+e a net profit of #ore than
t!elve percent annually of its invest#ents plus t!o-#onth operatin e,penses. The National Po!er
Corporation shall rene! all e,istin contracts !ith franchise holder for the supply of electric po!er and
enery, in order to ive effect to the provisions hereof. 2n the event that the net profit as verified by the
Public =ervice Co##ission should e,ceed the said t!elve percent, the public =ervice Co##ission shall
order such e,cess to be returned pro rata to the custo#ers either in cash or as credit for future electric
bills.&
0
Article H2, =ection .%, par. %, Constitution of the Philippines. The constitutional provision reads thus; &No bill
!hich #ay be enacted into la! shall e#brace #ore than one sub/ect !hich shall be e,pressed in the title of the
bill.&
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 145361 No-&/%&* 11, 1993
T7E P7ILIPPINE JU2GES ASSOCIATION, )uly *&,. %y !+ P*&!)&"+, 8ERNAR2O P. A8ESAMIS, 9!.&-
P*&!)&"+ (o* L&#'l A(('!*, MARIANO M. UMALI, 2!*&.+o* (o* P'!#, M':'+!, '") P''y, M&+*o M'"!l',
AL3RE2O C. 3LORES, '") C$'!*/'" o( +$& Co//!++&& o" L&#'l A!), JESUS G. 8ERSAMIRA, P*&!)!"#
Ju)#& o( +$& R&#!o"'l T*!'l Cou*+, 8*'".$ 85, ;u&<o" C!+y '") 8*'".$& 164, 166 '") 166, P'!#, M&+*o M'"!l',
*&,&.+!-&ly= +$& NATIONAL CON3E2ERATION O3 T7E JU2GES ASSOCIATION O3 T7E P7ILIPPINES,
.o/,o&) o( +$& METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT JU2GES ASSOCIATION *&,. %y !+ P*&!)&"+. REINATO
;UILALA o( +$& MUNICIPAL TRIAL CIRCUIT COURT, M'"!l'> T7E MUNICIPAL JU2GES LEAGUE O3
T7E P7ILIPPINES *&,. %y !+ P*&!)&"+, TOMAS G. TALA9ERA> %y +$&/&l-& '") !" %&$'l( o( 'll +$& Ju)#&
o( +$& R&#!o"'l T*!'l '") S$'*!?' Cou*+, M&+*o,ol!+'" T*!'l Cou*+ '") Mu"!.!,'l Cou*+ +$*ou#$ou+ +$&
Cou"+*y, petitioners,
vs.
7ON. PETE PRA2O, !" $! .','.!+y ' S&.*&+'*y o( +$& 2&,'*+/&"+ o( T*'",o*+'+!o" '") Co//u"!.'+!o",
JORGE 9. SARMIENTO, !" $! .','.!+y ' Po+/'+&* G&"&*'l, '") +$& P7ILIPPINE POSTAL
CORP., respondents.

CRU@, J.:
The basic issue raised in this petition is the independence of the 9udiciary. 2t is asserted by the petitioners that this
hall#ar- of republicanis# is i#paired by the statute and circular they are here challenin. The =upre#e Court is itself
affected by these #easures and is thus an interested party that should ordinarily not also be a /ude at the sa#e ti#e.
Fnder our syste# of overn#ent, ho!ever, it cannot inhibit itself and #ust rule upon the challene, because no other
office has the authority to do so. 1e shall therefore act upon this #atter not !ith officiousness but in the dischare of an
unavoidable duty and, as al!ays, !ith detach#ent and fairness.
The #ain taret of this petition is =ection 0' of R.A. No. 40'6 as i#ple#ented by the Philippine Postal Corporation
throuh its Circular No.
7.-.:. These #easures !ithdra! the fran-in privilee fro# the =upre#e Court, the Court of Appeals, the Reional Trial
Courts, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the $and Reistration Co##ission and its Reisters
of "eeds, alon !ith certain other overn#ent offices.
The petitioners are #e#bers of the lo!er courts !ho feel that their official functions as /udes !ill be pre/udiced by the
above-na#ed #easures. The National $and Reistration Authority has ta-en co##on cause !ith the# insofar as its o!n
activities, such as sendin of re*uisite notices in reistration cases, affect /udicial proceedins. @n its #otion, it has been
allo!ed to intervene.
The petition assails the constitutionality of R.A. No. 40'6 on the rounds that; 3%5 its title e#braces #ore than one sub/ect
and does not e,press its purposes< 3.5 it did not pass the re*uired readins in both >ouses of Conress and printed copies
of the bill in its final for# !ere not distributed a#on the #e#bers before its passae< and 305 it is discri#inatory and
encroaches on the independence of the 9udiciary.
1e approach these issues !ith one i#portant principle in #ind, to !it, the presu#ption of the constitutionality of statutes.
The theory is that as the /oint act of the $eislature and the E,ecutive, every statute is supposed to have first been
carefully studied and deter#ined to be constitutional before it !as finally enacted. >ence, unless it is clearly sho!n that it
is constitutionally fla!ed, the attac- aainst its validity #ust be re/ected and the la! itself upheld. To doubt is to sustain.
2
1e consider first the ob/ection based on Article H2, =ec. .83l5, of the Constitution providin that &Every bill passed by the
Conress shall e#brace only one sub/ect !hich shall be e,pressed in the title thereof.&
The purposes of this rule are; 3%5 to prevent hode-pode or &lo-rollin& leislation< 3.5 to prevent surprise or fraud upon
the leislature by #eans of provisions in bills of !hich the title ives no inti#ation, and !hich #iht therefore be
overloo-ed and carelessly and unintentionally adopted< and 305 to fairly apprise the people, throuh such publication of
leislative proceedins as is usually #ade, of the sub/ect of leislation that is bein considered, in order that they #ay
have opportunity of bein heard thereon, by petition or other!ise, if they shall so desire.
1
2t is the sub#ission of the petitioners that =ection 0' of R.A. No. 40'6 !hich !ithdre! the fran-in privilee fro# the
9udiciary is not e,pressed in the title of the la!, nor does it reflect its purposes.
R.A. No. 40'6 is entitled &An Act Creatin the Philippine Postal Corporation, "efinin its Po!ers, ?unctions and
Responsibilities, Providin for Reulation of the 2ndustry and for @ther Purposes Connected There!ith.&
The ob/ectives of the la! are enu#erated in =ection 0, !hich provides;
The =tate shall pursue the follo!in ob/ectives of a nation!ide postal syste#;
a5 to enable the econo#ical and speedy transfer of #ail and other postal #atters, fro# sender to
addressee, !ith full reconition of their privacy or confidentiality<
b5 to pro#ote international interchane, cooperation and understandin throuh the unha#pered flo! or
e,chane of postal #atters bet!een nations<
c5 to cause or effect a !ide rane of postal services to cater to different users and chanin needs,
includin but not li#ited to, philately, transfer of #onies and valuables, and the li-e<
d5 to ensure that sufficient revenues are enerated by and !ithin the industry to finance the overall cost of
providin the varied rane of postal delivery and #essenerial services as !ell as the e,pansion and
continuous upradin of service standards by the sa#e.
=ec. 0' of R.A. No. 40'6, !hich is the principal taret of the petition, reads as follo!s;
=ec. 0'. 1epealing Clause. I All acts, decrees, orders, e,ecutive orders, instructions, rules and
reulations or parts thereof inconsistent !ith the provisions of this Act are repealed or #odified
accordinly.
All fran-in privilees authori+ed by la! are hereby repealed, e,cept those provided for under
Co##on!ealth Act No. .8', Republic Acts Nu#bered 87, %:(, %6%6, .(:4 and '('7. The Corporation
#ay continue the fran-in privilee under Circular No. 0' dated @ctober .6, %744 and that of the Hice
President, under such arrane#ents and conditions as #ay obviate abuse or unauthori+ed use thereof.
The petitionersE contention is untenable. 1e do not aree that the title of the challened act violates the Constitution.
The title of the bill is not re*uired to be an inde, to the body of the act, or to be as co#prehensive as to cover every sinle
detail of the #easure. 2t has been held that if the title fairly indicates the eneral sub/ect, and reasonably covers all the
provisions of the act, and is not calculated to #islead the leislature or the people, there is sufficient co#pliance !ith the
constitutional re*uire#ent.
2
To re*uire every end and #eans necessary for the acco#plish#ent of the eneral ob/ectives of the statute to be e,pressed
in its title !ould not only be unreasonable but !ould actually render leislation i#possible.
3
As has been correctly
e,plained;
The details of a leislative act need not be specifically stated in its title, but #atter er#ane to the sub/ect
as e,pressed in the title, and adopted to the acco#plish#ent of the ob/ect in vie!, #ay properly be
included in the act. Thus, it is proper to create in the sa#e act the #achinery by !hich the act is to be
enforced, to prescribe the penalties for its infraction, and to re#ove obstacles in the !ay of its e,ecution.
2f such #atters are properly connected !ith the sub/ect as e,pressed in the title, it is unnecessary that they
should also have special #ention in the title 3=outhern Pac. Co. v. Bartine, %4( ?ed. 4.'5.
This is particularly true of the repealin clause, on !hich Cooley !rites; &The repeal of a statute on a iven sub/ect is
properly connected !ith the sub/ect #atter of a ne! statute on the sa#e sub/ect< and therefore a repealin section in the
ne! statute is valid, not!ithstandin that the title is silent on the sub/ect. 2t !ould be difficult to conceive of a #atter #ore
er#ane to an act and to the ob/ect to be acco#plished thereby than the repeal of previous leislations connected
there!ith.&
4
The reason is that !here a statute repeals a for#er la!, such repeal is the effect and not the sub/ect of the statute< and it is
the sub/ect, not the effect of a la!, !hich is re*uired to be briefly e,pressed in its title.
5
As observed in one case,
6
if the
title of an act e#braces only one sub/ect, !e apprehend it !as never clai#ed that every other act !hich repeals it or alters
by i#plication #ust be #entioned in the title of the ne! act. Any such rule !ould be neither !ithin the reason of the
Constitution, nor practicable.
1e are convinced that the !ithdra!al of the fran-in privilee fro# so#e aencies is er#ane to the acco#plish#ent of
the principal ob/ective of R.A. No. 40'6, !hich is the creation of a #ore efficient and effective postal service syste#. @ur
rulin is that, by virtue of its nature as a repealin clause, =ection 0' did not have to be e,pressly included in the title of
the said la!.
22
The petitioners #aintain that the second pararaph of =ec. 0' coverin the repeal of the fran-in privilee fro# the
petitioners and this Court under E.@. .(4, P" %::. and P" .8 !as not included in the oriinal version of =enate Bill No.
4.( or >ouse Bill No. 6.((. As this pararaph appeared only in the Conference Co##ittee Report, its addition, violates
Article H2, =ec. .83.5 of the Constitution, readin as follo!s;
3.5 No bill passed by either >ouse shall beco#e a la! unless it has passed three readins on separate
days, and printed copies thereof in its final for# have been distributed to its Me#bers three days before
its passae, e,cept !hen the President certifies to the necessity of its i##ediate enact#ent to #eet a
public cala#ity or e#erency. Fpon the last readin of a bill, no a#end#ent thereto shall be allo!ed, and
the vote thereon shall be ta-en i##ediately thereafter, and the 'easand na's entered in the 9ournal.
The petitioners also invo-e =ec. 46 of the Rules of the >ouse of Representatives, re*uirin that a#end#ent to any bill
!hen the >ouse and the =enate shall have differences thereon #ay be settled by a conference co##ittee of both
cha#bers. They stress that =ec. 0' !as never a sub/ect of any disaree#ent bet!een both >ouses and so the second
pararaph could not have been validly added as an a#end#ent.
These aru#ent are unacceptable.
1hile it is true that a conference co##ittee is the #echanis# for co#pro#isin differences bet!een the =enate and the
>ouse, it is not li#ited in its /urisdiction to this *uestion. 2ts broader function is described thus;
A conference co##ittee #ay, deal enerally !ith the sub/ect #atter or it #ay be li#ited to resolvin the
precise differences bet!een the t!o houses. Even !here the conference co##ittee is not by rule li#ited
in its /urisdiction, leislative custo# severely li#its the freedo# !ith !hich ne! sub/ect #atter can be
inserted into the conference bill. But occasionally a conference co##ittee produces une,pected results,
results beyond its #andate, These e,cursions occur even !here the rules i#pose strict li#itations on
conference co##ittee /urisdiction. This is sy#pto#atic of the authoritarian po!er of conference
co##ittee 3"avies, $eislative $a! and Process; 2n a Nutshell, %7:8 Ed., p.:%5.
2t is a #atter of record that the conference Co##ittee Report on the bill in *uestion !as returned to and duly approved by
both the =enate and the >ouse of Representatives. Thereafter, the bill !as enrolled !ith its certification by =enate
President Neptali A. Jon+ales and =pea-er Ra#on H. Mitra of the >ouse of Representatives as havin been duly passed
by both >ouses of Conress. 2t !as then presented to and approved by President Cora+on C. A*uino on April 0, %77..
Fnder the doctrine of separation po!ers, the Court #ay not in*uire beyond the certification of the approval of a bill fro#
the presidin officers of Conress. Casco (hilippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez
6
laid do!n the rule that the enrolled bill, is
conclusive upon the 9udiciary 3e,cept in #atters that have to be entered in the /ournals li-e the 'eas and na'son the final
readin of the
bill5.
8
The /ournals are the#selves also bindin on the =upre#e Court, as !e held in the old 3but still valid5 case of 7.S.
vs. (ons,
9
!here !e e,plained the reason thus;
To in*uire into the veracity of the /ournals of the Philippine leislature !hen they are, as !e have said,
clear and e,plicit, !ould be to violate both the, letter and spirit of the oranic la!s by !hich the
Philippine Jovern#ent !as brouht into e,istence, to invade a coordinate and independent depart#ent of
the Jovern#ent, and to interfere !ith the leiti#ate po!ers and functions, of the $eislature.
Applyin these principles, !e shall decline to loo- into the petitionersE chares that an a#end#ent !as #ade upon the last
readin of the bill that eventually beca#e R.A. No. 40'6 and that copies thereof in its final for# !ere not distributed
a#on the #e#bers of each >ouse. Both the enrolled bill and the leislative /ournals certify that the #easure !as duly
enacted i.e., in accordance !ith Article H2, =ec. .83.5 of the Constitution. 1e are bound by such official assurances fro# a
coordinate depart#ent of the overn#ent, to !hich !e o!e, at the very least, a beco#in courtesy.
222
The third and #ost serious challene of the petitioners is based on the e*ual protection clause.
2t is alleed that R.A. No. 40'6 is discri#inatory because !hile !ithdra!in the fran-in privilee fro# the 9udiciary, it
retains the sa#e for the President of the Philippines, the Hice President of the Philippines< =enators and Me#bers of the
>ouse of Representatives, the Co##ission on Elections< for#er Presidents of the Philippines< the National Census and
=tatistics @ffice< and the eneral public in the filin of co#plaints aainst public offices and officers.
14
The respondents counter that there is no discri#ination because the la! is based on a valid classification in accordance
!ith the e*ual protection clause. 2n fact, the fran-in privilee has been !ithdra!n not only fro# the 9udiciary but also
the @ffice of Adult Education, the 2nstitute of National $anuae< the Teleco##unications @ffice< the Philippine "eposit
2nsurance Corporation< the National >istorical Co##ission< the Ar#ed ?orces of the Philippines< the Ar#ed ?orces of the
Philippines $adies =teerin Co##ittee< the City and Provincial Prosecutors< the Tanodbayan 3@ffice of =pecial
Prosecutor5< the Kabataan Baranay< the Co##ission on the ?ilipino $anuae< the Provincial and City Assessors< and
the National Council for the 1elfare of "isabled Persons.
11
The e*ual protection of the la!s is e#braced in the concept of due process, as every unfair discri#ination offends the
re*uire#ents of /ustice and fair play. 2t has nonetheless been e#bodied in a separate clause in Article 222 =ec. %., of the
Constitution to provide for a #ore, specific uaranty aainst any for# of undue favoritis# or hostility fro# the
overn#ent. Arbitrariness in eneral #ay be challened on the basis of the due process clause. But if the particular act
assailed parta-es of an un!arranted partiality or pre/udice, the sharper !eapon to cut it do!n is the e*ual protection
clause.
Accordin to a lon line of decisions, e*ual protection si#ply re*uires that all persons or thins si#ilarly situated should
be treated ali-e, both as to rihts conferred and responsibilities i#posed,
12
=i#ilar sub/ects, in other !ords, should not be
treated differently, so as to ive undue favor to so#e and un/ustly discri#inate aainst others.
The e*ual protection clause does not re*uire the universal application of the la!s on all persons or thins !ithout
distinction. This #iht in fact so#eti#es result in une*ual protection, as !here, for e,a#ple, a la! prohibitin #ature
boo-s to all persons, reardless of ae, !ould benefit the #orals of the youth but violate the liberty of adults. 1hat the
clause re*uires is e*uality a#on e*uals as deter#ined accordin to a valid classification. By classification is #eant the
roupin of persons or thins si#ilar to each other in certain particulars and different fro# all others in these sa#e
particulars.
13
1hat is the reason for the rant of the fran-in privilee in the first placeC 2s the fran-in privilee e,tended to the
President of the Philippines or the Co##ission on Elections or to for#er Presidents of the Philippines purely as
acourtes' fro# the la!#a-in bodyC 2s it offered because of the importance or status of the rantee or because of
its need for the privileeC @r have the rantees been chosen pell-#ell, as it !ere, !ithout any basis at all for the selectionC
1e re/ect outriht the last con/ecture as there is no doubt that the statute as a !hole !as carefully deliberated upon, by the
political depart#ents before it !as finally enacted. There is reason to suspect, ho!ever, that not enouh care or attention
!as iven to its repealin clause, resultin in the un!ittin !ithdra!al of the fran-in privilee fro# the 9udiciary.
1e also do not believe that the basis of the classification !as #ere courtesy, for it is uni#ainable that the political
depart#ents !ould have intended this serious sliht to the 9udiciary as the third of the #a/or and e*ual depart#ents the
overn#ent. The sa#e observations are #ade if the i#portance or status of the rantee !as the criterion used for the
e,tension of the fran-in privilee, !hich is en/oyed by the National Census and =tatistics @ffice and even so#e private
individuals but not the courts of /ustice.
2n our vie!, the only acceptable reason for the rant of the fran-in privilee !as the perceived need of the rantee for the
acco##odation, !hich !ould /ustify a !aiver of substantial revenue by the Corporation in the interest of providin for a
s#oother flo! of co##unication bet!een the overn#ent and the people.
Assu#in that basis, !e cannot understand !hy, of all the depart#ents of the overn#ent, it is the 9udiciary, that has been
denied the fran-in privilee. There is no *uestion that if there is any #a/or branch of the overn#ent that needs the
privilee, it is the 9udicial "epart#ent, as the respondents the#selves point out. Curiously, the respondents !ould /ustify
the distinction on the basis precisely of this need and, on this basis, deny the 9udiciary the fran-in privilee !hile
e,tendin it to others less deservin.
2n their Co##ent, the respondents point out that available data fro# the Postal =ervice @ffice sho! that fro# 9anuary
%7:: to 9une %77., the total volu#e of fran- #ails a#ounted to P7(,6.6,%4'.((. @f this a#ount, fran- #ails fro# the
9udiciary and other aencies !hose functions include the service of /udicial processes, such as the intervenor, the
"epart#ent of 9ustice and the @ffice of the @#buds#an, a#ounted to P:8,6:%,4'7. ?ran- #ails co#in fro#the
9udiciary a#ounted to P40,'46,:86.((, and those co#in fro# the petitioners reached the total a#ount of
P8(,77%,60%.((. The respondentsE conclusion is that because of this considerable volu#e of #ail fro# the 9udiciary, the
fran-in privilee #ust be !ithdra!n fro# it.
The aru#ent is self-defeatin. The respondents are in effect sayin that the fran-in privilee should be e,tended only to
those !ho do not need it very #uch, if at all, 3li-e the !ido!s of for#er Presidents5 but not to those !ho need it badly
3especially the courts of /ustice5. 2t is li-e sayin that a person #ay be allo!ed cos#etic surery althouh it is not really
necessary but not an operation that can save his life.
2f the proble# of the respondents is the loss of revenues fro# the fran-in privilee, the re#edy, it see#s to us, is to
!ithdra! it altoether fro# all aencies of overn#ent, includin those !ho do not need it. The proble# is not solved by
retainin it for so#e and !ithdra!in it fro# others, especially !here there is no substantial distinction bet!een those
favored, !hich #ay or #ay not need it at all, and the 9udiciary, !hich definitely needs it. The proble# is not solved by
violatin the Constitution.
2n lu#pin the 9udiciary !ith the other offices fro# !hich the fran-in privilee has been !ithdra!n, =ection 0' has
placed the courts of /ustice in a cateory to !hich it does not belon. 2f it reconi+es the need of the President of the
Philippines and the #e#bers of Conress for the fran-in privilee, there is no reason !hy it should not reconi+e a
si#ilar and in fact reater need on the part of the 9udiciary for such privilee. 1hile !e #ay appreciate the !ithdra!al of
the fran-in privilee fro# the Ar#ed ?orces of the Philippines $adies =teerin Co##ittee, !e fail to understand !hy the
=upre#e Court should be si#ilarly treated as that Co##ittee. And !hile !e #ay concede the need of the National Census
and =tatistics @ffice for the fran-in privilee, !e are intriued that a si#ilar if not reater need is not reconi+ed in the
courts of /ustice.
3@n second thouht, there does not see# to be any /ustifiable need for !ithdra!in the privilee fro# the Ar#ed ?orces
of the Philippines $adies =teerin Co##ittee, !hich, li-e for#er Presidents of the Philippines or their !ido!s, does not
send as #uch fran- #ail as the 9udiciary.5
2t is !orth observin that the Philippine Postal Corporation, as a overn#ent-controlled corporation, !as created and is
e,pected to operate for the purpose of pro#otin the public service. 1hile it #ay have been established pri#arily for
private ain, it cannot e,cuse itself fro# perfor#in certain functions for the benefit of the public in e,chane for the
franchise e,tended to it by the overn#ent and the #any advantaes it en/oys under its charter.
14
A#on the services it
should be prepared to e,tend is free carriae of #ail for certain offices of the overn#ent that need the fran-in privilee
in the dischare of their o!n public functions.
1e also note that under =ection 7 of the la!, the Corporation is capitali+ed at P%( billion pesos, '') of !hich is supplied
by the Jovern#ent, and that it derives substantial revenues fro# the sources enu#erated in =ection %(, on top of the
e,e#ptions it en/oys. 2t is not li-ely that the retention of the fran-in privilee of the 9udiciary !ill cripple the
Corporation.
At this ti#e !hen the 9udiciary is bein faulted for the delay in the ad#inistration of /ustice, the !ithdra!al fro# it of the
fran-in privilee can only further deepen this serious proble#. The volu#e of /udicial #ail, as e#phasi+ed by the
respondents the#selves, should stress the dependence of the courts of /ustice on the postal service for co##unicatin
!ith la!yers and litiants as part of the /udicial process. The 9udiciary has the lo!est appropriation in the national budet
co#pared to the $eislative and E,ecutive "epart#ents< of the P0(7 billion budeted for %770, only .:6), or less than
%), is alloted for the /udiciary. 2t should not be hard to i#aine the increased difficulties of our courts if they have to affi,
a purchased sta#p to every process they send in the dischare of their /udicial functions.
1e are unable to aree !ith the respondents that =ection 0' of R.A. No. 40'6 represents a valid e,ercise of discretion by
the $eislature under the police po!er. @n the contrary, !e find its repealin clause to be a discri#inatory provision that
denies the 9udiciary the e*ual protection of the la!s uaranteed for all persons or thins si#ilarly situated. The distinction
#ade by the la! is superficial. 2t is not based on substantial distinctions that #a-e real differences bet!een the 9udiciary
and the rantees of the fran-in privilee.
This is not a *uestion of !isdo# or po!er into !hich the 9udiciary #ay not intrude. 2t is a #atter of arbitrariness that this
Court has the duty and po!er to correct.
2H
2n su#, !e sustain R.A. No. 40'6 aainst the attac- that its sub/ect is not e,pressed in its title and that it !as not passed in
accordance !ith the prescribed procedure. >o!ever, !e annul =ection 0' of the la! as violative of Article 0, =ec. %, of the
Constitution providin that no person shall &be deprived of the e*ual protection of la!s.&
1e arrive at these conclusions !ith a full a!areness of the criticis# it is certain to provo-e. 1hile rulin aainst the
discri#ination in this case, !e #ay ourselves be accused of si#ilar discri#ination throuh the e,ercise of our ulti#ate
po!er in our o!n favor. This is inevitable. Criticis# of /udicial conduct, ho!ever undeserved, is a fact of life in the
political syste# that !e are prepared to accept.. As /udes, !e cannot debate !ith our detractors. 1e can only decide the
cases before us as la! i#poses on us the duty to be fair and our o!n conscience ives us the liht to be riht.
ACC@R"2NJ$L, the petition is partially JRANTE" and =ection 0' of R.A. No. 40'6 is declared
FNC@N=T2TFT2@NA$. Circular No. 7.-.: is =ET A=2"E insofar as it !ithdra!s the fran-in privilee fro# the
=upre#e Court, the Court of Appeals, the Reional trail Courts, the Municipal trial Courts, and the National $and
Reistration Authority and its Reister of "eeds to all of !hich offices the said privilee shall be RE=T@RE". The
te#porary restrainin order dated 9une ., %77., is #ade per#anent.
=@ @R"ERE".
2arvasa# C.4.# $eliciano# (adilla# "idin# 1egalado# 5avide# 4r.# 1omero# 2ocon# &elo# 8uiason# (uno and 9itug# 44.#
concur.
"ellosillo# 4.# is on leave.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-28489 O.+o%&* 25, 1966
8ARA LI2ASAN, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
Sunta' for petitioner.
"arrios and $ule for respondent.
SANC7E@, J.:
The *uestion initially presented to the Co##ission on Elections,
%
is this; 2s Republic Act 647(, !hich is entitled &An Act
Creatin the Municipality of "ianaton in the Province of $anao del =ur&, but !hich includes barrios located in another
province I Cotabato I to be spared fro# attac- planted upon the constitutional #andate that &No bill !hich #ay be
enacted into la! shall e#brace #ore than one sub/ect !hich shall be e,pressed in the title of the bill&C Co#elecEs ans!er
is in the affir#ative. @ffshoot is the present oriinal petition for certiorari and prohibition.
@n 9une %:, %788, the Chief E,ecutive sined into la! >ouse Bill %.64, -no!n as Republic Act 647(, no! in dispute.
The body of the statute, reproduced in haec ver)a, reads;
=ec. %. Barrios Toai, Madalu#, Bayana, $an-on, =ara-an, Kat-bo, "ia-apan, Maabo, Tabanao, Tion-o,
Colodan, Kaba#a-a!an, Kapataan, Bonabon, Aipan, "ao!an, Ba-i-is, Bunabun, $osain, Mati#os and
Maolatun, in the Municipalities of Buti and Balabaan, Province of $anao del =ur, are separated fro# said
#unicipalities and constituted into a distinct and independent #unicipality of the sa#e province to be -no!n as
the Municipality of "ianaton, Province of $anao del =ur. The seat of overn#ent of the #unicipality shall be in
Toai.
=ec. .. The first #ayor, vice-#ayor and councilors of the ne! #unicipality shall be elected in the nineteen
hundred si,ty-seven eneral elections for local officials.
=ec. 0. This Act shall ta-e effect upon its approval.
2t ca#e to liht later that barrios Toai and Madalu# /ust #entioned are !ithin the #unicipality of "uldon,(rovince of
Cota)ato, and that Bayana, $an-on, =ara-an, Kat-bo, "ia-apan, Maabo, Tabanao, Tion-o, Colodan and
Kaba#a-a!an are parts and parcel of another #unicipality, the #unicipality of (arang, also in the(rovince of
Cota)ato and not of $anao del =ur.
Pro#pted by the co#in elections, Co#elec adopted its resolution of Auust %', %784, the pertinent portions of !hich are;
?or purposes of establish#ent of precincts, reistration of voters and for other election purposes, the Co##ission
RE=@$HE" that pursuant to RA 647(, the ne! #unicipality of "ianaton, $anao del =ur shall co#prise the
barrios of Kapataan, Bonabon, Aipan, "ao!an, Ba-i-is, Bunabun, $osain, Mati#os, and Maolatun
situated in the #unicipality of Balabaan, $anao del =ur, the barrios of Toai and Madalu# situated in the
#unicipality of Buldon, Cotabato, the barrios of Bayana, $an-on, =ara-an, Kat-bo, "ia-apan, Maabo,
Tabanao, Tion-o, Colodan and Kaba#a-a!an situated in the #unicipality of Paran, also of Cotabato.
"oubtless, as the statute stands, t!elve barrios I in t!o #unicipalities in the province of Cotabato I are transferred to
the province of $anao del =ur. This brouht about a chane in the boundaries of the t!o provinces.
Apprised of this develop#ent, on =epte#ber 4, %784, the @ffice of the President, throuh the Assistant E,ecutive
=ecretary, reco##ended to Co#elec that the operation of the statute be suspended until &clarified by correctin
leislation.&
Co#elec, by resolution of =epte#ber .(, %784, stood by its o!n interpretation, declared that the statute &should be
i#ple#ented unless declared unconstitutional by the =upre#e Court.&
This triered the present oriinal action for certiorari and prohibition by Bara $idasan, a resident and ta,payer of the
detached portion of Paran, Cotabato, and a *ualified voter for the %784 elections. >e prays that Republic Act 647( be
declared unconstitutional< and that Co#elecEs resolutions of Auust %', %784 and =epte#ber .(, %784 i#ple#entin the
sa#e for electoral purposes, be nullified.
%. Petitioner relies upon the constitutional re*uire#ent aforestated, that &AnBo bill !hich #ay be enacted into la! shall
e#brace #ore than one sub/ect !hich shall be e,pressed in the title of the bill.&
.
2t #ay be !ell to state, riht at the outset, that the constitutional provision contains dual li#itations upon leislative
po!er. $irst. Conress is to refrain fro# conlo#eration, under one statute, of heteroeneous sub/ects. Second. The title
of the bill is to be couched in a lanuae sufficient to notify the leislators and the public and those concerned of the
i#port of the sinle sub/ect thereof.
@f relevance here is the second directive. The sub/ect of the statute #ust be &e,pressed in the title& of the bill. This
constitutional re*uire#ent &breathes the spirit of co##and.&
0
Co#pliance is i#perative, iven the fact that the
Constitution does not e,act of Conress the obliation to read durin its deliberations the entire te,t of the bill. 2n fact, in
the case of >ouse Bill %.64, !hich beca#e Republic Act 647(, only its title !as read fro# its introduction to its final
approval in the >ouse of Representatives
6
!here the bill, bein of local application, oriinated.
'
@f course, the Constitution does not re*uire Conress to e#ploy in the title of an enact#ent, lanuae of such precision as
to #irror, fully inde, or cataloue all the contents and the #inute details therein. 2t suffices if the title should serve the
purpose of the constitutional de#and that it infor# the leislators, the persons interested in the sub/ect of the bill, and the
public, of the nature, scope and conse*uences of the proposed la! and its operation. And this, to lead the# to in*uire into
the body of the bill, study and discuss the sa#e, ta-e appropriate action thereon, and, thus, prevent surprise or fraud upon
the leislators.
8
2n our tas- of ascertainin !hether or not the title of a statute confor#s !ith the constitutional re*uire#ent, the follo!in,
!e believe, #ay be ta-en as uidelines;
The test of the sufficiency of a title is !hether or not it is #isleadin< and, !hich technical accuracy is not
essential, and the sub/ect need not be stated in e,press ter#s !here it is clearly inferable fro# the details set
forth, a title which is so uncertain that the average person reading it would not )e informed of the purpose of the
enactment or put on in:uir' as to its contents# or which is misleading# either in referring to or indicating one
su);ect where another or different one is reall' em)raced in the act# or in omitting an' e<pression or indication of
the real su);ect or scope of the act# is )ad.
,,, ,,, ,,,
2n deter#inin sufficiency of particular title its su)stance rather than its form should )e considered# and the
purpose of the constitutional re:uirement# of giving notice to all persons interested# should )e ept in mind )' the
court.
4
1ith the foreoin principles at hand, !e ta-e a hard loo- at the disputed statute. The title I &An Act Creatin the
Municipality of "ianaton, in the (rovince of Lanao del Sur&
:
I pro/ects the i#pression that solely the province of $anao
del =ur is affected by the creation of "ianaton. Not the slihtest inti#ation is there that co##unities in the ad/acent
province of Cotabato are incorporated in this ne! $anao del =ur to!n. The phrase &in the Province of $anao del =ur,&
read !ithout subtlety or contortion, #a-es the title #isleadin, deceptive. ?or, the -no!n fact is that the leislation has a
t!o-proned purpose co#bined in one statute; 3%5 it creates the #unicipality of "ianaton purportedly fro# t!enty-one
barrios in the to!ns of Buti and Balabaan, both in the province of $anao del =ur< and 3.5 it also dis#e#bers t!o
#unicipalities in Cotabato, a province different fro# $anao del =ur.
The baneful effect of the defective title here presented is not so difficult to perceive. =uch title did not infor# the #e#bers
of Conress as to the full i#pact of the la!< it did not apprise the people in the to!ns of Buldon and Paran in Cotabato
and in the province of Cotabato itself that part of their territory is bein ta-en a!ay fro# their to!ns and province and
added to the ad/acent Province of $anao del =ur< it -ept the public in the dar- as to !hat to!ns and provinces !ere
actually affected by the bill. These are the pressures !hich heavily !eih aainst the constitutionality of Republic Act
647(.
RespondentEs stance is that the chane in boundaries of the t!o provinces resultin in &the substantial di#inution of
territorial li#its& of Cotabato province is &#erely the incidental leal results of the definition of the boundary& of the
#unicipality of "ianaton and that, therefore, reference to the fact that portions in Cotabato are ta-en a!ay &need not be
e,pressed in the title of the la!.& This posture I !e #ust say I but e#phasi+es the error of constitutional di#ensions in
!ritin do!n the title of the bill. Transfer of a si+eable portion of territory fro# one province to another of necessity
involves reduction of area, population and inco#e of the first and the correspondin increase of those of the other. This is
as i#portant as the creation of a #unicipality. And yet, the title did not reflect this fact.
Respondent as-s us to read $elwa vs. Salas, $-%8'%%, @ctober .7, %788, as controllin here. The $elwa case is not in
focus. ?or there, the title of the Act 3Republic Act 687'5 reads; &An Act Creatin the Provinces of Benuet, Mountain
Province, 2fuao, and Kalina-Apayao.& That title !as assailed as unconstitutional upon the aver#ent that the provisions
of the la! 3=ection, : thereof5 in reference to the elective officials of the provinces thus created, !ere not set forth in the
title of the bill. 1e there ruled that this pretense is devoid of #erit &for, surely, an Act creatin said provinces #ust be
e,pected to provide for the officers !ho shall run the affairs thereof& I !hich is &#anifestly er#ane to the sub/ect& of
the leislation, as set forth in its title. The statute no! before us stands altoether on a different footin. The lu#pin
toether of barrios in ad/acent but separate provinces under one statute is neither a natural nor loical conse*uence of the
creation of the ne! #unicipality of "ianaton. A chane of boundaries of the t!o provinces #ay be #ade !ithout
necessarily creatin a ne! #unicipality and vice versa.
As !e canvass the authorities on this point, our attention is dra!n to Hume vs. 9illage of $ruitport, .%7 N1 86:, 867.
There, the statute in controversy bears the title &An Act to 2ncorporate the Hillae of ?ruitport, in the County of
Mus-eon.& The statute, ho!ever, in its section % reads; &The people of the state of Michian enact, that the follo!in
described territory in the counties of Mus-eon and @tta!a Michian, to !it; . . . be, and the sa#e is hereby constituted a
villae corporate, by the na#e of the Hillae of ?ruitport.& This statute !as challened as void by plaintiff, a resident of
@tta!a county, in an action to restraint the Hillae fro# e,ercisin /urisdiction and control, includin ta,in his lands.
Plaintiff based his clai# on =ection .(, Article 2H of the Michian =tate Constitution, !hich reads; &No la! shall e#brace
#ore than one ob/ect, !hich shall be e,pressed in its title.& The Circuit Court decree voided the statute and defendant
appealed. The =upre#e Court of Michian voted to uphold the decree of nullity. The follo!in, said in Hume, #ay !ell
apply to this case;
2t #ay be that !ords, &An act to incorporate the villae of ?ruitport,& !ould have been a sufficient title, and that
the !ords, &in the county of Mus-eon& !ere unnecessary< but !e do not aree !ith appellant that the !ords last
*uoted #ay, for that reason, be disrearded as surplusae.
. . . Fnder the uise of discardin surplusae, a court cannot re/ect a part of the title of an act for the purpose of
savin the act. =ch#al+ vs. 1oody, '8 N.9. E*. 867, 07 A. '07.
