Corporate Powers (Sec. 22, LGC, Art.

46, IRR)
* Sec. 22, LGC, Corporate Powers. A) Every LGU, as a corporate, shall have the following powers:
1. To have continuous succession in its corporate name;
2. To sue and be sued;
3. To have and use a corporate seal;
4. To acquire and convey real or personal property
5. To enter into contracts; and
6. To exercise such other powers as are granted to corporations, subject to the limitations provided in this Code
and other laws.
b) LGUs may continue using, modify, or change their existing corporate seals. Provided, that newly
established LGUs or those without corporate seals may create their own corporate seals which shall be registered with
the DILG. Provided further, that may change of corporate seal shall also be registered as provided herein.
c) Unless otherwise provided in this Code, no contract may be entered into by the local chief executive in
behalf of the LGU without prior authorization by the sanggunian concerned. A legible copy of such contrast shall be
posted at a conspicuous place in the province capitol or the city, municipal or barangay hall.
d) LGUs shall enjoy full local autonomy to the exercise of their proprietary functions and in the
management of their economic enterprises, subject to the limitations provided in this Code and other applicable laws.

*Article 46, IRR. Note: Its exactly the same as Sec. 22, LGC.

*Municipality Liability
A. General Rule
Municipal liabilities arise from various sources in the conduct of municipal affairs, both governmental and
proprietary. Broadly, claims against municipalities include all obligations upon all municipal contracts and upon all
outstanding bonds, notes, and warrants issued by them. Strictly, however, these claims are demands for payments for
articles, furnished or services rendered to a municipality in the conduct of its affairs, or demands asserting the tort liabi lity
of the municipality.

B. Exceptions
1. As provided by law
a) Article 2189, New Civil Code Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages
for the death of or injuries suffered by any person by reason of the defective conditions of roads, streets, bridges, public
buildings, and other public works their control and supervision.

Cases:
e.1. City of Manila v. Teotico 22, SCRA 267
Facts: On Jan. 27, 1958, at about 8 p.m., Genaro Teotico was at the corner of the Old Luneta and P. Burgos
Avenue, Manila, waiting for a jeepney to take him downtown. After 5 minutes, he managed to hail a jeepney that came
along to a stop. As he stepped down from the curb to board the jeepney, and took a few steps he fell inside an uncovered
and unlighted manhole on P. Burgos Avenue. Teotico sustained a lacerated wound in his left eyelid, conclusion on his left
thigh, the upper left thigh oh my goodness, every injury imaginable! (Use Atty. Uleps tone of voice). Teotico was
hospitalized and the anti-tetanus injections administered to him caused allergic eruptions which required further medical
treatment. Teotico filed an action for damages (actual and moral damages) against the City of Manila. The City denied
liability contending that Sec. 4 of the City Charter (RA 409) should prevail over Art. 2189 of the Civil Code because the
former is a special law intended exclusively for the City of Manila, whereas the Civil Code is a general law applicable to
the entire Philippines.

Held: Sec. 4 of RA 409 refers to liability arising from negligence in general regardless of the object thereof
whereas Art. 2189 governs liability due to defective streets in particular. Since the presentation action is based upon the
detective condition of a road, said Art. 2189 is decisive. Under Art. 2189, it is not necessary for the liability therein
established to attach that the defective roads or streets belong to the province, city or municipality from which
responsibility is exacted. What said Article requires is that the province, city or municipality has either control or
supervision over said street or road. Even if P. Burgos were, therefore, a national highway, this circumstance would not
necessarily detract from its control of supervision by the City of Manila, under RA 409. The City of Manila is therefore
liable to Teotico for damages.

e.2. Jimenez v. City of Manila 150 SCRA 510
Facts: Bernardino Jimenez was the unlucky said who fell in an uncovered opening o the ground located within the
premises of the Sta. Ana public market. At that time, the market was flooded with ankle-deep rainwater which prevented
the opening form being seen. Jimenez, for his part, went to that market to buy bagoong despite the rains. He sustained an
injury due to a rusty 4-inch nail which pierced his left leg.
Jimenez sued the Asiatic Integrated Corporation (AIC) and the City of Manila for his misfortune. The Sta. Ana
Market at that time was under the administration of the AIC by virtue of a management and Operating Contract it had with
the City of Manila. The trial court held the AIC responsible but absolved the City of Manila. Is the City of Manila indeed not
liable?

Held: The City of Manila is liable. Reasons:
1) Again, Art. 2189 comes into play, since the injury took place in a public building.
2) Also, Art. 2189 requires that the LGU must retain supervision and control over the public work in question for it
to be held liable. The evidence showed that the Management and Operating Contract explicitly stated that the City of
Manila retained supervision and control over the Sta. Ana Market. Also, in a letter to Finance Secretary Cesar Virata,
Mayor Raymond Bagatsing admitted this fact of supervision and control. Moreover, Sec. 30(g) of the Local Tax Code says
that public markets shall be under the immediate supervision, administration and control of the City Treasurer.
3) Jimenez could not be held for negligence. A customer in a store has every right to presume that the owner will
comply with his duty to keep his premises safe for customers. The owner of the market, on the other hand, was proven to
have been negligent in not providing a cover for the said opening. The negligence of the City of Manila is the proximate
cause of the injury suffered.
NOTE: It is not necessary for the LGU to have ownership over the public work in question; mere control and
supervision is sufficient.

e.3. Guilatco v. City of Dagupan 171 SCRA 382
Facts: Florentina Guilatco, a court interpreter, was about to board a tricycle at a sidewalk located at Perez
Boulevard when she accidentally fell into a manhole located in said side walk, causing her right leg to be fractured. She
was hospitalized and also as a result, suffered loss of income and moral damages.
Guilatco sued the City of Dagupan. The City replied that Perez Boulevard, where the deadly manhole was
located, is a national road not under the control and supervision of Dagupan. It is submitted that it is actually the Ministry
of Public Highways that has control and supervision thru the Highway Engineer, who by mere coincidence, is also the City
Engineer of Dagupan (malas naman namin, City Engineer).
Is the City of Dagupan liable?

Held: Yes, Reasons:
1) We again apply Art. 2189. But the bigger question is , does the City of Dagupan have control and supervision
over Perez Boulevard in order for it to be held liable? The answer is yes. Why? Read on.
2) The City of Dagupan argued that the supervision and control over Perez Boulevard belongs more to his
function as ex-officio Highway Engineer, thus the Ministry of Public Highways should be held liable. However, the court
gave this arguments: Alfredo G. Tangco, in his official capacity as City Engineer of Dagupan, as Ex-Officio Highway
Engineer, as Ex-Officio City Engineer of the Bureau of Public Works, and, last but not the least, as Building Official for
Dagupan City, receives the following monthly compensation: P1,810.66 from Dagupan City, P200.00 from the Ministry of
Public Highways, P100.00 from the Bureau of Public Works and P500.00 by virtue of P>D 1096, respectively. This
function of supervision over streets, public buildings, and other public works pertaining to the City Engineer is coursed
through Maintenance Foeman and a Maintenance Engineer. Although these last two officials are employees of the
National Government, they are detailed with the City of Dagupan and hence receive instruction and supervision from the
city through the City Engineer. There is , therefore, no doubt that the City Engineer exercises control or supervision over
the public works in question. Hence, the liability of the city to the petitioner under article 2198 of the City Code is clear.
(Duh? What kind of explanation is that? Personally, I cant understand it, but if the SC says the City of Dagupan is liable,
then we must trust the wisdom of the omniscience SC).

LIABILITY FOR QUASI-DELICT
Palafox v. Province of Ilocos Norte 102 Phil. 1186
Facts: Palafox filed a suit to recover damages from the provincial government for the death of his son caused by
the negligence of a regular chauffer of the provincial government. The accident occurred while the chauffer was working
at the highway construction. The questions now are: 1) May the province be held liable? 2) Does the doctrine of
respondent superior apply?