A purpose of the provision of the Constitution is to =challenge the attention of those affected )' the act to its
provisions.= =avins Ban- vs. =tate of Michian, ..: Mich. 0%8, .(( N1 .8..
The title here is restrictive. 0t restricts the operation of the act of &usegon count'. The act goes )e'ond the
restriction. As was said in Schmalz vs. /ool'# supra> =The title is erroneous in the worst degree# for it is
misleading.=
7
=i#ilar statutes ai#ed at chanin boundaries of political subdivisions, !hich leislative purpose is not e,pressed in the
title, !ere li-e!ise declared unconstitutional.&
%(
1e rule that Republic Act 647( is null and void.
.. =uestion !as #ade that Republic Act 647( #ay still be salvaed !ith reference to the nine barrios in the
#unicipalities of Buti and Balabaan in $anao del =ur, !ith the #ere nullification of the portion thereof !hich too-
a!ay the t!elve barrios in the #unicipalities of Buldon and Paran in the other province of Cotabato. The reasonin
advocated is that the li#ited title of the Act still covers those barrios actually in the province of $anao del =ur.
1e are not un#indful of the rule, buttressed on reason and of lon standin, that !here a portion of a statute is rendered
unconstitutional and the re#ainder valid, the parts !ill be separated, and the constitutional portion upheld. Blac-,
ho!ever, ives the e,ception to this rule, thus;
. . . But !hen the parts of the statute are so #utually dependent and connected, as conditions, considerations,
induce#ents, or co#pensations for each other, as to !arrant a belief that the leislature intended the# as a !hole,
and that if all could not be carried into effect, the leislature !ould not pass the residue independently, then, if
so#e parts are unconstitutional, all the provisions !hich are thus dependent, conditional, or connected, #ust fall
!ith the#,
%%
2n substantially si#ilar lanuae, the sa#e e,ception is reconi+ed in the /urisprudence of this Court, thus;
The eneral rule is that !here part of a statute is void, as repunant to the @ranic $a!, !hile another part is
valid, the valid portion if separa)le fro# the invalid, #ay stand and be enforced. But in order to do this, the valid
portion #ust be so far independent of the invalid portion that it is fair to presume that the Legislature would have
enacted it )' itself if the' had supposed that the' could not constitutionall' enact the other. . . Enouh #ust
re#ain to #a-e a co#plete, intelliible, and valid statute, !hich carries out the leislative intent. . . . The
lanuae used in the invalid part of the statute can have no leal force or efficacy for any purpose !hatever,
and what remains must e<press the legislative will independentl' of the void part# since the court has no power to
legislate, . . . .
%.
Could !e indule in the assu#ption that Conress still intended, by the Act, to create the restricted area of nine )arrios in
the to!ns of Buti and Balabaan in $anao del =ur into the to!n of "ianaton, if the twelve )arrios in the to!ns of Buldon
and Paran, Cotabato !ere to be e,cluded therefro#C The ans!er #ust be in the neative.
Municipal corporations perfor# t!in functions. $irstl'. They serve as an instru#entality of the =tate in carryin out the
functions of overn#ent. Secondl'. They act as an aency of the co##unity in the ad#inistration of local affairs. 2t is in
the latter character that they are a separate entity actin for their o!n purposes and not a subdivision of the =tate.
%0
Conse*uently, several factors co#e to the fore in the consideration of !hether a roup of barrios is capable of #aintainin
itself as an independent #unicipality. A#onst these are population, territory, and inco#e. 2t !as apparently these sa#e
factors !hich induced the !ritin out of >ouse Bill %.64 creatin the to!n of "ianaton. =pea-in of the oriinal twent'-
one )arrios !hich co#prise the ne! #unicipality, the e,planatory note to >ouse Bill %.64, no! Republic Act 647(,
reads;
The territory is no! a proressive co##unity< the areate population is lare< and the collective inco#e is
sufficient to #aintain an independent #unicipality.
This bill, if enacted into la!, !ill enable the inhabitants concerned to overn the#selves and en/oy the blessins
of #unicipal autono#y.
1hen the foreoin bill !as presented in Conress, un*uestionably, the totality of the t!enty-one barrios I not nine
barrios I !as in the #ind of the proponent thereof. That this is so, is plainly evident by the fact that the bill itself,
thereafter enacted into la!, states that the seat of the overn#ent is in Toai, !hich is a barrio in the #unicipality of
Buldon in Cotabato. And then the reduced area poses a nu#ber of *uestions, thus; Could the observations as to
proressive co##unity, lare areate population, collective inco#e sufficient to #aintain an independent #unicipality,
still apply to a #otley roup of only nine barrios out of the t!enty-oneC 2s it fair to assu#e that the inhabitants of the said
re#ainin barrios !ould have areed that they be for#ed into a #unicipality, !hat !ith the conse*uent duties and
liabilities of an independent #unicipal corporationC Could they stand on their o!n feet !ith the inco#e to be derived in
their co##unityC >o! about the peace and order, sanitation, and other corporate obliationsC This Court #ay not supply
the ans!er to any of these disturbin *uestions. And yet, to re#ain deaf to these proble#s, or to ans!er the# in the
neative and still clin to the rule on separability, !e are afraid, is to i#pute to Conress an undeclared !ill. 1ith the
-no!n pre#ise that "ianaton !as created upon the basic considerations of proressive co##unity, lare areate
population and sufficient inco#e, !e #ay not no! say that Conress intended to create "ianaton !ith only nine I of the
oriinal t!enty-one I barrios, !ith a seat of overn#ent still left to be con/ectured. ?or, this unduly stretches /udicial
interpretation of conressional intent beyond credibility point. To do so, indeed, is to pass the line !hich circu#scribes the
/udiciary and tread on leislative pre#ises. Payin due respect to the traditional separation of po!ers, !e #ay not no!
#elt and recast Republic Act 647( to read a "ianaton to!n of nine instead of the oriinally intended t!enty-one barrios.
Really, if these nine barrios are to constitute a to!n at all, it is the function of Conress, not of this Court, to spell out that
conressional !ill.
Republic Act 647( is thus indivisible, and it is accordinly null and void in its totality.
%6
0. There re#ains for consideration the issue raised by respondent, na#ely, that petitioner has no substantial leal interest
adversely affected by the i#ple#entation of Republic Act 647(. =tated differently, respondentEs pose is that petitioner is
not the real party in interest.
>ere the validity of a statute is challened on the round that it violates the constitutional re*uire#ent that the sub/ect of
the bill be e,pressed in its title. Capacity to sue, therefore, hines on !hether petitionerEs substantial rihts or interests are
i#paired by lac- of notification in the title that the barrio in Paran, Cotabato, !here he is residin has been transferred to
a different provincial hee#ony.
The riht of every citi+en, ta,payer and voter of a co##unity affected by leislation creatin a to!n to ascertain that the
la! so created is not dis#e#berin his place of residence &in accordance !ith the Constitution& is reconi+ed in this
/urisdiction.
%'
Petitioner is a *ualified voter. >e e,pects to vote in the %784 elections. >is riht to vote in his o!n barrio before it !as
anne,ed to a ne! to!n is affected. >e #ay not !ant, as is the case here, to vote in a to!n different fro# his actual
residence. >e #ay not desire to be considered a part of hitherto different co##unities !hich are fanned into the ne!
to!n< he #ay prefer to re#ain in the place !here he is and as it !as constituted, and continue to en/oy the rihts and
benefits he ac*uired therein. >e #ay not even -no! the candidates of the ne! to!n< he #ay e,press a lac- of desire to
vote for anyone of the#< he #ay feel that his vote should be cast for the officials in the to!n before dis#e#ber#ent.
=ince by constitutional direction the purpose of a bill #ust be sho!n in its title for the benefit, a#onst others, of the
co##unity affected thereby,
%8
it stands to reason to say that !hen the constitutional riht to vote on the part of any citi+en
of that co##unity is affected, he #ay beco#e a suitor to challene the constitutionality of the Act as passed by Conress.
?or the reasons iven, !e vote to declare Republic Act 647( null and void, and to prohibit respondent Co##ission fro#
i#ple#entin the sa#e for electoral purposes.
No costs allo!ed. =o ordered.
Concepcion# C.4.# 1e'es# 4.".L.# 5izon# &aalintal# "engzon# 4.(.# 6aldivar# Castro and Angeles# 44.# concur.
=eparate @pinions
3ERNAN2O, J., dissentin;
1ith reret and !ith due reconition of the #erit of the opinion of the Court, 2 find #yself unable to ive #y assent.
>ence these fe! !ords to e,press #y stand.
Republic Act No. 647( deals !ith one sub/ect #atter, the creation of the #unicipality of "ianaton in the province of
$anao del =ur. The title #a-es evident !hat is the sub/ect #atter of such an enact#ent. The #ere fact that in the body of
such statute barrios found in t!o other #unicipalities of another province !ere included does not of itself suffice for a
findin of nullity by virtue of the constitutional provision invo-ed. At the #ost, the statute to be free fro# the
insubstantial doubts about its validity #ust be construed as not includin the barrios, located not in the #unicipalities of
Buti and Balabaan, $anao del =ur, but in Paran and Baldon, Cotabato.
The constitutional re*uire#ent is that no bill !hich #ay be enacted into la! shall e#brace #ore than one sub/ect !hich
shall be e,pressed in the title of the bill.
%
This provision is si#ilar to those found in the Constitution of #any A#erican
=tates. 2t is ai#ed aainst the evils, of the so-called o#nibus bills, and lo-rollin leislation, and aainst surreptitious or
unconsidered enact#ents.
.
1here the sub/ect of a bill is li#ited to a particular #atter, the #e#bers of the leislature as
!ell as the people should be infor#ed of the sub/ect of proposed leislative #easures. This constitutional provision thus
precludes the insertion of riders in leislation, a rider bein a provision not er#ane to the sub/ect #atter of the bill.
2t is not to be narro!ly construed thouh as to cripple or i#pede proper leislation. The construction #ust be reasonable
and not technical. 2t is sufficient if the title be co#prehensive enouh reasonably to include the eneral ob/ect !hich the
statute see-s to effect !ithout e,pressin each and every end and #eans necessary for the acco#plish#ent of that ob/ect.
Mere details need not be set forth. The leislature is not re*uired to #a-e the title of the act a co#plete inde, of its
contents. The constitutional provision is satisfied if all parts of an act !hich relates to its sub/ect find e,pression in its
title.
0
The first decision of this Court, after the establish#ent of the Co##on!ealth of the Philippines, in %70:, construin a
provision of this nature, Government v. Hongong ! Shanghai "an,
6
held that the inclusion of =ection %% of Act No.
6((4, the Reorani+ation $a!, providin for the #ode in !hich the total annual e,penses of the Bureau of Ban-in #ay
be rei#bursed throuh assess#ent levied upon all ban-in institutions sub/ect to inspection by the Ban- Co##issioner
!as not violative of such a re*uire#ent in the 9ones $a!, the previous oranic act. 9ustice $aurel, ho!ever, viorously
dissented, his vie! bein that !hile the #ain sub/ect of the act !as reorani+ation, the provision assailed did not deal !ith
reorani+ation but !ith ta,ation. 1hile the case ofGovernment vs. Hongong ! Shanghai "an !as decided by a bare
#a/ority of four /ustices aainst three, the present trend see#s to be that the constitutional re*uire#ent is to be iven the
liberal test as indicated in the #a/ority opinion penned by 9ustice Abad =antos, and not the strict test as desired by the
#a/ority headed by 9ustice $aurel.
=uch a trend has been reflected in subse*uent decisions beinnin !ith Sumulong v. Commission on %lections,
'
up to and
includin $elwa vs. Salas, a %788 decision,
8
the opinion co#in fro# 9ustice Concepcion.
2t is true of course that in (hilconsa v. Gimenez,
4
one of the rounds on !hich the invalidity of Republic Act No. 0:08 !as
predicated !as the violation of the above constitutional provision. This Retire#ent Act for senators and representatives
!as entitled &AN ACT AMEN"2NJ =FB-=ECT2@N 3c5, =ECT2@N T1E$HE @? C@MM@N1EA$T> ACT
NFMBERE" @NE >FN"RE" E2J>TL-=2M, A= AMEN"E" BL REPFB$2C ACT NFMBERE" T>2RTL
>FN"RE" N2NETL-=2M.& As !e noted, the pararaph in Republic Act No. 0:08 dee#ed ob/ectionable &refers to
#e#bers of Conress and to elective officers thereof !ho are not #e#bers of the Jovern#ent =ervice 2nsurance =yste#.
To provide retire#ent benefits, therefore, for these officials, !ould relate to a sub/ect #atter !hich is not er#ane to
Co##on!ealth Act No. %:8. 2n other !ords, this portion of the a#end#ent 3 re retire#ent benefits for Me#bers of
Conress and appointive officers, such as the =ecretary and =ereants-at-ar#s for each house5 is not related in any #anner
to the sub/ect of Co##on!ealth Act No. %:8 establishin the Jovern#ent =ervice 2nsurance =yste# and !hich provides
for both retire#ent and insurance benefits to its #e#bers.& Nonetheless our opinion !as careful to note that there !as no
abandon#ent of the principle of liberality. Thus; &!e are not un#indful of the fact that there has been a eneral
disposition in all courts to construe the constitutional provision !ith reference to the sub/ect and title of the Act, liberally.&
2t !ould follo! therefore that the challened leislation Republic Act No. 647( is not susceptible to the indict#ent that
the constitutional re*uire#ent as to leislation havin only one sub/ect !hich should be e,pressed in his title !as not #et.
The sub/ect !as the creation of the #unicipality of "ianaton. That !as e#bodied in the title.
2t is in the liht of the afore#entioned /udicial decisions of this Court, so#e of the opinions co#in fro# /urists illustrious
for their #astery of constitutional la! and their ac-no!leded erudition, that, !ith all due respect, 2 find the citation
fro# Corpus 4uris Secundum, unnecessary and far fro# persuasive. The =tate decisions cited, 2 do not dee# controllin,
as the freedo# of this Court to accept or re/ect doctrines therein announced cannot be doubted.
1herein does the !ea-ness of the statute lie thenC To repeat, several barrios of t!o #unicipalities outside $anao del =ur
!ere included in the #unicipality of "ianaton of that province. That itself !ould not have iven rise to a constitutional
*uestion considerin the broad, !ell-hih plenary po!ers possessed by Conress to alter provincial and #unicipal
boundaries. 1hat /ustified resort to this Court !as the conressional failure to #a-e e,plicit that such barrios in t!o
#unicipalities located in Cotabato !ould thereafter for# part of the ne!ly created #unicipality of "ianaton, $anao del
=ur.
To avoid any doubt as to the validity of such statute, it #ust be construed as to e,clude fro# "ianaton all of such barrios
#entioned in Republic Act No. 647( found in #unicipalities outside $anao del =ur. As thus interpreted, the statute can
#eet the test of the #ost riid scrutiny. Nor is this to do violence to the leislative intent. 1hat !as created !as a ne!
#unicipality fro# barrios na#ed as found in $anao del =ur. This construction assures precisely that.
This #ode of interpretin Republic Act No. 647( finds support in basic principles underlyin precedents, !hich if not
precisely controllin, have a persuasive rin. 2n 1adiowealth v. Agregado,
:
certain provisions of the Ad#inistrative Code
!ere interpreted and iven a &construction !hich !ould be #ore in har#ony !ith the tenets of the funda#ental la!.&
2n Sanchez v. L'on Construction,
7
this Court had a si#ilar rulin; &Article 0(. of the Code of Co##erce #ust be applied
in consonance !ith Athe relevantB provisions of our Constitution.& The above principle ained acceptance at a #uch earlier
period in our constitutional history. Thus in a %7%0 decision, 2n re JuariNa;
%(
&2n construin a statute enacted by the
Philippine Co##ission !e dee# it our duty not to ive it a construction !hich !ould be repunant to an Act of Conress,
if the lanuae of the statute is fairly susceptible of another construction not in conflict !ith the hiher la!. 2n doin so,
!e thin- !e should not hesitate to disreard contentions touchin the apparent intention of the leislator !hich !ould
lead to the conclusion that the Co##ission intended to enact a la! in violation of the Act of Conress. >o!ever specious
the aru#ent #ay be in favor of one of t!o possible constructions, it #ust be disrearded if on e,a#ination it is found to
rest on the contention that the leislator desined an atte#pt to transcend the rihtful li#its of his authority, and that his
apparent intention !as to enact an invalid la!.&
A#erican =upre#e Court decisions are e*ually e,plicit. The then 9ustice, later Chief 9ustice, =tone, construed statutes
&!ith an eye to possible constitutional li#itations so as to avoid doubts as to AtheirB validity.&
%%
?ro# the pen of the
articulate /urist, ?ran-furter;
%.
&Accordinly, the phrase &lobbyin activities& in the resolution #ust be iven the #eanin
that #ay fairly be attributed to it, havin special reard for the principle of constitutional ad/udication !hich #a-es it
decisive in the choice of fair alternatives that one construction #ay raise serious constitutional *uestions avoided by
another.& >is opinion in the Ru#ely case continues !ith the above pronounce#ent of =tone and t!o other for#er Chief
9ustices; &2n the !ords of Mr. Chief 9ustice Taft, E3i5t is our duty in the interpretation of federal statutes to reach conclusion
!hich !ill avoid serious doubt of their constitutionalityE, Rich#ond =cre! Anchor Co. v. Fnited =tates, .4' F= 00%, 068,
6: =. Ct. %76, %7:, 4. $. ed. 0(0. . . . As phrased by Mr. Chief 9ustice >uhes, &if a serious doubt of constitutionality is
raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court !ill first ascertain !hether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by
!hich the *uestion #ay be avoided.E Cro!ell v. Benson, .:', .78, 48 $. ed. '7:, and cases cited.& The prevailin doctrine
then as set forth by 9ustice Clar- in a %780 decision,
%0
is that courts &have consistently souht an interpretation !hich
supports the constitutionality of leislation.& Phrased differently by 9ustice "oulas, the /udiciary favors &that
interpretation of leislation !hich ives it the reater chane of survivin the test of constitutionality.&
%6
2t !ould follo! then that both Philippine and A#erican decisions unite in the vie! that a leislative #easure, in the
lanuae of Han "evanter &should not be iven a construction !hich !ill i#peril its validity !here it is reasonably open
to construction free fro# such peril.&
%'
Republic Act No. 647( as above construed incurs no such ris- and is free fro# the
peril of nullity.
=o 2 !ould vie! the #atter, !ith all due ac-no!led#ent of the practical considerations clearly brouht to liht in the
opinion of the Court.
3oo+"o+&
%
>ereinafter referred to as Co#elec.
.
Article H2, =ec. .%3%5, Philippine Constitution.
0
=tilit+ vs. =chiardien, 6( =1 .d 0%', 0%4, 0.(.
6
Conressional Record, Hol. 2, No. 6(, p. :< Hol. 2, No. '(, pp. 6(-6%.
'
=ection %:, Article H2 of the Constitution, provides;
&=ec. %:. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authori+in increase of the public debt, bills of
local application, and private bills, shall oriinate e,clusively in the >ouse of Representatives, but the
=enate #ay propose or concur !ith a#end#ents.&
8
Hidal de Roces vs. Posadas, ': Phil. %(:, %%%-%%.< 2chon vs. >ernande+, %(% Phil. %%'', %%::-%%7(.
4
:. C.9.=. pp. 08', 04(< e#phasis supplied.
:
E#phasis ours.
7
E#phasis supplied.
%(
E,a#ples; 1ilco, vs. Paddoc-, 0% N1 8(7, !here the statute entitled &An act #a-in an appropriation of state
s!a#p lands to aid the county of Jratiot in i#provin the channel of Maple river . . .& but the body of the act
affected another county other than Jratiot.
=tate vs. Burr, .0: P ':', the statute entitled &An act to a#end =ecs. 60%: and 60.4 of the Codes of
Montana relatin to chanin the boundaries of ?erus and 9udith Basin countries& !as rendered void
because the body of the act included the boundaries of Petroleu# county.
Atchison vs. Kearney County, 6: P ':0, !here the title of the act purported to attach Kearney county to
?inney county the body of the act attached it to >a#ilton county.
=tate vs. Nelson, 7: =o. 4%', the title of the act purportin to alter or rearrane the boundaries of "ecatur
city and the body of the act !hich actually di#inished the boundary lines of the city !ere considered by
the court as dealin !ith inconruous #atters. The readin of the for#er !ould ive no clear suestion
that the latter !ould follo! and be #ade the sub/ect of the act. 9ac-son, Cler- vs. =herrod, 7. =o. 6:%<
City of Ensley vs. =i#pson, '. =o. 8%, cited.
?airvie! vs. City of "etroit, %%0 N1 08:, !here the title ave notice that the entire villae of ?airvie! is
anne,ed to "etroit !hen the body affected only a portion.
%%
Blac-, 2nterpretation of $a!s, .d. ed., p. %%8.
%.
Barra#eda vs. Moir, .' Phil. 66, 64-6:, :uoted in Jovern#ent vs. =priner 3'( Phil. .'7, .7.< e#phasis
supplied5.
%0
McDuillin, Municipal Corporations, 0d ed., pp. 6'8-686.
%6
2n the case of ?u*ua vs. City of Mobile, %.% =o. 878, it !as asserted that the portion of the statute e,cludin a
territory fro# Mobile !hich !as not e,press in the title &An act to alter and rearrane the boundary lines of the
city of Mobile in the state of Alaba#a& should be the only portion invalidated. The court, usin the test !hether or
not after the ob/ectionable feature is stric-en off there !ould still re#ain an act co#plete in itself, sensible,
capable of bein e,ecuted, ruled that there can be no sereation of that portion dealin !ith the e,cluded
territory fro# that dealin !ith additional territory because these t!o #atters are all e#braced and inter#inled
in one section dealin !ith the corporate li#its of the city.
2n the case of Enle vs. Bonnie, .(6 =1 .d 780, the statute involved !as entitled &An Act relatin to
cities&. =ection 6 thereof &re*uires the creation of a #unicipality on petition of a #a/ority of voters or '((
voters.& But so#e of the provisions !ere er#ane to the title of the la!. This statute !as declared void in
toto. The Court of Appeals of Kentuc-y ruled as follo!s;
&The /ud#ent declared only =ection 6 Arelative to the creation of a #unicipality on petition of the votersB
to be void and the re#ainder valid. 1hile so#e of the provisions of the act are er#ane to the title, since
they deal !ith the classification of cities to be created, they see# #erely to har#oni+e other sections of
the statute !hich they a#end !ith a ne! creation of cities other than si,th class to!ns. To re#ove only
=ection 6 !ould be li-e ta-in the #otor of an auto#obile !hich leaves the #achine of no use. 1e are
*uite sure that these provisions !ould not have been enacted !ithout =ection 6< hence, they too #ust
fall.&
%'
Macias vs. The Co##ission on Elections, $-%:8:6, =epte#ber %6, %78%.
%8
Broo-s vs. >ydorn, 6. N1 %%.., %%.0-%%.6< ?airvie! vs. City of "etroit, %%0 N1 08:, 04(.
%
Art. H2, =ec. .%, par. %, Constitution.
.
Jovern#ent v. >on-on G =hanhai Ban- 3%70:5, 88 Phil. 6:0.
0
People vs. Carlos 3%7645, 4: Phil. '0'.
6
88 Phil. 6:0.
'
40 Phil. 3%76.5 ..:.
8
$-.8'%%, @ctober .7, %78(. The other cases that #ay be cited follo!s People v. Carlos 3%7645, 4: Phil. '0'<
Nuval v. de la ?uente 3%7'05, 7. Phil. %(46< 2chon v. >ernande+ 3%7'%5, %(% Phil. %%''< Cordero v. Cabatuando,
$-%6'6., @ct. 0%, %78.< Municipality of 9ose Pananiban v. =hell Co#pany, $-%:067, 9uly 0(, %788.
4
$-.00.8, "ece#ber %:, %78'.
:
:8 Phil. 6.7 3%7'(5.
7
:4 Phil. 0(7 3%7'(5, Cf . City of Manila v. Arellano $a! Collees, 2nc. 3%7'(5, :' Phil. 880.
%(
.6 Phil. 04. 9ustice Carson !ho penned the opinion cited Blac- on 2nterpretation of $a!s to this effect; &>ence
it follo!s that the courts !ill not so construe the la! as to #a-e it conflict !ith the constitution, but !ill rather put
such an interpretation upon it as !ill avoid conflict !ith the constitution and ive it full force and effect, if this
can be done !ithout e,travaance. 2f there is doubt, or uncertainty as to the #eanin of the leislature, if the
!ords or provisions of the statute are obscure, or if the enact#ent is fairly susceptible of t!o or #ore
constructions, that interpretation !ill be adopted !hich !ill avoid the effect of unconstitutionality, even thouh it
#ay be necessary, for this purpose, to disreard the #ore usual or apparent i#pact of the lanuae e#ployed.&
%%
$ucas v. Ale,ander 3%7.:5. .47 F= '40, '44-'4:, citin Fnited =tates e, rel. Atty. Jen. v. "ela!are G >. Co.
.%0 F= 088, 6(4, 6(:, '0 $. ed. :08, :6:, :67, .7 =up. Ct. Rep. '.4; Fnited =tates v. =tandard Bre!ery, .'% F=
.%(, ..(, 86 $. ed. ..7, .0', 6( =up. Ct. Rep. %07< Te,as v. Eastern Te,as R. Co. .': F= .(6, .%4, 88 $. ed. '88,
'4., 6. =up. Ct. Rep. .:%< Bratton v. Chandler, .8( F= %%(, %%6, 84 $. ed. %'4, %8%, 60 =up. Ct. Rep. 60< Pana#a
R. Co. v. 9ohnson, .86 F= 04', 07(, 8: $. ed. 46:, 4'6, 66 =up. Ct. Rep. 07%.
%.
Fnited =tates v. Ru#ely 3%7'05, 06' F= 6%, 6'.
%0
Fnited =tates v. National "airy Product Corp. 040 F= .7, 0..
%6
%< parte Endo 3%7665, 0.0 F= .:0, .77-0((.
%'
Chippe!a 2ndians v. Fnited =tates 3%7045, 0(% F= 0':, 048.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN 8ANC
G.R. No. 148564 No-&/%&* 19, 2441
JOSEP7 EJERCITO ESTRA2A, petitioner,
vs.
SAN2IGAN8AYAN AT$!*) 2!-!!o"B '") PEOPLE O3 T7E P7ILIPPINES, respondents.
" E C 2 = 2 @ N
8ELLOSILLO, J.:
9@>N =TFART M2$$, in his essay On Li)ert', unleashes the full fury of his pen in defense of the rihts of the individual
fro# the vast po!ers of the =tate and the inroads of societal pressure. But even as he dra!s a sacrosanct line de#arcatin
the li#its on individuality beyond !hich the =tate cannot tread - assertin that &individual spontaneity& #ust be allo!ed
to flourish !ith very little reard to social interference - he veritably ac-no!ledes that the e,ercise of rihts and liberties
is i#bued !ith a civic obliation, !hich society is /ustified in enforcin at all cost, aainst those !ho !ould endeavor to
!ithhold fulfill#ent. Thus he says -
The sole end for which manind is warranted# individuall' or collectivel'# in interfering with the li)ert' of action of an' of
their num)er# is self-protection. The onl' purpose for which power can )e rightfull' e<ercised over an' mem)er of a
civilized communit'# against his will# is to prevent harm to others.
Parallel to individual liberty is the natural and illi#itable riht of the =tate to self-preservation. 1ith the end of
#aintainin the interity and cohesiveness of the body politic, it behooves the =tate to for#ulate a syste# of la!s that
!ould co#pel obeisance to its collective !isdo# and inflict punish#ent for non-observance.
The #ove#ent fro# MillEs individual liberalis# to unsyste#atic collectivis# !rouht chanes in the social order,
carryin !ith it a ne! for#ulation of funda#ental rihts and duties #ore attuned to the i#peratives of conte#porary
socio-political ideoloies. 2n the process, the !eb of rihts and =tate i#positions beca#e tanled and obscured, en#eshed
in threads of #ultiple shades and colors, the s-ein irreular and bro-en. Antaonis#, often outriht collision, bet!een the
la! as the e,pression of the !ill of the =tate, and the +ealous atte#pts by its #e#bers to preserve their individuality and
dinity, inevitably follo!ed. 2t is !hen individual rihts are pitted aainst =tate authority that /udicial conscience is put to
its severest test.
Petitioner 9oseph E/ercito Estrada, the hihest-ran-in official to be prosecuted under RA 4(:( 3An Act 5efining and
(enalizing the Crime of (lunder5,
%
as a#ended by RA 48'7,
.
!ishes to i#press upon us that the assailed la! is so
defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin but distinct line !hich divides the valid fro# the constitutionally infir#. >e
therefore #a-es a strinent call for this Court to sub/ect the Plunder $a! to the crucible of constitutionality #ainly
because, accordin to hi#, 3a5 it suffers fro# the vice of vaueness< 3b5 it dispenses !ith the &reasonable doubt& standard
in cri#inal prosecutions< and, 3c5 it abolishes the ele#ent of mens rea in cri#es already punishable under The 1evised
(enal Code, all of !hich are purportedly clear violations of the funda#ental rihts of the accused to due process and to be
infor#ed of the nature and cause of the accusation aainst hi#.
=pecifically, the provisions of the Plunder $a! clai#ed by petitioner to have transressed constitutional boundaries are
=ecs. %, par. 3d5, . and 6 !hich are reproduced hereunder;
Section *. , , , , 3d5 &2ll-otten !ealth& #eans any asset, property, business, enterprise or #aterial possession of any
person !ithin the purvie! of =ection T!o 3.5 hereof, ac*uired by hi# directly or indirectly throuh du##ies, no#inees,
aents, subordinates andOor business associates by any co#bination or series of the follo!in #eans or si#ilar sche#es;
3%5 Throuh #isappropriation, conversion, #isuse, or #alversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury<
3.5 By receivin, directly or indirectly, any co##ission, ift, share, percentae, -ic-bac-s or any other for# of
pecuniary benefit fro# any person andOor entity in connection !ith any overn#ent contract or pro/ect or by
reason of the office or position of the public office concerned<
305 By the illeal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonin to the National Jovern#ent or any
of its subdivisions, aencies or instru#entalities, or overn#ent o!ned or controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries<
365 By obtainin, receivin or acceptin directly or indirectly any shares of stoc-, e*uity or any other for# of
interest or participation includin the pro#ise of future e#ploy#ent in any business enterprise or underta-in<
3'5 By establishin aricultural, industrial or co##ercial #onopolies or other co#binations andOor
i#ple#entation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or special interests< or
385 By ta-in advantae of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to un/ustly enrich
hi#self or the#selves at the e,pense and to the da#ae and pre/udice of the ?ilipino people and the Republic of
the Philippines.
=ection .. "efinition of the Cri#e of Plunder, Penalties. - An' pu)lic officer who# )' himself or in connivance with
mem)ers of his famil'# relatives )' affinit' or consanguinit'# )usiness associates# su)ordinates or other persons# amasses#
accumulates or ac:uires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts as descri)ed in
Section * ?d@ hereof# in the aggregate amount or total value of at least fift' million pesos ?(AB#BBB#BBB.BB@ shall )e guilt'
of the crime of plunder and shall )e punished )' reclusion perpetua to death. An' person who participated with the said
pu)lic officer in the commission of an offense contri)uting to the crime of plunder shall liewise )e punished for such
offense. 0n the imposition of penalties# the degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and e<tenuating
circumstances as provided )' the 1evised (enal Code shall )e considered )' the court. The court shall declare an' and
all ill-gotten wealth and their interests and other incomes and assets including the properties and shares of stocs derived
from the deposit or investment thereof forfeited in favor of the State ?underscoring supplied@.
Section C. 1ule of %vidence. - $or purposes of esta)lishing the crime of plunder# it shall not )e necessar' to proveeach
and every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or
acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts
indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy ?underscoring supplied@.
@n 6 April .((% the @ffice of the @#buds#an filed before the =andianbayan eiht 3:5 separate 2nfor#ations, doc-eted
as; 3a5 Cri#. Case No. .8'':, for violation of RA 4(:(, as a#ended by RA 48'7< 3b5 Cri#. Cases Nos. .8''7 to .8'8.,
inclusive, for violation of =ecs. 0, par. 3a5, 0, par. 3a5, 0, par. 3e5 and 0, par. 3e5, of RA 0(%7 3Anti-Graft and Corrupt
(ractices Act5, respectively< 3c5 Cri#. Case No. .8'80, for violation of =ec. 4, par. 3d5, of RA 84%0 3The Code of Conduct
and %thical Standards for (u)lic Officials and %mplo'ees5< 3d5 Cri#. Case No. .8'86, for Per/ury 3Art. %:0 of The
1evised (enal Code5< and, 3e5 Cri#. Case No. .8'8', for 2lleal Fse @f An Alias 3CA No. %6., as a#ended by RA 8(:'5.
@n %% April .((% petitioner filed an Omni)us &otion for the re#and of the case to the @#buds#an for preli#inary
investiation !ith respect to specification &d& of the chares in the 2nfor#ation in Cri#. Case No. .8'':< and, for
reconsiderationOreinvestiation of the offenses under specifications &a,& &b,& and &c& to ive the accused an opportunity to
file counter-affidavits and other docu#ents necessary to prove lac- of probable cause. Noticeably, the rounds raised !ere
only lac- of preli#inary investiation, reconsiderationOreinvestiation of offenses, and opportunity to prove lac- of
probable cause. The purported a#biuity of the chares and the vaueness of the la! under !hich they are chared !ere
never raised in that Omni)us &otion thus indicatin the e,plicitness and co#prehensibility of the Plunder $a!.
@n .' April .((% the =andianbayan, Third "ivision, issued a Resolution in Cri#. Case No. .8'': findin that &a
probable cause for the offense of P$FN"ER e,ists to /ustify the issuance of !arrants for the arrest of the accused.& @n .'
9une .((% petitionerEs #otion for reconsideration !as denied by the =andianbayan.
@n %6 9une .((% petitioner #oved to *uash the 2nfor#ation in Cri#. Case No. .8'': on the round that the facts alleed
therein did not constitute an indictable offense since the la! on !hich it !as based !as unconstitutional for vaueness,
and that the A#ended 2nfor#ation for Plunder chared #ore than one 3%5 offense. @n .% 9une .((% the Jovern#ent filed
its Opposition to the &otion to 8uash, and five 3'5 days later or on .8 9une .((% petitioner sub#itted his 1epl' to the
Opposition. @n 7 9uly .((% the =andianbayan denied petitionerEs &otion to 8uash.
As concisely delineated by this Court durin the oral aru#ents on %: =epte#ber .((%, the issues for resolution in the
instant petition for certiorari are; 3a5 The Plunder $a! is unconstitutional for bein vaue< 3b5 The Plunder $a! re*uires
less evidence for provin the predicate cri#es of plunder and therefore violates the rihts of the accused to due process<
and, 3c5 1hether Plunder as defined in RA 4(:( is a malum prohi)itum, and if so, !hether it is !ithin the po!er of
Conress to so classify it.
Preli#inarily, the !hole a#ut of leal concepts pertainin to the validity of leislation is predicated on the basic
principle that a leislative #easure is presu#ed to be in har#ony !ith the Constitution.
0
Courts invariably train their
sihts on this funda#ental rule !henever a leislative act is under a constitutional attac-, for it is the postulate of
constitutional ad/udication. This stron predilection for constitutionality ta-es its bearins on the idea that it is forbidden
for one branch of the overn#ent to encroach upon the duties and po!ers of another. Thus it has been said that the
presu#ption is based on the deference the /udicial branch accords to its coordinate branch - the leislature.
2f there is any reasonable basis upon !hich the leislation #ay fir#ly rest, the courts #ust assu#e that the leislature is
ever conscious of the borders and edes of its plenary po!ers, and has passed the la! !ith full -no!lede of the facts and
for the purpose of pro#otin !hat is riht and advancin the !elfare of the #a/ority. >ence in deter#inin !hether the
acts of the leislature are in tune !ith the funda#ental la!, courts should proceed !ith /udicial restraint and act !ith
caution and forbearance. Every intend#ent of the la! #ust be ad/uded by the courts in favor of its constitutionality,
invalidity bein a #easure of last resort. 2n construin therefore the provisions of a statute, courts #ust first ascertain
!hether an interpretation is fairly possible to sidestep the *uestion of constitutionality.
2n La 7nion Credit Cooperative# 0nc. v. 3aranon
6
!e held that as lon as there is so#e basis for the decision of the court,
the constitutionality of the challened la! !ill not be touched and the case !ill be decided on other available rounds. Let
the force of the presu#ption is not sufficient to catapult a funda#entally deficient la! into the safe environs of
constitutionality. @f course, !here the la! clearly and palpably transresses the hallo!ed do#ain of the oranic la!, it
#ust be struc- do!n on siht lest the positive co##ands of the funda#ental la! be unduly eroded.
Herily, the onerous tas- of rebuttin the presu#ption !eihs heavily on the party challenin the validity of the statute.
>e #ust de#onstrate beyond any tine of doubt that there is indeed an infrine#ent of the constitution, for absent such a
sho!in, there can be no findin of unconstitutionality. A doubt, even if !ell-founded, !ill hardly suffice. As tersely put
by 9ustice Malcol#, &To )ou%+ ! +o u+'!".&
'
And petitioner has #iserably failed in the instant case to dischare his
burden and overco#e the presu#ption of constitutionality of the Plunder $a!.
As it is !ritten, the Plunder $a! contains ascertainable standards and !ell-defined para#eters !hich !ould enable the
accused to deter#ine the nature of his violation. =ection . is sufficiently e,plicit in its description of the acts, conduct and
conditions re*uired or forbidden, and prescribes the ele#ents of the cri#e !ith reasonable certainty and particularity.
Thus -
*. That the offender is a pu)lic officer who acts )' himself or in connivance with mem)ers of his famil'# relatives
)' affinit' or consanguinit'# )usiness associates# su)ordinates or other personsD
E. That he amassed# accumulated or ac:uired ill-gotten wealth through a com)ination or series of the following
overt or criminal acts> ?a@ through misappropriation# conversion# misuse# or malversation of pu)lic funds or raids
on the pu)lic treasur'D ?)@ )' receiving# directl' or indirectl'# an' commission# gift# share# percentage# ic)ac
or an' other form of pecuniar' )enefits from an' person andFor entit' in connection with an' government
contract or pro;ect or )' reason of the office or position of the pu)lic officerD ?c@ )' the illegal or fraudulent
conve'ance or disposition of assets )elonging to the 2ational Government or an' of its su)divisions# agencies or
instrumentalities of Government owned or controlled corporations or their su)sidiariesD ?d@ )' o)taining#
receiving or accepting directl' or indirectl' an' shares of stoc# e:uit' or an' other form of interest or
participation including the promise of future emplo'ment in an' )usiness enterprise or undertaingD ?e@ )'
esta)lishing agricultural# industrial or commercial monopolies or other com)inations andFor implementation of
decrees and orders intended to )enefit particular persons or special interestsD or ?f@ )' taing advantage of
official position# authorit'# relationship# connection or influence to un;ustl' enrich himself or themselves at the
e<pense and to the damage and pre;udice of the $ilipino people and the 1epu)lic of the (hilippinesD and#
G. That the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth amassed# accumulated or ac:uired is at
least (AB#BBB#BBB.BB.
As lon as the la! affords so#e co#prehensible uide or rule that !ould infor# those !ho are sub/ect to it !hat conduct
!ould render the# liable to its penalties, its validity !ill be sustained. 2t #ust sufficiently uide the /ude in its
application< the counsel, in defendin one chared !ith its violation< and #ore i#portantly, the accused, in identifyin the
real# of the proscribed conduct. 2ndeed, it can be understood !ith little difficulty that !hat the assailed statute punishes is
the act of a public officer in a#assin or accu#ulatin ill-otten !ealth of at leastP'(,(((,(((.(( throuh a series or
co#bination of acts enu#erated in =ec. %, par. 3d5, of the Plunder $a!.
2n fact, the a#ended 2nfor#ation itself closely trac-s the lanuae of the la!, indicatin !ith reasonable certainty the
various ele#ents of the offense !hich petitioner is alleed to have co##itted;
&The undersined @#buds#an, Prosecutor and @2C-"irector, EP2B, @ffice of the @#buds#an, hereby accuses
for#er PRESI2ENT O3 T7E REPU8LIC O3 T7E P7ILIPPINES, 9oseph E/ercito Estrada, a.-.a. EA=2@NJ
=A$@NJAE and a.-.a. E9@=E HE$AR"E,E toether !ith 9ose E9inoyE Estrada, Charlie EAtonE An, Ed!ard =erapio,
Lolanda T. Ricaforte, Al#a Alfaro, 9@>N "@E a.-.a. Eleuterio Tan OR Eleuterio Ra#os Tan or Mr. Fy, 9ane "oe a.-.a.
"elia Ra/as, and 9ohn 2OES G 9ane "oes, of the cri#e of Plunder, defined and penali+ed under R.A. No. 4(:(, as
a#ended by =ec. %. of R.A. No. 48'7, co##itted as follo!s;
That durin the period fro# 9une, %77: to 9anuary .((%, in the Philippines, and !ithin the /urisdiction of this >onorable
Court, accused 9oseph E/ercito Estrada, T7EN A PRESI2ENT O3 T7E REPU8LIC O3 T7E P7ILIPPINES, by
hi#self AN"O@R in CONNI9ANCECCONSPIRACY !ith his co-accused, 17O ARE MEM8ERS O3 7IS 3AMILY,
RELATI9ES 8Y A33INITY OR CONSANGUINITY, 8USINESS ASSOCIATES, SU8OR2INATES AN2COR
OT7ER PERSONS, 8Y TADING UN2UE A29ANTAGE O3 7IS O33ICIAL POSITION, AUT7ORITY,
RELATIONS7IP, CONNECTION, OR IN3LUENCE, did then and there !illfully, unla!fully and cri#inally a#ass,
accu#ulate and ac*uire 8Y 7IMSEL3, 2IRECTLY OR IN2IRECTLY, ill-otten !ealth in the areate a#ount
orTOTAL 9ALUE o( 3OUR 8ILLION NINETY SE9EN MILLION EIG7T 7UN2RE2 3OUR T7OUSAN2
ONE 7UN2RE2 SE9ENTY T7REE PESOS AN2 SE9ENTEEN CENTA9OS 3P6,(74,:(6,%40.%45, #ore or
less,T7ERE8Y UNJUSTLY ENRIC7ING 7IMSEL3 OR T7EMSEL9ES AT T7E EEPENSE AN2 TO T7E
2AMAGE O3 T7E 3ILIPINO PEOPLE AN2 T7E REPU8LIC O3 T7E P7ILIPPINES, throuh ANY OR
A co#bination OR A series of overt OR cri#inal acts, OR SIMILAR SC7EMES OR MEANS, described as follo!s;
3a5 by receivin OR collectin, directly or indirectly, on SE9ERAL INSTANCES, MONEY IN T7E
AGGREGATE AMOUNT O3 3I9E 7UN2RE2 3ORTY-3I9E MILLION PESOS A P 545,444,444.44B,
MORE OR LESS, 3ROM ILLEGAL GAM8LING IN T7E 3ORM O3 GI3T, S7ARE, PERCENTAGE,
DICD8ACD OR ANY 3ORM O3 PECUNIARY 8ENE3IT, 8Y 7IMSEL3 AN2COR in connection !ith co-
accused C7ARLIE ?ATONG? ANG, 4ose H4inggo'H %strada, Lolanda T. Ricaforte, Ed!ard =erapio, AN2 JO7N
2OES AN2 JANE 2OES, in consideration O3 TOLERATION OR PROTECTION O3 ILLEGAL
GAM8LING<
3b5 by 2I9ERTING, RECEI9ING, #isappropriatin, convertin OR #isusin 2IRECTLY OR
IN2IRECTLY, for 7IS OR T7EIR PERSONAL ain and benefit, public funds in the a#ount of @NE
>FN"RE" T>2RTL M2$$2@N PE=@= 3P%0(,(((,(((.((5, #ore or less, representin a portion of the T1O
7UN2RE2 MILLION PESOS A P 244,444,444.44B tobacco e,cise ta, share allocated for the province of 2locos
=ur under R.A. No. 4%4%, %y $!/&l( '")Co* in connivance !ith co-accused Charlie EAtonE An, Al#a
Alfaro, JO7N 2OE '.:.'. Eleuterio Ra#os Tan or Mr. Fy, 9ane "oe a.-.a. "elia Ra/as, AN2 OT7ER JO7N
2OES F JANE 2OES< 3italic supplied5.
3c5 by directin, orderin and co#pellin, 3OR 7IS PERSONAL GAIN AN2 8ENE3IT, the Jovern#ent
=ervice 2nsurance =yste# 3J=2=5 TO PURC7ASE 351,868,444 S7ARES O3 STOCDS, MORE OR LESS,
and the =ocial =ecurity =yste# 3===5, 0.7,:'',((( S7ARES O3 STOCD, MORE OR LESS, O3 T7E
8ELLE CORPORATION IN T7E AMOUNT O3 MORE OR LESS ONE 8ILLION ONE 7UN2RE2
T1O MILLION NINE 7UN2RE2 SIETY 3I9E T7OUSAN2 SIE 7UN2RE2 SE9EN PESOS AN2
3I3TY CENTA9OS A P 1,142,965,646.54B AN2 MORE OR LESS SE9EN 7UN2RE2 3ORTY 3OUR
MILLION SIE 7UN2RE2 T1EL9E T7OUSAN2 AN2 3OUR 7UN2RE2 3I3TY PESOS
AP 644,612,454.44B, RESPECTI9ELY, OR A TOTAL O3 MORE OR LESS ONE 8ILLION EIG7T
7UN2RE2 3ORTY SE9EN MILLION 3I9E 7UN2RE2 SE9ENTY EIG7T T7OUSAN2 3I3TY
SE9EN PESOS AN2 3I3TY CENTA9OS A P 1,846,568,456.54B> AN2 8Y COLLECTING OR RECEI9ING,
2IRECTLY OR IN2IRECTLY, 8Y 7IMSEL3 AN2COR IN CONNI9ANCE 1IT7 JO7N 2OES AN2
JANE 2OES, COMMISSIONS OR PERCENTAGES 8Y REASON O3 SAI2 PURC7ASES O3 S7ARES
O3 STOCD IN T7E AMOUNT O3 ONE 7UN2RE2 EIG7TY NINE MILLION SE9EN 7UN2RE2
T7OUSAN2 PESOS A P 189,644,444.44B MORE OR LESS, 3ROM T7E 8ELLE CORPORATION
17IC7 8ECAME PART O3 T7E 2EPOSIT IN T7E E;UITA8LE-PCI 8AND UN2ER T7E
ACCOUNT NAME ?JOSE 9ELAR2E<E
3d5 by un/ustly enrichin hi#self 3ROM COMMISSIONS, GI3TS, S7ARES, PERCENTAGES,
DICD8ACDS, OR ANY 3ORM O3 PECUNIARY 8ENE3ITS, IN CONNI9ANCE 1IT7 JO7N 2OES
AN2 JANE 2OES, in the a#ount of MORE OR LESS T>REE B2$$2@N T1@ >FN"RE" T>2RTL T>REE
M2$$2@N @NE >FN"RE" ?@FR T>@F=AN" @NE >FN"RE" =EHENTL T>REE PE=@= AN"
=EHENTEEN CENTAH@= 3P0,.00,%(6,%40.%45 AN2 2EPOSITING T7E SAME UN2ER 7IS ACCOUNT
NAME ?JOSE 9ELAR2E? AT T7E E;UITA8LE-PCI 8AND.&
1e discern nothin in the foreoin that is vaue or a#biuous - as there is obviously none - that !ill confuse petitioner
in his defense. Althouh sub/ect to proof, these factual assertions clearly sho! that the ele#ents of the cri#e are easily
understood and provide ade*uate contrast bet!een the innocent and the prohibited acts. Fpon such une*uivocal
assertions, petitioner is co#pletely infor#ed of the accusations aainst hi# as to enable hi# to prepare for an intellient
defense.
Petitioner, ho!ever, be!ails the failure of the la! to provide for the statutory definition of the ter#s &co#bination& and
&series& in the -ey phrase &a co#bination or series of overt or cri#inal acts& found in =ec. %, par. 3d5, and =ec. ., and the
!ord &pattern& in =ec. 6. These o#issions, accordin to petitioner, render the Plunder $a! unconstitutional for bein
i#per#issibly vaue and overbroad and deny hi# the riht to be infor#ed of the nature and cause of the accusation
aainst hi#, hence, violative of his funda#ental riht to due process.
The rationali+ation see#s to us to be pure sophistry. A statute is not rendered uncertain and void #erely because eneral
ter#s are used therein, or because of the e#ploy#ent of ter#s !ithout definin the#<
8
#uch less do !e have to define
every !ord !e use. Besides, there is no positive constitutional or statutory co##and re*uirin the leislature to define
each and every !ord in an enact#ent. Conress is not restricted in the for# of e,pression of its !ill, and its inability to so
define the !ords e#ployed in a statute !ill not necessarily result in the vaueness or a#biuity of the la! so lon as the
leislative !ill is clear, or at least, can be athered fro# the !hole act, !hich is distinctly e,pressed in the Plunder $a!.
Moreover, it is a !ell-settled principle of leal her#eneutics that !ords of a statute !ill be interpreted in their natural,
plain and ordinary acceptation and sinification,
4
unless it is evident that the leislature intended a technical or special
leal #eanin to those !ords.
:
The intention of the la!#a-ers - !ho are, ordinarily, untrained philoloists and
le,icoraphers - to use statutory phraseoloy in such a #anner is al!ays presu#ed. Thus, 1ebsterEs Ne! Colleiate
"ictionary contains the follo!in co##only accepted definition of the !ords &co#bination& and &series;&
Com)ination - the result or product of co#binin< the act or process of co#binin. To com)ine is to brin into such close
relationship as to obscure individual characters.
Series - a nu#ber of thins or events of the sa#e class co#in one after another in spatial and te#poral succession.
That Conress intended the !ords &co#bination& and &series& to be understood in their popular #eanins is pristinely
evident fro# the leislative deliberations on the bill !hich eventually beca#e RA 4(:( or the Plunder $a!;
DEL!E"#$%&' %( $)E !*#+E"#L *%++$$EE %& J,'$*E, - +ay .//.
1%(. 0S051O> 0 am ;ust intrigued again )' our definition of plunder. /e sa' TH1O7GH A CO&"02AT0O2 O1 S%10%S
O$ O9%1T O1 C10&02AL ACTS AS &%2T0O2%5 02 S%CT0O2 O2% H%1%O$. 2ow when we sa' com)ination# we
actuall' mean to sa'# if there are two or more means# we mean to sa' that num)er one and two or num)er one and
something else are included# how a)out a series of the same actI $or e<ample# through misappropriation# conversion#
misuse# will these )e included alsoI
1%(. GA1C0A> 3eah# )ecause we sa' a series.
1%(. 0S051O> Series.
1%(. GA1C0A> 3eah# we include series.
1%(. 0S051O> "ut we sa' we )egin with a com)ination.
1%(. GA1C0A> 3es.
1%(. 0S051O> /hen we sa' com)ination# it seems that -
1%(. GA1C0A> Two.
1%(. 0S051O> 2ot onl' two )ut we seem to mean that two of the enumerated means not twice of one enumeration.
1%(. GA1C0A> 2o# no# not twice.
1%(. 0S051O> 2ot twiceI
1%(. GA1C0A> 3es. Com)ination is not twice - )ut com)ination# two acts.
1%(. 0S051O> So in other words# thatJs it. /hen we sa' com)ination# we mean# two different acts. 0t cannot )e a
repetition of the same act.
1%(. GA1C0A> That )e referred to series# 'eah.
1%(. 0S051O> 2o# no. Supposing one act is repeated# so there are two.
1%(. GA1C0A> A series.
1%(. 0S051O> ThatJs not series. 0ts a com)ination. "ecause when we sa' com)ination or series# we seem to sa' that two
or more# di )aI
1%(. GA1C0A> 3es# this distinguishes it reall' from ordinar' crimes. That is wh'# 0 said# that is a ver' good suggestion
)ecause if it is onl' one act# it ma' fall under ordinar' crime )ut we have here a com)ination or series of overt or
criminal acts. So < < < <
1%(. GA1C0A> Series. One after the other eh di....
S%2. TA2A5A> So that would fall under the term =seriesI=
1%(. GA1C0A> Series# oo.
1%(. 0S051O> 2ow# if it is a com)ination# ano# two misappropriations....
1%(. GA1C0A> 0ts not... Two misappropriations will not )e com)ination. Series.
1%(. 0S051O> So# it is not a com)inationI
1%(. GA1C0A> 3es.
1%(. 0S051O> /hen 'ou sa' com)ination# two differentI
1%(. GA1C0A> 3es.
S%2. TA2A5A> Two different.
1%(. 0S051O> Two different acts.
1%(. GA1C0A> $or e<ample# ha...
1%(. 0S051O> 2ow a series# meaning# repetition...
5%L0"%1AT0O2S O2 S%2AT% "0LL 2O. KGG# L 4une *MNM
S%2ATO1 &AC%5A> 0n line with our interpellations that sometimes =one= or ma')e even =two= acts ma' alread' result
in such a )ig amount# on line EA# would the Sponsor consider deleting the words =a series of overt or#= to read# therefore>
=or conspirac' CO&&0TT%5 )' criminal acts such as.= 1emove the idea of necessitating =a series.= An'wa'# the
criminal acts are in the plural.
S%2ATO1 TA2A5A> That would mean a com)ination of two or more of the acts mentioned in this.
TH% (1%S05%2T> (ro)a)l' two or more would )e....
S%2ATO1 &AC%5A> 3es# )ecause =a series= implies several or man'D two or more.
S%2ATO1 TA2A5A> Accepted# &r. (resident < < < <
TH% (1%S05%2T> 0f there is onl' one# then he has to )e prosecuted under the particular crime. "ut when we sa' =acts of
plunder= there should )e# at least# two or more.
S%2ATO1 1O&7LO> 0n other words# that is alread' covered )' e<isting laws# &r. (resident.
Thus !hen the Plunder $a! spea-s of &co#bination,& it is referrin to at least t!o 3.5 acts fallin under different
cateories of enu#eration provided in =ec. %, par. 3d5, e.., raids on the public treasury in =ec. %, par. 3d5, subpar. 3%5, and
fraudulent conveyance of assets belonin to the National Jovern#ent under =ec. %, par. 3d5, subpar. 305.
@n the other hand, to constitute a series& there #ust be t!o 3.5 or #ore overt or cri#inal acts fallin under the sa#e
cateory of enu#eration found in =ec. %, par. 3d5, say, #isappropriation, #alversation and raids on the public treasury, all
of !hich fall under =ec. %, par. 3d5, subpar. 3%5. Herily, had the leislature intended a technical or distinctive #eanin for
&co#bination& and &series,& it !ould have ta-en reater pains in specifically providin for it in the la!.
As for &pattern,& !e aree !ith the observations of the =andianbayan
7
that this ter# is sufficiently defined in =ec. 6, in
relation to =ec. %, par. 3d5, and =ec. . -
< < < < under Sec. * ?d@ of the law# a HpatternH consists of at least a com)ination or series of overt or criminal acts
enumerated in su)sections ?*@ to ?L@ of Sec. * ?d@. Secondl'# pursuant to Sec. E of the law# the pattern of overt or criminal
acts is directed towards a common purpose or goal which is to ena)le the pu)lic officer to amass# accumulate or ac:uire
ill-gotten wealth. And thirdl'# there must either )e an Hoverall unlawful schemeH or Hconspirac'H to achieve said common
goal. As commonl' understood# the term Hoverall unlawful schemeH indicates a Hgeneral plan of action or methodH which
the principal accused and pu)lic officer and others conniving with him follow to achieve the aforesaid common goal. 0n
the alternative# if there is no such overall scheme or where the schemes or methods used )' multiple accused var'# the
overt or criminal acts must form part of a conspirac' to attain a common goal.
>ence, it cannot plausibly be contended that the la! does not ive a fair !arnin and sufficient notice of !hat it see-s to
penali+e. Fnder the circu#stances, petitionerEs reliance on the &void-for-vaueness& doctrine is #anifestly #isplaced. The
doctrine has been for#ulated in various !ays, but is #ost co##only stated to the effect that a statute establishin a
cri#inal offense #ust define the offense !ith sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary intellience can understand
!hat conduct is prohibited by the statute. 2t can only be invo-ed aainst that specie of leislation that is utterly vaue on
its face, i.e., that !hich cannot be clarified either by a savin clause or by construction.
A statute or act #ay be said to be vaue !hen it lac-s co#prehensible standards that #en of co##on intellience #ust
necessarily uess at its #eanin and differ in its application. 2n such instance, the statute is repunant to the Constitution
in t!o 3.5 respects - it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties tareted by it, fair notice of
!hat conduct to avoid< and, it leaves la! enforcers unbridled discretion in carryin out its provisions and beco#es an
arbitrary fle,in of the Jovern#ent #uscle.
%(
But the doctrine does not apply as aainst leislations that are #erely
couched in i#precise lanuae but !hich nonetheless specify a standard thouh defectively phrased< or to those that are
apparently a#biuous yet fairly applicable to certain types of activities. The first #ay be &saved& by proper construction,
!hile no challene #ay be #ounted as aainst the second !henever directed aainst such activities.
%%
1ith #ore reason,
the doctrine cannot be invo-ed !here the assailed statute is clear and free fro# a#biuity, as in this case.
The test in deter#inin !hether a cri#inal statute is void for uncertainty is !hether the lanuae conveys a sufficiently
definite !arnin as to the proscribed conduct !hen #easured by co##on understandin and practice.
%.
2t #ust be
stressed, ho!ever, that the &vaueness& doctrine #erely re*uires a reasonable deree of certainty for the statute to be
upheld - not absolute precision or #athe#atical e,actitude, as petitioner see#s to suest. ?le,ibility, rather than
#eticulous specificity, is per#issible as lon as the #etes and bounds of the statute are clearly delineated. An act !ill not
be held invalid #erely because it #iht have been #ore e,plicit in its !ordins or detailed in its provisions, especially
!here, because of the nature of the act, it !ould be i#possible to provide all the details in advance as in all other statutes.
Moreover, !e aree !ith, hence !e adopt, the observations of Mr. 9ustice Hicente H. Mendo+a durin the deliberations of
the Court that the alleations that the Plunder $a! is vaue and overbroad do not /ustify a facial revie! of its validity -
The void-for-vaueness doctrine states that &a statute !hich either forbids or re*uires the doin of an act in ter#s so vaue
that #en of co##on intellience #ust necessarily uess at its #eanin and differ as to its application, violates the first
essential of due process of la!.&
%0
The overbreadth doctrine, on the other hand, decrees that &a overn#ental purpose #ay
not be achieved by #eans !hich s!eep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedo#s.&
%6
A facial challene is allo!ed to be #ade to a vaue statute and to one !hich is overbroad because of possible &chillin
effect& upon protected speech. The theory is that &A!Bhen statutes reulate or proscribe speech and no readily apparent
construction suests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitatin the statutes in a sinle prosecution, the transcendent value to all
society of constitutionally protected e,pression is dee#ed to /ustify allo!in attac-s on overly broad statutes !ith no
re*uire#ent that the person #a-in the attac- de#onstrate that his o!n conduct could not be reulated by a statute dra!n
!ith narro! specificity.&
%'
The possible har# to society in per#ittin so#e unprotected speech to o unpunished is
out!eihed by the possibility that the protected speech of others #ay be deterred and perceived rievances left to fester
because of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes.
This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Cri#inal statutes have eneral in terrorem effect resultin fro# their very
e,istence, and, if facial challene is allo!ed for this reason alone, the =tate #ay !ell be prevented fro# enactin la!s
aainst socially har#ful conduct. 2n the area of cri#inal la!, the la! cannot ta-e chances as in the area of free speech.
The overbreadth and vaueness doctrines then have special application only to free speech cases. They are inapt for
testin the validity of penal statutes. As the F.=. =upre#e Court put it, in an opinion by Chief 9ustice Rehn*uist, &!e have
not reconi+ed an EoverbreadthE doctrine outside the li#ited conte,t of the ?irst A#end#ent.&
%8
2n "roadric v.
Olahoma,
%4
the Court ruled that &clai#s of facial overbreadth have been entertained in cases involvin statutes !hich, by
their ter#s, see- to reulate only spo-en !ords& and, aain, that &overbreadth clai#s, if entertained at all, have been
curtailed !hen invo-ed aainst ordinary cri#inal la!s that are souht to be applied to protected conduct.& ?or this reason,
it has been held that &a facial challene to a leislative act is the #ost difficult challene to #ount successfully, since the
challener #ust establish that no set of circu#stances e,ists under !hich the Act !ould be valid.&
%:
As for the vaueness
doctrine, it is said that a litiant #ay challene a statute on its face only if it is vaue in all its possible applications. &A
plaintiff !ho enaes in so#e conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot co#plain of the vaueness of the la! as applied to
the conduct of others.&
%7
2n su#, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vaueness are analytical tools developed for testin &on their
faces& statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in A#erican la!, ?irst A#end#ent cases. They cannot be #ade to
do service !hen !hat is involved is a cri#inal statute. 1ith respect to such statute, the established rule is that &one to
!ho# application of a statute is constitutional !ill not be heard to attac- the statute on the round that i#pliedly it #iht
also be ta-en as applyin to other persons or other situations in !hich its application #iht be unconstitutional.&
.(
As has
been pointed out, &vaueness challenes in the ?irst A#end#ent conte,t, li-e overbreadth challenes typically produce
facial invalidation, !hile statutes found vaue as a #atter of due process typically are invalidated AonlyB Eas appliedE to a
particular defendant.&
.%
Conse*uently, there is no basis for petitionerEs clai# that this Court revie! the Anti-Plunder $a!
on its face and in its entirety.
2ndeed, &on its face& invalidation of statutes results in stri-in the# do!n entirely on the round that they #iht be
applied to parties not before the Court !hose activities are constitutionally protected.
..
2t constitutes a departure fro# the
case and controversy re*uire#ent of the Constitution and per#its decisions to be #ade !ithout concrete factual settins
and in sterile abstract conte,ts.
.0
But, as the F.=. =upre#e Court pointed out in 3ounger v. Harris
.6
ATBhe tas- of analy+in a proposed statute, pinpointin its deficiencies, and re*uirin correction of these deficiencies
before the statute is put into effect, is rarely if ever an appropriate tas- for the /udiciary. The co#bination of the relative
re#oteness of the controversy, the i#pact on the leislative process of the relief souht, and above all the speculative and
a#orphous nature of the re*uired line-by-line analysis of detailed statutes, . . . ordinarily results in a -ind of case that is
!holly unsatisfactory for decidin constitutional *uestions, !hichever !ay they #iht be decided.
?or these reasons, &on its face& invalidation of statutes has been described as &#anifestly stron #edicine,& to be
e#ployed &sparinly and only as a last resort,&
.'
and is enerally disfavored.
.8
2n deter#inin the constitutionality of a
statute, therefore, its provisions !hich are alleed to have been violated in a case #ust be e,a#ined in the liht of the
conduct !ith !hich the defendant is chared.
.4
2n liht of the foreoin dis*uisition, it is evident that the purported a#biuity of the Plunder $a!, so tenaciously clai#ed
and arued at lenth by petitioner, is #ore i#ained than real. A#biuity, !here none e,ists, cannot be created by
dissectin parts and !ords in the statute to furnish support to critics !ho cavil at the !ant of scientific precision in the
la!. Every provision of the la! should be construed in relation and !ith reference to every other part. To be sure, it !ill
ta-e #ore than nitpic-in to overturn the !ell-entrenched presu#ption of constitutionality and validity of the Plunder
$a!. A fortiori, petitioner cannot fein inorance of !hat the Plunder $a! is all about. Bein one of the =enators !ho
voted for its passae, petitioner #ust be a!are that the la! !as e,tensively deliberated upon by the =enate and its
appropriate co##ittees by reason of !hich he even reistered his affir#ative vote !ith full -no!lede of its leal
i#plications and sound constitutional anchorae.
The parallel case of Gallego v. Sandigan)a'an
.:
#ust be #entioned if only to illustrate and e#phasi+e the point that
courts are loathed to declare a statute void for uncertainty unless the la! itself is so i#perfect and deficient in its details,
and is susceptible of no reasonable construction that !ill support and ive it effect. 2n that case,
petitioners Gallego and Agoncillo challened the constitutionality of =ec. 0, par. 3e5, of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt
(ractices Act for bein vaue. Petitioners posited, a#on others, that the ter# &un!arranted& is hihly i#precise and
elastic !ith no co##on la! #eanin or settled definition by prior /udicial or ad#inistrative precedents< that, for its
vaueness, =ec. 0, par. 3e5, violates due process in that it does not ive fair !arnin or sufficient notice of !hat it see-s to
penali+e. Petitioners further arued that the 2nfor#ation chared the# !ith three 305 distinct offenses, to !it; 3a5 ivin of
&un!arranted& benefits throuh #anifest partiality< 3b5 ivin of &un!arranted& benefits throuh evident bad faith< and,
3c5 ivin of &un!arranted& benefits throuh ross ine,cusable nelience !hile in the dischare of their official function
and that their riht to be infor#ed of the nature and cause of the accusation aainst the# !as violated because they !ere
left to uess !hich of the three 305 offenses, if not all, they !ere bein chared and prosecuted.
2n dis#issin the petition, this Court held that =ec. 0, par. 3e5, of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt (ractices Act does not suffer
fro# the constitutional defect of vaueness. The phrases &#anifest partiality,& &evident bad faith,& and &ross and
ine,cusable nelience& #erely describe the different #odes by !hich the offense penali+ed in =ec. 0, par. 3e5, of the
statute #ay be co##itted, and the use of all these phrases in the sa#e 2nfor#ation does not #ean that the indict#ent
chares three 305 distinct offenses.
The !ord Eun!arrantedE is not uncertain. 2t see#s lac-in ade*uate or official support< un/ustified< unauthori+ed 31ebster,
Third 2nternational "ictionary, p. .'%65< or !ithout /ustification or ade*uate reason 3Philadelphia Ne!spapers, 2nc. v. F=
"ept. of 9ustice, C.". Pa., 6(' ?. =upp. :, %., cited in 1ords and Phrases, Per#anent Edition, Hol. 60-A %74:, Cu#ulative
Annual Poc-et Part, p. %75.
The assailed provisions of the Anti-Jraft and Corrupt Practices Act consider a corrupt practice and #a-e unla!ful the act
of the public officer in;
, , , or ivin any private party any un!arranted benefits, advantae or preference in the dischare of his official,
ad#inistrative or /udicial functions throuh #anifest partiality, evident bad faith or ross ine,cusable nelience, , , ,
3=ection 0 AeB, Rep. Act 0(%7, as a#ended5.
2t is not at all difficult to co#prehend that !hat the afore*uoted penal provisions penali+e is the act of a public officer, in
the dischare of his official, ad#inistrative or /udicial functions, in ivin any private party benefits, advantae or
preference !hich is un/ustified, unauthori+ed or !ithout /ustification or ade*uate reason, throuh #anifest partiality,
evident bad faith or ross ine,cusable nelience.
2n other !ords, this Court found that there !as nothin vaue or a#biuous in the use of the ter# &un!arranted& in =ec.
0, par. 3e5, of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt (ractices Act, !hich !as understood in its pri#ary and eneral acceptation.
Conse*uently, in that case, petitionersE ob/ection thereto !as held inade*uate to declare the section unconstitutional.
@n the second issue, petitioner advances the hihly stretched theory that =ec. 6 of the Plunder $a! circu#vents the
i##utable obliation of the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the predicate acts constitutin the cri#e of
plunder !hen it re*uires only proof of a pattern of overt or cri#inal acts sho!in unla!ful sche#e or conspiracy -
S%C. C. Rule of Evidence. - $or purposes of esta)lishing the crime of plunder# it shall not )e necessar' to prove each and
ever' criminal act done )' the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspirac' to amass# accumulate or ac:uire ill-
gotten wealth# it )eing sufficient to esta)lish )e'ond reasona)le dou)t a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the
overall unlawful scheme or conspirac'.
The runnin fault in this reasonin is obvious even to the si#plistic #ind. 2n a cri#inal prosecution for plunder, as in all
other cri#es, the accused al!ays has in his favor the presu#ption of innocence !hich is uaranteed by the Bill of Rihts,
and unless the =tate succeeds in de#onstratin by proof beyond reasonable doubt that culpability lies, the accused is
entitled to an ac*uittal.
.7
The use of the &reasonable doubt& standard is indispensable to co##and the respect and
confidence of the co##unity in the application of cri#inal la!. 2t is critical that the #oral force of cri#inal la! be not
diluted by a standard of proof that leaves people in doubt !hether innocent #en are bein conde#ned. 2t is also i#portant
in our free society that every individual oin about his ordinary affairs has confidence that his overn#ent cannot
ad/ude hi# uilty of a cri#inal offense !ithout convincin a proper factfinder of his uilt !ith ut#ost certainty. This
&reasonable doubt& standard has ac*uired such e,alted stature in the real# of constitutional la! as it ives life to the 5ue
(rocess Clause !hich protects the accused aainst conviction e,cept upon proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact
necessary to constitute the cri#e !ith !hich he is chared.
0(
The follo!in e,chanes bet!een Rep. Rodolfo Albano and
Rep. Pablo Jarcia on this score durin the deliberations in the floor of the >ouse of Representatives are elucidatin -
"E$2BERAT2@N= @? T>E >@F=E @? REPRE=ENTAT2HE= @N RA 4(:(, 7 @ctober %77(
&1. AL"A2O> 2ow# &r. Speaer# it is also elementar' in our criminal law that what is alleged in the information must )e
proven )e'ond reasona)le dou)t. 0f we will prove onl' one act and find him guilt' of the other acts enumerated in the
information# does that not wor against the right of the accused especiall' so if the amount committed# sa'# )'
falsification is less than (*BB million# )ut the totalit' of the crime committed is (*BB million since there is malversation#
)ri)er'# falsification of pu)lic document# coercion# theftI
&1. GA1C0A> &r. Speaer# not ever'thing alleged in the information needs to )e proved )e'ond reasona)le dou)t. /hat
is re:uired to )e proved )e'ond reasona)le dou)t is ever' element of the crime charged. $or e<ample# &r. Speaer# there
is an enumeration of the things taen )' the ro))er in the information O three pairs of pants# pieces of ;ewelr'. These need
not )e proved )e'ond reasona)le dou)t# )ut these will not prevent the conviction of a crime for which he was charged ;ust
)ecause# sa'# instead of G pairs of diamond earrings the prosecution proved two. 2ow# what is re:uired to )e proved
)e'ond reasona)le dou)t is the element of the offense.
&1. AL"A2O> 0 am aware of that# &r. Speaer# )ut considering that in the crime of plunder the totalit' of the amount is
ver' important# 0 feel that such a series of overt criminal acts has to )e taen singl'. $or instance# in the act of )ri)er'# he
was a)le to accumulate onl' (AB#BBB and in the crime of e<tortion# he was onl' a)le to accumulate (* million. 2ow#
when we add the totalit' of the other acts as re:uired under this )ill through the interpretation on the rule of evidence# it
is ;ust one single act# so how can we now convict himI
&1. GA1C0A> /ith due respect# &r. Speaer# for purposes of proving an essential element of the crime# there is a need to
prove that element )e'ond reasona)le dou)t. $or e<ample# one essential element of the crime is that the amount involved
is (*BB million. 2ow# in a series of defalcations and other acts of corruption in the enumeration the total amount would
)e (**B or (*EB million# )ut there are certain acts that could not )e proved# so# we will sum up the amounts involved in
those transactions which were proved. 2ow# if the amount involved in these transactions# proved )e'ond reasona)le
dou)t# is (*BB million# then there is a crime of plunder 3underscorin supplied5.
2t is thus plain fro# the foreoin that the leislature did not in any #anner refashion the standard *uantu# of proof in the
cri#e of plunder. The burden still re#ains !ith the prosecution to prove beyond any iota of doubt every fact or ele#ent
necessary to constitute the cri#e.
The thesis that =ec. 6 does a!ay !ith proof of each and every co#ponent of the cri#e suffers fro# a dis#al
#isconception of the i#port of that provision. 1hat the prosecution needs to prove beyond reasonable doubt is only a
nu#ber of acts sufficient to for# a co#bination or series !hich !ould constitute a pattern and involvin an a#ount of at
least P'(,(((,(((.((. There is no need to prove each and every other act alleed in the 2nfor#ation to have been
co##itted by the accused in furtherance of the overall unla!ful sche#e or conspiracy to a#ass, accu#ulate or ac*uire ill-
otten !ealth. To illustrate, supposin that the accused is chared in an 2nfor#ation for plunder !ith havin co##itted
fifty 3'(5 raids on the public treasury. The prosecution need not prove all these fifty 3'(5 raids, it bein sufficient to prove
by pattern at least t!o 3.5 of the raids beyond reasonable doubt provided only that they a#ounted to at
least P'(,(((,(((.((.
0%
A readin of =ec. . in con/unction !ith =ec. 6, brins us to the loical conclusion that &pattern of overt or cri#inal acts
indicative of the overall unla!ful sche#e or conspiracy& inheres in the very acts of accu#ulatin, ac*uirin or a#assin
hidden !ealth. =tated other!ise, such pattern arises !here the prosecution is able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the
predicate acts as defined in =ec. %, par. 3d5. Pattern is #erely a by-product of the proof of the predicate acts. This
conclusion is consistent !ith reason and co##on sense. There !ould be no other e,planation for a co#bination or series
of
overt or cri#inal acts to stash P'(,(((,(((.(( or #ore, than &a sche#e or conspiracy to a#ass, accu#ulate or ac*uire ill
otten !ealth.& The prosecution is therefore not re*uired to #a-e a deliberate and conscious effort to prove pattern as it
necessarily follo!s !ith the establish#ent of a series or co#bination of the predicate acts.