Held: The answers to both questions are given below (obviously):
1) To attach liability to the State for the negligence of its officer or employee, the latter must be not upon whom
properly devolved the duty of driving the truck on that occasion. This principle applies both to the national and municipal
governments. The province is liable.
2) The doctrine of respondeat superior or corporate liability for the negligence or tort of its officers, applies only
where the government is engaged in proprietary or business functions. When engaged in government functions, as the
construction and maintenance of roads, the doctrine does not apply. The reason for the exemption is the government
does not undertake to guarantee to any person the fidelity of the officers or agents whom it employs, since that would
involve in all its operations endless embarrassments, difficulties and losses subversive of the public interest.
2. Liability for torts if engaged in proprietary function

Cases:
1. Torio v. Fontanilla 85S CRA 599
Facts: The Municipal Council of Malasiqui, Pangasinan passed a resolution celebrating a town fiesta for 3 days
on January, 1959. The resolution created on Executive Committee which would oversee the operations of the town fiesta.
The Executive Committee in turn had a sub-committee in charge of building 2 stages, one of which was for a zarzuela
program.
Vicente Fontanilla was one of the actors of the zarzuela. While the zarzuela was going on the stage where the
play was set collapsed. Fontanilla, who has at the rear of the stage, was pinned underneath and died the following day.
The family and heirs of Fontanilla filed a complaint against the Municipality of Malasiqui, the Municipal Council
and the individual members of the Municipal Council. Can they be held liable?

Held: The Municipality of Malasiqui is liable and the individual members of the Municipal Council are not liable.
Reasons:
1) The basic rule to be first followed is that a municipal corporation cannot be held liable for an injury caused in
the course of performance of a governmental function. With respect to proprietary functions, the settled rule is that a
municipal corporation can be held liable upon contracts and in torts.
2) The next question to be answered is that whether the fiesta above-quota was performed by the municipality in
the exercise of its governmental or proprietary function. According to 2282 of the revised Administrative Code,
municipalities are authorized to hold fiesta, but it is not their duty to conduct such. Thus, the fiesta is proprietary in nature.
The same analogy can be applied to the maintenance of parks, which is a private undertaking, as opposed to the
maintenance of public schools and jails, which are for the public service. (The key word then is duty.)
3) Under the doctrine of respondent superior (see first paragraph of Art. 2180), the municipality can be held liable
for the death of Fontanilla if a) the municipality was performing a proprietary function at that time and b) negligence can be
attributed to the municipalitys officers, employees or agents performing the proprietary function. The evidence proved that
the committee overseeing the construction of the stage failed to build a strong enough to insure the safety of zarzuela
participants. Fontanilla was entitled to ensure that he would be exposed to danger on that occasion.
4) Finally, the municipal council is not responsible. The Municipality stands on the same footing as an ordinary
private corporation with the municipal council acting as its board of directors. It is an elementary principle that a
corporation has a personality, separate and distinct from its officers, directors, or persons composing it and the latter are
not as a rule co-responsible in an action for damages for tort or negligence culpa aquillana committed by the corporations
employees of agents unless there is a showing of bad faith or gross or wanton negligence on their part. To make an
officer of a corporation liable for the negligence of the corporation there must have been upon his part such a breach of
duty as contributed to or helped to bring about, the injury; that is to say, he must be a participant in the wrongful act.

2. Municipality of San Fernando, La Union v. Firing 195 SCRA 692
Facts: Laurence Banino, Sr., along with several other passengers in a jeepney they were riding in, died after
collision involving said jeepney, a privately owned graved and sand trucks and a dump truck owned by the Municipality of
San Fernando, La Union, driven by Alfredo Bislig, a regular employee of said municipality. The heirs included in its
complaint the municipality and the dump trucks driver. The municipality invokes non-suability of the State. Is it correct?
Held: Yes.
1) The general rule is that the State may not be sued except when it gives consent to be sued. Consent takes the
form of express of implied consent.

Express consent may be embodied in a general law or a special law. The standing consent of the State to be
sued in case of money claims involving liability arising from contracts is found in Act No. 3083. A special law may be
passed to enable a person to sue the government for an alleged quasi delict.

Consent is implied when the government enters into business contracts, thereby descending to the level of the
other contracting party, and also when the State files a complaint thus opening itself to a counterclaim.

Municipal corporations for example, like provinces and cities, are agencies of the State when they are engaged in
governmental functions and therefore should enjoy the sovereign immunity from suit. Nevertheless, they are subject to
suit even in the performance of such functions because their charter provided that they can sue and be sued.

2. A distinction should first be made between suability and liability. Suability depends on the consent of the state
to be sued, liability on the applicable law and the established facts. The circumstance that a State is suable does not
necessarily mean that it is liable; on the other hand, it can never be held allowing itself to be sued. When the state does
waive its sovereign immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant is liable.

3. About the issue of whether or not the municipality is liable for the torts committed by its employee, the test of
liability of the municipality depends on whether or not the driver, acting in behalf of the municipality is performing
governmental of propriety functions. As emphasized in the case of Torio vs. Fontanilla, the distinction of powers becomes
important for purposes of determining the liability of the municipality for the acts of its agents which result in an injury to
third persons.

It has already been remarked that municipal corporations are suable because their charters grant them the
competence to sue and be sued. Nevertheless, they are generally not liable for torts committed by them in the discharge
of governmental functions and can be held answerable only if it can be shown that they were acting in a propriety
capacity. In permitting such entities to be sued, the State merely gives the claimant the right to show that the defendant is
not acting in its governmental capacity when the injury was committed or that the case comes under exceptions
recognized by law. Failing this, the claimant cannot recover.

4. In the case at bar, the driver of the dump truck of the municipality insists that he was on his way to Naguilian
River to get a load of sand and gravel for the repair of San Fernandos municipal streets.

In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the regularity of the performance of official duty is presumed
pursuant to Section 3 (m) of Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of Court, Hence, We rule that the driver of the dump truck was
performing duties or tasks pertaining to his office.

3. Read RA 7678 DIGITEL Franchise

The title states: Republic Act no. 7678, February 17, 1994: An Act granting the Digital Telecommunications
Philippines, Incorporated, a franchise to install, operates and maintains telecommunications systems throughout the
Philippines and for other purposes.

Section 13 states: Warranty in Favor of the National and Local Government. The grantee shall hold the national,
provincial, city and municipal governments harmless from all claims, accounts, demands or actions arising out of
accidents or injuries, whether to property or to persons, caused by the installation and operation of the
telecommunications systems of the grantee.

LIABILITY FOR CONTRACTS (DOCTRINE OF IMPLIED MUNICIPAL LIABILITY)

. City of Manila v. JAC 179 SCRA 423
Facts: The City of Manila leased a lot of the North Cemetery to Irene Sto. Domingo. The period of the lease is
from June 6, 1971 to June 6, 2001.

Irenes husband died and was buried in said lot on June 6, 1971. The authorities of the North cemetery however,
ordered the lot exhumed on January 25, 1978, according to their interpretation in good faith of AO No. 5, 1975, which
provided for a uniform procedure and guidelines in the processing of documents pertaining to and for the use and
disposition of burial lots and plots within the North Cemetery, etc.

Naturally, Irene and her family were shocked, Adding to their dismay was that the remains of her husband was
callously dumped in a warehouse of a cemetery were thousands of other sacks of bones were kept. The risk, according to
her, of claiming the wrong set of bones was high. Irene filed a claim for damages against the city. Will the suit prosper?

Held: Yes, reasons:

1. In connection with its powers as a municipal corporation, the City of Manila may acquire property in its public
or governmental capacity, and private or propriety capacity. The NCC divides such properties into property for
public use as provincial roads, city streets, municipal streets, the squares, fountains, public waters,
promenades, and public works for public service paid for by said provisions, cities or municipalities, all other
property is patrimonial without prejudice to the provisions of special laws.

2. In the absence of special law, the North Cemetery is a patrimonial property of the City of Manila, which was
created by resolution of the Municipal Board of August 27, 1903 and January 7, 1904. With its acts of
dominion, there is therefore no doubt that the North Cemetery is within the class of property which the City of
Manila owns in its propriety of private character. Furthermore, there is no dispute that the burial was leased in
favor of the Sto. Domingo. Hence, obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between them.
Therefore, a breach of contractual provision entitles the other party to damages even of no penalty for such
breach is prescribed in the contract.

3. It should also be noted that the Charter of Manila states that it may sue and be sued. By virtue if this and the
doctrine of respondent superior, the City is liable for the negligent acts of its agents in failing to verify the
duration of the lease above- quoted. The agents reliance in AO No.5 is unavailing because said AO covers
only new leases.

* Doctrine of Implied Municipal Liability (Contra personal liability)

To hold a municipal corporation for benefits received under an implied contract:

a. It is necessary to show that the implied contract be within the contractual powers of the
corporation and that the officers who entered into contract were fully authorized.

b. It must be further shown that the benefits were voluntarily accepted under such circumstances
as will indicate that payment was intended by the parties or that justice and equity would
require the payment of compensation.