Relative to petitionerEs contentions on the purported defect of =ec. 6 is his sub#ission that &pattern& is &a very i#portant
ele#ent of the cri#e of plunder<& and that =ec. 6 is &t!o proned, 3as5 it contains a rule of evidence and a substantive
ele#ent of the cri#e,& such that !ithout it the accused cannot be convicted of plunder -
47ST0C% "%LLOS0LLO> 0n other words# cannot an accused )e convicted under the (lunder Law without appl'ing
Section C on the 1ule of %vidence if there is proof )e'ond reasona)le dou)t of the commission of the acts complained ofI
ATT3. AGA"02> 0n that case he can )e convicted of individual crimes enumerated in the 1evised (enal Code# )ut not
plunder.
47ST0C% "%LLOS0LLO> 0n other words# if all the elements of the crime are proved )e'ond reasona)le dou)t without
appl'ing Section C# can 'ou not have a conviction under the (lunder LawI
ATT3. AGA"02> 2ot a conviction for plunder# 'our Honor.
47ST0C% "%LLOS0LLO> Can 'ou not disregard the application of Sec. C in convicting an accused charged for violation
of the (lunder LawI
ATT3. AGA"02> /ell# 'our Honor# in the first place Section C la's down a su)stantive element of the law < < < <
47ST0C% "%LLOS0LLO> /hat 0 said is - do we have to avail of Section C when there is proof )e'ond reasona)le dou)t
on the acts charged constituting plunderI
ATT3. AGA"02> 3es# 'our Honor# )ecause Section C is two pronged# it contains a rule of evidence and it contains a
su)stantive element of the crime of plunder. So# there is no wa' )' which we can avoid Section C.
47ST0C% "%LLOS0LLO> "ut there is proof )e'ond reasona)le dou)t insofar as the predicate crimes charged are
concerned that 'ou do not have to go that far )' appl'ing Section CI
ATT3. AGA"02> 3our Honor# our thining is that Section C contains a ver' important element of the crime of plunder and
that cannot )e avoided )' the prosecution.
0.
1e do not subscribe to petitionerEs stand. Pri#arily, all the essential ele#ents of plunder can be culled and understood
fro# its definition in =ec. ., in relation to =ec. %, par. 3d5, and &pattern& is not one of the#. Moreover, the epiraph and
openin clause of =ec. 6 is clear and une*uivocal;
S%C. C. Rule of Evidence . - $or purposes of esta)lishing the crime of plunder < < < <
2t purports to do no #ore than prescribe a rule of procedure for the prosecution of a cri#inal case for plunder. Bein a
purely procedural #easure, =ec. 6 does not define or establish any substantive riht in favor of the accused but only
operates in furtherance of a re#edy. 2t is only a #eans to an end, an aid to substantive la!. 2ndubitably, even !ithout
invo-in =ec. 6, a conviction for plunder #ay be had, for !hat is crucial for the prosecution is to present sufficient
evidence to enender that #oral certitude e,acted by the funda#ental la! to prove the uilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. Thus, even rantin for the sa-e of aru#ent that =ec. 6 is fla!ed and vitiated for the reasons advanced
by petitioner, it #ay si#ply be severed fro# the rest of the provisions !ithout necessarily resultin in the de#ise of the
la!< after all, the e,istin rules on evidence can supplant =ec. 6 #ore than enouh. Besides, =ec. 4 of RA 4(:( provides
for a separability clause -
=ec. 4. =eparability of Provisions. - 2f any provisions of this Act or the application thereof to any person or circu#stance
is held invalid, the re#ainin provisions of this Act and the application of such provisions to other persons or
circu#stances shall not be affected thereby.
2#plicit in the foreoin section is that to avoid the !hole act fro# bein declared invalid as a result of the nullity of so#e
of its provisions, assu#in that to be the case althouh it is not really so, all the provisions thereof should accordinly be
treated independently of each other, especially if by doin so, the ob/ectives of the statute can best be achieved.
As reards the third issue, aain !e aree !ith 9ustice Mendo+a that plunder is a malum in se !hich re*uires proof of
cri#inal intent. Thus, he says, in his Concurrin @pinion -
, , , Precisely because the constitutive cri#es are mala in se the ele#ent of mens rea #ust be proven in a prosecution for
plunder. 2t is note!orthy that the a#ended infor#ation allees that the cri#e of plunder !as co##itted &!illfully,
unla!fully and cri#inally.& 2t thus allees uilty -no!lede on the part of petitioner.
2n support of his contention that the statute eli#inates the re*uire#ent of mens rea and that is the reason he clai#s the
statute is void, petitioner cites the follo!in re#ar-s of =enator TaNada #ade durin the deliberation on =.B. No. 400;
=ENAT@R TAPA"A . . . And the evidence that !ill be re*uired to convict hi# !ould not be evidence for each and every
individual cri#inal act but only evidence sufficient to establish the conspiracy or sche#e to co##it this cri#e of
plunder.
00
>o!ever, =enator TaNada !as discussin Q6 as sho!n by the succeedin portion of the transcript *uoted by petitioner;
=ENAT@R R@MF$@; And, Mr. President, the Jentle#an feels that it is contained in =ection 6, Rule of Evidence, !hich,
in the Jentle#anEs vie!, !ould provide for a speedier and faster process of attendin to this -ind of casesC
=ENAT@R TAPA"A; Les, Mr. President . . .
06
=enator TaNada !as only sayin that !here the chare is conspiracy to co##it plunder, the prosecution need not prove
each and every cri#inal act done to further the sche#e or conspiracy, it bein enouh if it proves beyond reasonable doubt
a pattern of overt or ci#inal acts indicative of the overall unla!ful sche#e or conspiracy. As far as the acts constitutin
the pattern are concerned, ho!ever, the ele#ents of the cri#e #ust be proved and the re*uisite mens rea #ust be sho!n.
2ndeed, Q. provides that -
Any person !ho participated !ith the said public officer in the co##ission of an offense contributin to the cri#e of
plunder shall li-e!ise be punished for such offense. 2n the i#position of penalties, the deree of participation and the
attendance of #itiatin and e,tenuatin circu#stances, as provided by the Revised Penal Code, shall be considered by
the court.
The application of #itiatin and e,tenuatin circu#stances in the Revised Penal Code to prosecutions under the Anti-
Plunder $a! indicates *uite clearly that mens rea is an ele#ent of plunder since the deree of responsibility of the
offender is deter#ined by his cri#inal intent. 2t is true that Q. refers to &any person !ho participates !ith the said public
officer in the co##ission of an offense contributin to the cri#e of plunder.& There is no reason to believe, ho!ever, that
it does not apply as !ell to the public officer as principal in the cri#e. As 9ustice >ol#es said; &1e aree to all the
eneralities about not supplyin cri#inal la!s !ith !hat they o#it, but there is no canon aainst usin co##on sense in
construin la!s as sayin !hat they obviously #ean.&
0'
?inally, any doubt as to !hether the cri#e of plunder is a malum in se #ust be dee#ed to have been resolved in the
affir#ative by the decision of Conress in %770 to include it a#on the heinous cri#es punishable by reclusion
perpetua to death. @ther heinous cri#es are punished !ith death as a straiht penalty in R.A. No. 48'7. Referrin to these
roups of heinous cri#es, this Court held in (eople v. %chegara';
08
The evil of a cri#e #ay ta-e various for#s. There are cri#es that are, by their very nature, despicable, either because life
!as callously ta-en or the victi# is treated li-e an ani#al and utterly dehu#ani+ed as to co#pletely disrupt the nor#al
course of his or her ro!th as a hu#an bein . . . . =een in this liht, the capital cri#es of -idnappin and serious illeal
detention for ranso# resultin in the death of the victi# or the victi# is raped, tortured, or sub/ected to dehu#ani+in
acts< destructive arson resultin in death< and dru offenses involvin #inors or resultin in the death of the victi# in the
case of other cri#es< as !ell as #urder, rape, parricide, infanticide, -idnappin and serious illeal detention, !here the
victi# is detained for #ore than three days or serious physical in/uries !ere inflicted on the victi# or threats to -ill hi#
!ere #ade or the victi# is a #inor, robbery !ith ho#icide, rape or intentional #utilation, destructive arson, and
carnappin !here the o!ner, driver or occupant of the carnapped vehicle is -illed or raped, !hich are penali+ed by
reclusion perpetua to death, are clearly heinous by their very nature.
There are cri#es, ho!ever, in !hich the abo#ination lies in the sinificance and i#plications of the sub/ect cri#inal acts
in the sche#e of the larer socio-political and econo#ic conte,t in !hich the state finds itself to be strulin to develop
and provide for its poor and underprivileed #asses. Reelin fro# decades of corrupt tyrannical rule that ban-rupted the
overn#ent and i#poverished the population, the Philippine Jovern#ent #ust #uster the political !ill to dis#antle the
culture of corruption, dishonesty, reed and syndicated cri#inality that so deeply entrenched itself in the structures of
society and the psyche of the populace. A1ith the overn#entB terribly lac-in the #oney to provide even the #ost basic
services to its people, any for# of #isappropriation or #isapplication of overn#ent funds translates to an actual threat to
the very e,istence of overn#ent, and in turn, the very survival of the people it overns over. Hie!ed in this conte,t, no
less heinous are the effects and repercussions of cri#es li-e *ualified bribery, destructive arson resultin in death, and
dru offenses involvin overn#ent officials, e#ployees or officers, that their perpetrators #ust not be allo!ed to cause
further destruction and da#ae to society.
The leislative declaration in R.A. No. 48'7 that plunder is a heinous offense i#plies that it is a malum in se. ?or !hen
the acts punished are inherently i##oral or inherently !ron, they are mala in se
04
and it does not #atter that such acts
are punished in a special la!, especially since in the case of plunder the predicate cri#es are #ainly mala in se. 2ndeed, it
!ould be absurd to treat prosecutions for plunder as thouh they are #ere prosecutions for violations of the Bouncin
Chec- $a! 3B.P. Bl. ..5 or of an ordinance aainst /ay!al-in, !ithout reard to the inherent !ronness of the acts.
To clinch, petitioner li-e!ise assails the validity of RA 48'7, the a#endatory la! of RA 4(:(, on constitutional rounds.
=uffice it to say ho!ever that it is no! too late in the day for hi# to resurrect this lon dead issue, the sa#e havin been
eternally consined by (eople v. %chegara'
0:
to the archives of /urisprudential history. The declaration of this Court
therein that RA 48'7 is constitutionally valid stands as a declaration of the =tate, and beco#es, by necessary effect,
assi#ilated in the Constitution no! as an interal part of it.
@ur nation has been rac-ed by scandals of corruption and obscene profliacy of officials in hih places !hich have
sha-en its very foundation. The anato#y of raft and corruption has beco#e #ore elaborate in the corridors of ti#e as
unscrupulous people relentlessly contrive #ore and #ore inenious !ays to bil- the coffers of the overn#ent. "rastic
and radical #easures are i#perative to fiht the increasinly sophisticated, e,traordinarily #ethodical and econo#ically
catastrophic lootin of the national treasury. =uch is the Plunder $a!, especially desined to disentanle those hastly
tissues of rand-scale corruption !hich, if left unchec-ed, !ill spread li-e a #alinant tu#or and ulti#ately consu#e the
#oral and institutional fiber of our nation. The Plunder $a!, indeed, is a livin testa#ent to the !ill of the leislature to
ulti#ately eradicate this scoure and thus secure society aainst the avarice and other venalities in public office.
These are ti#es that try #enEs souls. 2n the chec-ered history of this nation, fe! issues of national i#portance can e*ual
the a#ount of interest and passion enerated by petitionerEs ino#inious fall fro# the hihest office, and his eventual
prosecution and trial under a virinal statute. This continuin saa has driven a !ede of dissension a#on our people
that #ay liner for a lon ti#e. @nly by respondin to the clarion call for patriotis#, to rise above factionalis# and
pre/udices, shall !e e#ere triu#phant in the #idst of fer#ent.
PREMISES CONSI2ERE2, this Court holds that RA 4(:( other!ise -no!n as the Plunder $a!, as a#ended by RA
48'7, is C@N=T2TFT2@NA$. Conse*uently, the petition to declare the la! unconstitutional is "2=M2==E" for lac- of
#erit.
=@ @R"ERE".
Buena, and "e $eon, 9r., 99., concur.
"avide, 9r. C.9., Melo, Duisu#bin, 99., /oin concurrin opinion of 9. Mendo+a.
Puno, Hitu, 99., concurred and /oins 9. Mendo+aEs concurrin opinion.
Kapunan, Pardo, =andoval-Jutierre+, Lnares-=antiao, 99., see dissentin opinion.
Mendo+a, 9., please see concurrin opinion.
Pananiban 9., please see separate concurrin opinion.
Carpio, 9., no part. 1as one of the co#plainants before @#buds#an.
3!ith dissentin opinion5
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
=EC@N" "2H=2@N
G.R. No. L-26551 3&%*u'*y 26, 1966
T7E PEOPLE O3 T7E P7ILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
1ENCESLAO ALMUETE 3ERNAN2O 3RON2A, 3AUSTO 2URION '") CIPRIANO 3RON2A, defendants-
appellees.
Sol!.!+o* G&"&*'l A"+o"!o P. 8'**&)o, A!+'"+ Sol!.!+o* G&"&*'l A"+o"!o G. I%'**' '") Sol!.!+o* 9!.&"+& A. To**&
(o* appellant.
E/!l!'"o 2. C'+&ll'"& (o* appellees.

A;UINO, J.:
1enceslao Al#uete ?ernando ?ronda, Cipriano ?ronda and ?austo "urion !ere chared !ith a violation of section 07 of
the Aricultural Tenancy $a!. 2t !as alleed in the infor#ation that in "ece#ber, %780, in MuNo+, Nueva Eci/a the
accused bein tenants of Mararita ?ernando in her riceland, !ithout notice to her or !ithout her consent, pre-threshed a
portion of their respective harvests of five 3'5 cavans of palay each to her da#ae in the a#ount of P%:4.'( at P%..'( a
cavan 3Cri#inal Case No. ="-%47, Court of ?irst 2nstance of Nueva Eci/a, =to. "o#ino Branch H25.
Fpon arrain#ent the accused pleaded not uilty. They filed #otion for a bill of particulars as to the e,act date of the
co##ission of the offense chared. The lo!er court denied their #otion because they had already entered their plea.
Thereafter, they -filed a #otion to *uash the infor#ation on that rounds 3%5 that it does not allee facts sufficient to
constitute the cri#e chared< 3.5 that there is no la! punishin it, and 305 that the court has, no /urisdiction over the
alleed ti#e The fiscal opposed the #otion.
The lo!er court ranted the #otion and dis#issed the infor#ation in its order of Auust %%, %788. 2t held that the
infor#ation is basically deficient because it does not describe t lie circu#stances under !hich the cavans of palay !ere
found in the possession of the accused tenants< it does not specify the date areed upon for the threshin of the harvests,
and it does not allee that the palay found in the tenantsE possession e,ceeded ten percent of their net share based on the
last nor#al harvest.
The prosecution appealed fro# the order of dis#issal. The =olicitor Jeneral arues in his brief that the infor#ation in this
case allees all the ele#ents of the offense defined in section 07 of Republic Act No. %%77, as a#ended of Republic Act
No. ..80. =ections 07 and '4 of the sa#e la! reads as follo!s;
=EC. 07. (rohi)ition on (re-threshing. I 2t shall be unla!ful for either the tenant or landholder, !ithout #utual consent,
to reap or thresh a portion of the crop at any ti#e previous to the date set for its threshin- That if the tenant n food for his
fa#ily and the landholder does not or cannot furnish such and refuses to allo! the tenant to reap or thresh a portion of the
crop previous to the date set for its threshin, the tenant can reap or thresh not #ore than ten percent of his net share in the
last nor#al harvest after ivin notice thereof to the landholder or his representative. Any violation of this situation by
either party shall be treated and penali+ed in accordance !ith this Act andOor under the eneral provisions of la!
applicable to that act co##itted.
=EC. '4. (enal (rovision. I Hiolation of the provisions of ... sections thirty-nine and forty-nine of this Act shall be
punished by a fine not e,ceedin t!o thousand pesos or i#prison#ent not e,ceedin one year, or both, in the discretion of
the Court. ... G
1e hold that the order of dis#issal should be affir#ed because as held in (eople vs. Adillo, $-.0M, Nove#ber .4, %74', a
case si#ilar to the instant case, section 77 !as i#pliedly repealed by the Aricultural $and Refor# Code of %780, as
a#ended by Republic Act No. 80:7 %8: @.J. 7%'5 and as i#ple#ented by Presidential "ecrees Nos. ., .4 and 0%8. That
Code !as already in force !hen the act co#plained of !as co##itted. The repeal #ay be rationali+ed in this #anner;
The prohibition aainst pre-reapin or pre-threshin found in section 07 of the Aricultural Tenancy $a! of %7'6 is
pre#ised on the e,istence of the rice share tenancy syste#. The evident purpose is to prevent the tenant and the
landholder fro# defraudin each other in the division of the harvests.
The Aricultural $and Refor# Code superseded the Aricultural Tenancy $a! 3e,cept as *ualified in sections 6 and 0' of
the Code5. The Code instituted the leasehold syste# and abolished share tenancy sub/ect to certain conditions indicated in
section 6 thereof. 2t is sinificant that section 07 is not reproduced in the Aricultural $and Refor# Code !hose section
%4. repeals &all la!s or part of any la! inconsistent !ith& its provisions.
Fnder the leasehold syste# the prohibition aainst pre-threshin has no, #ore raison dEetre because the lessee is obliated
to pay a fi,ed rental as prescribed in section 06 of the Aricultural $and Refor# Code, or the Code of Ararian Refor#s,
as redesinated in Republic Act No. 80:7 !hich too- effect on =epte#ber %(, %74%. Thus, the leal #a,i#, cessante
ratione leis, cessat ipsa le, 3the reason for the la! ceasin, the la! itself also ceases5. applies to this case.
=ection 6 of the Code of Ararian Refor#s declared aricultural share tenancy throuhout the country as contrary to
public policy and auto#atically converted it to aricultural leasehold. Presidential "ecree No. . proclai#ed the entire
country &as a land refor# area&. Presidential "ecree No. .4 e#ancipated the tenant fro# the bondae of the soil. And
Presidential "ecree No. 0%8 interdicted the e/ect#ent or re#oval of the tenant-far#er fro# his far#holdin until the
pro#ulation of the rules and reulations i#ple#entin Presidential "ecree No. .4. 3=ee People vs. Adillo, supra5.
The leislative intent not to punish any#ore the tenantEs act of pre- reapin and pre-threshin !ithout notice to the
landlord is inferable fro# the fact that, as already noted, the Code of Ararian Refor#s did not reenact section 07 of the
Aricultural Tenancy $a! and that it abolished share tenancy !hich is the basis for penali+in clandestine pre-reapin and
pre-threshin.
All indications point to a deliberate and #anifest leislative desin to replace the Aricultural Tenancy $a! !ith the Code
of Ararian Refor#s, for#erly the Aricultural $and Refor# Code, at least as far as ricelands are concerned.
As held in the Adillo case, the act of pre-reapin and pre-threshin !ithout notice to the landlord, !hich is an offense
under the Aricultural Tenancy $a!, had ceased to be an offense under the subse*uent la!, the Code of Ararian Refor#s.
To prosecute it as an offense !hen the Code of Ararian Refor#s is already in force !ould be repunant or abhorrent to
the policy and spirit of that Code and !ould subvert the #anifest leislative intent not to punish any#ore pre-reapin and
pre-threshin !ithout notice to landholder.
2t is a rule of leal her#eneutics that &an act !hich purports to set out in full all that it intends to contain operates as a
repeal of anythin o#itted !hich !as contain in the old act and not included in the a#endatory act& 3Cra!ford,
Construction of =tatutes, p. 8.% cited in the Adillo case5.
A subse*uent statute, revisin the !hole sub/ect #atter of a for#er statute, and evidently intended as a substitute for it,
operates to repeal the for#er statute& 3:. C.9.=. 6775. EThe revisin statute is in effect a Eleislative declaration that
!hatever is e#braced in the ne! statute shall prevail, and !hatever is e,cluded therefro# shall be discarded& 3:. C.9.=.
'((5.
The repeal of appeal la! deprives the courts of /urisdiction to punish persons chared !ith a violation of the old penal la!
prior to its repeal 3People vs. Ta#ayo, 8% Phil. ..'< People vs. =indion and Pastor, 44 Phil. %(((< People vs. Binuya, 8%
Phil. .(:< F.=. vs. Reyes, %( Phil. 6.0< F.=. vs. Acade#ia, %( Phil. 60%. =ee dissent in $ari#as vs. "irector of Prisons,
'4 Phil. .64, .'., .'65.
1>ERE?@RE, the order of dis#issal is affir#ed !ith costs de oficio.
=@ @R"ERE".
$ernando ?Chairman@# Antonio# Concepcion# 4r. and &artin# 44.# concur.
"arredo# 4.# too no part.
&artin# 4.# was designated to sit in the Second 5ivision.
3oo+"o+&
R AppelleesE contention that the Court of ?irst 2nstance had no /urisdiction over the offense because inferior courts have
/urisdiction over offense in !hich the penalty is i#prison#ent for not #ore than three years, or a fine of not #ore three
thousand pesos, or both such fine and i#prison#ent and that it is the MuNo+ #unicipal court that has /urisdiction is
!ron. The Court of ?irst 2nstance has concurrent /urisdiction !ith the inferior court in ## in !hich the penalty provided
by la! is i#prison#ent for #ore than si, #onths, or a fine of-#ore than t!o hundred pesos 3=ec. 66AfB, 9udiciary $a!5.
The $a!phil Pro/ect - Arellano $a! ?oundation
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 143982 2&.&/%&* 11, 1992
ANTONIO A. MECANO, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON AU2IT, respondent.

CAMPOS, JR., J.:
Antonio A. Mecano, throuh a petition for certiorari# see-s to nullify the decision of the Co##ission on Audit 3C@A, for
brevity5 e#bodied in its 4th 2ndorse#ent, dated 9anuary %8, %77., denyin his clai# for rei#burse#ent under =ection 877
of the Revised Ad#inistrative Code 3RAC5, as a#ended, in the total a#ount of P6(,:0%.((.
Petitioner is a "irector 22 of the National Bureau of 2nvestiation 3NB25. >e !as hospitali+ed for cholecystitis fro# March
.8, %77( to April 4, %77(, on account of !hich he incurred #edical and hospitali+ation e,penses, the total a#ount of
!hich he is clai#in fro# the C@A.
@n May %%, %77(, in a #e#orandu# to the NB2 "irector, Alfredo =. $i# 3"irector $i#, for brevity5, he re*uested
rei#burse#ent for his e,penses on the round that he is entitled to the benefits under =ection 877
1
of the RAC, the
pertinent provisions of !hich read;
=ec. 877. Allowances in case of in;ur'# death# or sicness incurred in performance of dut'. I 1hen a
person in the service of the national overn#ent of a province, city, #unicipality or #unicipal district is
so in/ured in the perfor#ance of duty as thereby to receive so#e actual physical hurt or !ound, the proper
>ead of "epart#ent #ay direct that absence durin any period of disability thereby occasioned shall be
on full pay, thouh not #ore than si, #onths, and in such case he #ay in his discretion also authori+e the
pay#ent of the #edical attendance, necessary transportation, subsistence and hospital fees of the in/ured
person. Absence in the case conte#plated shall be chared first aainst vacation leave, if any there be.
,,, ,,, ,,,
2n case of sic-ness caused by or connected directly !ith the perfor#ance of so#e act in the line of duty,
the "epart#ent head #ay in his discretion authori+e the pay#ent of the necessary hospital fees.
"irector $i# then for!arded petitionerEs clai#, in a %st 2ndorse#ent dated 9une .., %77(, to the =ecretary of 9ustice,
alon !ith the co##ent, bearin the sa#e date, of Jerarda Jalan, Chief, $E" of the NB2, &reco##endin favorable
action thereof&. ?indin petitionerEs illness to be service-connected, the Co##ittee on Physical E,a#ination of the
"epart#ent of 9ustice favorably reco##ended the pay#ent of petitionerEs clai#.
>o!ever, then Fndersecretary of 9ustice =ilvestre >. Bello 222, in a 6th 2ndorse#ent dated Nove#ber .%, %77(, returned
petitionerEs clai# to "irector $i#, havin considered the state#ents of the Chair#an of the C@A in its 'th 2ndorse#ent
dated %7 =epte#ber %77(, to the effect that the RAC bein relied upon !as repealed by the Ad#inistrative Code of %7:4.
Petitioner then re-sub#itted his clai# to "irector $i#, !ith a copy of @pinion No. 40, =. %77%
2
dated April .8, %77% of
then =ecretary of 9ustice ?ran-lin M. "rilon 3=ecretary "rilon, for brevity5 statin that &the issuance of the Ad#inistrative
Code did not operate to repeal or abreate in its entirety the Revised Ad#inistrative Code, includin the particular =ection
877 of the latter&.
@n May %(, %77%, "irector $i#, under a 'th 2ndorse#ent trans#itted ane! MecanoEs clai# to then Fndersecretary Bello
for favorable consideration. Fnder a 8th 2ndorse#ent, dated 9uly ., %77%, =ecretary "rilon for!arded petitionerEs clai# to
the C@A Chair#an, reco##endin pay#ent of the sa#e. C@A Chair#an Eufe#io C. "o#ino, in his 4th 2ndorse#ent of
9anuary %8, %77., ho!ever, denied petitionerEs clai# on the round that =ection 877 of the RAC had been repealed by the
Ad#inistrative Code of %7:4, solely for the reason that the sa#e section !as not restated nor re-enacted in the
Ad#inistrative Code of %7:4. >e co##ented, ho!ever, that the clai# #ay be filed !ith the E#ployeesE Co#pensation
Co##ission, considerin that the illness of "irector Mecano occurred after the effectivity of the Ad#inistrative Code of
%7:4.
Eventually, petitionerEs clai# !as returned by Fndersecretary of 9ustice Eduardo Montenero to "irector $i# under a 7th
2ndorse#ent dated ?ebruary 4, %77., !ith the advice that petitioner &elevate the #atter to the =upre#e Court if he so
desires&.
@n the sole issue of !hether or not the Ad#inistrative Code of %7:4 repealed or abroated =ection 877 of the RAC, this
petition !as brouht for the consideration of this Court.
Petitioner anchors his clai# on =ection 877 of the RAC, as a#ended, and on the afore#entioned @pinion No. 40, =. %77%
of =ecretary "rilon. >e further #aintains that in the event that a clai# is filed !ith the E#ployeesE Co#pensation
Co##ission, as suested by respondent, he !ould still not be barred fro# filin a clai# under the sub/ect section. Thus,
the resolution of !hether or not there !as a repeal of the Revised Ad#inistrative Code of %7%4 !ould decide the fate of
petitionerEs clai# for rei#burse#ent.
The C@A, on the other hand, stronly #aintains that the enact#ent of the Ad#inistrative Code of %7:4 3E,ec. @rder No.
.7.5 operated to revo-e or supplant in its entirety the Revised Ad#inistrative Code of %7%4. The C@A clai#s that fro#
the &!hereas& clauses of the ne! Ad#inistrative Code, it can be leaned that it !as the intent of the leislature to repeal
the old Code. Moreover, the C@A *uestions the applicability of the aforesaid opinion of the =ecretary of 9ustice in
decidin the #atter. $astly, the C@A contends that e#ploy#ent-related sic-ness, in/ury or death is ade*uately covered by
the E#ployeesE Co#pensation Prora# under P.". 8.8, such that to allo! si#ultaneous recovery of benefits under both
la!s on account of the sa#e continency !ould be unfair and un/ust to the Jovern#ent.
The *uestion of !hether a particular la! has been repealed or not by a subse*uent la! is a #atter of leislative intent. The
la!#a-ers #ay e,pressly repeal a la! by incorporatin therein a repealin provision !hich e,pressly and specifically
cites the particular la! or la!s, and portions thereof, that are intended to be repealed.
3
A declaration in a statute, usually
in its repealin clause, that a particular and specific la!, identified by its nu#ber or title, is repealed is an e,press repeal<
all others are i#plied repeals.
4
2n the case of the t!o Ad#inistrative Codes in *uestion, the ascertain#ent of !hether or not it !as the intent of the
leislature to supplant the old Code !ith the ne! Code partly depends on the scrutiny of the repealin clause of the ne!
Code. This provision is found in =ection .4, Boo- H22 3?inal Provisions5 of the Ad#inistrative Code of %7:4 !hich reads;
=ec. .4. 1epealing Clause. I All la!s, decrees, orders, rules and reulations, or portions thereof,
inconsistent !ith this Code are hereby repealed or #odified accordinly.
The *uestion that should be as-ed is; 1hat is the nature of this repealin clauseC 2t is certainly not an e,press repealin
clause because it fails to identify or desinate the act or acts that are intended to be repealed.
5
Rather, it is an e,a#ple of a
eneral repealin provision, as stated in @pinion No. 40, =. %77%. 2t is a clause !hich predicates the intended repeal under
the condition that substantial conflict #ust be found in e,istin and prior acts. The failure to add a specific repealin
clause indicates that the intent !as not to repeal any e,istin la!, unless an irreconcilable inconcistency and repunancy
e,ist in the ter#s of the ne! and old la!s.
6
This latter situation falls under the cateory of an i#plied repeal.
Repeal by i#plication proceeds on the pre#ise that !here a statute of later date clearly reveals an intention on the part of
the leislature to abroate a prior act on the sub/ect, that intention #ust be iven effect.
6
>ence, before there can be a
repeal, there #ust be a clear sho!in on the part of the la!#a-er that the intent in enactin the ne! la! !as to abroate
the old one. The intention to repeal #ust be clear and #anifest<
8
other!ise, at least, as a eneral rule, the later act is to be
construed as a continuation of, and not a substitute for, the first act and !ill continue so far as the t!o acts are the sa#e
fro# the ti#e of the first enact#ent.
9
There are t!o cateories of repeal by i#plication. The first is !here provisions in the t!o acts on the sa#e sub/ect #atter
are in an irreconcilable conflict, the later act to the e,tent of the conflict constitutes an i#plied repeal of the earlier one.
The second is if the later act covers the !hole sub/ect of the earlier one and is clearly intended as a substitute, it !ill
operate to repeal the earlier la!.
14
2#plied repeal by irreconcilable inconsistency ta-es place !hen the t!o statutes cover the sa#e sub/ect #atter< they are so
clearly inconsistent and inco#patible !ith each other that they cannot be reconciled or har#oni+ed< and both cannot be
iven effect, that is, that one la! cannot be enforced !ithout nullifyin the other.
11
Co#parin the t!o Codes, it is apparent that the ne! Code does not cover nor atte#pt to cover the entire sub/ect #atter of
the old Code. There are several #atters treated in the old Code !hich are not found in the ne! Code, such as the
provisions on notaries public, the leave la!, the public bondin la!, #ilitary reservations, clai#s for sic-ness benefits
under =ection 877, and still others.
Moreover, the C@A failed to de#onstrate that the provisions of the t!o Codes on the #atter of the sub/ect clai# are in an
irreconcilable conflict. 2n fact, there can be no such conflict because the provision on sic-ness benefits of the nature bein
clai#ed by petitioner has not been restated in the Ad#inistrative Code of %7:4. >o!ever, the C@A !ould have Fs
consider that the fact that =ection 877 !as not restated in the Ad#inistrative Code of %7:4 #eant that the sa#e section
had been repealed. 2t further #aintained that to allo! the particular provisions not restated in the ne! Code to continue in
force arues aainst the Code itself. The C@A anchored this aru#ent on the !hereas clause of the %7:4 Code, !hich
states;
1>EREA=, the effectiveness of the Jovern#ent !ill be enhanced by a ne! Ad#inistrative Code !hich
incorporate in a unified document the #a/or structural, functional and procedural principles and rules of
overnance< and
,,, ,,, ,,,
2t arues, in effect, that !hat is conte#plated is only one Code I the Ad#inistrative Code of %7:4. This contention is
untenable.
The fact that a later enact#ent #ay relate to the sa#e sub/ect #atter as that of an earlier statute is not of itself sufficient to
cause an i#plied repeal of the prior act, since the ne! statute #ay #erely be cu#ulative or a continuation of the old
one.
12
1hat is necessary is a #anifest indication of leislative purpose to repeal.
13
1e co#e no! to the second cateory of repeal I the enact#ent of a statute revisin or codifyin the for#er la!s on the
!hole sub/ect #atter. This is only possible if the revised statute or code !as intended to cover the !hole sub/ect to be a
co#plete and perfect syste# in itself. 2t is the rule that a subse*uent statute is dee#ed to repeal a prior la! if the for#er
revises the !hole sub/ect #atter of the for#er statute.
14
1hen both intent and scope clearly evidence the idea of a repeal,
then all parts and provisions of the prior act that are o#itted fro# the revised act are dee#ed repealed.
15
?urther#ore,
before there can be an i#plied repeal under this cateory, it #ust be the clear intent of the leislature that the later act be
the substitute to the prior act.
16
Accordin to @pinion No. 40, =. %77% of the =ecretary of 9ustice, !hat appears clear is the intent to cover only those
aspects of overn#ent that pertain to ad#inistration, orani+ation and procedure, understandably because of the #any
chanes that transpired in the overn#ent structure since the enact#ent of the RAC decades of years ao. The C@A
challenes the !eiht that this opinion carries in the deter#ination of this controversy inas#uch as the body !hich had
been entrusted !ith the i#ple#entation of this particular provision has already rendered its decision. The C@A relied on
the rule in ad#inistrative la! enunciated in the case of Sison vs.(angramu'en
16
that in the absence of palpable error or
rave abuse of discretion, the Court !ould be loathe to substitute its o!n /ud#ent for that of the ad#inistrative aency
entrusted !ith the enforce#ent and i#ple#entation of the la!. This !ill not hold !ater. This principle is sub/ect to
li#itations. Ad#inistrative decisions #ay be revie!ed by the courts upon a sho!in that the decision is vitiated by fraud,
i#position or #ista-e.
18
2t has been held that @pinions of the =ecretary and Fndersecretary of 9ustice are #aterial in the
construction of statutes in pari materia.
19
$astly, it is a !ell-settled rule of statutory construction that repeals of statutes by i#plication are not favored.
24
The
presu#ption is aainst inconsistency and repunancy for the leislature is presu#ed to -no! the e,istin la!s on the
sub/ect and not to have enacted inconsistent or conflictin statutes.
21
This Court, in a case, e,plains the principle in detail as follo!s; &Repeals by i#plication are not favored, and !ill not be
decreed unless it is #anifest that the leislature so intended. As la!s are presu#ed to be passed !ith deliberation !ith full
-no!lede of all e,istin ones on the sub/ect, it is but reasonable to conclude that in passin a statute it !as not intended
to interfere !ith or abroate any for#er la! relatin to so#e #atter, unless the repunancy bet!een the t!o is not only
irreconcilable, but also clear and convincin, and flo!in necessarily fro# the lanuae used, unless the later act fully
e#braces the sub/ect #atter of the earlier, or unless the reason for the earlier act is beyond peradventure rene!ed. >ence,
every effort #ust be used to #a-e all acts stand and if, by any reasonable construction, they can be reconciled, the later
act !ill not operate as a repeal of the earlier.
22
Reardin respondentEs contention that recovery under this sub/ect section shall bar the recovery of benefits under the
E#ployeesE Co#pensation Prora#, the sa#e cannot be upheld. The second sentence of Article %40, Chapter 22, Title 22
3dealin on E#ployeesE Co#pensation and =tate 2nsurance ?und5, Boo- 2H of the $abor Code, as a#ended by P.". %7.%,
e,pressly provides that &the pay#ent of co#pensation under this Title shall not bar the recovery of benefits as provided
for in =ection 877 of the Revised Ad#inistrative Code . . . !hose benefits are ad#inistered by the syste# 3#eanin ===
or J=2=5 or by other aencies of the overn#ent.&
1>ERE?@RE, pre#ises considered, the Court resolves to JRANT the petition< respondent is hereby ordered to ive due
course to petitionerEs clai# for benefits. No costs.
=@ @R"ERE".
2arvasa# C.4.# Cruz# $eliciano# (adilla# "idin# Gri-o-A:uino# 1egalado# 5avide# 4r.# 1omero# 2ocon# "ellosillo and
&elo# 44.# concur.
Gutierrez# 4r.# 4.# concur in the result.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
=EC@N" "2H2=2@N
G.R. No. L-38636 M'y 21, 1984
3ELIPE G. TAC-AN, petitioner,
vs.
7ONORA8LE COURT O3 APPEALS '") ELEUTERIO ACOPIA2O, MAEIMINO ACOPIA2O, +$& SPOUSES
JESUS PAG7ASIAN '") PILAR LI8ETARIO, respondents.
Liliano ". 2eri for petitioner.
9ic T. Laca'a for private respondents.