1. Inciong v. Domingo 211 SCRA 139
Facts: This case basically concerns the implied liability of a municipal corporation in paying the fees of an
attorney it hired. But first, the useless facts.

The Philippines Sugar Commission (PHILSUCOM) owned a sugar refinery at Barangay Caloocan, Balayan,
Batangas. However, PHILSUCOM failed to pay the real state taxes due on said sugar refinery. So the Provincial
Treasurer of Batangas scheduled for the sale of the sugar refinery thru a public auction.

PHILSUCOM, however, was granted a restraining order maintaining the status quo. In the meantime, Barangay
Caloocan, thru Atty. Ceferino Inciong, intervened in the case as it had 10% property tax share to be collected form
PHILSUCOM. To make the long story short, Atty. Inciong eked out a compromise agreement for both warring parties so
everybody went home happy except for Atty. Inciong.

It seemed that the request of the Barangay Captain of Caloocan for petitioners legal assistance was not taken up
nor approved by the Sangguniang Barangay nor was there any showing that it was approved by the Solicitor General and
concurred in by COA as required under COA Circular No. 86 255, dated April 2, 1986.

Also it seemed that the hiring of petitioner by the Punong Barangay did not carry with it the approval of the
Sangguniang Barangay as required under Section 91 (1-1) of the B.P. 377, nor was there any appropriation therefore; the
hiring was not approved by the Solicitor General and concurred in by COA.

In other words, Barangay Caloocan doesnt want to pay Atty. Inciong. Is that correct?

Held: Our companero must be paid. Reasons:

1. We dont want to see a kindred spirit get unpaid or else we lawyers will have to go on strike.

2. As correctly stated by the Office of the Solicitor General, the position of respondent Chairman of the COA
disallowing payment of attorneys fees to petitioner Atty. Ceferino Inciong is not proper in the light of the following
considerations:

a. The employment by Barangay Caloocan of petitioner as its counsel, even if allegedly unauthorized by
the Sangguniang Barangay, is binding on Barangay Caloocan as it took no prompt measure to
repudiate petitioners employment.

b. The decision of the RTC directing Barangay Caloocan to pay attorneys fees to petitioner has become
final and executory and is binding upon Barangay Caloocan.

c. COA Circular No. 86 255 cannot diminish the substantive right of petitioner to recover attorneys
fees under the final and executory decision dated August 9, 1989 of the Regional Trial Court.

3. The respondent COA Chairman states that PHILSUCOM paid the amount of 7,199,887. 51 pesos to the
Municipal Treasurer under the Amnesty Compromise Agreement. Out of this amount, the Municipal Treasurer allocated to
Barangay Caloocan as its share the amount of 719,988.75 pesos. This allocation is erroneous because pursuant to
Republic Act No. 5447, Barangay Caloocan should only share from the basic tax which is 50% of what PHILSUCOM paid
because the other half should go to the Special Education Fund. Under the said Republic Act No. 5447, the rightful share
of Barangay Caloocan should be 359,944.38 pesos only.

The Chairman prayed that in the event the Court orders the payment of attorneys fees to petitioner this amount of
359,944.38 pesos should be made the basis therefore. The Court replied in a booming voice, WHEREFORE, the petition
is GRANTED and respondent is ordered to direct the payment of attorney fees to petitioner Atty. Ceferino Inciong in an
amount equivalent to 10% of 359,994.38 pesos.

2. Province of Cebu v. JAC 147 SCRA 447
Facts: Again, this case concerns the implied liability of a municipal corporation in paying the fees of an attorney
hired but the attorney ended up with only a pittance.

There was a time when Cebu City almost became the owner of practically the whole of the Province of Cebu. This
happened in Feb. 4. 1964 when the Vice Governor and the Provincial Board of Cebu, taking advantage of Governor
Rene Espinas absence (he was away on an official business trip [ows?]} donated 210 lots or 380 hectares of provincial
patrimonial land to Cebu City. When Governor Espina finally heard of the donation, he filed a case to declare the donation
void for being illegal and immoral. The defendants in the case were Cebu City, City mayor Sergio Osmena and the dumb
provincial officials responsible for the donation.

Governor Espina hired Atty. Pablo Garcia, a private lawyer, as his counsel. Atty. Garcia toiled for 8 years on the
case, but for some reason, he was no longer counsel when the parties settled for a compromise agreement.
Nevertheless, Atty. Garcia claims he is entitled to fees worth 30% of the worth of the properties or 36 million pesos (a
staggering amount, considering that the amount was based on the peso - dollar rates of 1979).

The province of Cebu City however refused to give him even one centavo. They said Sec. 1683 of the RAC and
Sec. 3 of the Local Autonomy Law is clear that only the provincial fiscal and municipal attorney can represent a province
or municipality in its lawsuits. More importantly, if the province of Cebu were to hire a private lawyers (such as when the
provincial fiscal is disqualified) the Provincial Board must pass a resolution to allow such a move.

The Trial court awarded attorneys fees based on quantum merit. On appeal, the IAC awarded 5% worth of
properties. The questions now are 1. Should the province pay Atty. Garcia and 2? If so how much is Atty. Garcia entitled
to?

Held: The province must pay Atty. Garcia but he is entitled only to quantum merit. Reasons:

1. Ibi quid generaliter conceditur; inest haee exception, si non aliquid sit contra jus fasque. (Where
anything is granted generally, this exception is implied; that nothing shall be contrary to law and right).
This simply means that every rule, no matter how strict or harsh, must have an exception. Here, equity
comes into play. To deny Atty. Garcia compensation for his professional services would amount to a
deprivation of property without due process of law.

2. The argument that the hiring of private lawyers by a province must first gain the approval of the
Provincial Board is absurd. First of all, the service of the Provincial Fiscal has already been engaged
by the Provincial Board. More importantly, its so stupid for the Provincial Board to pass a resolution
grant the hiring of a private lawyer who would litigate against them. The Provincial Board may just not
pass such a resolution. The legal maxim which we can use as a basis for this situation is Nemo
tenetur ad impossibile (The law obliges no one to perform an impossibility)

3. Until the contrary is clearly shown, an attorney is presumed to be acting under authority of the litigant
whom he purports to represent. His authority to appear for and represent petitioner in litigation, not
having been questioned in the lower court, it will be presumed on appeal that counsel was properly
authorized to file the complaint and appear for his client. Even where an attorney is employed by an
unauthorized person to represent a client, the latter will be bound where it has knowledge of the fact
that it is being represented by an attorney in a particular litigation and takes no prompt measure to
repudiate the assumed authority. Such acquiescence in the employment of an attorney as occurred in
this case is tantamount to ratification. The act of the successor provincial board and provincial officials
in allowing Atty. Pablo P. Garcia to continue as counsel and in joining him in the suit led the counsel to
believe his services were still necessary.

4. Atty. Garcia is entitled only to quantum merit. He simply was not counsel when the compromise
agreement was made. He gets only 30,000 pesos,

* Instances where the municipal mayor was held liable for back salaries of, or damages to dismissed municipal
employees, to the exclusion of the municipality

Salcedo vs. Court of Appeals the municipal mayor was held liable for the back salaries of the Chief of Police he
had dismissed, not only because the dismissal was arbitrary but also because the mayor refuse to reinstate him in
defiance of an order of the Commissioner of Civil Service to reinstate.

Nemenzo vs. Sabillano the municipal mayor was held personally liable for dismissing a police corporal who
possessed the necessary civil service eligibility, the dismissal being done without justifiable cause and without any
administrative investigation.

Rama vs. Court of Appeals- the governor, vice governor, member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, provincial
auditor, provincial treasurer and provincial engineer were ordered to pay jointly and severally in their individual and
personal capacity damages to some 200 employees of the province of Cebu who were eased out from their positions
because of their party affiliations.

* Instance where the municipality was also held liable along with municipal mayor

3. Laganapan v. Asedillo 154 SCRA 377
Facts: Solano Laganapan was appointed Chief of Police. However, he was summarily dismissed from his position
by respondent Mayor Elpidio Asedillo of Kalayaan, Laguna on the ground that his appointment was provisional and that
he has no civil service eligibility. Respondent Epifanio Ragotero was appointed acting chief of police of Kalayaan, Laguna
on the same day in place of the petitioner.

Subsequently, the Municipal Council of Kalayaan, Laguna abolished the appropriation for the salary of the chief of
police of Kalayaan, Laguna. Laganapan thus filed a complaint against Mayor Asedillo and the Municipality of Kalayaan for
reinstatement and payment of back wages. May Laganapan be reinstated? Is the Municipality also liable?