A8A2 SANTOS, J.:
The petitioner, ?elipe J. Tac-An, is a la!yer !hose services !ere enaed by the brothers Eleuterio Acopiado and
Ma,i#ino Acopiado !ho !ere accused of frustrated #urder and theft of lare cattle before the Municipal Court of Ne!
PiNan, Sa#boana del Norte in March, %78(.
@n April 6, %78(, Tac-An caused a docu#ent entitled, &"eed of Duitclai#& to be thu#b-#ar-ed by the Acopiado brothers
!hereby for the su# of P%,.((.(( representin his fees as their la!yer in the cri#inal cases, they conveyed to hi# a
parcel of land !ith an area of three hectares. The docu#ent !as ac-no!leded before Notary Public Pacifico Ci#afranca
on the sa#e date !ho e,plained its contents to the Acopiados.
@n April 8, %78(, or t!o days after the e,ecution of the deed, the Acopiados told Tac-An that they !ere ter#inatin his
services because their !ives and parents did not aree that the land be iven to pay for his services. They also said that
they had hired another la!yer, a relative, to defend the#. But Tac-An continued to represent the#.
2n the case for frustrated #urder, the Acopiados !ere ac*uitted. The cases for theft of lare cattle !ere dis#issed due to
the desistance of the co#plainants.
@n April ., %78%, Eleuterio sold his share of the land previously conveyed to Tac-An to 9esus Pahasian and Pilar
$ibetario but the latter did not ta-e possession thereof.
2n 9une, %786, Tac-An appointed 2rineo Hille/o, a barrio captain, as his overseer in the land. @n 9uly ., %786, Tac-An also
secured the approval of the Provincial Jovernor of Sa#boana del Norte to the "eed of Duitclai#. And on @ctober 4,
%786, Tac-An filed a co#plaint aainst the Acopiado brothers, Pahasian and $ibetario in the C?2 of Sa#boana del
Norte. >e prayed that he be declared the o!ner of the land< that the sale #ade in favor of Pahasian and o!ner $ibetario
be annulled< and that he be paid da#aes, attorneyEs fees, etc.
The Court of ?irst 2nstance decided in favor of Tac-An !hereupon the Acopiados, et al. appealed to the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals voided the transfer of the land to Tac-An but held that for his services in the cri#inal cases he !as
entitled to the areed upon a#ount of P%,.((.((. The /ud#ent of the Court of Appeals reads as follo!s;
1>ERE?@RE, the /ud#ent appealed fro# is hereby reversed and set aside. 2n lieu thereof, another one
is rendered orderin the defendants Acopiados to pay the plaintiff the su# of P%,.((.(( !ith interest at a
leal rate fro# the date of the finality of this /ud#ent until full pay#ent thereof. No pronounce#ent as
to costs. 3Rollo, pp. 6(-6%.5
Petitioner Tac-An prays that the decision of the Court of Appeals be set aside and that the decision of the Court of ?irst
2nstance be upheld instead.
The petition is not i#pressed !ith #erit.
The Court of Appeals found as a fact that the Acopiado brothers fully understood the tenor of the "eed of Duitclai#
!hich they e,ecuted. But the Court of Appeals also found as a fact that the Acopiado brothers are Non-Christians, #ore
specifically =ubanons, and that each is #arried to a =ubanon. And because they are Non-Christians, the Court of Appeals
applied =ection %6' of the Ad#inistrative Code of Mindanao and =ulu !hich reads as follo!s;
=ec. %6'. Contracts with 2on-Christians re:uisites. -- =ave and e,cept contracts of sale or barter of
personal property and contracts of personal service co#prehended in chapter seventeen hereof no contract
or aree#ent shall be #ade in the "epart#ent by any person !ith any Moro or other non-Christian tribe
or portion thereof the "epart#ent or !ith any individual Moro or other non-Christian inhabitants of the
sa#e for the pay#ent or delivery of #oney or other thins of value in present or in prospective, or in the
#anner affectin or relatin to any real property, unless such contract or aree#ent be e,ecuted and
approved as follo!s;
,,, ,,, ,,,
3b5 2t shall be e,ecuted before a /ude of a court of record, /ustice or au,illiary /ustice of the peace, or
notary public, and shall bear the approval of the provincial overnor !herein the sa#e !as e,ecuted or
his representative duly authori+ed in !ritin for such purpose, indorsed upon it.
2t should be stated that under =ection %68 of the sa#e Code, contracts or aree#ents #ade in violation of =ec. %6' shall
be &null and void.&
2t should be recalled that on 9uly ., %786, Tac-An secured the approval of the Provincial Jovernor of Sa#boana del
Norte to the "eed of Duitclai# and that should have satisfied the re*uire#ent of =ec. %6' of the Ad#inistrative Code for
Mindanao and =ulu. But it appears that on April %., %78', !hile Tac-AnEs suit !as pendin in the trial court, the Jovernor
of Sa#boana del Norte revo-ed his approval for the reasons stated therein.
The petitioner no! asserts that the revocation of the approval !hich had been iven by the Provincial Jovernor has no
leal effect and cannot affect his riht to the land !hich had already vested. But as 9ustice Conrado M. Has*ue+, !ith
9ustices Mateo Canonoy and A#eurfina M. >errera concurrin, said;
The approval by Provincial Jovernor ?elipe A+cuna appearin on the face of the "eed of Duitclai# 3E,h.
&E &5 #ade on 9uly ., %786 #ay no loner be relied upon by the plaintiff in vie! of the revocation thereof
by the sa#e official on April %., %78' 3E,h. 65. The revocation !as based on the round that the sinature
of Jovernor A+cuna !as obtained thru a false representation to the effect that the alleed transaction !as
leal and voluntary !hen in truth and in fact, as found out later, the said parcel of land !as the sub/ect
#atter of a court litiation< and, #oreover, the non-Christian vendors !ere not brouht before hi# for
interroation, confir#ation or ratification of the alleed deed of *uitclai#. The fact that the revocation
!as #ade after the filin of instant action on @ctober %(, %786 does not vitiate the aforesaid action of the
Provincial Jovernor. =inificantly, no atte#pt !as #ade to disprove the truth of the reasons stated in the
certificate of revocation 3E,h. 65. 3Rollo, p. 04.5
The petitioner also arues that the Ad#inistrative Code of Mindanao and =ulu !as repealed on 9une %7, %78' by Republic
Act No, 6.'., hence the approval of the Provincial Jovernor beca#e unnecessary. =uffice it to say that at ti#es #aterial
to the case, i.e. !hen the "eed of Duitclai# !as e,ecuted, !hen the approval by the Provincial Jovernor !as iven and
!hen the approval !as revo-ed, =ections %6' and %68 of the Ad#inistrative Code of Mindanao and =ulu !ere in full
force and effect and since they !ere substantive in nature the repealin statute cannot be iven retroactive effect. 2t should
also be stated that the land in *uestion #ust be presu#ed to be con/ual in nature and since the spouses of the Acopiado
brothers did not consent to its transfer to the petitioner, the transaction !as at least voidable.
1>ERE?@RE findin the petition to be lac-in in #erit, the sa#e is hereby dis#issed !ith costs aainst the petitioner.
=@ @R"ERE".
&aasiar# A:uino# Concepcion# 4r.# Guerrero# and 5e Castro# 44.# concur.
%scolin# 4.# too no part.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-9636 A,*!l 34, 1956
AMERICAN 8I8LE SOCIETY, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
CITY O3 MANILA, defendant-appellee.
Cit' $iscal %ugenio Angeles and 4uan 2a)ong for appellant.
Assistant Cit' $iscal Arsenio 2a-awa for appellee.
3ELIE, J.=
Plaintiff-appellant is a forein, non-stoc-, non-profit, reliious, #issionary corporation duly reistered and doin business
in the Philippines throuh its Philippine aency established in Manila in Nove#ber, %:7:, !ith its principal office at 808
2saac Peral in said City. The defendant appellee is a #unicipal corporation !ith po!ers that are to be e,ercised in
confor#ity !ith the provisions of Republic Act No. 6(7, -no!n as the Revised Charter of the City of Manila.
2n the course of its #inistry, plaintiffEs Philippine aency has been distributin and sellin bibles andOor ospel portions
thereof 3e,cept durin the 9apanese occupation5 throuhout the Philippines and translatin the sa#e into several
Philippine dialects. @n May .7 %7'0, the actin City Treasurer of the City of Manila infor#ed plaintiff that it !as
conductin the business of eneral #erchandise since Nove#ber, %76', !ithout providin itself !ith the necessary
MayorEs per#it and #unicipal license, in violation of @rdinance No. 0(((, as a#ended, and @rdinances Nos. .'.7, 0(.:
and 0086, and re*uired plaintiff to secure, !ithin three days, the correspondin per#it and license fees, toether !ith
co#pro#ise coverin the period fro# the 6th *uarter of %76' to the .nd *uarter of %7'0, in the total su# of P',:.%.6'
3Anne, A5.
Plaintiff protested aainst this re*uire#ent, but the City Treasurer de#anded that plaintiff deposit and pay under protest
the su# of P',:7%.6', if suit !as to be ta-en in court reardin the sa#e 3Anne, B5. To avoid the closin of its business as
!ell as further fines and penalties in the pre#ises on @ctober .6, %7'0, plaintiff paid to the defendant under protest the
said per#it and license fees in the afore#entioned a#ount, ivin at the sa#e ti#e notice to the City Treasurer that suit
!ould be ta-en in court to *uestion the leality of the ordinances under !hich, the said fees !ere bein collected 3Anne,
C5, !hich !as done on the sa#e date by filin the co#plaint that ave rise to this action. 2n its co#plaint plaintiff prays
that /ud#ent be rendered declarin the said Municipal @rdinance No. 0(((, as a#ended, and @rdinances Nos. .'.7,
0(.: and 0086 illeal and unconstitutional, and that the defendant be ordered to refund to the plaintiff the su# of
P',:7%.6' paid under protest, toether !ith leal interest thereon, and the costs, plaintiff further prayin for such other
relief and re#edy as the court #ay dee# /ust e*uitable.
"efendant ans!ered the co#plaint, #aintainin in turn that said ordinances !ere enacted by the Municipal Board of the
City of Manila by virtue of the po!er ranted to it by section .666, subsection 3#-.5 of the Revised Ad#inistrative Code,
superseded on 9une %:, %767, by section %:, subsection 3%5 of Republic Act No. 6(7, -no!n as the Revised Charter of the
City of Manila, and prayin that the co#plaint be dis#issed, !ith costs aainst plaintiff. This ans!er !as replied by the
plaintiff reiteratin the unconstitutionality of the often-repeated ordinances.
Before trial the parties sub#itted the follo!in stipulation of facts;
C@ME N@1 the parties in the above-entitled case, thru their undersined attorneys and respectfully sub#it the
follo!in stipulation of facts;
%. That the plaintiff sold for the use of the purchasers at its principal office at 808 2saac Peral, Manila, Bibles,
Ne! Testa#ents, bible portions and bible concordance in Enlish and other forein lanuaes i#ported by it fro#
the Fnited =tates as !ell as Bibles, Ne! Testa#ents and bible portions in the local dialects i#ported andOor
purchased locally< that fro# the fourth *uarter of %76' to the first *uarter of %7'0 inclusive the sales #ade by the
plaintiff !ere as follo!s;
8uarter Amount of Sales
6th *uarter %76' P%,.66..%
%st *uarter %768 .,.(8.:'
.nd *uarter %768 %,7'(.0:
0rd *uarter %768 .,.0'.77
6th *uarter %768 0,.'8.(6
%st *uarter %764 %0,.6%.(4
.nd *uarter %764 %',446.''
0rd *uarter %764 %6,8'6.%0
6th *uarter %764 %.,'7(.76
%st *uarter %76: %%,%60.7(
.nd *uarter %76: %6,4%'..8
0rd *uarter %76: 0:,000.:0
6th *uarter %76: %8,%47.7(
%st *uarter %767 .0,74'.%(
.nd *uarter %767 %4,:(..(:
0rd *uarter %767 %8,86(.47
6th *uarter %767 %',78%.0:
%st *uarter %7'( %:,'8..68
.nd *uarter %7'( .%,:%8.0.
0rd *uarter %7'( .',((6.''
6th *uarter %7'( 6',.:4.7.
%st *uarter %7'% 04,:6%..%
.nd *uarter %7'% .7,%(0.7:
0rd *uarter %7'% .(,%:%.%(
6th *uarter %7'% ..,78:.7%
%st *uarter %7'. .0,((..8'
.nd *uarter %7'. %4,8.8.78
0rd *uarter %7'. %4,7.%.(%
6th *uarter %7'. .6,%:(.4.
%st *uarter %7'0 .7,'%8..%
.. That the parties hereby reserve the riht to present evidence of other facts not herein stipulated.
1>ERE?@RE, it is respectfully prayed that this case be set for hearin so that the parties #ay present further
evidence on their behalf. 3Record on Appeal, pp. %'-%85.
1hen the case !as set for hearin, plaintiff proved, a#on other thins, that it has been in e,istence in the Philippines
since %:77, and that its parent society is in Ne! Lor-, Fnited =tates of A#erica< that its, contiuous real properties
located at 2saac Peral are e,e#pt fro# real estate ta,es< and that it !as never re*uired to pay any #unicipal license fee or
ta, before the !ar, nor does the A#erican Bible =ociety in the Fnited =tates pay any license fee or sales ta, for the sale of
bible therein. Plaintiff further tried to establish that it never #ade any profit fro# the sale of its bibles, !hich are disposed
of for as lo! as one third of the cost, and that in order to #aintain its operatin cost it obtains substantial re#ittances fro#
its Ne! Lor- office and voluntary contributions and ifts fro# certain churches, both in the Fnited =tates and in the
Philippines, !hich are interested in its #issionary !or-. Reardin plaintiffEs contention of lac- of profit in the sale of
bibles, defendant retorts that the ad#issions of plaintiff-appellantEs lone !itness !ho testified on cross-e,a#ination that
bibles bearin the price of 4( cents each fro# plaintiff-appellantEs Ne! Lor- office are sold here by plaintiff-appellant at
P%.0( each< those bearin the price of T6.'( each are sold here at P%( each< those bearin the price of T4 each are sold
here at P%' each< and those bearin the price of T%% each are sold here at P.. each, clearly sho! that plaintiffEs contention
that it never #a-es any profit fro# the sale of its bible, is evidently untenable.
After hearin the Court rendered /ud#ent, the last part of !hich is as follo!s;
As #ay be seen fro# the repealed section 3#-.5 of the Revised Ad#inistrative Code and the repealin portions
3o5 of section %: of Republic Act No. 6(7, althouh they see#inly differ in the !ay the leislative intent is
e,pressed, yet their #eanin is practically the sa#e for the purpose of ta,in the #erchandise #entioned in said
leal provisions, and that the ta,es to be levied by said ordinances is in the nature of percentae raduated ta,es
3=ec. 0 of @rdinance No. 0(((, as a#ended, and =ec. %, Jroup ., of @rdinance No. .'.7, as a#ended by
@rdinance No. 00865.
2N H2E1 @? T>E ?@REJ@2NJ C@N=2"ERAT2@N=, this Court is of the opinion and so holds that this case
should be dis#issed, as it is hereby dis#issed, for lac- of #erits, !ith costs aainst the plaintiff.
Not satisfied !ith this verdict plaintiff too- up the #atter to the Court of Appeals !hich certified the case to Fs for the
reason that the errors assined to the lo!er Court involved only *uestions of la!.
Appellant contends that the lo!er Court erred;
%. 2n holdin that @rdinances Nos. .'.7 and 0(((, as respectively a#ended, are not unconstitutional<
.. 2n holdin that subsection #-. of =ection .666 of the Revised Ad#inistrative Code under !hich @rdinances
Nos. .'7. and 0((( !ere pro#ulated, !as not repealed by =ection %: of Republic Act No. 6(7<
0. 2n not holdin that an ordinance providin for ta,es based on ross sales or receipts, in order to be valid under
the ne! Charter of the City of Manila, #ust first be approved by the President of the Philippines< and
6. 2n holdin that, as the sales #ade by the plaintiff-appellant have assu#ed co##ercial proportions, it cannot
escape fro# the operation of said #unicipal ordinances under the cloa- of reliious privilee.
The issues. I As #ay be seen fro# the proceedin state#ent of the case, the issues involved in the present controversy
#ay be reduced to the follo!in; 3%5 !hether or not the ordinances of the City of Manila, Nos. 0(((, as a#ended, and
.'.7, 0(.: and 0086, are constitutional and valid< and 3.5 !hether the provisions of said ordinances are applicable or not
to the case at bar.
=ection %, subsection 345 of Article 222 of the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, provides that;
345 No la! shall be #ade respectin an establish#ent of reliion, or prohibitin the free e,ercise thereof, and the
free e,ercise and en/oy#ent of reliious profession and !orship, !ithout discri#ination or preference, shall
forever be allo!ed. No reliion test shall be re*uired for the e,ercise of civil or political rihts.
Predicated on this constitutional #andate, plaintiff-appellant contends that @rdinances Nos. .'.7 and 0(((, as
respectively a#ended, are unconstitutional and illeal in so far as its society is concerned, because they provide for
reliious censorship and restrain the free e,ercise and en/oy#ent of its reliious profession, to !it; the distribution and
sale of bibles and other reliious literature to the people of the Philippines.
Before enterin into a discussion of the constitutional aspect of the case, 1e shall first consider the provisions of the
*uestioned ordinances in relation to their application to the sale of bibles, etc. by appellant. The records, sho! that by
letter of May .7, %7'0 3Anne, A5, the City Treasurer re*uired plaintiff to secure a MayorEs per#it in connection !ith the
societyEs alleed business of distributin and sellin bibles, etc. and to pay per#it dues in the su# of P0' for the period
covered in this litiation, plus the su# of P0' for co#pro#ise on account of plaintiffEs failure to secure the per#it
re*uired by @rdinance No. 0((( of the City of Manila, as a#ended. This @rdinance is of eneral application and not
particularly directed aainst institutions li-e the plaintiff, and it does not contain any provisions !hatever prescribin
reliious censorship nor restrainin the free e,ercise and en/oy#ent of any reliious profession. =ection % of @rdinance
No. 0((( reads as follo!s;
=EC. %. PERM2T= NECE==ARL. I 2t shall be unla!ful for any person or entity to conduct or enae in any of
the businesses, trades, or occupations enumerated in Section G of this Ordinance or other )usinesses# trades# or
occupations for which a permit is re:uired for the proper supervision and enforcement of e<isting laws and
ordinances governing the sanitation# securit'# and welfare of the pu)lic and the health of the emplo'ees engaged
in the )usiness specified in said section G hereof# 12T>@FT ?2R=T >AH2NJ @BTA2NE" A PERM2T
T>ERE?@R ?R@M T>E MAL@R AN" T>E NECE==ARL $2CEN=E ?R@M T>E C2TL TREA=FRER.
The business, trade or occupation of the plaintiff involved in this case is not particularly #entioned in =ection 0 of the
@rdinance, and the record does not sho! that a per#it is re*uired therefor under e,istin la!s and ordinances for the
proper supervision and enforce#ent of their provisions overnin the sanitation, security and !elfare of the public and the
health of the e#ployees enaed in the business of the plaintiff. >o!ever, sections 0 of @rdinance 0((( contains ite# No.
47, !hich reads as follo!s;
47. All other businesses, trades or occupations not
#entioned in this @rdinance, e,cept those upon !hich the
City is not e#po!ered to license or to ta, P'.((
Therefore, the necessity of the per#it is #ade to depend upon the po!er of the City to license or ta, said business, trade
or occupation.
As to the license fees that the Treasurer of the City of Manila re*uired the society to pay fro# the 6th *uarter of %76' to
the %st *uarter of %7'0 in the su# of P',:.%.6', includin the su# of P'( as co#pro#ise, @rdinance No. .'.7, as
a#ended by @rdinances Nos. .447, .:.% and 0(.: prescribes the follo!in;
=EC. %. ?EE=. I =ub/ect to the provisions of section '4: of the Revised @rdinances of the City of Manila, as
a#ended, there shall be paid to the City Treasurer for enain in any of the businesses or occupations belo!
enu#erated, *uarterly, license fees based on ross sales or receipts reali+ed durin the precedin *uarter in
accordance !ith the rates herein prescribed; PR@H2"E", >@1EHER, That a person enaed in any businesses
or occupation for the first ti#e shall pay the initial license fee based on the probable ross sales or receipts for the
first *uarter beinnin fro# the date of the openin of the business as indicated herein for the correspondin
business or occupation.
, , , , , , , , ,
JR@FP .. I Retail dealers in ne! 3not yet used5 #erchandise, !hich dealers are not yet sub/ect to the pay#ent
of any #unicipal ta,, such as 3%5 retail dealers in general merchandise< 3.5 retail dealers e,clusively enaed in
the sale of . . . boo-s, includin stationery.
, , , , , , , , ,
As #ay be seen, the license fees re*uired to be paid *uarterly in =ection % of said @rdinance No. .'.7, as a#ended, are
not i#posed directly upon any reliious institution but upon those enaed in any of the business or occupations therein
enu#erated, such as retail &dealers in eneral #erchandise& !hich, it is alleed, cover the business or occupation of
sellin bibles, boo-s, etc.
Chapter 8( of the Revised Ad#inistrative Code !hich includes section .666, subsection 3#-.5 of said leal body, as
a#ended by Act No. 08'7, approved on 5ecem)er N# *MEM, e#po!ers the Municipal Board of the City of Manila;
3M-.5 To ta, and fi, the license fee on 3a5 dealers in ne! auto#obiles or accessories or both, and 3b5 retail dealers
in ne! 3not yet used5 #erchandise, !hich dealers are not yet sub/ect to the pay#ent of any #unicipal ta,.
?or the purpose of ta,ation, these retail dealers shall be classified as 3%5 retail dealers in eneral #erchandise, and
3.5 retail dealers e,clusively enaed in the sale of 3a5 te,tiles . . . 3e5 boo-s, includin stationery, paper and office
supplies, . . .; PR@H2"E", >@1EHER, That the com)ined total ta< of an' de)tor or manufacturer# or )oth#
enumerated under these su)sections ?m-*@ and ?m-E@# whether dealing in one or all of the articles mentioned
herein# SHALL 2OT "% 02 %PC%SS O$ $09% H7251%5 (%SOS (%1 A227&.
and appelleeEs counsel #aintains that City @rdinances Nos. .'.7 and 0(((, as a#ended, !ere enacted in virtue of the
po!er that said Act No. 0887 conferred upon the City of Manila. Appellant, ho!ever, contends that said ordinances are
loner in force and effect as the la! under !hich they !ere pro#ulated has been e,pressly repealed by =ection %(. of
Republic Act No. 6(7 passed on 4une *N# *MCM, -no!n as the Revised Manila Charter.
Passin upon this point the lo!er Court cateorically stated that Republic Act No. 6(7 e,pressly repealed the provisions
of Chapter 8( of the Revised Ad#inistrative Code but in the opinion of the trial 9ude, althouh =ection .666 3#-.5 of the
for#er Manila Charter and section %: 3o5 of the ne! see#inly differ in the !ay the leislative intent !as e,pressed, yet
their #eanin is practically the sa#e for the purpose of ta,in the #erchandise #entioned in both leal provisions and,
conse*uently, @rdinances Nos. .'.7 and 0(((, as a#ended, are to be considered as still in full force and effect
uninterruptedly up to the present.
@ften the leislature, instead of si#ply a#endin the pre-e,istin statute, !ill repeal the old statute in its entirety
and by the sa#e enact#ent re-enact all or certain portions of the pree,istin la!. @f course, the proble# created
by this sort of leislative action involves #ainly the effect of the repeal upon rihts and liabilities !hich accrued
under the oriinal statute. Are those rihts and liabilities destroyed or preservedC The authorities are divided as to
the effect of si#ultaneous repeals and re-enact#ents. =o#e adhere to the vie! that the rihts and liabilities
accrued under the repealed act are destroyed, since the statutes fro# !hich they spran are actually ter#inated,
even thouh for only a very short period of ti#e. Others# and the' seem to )e in the ma;orit'# refuse to accept this
view of the situation# and conse:uentl' maintain that all rights an lia)ilities which have accrued under the
original statute are preserved and ma' )e enforced# since the re-enactment neutralizes the repeal# therefore#
continuing the law in force without interruption. 3Cra!ford-=tatutory Construction, =ec. 0..5.
AppellantEs counsel states that section %: 3o5 of Republic Act No, 6(7 introduces a ne! and !ider concept of ta,ation and
is different fro# the provisions of =ection .6663#-.5 that the for#er cannot be considered as a substantial re-enact#ent of
the provisions of the latter. 1e have *uoted above the provisions of section .6663#-.5 of the Revised Ad#inistrative
Code and 1e shall no! copy hereunder the provisions of =ection %:, subdivision 3o5 of Republic Act No. 6(7, !hich
reads as follo!s;
3o5 To ta, and fi, the license fee on dealers in eneral #erchandise, includin i#porters and indentors, e,cept
those dealers !ho #ay be e,pressly sub/ect to the pay#ent of so#e other #unicipal ta, under the provisions of
this section.
"ealers in eneral #erchandise shall be classified as 3a5 !holesale dealers and 3)5 retail dealers. ?or purposes of
the ta, on retail dealers, eneral #erchandise shall be classified into four #ain classes; na#ely 3%5 lu,ury articles,
3.5 se#i-lu,ury articles, 305 essential co##odities, and 365 #iscellaneous articles. A separate license shall be
prescribed for each class but !here co##odities of different classes are sold in the sa#e establish#ent, it shall
not be co#pulsory for the o!ner to secure #ore than one license if he pays the hiher or hihest rate of ta,
prescribed by ordinance. 1holesale dealers shall pay the license ta, as such, as #ay be provided by ordinance.
?or purposes of this section, the ter# &Jeneral #erchandise& shall include poultry and livestoc-, aricultural
products, fish and other allied products.
The only essential difference that 1e find bet!een these t!o provisions that #ay have any bearin on the case at bar, is
that, !hile subsection 3#-.5 prescribes that the co#bined total ta, of any dealer or #anufacturer, or both, enu#erated
under subsections 3#-%5 and 3#-.5, !hether dealin in one or all of the articles #entioned therein,shall not )e in e<cess of
(ABB per annum, the correspondin section %:, subsection 3o5 of Republic Act No. 6(7, does not contain any li#itation as
to the a#ount of ta, or license fee that the retail dealer has to pay per annu#. >ence, and in accordance !ith the !eiht of
the authorities above referred to that #aintain that &all rihts and liabilities !hich have accrued under the oriinal statute
are preserved and #ay be enforced, since the reenact#ent neutrali+es the repeal, therefore continuin the la! in force
!ithout interruption&, 1e hold that the *uestioned ordinances of the City of Manila are still in force and effect.
Plaintiff, ho!ever, arues that the *uestioned ordinances, to be valid, #ust first be approved by the President of the
Philippines as per section %:, subsection 3ii5 of Republic Act No. 6(7, !hich reads as follo!s;
3ii5 To ta,, license and reulate any business, trade or occupation bein conducted !ithin the City of Manila,not
otherwise enumerated in the preceding su)sections# including percentage ta<es )ased on gross sales or receipts#
su);ect to the approval of the (1%S05%2T# e<cept amusement ta<es.
but this re*uire#ent of the PresidentEs approval !as not contained in section .666 of the for#er Charter of the City of
Manila under !hich @rdinance No. .'.7 !as pro#ulated. Any!ay, as stated by appelleeEs counsel, the business of
&retail dealers in eneral #erchandise& is e,pressly enu#erated in subsection 3o5, section %: of Republic Act No. 6(7<
hence, an ordinance prescribin a #unicipal ta, on said business does not have to be approved by the President to be
effective, as it is not a#on those referred to in said subsection 3ii5. Moreover, the *uestioned ordinances are still in force,
havin been pro#ulated by the Municipal Board of the City of Manila under the authority ranted to it by la!.
The *uestion that no! re#ains to be deter#ined is !hether said ordinances are inapplicable, invalid or unconstitutional if
applied to the alleed business of distribution and sale of bibles to the people of the Philippines by a reliious corporation
li-e the A#erican Bible =ociety, plaintiff herein.
1ith reard to @rdinance No. .'.7, as a#ended by @rdinances Nos. .447, .:.% and 0(.:, appellant contends that it is
unconstitutional and illeal because it restrains the free e,ercise and en/oy#ent of the reliious profession and !orship of
appellant.
Article 222, section %, clause 345 of the Constitution of the Philippines afore*uoted, uarantees the freedo# of reliious
profession and !orship. &Reliion has been spo-en of as a profession of faith to an active po!er that binds and elevates
#an to its Creator& 3Alipay vs. Rui+, 86 Phil., .(%5.2t has reference to oneEs vie!s of his relations to >is Creator and to
the obliations they i#pose of reverence to >is bein and character, and obedience to >is 1ill 3"avis vs. Beason, %00
F.=., 06.5. The constitutional uaranty of the free e,ercise and en/oy#ent of reliious profession and !orship carries !ith
it the riht to disse#inate reliious infor#ation. Any restraints of such riht can only be /ustified li-e other restraints of
freedo# of e,pression on the rounds that there is a clear and present daner of any substantive evil !hich the =tate has
the riht to prevent&. 3TaNada and ?ernando on the Constitution of the Philippines, Hol. %, 6th ed., p. .745. 2n the case at
bar the license fee herein involved is i#posed upon appellant for its distribution and sale of bibles and other reliious
literature;
2n the case of &urdoc vs. (enns'lvania, it !as held that an ordinance re*uirin that a license be obtained before
a person could canvass or solicit orders for oods, paintins, pictures, !ares or #erchandise cannot be #ade to
apply to #e#bers of 9ehovahEs 1itnesses !ho !ent about fro# door to door distributin literature and solicitin
people to &purchase& certain reliious boo-s and pa#phlets, all published by the 1atch To!er Bible G Tract
=ociety. The &price& of the boo-s !as t!enty-five cents each, the &price& of the pa#phlets five cents each. 2t !as
sho!n that in #a-in the solicitations there !as a re*uest for additional &contribution& of t!enty-five cents each
for the boo-s and five cents each for the pa#phlets. $esser su# !ere accepted, ho!ever, and boo-s !ere even
donated in case interested persons !ere !ithout funds.
@n the above facts the =upre#e Court held that it could not be said that petitioners !ere enaed in co##ercial
rather than a reliious venture. Their activities could not be described as e#braced in the occupation of sellin
boo-s and pa#phlets. Then the Court continued;
&1e do not #ean to say that reliious roups and the press are free fro# all financial burdens of overn#ent.
=ee Gros;ean vs. American (ress Co., .74 F.=., .00, .'(, :( $. ed. 88(, 88:, '8 =. Ct. 666. 1e have here
so#ethin *uite different, for e,a#ple, fro# a ta, on the inco#e of one !ho enaes in reliious activities or a
ta, on property used or e#ployed in connection !ith activities. 2t is one thin to i#pose a ta, on the inco#e or
property of a preacher. 2t is *uite another to e,act a ta, fro# hi# for the privilee of deliverin a ser#on. The ta,
i#posed by the City of 9eannette is a flat license ta,, pay#ent of !hich is a condition of the e,ercise of these
constitutional privilees. The po!er to ta, the e,ercise of a privilee is the po!er to control or suppress its
en/oy#ent. . . . Those !ho can ta, the e,ercise of this reliious practice can #a-e its e,ercise so costly as to
deprive it of the resources necessary for its #aintenance. Those !ho can ta, the privilee of enain in this for#
of #issionary evanelis# can close all its doors to all those !ho do not have a full purse. =preadin reliious
beliefs in this ancient and honorable #anner !ould thus be denied the needy. . . .
2t is contended ho!ever that the fact that the license ta, can suppress or control this activity is uni#portant if it
does not do so. But that is to disreard the nature of this ta,. 2t is a license ta, I a flat ta, i#posed on the
e,ercise of a privilee ranted by the Bill of Rihts . . . The po!er to i#pose a license ta, on the e,ercise of these
freedo# is indeed as potent as the po!er of censorship !hich this Court has repeatedly struc- do!n. . . . 2t is not a
no#inal fee i#posed as a reulatory #easure to defray the e,penses of policin the activities in *uestion. 2t is in
no !ay apportioned. 2t is flat license ta, levied and collected as a condition to the pursuit of activities !hose
en/oy#ent is uaranteed by the constitutional liberties of press and reliion and inevitably tends to suppress their
e,ercise. That is al#ost unifor#ly reconi+ed as the inherent vice and evil of this flat license ta,.&
Nor could disse#ination of reliious infor#ation be conditioned upon the approval of an official or #anaer even
if the to!n !ere o!ned by a corporation as held in the case of &arsh vs. State of Ala)ama 30.8 F.=. '(%5, or by
the Fnited =tates itself as held in the case of Tuc-er vs. Te,as 30.8 F.=. '%45. 2n the for#er case the =upre#e
Court e,pressed the opinion that the riht to en/oy freedo# of the press and reliion occupies a preferred position
as aainst the constitutional riht of property o!ners.
&1hen !e balance the constitutional rihts of o!ners of property aainst those of the people to en/oy freedo# of
press and reliion, as !e #ust here, !e re#ain #indful of the fact that the latter occupy a preferred position. . . .
2n our vie! the circu#stance that the property rihts to the pre#ises !here the deprivation of property here
involved, too- place, !ere held by others than the public, is not sufficient to /ustify the =tateEs per#ittin a
corporation to overn a co##unity of citi+ens so as to restrict their funda#ental liberties and the enforce#ent of
such restraint by the application of a =tate statute.& 3TaNada and ?ernando on the Constitution of the Philippines,
Hol. %, 6th ed., p. 0(6-0(85.
=ection .4 of Co##on!ealth Act No. 688, other!ise -no!n as the National 2nternal Revenue Code, provides;
=EC. .4. EMEMPT2@N= ?R@M TAM @N C@RP@RAT2@N=. I The follo!in orani+ations shall not be ta,ed
under this Title in respect to inco#e received by the# as such I
3e5 Corporations or associations orani+ed and operated e,clusively for religious, charitable, . . . or educational
purposes, . . .; Provided, ho!ever, That the inco#e of !hatever -ind and character fro# any of its properties, real
or personal, or fro# any activity conducted for profit, reardless of the disposition #ade of such inco#e, shall be
liable to the ta, i#posed under this Code<
AppellantEs counsel clai#s that the Collector of 2nternal Revenue has e,e#pted the plaintiff fro# this ta, and says that
such e,e#ption clearly indicates that the act of distributin and sellin bibles, etc. is purely reliious and does not fall
under the above leal provisions.
2t #ay be true that in the case at bar the price as-ed for the bibles and other reliious pa#phlets !as in so#e instances a
little bit hiher than the actual cost of the sa#e but this cannot #ean that appellant !as enaed in the business or
occupation of sellin said &#erchandise& for profit. ?or this reason 1e believe that the provisions of City of Manila
@rdinance No. .'.7, as a#ended, cannot be applied to appellant, for in doin so it !ould i#pair its free e,ercise and
en/oy#ent of its reliious profession and !orship as !ell as its rihts of disse#ination of reliious beliefs.
1ith respect to @rdinance No. 0(((, as a#ended, !hich re*uires the obtention the MayorEs per#it before any person can
enae in any of the businesses, trades or occupations enu#erated therein, 1e do not find that it i#poses any chare upon
the en/oy#ent of a riht ranted by the Constitution, nor ta, the e,ercise of reliious practices. 2n the case of Coleman vs.
Cit' of Griffin, %:7 =.E. 6.4, this point !as elucidated as follo!s;
An ordinance by the City of Jriffin, declarin that the practice of distributin either by hand or other!ise,
circulars, handboo-s, advertisin, or literature of any -ind, !hether said articles are bein delivered free, or
!hether sa#e are bein sold !ithin the city li#its of the City of Jriffin, !ithout first obtainin !ritten per#ission
fro# the city #anaer of the City of Jriffin, shall be dee#ed a nuisance and punishable as an offense aainst the
City of Jriffin, does not deprive defendant of his constitutional right of the free e<ercise and en;o'ment of
religious profession and worship# even though it prohi)its him from introducing and carr'ing out a scheme or
purpose which he sees fit to claim as a part of his religious s'stem.
2t see#s clear, therefore, that @rdinance No. 0((( cannot be considered unconstitutional, even if applied to plaintiff
=ociety. But as @rdinance No. .'.7 of the City of Manila, as a#ended, is not applicable to plaintiff-appellant and
defendant-appellee is po!erless to license or ta, the business of plaintiff =ociety involved herein for, as stated before, it
!ould i#pair plaintiffEs riht to the free e,ercise and en/oy#ent of its reliious profession and !orship, as !ell as its
rihts of disse#ination of reliious beliefs, 1e find that @rdinance No. 0(((, as a#ended is also inapplicable to said
business, trade or occupation of the plaintiff.
1herefore, and on the strenth of the foreoin considerations, 1e hereby reverse the decision appealed fro#, sentencin
defendant return to plaintiff the su# of P',:7%.6' unduly collected fro# it. 1ithout pronounce#ent as to costs. 2t is so
ordered.
"engzon# (adilla# &ontema'or# "autista Angelo# La)rador# Concepcion and %ndencia# 44.# concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-11555 J'"u'*y 6, 1916
T7E UNITE2 STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
GA8INO SOLIMAN, defendant-appellant.