Held: The municipality is liable but Laganapan cannot be reinstated. Reasons:

1. Laganapan was summarily dismissed without any semblance of compliance with due process. No
charges were filed, no notice or hearing was made, no nothing. The Court finds no merit in the mayors contention that,
since the appointments extended to Laganapan as chief of police of Kalayaan, Laguna, were all provisional in nature, and
not permanent, his services could be terminated with or without cause at the pleasure of the appointing officer. While it
may be true that Laganapan was holding a provisional appointment at the time of his dismissal, he was not a temporary
official who could be dismissed at any time. His provisional appointment could only be terminated thirty (30) days after
receipt by the appointing officer of a list of eligible form the Civil Services Commission. Here no such certification was
received by Mayor Asedillo thirty (30) days prior to his dismissal of Laganapan.

Furthermore, it is of record that, after the summary dismissal of Laganapan by Asedillo, the Municipal Council of
Kalayaan instead of opposing or at least protesting Laganapans summary dismissal of his position, even abolished the
appropriation for the salary of the Chief of Police of Kalayaan Laguna. The Court considers this act of the Municipal
Council as an approval or confirmation of the act of respondent Mayor in summarily dismissing Laganapan, as to make
said municipality equally liable as the mayor for the reinstatement of Laganapan and for the payment of his back salaries.

Finally it should be noted that Asedillo was sued not personally, but in his capacity as mayor.

2. Laganapan cannot be reinstated. PD 482, recently enacted at that time, calls for the appointment of a
permanent Chief of Police (known as Station Commander), in certain provinces including Laguna. His reinstatement is not
feasible. The Mayor and the municipality are instead liable for payment of back salaries.

EXECUTION AND SATISFACTION OF JUDGEMENT
Facts: Petitioner Municipality of Makati expropriated a portion of land owned by private respondents,
Admiral Finance Creditors Consortium, Inc. After proceedings, the RTC of Makati determined the cost of
the said land which the petitioner must pay to the private respondents amounting to P5,291,666.00 minus
the advanced payment of P338,160.00. It issued the corresponding writ of execution accompanied with a
writ of garnishment of funds of the petitioner which was deposited in PNB. However, such order was
opposed by petitioner through a motion for reconsideration, contending that its funds at the PNB could
neither be garnished nor levied upon execution, for to do so would result in the disbursement of public
funds without the proper appropriation required under the law, citing the case of Republic of the
Philippines v. Palacio.The RTC dismissed such motion, which was appealed to the Court of Appeals; the
latter affirmed said dismissal and petitioner now filed this petition for review.

Issue: Whether or not funds of the Municipality of Makati are exempt from garnishment and levy upon
execution.

Held: It is petitioner's main contention that the orders of respondent RTC judge involved the net amount of
P4,965,506.45, wherein the funds garnished by respondent sheriff are in excess of P99,743.94, which are public fund and
thereby are exempted from execution without the proper appropriation required under the law. There is merit in this
contention. In this jurisdiction, well-settled is the rule that public funds are not subject to levy and execution, unless
otherwise provided for by statute. Municipal revenues derived from taxes, licenses and market fees, and which are
intended primarily and exclusively for the purpose of financing the governmental activities and functions of the
municipality, are exempt from execution. Absent a showing that the municipal council of Makati has passed an ordinance
appropriating the said amount from its public funds deposited in their PNB account, no levy under execution may be
validly effected. However, this court orders petitioner to pay for the said land which has been in their use already. This
Court will not condone petitioner's blatant refusal to settle its legal obligation arising from expropriation of land they are
already enjoying. The State's power of eminent domain should be exercised within the bounds of fair play and justice.
Legislative Powers

* Requisites of a valid ordinance

1. Must not contravene the constitution or statute
2. Must not be oppressive
3. Must not impartial, fair and general
4. Must not prohibit, but may regulate trade
5. Must not contravene common right
6. Must be consistent with public
7. Must not be unreasonable

NOTE: See also Solicitor General V. MMA, p. 25 of this reviewer

Distinction between an Ordinance and a Resolution
An ordinance prescribes a permanent rule of conduct government; whereas a resolution is of temporary character
only

*Article 107, IRR. Ordinances and Resolutions. The following rules shall govern the enactment of ordinances and
resolutions:

1. Legislative actions in a general and permanent character shall be enacted in the form of ordinances, while those
temporary characters shall be passed in the form of resolutions. Matters relating to propriety functions and to
private concerns shall be enacted in a resolution.

2. Proposed ordinances and resolutions shall begin writing and shall contain an assigned number, a title or caption,
an enacting or ordaining clause and the date of its proposed effectivity. In addition, every proposed ordinance
shall be accompanied by a brief explanatory note contain the justification for its approval. It shall be signed by the
author or authors and submitted to the secretary to the sanggunian who shall report the same to the sanggunian
at the next meeting.

3. A resolution shall be enacted in the same manner prescribed for an ordinance, except that it need not go through
a third reading for its final consideration unless decided otherwise by a majority of the sanggunian members.

4. No ordinance or resolution shall be considered on second reading in any regular meeting unless it has been
reported out by the proper committee to which it was referred or certified as urgent by the local chief executive.

5. Any legislative matter duly certified by the local chief executive as urgent whether or not it is included in the
calendar of business, may be presented and considered by the body at the same meeting without need of
suspending the rules.

6. The secretary to the sanggunian of the province, city or municipality shall prepare copies of the proposed
ordinance or resolution in the form it was passed on second reading and shall distribute to each sanggunian
member a copy thereof, except that a measure certified by the local chief execute as urgent may be submitted for
final voting immediately after debate or amendment during the second reading.

7. No ordinance or resolution passed by the sanggunian in a regular or special session duly called for the purpose
shall be valid unless approved by majority of the members present, there being a quorum. Any ordinance or
resolution authorizing or directing the payment of money or creating liability, shall require the affirmative vote of all
the sanggunian members for its passage.

8. Upon passage of all ordinances and resolution directing the payment of money or creating liability, and at the
request of any members, of any resolution or motion, the sanggunian shall record the ayes and nays. Each
approved ordinance or resolution shall be stamped with the seal of the sanggunian and recorded in a book kept
for the purpose.

*Article 108 144, IRR, LGC

. INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS OF PUBLIC CORPORATIONS (ART. 59, 64, IRR)

Article 59, IRR... General supervision of the province over component cites and municipalities.

a. The province, thru its governor, shall exercise supervisory authority over component cities and municipalities within its
territorial jurisdiction to ensure that they act within the scope of their prescribed powers and function. Highly urbanize cites
and independent component cities shall be independent of the province.

b. The scope of the supervision by the province over component cites and municipalities shall include but not limited to
the following:
1. The governor shall review executive order issued by the mayor of the component city or municipality, subject to
the concurrence of the sangguniang panlalawigan, except as otherwise provided under the Constitution and
special statutes. If the governor and the sangguniang panlalawigan failed to act on said executive order within 30
days form receipt thereof, the same shall be deemed consistent with law and therefore valid.

2. The sangguniang panlalawigan shall review all approved city or municipal ordinance and resolution approving the
development plans and public investment programs formulated by the city or municipal development councils.

3. The SP shall review the ordinances authorizing annual or supplemental appropriations of component cities and
municipalities in the same manner and within the same period prescribe for the review of other ordinances of the
LGU.

4. The governor shall visit component cities and municipalities of the province at least once every 6 months to fully
understand their problems and conditions, listen and give appropriate counsel to local officials and inhabitants,
inform the officials and inhabitants of component cites and municipalities of general laws and ordinances which
especially concern them and conduct visits and inspections to the end that the governance of the province shall
improve the quality of life of the inhabitants.

5. The governor shall coordinate plans of the province in coordination with mayors of cites and municipalities as well
as NGO's concerned to:

a. Formulate peace and order plan of the province in coordination with mayors of component cities and
municipalities and the National Police Commission.

b. Adopt adequate measure to safeguard and conserve land, mineral, marine, forest and other resources of
the province, in coordination with mayors of component cities and municipalities.

c. Coordinate efforts of component cites and municipalities in the national or regional palaro or sports
development activities; and

d Call conventions, seminars, conferences or meetings of any elective and appointed officials of the province
and component cities and municipalities.

6. The proceeds of the basic real property tax, including interest thereon and proceeds form the use, leas or
disposition, sale or redemption of property acquired at a public auction shall be shared by the province,
municipality and barangay in the manner prescribed in Rule XXXI of these Rules.
7. The province shall share its collections form the tax on sand, gravel and other quantity resources within its
component city and municipality and the barangay where said resources are extracted.

* Article 62, IRR. Role of people's organizations, non governmental organizations and the private sector

LGU's shall promote the establishment and operation of people's organizations, NGOs and the private sector to
make them active partners in the pursuit of local autonomy. For this purposes, people's organization, NGO's and the
private sector shall be directly involved in the following plans, programs, projects and activities of LGUs:

a. Local special bodies;
b. Delivery of basic services and facilities
c. Joint ventures and cooperative programs and undertakings
d. Financial and other forms of assistance
e. Preferential treatment for organizations and cooperatives of marginalized fishermen
f. Preferential treatment for cooperatives development and
g. Financing, cooperative, maintenance, operation, and management of infrastructure projects

* 1. Between the national government and the local governments: 2. With PNP: 3. With component cites and
municipalities: 4. With People's and Non Governmental Organizations (Sec. 25-36, LGC)

Sec. 25. National supervision over local governments

a. Consistent with the basic policy on local autonomy, the President shall exercise general supervision over LGU's
to ensure that their acts are within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions.

The President shall exercise supervisory authority directly over provinces, highly urbanized cities and
independent component cities, thru the province with respect to component cities and municipalities and the city and
municipalities with respect to barangays.

b. National Agencies and offices with the project implementation functions shall coordinate with one another and
with the LGU's concerned in the discharge of these functions. They shall ensure the participation of LGU's both in the
planning and implementation of the said projects.

c. The President may, upon request of the LGU concerned, direct the appropriate national agency provide financial,
technical or other forms of assistance to the LGU. Such assistance shall be extended at extra cost to the LGU concerned

d. National agencies and offices including government owned or controlled corporations with field under or
branches in a province, city or municipality shall furnish the local chief executive concerned, for information and guidance,
monthly reports including duly certified budgetary allocations and expenditures.

Sec. 26. Duty of national government agencies in the maintenance of ecological balance (just go and read the code or
JGRC)

Sec. 27. Prior consultations required (JGRC)

Sec. 28. Powers of local chief executives over the units of the Philippine National Police

The extent of operational management and control of local chief executives over the police force, fire protection
unit, and jail management personnel assigned in their respective jurisdictions shall be governed by the provisions of RA
6975, otherwise known as the DILG Act of 1990, the rules and regulations issued are pursuant thereto.

Sec. 29. Provincial relations with component cites and municipalities

The province, thru the governor, shall ensure that every component cities and municipality within its territorial
jurisdiction acts within the scope of its prescribed powers and functions. Highly urbanized cities and independent
component cities shall be independent of the province.

Sec. 30. Review of executive orders

a. Except as otherwise provided under the Constitutions and special statues, the governor shall review executive
orders promulgated by the component city or municipal mayor within his jurisdiction. The city municipal mayor shall review
all EO's promulgated by the punong barangay within his jurisdiction. Copies of such orders shall be forward to the
governor or the city or municipal mayor, as the case may be, within 3 days from their issuance. In all instances of review,
the local chief executive concerned shall ensure that such EO's are within the powers granted by law and in conformity
with provincial, city or municipal ordinances.

b. If the governor or city or municipal mayor fails to act on said EO's within 30 days of submission, the same shall
be deemed consistent with law and therefore valid.

Sec 31. Submission of municipal question to the provincial legal officer or prosecutor

In the absence of municipal legal officer, the municipal government may secure the opinion of the provincial legal
officer and in the absence of the latter, that of the provincial prosecutor on any legal question affecting the municipality

Sec 32. City and municipal supervision over their respective barangays

The city or municipality, thru the city or municipal mayor concerned shall exercise general supervision after
component barangay to ensure that said barangays act within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions.

Sec 33. Cooperative undertakings among LGU's

LGUs' may, thru appropriate ordinances, group themselves, consolidate, or coordinate their efforts, services and
resources for purposes commonly beneficial to them. In support of such undertakings, the LGU's involved may, upon
approval by the sanggunian concerned after a public hearing for the purpose, contribute lands, real estate, equipment,
and other king of property and appoint or assign personnel under such terms and conditions as may be agreed upon by
the participating local units thru Memoranda of Agreement.

Sec. 34. Role of people's and non governmental organizations

LGU's shall promote the establishment and operation of people's and non governmental organization to become
active partners in the pursuit of local autonomy.

Sec. 35. Linkages with people's and non governmental organizations

LGU's may enter into joint ventures and such other cooperative agreements with people's and non
governmental organizations to engage in the delivery of basic services, capability building and livelihood projects, and
top develop local enterprises designed to improve productivity and income, diversity, agriculture, spur industrialization,
promote ecological balance and enhance the economic and social well being of the people.

Sec 36. Assistance to people's and non governmental organizations

An LGU may thru its local chief executive and with the concurrence of the sanggunian concerned, provide
assistance, financial or otherwise to such people's and non governmental organizations for economic , socially
oriented, environmental, or cultural projects to be implemented within its jurisdiction.

REQUIREMENTS AND PROHIBITIONS APPLICABLE TO ALL LOCAL OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES (Sec 90, 94,
94, Art 177, 179, IRR)

Section 90. Practice of Profession

a. All governors, city and municipal mayors are prohibited from practicing their profession or engaging in any
occupation other than the exercise of their functions as local chief executives.

b. Sanggunian officials may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools except
during session hours. Provided, that sanggunian members who are also members of the Bar shall not:

1. Appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein and LGU or any office, agency or instrumentality of
the government is the adverse party

2. Appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an official or employee of the national or local government is
accused of an offense committed in relation to his office

3. Collect any fee for their appearance in administrative proceedings involving the LGU of which he is an official

4. Use property and personnel of the Government except when the sanggunian member concerned is defending
the interest of the Government.

c. Doctors of medicine may practice their profession even during official hours of work only on occasion of
emergency. Provided, that the official do not derive any monetary income profession.

Section 94. Appointment of elective and appointive local officials: candidates who lost in an election

a. No elective or appointive local official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office
or position during his tenure

Unless otherwise allowed by law or primary functions of his position, no elective or appointive local official shall
hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision or agency, or instrumentality thereof, including
government owned or controlled corporation (GOCC) or their subsidiaries;

b. Except for losing candidates in barangay elections, no candidate who lost in any elections shall within 1 year after such
election be appointed to any office in the Government or any GOCC or in any of the subsidiaries

Section 95. Additional or double compensation

No elective or appointive local official or employee shall receive additional, double or indirect compensation
unless specifically authorized by law, nor accept, without the consent of Congress, any present, emoluments, office, or
title of any kind form any foreign government. Pensions or gratuities shall not be considered additional or double or
indirect compensation.

Article 177. IRR. Practice of profession. Same as Section 90, LGC

Article 179. IRR Prohibited business and pecuniary interest.

a. It shall be unlawful for any local government official or employee whether directly or indirectly, to:

1. Engage in any business transaction with the LGU in which he is an official or employee or over which he has the
power of supervision or with any of its authorized boards, officials, agents or attorneys where money is to be paid,
or property or any other thing of value is to be transferred, directly or indirectly, out of the resources of the LGU to
such person or firm;
2. Hold such interests in any cockpit or other games licensed by LGU
3. Purchase any real estate or other property forfeited in favor of an LGU for unpaid taxes or assessment or by
virtues of a legal process at the instance of the said LGU
4. Be a surety for any person contracting or doing business with an LGU for which a surety is acquired; and
5. Possess or use any public property of an LGU for private purposes

b., All other prohibitions governing the conduct of national public officers relating to prohibited business and pecuniary
interest so provided in RA 6713, otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards of Public officials and
Employees, and other rules and regulations shall also be applicable to local government officials and employees.

Read SC Circular No. 12 dated June 30, 1988
Circulars passed by the SC and administrative agencies are a bit more difficult to research. They're probably not
that important anyway probably.