$rancisco Sevilla for appellant.
Attorne'-General Avance-a for appellee.
CARSON, J.=
The evidence of record conclusively discloses that the defendant and appellant in this case, Jabino =oli#an, testifyin in
his on behalf in the course of another cri#inal case in !hich he, !ith several others, !as chared !ithestafa, s!ore falsely
to certain #aterial alleations of fact.
@n that occasion he testified falsely that a s!orn state#ent offered in evidence in support of the chare of estafa, !hich
!as in effect an e,tra/udicial confession of his uilt, had not been e,ecuted voluntarily, and that its e,ecution had not been
procured by the police by the use of force, inti#idation and proloned torture.
The trial /ude !ho presided in the for#er case ac*uitted the accused on the round that there !as roo# for reasonable
doubt as to !hether the e,tra/udicial confession had been #ade voluntarily, and his action in this reard clearly establishes
the #ateriality of the false testi#ony sub#itted in that case< #oreover, the #ateriality of the evidence is #anifest !ithout
considerin the /ud#ent in the case in !hich it !as sub#itted, since, if accepted as true, this false testi#ony necessarily
had the effect of renderin !holly inco#petent the evidence as to the e,tra/udicial confession !hich other!ise !ould
al#ost conclusively sustain and necessitate a conviction. 3F. =. vs.EstraNa, %8 Phil. Rep., '.(.5
There can be no doubt that the accused !as uilty of the cri#e of per/ury as defined and penali+ed in section 0 of Act No.
%874 and that the sentence of si, #onthsE i#prison#ent and P0(( fine i#posed by the trial /ude !as correctly i#posed
under the provisions of that statute.
2t appears ho!ever that since /ud#ent !as entered in this case on Nove#ber .0, %7%', section 0 of Act No. %874 has
been e,pressly repealed by the enact#ent of the Ad#inistrative Code, !hich beca#e effective on 9uly %, %7%8, and it has
been suested that the /ud#ent convictin and sentencin the accused under the provisions of that statute should not be
sustained, and that the repeal of the statute should be held to have the effect of re#ittin and e,tinuishin the cri#inal
responsibility of the accused incurred under the provisions of the repealed la! prior to the enact#ent of the
Ad#inistrative Code. 1e cannot aree !ith the proposition thus stated.
2n the case of Fnited =tates vs. Cuna 3%. Phil. Rep., .6%5, !e held as follo!s;
The rule of interpretation of Enlish and A#erican co##on la!, by virtue of !hich the repeal of a la!
prescribin penalties is held to have the effect of re#ittin or e,tinuishin any penalty, loss of rihts or
responsibility incurred under such la!, as to all persons !ho have not been convicted and sentenced under the
provisions of such la! prior to the enact#ent of the repealin la!, is not and has not been the accepted doctrine in
these 2slands.
1here an Act of the Co##ission or of the Philippine $eislature !hich penali+es an offense, such repeal does not
have the effect of thereafter deprivin the courts of /urisdiction to try, convict and sentence offenders chared !ith
violations of the old la! prior to its repeal.
A *uestion does arise, ho!ever, as to the penalty !hich should be i#pose upon the convict.
2f the repealin statute provides or has the effect of providin ne! penalties for the co##ission of the acts penali+ed
under the repealed statute, should the penalty be i#posed in accordance !ith the old or the ne! statuteC
Article % of the Penal Code in force in these 2slands defines cri#es and #isde#eanors as voluntary acts or o#issions
penali+ed by la!< and co#ple#entary to this provision, article .% provides that no cri#e or #isde#eanor shall be
punished !ith a penalty !hich has not been prescribed by la! prior to its co##ission. 2n accordance !ith these
provisions the *uestion !hether an act is punishable or not depends upon the *uestion !hether or not at the time of its
commission, there !as a la! in force !hich penali+ed it< this rule bein #odified, ho!ever, by article .. of the sa#e
code, !hich provides that penal la!s shall have a retroactive effect in so far as they favor persons convicted of a cri#e or
#isde#eanor.
The courts of =pain and the learned co##entators on =panish la! have construed these provisions to #ean that such
penal la!s are to be iven a retroactive effect only in so far as they favor the defendant chared !ith a cri#e or a
#isde#eanor, and that, !hen a penal la! is enacted repealin a prior la!, such repeal does not have the effect of relievin
an offender in !hole or in part of penalties already incurred under the old la!, unless the ne! la! favors the defendant by
di#inishin the penalty or doin a!ay !ith it altoether, and then only to the e,tent to !hich the ne! la! is favorable to
the offender. 2n other !ords, that the enact#ent of ne! penal la!s, not!ithstandin the fact that they contain eneral
repealin clauses, doe not deprive the courts of /urisdiction to try, convict and sentence persons chared !ith violations of
the old la! prior to the date !hen the repealin la! oes into effect, unless the ne! la! !holly fails to penalties the acts
!hich constituted the offense defined and penali+ed in the repealed la!.
Thus Pacheco, co##entin upon the ne! Penal Code of %:6:-%:'(, of !hich article '(8 provided that all eneral penal
la!s !ere repealed by its publication, says;
At this ti#e !hen the Penal Code is bein put into effect and iven force, !e have in fact t!o cri#inal la!s in
=pain, and close attention is necessary to apply the# properly. There #ay be prosecutions !hich it is necessary to
dis#iss, as, for e,a#ple, those for sodo#y< others !hich it #ay be necessary to decide in confor#ity !ith the
provisions of the ne! codes, as, for e,a#ple, those for carryin concealed !eapons< and others !hich #ust be
/uded in accordance !ith the old provisions, as, for e,a#ple. #any cases of robbery. The rules of procedure in
one or other #anner bein furnished us by the for#er article 3article %7 of the Penal Code of =pain identical !ith
article .% of the Penal Code of the Philippines5, and the present article 3article .( of the Penal Code of =pain and
article .. of the Philippine Code5. >as the code increased the penaltyC Then it is not applicable to cri#es
co##itted prior to its enact#ent. >as it e,tinuished or di#inished the#C Then it is clearly applicable to the#. 3%
Pacheco, .78.5
And a si#ilar construction !as placed upon the provisions of the Penal Code of %:4( by the supre#e court of =pain.
Article 8.8 of this code 3!hich is substantially identical !ith article '(8 of the Penal Code of %:6: and article 8%% of the
Penal Code of the Philippine 2slands5 repealed all eneral penal la!s prior to its pro#ulation, but the court held that,
!here a cri#e !as co##itted prior to the publication of the refor#ed code, the penalty prescribed by the code of %:'(
3the code prior to that of %:4(5 bein #ore favorable to the accused, that #ust be applied. 3"ecision of the supre#e court
of =pain, %4th of 9anuary, %:40.5
1e conclude therefore that in any case in !hich a statute prescribin a penalty for the co##ission of a specific offense is
repealed, and in !hich the ne! statute provides ne! and distinct penalties for the co##ission of such offense, the penalty
!hich #ust be i#posed on one !ho co##itted the offense prior to the enact#ent of the repealin statute is that one !hich
is #ore favorable to the convict. 3F. =. vs. Cuna, %. Phil. Rep., .6%.5
2t see#s i#portant, then, to deter#ine !hether the repeal of section 0 of Act No. %874 by the enact#ent of the
Ad#inistrative Code had the effect of providin ne! and distinct penalties for the co##ission of the cri#e of per/ury, and
!hether the ne! penalties are or are not #ore favorable to the convict in the case at bar than those i#posed by the trial
/ude.
=ection 0 of Act No. %874, !hich defined and penali+ed the cri#e of per/ury, repealed the provisions of the Penal Code
definin and penali+in the cri#e of per/ury, not e,pressly, but by i#plication, and !e are of opinion that the repeal of Act
No. %874 revived those provisions of the code. 3F. =. vs. Concepcion, %0 Phil. Rep., 6.6< F. =. vs.EstraNa, %8 Phil. Rep.,
'.(.5
2n the absence of the #ost e,press lanuae to the contrary it !ill not be presu#ed that it !as the intention of the
leislator to let false s!earin as to a #aterial #atter in a court of /ustice o unpunished, and such !ould be the effect of
the repeal of section 0 of Act No. %874, unless !e held that the repeal had the effect of revivin the old statute.
At the co##on la! the repeal of a repealin act revived the for#er act 38 Co., %77< % Jray, %80< 4 1. G =., .80< .
Blac-stone, 0.< '6 N. 9. $. 9., %4'5< and the =upre#e Court of the Fnited =tates has held that the repeal of a repealin la!
has this effect, unless the lanuae of the repealin statute or so#e eneral statute provides other!ise. 3F. =. vs. @tis, %.(
F. =., '. A%%'B.5
Manifestly, !ith this rule in #ind, section %. of the Ad#inistrative Code 3Act No. .8'45 !hich is found in Article 222,
AChapter 2B dealin !ith the for# and effect of la!s in eneral, provides that &!hen a la! !hich e,pressly repeals a prior
la! is itself repealed the la! first repealed shall not be thereby revived unless e,pressly so provided.& ?ro# !hich it #ay
fairly be inferred that the old rule continues in force !here a la! !hich repeals a prior la!, not e,pressly but by
i#plication, it itself repealed< and that in such cases the repeal of the repealin la! revives the prior la!, unless the
lanuae of the repealin statute provides other!ise.
Applyin this rule, !e conclude that the e,press repeal of section 0 of Act No. %874 by the enact#ent of the
Ad#inistrative Code 3Act No. .8'45 revived the provisions of the Penal Code touchin per/ury, !hich !ere the#selves
repealed, not e,pressly but by i#plication, by the enact#ent of Act No. %874.
A co#parison of the penalties prescribed in the Penal Code for the co##ission of the acts of !hich the accused in the
case at bar !as convicted, ivin hi# as !e should the benefit of the provisions of Act No. .%6., discloses that the
penalty prescribed therein is less than that i#posed upon the appellant under the provisions of section 0 of Act No. %874,
and !e conclude fro# !hat has been said already that the penalty i#posed by the court belo! should be revo-ed and that
in lieu thereof the penalty prescribed in the Penal Code should be i#posed upon the convict.
A *uestion has been raised as to !hether, ad#ittin that the provisions of the Penal Code touchin per/ury have been
revived, the accused can be convicted and penali+ed thereunder, it appearin that at the ti#e !hen he testified falsely he
!as testifyin in his o!n behalf in a cri#inal case in !hich he hi#self !as the accused, on trial for the co##ission of a
rave offense.
2n the case of Fnited =tates vs. Jutierre+ 3%. Phil. Rep., '.75, !e said, spea-in throuh Chief 9ustice Arellano, that,
&Per/ury co##itted by a party in his o!n cause !ould not be punishable under =panish leislation, because in said
leislation no one !as a !itness in his o!n cause, and could not therefore beco#e uilty of ivin false testi#ony in a
civil cause in !hich he !as either the plaintiff or the defendant< but under the procedure in force by virtue of Act No. %7(,
a party to a suit #ay testify in his o!n behalf, and if he declares falsely under oath as a !itness in his o!n cause, li-e any
other !itness, he incurs the penalty by !hich false testi#ony in civil #atters is repressed and punished. This court has so
held, it bein a settled rule, that the false testi#ony iven by a litiant as a !itness constitutes the cri#e of ivin false
testi#ony inas#uch as such a declaration, accordin to the ne! la!s in force, #ay deter#ine a /ud#ent in his favor and
to the pre/udice of the adverse party, and that a litiant !ho, in s!orn testi#ony iven by hi# as a !itness in a civil cause,
shall pervert the truth and ive false testi#ony, incurs as such !itness the penalties i#posed by article 0.% of the Penal
Code.&
Analoous reasonin leads to a li-e conclusion as to the cri#inal liability for per/ury of a defendant in a cri#inal case
testifyin falsely in his o!n behalf. Fnder the provisions of Jeneral @rders No. ': an accused person #ay, if he so
desires, testify under oath in his o!n behalf, and in that event, &if he declares falsely as a !itness in his o!n cause, li-e
any other !itness, he incurs the penalty by !hich false testi#ony& in cri#inal #atters &is repressed and punished.&
2t has been suested that such a rulin !ill have a tendency to e,pose accused persons to ve,atious cri#inal prosecutions
by prosecutin officers, !ho, havin failed to secure a conviction on the oriinal chare, #ay be disposed to institute
cri#inal prosecutions for per/ury fro# a vindictive un!illinness to let the defendant escape scot free fro# the #eshes of
the la!. 2t is said also that the fear of subse*uent prosecution for per/ury !ill tend to e#barrass accused persons in their
efforts to defend the#selves by testifyin in their o!n behalf. But si#ilar ob/ections #ay be advanced aainst the
prosecution of any of the !itnesses called for the defense on chares of per/ury, and it #ust not be forotten that the riht
of an accused person to testify under oath in his o!n behalf is secured to hi#, not that he #ay be enabled to introduce
false testi#ony into the record, but to enable hi# to spread upon the record the truth as to any #atter !ithin his
-no!lede !hich !ill tend to establish his innocence.
@f course #uch #ust be left to the ood sense and sound /ud#ent of the prosecutin officer in deter#inin !hether a
prosecution for per/ury should be instituted aainst an accused person !hose testi#ony in his o!n behalf !ould see# to
be per/ured.
"ue reard for the situation in !hich an accused person finds hi#self !hen testifyin in his o!n behalf in a cri#inal
proceedin !ill restrain a prudent prosecutin officer fro# the filin of chares of per/ury in every case in !hich he #ay
have reason to believe that the accused has not adhered strictly to the truth, in his an,iety to shield hi#self fro#
punish#ent. But !hen, as in the case at bar, an accused person voluntarily oes upon the !itness stand and falsely
i#putes so#e other person the co##ission of a rave offense, it !ould see# to be hihly proper that he should be called
to account in a cri#inal action for per/ury upon the co#plaint of the person aainst !ho# such false chares are #ade.
Article 0%7 of the Penal Code is as follo!s;
Any person !ho shall ive false testi#ony in favor of a defendant in a cri#inal case shall suffer a penalty ranin
fro# arresto ma'or in its #a,i#u# deree to prision correccional in its #ediu# deree and a fine of not less
than three hundred and seventy-five and not #ore than three thousand seven hundred and fiftypesetas, if the case
!ere for a felony, and the penalty of arresto ma'or if it !ere for a #isde#eanor.
1e conclude that the /ud#ent of conviction entered in the court belo! should be affir#ed but that the sentence i#posed
therein should be reversed, and that ivin the accused the benefit of the provisions of Act No. .%6., a penalty of 6
#onths and % day of arresto ma'or and a fine of P4' !ith subsidiary i#prison#ent as prescribed by la! should be
i#posed upon hi# in lieu of that i#posed by the trial /ude, !ith the costs of this instance de officio. =o ordered.
Torres# 4ohnson and Araullo# 44.# concur.
S&,'*'+& O,!"!o"
MORELAN2, J., dissentin;
2 aree that the provisions of the Penal Code relative to false s!earin !ere revived by the repeal of Act No. %874 by the
Ad#inistrative Code.
2 cannot believe, ho!ever, that the Penal Code intended to include a defendant in a cri#inal action a#on those !ho are
to be punished for false s!earin.
The defendant in the case at bar is chared !ith havin s!orn falsely !hen testifyin in his o!n behalf !hile on trial
chared !ith estafa, in that, on that trial, he testified that a certain !ritten confession of his uilt alleed to have been
#ade by hi# and put in evidence aainst hi# !as false in its state#ent of the facts and had been obtained fro# hi# by
threats, inti#idation and violence.
@n the trial for estafa the court accepted as a true enouh of the testi#ony of the accused as to the #anner in !hich the
confession had been obtained to raise in his #ind a reasonable doubt as to the voluntary character of the confession< and,
there not bein other evidence sufficient to sustain a conviction, the accused !as ac*uitted.
2 cannot brin #yself to believe, as 2 have already stated, that the provisions of the Penal Code definin false s!earin
include the false testi#ony of a defendant in a cri#inal action iven in his o!n behalf.
2n the first place, the !ordin of the la! does not include hi#. Article 0%7 provides;
Any person !ho shall ive false testi#ony in favor of a defendant in a cri#inal case shall suffer a penalty ranin
fro# arresto ma'or in its #a,i#u# deree to prision correccional in its #ediu# deree and a fine of not less
than three hundred and seventy-five and not #ore than three thousand seven hundred and fiftypesetas, if the case
!ere for a felony, and the penalty of arresto ma'or if it !ere for a #isde#eanor.
The lanuae itself plainly sho!s that the &person !ho shall ive false testi#ony& is not the defendant in the action but a
different person I a witness and not a part', an outsider and not one !hose life or liberty depends on the result of the
action.
2n the second place, the defendant in a cri#inal action could not be a !itness !hen the Penal Code !as adopted and,
accordinly, the fra#ers of the Penal Code could not have conte#plated hi# as the &person !ho shall ive false
testi#ony.& 3F. =. vs. Jutierre+, %. Phil. Rep., '.7.5
Thirdly, there is a reason iven by Hiada !hy the =panish la! did not punish a party for false s!earin even in those
proceedins in !hich false s!earin !as punishable and in !hich he !as allo!ed to testify. 2n volu#e . of his
co##entaries on the Penal Code, at pae 68' and 688, he puts this *uestion &1ill a party !ho testifies falsely in his
ans!ers to interroatories prepared in a civil case be uilty of false s!earinC& And ans!ers it as follo!s;
2t is !orth !hile to consider this *uestion here !as !e have recently seen a /ude in this city order prepared a
copy of the testi#ony iven by a defendant in ans!er to interroatories prepared in a civil suit as a basis for a
cri#inal action aainst hi# because the /ude believed that he had testified falsely in ans!erin said
interroatories. A part' !ho testifies falsely in reply to interroatories cannot be prosecuted for false s!earin for
the si#ple reason that he is not a !itness, for, as the "iest says, nullus indoneus testis in re sua intelligitur< and,
besides, if the leislator had !ished to punish the per/ury of a party he !ould have done so by includin in the
Penal Code a special provision to that effect, as !as done in the ?rench Penal Code by art. 088. The =panish la!
too- into consideration the frailty of hu#an nature< it believed that a false oath iven by a part' !as sufficiently
punished by his conscience, especially in vie! of the fact that, as a learned author has said, for a #an to testify
aainst hi#self for #ere love of or respect for the truth is certainly heroic, and by reason of the very fact that it is
heroic no one should be conde#ned cri#inally for not doin it.
2f it is true that it !as not the intention of the fra#ers of the Penal Code to #a-e a defendant in a cri#inal action !ho
should testify falsely in his o!n behalf uilty of per/ury, the #ere fact of #a-in hi# a co#petent !itness in the case is
not sufficient to include hi# !ithin the provisions relatin to false s!earin, !hen, but for the fact of bein a co#petent
!itness, he !ould not be included. 2f there is any doubt that a iven class of person is included in a penal provision it
should be e,cluded.
?or the reason stated, 2 have rave doubts of the intention of the =panish la!#a-ers to include a defendant in a cri#inal
action as one of the &!itnesses& !ho could co##it the cri#e of false s!earin< and it is the =panish la! of cri#es !e are
applyin and not the A#erican la! of the co#petency of !itnesses. The intention of the la! bein to e,clude a part' fro#
its operation, that intention cannot loically be held to have been chaned by ivin the party an additional attribute.
Althouh he #ay be #ade a !itness he still re#ains a party< and Hiada says that the =panish la! never intended to hold a
defendant !ho testified falsely to save his nec- fro# the allo!s to the sa#e responsibility as a #ere !itness !ho has
absolutely nothin to lose by his testi#ony.
Jroi+ard #a-es a suestion !hich approaches the *uestion in hand very closely and sho!s the trend of /udicial as !ell
as leislative thouht on the sub/ect under discussion. =pea-in of the person !ho, under the Penal Code, #ay be
punished for false s!earin, he says &There is one e,ception !hich !e could have !ished our code to #a-e in connection
!ith the #atter !e are discussin, and that is that its provisions shall not apply to those !itnesses !hose honor !ould be
sullied by the truth or !ho, if they testified truthfully, !ould be e,posed to the ris- of a cri#inal prosecution. Nor should
he be held to ans!er to a chare of false s!earin !ho testifies falsely to save his parents, his brothers or sisters, or his
relations !ithin the fourth deree. The la! should not so far foret the po!er and influence of personal interest and fa#ily
ties as to re*uire as a leal duty so#ethin !hich not all reard even as a #oral duty. Blood has its la!. . . .&
=panish la! and =panish leal thouht are aainst the position of the court in this case. A#erican la! does not e,pressly,
or even clearly, underta-e to chane it. Ma-in a person a !itness does not deprive hi# of his character as a party< and it
is precisely in his character as a party that the =panish la! protects hi#.
The case of Fnited =tates vs. Jutierre+, already cited, is not conclusive of the case before us. There the false testi#ony
!as iven in a civil action. >ere it !as iven in a cri#inal action.
There is stron doubt in #y #ind also !ith respect to the correct resolution of another *uestion presented in this case
!hich has been decided by this court adversely to the defendant. As 2 have already stated, the defendant in this case is on
trial for per/ury for havin testified falsely in a cri#inal action in !hich he !as a defendant chared !ith the cri#e
of estafa. The testi#ony !hich he ave and !hich is alleed in the present action to have been false related, as already
stated, to the voluntary and spontaneous character of a !ritten confession !hich he is alleed to have #ade !ith reard to
the co##ission of the cri#e !ith !hich he !as chared. >e contended, as a !itness for hi#self on his trial for estafa, that
the confession !as false in its state#ent of facts and had been obtained fro# hi# by threats, inti#idation and violence. >e
!as ac*uitted in that case upon the round that his testi#ony in that reard !as true, or !as of such a character as to
produce in the #ind of the court doubt sufficient to re*uire an ac*uittal. The /ude !ho presided at the trial of the accused
for estafa presided also at the trial of the accused for per/ury. 2n his opinion ac*uittin the defendant of the chare
of estafa the court said, spea-in of the alleed confession and of the testi#ony relatin to it iven in that case;
This is not a ne! occurrence in this court. 2t is fre*uently resorted to in i#portant cases, !here confessions have
been secured by the secret service. 1e are fully convinced that every precaution is ta-en by the chief of the =ecret
=ervice Bureau !ith a vie! to avoidin the #altreat#ent of persons !ho have been apprehended by that Bureau,
and !ho are under suspicion of cri#e, and in the #a/ority of cases !e pay no heed to the testi#ony of cri#inals
!ho have co#e to loo- upon this alleation of #altreat#ent as a stoc- defense. But in this case there !ere so#e
circu#stances in connection !ith the testi#ony of the defendants !hich raised a rave doubt at least as to the
voluntary character and spontaneity of these confessions, and in vie! therefore, of this rave doubt, and of the
unsatisfactory character of the evidence enerally, the defendants are ac*uitted and the costs are ta,ed de officio.
2n the present case the sa#e /ude says !ith reard to the sa#e #atter;
2n the case in !hich the defendant !as chared !ith estafa and in !hich he is accused of havin testified falsely,
the case turned larely upon the truth of the confessions of the defendant and his codefendants, !hich !ere
alleed to have been #ade !hile they !ere under detention in secret service head*uarters. 2f it !ere true that such
confessions !ere e,tracted under threats and torture, it is unnecessary to state that it !ould be a very serious
#atter. 2ndeed the court considered it so serious at the ti#e the accused in *uestion !as tried !ith his
codefendants, that it preferred to enter an ac*uittal rather than to ris- a conviction on confessions !hich appear to
be tainted !ith this suspicion.&
2 a# inclined to believe that the findin of the trial court in the case of estafa !ith reard to the testi#ony of the defendant
in relation to the confession is a bar to a subse*uent trial of the sa#e defendant for per/ury for ivin the testi#ony to
!hich the findin of the court relates. 2n the case of Cooper vs. Co##on!ealth 3%(8 Ky., 7(75 it appeared that the
appellant in that case and one $ibbie Purvis !ere /ointly indicted in the Ro!an Circuit Court for the offense of adultery.
The trial under that indict#ent resulted in a verdict of ac*uittal for appellant. The rand /ury of Ro!an County thereupon
reported an indict#ent aainst hi# in !hich it !as chared that, upon the trial of appellant and $ibbie Purvis upon the
chare of adultery, &he did -no!inly, !illfully, and corruptly s!ear that he had not had carnal se,ual intercourse !ith
$ibbie Purvis, !hen sa#e !as false and untrue, and !as -no!n by hi# to be false and untrue.& The trial under this
indict#ent resulted in a verdict of uilty, and /ud#ent sentencin appellant to confine#ent in the penitentiary !as
entered and the case ca#e to the =upre#e Court of the =tate of Kentuc-y upon an appeal fro# that /ud#ent. 2n its
opinion for a reversal the court said;
The principal *uestion to be considered is the effect !hich is to be iven to the indict#ent, trial, verdict and
/ud#ent of ac*uittal of appellant under the indict#ent for adultery, as it is #anifest that appellant can not be
uilty in this case if he !as innocent of the chare contained in the indict#ent.
>is uilt or innocence of the offense of havin had carnal se,ual intercourse !ith $ibbie Purvis !as the e,act
*uestion !hich !as tried in the first proceedin, and as a result of that trial the defendant !as found not uilty. 2n
order to convict hi# in this case, it !as necessary for the /ury to believe that he !as uilty of the identical offense
for !hich he had been tried and ac*uitted under the other indict#ent, as it is evident that, if he !as innocent of
havin had carnal se,ual intercourse !ith $ibbie Parvis, he !as not uilty of false s!earin !hen he stated that
he had not had such intercourse !ith her. 1e therefore have, as a result of the trial of appellant under these t!o
indict#ents, a verdict and /ud#ent findin hi# not uilty of the offense of havin had carnal se,ual intercourse
!ith $ibbie Purvis, and in the second case a verdict and /ud#ent findin hi# uilty of false s!earin !hen he
testified that he had not had such intercourse !ith her< in other !ords, the first /ury found hi# innocent of the
#isde#eanor !ith !hich he !as chared, and the second /ury found hi# uilty of the felony because he testified
that he !as not uilty of such #isde#eanor. 2t certainly !as never intended that the eninery of the la! should be
used to acco#plish such inconsistent results. 2t appears to us fro# the conflictin character of the testi#ony in the
case upon the *uestion of defendantEs uilt or innocence that a verdict of the /ury #iht have been upheld in the
first case !hether it found one !ay or the other, but certainly the findin of the /ury #ust be conclusive of the fact
considered as aainst the Co##on!ealth, and preclude any further prosecution !hich involves the ascertain#ent
of such fact.
,,, ,,, ,,,
Appellant in this case had already been tried and ac*uitted of the offense of havin had carnal se,ual intercourse
!ith $ibbie Purvis, and the /ud#ent in that case is res ;udicata aainst the Co##on!ealth, and he can not aain
be put on trial !here the truth or falsity of the chare in that indict#ent is the ist of the *uestion under
investiation. 2t therefore follo!s that appellant !as entitled to a pere#ptory instruction to the /ury to find hi# not
uilty.
2n the case of Fnited =tates vs. Butler 30: ?ed. Rep., 67:5 a defendant, !ho had been ac*uitted upon an indict#ent for
sellin li*uors !ithout pay#ent of the special ta, re*uired by la!, !as subse*uently put upon trial for per/ury for havin
s!orn upon his preli#inary e,a#ination before a co##issioner that he did not sell. 2t !as held that his ac*uittal for
sellin li*uor !as a conclusive ad/udication in his favor upon the subse*uent trial for per/ury, and that the Jovern#ent
could not sho! that his oath !as false. 2n that case the court said;
But 2 a# clearly of the opinion that upon the trial of this case the defendant !ould be entitled to sho! that he had
been ac*uitted of the offense concernin !hich he is chared to have co##itted per/ury, and that such ac*uittal
!ould be conclusive. 1henever the sa#e fact has been put in issue bet!een the sa#e parties, the verdict of the
/ury upon such issue is a co#plete estoppel. This case contains all the ele#ents of a plea ofres ;udicata< the parties
as the sa#e< the point issue, viz, !hether he did in fact sell li*uor, is the sa#e, and the *uantu# of proof re*uisite
in both cases is also the sa#e. >ad he s!orn before the co##issioner that he had paid his ta, and had been
ac*uitted by the /ury upon the round that he did not sell li*uor, the issue !ould have been different, and perhaps
such difference #iht have been sho!n by parol, but in this case the t!o issues !ere identically the sa#e.
2n Co##on!ealth vs. Ellis 3%8( Mass., %8'5, it !as held that the record of the conviction and sentence of a father upon a
co#plaint, under the statute of %::', c. %48, for unreasonably nelectin to support his #inor child, !as conclusive
evidence that the paternity of the child !as deter#ined, and the father !as estopped to set up the illeiti#acy of the child
as a defense to a subse*uent co#plaint under the sa#e statute for a si#ilar offense. 2n arrivin at this conclusion the court
said;
The *uestion of the paternity of the child !as necessarily involved in the prior conviction of the defendant. That
fact havin been deter#ined, it cannot aain be litiated bet!een the sa#e parties unless a different rule applies to
cri#inal proceedins fro# that !hich obtains in civil proceedins. =ee =ly vs. >unt, %'7 Mass., %', and cases
cited. 2t is !ell settled that the rule is the sa#e in both classes of cases. Thus, in Co##on!ealth vs. Evans, %(%
Mass., .', it !as held, on the trial of an indict#ent for #anslauhter, that the record of a conviction of the
defendant for the assault !hich caused the death !as conclusive evidence that the assault !as un/ustifiable. =o in
Co##on!ealth vs. ?eld#an, %0% Mass., '::, !here the defendant !as indicted for an assault upon a public
officer, co##itted !hile the defendant !as under arrest for drun-enness< it !as held that a record of his
conviction and sentence for drun-enness at the ti#e of his arrest !as conclusive evidence of that fact.
2n the case of Coffey vs. Fnited =tates 3%%8 F. =. 6085 the principal *uestion presented for deter#ination !as stated by the
court as follo!s;
The principal *uestion is as to the effect of the indict#ent, trial, verdict and /ud#ent of ac*uittal set up in the
fourth pararaph of the ans!er. The infor#ation is founded on sections 0.'4, 06'(, and 06'0< and there is no
*uestion, on the aver#ents in the ans!er, that the fraudulent acts and atte#pts and intents to defraud, alleed in
the prior cri#inal infor#ation and covered by the verdict and /ud#ent of ac*uittal, e#braced all of the acts,
atte#pts and intents averred in the infor#ation in this suit.
The *uestion, therefore, is distinctly presented, !hether such /ud#ent of ac*uittal is a bar to this suit. 1e are of
opinion that it is.
2t is true that section 0.'4, after denouncin the sinle act of a distiller defraudin or atte#ptin to defraud the
Fnited =tates of the ta, on the spirits distilled by hi#, declares the conse*uences of the co##ission of the act to
be; 3%5 That certain specific property shall be forfeited, and 3.5 that the offender shall be fined and i#prisoned. 2t
is also true that the proceedin to enforce the forfeiture aainst the res na#ed #ust be a proceedin in rem and a
civil action< !hile that to enforce the fine and i#prison#ent #ust be a cri#inal proceedin, as !as held by this
court in The Pal#yra 3%. 1heat., %, %6 A.' F. =., b-. 8, $. ed. '0%, '0'B5. Let, !here an issue raised as to the
e,istence of the act or fact denounced has been tried in a cri#inal proceedin, instituted by the Fnited =tates, and
a /ud#ent of ac*uittal has been rendered in favor of a particular person, that /ud#ent is conclusive in favor of
such person, on the subse*uent trial of a suit in rem by the Fnited =tates, !here, as aainst hi#, the e,istence of
the sa#e act or fact is the #atter in issue, as a cause for the forfeiture of the property prosecuted in such suit in
rem. 2t is ured as a reason for not allo!in such effect to the /ud#ent, that the ac*uittal in the cri#inal case #ay
have ta-en place because of the rule re*uirin uilt to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt< and that, on the sa#e
evidence, on the *uestion of preponderance of proof, there #iht be a verdict for the Fnited =tates, in the suit in
rem. Nevertheless, the fact or act has been put in issue and deter#ined aainst the Fnited =tates< and all that is
i#posed by the statute, as a conse*uence of uilt, is a punish#ent therefor. There could be no ne! trial of the
cri#inal prosecution after the ac*uittal in it< and a subse*uent trial of the civil suit a#ounts substantially to the
sa#e thin, !ith a difference only in the conse*uences follo!in a /ud#ent adverse to the clai#ant.
1hen an ac*uittal in a cri#inal prosecution in behalf of the Jovern#ent is pleaded or offered in evidence, by the
sa#e defendant, in an action aainst hi# by an individual, the rule does not apply, for the reason that the parties
are not the sa#e< and often for the additional reason that a certain intent #ust be proved to support the indict#ent,
!hich need not be proved to support the civil action. But upon this record, as !e have already seen, the parties
and the #atter in issue are the sa#e.
1hether a conviction on an indict#ent under section 0.'4 could be availed of as conclusive evidence, in la!, for
a conde#nation, in a subse*uent suit in rem under that section, and !hether a /ud#ent of forfeiture in a suit in
rem under it !ould be conclusive evidence, in la!, for a conviction on a subse*uent indict#ent under it, are
*uestions not no! presented.
The conclusion !e have reached is in consonance !ith the principles laid do!n by this court in Jelston vs.>oyt
30 1heat., .68 A%8 F. =., b-. 6, $. ed., 0:%B5. 2n that case >oyt sued Jelston the collector, and =chenc- the
surveyor, of the Port of Ne! Lor-, in trespass, for ta-in and carryin a!ay a vessel. The defendants pleaded that
they had sei+ed the vessel, by authority of the President, as forfeited for a violation of the statute aainst fittin
out a vessel to co##it hostilities aainst a friendly forein po!er, and that she had been so fitted out and !as
forfeited. At the trial it !as sho!n that after sei+ure, the vessel !as proceeded aainst by the Fnited =tates, by
libel, in the Fnited =tates "istrict Court, for the alleed offense, and >oyt had clai#ed her and she !as ac*uitted
and ordered to be restored, and a certificate of reasonable cause of sei+ure !as denied. The defendants offered to
prove facts sho!in the forfeiture. The trial court e,cluded the evidence. 2n this court, the *uestion !as presented
!hether the sentence of the district court !as or !as not conclusive on the defendants, on the *uestion of
forfeiture. This court held that the sentence of ac*uittal, !ith a denial of a certificate of reasonable cause of
sei+ure, !as conclusive evidence that no forfeiture !as incurred, and that the sei+ure !as tortious< and that these
*uestions could not aain be litiated in any foru#.
This doctrine is peculiarly applicable to a case li-e the present, !here, in both proceedins, cri#inal and civil, the
Fnited =tates is the party on one side and this clai#ant the party on the other. The /ud#ent of ac*uittal in the
cri#inal proceedin ascertained that the facts !hich !ere the basis of that proceedin, and are the basis of this
one, and !hich are #ade by the statute the foundation of any punish#ent, personal or pecuniary, did not e,ist.
This !as ascertained once for all, bet!een the Fnited =tates and the clai#ant, in the cri#inal proceedin, so that
the facts can not aain be litiated bet!een the#, as the basis of any statutory punish#ent denounced as a
conse*uence of the e,istence of the facts. This is a necessary result of the rules laid do!n in the unani#ous
opinion of the /udes in the case of 1e< vs. 5uchess of Qingston 3.( >o!ell, =t. Tr., 0'', '0:5, and !hich !ere
for#ulated thus; the /ud#ent of a court of concurrent /urisdiction, directly upon the point, is as a plea a bar, or as
evidence conclusive, bet!een the sa#e parties, upon the sa#e #atter directly in *uestion in another court< and the
/ud#ent of a court of e,clusive /urisdiction, directly upon the point, is, in li-e #anner, conclusive upon the sa#e
#atter, bet!een the sa#e parties, co#in incidentally in *uestion in another court for a different purpose. 2n the
present case, the court is the sa#e court and had /urisdiction< and the /ud#ent !as directly on the point no!
involved and bet!een the sa#e parties.
2n a case before Mr. 9ustice Miller and 9ude "illon 3F. =. vs. McKee, 6 "ill., %.:5, the defendant had been
convicted and punished under a section of the Revised =tatutes, for conspirin !ith certain distillers to defraud
the Fnited =tates, by unla!fully re#ovin distilled spirits !ithout pay#ent of the ta,es thereon. >e !as
after!ards sued in a civil action by the Fnited =tates, under another section, to recover a penalty of double the
a#ount of the ta,es lost by the conspiracy and fraud. The t!o alleed transactions !ere but one< and it !as held
that the suit for the penalty !as barred by the /ud#ent in the cri#inal case. The decision !as put on the round
that the defendant could not be t!ice punished for the sa#e cri#e, and that the for#er conviction and /ud#ent
!ere a bar to the suit for the penalty.