LOCAL OFFICIALS SECTION 39-75 OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE
1. Frivaldo v. COMELEC 257 SCRA 727
Facts: The dissenting opinion by Justice Davide here is both prophetic and ironic because he spoke that
sovereignty cannot be fragmentized because such fragment cannot be treated as a whole. Davide was talking about the
rule that the popular will of the people (of Sorsogon) in electing Juan Frivaldo as governor should not be frustrated since
he garnered the most votes. Yet Frivaldo won under a cloud of doubt because he may not have legally reacquired his
citizenship in time for the elections. To allow Frivaldo as governor just because the popular will of the electorate should
not be frustrated but setting aside the rule of law in the process would be anarchy. Davide said (How ironic that it was
Davide himself who swore in GMA as President during EDSA II)
The majority opinion however, fortunately or otherwise, is the prevailing rule, Frivaldo filed his certificate
of candidacy for governor on March 20, 1995. Raul Lee, the eventual second placer, filed a petition with the COMELEC to
disqualify Frivaldo because he was not yet a Filipino citizen at the time. The COMELEC ruled in favor of Lee but since
Frivaldo moved for reconsideration, his candidacy continued. Frivaldo eventually topped the elections but on June 30,
1995, the COMELEC acting on Lee's petition, proclaimed Lee as governor.
A week later, Frivaldo filed a petition claiming that on June 30, 1995 (day of Lee's proclamation), he took his oath
of allegiance as a Filipino citizen after his August 17, 1994 petition for repatriation has been granted. The COMELEC thus
proclaimed Frivaldo as winner.
Lee contends: 1. that Frivaldo's disqualification due to his lack of citizenship is a continuing condition and
rendered him ineligible to run for governor; and 2. the alleged repatriation of Frivaldo cannot be retroactive.

Held: Lee is wrong (or maybe, wronged). Reasons:
1. Under Sec. 39 of the LGC of 1991, there is no showing that a candidate for an electoral position must be a
Filipino citizen at any particular date and time. Admittedly, there was the objection that since a candidate must have been
a registered voter beforehand, he must have therefore possessed Filipino citizenship in order to become a registered
voter. The Court gave an explanation that the qualification of citizenship for a registered voter and that for a candidate
are separate. The registration requirement of a candidate moreover, is for the purpose of registering him as a voter in the
area or requirement of a candidate moreover, is only for the purpose of registering him as a voter in the area or territory
he seeks to govern. He does not actually have to vote (Ang layo! The issue is citizenship, not voting. The issue of being a
registered voter was merely raised to bolster the claim that the qualification of citizenship is a continuing one and thus
cannot be acquired at a later time. The Court is saying, Run now, acquire citizenship later, which is lousy. Is this the way
we treat our precious citizenship?)

2. The alleged repatriation of Frivaldo can be retroactive. PD 725 declares that repatriation creates a new right in
order to cure a defect in the existing naturalization law. In Frivaldo's cause he was stateless at the time he took his Filipino
oath of allegiance since in his comment, he has long renounced his American citizenship (a self serving statement).
Moreover since he ran for governor several times prior to 1995, he necessarily must have taken the Filipino oath of
allegiance several times as well, which is another indication of renunciation of his American citizenship (Davide countered
that it is the US, not Frivaldo, who decides who is and who is not her nationals, a principle in international law). Therefore,
to prevent prejudice to Frivaldo by letting him remain stateless for a substantial period of time while in the meantime being
deprived of his rights, it is clear then that PD 725 was intended to be retroactive. In short, Frivaldo's repatriation retracted
to Aug 17, 1994, the day he filed his application for such and not just on June 30, 1995.

176 SCRA 1 Law on Public Officers Election Laws Citizenship of a Public Officer Dual Citizenship Labo
Doctrine
In 1988, Ramon Labo, Jr. was elected as mayor of Baguio City. His rival, Luis Lardizabal filed a petition for quo warranto
against Labo as Lardizabal asserts that Labo is an Australian citizen hence disqualified; that he was naturalized as an
Australian after he married an Australian. Labo avers that his marriage with an Australian did not make him an Australian;
that at best he has dual citizenship, Australian and Filipino; that even if he indeed became an Australian when he married
an Australian citizen, such citizenship was lost when his marriage with the Australian was later declared void for being
bigamous. Labo further asserts that even if hes considered as an Australian, his lack of citizenship is just a mere
technicality which should not frustrate the will of the electorate of Baguio who voted for him by a vast majority.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Labo can retain his public office.
2. Whether or not Lardizabal, who obtained the second highest vote in the mayoralty race, can replace Labo in the event
Labo is disqualified.
HELD: 1. No. Labo did not question the authenticity of evidence presented against him. He was naturalized as an
Australian in 1976. It was not his marriage to an Australian that made him an Australian. It was his act of subsequently
swearing by taking an oath of allegiance to the government of Australia. He did not dispute that he needed an Australian
passport to return to the Philippines in 1980; and that he was listed as an immigrant here. It cannot be said also that he is
a dual citizen. Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law. He lost his
Filipino citizenship when he swore allegiance to Australia. He cannot also claim that when he lost his Australian
citizenship, he became solely a Filipino. To restore his Filipino citizenship, he must be naturalized or repatriated or be
declared as a Filipino through an act of Congress none of this happened.
Labo, being a foreigner, cannot serve public office. His claim that his lack of citizenship should not overcome the will of
the electorate is not tenable. The people of Baguio could not have, even unanimously, changed the requirements of the
Local Government Code and the Constitution simply by electing a foreigner (curiously, would Baguio have voted for Labo
had they known he is Australian). The electorate had no power to permit a foreigner owing his total allegiance to the
Queen of Australia, or at least a stateless individual owing no allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, to preside over
them as mayor of their city. Only citizens of the Philippines have that privilege over their countrymen.
3. Lardizabal on the other hand cannot assert, through the quo warranto proceeding, that he should be declared the
mayor by reason of Labos disqualification because Lardizabal obtained the second highest number of vote. It
would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a
candidate who has not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner and imposed as the
representative of a constituency, the majority of which have positively declared through their ballots that they do
not choose him. Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who have received the highest
number of votes cast in the election for that office, and it is a fundamental idea in all republican forms of
government that no one can be declared elected and no measure can be declared carried unless he or it receives
a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the election.

DISQUALIFICATIONS- SECTION 40 OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE

Caasi v. CA
Doctrine:
To be qualified to run for elective office in the Philippines, the law requirest hat t he candi date who i s a gr een car d
hol der must have wai ved hi s st at us as apermanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country.

MARQUEZ VS. COMELEC





RODRIQUEZ VS. COMELEC






DELA TORRE VS. COMELEC
FACTS:
Petitioner Rolando dela Torre was disqualified from running as mayor of Cavinti Laguna on the ground
that he was convicted of violation the Anti-Fencing Law.

He argues that he should not be disqualified because he is serving probation of his sentence and hence,
the execution of his judgment was suspended together with all its legal consequences.

ISSUE:
WON Dela Torre is disqualified to run for public office.

HELD:
Sec.40 of LGC provides:
Disqualifications.
The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable
by one (1) year or more of imprisonment within two (2) years after serving sentence;

Moral turopitude is considered as an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a
man owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right
and duty between man and woman or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.

In this case of fencing, actual knowledge by the "fence" of the fact that property received is stolen displays
the same degree of malicious deprivation of one's rightful property as that which animated the robbery or
theft which, by their very nature, are crimes of moral turpitude. Hence Dela Torre is disqualified from
seeking public office.

With regard to his argument that he is under probation, the court ruled that the legal effect of probation is
only to suspend the execution of the sentence.

Dela Torre's conviction subsists and remains totally unaffected notwithstanding the grant of probation. In
fact, a judgment of conviction in a criminal case ipso facto attains finality when the accused applies for
probation, although it is not executory pending resolution of the application for probation.

PROHIBITONS

3. Noriega v. Sison 125 SCRA 293
Facts: The name of the guy here is Emmanuel Sison. We place emphasize on the name here coz the
complainant Hermino Noriega made such a big deal out of it Noriega claimed that Sison, an attorney who works as a
Hearing Officer for the SEC, held himself out to the public as Atty. Manuel Sison and under such a gross
misrepresentation of his name handled a case for a close family friend. Noriega said that Sison violated the prohibition on
government employees form practicing their professions. Sison replied that the SEC, thru associate commissioner,
authorized him to allow as counsel for such and that he did it for free.

Held: Sison's appearance as counsel as cited was an isolated case, the same therefore did not constitute practice
of law since he did not receive pecuniary benefit (Note that this case took place before the advent of the Cayetano v
Monsod ruling). The case against him seemed more like an instrument of harassment Noriega since the latter once lost to
Sison in a SEC case. There is simply no evidence that the interchanges his name for a fraudulent purpose (the guy's
entitled to use a nickname like everybody else, right?) nor this pleading which revealed his name to be Manuel Sison be
tainted with deception since it was a mistake of Sison's part and he consistently tried to correct the same by pointing it out
in court.