2 a# rather inclined to believe that these decisions cover the case at bar. 2t is true that the fact deter#ined by the court on
the trial for estafa !as not a fact necessary to be alleed in the infor#ation charin the cri#e as an essential ele#ent
thereof< and that conse*uently it !as not one of the facts necessary to be established in order to convict. Reasonin fro#
these facts it #iht be clai#ed that, !hether the confession offered in evidence in the estafa case !as voluntary or !as
obtained by threat, inti#idation and violence, !as not the fact in issue on that trial, and that, therefore, the /ud#ent in the
estafa case deter#inin that *uestion !as not a bar to the presentation of the sa#e *uestion in the present action for
per/ury. 2 a# of the opinion, ho!ever, that the principles enunciated in the cases cited, and especially the Coffey case, are
sufficiently broad to cover the case at bar. 2t is !ell settled that a riht, *uestion or fact definitely put in issue and directly
deter#ined by a court of co#petent /urisdiction, as a round of recovery, cannot be discussed in a subse*uent suit bet!een
the sa#e parties or their privies< and that even if the second suit is for a different cause of action, the riht, *uestion, or
fact once so deter#ined #ust, as bet!een the sa#e parties or their privies, be ta-en as conclusively established, so lon as
the /ud#ent in the first suit re#ains un#odified. This is substantially the rule stated in the case of =outhern Pacific
Railroad vs. Fnited =tates 3%8: F. =., %5.
2t is clear fro# the decision of the trial court in the estafa case that the *uestion #ost stronly fouht by the parties in that
action !as !hether or not the confession !as voluntary or had been obtained by threats, inti#idation and violence. The
evidence !hich the Jovern#ent !as able to produce !as, apart fro# the confession, insufficient to convict< and, as a
necessary conse*uence, !hether or not the defendant !as convicted in that case depended, in the #ain, upon the character
of the confession. 2n all respects an issue !as /oined by the parties !ith reference thereto 3$i+arraa >er#anos vs. Lap
Tico, .6 Phil. Rep., '(65. 2t !as accepted by both parties and a lare part of the evidence in the estafa case, so far as !e
can /ude fro# the opinion of the trial court in that case, related to that issue. The *uestion of fact involved !as decided
adversely to the Jovern#ent and, as !e have seen fro# the opinion of the trial court in that and the present case, the
ac*uittal !as based !holly upon the defeat of the Jovern#ent on that issue.
2t !ould see# to #e, therefore, that the character of the confession !as as thorouhly litiated and decided by the trial
court as if it had been a fact necessary to have been alleed in the infor#ation to describe the cri#e souht to be chared.
2f that is so then the Jovern#ent in the present case cannot be allo!ed to put that *uestion aain in issue and can not be
heard to chare that the testi#ony iven by the defendant in relation thereto !as false.
?or these reason 2 a# of the opinion that the conviction can not stand and that the accused should be ac*uitted.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 111496 July 24, 1994
MAYOR PA8LO P. MAGTAJAS F T7E CITY O3 CAGAYAN 2E ORO, petitioners,
vs.
PRYCE PROPERTIES CORPORATION, INC. F P7ILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AN2 GAMING
CORPORATION,respondents.
A:uilino G. (imentel# 4r. and Associates for petitioners.
1.1. Torral)a ! Associates for private respondent.

CRU@, J.:
There !as instant opposition !hen PAJC@R announced the openin of a casino in Caayan de @ro City. Civic
orani+ations anrily denounced the pro/ect. The reliious ele#ents echoed the ob/ection and so did the !o#enEs roups
and the youth. "e#onstrations !ere led by the #ayor and the city leislators. The #edia tru#peted the protest, describin
the casino as an affront to the !elfare of the city.
The trouble arose !hen in %77., flush !ith its tre#endous success in several cities, PAJC@R decided to e,pand its
operations to Caayan de @ro City. To this end, it leased a portion of a buildin belonin to Pryce Properties
Corporation, 2nc., one of the herein private respondents, renovated and e*uipped the sa#e, and prepared to inauurate its
casino there durin the Christ#as season.
The reaction of the =anunian Panlunsod of Caayan de @ro City !as s!ift and hostile. @n "ece#ber 4, %77., it
enacted @rdinance No. 00'0 readin as follo!s;
@R"2NANCE N@. 00'0
AN @R"2NANCE PR@>2B2T2NJ T>E 2==FANCE @? BF=2NE== PERM2T AN" CANCE$$2NJ
EM2=T2NJ BF=2NE== PERM2T T@ ANL E=TAB$2=>MENT ?@R T>E F=2NJ AN" A$$@12NJ
T@ BE F=E" 2T= PREM2=E= @R P@RT2@N T>ERE@? ?@R T>E @PERAT2@N @? CA=2N@.
BE 2T @R"A2NE" by the =anunian Panlunsod of the City of Caayan de @ro, in session asse#bled
that;
=ec. %. I That pursuant to the policy of the city bannin the operation of casino !ithin its territorial
/urisdiction, no business per#it shall be issued to any person, partnership or corporation for the operation
of casino !ithin the city li#its.
=ec. .. I That it shall be a violation of e,istin business per#it by any persons, partnership or
corporation to use its business establish#ent or portion thereof, or allo! the use thereof by others for
casino operation and other a#blin activities.
=ec. 0. I PENA$T2E=. I Any violation of such e,istin business per#it as defined in the precedin
section shall suffer the follo!in penalties, to !it;
a5 =uspension of the business per#it for si,ty 38(5 days for the first
offense and a fine of P%,(((.((Oday
b5 =uspension of the business per#it for =i, 385 #onths for the second
offense, and a fine of P0,(((.((Oday
c5 Per#anent revocation of the business per#it and i#prison#ent of @ne
3%5 year, for the third and subse*uent offenses.
=ec. 6. I This @rdinance shall ta-e effect ten 3%(5 days fro# publication thereof.
Nor !as this all. @n 9anuary 6, %770, it adopted a sterner @rdinance No. 004'-70 readin as follo!s;
@R"2NANCE N@. 004'-70
AN @R"2NANCE PR@>2B2T2NJ T>E @PERAT2@N @? CA=2N@ AN" PR@H2"2NJ PENA$TL
?@R H2@$AT2@N T>ERE?@R.
1>EREA=, the City Council established a policy as early as %77( aainst CA=2N@ under its Resolution
No. ..7'<
1>EREA=, on @ctober %6, %77., the City Council passed another Resolution No. .840, reiteratin its
policy aainst the establish#ent of CA=2N@<
1>EREA=, subse*uently, thereafter, it li-e!ise passed @rdinance No. 00'0, prohibitin the issuance of
Business Per#it and to cancel e,istin Business Per#it to any establish#ent for the usin and allo!in to
be used its pre#ises or portion thereof for the operation of CA=2N@<
1>EREA=, under Art. 0, section 6':, No. 365, sub pararaph H2 of the $ocal Jovern#ent Code of %77%
3Rep. Act 4%8(5 and under Art. 77, No. 365, Pararaph H2 of the i#ple#entin rules of the $ocal
Jovern#ent Code, the City Council as the $eislative Body shall enact #easure to suppress any activity
ini#ical to public #orals and eneral !elfare of the people andOor reulate or prohibit such activity
pertainin to a#use#ent or entertain#ent in order to protect social and #oral !elfare of the co##unity<
N@1 T>ERE?@RE,
BE 2T @R"A2NE" by the City Council in session duly asse#bled that;
=ec. %. I The operation of a#blin CA=2N@ in the City of Caayan de @ro is hereby prohibited.
=ec. .. I Any violation of this @rdinance shall be sub/ect to the follo!in penalties;
a5 Ad#inistrative fine of P',(((.(( shall be i#posed aainst the proprietor, partnership or corporation
underta-in the operation, conduct, #aintenance of a#blin CA=2N@ in the City and closure thereof<
b5 2#prison#ent of not less than si, 385 #onths nor #ore than one 3%5 year or a fine in the a#ount of
P',(((.(( or both at the discretion of the court aainst the #anaer, supervisor, andOor any person
responsible in the establish#ent, conduct and #aintenance of a#blin CA=2N@.
=ec. 0. I This @rdinance shall ta-e effect ten 3%(5 days after its publication in a local ne!spaper of
eneral circulation.
Pryce assailed the ordinances before the Court of Appeals, !here it !as /oined by PAJC@R as intervenor and
supple#ental petitioner. Their challene succeeded. @n March 0%, %770, the Court of Appeals declared the ordinances
invalid and issued the !rit prayed for to prohibit their enforce#ent.
1
Reconsideration of this decision !as denied on 9uly
%0, %770.
2
Caayan de @ro City and its #ayor are no! before us in this petition for revie! under Rule 6' of the Rules of
Court.
3
They aver that the respondent Court of Appeals erred in holdin that;
%. Fnder e,istin la!s, the =anunian Panlunsod of the City of Caayan de @ro does not have the
po!er and authority to prohibit the establish#ent and operation of a PAJC@R a#blin casino !ithin
the CityEs territorial li#its.
.. The phrase &a#blin and other prohibited a#es of chance& found in =ec. 6':, par. 3a5, sub-par. 3%5 I
3v5 of R.A. 4%8( could only #ean &illeal a#blin.&
0. The *uestioned @rdinances in effect annul P.". %:87 and are therefore invalid on that point.
6. The *uestioned @rdinances are discri#inatory to casino and partial to coc-fihtin and are therefore
invalid on that point.
'. The *uestioned @rdinances are not reasonable, not consonant !ith the eneral po!ers and purposes of
the instru#entality concerned and inconsistent !ith the la!s or policy of the =tate.
8. 2t had no option but to follo! the rulin in the case of "asco# et al. v. (AGCO1# J.R. No. 7%867, May
%6, %77%, %74 =CRA '0 in disposin of the issues presented in this present case.
PAJC@R is a corporation created directly by P.". %:87 to help centrali+e and reulate all a#es of chance, includin
casinos on land and sea !ithin the territorial /urisdiction of the Philippines. 2n "asco v. (hilippine Amusements and
Gaming Corporation,
4
this Court sustained the constitutionality of the decree and even cited the benefits of the entity to
the national econo#y as the third hihest revenue-earner in the overn#ent, ne,t only to the B2R and the Bureau of
Custo#s.
Caayan de @ro City, li-e other local political subdivisions, is e#po!ered to enact ordinances for the purposes indicated
in the $ocal Jovern#ent Code. 2t is e,pressly vested !ith the police po!er under !hat is -no!n as the Jeneral 1elfare
Clause no! e#bodied in =ection %8 as follo!s;
=ec. %8. I Jeneral 1elfare. I Every local overn#ent unit shall e,ercise the po!ers e,pressly ranted,
those necessarily i#plied therefro#, as !ell as po!ers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its
efficient and effective overnance, and those !hich are essential to the pro#otion of the eneral !elfare.
1ithin their respective territorial /urisdictions, local overn#ent units shall ensure and support, a#on
other thins, the preservation and enrich#ent of culture, pro#ote health and safety, enhance the riht of
the people to a balanced ecoloy, encourae and support the develop#ent of appropriate and self-reliant
scientific and technoloical capabilities, i#prove public #orals, enhance econo#ic prosperity and social
/ustice, pro#ote full e#ploy#ent a#on their residents, #aintain peace and order, and preserve the
co#fort and convenience of their inhabitants.
2n addition, =ection 6': of the said Code specifically declares that;
=ec. 6':. I Po!ers, "uties, ?unctions and Co#pensation. I 3a5 The =anunian Panlunsod, as the
leislative body of the city, shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the
eneral !elfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to =ection %8 of this Code and in the proper
e,ercise of the corporate po!ers of the city as provided for under =ection .. of this Code, and shall;
3%5 Approve ordinances and pass resolutions necessary for an efficient and effective city overn#ent, and
in this connection, shall;
,,, ,,, ,,,
3v5 Enact ordinances intended to prevent, suppress and i#pose
appropriate penalties for habitual drun-enness in public places, varancy,
#endicancy, prostitution, establish#ent and #aintenance of houses of ill
repute,gam)ling and other prohibited a#es of chance, fraudulent
devices and !ays to obtain #oney or property, dru addiction,
#aintenance of dru dens, dru pushin, /uvenile delin*uency, the
printin, distribution or e,hibition of obscene or pornoraphic #aterials
or publications, and such other activities ini#ical to the !elfare and
#orals of the inhabitants of the city<
This section also authori+es the local overn#ent units to reulate properties and businesses !ithin their territorial li#its
in the interest of the eneral !elfare.
5
The petitioners arue that by virtue of these provisions, the =anunian Panlunsod #ay prohibit the operation of
casinos because they involve a#es of chance, !hich are detri#ental to the people. Ja#blin is not allo!ed by eneral
la! and even by the Constitution itself. The leislative po!er conferred upon local overn#ent units #ay be e,ercised
over all -inds of a#blin and not only over &illeal a#blin& as the respondents erroneously arue. Even if the
operation of casinos #ay have been per#itted under P.". %:87, the overn#ent of Caayan de @ro City has the authority
to prohibit the# !ithin its territory pursuant to the authority entrusted to it by the $ocal Jovern#ent Code.
2t is sub#itted that this interpretation is consonant !ith the policy of local autono#y as #andated in Article 22, =ection .',
and Article M of the Constitution, as !ell as various other provisions therein see-in to strenthen the character of the
nation. 2n ivin the local overn#ent units the po!er to prevent or suppress a#blin and other social proble#s, the
$ocal Jovern#ent Code has reconi+ed the co#petence of such co##unities to deter#ine and adopt the #easures best
e,pected to pro#ote the eneral !elfare of their inhabitants in line !ith the policies of the =tate.
The petitioners also stress that !hen the Code e,pressly authori+ed the local overn#ent units to prevent and suppress
a#blin and other prohibited a#es of chance, li-e craps, baccarat, blac-/ac- and roulette, it #eant allfor#s of a#blin
!ithout distinction. 7)i le< non distinguit# nec nos distinguere de)emos.
6
@ther!ise, it !ould have e,pressly e,cluded
fro# the scope of their po!er casinos and other for#s of a#blin authori+ed by special la!, as it could have easily done.
The fact that it did not do so si#ply #eans that the local overn#ent units are per#itted to prohibit all -inds of a#blin
!ithin their territories, includin the operation of casinos.
The adoption of the $ocal Jovern#ent Code, it is pointed out, had the effect of #odifyin the charter of the PAJC@R.
The Code is not only a later enact#ent than P.". %:87 and so is dee#ed to prevail in case of inconsistencies bet!een
the#. More than this, the po!ers of the PAJC@R under the decree are e,pressly discontinued by the Code insofar as they
do not confor# to its philosophy and provisions, pursuant to Par. 3f5 of its repealin clause readin as follo!s;
3f5 All eneral and special la!s, acts, city charters, decrees, e,ecutive orders, procla#ations and
ad#inistrative reulations, or part or parts thereof !hich are inconsistent !ith any of the provisions of
this Code are hereby repealed or #odified accordinly.
2t is also #aintained that assu#in there is doubt reardin the effect of the $ocal Jovern#ent Code on P.". %:87, the
doubt #ust be resolved in favor of the petitioners, in accordance !ith the direction in the Code callin for its liberal
interpretation in favor of the local overn#ent units. =ection ' of the Code specifically provides;
=ec. '. Rules of 2nterpretation. I 2n the interpretation of the provisions of this Code, the follo!in rules
shall apply;
3a5 An' provision on a power of a local government unit shall )e li)erall' interpreted in its favor# and in
case of dou)t# an' :uestion thereon shall )e resolved in favor of devolution of powers and of the lower
local government unit. Any fair and reasonable doubt as to the e,istence of the po!er shall be interpreted
in favor of the local overn#ent unit concerned<
,,, ,,, ,,,
3c5 The general welfare provisions in this Code shall )e li)erall' interpreted to give more powers to local
government units in acceleratin econo#ic develop#ent and upradin the *uality of life for the people
in the co##unity< . . . 3E#phasis supplied.5
?inally, the petitioners also attac- a#blin as intrinsically har#ful and cite various provisions of the Constitution and
several decisions of this Court e,pressive of the eneral and official disapprobation of the vice. They invo-e the =tate
policies on the fa#ily and the proper upbrinin of the youth and, as #iht be e,pected, call attention to the old case
of 7.S. v. Salaveria,
6
!hich sustained a #unicipal ordinance prohibitin the playin of panguingue. The petitioners decry
the i##orality of a#blin. They also i#pun the !isdo# of P.". %:87 3!hich they describe as &a #artial la!
instru#ent&5 in creatin PAJC@R and authori+in it to operate casinos &on land and sea !ithin the territorial /urisdiction
of the Philippines.&
This is the opportune ti#e to stress an i#portant point.
The #orality of a#blin is not a /usticiable issue. Ja#blin is not illeal per se. 1hile it is enerally considered
ini#ical to the interests of the people, there is nothin in the Constitution cateorically proscribin or penali+in a#blin
or, for that #atter, even #entionin it at all. 2t is left to Conress to deal !ith the activity as it sees fit. 2n the e,ercise of its
o!n discretion, the leislature #ay prohibit a#blin altoether or allo! it !ithout li#itation or it #ay prohibit so#e
for#s of a#blin and allo! others for !hatever reasons it #ay consider sufficient. Thus, it has
prohibited ;ueteng and monte but per#its lotteries, coc-fihtin and horse-racin. 2n #a-in such choices, Conress has
consulted its o!n !isdo#, !hich this Court has no authority to revie!, #uch less reverse. 1ell has it been said that courts
do not sit to resolve the #erits of conflictin theories.
8
That is the preroative of the political depart#ents. 2t is settled
that *uestions reardin the !isdo#, #orality, or practicibility of statutes are not addressed to the /udiciary but #ay be
resolved only by the leislative and e,ecutive depart#ents, to !hich the function belons in our sche#e of overn#ent.
That function is e,clusive. 1hichever !ay these branches decide, they are ans!erable only to their o!n conscience and
the constituents !ho !ill ulti#ately /ude their acts, and not to the courts of /ustice.
The only *uestion !e can and shall resolve in this petition is the validity of @rdinance No. 00'' and @rdinance No. 004'-
70 as enacted by the =anunian Panlunsod of Caayan de @ro City. And !e shall do so only by the criteria laid do!n
by la! and not by our o!n convictions on the propriety of a#blin.
The tests of a valid ordinance are !ell established. A lon line of decisions
9
has held that to be valid, an ordinance #ust
confor# to the follo!in substantive re*uire#ents;
%5 2t #ust not contravene the constitution or any statute.
.5 2t #ust not be unfair or oppressive.
05 2t #ust not be partial or discri#inatory.
65 2t #ust not prohibit but #ay reulate trade.
'5 2t #ust be eneral and consistent !ith public policy.
85 2t #ust not be unreasonable.
1e bein by observin that under =ec. 6': of the $ocal Jovern#ent Code, local overn#ent units are authori+ed to
prevent or suppress, a#on others, &a#blin and other prohibited a#es of chance.& @bviously, this provision e,cludes
a#es of chance !hich are not prohibited but are in fact per#itted by la!. The petitioners are less than accurate in
clai#in that the Code could have e,cluded such a#es of chance but did not. 2n fact it does. The lanuae of the section
is clear and un#ista-able. Fnder the rule of noscitur a sociis, a !ord or phrase should be interpreted in relation to, or
iven the sa#e #eanin of, !ords !ith !hich it is associated. Accordinly, !e conclude that since the !ord &a#blin& is
associated !ith &and other prohibited a#es of chance,& the !ord should be read as referrin to only illeal a#blin
!hich, li-e the other prohibited a#es of chance, #ust be prevented or suppressed.
1e could stop here as this interpretation should settle the proble# *uite conclusively. But !e !ill not. The viorous
efforts of the petitioners on behalf of the inhabitants of Caayan de @ro City, and the earnestness of their advocacy,
deserve #ore than short shrift fro# this Court.
The apparent fla! in the ordinances in *uestion is that they contravene P.". %:87 and the public policy e#bodied therein
insofar as they prevent PAJC@R fro# e,ercisin the po!er conferred on it to operate a casino in Caayan de @ro City.
The petitioners have an inenious ans!er to this #isivin. They deny that it is the ordinances that have chaned P.".
%:87 for an ordinance ad#ittedly cannot prevail aainst a statute. Their theory is that the chane has been #ade by the
$ocal Jovern#ent Code itself, !hich !as also enacted by the national la!#a-in authority. 2n their vie!, the decree has
been, not really repealed by the Code, but #erely &#odified pro tanto& in the sense that PAJC@R cannot no! operate a
casino over the ob/ection of the local overn#ent unit concerned. This #odification of P.". %:87 by the $ocal
Jovern#ent Code is per#issible because one la! can chane or repeal another la!.
2t see#s to us that the petitioners are playin !ith !ords. 1hile insistin that the decree has only been &#odifiedpro
tanto,& they are actually aruin that it is already dead, repealed and useless for all intents and purposes because the Code
has shorn PAJC@R of all po!er to centrali+e and reulate casinos. =trictly spea-in, its operations #ay no! be not only
prohibited by the local overn#ent unit< in fact, the prohibition is not only discretionary but mandated by =ection 6': of
the Code if the !ord &shall& as used therein is to be iven its accepted #eanin. $ocal overn#ent units have no! no
choice but to prevent and suppress a#blin, !hich in the petitionersE vie! includes both leal and illeal a#blin.
Fnder this construction, PAJC@R !ill have no #ore a#es of chance to reulate or centrali+e as they #ust all be
prohibited by the local overn#ent units pursuant to the #andatory duty i#posed upon the# by the Code. 2n this
situation, PAJC@R cannot continue to e,ist e,cept only as a toothless tier or a !hite elephant and !ill no loner be able
to e,ercise its po!ers as a pri#e source of overn#ent revenue throuh the operation of casinos.
2t is note!orthy that the petitioners have cited only Par. 3f5 of the repealin clause, conveniently discardin the rest of the
provision !hich painsta-inly #entions the specific la!s or the parts thereof !hich are repealed 3or #odified5 by the
Code. =inificantly, P.". %:87 is not one of the#. A readin of the entire repealin clause, !hich is reproduced belo!, !ill
disclose the o#ission;
=ec. '06. Repealin Clause. I 3a5 Batas Pa#bansa Bl. 004, other!ise -no!n as the &$ocal Jovern#ent
Code,& E,ecutive @rder No. %%. 3%7:45, and E,ecutive @rder No. 0%7 3%7::5 are hereby repealed.
3b5 Presidential "ecree Nos. 8:6, %%7%, %'(: and such other decrees, orders, instructions, #e#oranda and
issuances related to or concernin the baranay are hereby repealed.
3c5 The provisions of =ections ., 0, and 6 of Republic Act No. %707 reardin hospital fund< =ection 0, a
305 and b 3.5 of Republic Act. No. '664 reardin the =pecial Education ?und< Presidential "ecree No.
%66 as a#ended by Presidential "ecree Nos. ''7 and %46%< Presidential "ecree No. .0% as a#ended<
Presidential "ecree No. 608 as a#ended by Presidential "ecree No. '':< and Presidential "ecree Nos.
0:%, 608, 686, 644, '.8, 80., 4'., and %%08 are hereby repealed and rendered of no force and effect.
3d5 Presidential "ecree No. %'76 is hereby repealed insofar as it overns locally-funded pro/ects.
3e5 The follo!in provisions are hereby repealed or a#ended insofar as they are inconsistent !ith the
provisions of this Code; =ections ., %8, and .7 of Presidential "ecree No. 4(6< =ections %. of Presidential
"ecree No. :4, as a#ended< =ections '., '0, 88, 84, 8:, 87, 4(, 4%, 4., 40, and 46 of Presidential "ecree
No. 680, as a#ended< and =ection %8 of Presidential "ecree No. 74., as a#ended, and
3f5 All eneral and special la!s, acts, city charters, decrees, e,ecutive orders, procla#ations and
ad#inistrative reulations, or part or parts thereof !hich are inconsistent !ith any of the provisions of
this Code are hereby repealed or #odified accordinly.
?urther#ore, it is a fa#iliar rule that i#plied repeals are not lihtly presu#ed in the absence of a clear and un#ista-able
sho!in of such intention. 2n Lichauco ! Co. v. Apostol,
14
this Court e,plained;
The cases relatin to the sub/ect of repeal by i#plication all proceed on the assu#ption that if the act of
later date clearly reveals an intention on the part of the la!#a-in po!er to abroate the prior la!, this
intention #ust be iven effect< but there #ust al!ays be a sufficient revelation of this intention, and it has
beco#e an unbendin rule of statutory construction that the intention to repeal a for#er la! !ill not be
i#puted to the $eislature !hen it appears that the t!o statutes, or provisions, !ith reference to !hich the
*uestion arises bear to each other the relation of eneral to special.
There is no sufficient indication of an i#plied repeal of P.". %:87. @n the contrary, as the private respondent points out,
PAJC@R is #entioned as the source of fundin in t!o later enact#ents of Conress, to !it, R.A. 40(7, creatin a Board
of Clai#s under the "epart#ent of 9ustice for the benefit of victi#s of un/ust punish#ent or detention or of violent
cri#es, and R.A. 486:, providin for #easures for the solution of the po!er crisis. PAJC@R revenues are tapped by these
t!o statutes. This !ould sho! that the PAJC@R charter has not been repealed by the $ocal Jovern#ent Code but has in
fact been i#proved as it !ere to #a-e the entity #ore responsive to the fiscal proble#s of the overn#ent.
2t is a canon of leal her#eneutics that instead of pittin one statute aainst another in an inevitably destructive
confrontation, courts #ust e,ert every effort to reconcile the#, re#e#berin that both la!s deserve a beco#in respect as
the handi!or- of a coordinate branch of the overn#ent. @n the assu#ption of a conflict bet!een P.". %:87 and the
Code, the proper action is not to uphold one and annul the other but to ive effect to both by har#oni+in the# if possible.
This is possible in the case before us. The proper resolution of the proble# at hand is to hold that under the $ocal
Jovern#ent Code, local overn#ent units #ay 3and indeed #ust5 prevent and suppress all -inds of a#blin !ithin their
territories e,cept only those allo!ed by statutes li-e P.". %:87. The e,ception reserved in such la!s #ust be read into the
Code, to #a-e both the Code and such la!s e*ually effective and #utually co#ple#entary.
This approach !ould also affir# that there are indeed t!o -inds of a#blin, to !it, the illeal and those authori+ed by
la!. $eali+ed a#blin is not a #odern concept< it is probably as old as illeal a#blin, if not indeed #ore so. The
petitionersE suestion that the Code authori+es the# to prohibit all -inds of a#blin !ould erase the distinction bet!een
these t!o for#s of a#blin !ithout a clear indication that this is the !ill of the leislature. Plausibly, follo!in this
theory, the City of Manila could, by #ere ordinance, prohibit the Philippine Charity =!eepsta-es @ffice fro# conductin
a lottery as authori+ed by R.A. %%87 and B.P. 6. or stop the races at the =an $a+aro >ippodro#e as authori+ed by R.A.
0(7 and R.A. 7:0.
2n liht of all the above considerations, !e see no !ay of arrivin at the conclusion ured on us by the petitioners that the
ordinances in *uestion are valid. @n the contrary, !e find that the ordinances violate P.". %:87, !hich has the character
and force of a statute, as !ell as the public policy e,pressed in the decree allo!in the playin of certain a#es of chance
despite the prohibition of a#blin in eneral.
The rationale of the re*uire#ent that the ordinances should not contravene a statute is obvious. Municipal overn#ents
are only aents of the national overn#ent. $ocal councils e,ercise only deleated leislative po!ers conferred on the#
by Conress as the national la!#a-in body. The deleate cannot be superior to the principal or e,ercise po!ers hiher
than those of the latter. 2t is a heresy to suest that the local overn#ent units can undo the acts of Conress, fro# !hich
they have derived their po!er in the first place, and neate by #ere ordinance the #andate of the statute.
Municipal corporations o!e their oriin to, and derive their po!ers and rihts !holly fro# the leislature.
2t breathes into the# the breath of life, !ithout !hich they cannot e,ist. As it creates, so it #ay destroy.
As it #ay destroy, it #ay abride and control. Fnless there is so#e constitutional li#itation on the riht,
the leislature #iht, by a sinle act, and if !e can suppose it capable of so reat a folly and so reat a
!ron, s!eep fro# e,istence all of the #unicipal corporations in the =tate, and the corporation could not
prevent it. 1e -no! of no li#itation on the riht so far as to the corporation the#selves are concerned.
They are, so to phrase it, the #ere tenants at !ill of the leislature.
11
This basic relationship bet!een the national leislature and the local overn#ent units has not been enfeebled by the ne!
provisions in the Constitution strenthenin the policy of local autono#y. 1ithout #eanin to detract fro# that policy, !e
here confir# that Conress retains control of the local overn#ent units althouh in sinificantly reduced deree no!
than under our previous Constitutions. The po!er to create still includes the po!er to destroy. The po!er to rant still
includes the po!er to !ithhold or recall. True, there are certain notable innovations in the Constitution, li-e the direct
confer#ent on the local overn#ent units of the po!er to ta,,
12
!hich cannot no! be !ithdra!n by #ere statute. By and
lare, ho!ever, the national leislature is still the principal of the local overn#ent units, !hich cannot defy its !ill or
#odify or violate it.
The Court understands and ad#ires the concern of the petitioners for the !elfare of their constituents and their
apprehensions that the !elfare of Caayan de @ro City !ill be endanered by the openin of the casino. 1e share the
vie! that &the hope of lare or easy ain, obtained !ithout special effort, turns the head of the !or-#an&
13
and that
&habitual a#blin is a cause of la+iness and ruin.&
14
2n (eople v. Gorostiza,
15
!e declared; &The social scoure of
a#blin #ust be sta#ped out. The la!s aainst a#blin #ust be enforced to the li#it.& Jeore 1ashinton called
a#blin &the child of avarice, the brother of ini*uity and the father of #ischief.& Nevertheless, !e #ust reconi+e the
po!er of the leislature to decide, in its o!n !isdo#, to leali+e certain for#s of a#blin, as !as done in P.". %:87 and
i#pliedly affir#ed in the $ocal Jovern#ent Code. That decision can be revo-ed by this Court only if it contravenes the
Constitution as the touchstone of all official acts. 1e do not find such contravention here.
1e hold that the po!er of PAJC@R to centrali+e and reulate all a#es of chance, includin casinos on land and sea
!ithin the territorial /urisdiction of the Philippines, re#ains uni#paired. P.". %:87 has not been #odified by the $ocal
Jovern#ent Code, !hich e#po!ers the local overn#ent units to prevent or suppress only those for#s of a#blin
prohibited by la!.
Casino a#blin is authori+ed by P.". %:87. This decree has the status of a statute that cannot be a#ended or nullified by
a #ere ordinance. >ence, it !as not co#petent for the =anunian Panlunsod of Caayan de @ro City to enact
@rdinance No. 00'0 prohibitin the use of buildins for the operation of a casino and @rdinance No. 004'-70 prohibitin
the operation of casinos. ?or all their praise!orthy #otives, these ordinances are contrary to P.". %:87 and the public
policy announced therein and are therefore ultra vires and void.
1>ERE?@RE, the petition is "EN2E" and the challened decision of the respondent Court of Appeals is A??2RME",
!ith costs aainst the petitioners. 2t is so ordered.
2arvasa# C.4.# $eliciano# "idin# 1egalado# 1omero# "ellosillo# &elo# 8uiason# (uno# 9itug# Qapunan and
&endoza# 44.# concur.
3!ith separate opinions5
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-24664 2&.&/%&* 14, 1969
ORTIGAS F CO., LIMITE2 PARTNERS7IP, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
3EATI 8AND AN2 TRUST CO., defendant-appellee.
1amirez ! Ortigas for appellant.
Ta-ada# Teehanee ! Carreon for appellee.

SANTOS, J.:
An appeal interposed on 9une .0, %78' by plaintiff-appellant, @rtias G Co., $i#ited Partnership, fro# the decision of the
Court of ?irst 2nstance of Ri+al, Branch H2, at Pasi, >on. Andres Reyes presidin, !hich dis#issed its co#plaint in Civil
Case No. 44(8, entitled, &@rtias G Co#pany, $i#ited Partnership, plaintiff, v. ?eati Ban- and Trust Co#pany,
defendant,& for lac- of #erit.
The follo!in facts I a reproduction of the lo!er courtEs findins, !hich, in turn, are based on a stipulation of facts
entered into by the parties are not disputed. Plaintiff 3for#erly -no!n as &@rtias, Madrial y Cia&5 is a li#ited
partnership and defendant ?eati Ban- and Trust Co., is a corporation duly orani+ed and e,istin in accordance !ith the
la!s of the Philippines. Plaintiff is enaed in real estate business, developin and sellin lots to the public, particularly
the >ih!ay >ills =ubdivision alon Epifanio de los =antos Avenue, Mandaluyon, Ri+al.
1
@n March 6, %7'., plaintiff, as vendor, and Auusto Padilla y Aneles and Natividad Aneles, as vendees, entered into
separate aree#ents of sale on install#ents over t!o parcels of land, -no!n as $ots Nos. ' and 8, Bloc- 0%, of the
>ih!ay >ills =ubdivision, situated at Mandaluyon, Ri+al. @n 9uly %7, %78., the said vendees transferred their rihts
and interests over the aforesaid lots in favor of one E##a Chave+. Fpon co#pletion of pay#ent of the purchase price, the
plaintiff e,ecuted the correspondin deeds of sale in favor of E##a Chave+. Both the aree#ents 3of sale on install#ent5
and the deeds of sale contained the stipulations or restrictions that;
%. The parcel of land sub/ect of this deed of sale shall be used the Buyer e,clusively for residential
purposes, and she shall not be entitled to ta-e or re#ove soil, stones or ravel fro# it or any other lots
belonin to the =eller.
.. All buildins and other i#prove#ents 3e,cept the fence5 !hich #ay be constructed at any ti#e in said
lot #ust be, 3a5 of stron #aterials and properly painted, 3b5 provided !ith #odern sanitary installations
connected either to the public se!er or to an approved septic tan-, and 3c5 shall not be at a distance of less
than t!o 3.5 #eters fro# its boundary lines.
2
The above restrictions !ere later annotated in TCT Nos. %(%'(7 and %(%'%% of the Reister of "eeds of Ri+al, coverin
the said lots and issued in the na#e of E##a Chave+.
3
Eventually, defendant-appellee ac*uired $ots Nos. ' and 8, !ith TCT Nos. %(%8%0 and %(8(7. issued in its na#e,
respectively and the buildin restrictions !ere also annotated therein.
4
"efendant-appellee bouht $ot No. ' directly fro#
E##a Chave+, &free fro# all liens and encu#brances as stated in Anne, E"E,
5
!hile $ot No. 8 !as ac*uired fro#
Republic ?lour Mills throuh a &"eed of E,chane,& Anne, &E&.
6
TCT No. %(%4%7 in the na#e of Republic ?lour Mills
li-e!ise contained the sa#e restrictions, althouh defendant-appellee clai#s that Republic ?lour Mills purchased the said
$ot No. 8 &in ood faith. free fro# all liens and encu#brances,& as stated in the "eed of =ale, Anne, &?&
6
bet!een it and
E##a Chave+.
Plaintiff-appellant clai#s that the restrictions annotated on TCT Nos. %(%'(7, %(%'%%, %(%4%7, %(%8%0, and %(8(7. !ere
i#posed as part of its eneral buildin sche#e desined for the beautification and develop#ent of the >ih!ay >ills
=ubdivision !hich for#s part of the bi landed estate of plaintiff-appellant !here co##ercial and industrial sites are also
desinated or established.
8
"efendant-appellee, upon the other hand, #aintains that the area alon the !estern part of Epifanio de los =antos Avenue
3E"=A5 fro# =ha! Boulevard to Pasi River, has been declared a co##ercial and industrial +one, per Resolution No. .4,
dated ?ebruary 6, %78( of the Municipal Council of Mandaluyon, Ri+al.
9
2t allees that plaintiff-appellant Eco#pletely
sold and transferred to third persons all lots in said subdivision facin Epifanio de los =antos Avenue&
14
and the sub/ect
lots thereunder !ere ac*uired by it &only on 9uly .0, %78. or #ore than t!o 3.5 years after the area ... had been declared a
co##ercial and industrial +one ...
11
@n or about May ', %780, defendant-appellee bean layin the foundation and co##enced the construction of a buildin
on $ots Nos. ' and 8, to be devoted to ban-in purposes, but !hich defendant-appellee clai#s could also be devoted to,
and used e,clusively for, residential purposes. The follo!in day, plaintiff-appellant de#anded in !ritin that defendant-
appellee stop the construction of the co##erical buildin on the said lots. The latter refused to co#ply !ith the de#and,
contendin that the buildin !as bein constructed in accordance !ith the +onin reulations, defendant-appellee havin
filed buildin and plannin per#it applications !ith the Municipality of Mandaluyon, and it had accordinly obtained
buildin and plannin per#its to proceed !ith the construction.