1. J avellana v. DILG 212 SCRA 475
Facts: Attorney Edwin Javellana was a city councilor of Bago City, Negros Occidental. He was accused of
engaging in the practice of law without securing authority form the Regional Director of the Department of Local
Government. He also filed a case against the City Engineer, obviously a fellow city official. Javellana contends that the 2
ordinances and Sec. 90 of the LGC of 1991 which served as the basis of the charges against him were unconstitutional
because, according to Article VIII Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution, only the Supreme Court may promulgate rules and
regulations for the practice of law. He also attacked the said laws for being discriminatory for they ganged upon lawyers
and doctors when other similar professions like teachers and morticians were not affected.

Held: Javellana is wrong. Reasons:
1. His contention that Section 90 of the LGC of 1991 and DLG Memorandum Circular No. 90-81 violate Article VII,
Section 5 of the Constitution is completely off tangent. Neither the statute nor the circular trenches upon the
Supreme Court's power and authority to prescribe rules on the practice of law. The LGC and DLG Memorandum
Circular No. 90- 81 simply prescribes rules of conduct for public officials to avoid conflict of interest between the
discharge of their public duties and the private practice of their profession, in those instances where the law
allows it.
2. Section 90 of the LGC does not discriminate against the lawyers and doctors. It applies to all provincial and
municipal officials in the professions or engaged in any occupation. Section 90 explicitly provides that sanggunian
members may practice their professions, engage in any occupation or teach in school except during session hours. If
there are some prohibitions that apply particularly to lawyers, it is because of all the professions, the practice of law is
more likely than other to relate to or affect the area of public service

PRIVATE COUNSEL/LAWYERS FOR ELECTIVE LOCAL OFFICIALS
FACTS: Alinsug has been a regular employee of the municipal government of Escalante, as Clerk III in the office of the
Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator. In 1992, she received an order from Ponsica (who was newly-elected)
detailing her to the Office of the Mayor. The day after she received the order, she began reporting for work
Eight days after, she absented from work allegedly to attend to family matters. She obtained permission from the
personnel officer, not Ponsica. A few days later, Ponsica issued an order suspending her for one month and one day
without pay for simple misconduct, also categorized as an act of insubordination.
Alinsug then filed an injunction case with damages and TRO against Ponsica and Alvarez before RTC San Carlos. She
alleged that since her family supported Ponsica's rival in the recently-concluded elections, the suspension was an act of
political vendetta. In their answer, Ponsica and Alvarez raised failure to exhaust administrative remedies as a defense.
They also claimed that the suspension was in accordance with law.
Alinsug then moved that the answer be disregarded and the respondents be declared in default on the ground that as per
Sec. 481 (b) [i] and [3], Ponsica and Alvarez should have been represented by either the municipal legal officer, provincial
legal officer or prosecutor.
This was opposed, on the ground that the municipality of Escalante has no legal officer and that the LGC has no provision
pertaining to the duty of any provincial legal officer or prosecutor to represent a municipality or its officials in suits filed
against them by an employee or a private individual. They also raised two points in their opposition: 1) admin and judicial
rulings have sustained the validity of hiring a private counsel by municipal officials, and 2) because Alinsug prayed for
moral damages, Ponsica and Alvarez hiring a private counsel was justified (citing Albuera v. Torrens).
yA month later though, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Villaflor entered his appearance as counsel for Ponsica and
Alvarez in their official capacities. Due to this act, the RTC denied the motion of Alinsug. Alinsug's MR was also denied,
on the ground that the appointment of a legal officer was optional on the part the municipal government as per Art. 481,
3 of the LGC.
Alinsug before the SC: PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI
ISSUES:
a) W/N a private counsel may represent municipal officials sued in their official capacities. YES (Take note of the nature of
the suit though)
b) W/N Ponsica and Alvarez had been in default for having filed their answer through a private counsel. NO
DISCUSSION:
The LGC allows a private counsel to be hired by a municipality only when the municipality is an adverse party in
a case involving the provincial government or another municipality or city within the province. The origin of the
ruling is the case of De Guia v. The Auditor General

where the Court held that the municipality's authority to employ a
private attorney is expressly limited only to situations where the provincial fiscal would be disqualified to serve and
represent it. Then in the case of Ramos v. CA, the Court ruled that a municipality may not be represented by a private
law firm which had volunteered its services gratis, in collaboration with the municipal attorney and the fiscal. This strict
coherence to the letter of the law appears to have been dictated by the fact that "the municipality should not be burdened
with expenses of hiring a private lawyer" and that "the interests of the municipality would be best protected if a
government lawyer handles its litigations." chanrobles virtual law library BUT
BUT
BUT these proscriptions would not necessarily apply to public officials. In Correa v. CFI of Bulacan, the Court held
that in the discharge of governmental functions, "municipal corporations are responsible for the acts of its officers, except
if and when, the only to the extent that, they have acted by authority of the law, and in conformity with the requirements
thereof." chanrobles virtual law librar In such instance, this Court has sanctioned that representation by private counsel. It
has been held that where rigid adherence to the law on representation of local officials in court actions could deprive a
party of his right to redress for a valid grievance, the hiring of a private counsel would be proper. Furthermore, in Albuera
v. Torres, a provincial governor sued in his official capacity may engage the services of private counsel when "the
complaint contains other allegations and a prayer for moral damages, which, if due from the defendants, must be satisfied
by them in their private capacity." chanrobles virtual law library
Issue (A): The key lies on the nature of the action and the relief that is sought.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law li
In this case, the allegations were aimed at questioning certain acts which go beyond their official functions. There is also a
claim of moral and exemplary damages, plus litigation expenses.
ISSUE (B): since there were not improperly represented by a private counsel, they were not in default.
Petition Denied
. Vacancies and succession

1. Permanent Vacancies
* Sec 44. Permanent vacancies in the office of the governor, vice governor, mayor and vice mayor.
a. If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or mayor, the vice governor or vice mayor
concerned shall become the governor or mayor. If a permanent vacancy occurs on the office of the governor, vice
governor, mayor, or vice mayor as the case may be. Subsequent vacancies in the said office shall be filled automatically
by other sangguniang members according to their ranking as defined therein.
b. If a permanent vacancy occurred in the office of the punong barangay, the highest ranking sangguniang
barangay member or, in the case of his permanent inability, the second highest ranking sanggunian member shall
become the punong barangay.
c. A tie between or among the highest ranking sangguniang members shall be resolved by the drawing of lots
d. The successors as defined herein shall serve only the unexpired portions of their predecessors.

For purposes of this chapter, a permanent vacancy arises when an elective local official fills a higher vacant
office, refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is removed from office, voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise
permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office.
For purposes of succession as provided in this chapter, ranking in the sanggunian shall be determined on the
basis of the proportion of votes obtained by each winning candidate to the total number of registered voters in each district
in the immediately preceding local election.

* Sec 45. Permanent vacancies in the sanggunian
a. Permanent vacancies in the sanggunian where automatic successions provided above do not apply shall be
filled by appointment in the manner provided:

1. The President, thru the Executive Secretary, in the case of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan and the Sanggunian
Panlungsod of highly urbanized cites and independent component cities;
2. The governor, in case of the sangguniang panlungsod of component cites and the sangguniang bayan
3. The city or municipal mayor, in case of the sangguniang barangay, upon recommendation of the sangguniang
bayan concerned

b. Except for the sangguniang barangay, only the nominee of the political party under which the sangguniang member
concerned had been elected and whose elevation to the position next higher in rank created the last vacancy in the
sanggunian shall be appointed in the same manner herein provided. The appointee shall come form the same political
party as that of the sangguniang member who caused the vacancy and shall serve the unexpired term of the vacant
office. In the appointment herein mentioned a nomination and a certificate of membership of the appointee from the
highest official of the political party concerned are conditions sine qua non and any appointment without such nomination
shall be null and void and shall be a ground for administrative action against the official thereof.

c. In case the permanent vacancy in the representation of the youth and barangay in the sanggunian, said vacancy shall
be filled automatically by the official next in rank by the organization concerned

2. Temporary Vacancies
* Section 46 Temporary vacancies in the office of the local chief executive
a. When the governor city or municipal mayor or punong barangay is temporarily incapacitated to perform his
duties for physical or legal reasons such as but not limited to, leave of absence, travel abroad, suspension from office, the
vice-governor, city or municipal vice-mayor or the highest ranking sangguniang barangay member shall automatically
exercise the powers and perform the duties of the local chief executive concerned except the power to appoint, suspend,
or dismiss employees which can only be exercised if the period of the temporary incapacity exceeds for 30 working days

b. Said temporary incapacity shall terminate upon submission to the appropriate sanggunian of a written
declaration by the local chief executive concerned that he has to return back to office. In cases where the temporary
incapacity is due to legal causes the local chief executive concerned shall also submit necessary documents that said
legal causes no longer exist.

c. When the incumbent local chief executive is traveling within the country but outside his territorial jurisdiction for
period not exceeding 3 consecutive days, he may designate in writing an officer-in-charge of the said office. Such
authorization shall specifies the powers and functions that the local official concerned shall exercise in the absence of the
local chief executive except the power to appoint, suspend, or dismiss employees

d. In the event, however, that the local chief executive concerned fails or refuses to issue such authorization, the
vice-governor, the city or municipal vice-mayor, or the highest ranking sangguniang barangay member, as the case may
be, shall have the right to assume powers, duties and function of the said office on the 4
th
day of absence of the said local
chief executive, subject to the limitation provided in subsection (C) hereof.

e. Except as provided above the local chief executive in no case authorized any local official to assume the
powers, duties and functions, other than the vice-governor, the city or municipal vice-mayor, the highest sangguniang
barangay member, as the case may be.