12
@n the basis of the foreoin facts, Civil Case No. 44(8, supra, !as sub#itted in the lo!er court for decision. The
co#plaint souht, a#on other thins, the issuance of &a !rit of preli#inary in/unction ... restrainin and en/oinin
defendant, its aents, assins, and those actin on its or their behalf fro# continuin or co#pletin the construction of a
co##ercial ban- buildin in the pre#ises ... involved, !ith the vie! to co##andin the defendant to observe and co#ply
!ith the buildin restrictions annotated in the defendantEs transfer certificate of title.&
2n decidin the said case, the trial court considered, as the funda#ental issue, !hether or not the resolution of the
Municipal Council of Mandaluyon declarin $ots Nos. ' and 8, a#on others, as part of the co##ercial and industrial
+one of the #unicipality, prevailed over the buildin restrictions i#posed by plaintiff-appellant on the lots in
*uestion.
13
The records do not sho! that a !rit of preli#inary in/unction !as issued.
The trial court upheld the defendant-appellee and dis#issed the co#plaint, holdin that the sub/ect restrictions !ere
subordinate to Municipal Resolution No. .4, supra. 2t predicated its conclusion on the e,ercise of police po!er of the said
#unicipality, and stressed that private interest should &bo! do!n to eneral interest and !elfare. & 2n short, it upheld the
classification by the Municipal Council of the area alon Epifanio de los =antos Avenue as a co##ercial and industrial
+one, and held that the sa#e rendered &ineffective and unenforceable& the restrictions in *uestion as aainst defendant-
appellee.
14
The trial court decision further e#phasi+ed that it &assu#es said resolution to be valid, considerin that there is
no issue raised by either of the parties as to !hether the sa#e is null and void.
15
@n March ., %78', plaintiff-appellant filed a #otion for reconsideration of the above decision,
16
!hich #otion !as
opposed by defendant-appellee on March %4, %78'.
16
2t averred, a#on others, in the #otion for reconsideration that
defendant- appellee &!as duty bound to co#ply !ith the conditions of the contract of sale in its favor, !hich conditions
!ere duly annotated in the Transfer Certificates of Title issued in her 3E##a Chave+5 favor.& 2t also invited the trial
courtEs attention to its clai# that the Municipal Council had 3no5 po!er to nullify the contractual obliations assu#ed by
the defendant corporation.&
18
The trial court denied the #otion for reconsideration in its order of March .8, %78'.
19
@n April ., %78' plaintiff-appellant filed its notice of appeal fro# the decision dis#issin the co#plaint and fro# the
order of March .8, %78' denyin the #otion for reconsideration, its record on appeal, and a cash appeal bond.&
24
@n April
%6, the appeal !as iven due course
21
and the records of the case !ere elevated directly to this Court, since only *uestions
of la! are raised.
22
Plaintiff-appellant allees in its brief that the trial court erred I
2. 1hen it sustained the vie! that Resolution No. .4, series of %78( of the Municipal Council of
Mandaluyon, Ri+al declarin $ots Nos. ' and 8, a#on others, as part of the co##ercial and industrial
+one, is valid because it did so in the e,ercise of its police po!er< and
22. 1hen it failed to consider !hether or not the Municipal Council had the po!er to nullify the
contractual obliations assu#ed by defendant-appellee and !hen it did not #a-e a findin that the
buildin !as erected alon the property line, !hen it should have been erected t!o #eters a!ay fro# said
property line.
23
The defendant-appellee sub#itted its counter-assin#ent of errors. 2n this connection, 1e already had occasion to hold
in 1elativo v. Castro
24
that &325t is not incu#bent on the appellee, !ho occupies a purely defensive position, and is
see-in no affir#ative relief, to #a-e assin#ents of error, &
The only issues to be resolved, therefore, are; 3%5 !hether Resolution No. .4 s-%78( is a valid e,ercise of police po!er<
and 3.5 !hether the said Resolution can nullify or supersede the contractual obliations assu#ed by defendant-appellee.
%. The contention that the trial court erred in sustainin the validity of Resolution No. .4 as an e,ercise of police po!er is
!ithout #erit. 2n the first place, the validity of the said resolution !as never *uestioned before it. The rule is that the
*uestion of la! or of fact !hich #ay be included in the appellantEs assin#ent of errors #ust be those !hich have been
raised in the court belo!, and are !ithin the issues fra#ed by the parties.
25
The ob/ect of re*uirin the parties to present
all *uestions and issues to the lo!er court before they can be presented to the appellate court is to enable the lo!er court
to pass thereon, so that the appellate court upon appeal #ay deter#ine !hether or not such rulin !as erroneous. The
re*uire#ent is in furtherance of /ustice in that the other party #ay not be ta-en by surprise.
26
The rule aainst the practice
of blo!in &hot and cold& by assu#in one position in the trial court and another on appeal !ill, in the !ords of Elliot,
prevent deception.
26
?or it is !ell-settled that issues or defenses not raised
28
or properly litiated
29
or pleaded
34
in the
Court belo! cannot be raised or entertained on appeal.
2n this particular case, the validity of the resolution !as ad#itted at least i#pliedly, in the stipulation of facts belo!. !hen
plaintiff-appellant did not dispute the sa#e. The only controversy then as stated by the trial court !as !hether or not the
resolution of the Municipal Council of Mandaluyon ... !hich declared lots Nos. 6 and ' a#on others, as a part of the
co##ercial and industrial +one of the #unicipality, prevails over the restrictions constitutin as encu#brances on the lots
in *uestion.
31
>avin ad#itted the validity of the sub/ect resolution belo!, even if i#pliedly, plaintiff-appellant cannot
no! chane its position on appeal.
But, assu#in arguendo that it is not yet too late in the day for plaintiff-appellant to raise the issue of the invalidity of the
#unicipal resolution in *uestion, 1e are of the opinion that its posture is unsustainable. =ection 0 of R.A. No. ..86,
other!ise -no!n as the $ocal Autono#y Act,&
32
e#po!ers a Municipal Council &to adopt +onin and subdivision
ordinances or regulations&<
33
for the #unicipality. Clearly, the la! does not restrict the e,ercise of the po!er throuh an
ordinance. Therefore, rantin that Resolution No. .4 is not an ordinance, it certainly is a reulatory #easure !ithin the
intend#ent or a#bit of the !ord &reulation& under the provision. As a #atter of fact the sa#e section declares that the
po!er e,ists &3A5ny provision of la! to the contrary not!ithstandin ... &
An e,a#ination of =ection %. of the sa#e la!
34
!hich prescribes the rules for its interpretation li-e!ise reveals that the
i#plied po!er of a #unicipality should be &liberally construed in its favor& and that &3A5ny fair and reasonable doubt as
to the e,istence of the po!er should be interpreted in favor of the local overn#ent and it shall be presu#ed to e,ist.& The
sa#e section further #andates that the eneral !elfare clause be liberally interpreted in case of doubt, so as to ive #ore
po!er to local overn#ents in pro#otin the econo#ic conditions, social !elfare and #aterial proress of the people in
the co##unity. The only e,ceptions under =ection %. are e,istin vested rihts arisin out of a contract bet!een &a
province, city or #unicipality on one hand and a third party on the other,& in !hich case the oriinal ter#s and provisions
of the contract should overn. The e,ceptions, clearly, do not apply in the case at bar.
.. 1ith reard to the contention that said resolution cannot nullify the contractual obliations assu#ed by the defendant-
appellee U referrin to the restrictions incorporated in the deeds of sale and later in the correspondin Transfer Certificates
of Title issued to defendant-appellee U it should be stressed, that !hile non-i#pair#ent of contracts is constitutionally
uaranteed, the rule is not absolute, since it has to be reconciled !ith the leiti#ate e,ercise of police po!er, i.e., &the
po!er to prescribe reulations to pro#ote the health, #orals, peace, education, ood order or safety and eneral !elfare
of the people.
35
2nvariably described as &the #ost essential, insistent, and illi#itable of po!ers&
36
and &in a sense, the
reatest and #ost po!erful attribute of overn#ent,
36
the e,ercise of the po!er #ay be /udicially in*uired into and
corrected only if it is capricious, E!hi#sical, un/ust or unreasonable, there havin been a denial of due process or a
violation of any other applicable constitutional uarantee.
38
As this Court held throuh 9ustice 9ose P. Ben+on
in (hilippine Long 5istance Compan' vs. Cit' of 5avao# et al.
39
police po!er &is elastic and #ust be responsive to
various social conditions< it is not, confined !ithin narro! circu#scriptions of precedents restin on past conditions< it
#ust follo! the leal proress of a de#ocratic !ay of life.& 1e !ere even #ore e#phatic in 9da. de Genuino vs. The
Court of Agrarian 1elations# et al.,
44
!hen 1e declared; &1e do not see !hy public !elfare !hen clashin !ith the
individual riht to property should not be #ade to prevail throuh the stateEs e,ercise of its police po!er.
Resolution No. .4, s-%78( declarin the !estern part of hih!ay '6, no! E. de los =antos Avenue 3E"=A, for short5 fro#
=ha! Boulevard to the Pasi River as an industrial and co##ercial +one, !as obviously passed by the Municipal Council
of Mandaluyon, Ri+al in the e,ercise of police po!er to safeuard or pro#ote the health, safety, peace, ood order and
eneral !elfare of the people in the locality, 9udicial notice #ay be ta-en of the conditions prevailin in the area,
especially !here lots Nos. ' and 8 are located. The lots the#selves not only front the hih!ay< industrial and co##ercial
co#ple,es have flourished about the place. E"=A, a #ain traffic artery !hich runs throuh several cities and
#unicipalities in the Metro Manila area, supports an endless strea# of traffic and the resultin activity, noise and pollution
are hardly conducive to the health, safety or !elfare of the residents in its route. >avin been e,pressly ranted the po!er
to adopt +onin and subdivision ordinances or reulations, the #unicipality of Mandaluyon, throuh its Municipal
Ecouncil, !as reasonably, if not perfectly, /ustified under the circu#stances, in passin the sub/ect resolution.
The scope of police po!er -eeps e,pandin as civili+ation advances, stressed this Court, spea-in thru 9ustice $aurel in
the leadin case of Calalang v. /illiams et al.#
41
Thus-
As !as said in the case of 5o))ins v. Los Angeles 3%7' F= ..0, .0: 67 $. ed. %875, Hthe right to e<ercise
the police power is a continuing one# and a )usiness lawful toda' ma' in the future# )ecause of changed
situation# the growth of population or other causes# )ecome a menace to the pu)lic health and welfare#
and )e re:uired to 'ield to the pu)lic good.E And in People v. Po#ar 368 Phil. 66(5, it !as observed
that Hadvancing civilization is )ringing within the scope of police power of the state toda' things which
were not thought of as )eing with in such power 'esterda'. The develop#ent of civili+ation5, the rapidly
increasin population, the ro!th of public opinion, !ith an increasin desire on the part of the #asses
and of the overn#ent to loo- after and care for the interests of the individuals of the state, have brouht
!ithin the police po!er #any *uestions for reulation !hich for#erly !ere not so
considered.
42
3E#phasis, supplied.5
Thus, the state, in order to pro#ote the eneral !elfare, #ay interfere !ith personal liberty, !ith property, and !ith
business and occupations. Persons #ay be sub/ected to all -inds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the eneral
co#fort health and prosperity of the state
43
and to this funda#ental ai# of our Jovern#ent, the rihts of the individual
are subordinated.
44
The need for reconcilin the non-i#pair#ent clause of the Constitution and the valid e,ercise of police po!er #ay also be
leaned fro# Helvering v. 5avis
45
!herein Mr. 9ustice Cardo+o, spea-in for the Court, resolved the conflict &bet!een
one !elfare and another, bet!een particular and eneral, thus I
Nor is the concept of the eneral !elfare static. 2eeds that were narrow or parochial a centur' ago ma'
)e interwoven in our da' with the well-)eing of the nation 1hat is critical or urent chanes !ith the
ti#es.
46
The #otives behind the passae of the *uestioned resolution bein reasonable, and it bein a & leiti#ate response to a felt
public need,&
46
not !hi#sical or oppressive, the non-i#pair#ent of contracts clause of the Constitution !ill not bar the
#unicipalityEs proper e,ercise of the po!er. No! Chief 9ustice ?ernando puts it aptly !hen he declared; &Police po!er
leislation then is not li-ely to succu#b to the challene that thereby contractual rihts are rendered nuatory.&
48
?urther#ore, 1e restated in (hilippine American Life 0ns. Co. v. Auditor General
49
that la!s and reservation of essential
attributes of soverein po!er are read into contracts areed upon by the parties. Thus I
Not only are e,istin la!s read into contracts in order to fi, obliations as bet!een the parties, but the
reservation of essential attri)utes of sovereign power is also read into contracts as a postulate of the
legal order. The policy of protectin contracts aainst i#pair#ents presupposes the #aintenance of a
overn#ent by virtue of !hich contractual relations are !orth!hile U a overn#ent !hich retains
ade*uate authority to secure the peace and ood order of society.
Aain, 1e held in Li)eration Steamship Co.# 0nc. v. Court of 0ndustrial 1elations,
54
throuh 9ustice 9.B.$. Reyes, that ...
the la! for#s part of, and is read into, every contract, unless clearly e,cluded therefro# in those cases !here such
e,clusion is allo!ed.& The decision in &aritime Compan' of the (hilippines v. 1eparations Commission#
51
!ritten for the
Court by 9ustice ?ernando, no! Chief 9ustice, restates the rule.
@ne last observation. Appellant has placed un*ualified reliance on A#erican /urisprudence and authorities
52
to bolster its
theory that the #unicipal resolution in *uestion cannot nullify or supersede the aree#ent of the parties e#bodied in the
sales contract, as that, it clai#s, !ould i#pair the obliation of contracts in violation of the Constitution. =uch reliance is
#isplaced.
2n the first place, the vie!s set forth in A#erican decisions and authorities are not per se controllin in the Philippines, the
la!s of !hich #ust necessarily be construed in accordance !ith the intention of its o!n la!#a-ers and such intent #ay
be deduced fro# the lanuae of each la! and the conte,t of other local leislation related thereto.
53
and "urgess# et al v.
&agarian# et al.#
55
t!o @f the cases cited by plaintiff-appellant, lend support to the conclusion reached by the trial court,
i.e. that the #unicipal resolution supersedesOsupervenes over the contractual underta-in bet!een the parties. 5olan v.
"rown, states that &E*uity !ill not, as a rule, enforce a restriction upon the use of property by in/unction where the
propert' has so changed in character and environment as to mae it unfit or unprofita)le for use should the restriction )e
enforced# but !ill, in such a case, leave the co#plainant to !hatever re#edy he #ay have at la!.
56
3E#phasis supplied.5
>ence, the re#edy of in/unction in 5olan vs. "rown !as denied on the specific holdin that &A rantor #ay la!fully
insert in his deed conditions or restrictions !hich are not aainst public policy and do not #aterially i#pair the beneficial
en/oy#ent of the estate.
56
Applyin the principle /ust stated to the present controversy, 1e can say that since it is no!
unprofitable, nay a ha+ard to the health and co#fort, to use $ots Nos. ' and 8 for strictly residential purposes, defendants-
appellees should be per#itted, on the strenth of the resolution pro#ulated under the police po!er of the #unicipality, to
use the sa#e for co##ercial purposes. 2n "urgess v. &agarian et al. it !as, held that &restrictive covenants runnin !ith
the land are bindin on all subse*uent purchasers ... & >o!ever, =ection .0 of the +onin ordinance involved therein
contained a proviso e,pressly declarin that the ordinance !as not intended &to interfere !ith or abroate or annul any
ease#ents, covenants or other aree#ent bet!een parties.&
58
2n the case at bar, no such proviso is found in the sub/ect
resolution.
2t is, therefore, clear that even if the sub/ect buildin restrictions !ere assu#ed by the defendant-appellee as vendee of
$ots Nos. ' and 8, in the correspondin deeds of sale, and later, in Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. %(%8%0 and %(8(7.,
the contractual obliations so assu#ed cannot prevail over Resolution No. .4, of the Municipality of Mandaluyon, !hich
has validly e,ercised its police po!er throuh the said resolution. Accordinly, the buildin restrictions, !hich declare
$ots Nos. ' and 8 as residential, cannot be enforced.
2N H2E1 @? T>E ?@REJ@2NJ, the decision appealed fro#, dis#issin the co#plaint, is hereby A??2RME". &!ithout
pronounce#ent as to costs.
=@ @R"ERE".

&aasiar# Antonio# Concepcion# 4r.# $ernandez# Guerrero# 5e Castro and &elencio-Herrera# 44.# concur.
Teehanee R and A:uino#44.# too no part.
S&,'*'+& O,!"!o"

8ARRE2O, J., concurrin;
2 hold it is a #atter of public -no!lede that the place in *uestion is co##ercial. 2t !ould be !orse if the sa#e !ere to be
left as residential and all around are already co##ercial.
3ERNAN2O, *.J., concurrin;
The e,haustive and lucid opinion of the Court penned by 9ustice Juiller#o =. =antos co##ends itself for approval. 2 feel
no hesitancy, therefore, in yieldin concurrence, The observation, ho!ever, in the dissent of 9ustice Hicente Abad =antos
relative to restrictive covenants calls, to #y #ind, for further reflection as to the respect to !hich they are entitled
!henever police po!er leislation, !hether on the national or local level, is assailed. Before doin so, ho!ever, it #ay not
be a#iss to consider further the effect of such all-e#bracin attribute on e,istin contracts.
%. Reference !as #ade in the opinion of the Court to (hilippine American Life 0nsurance Compan' v. Auditor
General.
1
The ponente in that case !as 9ustice =anche+. A concurrence ca#e fro# #e. 2t contained this *ualification; &2t
cannot be said, !ithout renderin nuatory the constitutional uarantee of non-i#pair#ent, and for that #atter both the
e*ual protection and due process clauses !hich e*ually serve to protect property rihts, that at the #ere invocation of the
police po!er, the ob/ection on non-i#pair#ent rounds auto#atically loses force. >ere, as in other cases !here
overn#ental authority #ay trench upon property rihts, the process of balancin, ad/ust#ent or har#oni+ation is called
for.
2
After referrin to three leadin 7nited States Supreme Court decisions# Home "uilding and Loan Association v.
"laisdell#
0
2e))ia v. 2ew 3or#
4
and 2orman v. "altimore and Ohio 1ailroad Co.,
5
2 stated; &All of the above decisions
reflect the vie! that an enact#ent of a police po!er #easure does not per se call for the overrulin of ob/ections based on
either due process or non-i#pair#ent based on either due process or non-i#pair#ent rounds. There #ust be that
balancin, or ad/ust#ent, or har#oni+ation of the conflictin clai#s posed by an e,ercise of state reulatory po!er on the
one hand and assertion of rihts to property, !hether of natural or of /uridical persons, on the other. EThat is the only !ay
by !hich the constitutional uarantees #ay serve the hih ends that call for their inclusion in the Constitution and thus
effectively preclude ally abusive e,ercise of overn#ental authority.&
6
Nor did #y concurrence stop there; &2n the opinion
of the Blaisdell case, penned by the then Chief 9ustice >uhes, there !as this understandable stress on balancin or
har#oni+in, !hich is called for in litiations of this character; EThe policy of protectin contracts aainst i#pair#ent
presupposes the #aintenance of a overn#ent by virtue of !hich contractual relations are !orth!hile a overn#ent
!hich retains ade*uate authority to secure the peace and ood order of society. This principle of har#oni+in the
constitutional prohibition !ith the necessary residuu# of state po!er has had proressive reconition in the decisions of
this Court.E Also to the sa#e effect; EFndoubtedly, !hatever is reserved of state po!er #ust be consistent !ith the fair
intent of the constitutional li#itation of that po!er. The reserve po!er cannot be construed so as to destroy the li#itation,
nor is the li#itation to be construed to destroy the reserved po!er in its essential aspects. EThey #ust be construed in
har#ony !ith each other. This principle precludes a construction !hich !ould per#it the =tate to adopt as its policy the
repudiation of debts or the destruction of contracts or the denial of #eans to enforce the#. But it does not follo! that
conditions #ay not arise in !hich a te#porary restraint of enforce#ent #ay be consistent !ith the spirit and purpose of
the constitutional provision and thus be found to be !ithin the rane of the reserved po!er of the =tate to protect the vital
interests of the co##unity.E ?urther on, Chief 9ustice >uhes li-e!ise stated; E2t is #anifest fro# this revie! of our
decisions that there has been a ro!in appreciation of public needs and of the necessity of findin round for a rational
co#pro#ise bet!een individual rihts and public !elfare. &
6
This is the concludin pararaph of #y concurrence in the
Philippine A#erican $ife 2nsurance Co. case; &2f e#phasis be therefore laid, as this concurrin opinion does, on the
pressin and inescapable need for such an approach !henever a possible collision bet!een state authority and an assertion
of constitutional riht to property #ay e,ist, it is not to depart fro# !hat sound constitutional orthodo,y dictates. 2t is
rather to abide by !hat is co#pels. 2n litiations of this character then, perhaps #uch #ore so than in other disputes,
!here there is a reliance on a constitutional provision, the /udiciary cannot escape !hat >ol#es fitly referred to as the
soverein preroative of choice, the e,ercise of !hich #iht possibly be i#puned if there be no atte#pt, ho!ever sliht,
at such an effort of ad/ustin or reconcilin the respective clai#s of state reulatory po!er and constitutionally protected
rihts.&
8
2 adhere to such a vie!. This is not to say that there is a departure therefro# in the able and scholarly opinion of 9ustice
=antos. 2t is #erely to stress !hat to #y #ind is a funda#ental postulate of our Constitution. The only point 2 !ould !ish
to add is that in the process of such balancin and ad/ust#ent, the present Constitution, the Philippine A#erican $ife
2nsurance Co. decision havin been pro#ulated under the %70' Charter, leaves no doubt that the clai# to property rihts
based on the non-i#pair#ent clause has a lesser !eiht. ?or as e,plicitly provided by our present funda#ental la!; &The
=tate shall pro#ote social 9ustice to ensure the dinity, !elfare, and security of all the people. To!ards this end, the
=tate shall reulate the ac*uisition, o!nership, use, en/oy#ent, and disposition of private property, and e*uitably diffuse
property o!nership and profits.
9
.. No! as to restrictive convenants, accurately included by >art and =ac-s under the cateory of &private directive
arrane#ents. &
14
Throuh the# people are enable to aree on ho! to order their affairs. They could be utili+ed to overn
their affairs. They could be utili+ed to overn their future conduct. 2t is a !ell--no!n fact that the co##on la! relies to a
reat e,tent on such private directive arrane#ents to attain a desirable social condition. More specifically, such
covenants are an i#portant #eans of orderin one aspect of property relationships. Throuh the#, there could be
deli#itation of land use rihts. 2t is *uite understandable !hy the la! should ordinarily accord the# deference, 2t does so,
it has been said, both on rounds of #orality and utility. Nonetheless, there are li#its to the literal enforce#ent of their
ter#s. To the e,tent that they inore technoloical or econo#ic proress, they are not auto#atically entitled to /udicial
protection. Clearly, they #ust &spea- fro# one point of ti#e to another.&
11
The parties, li-e all #ortal, do not have the
po!er of predictin the future !ith unfailin certainty. 2n cases therefore !here societal !elfare calls for police po!er
leislation, the parties adversely affected should reali+e that arrane#ents dealin !ith property rihts are not i#pressed
!ith sanctity. That approach, in #y vie!, !as the uidin principle of the opinion of the Court. f fence #y full and entire
concurrence.
A8A2 SANTOS, J:, dissentin;
Althouh Resolution No. .4, series of %78(, of the Municipal Council of Mandaluyon, Ri+al, is valid until other!ise
declared, 2 do not believe that its enact#ent !as by virtue of the police po!er of that #unicipality. 2 do not here dispute
the concept of police po!er as stated in (rimicias vs. $ugoso, :( Phil. 44 3%76:5 for as a #atter of fact 2 accept it. And 2
aree also that it is elastic and #ust be responsive to various social conditions, etc. as ruled in(L5T vs. Cit' of 5avao, $-
.0(:(, @ct. .8, %78', %' =CRA .66. But Resolution No. .4, cannot be described as pro#otive of the health, #orals,
peace, education, ood order or safety and eneral !elfare of the people of Mandaluyon. @n the contrary, its effect is the
opposite. ?or the serenity, peace and *uite of a residential section !ould by the resolution be replaced by the chaos,
tur#oil and fren+y of co##erce and industry. 1here there !ould be no industrial and noise pollution these bane of so-
called proress !ould no! pervade and suffocate the environ#ent to the detri#ent of the ecoloy. To characteri+e the
ordinance as an e,ercise of police po!er !ould be retroressive. 2t !ill set bac- all the efforts of the Ministry of >u#an
=ettle#ents to i#prove the *uality of life especially in Metro Manila. 2t !ill #a-e Metro Manila, not the city of #an as
envisioned by its Jovernor but a city of co##erce and industry.
Considerin, therefore, that Resolution No, .-% !as not enacted in the leiti#ate e,ercise of police po!er, it cannot
i#pair the restrictive covenants !hich o !ith the lands that !ere sold by the plaintiff-appellant. 2 vote for the reversal of
the appealed decision.




H S&,'*'+& O,!"!o"
8ARRE2O, J., concurrin;
2 hold it is a #atter of public -no!lede that the place in *uestion is co##ercial. 2t !ould be !orse if the sa#e !ere to be
left as residential and all around are already co##ercial.
3ERNAN2O, *.J., concurrin;
The e,haustive and lucid opinion of the Court penned by 9ustice Juiller#o =. =antos co##ends itself for approval. 2 feel
no hesitancy, therefore, in yieldin concurrence, The observation, ho!ever, in the dissent of 9ustice Hicente Abad =antos
relative to restrictive covenants calls, to #y #ind, for further reflection as to the respect to !hich they are entitled
!henever police po!er leislation, !hether on the national or local level, is assailed. Before doin so, ho!ever, it #ay not
be a#iss to consider further the effect of such all-e#bracin attribute on e,istin contracts.
%. Reference !as #ade in the opinion of the Court to (hilippine American Life 0nsurance Compan' v. Auditor
General.
1
The ponente in that case !as 9ustice =anche+. A concurrence ca#e fro# #e. 2t contained this *ualification; &2t
cannot be said, !ithout renderin nuatory the constitutional uarantee of non-i#pair#ent, and for that #atter both the
e*ual protection and due process clauses !hich e*ually serve to protect property rihts, that at the #ere invocation of the
police po!er, the ob/ection on non-i#pair#ent rounds auto#atically loses force. >ere, as in other cases !here
overn#ental authority #ay trench upon property rihts, the process of balancin, ad/ust#ent or har#oni+ation is called
for.
2
After referrin to three leadin 7nited States Supreme Court decisions# Home "uilding and Loan Association v.
"laisdell#
0
2e))ia v. 2ew 3or#
4
and 2orman v. "altimore and Ohio 1ailroad Co.,
5
2 stated; &All of the above decisions
reflect the vie! that an enact#ent of a police po!er #easure does not per se call for the overrulin of ob/ections based on
either due process or non-i#pair#ent based on either due process or non-i#pair#ent rounds. There #ust be that
balancin, or ad/ust#ent, or har#oni+ation of the conflictin clai#s posed by an e,ercise of state reulatory po!er on the
one hand and assertion of rihts to property, !hether of natural or of /uridical persons, on the other. EThat is the only !ay
by !hich the constitutional uarantees #ay serve the hih ends that call for their inclusion in the Constitution and thus
effectively preclude ally abusive e,ercise of overn#ental authority.&
6
Nor did #y concurrence stop there; &2n the opinion
of the Blaisdell case, penned by the then Chief 9ustice >uhes, there !as this understandable stress on balancin or
har#oni+in, !hich is called for in litiations of this character; EThe policy of protectin contracts aainst i#pair#ent
presupposes the #aintenance of a overn#ent by virtue of !hich contractual relations are !orth!hile a overn#ent
!hich retains ade*uate authority to secure the peace and ood order of society. This principle of har#oni+in the
constitutional prohibition !ith the necessary residuu# of state po!er has had proressive reconition in the decisions of
this Court.E Also to the sa#e effect; EFndoubtedly, !hatever is reserved of state po!er #ust be consistent !ith the fair
intent of the constitutional li#itation of that po!er. The reserve po!er cannot be construed so as to destroy the li#itation,
nor is the li#itation to be construed to destroy the reserved po!er in its essential aspects. EThey #ust be construed in
har#ony !ith each other. This principle precludes a construction !hich !ould per#it the =tate to adopt as its policy the
repudiation of debts or the destruction of contracts or the denial of #eans to enforce the#. But it does not follo! that
conditions #ay not arise in !hich a te#porary restraint of enforce#ent #ay be consistent !ith the spirit and purpose of
the constitutional provision and thus be found to be !ithin the rane of the reserved po!er of the =tate to protect the vital
interests of the co##unity.E ?urther on, Chief 9ustice >uhes li-e!ise stated; E2t is #anifest fro# this revie! of our
decisions that there has been a ro!in appreciation of public needs and of the necessity of findin round for a rational
co#pro#ise bet!een individual rihts and public !elfare. &
6
This is the concludin pararaph of #y concurrence in the
Philippine A#erican $ife 2nsurance Co. case; &2f e#phasis be therefore laid, as this concurrin opinion does, on the
pressin and inescapable need for such an approach !henever a possible collision bet!een state authority and an assertion
of constitutional riht to property #ay e,ist, it is not to depart fro# !hat sound constitutional orthodo,y dictates. 2t is
rather to abide by !hat is co#pels. 2n litiations of this character then, perhaps #uch #ore so than in other disputes,
!here there is a reliance on a constitutional provision, the /udiciary cannot escape !hat >ol#es fitly referred to as the
soverein preroative of choice, the e,ercise of !hich #iht possibly be i#puned if there be no atte#pt, ho!ever sliht,
at such an effort of ad/ustin or reconcilin the respective clai#s of state reulatory po!er and constitutionally protected
rihts.&
8
2 adhere to such a vie!. This is not to say that there is a departure therefro# in the able and scholarly opinion of 9ustice
=antos. 2t is #erely to stress !hat to #y #ind is a funda#ental postulate of our Constitution. The only point 2 !ould !ish
to add is that in the process of such balancin and ad/ust#ent, the present Constitution, the Philippine A#erican $ife
2nsurance Co. decision havin been pro#ulated under the %70' Charter, leaves no doubt that the clai# to property rihts
based on the non-i#pair#ent clause has a lesser !eiht. ?or as e,plicitly provided by our present funda#ental la!; &The
=tate shall pro#ote social 9ustice to ensure the dinity, !elfare, and security of all the people. To!ards this end, the
=tate shall reulate the ac*uisition, o!nership, use, en/oy#ent, and disposition of private property, and e*uitably diffuse
property o!nership and profits.
9
.. No! as to restrictive convenants, accurately included by >art and =ac-s under the cateory of &private directive
arrane#ents. &
14
Throuh the# people are enable to aree on ho! to order their affairs. They could be utili+ed to overn
their affairs. They could be utili+ed to overn their future conduct. 2t is a !ell--no!n fact that the co##on la! relies to a
reat e,tent on such private directive arrane#ents to attain a desirable social condition. More specifically, such
covenants are an i#portant #eans of orderin one aspect of property relationships. Throuh the#, there could be
deli#itation of land use rihts. 2t is *uite understandable !hy the la! should ordinarily accord the# deference, 2t does so,
it has been said, both on rounds of #orality and utility. Nonetheless, there are li#its to the literal enforce#ent of their
ter#s. To the e,tent that they inore technoloical or econo#ic proress, they are not auto#atically entitled to /udicial
protection. Clearly, they #ust &spea- fro# one point of ti#e to another.&
11
The parties, li-e all #ortal, do not have the
po!er of predictin the future !ith unfailin certainty. 2n cases therefore !here societal !elfare calls for police po!er
leislation, the parties adversely affected should reali+e that arrane#ents dealin !ith property rihts are not i#pressed
!ith sanctity. That approach, in #y vie!, !as the uidin principle of the opinion of the Court. f fence #y full and entire
concurrence.
A8A2 SANTOS, J:, dissentin;
Althouh Resolution No. .4, series of %78(, of the Municipal Council of Mandaluyon, Ri+al, is valid until other!ise
declared, 2 do not believe that its enact#ent !as by virtue of the police po!er of that #unicipality. 2 do not here dispute
the concept of police po!er as stated in (rimicias vs. $ugoso, :( Phil. 44 3%76:5 for as a #atter of fact 2 accept it. And 2
aree also that it is elastic and #ust be responsive to various social conditions, etc. as ruled in(L5T vs. Cit' of 5avao, $-
.0(:(, @ct. .8, %78', %' =CRA .66. But Resolution No. .4, cannot be described as pro#otive of the health, #orals,
peace, education, ood order or safety and eneral !elfare of the people of Mandaluyon. @n the contrary, its effect is the
opposite. ?or the serenity, peace and *uite of a residential section !ould by the resolution be replaced by the chaos,
tur#oil and fren+y of co##erce and industry. 1here there !ould be no industrial and noise pollution these bane of so-
called proress !ould no! pervade and suffocate the environ#ent to the detri#ent of the ecoloy. To characteri+e the
ordinance as an e,ercise of police po!er !ould be retroressive. 2t !ill set bac- all the efforts of the Ministry of >u#an
=ettle#ents to i#prove the *uality of life especially in Metro Manila. 2t !ill #a-e Metro Manila, not the city of #an as
envisioned by its Jovernor but a city of co##erce and industry.
Considerin, therefore, that Resolution No, .-% !as not enacted in the leiti#ate e,ercise of police po!er, it cannot
i#pair the restrictive covenants !hich o !ith the lands that !ere sold by the plaintiff-appellant. 2 vote for the reversal of
the appealed decision.
H3oo+"o+&
% Record on Appeal, p. %%(.
. 0d., pp. 6-'. E#phasis supplied.
0 0d pp. %%%-%%..
6 0d., p. %%..
' 0d., p. :(.
8 0d., p. :8.
4 0d., p. 76.
: 0d., pp. %% .-%%0.
7 0d., pp. 8( and %%0.
%( Brief for "efendant-Appellee, p. ..
%% 0d# p. 0.
%. Record on Appeal, pp. %%0-%%6.
%0 0d., p. %%6.
%6 0d.# pp. %%6-%%'.
%' 0d.# p. %%6.
%8 0d.# p. %%8.
%4 0d.# p.%%:.
%: 0d.# p. %%4.
%7 0d.# p. %.4.
.( 0d.# pp. %.4-%.7.
.% 0d.# p. %0(.
.. 0)id.
.0 =ee Brief for "efendant-Appellee, pp. 0(-0%.
.6 48 Phil. '80, '84 3%7685.
.' =ec. %:, Rule 68, Revised Rules of Court< Tan Machan v. "e la Trinidad 0 Phil. 8:6, 3%7685.
.8 ?rancisco, The Revised Rules of Court, Hol. %%%, %78: Ed., p. 86:, citin 9ones v. =ey#our, 7' Art.
'70, '74, %0( =.1. '8(.
.4 0d., pp.80:-867, cit Elliot on Appellate Procedure, 6%8-6%4.
.: =u#erari+, et al. vs. "evelop#ent Ban- of the Philippines, et al., $-.0486, "ec. .8, %784, .% =CRA
%046; =an Miuel Bre!ery, et al. vs. Hda. de 9oves. et al., $-.6.':, 9une .8, %78:, .0 =CRA %(70, %(74.
=ee also Tuason vs. >on. Arca, et al., $- .6068, 9une .7, %78:, .0 =CRA %0(:, %0%..
.7 Plaridel =urety and 2ns. Co. vs. Co##issioner of 2nternal Revenue, $-.%'.(, "ec. %%, %784, .% =CRA
%%:4.
0( Manila Port =ervice, et al vs, Court of Appeals, et al., $.%:7(, March .7. %78:, .. =CRA %086.
0% Record on Appeal, p. %%6.
0. =ec. 0 reads;
=ec. 0. Additional po!ers of provincial boards, #unicipal boards or city councils and #unicipal and
reularly orani+ed #unicipal district councils.
,,, ,,, ,,,
Po!er to adopt +onin and plannin ordinances. Any provision of la! to the contrary not!ithstandin
Municipal Boards or City Councils in cities, and Municipal Councils in #unicipalities are hereby
authori+ed to adopt +onin and subdivision ordinances or reulations for their respective cities and
#unicipalities sub/ect to the approval of the City Mayor or Municipal Mayor, as the case #ay be. Cities
and #unicipalities #ay, ho!ever, consult the National Plannin Co##ission on #atters pertainin to
plannin and +onin. 3E#phasis supplied5.
00 E#phasis supplied.
06 The full te,t of =ection %. follo!s;
=EC. %.. Rules for the 2nterpretation of the $ocal Autono#y Act. I
%. 2#plied po!er of a province, a city or #unicipality shall be liberally construed in its
favor. Any fair and reasonable doubt as to the e,istence of the po!er should be
interpreted infavor of the local overn#ent and it shall be presu#ed to e,ist.
.. The eneral !elfare clause be liberally interpreted in case of local overn#ents in
pro#otin the econo#ic condition, social !elfare and #aterial proress of the people in
the co##unity.
0. Hested rihts e,istin at the ti#e of the pro#ulation of this arisin out of a contract
bet!een a province, city or #unicipality on one hand and third party on the other, should
be overned by the oriinal ter#s and provisions of the sa#e, and in no case !ould this
act infrine e,istin riht.
3!ith #ore sourcessss5