3. Resignation
* Article 82 IRR. Resignation

a. Resignation of elective local officials shall be deemed effective only upon acceptance of the following
authorities:
1. By the President, in the case of governor and vice-governor, mayors and vice-mayors of highly urbanized
cities, independent component cities and municipalities within the Metro Manila and other metropolitan
political subdivisions as may be created by law.
2. By the governor, in case of municipal mayor, municipal vice-mayors, mayors and vice-mayors of
component cities
3. By the sanggunian concerned, in the case of sanggunian members: and
4. By the city or the municipal mayor, in the case of barangay officials
b. The DILG shall be furnished copies of the letters of the resignation letters of elective local officials together with
the action taken by the authorities concerned

c. The resignation shall be deemed accepted if not acted upon by the authority concerned within 15 days from
receipt thereof

d. Irrevocable resignations by sanggunian members shall be deemed accepted upon presentation before an open
session of the sanggunian concerned and duly entered in its records. This provision shall not apply to sanggunian
members who are subject to recall elections or to cases where existing laws prescribed of acting upon such resignations.

1. Panis v. Civil Service Commission 229 SCRA 589
Facts: The Cebu City Medical Center (CCMC) is a government hospital of Cebu City. One day, a new office in
said hospital was created by virtue by a valid reorganization the Assistant Chief of Hospital for Administration. Two
candidates for the appointive position cropped up. Jaime Panis and Bella Veloso, Panis loved to crow about his seniority
status and thought he would be chosen for the position. However, the city mayor appointed Veloso, Panis now claims
that the appointment of Veloso was made in violation of law, existing civil service rules and established jurisprudence
because the seniority and next in rank rules were disregarded.

Held: Panis is wrong. First, even if granting that Veloso was originally an outsider as she came from the private
sector, it will not prohibit her employment as long as she has her civil service eligibility. Second, the next rank rule
applies only in cases of promotion. The position being fought was newly created. Assuming however, that said position
could only be filled up through promotion, still the next in rank rule is not mandatory it nearly gives preferential
treatment. Ultimately, the power to appoint lies within the discretion of the local chief executive vested with the power,
provided that appointee possesses the minimum requirements provided by law.

*FARINAS VS. BARBA
*NAVARRO VS. CA
4. Gamboa Jr. v. Aguirre Jr. 310 SCRA 867
Facts: In the 1995 elections, we have the following winners from Negros Occidental: Rafael Coscolluela as
governor; Romeo Gamboa as vice governor; and Marcelo Aguirre and Juan Araneta as Sangguniang Panlalawigan (SP).
Now, under the LGC of 1991, the vice governor shall also be the officer of the SP. Keep this in mind later on.
The governor went away on an official trip abroad. Before he left, he designated vice governor as acting governor.
So the vice governor became acting governor. But when vice governor Gamboa, who was now acting governor as well,
tried to preside over SP sessions, some SP members resented and even filed a case in court to prohibit him from doing
so. The court even declared Gamboa as temporarily legally incapacitated to preside over the sessions of the SP during
the period that he is the acting governor. Was the trial court correct?

Held: Yes, if you'll look at the composition of the SP, no presence of the governor. can be found. Since Gamboa
became acting governor., he technically had given up his SP membership notwithstanding him being still vice governor.
since the LGC of 1991 is clear that the composition of the SP should not have even the slightest hint of governor's
presence not even his smell. What the law enumerates, the law necessarily excludes. An acting give smells like a
governor. For all other purposes however, Gamboa still remains as vice governor.
In such case, since the vice governor. cannot preside, the SP members present and constituting a quorum shall
elect a temporary presiding officer form among themselves (Sec 49b, LGC)

C. Recall(See 69-75, LGC and Art 154 162, IRR)
* Sec 69, LGC. By whom exercised. The power of recall for loss of confidence shall be exercised by regular
voters of an LGU to which the local elective official subject to such recall belongs.
* Sec 70 Initiation of the recall process
a. Recall may be initiated by a preparatory recall assembly or by the registered voters of the LGU to which the
local elective official to such recall belongs.

b. There shall be a preparatory recall assembly in every province, city, district and municipality which shall be
composed of the following:
1. Provincial level. All the mayors, vice mayors and sanggunian members of the municipalities and
component cities
2. City level: all punong barangay and sangguniang barangay members in the city
3. Legislative district level. In case where sangguniang panlalawigan members are elected by district, all
elective municipal officers in the district and in cases where sangguniang panlungsod members are elected
by district, all elective barangay officials in the district and
4. Municipal level. All punong barangay and sangguniang barangay members in the municipality.

c. A majority of all the preparatory recall assembly members may convene in session in a public place initiate a
recall proceeding against any elective official in the LGU concerned. Recall of city, provincial and municipal officials shal l
be validly initiated through a resolution adopted by a majority of all the preparatory recall assembly concerned during its
session called for the purpose.

d. recall of any elective provincial, city, or municipal or barangay official may also be validly initiated on petition of
at least 25% of the total number of registered voters in the LGU concerned during the election which the local official
sought to be recalled was elected.

1. A written petition for recall duly signed before the election registrar or his rep and in the absence of rep of the
petitioner and a rep of the official sought to be recalled and in a public lace in the province, city or municipality or
barangay as the case maybe, shall be filed with the COMELEC thru its office of the LGU concerned. The COMELEC or its
duly authorized rep shall cause the publication of the petition in a public and conspicuous place for a period of not less
than 10 days nor more than 20 days for the purpose of ratifying the authenticity and genuineness of the petition and the
required percentage of voters.

2. Upon the lapse of the aforesaid period, the COMELEC or its duly authorize rep shall announce the acceptance
of candidates to the position and thereafter prepare a list of candidates which shall include the name of the official sought
to be recalled.

*Sec 71 Election on recall. Upon filing of a valid resolution or petition for recall with the appropriate local office of the
COMELEC, the Commission or its duly recognized rep shall set the date of the election on recall, which shall be not later
than 30 days after the filing of the resolution or petition for recall in the case of the barangay, city, or municipal officials
and 45 days in the case of provincial officials. The official officials sought to be recalled shall automatically be considered
as a duly registered candidate or candidates to pertinent positions and like other candidates, shall be entitled to be voted
upon.

*Sec 72 effectivity of recall. The recall of an elective local official shall be effective only upon the secretion and
proclamation of a successor in the person of the candidate receiving the highest number of votes cast during the election
on recall. Should the official sought to be recalled receive the highest number of votes, confidence in him is thereby
affirmed and he shall continue in office.

*Sec 73 Prohibition form resignation. The elective local official sought to be recalled shall not be allowed to resign while
the recall process is in progress.

*Sec 74 Limitations on recall

a. An elective local official may be the subject of a recall election only once during the term of his office or loss of
confidence.
b. No recall shall take place within 1 year from the date of the official's assumption to office of 1 year immediately
preceding a regular local election.

* Sec 75. Expenses incidental to recall elections. All expenses incidental to recall elections shall be borne by the
COMELEC. For this purpose, there shall be included in the annual General Appropriation Act a Contingency fund at the
disposal of the COMELEC for the conduct of recall elections.

* Art 154 162, IRR. Exactly the same as above, but with addition of Who may be recalled (see below)

1. Requisites
If there's such a thing as requisites of a recall, it's probably found buried in Section 69 and 70 of the LGC of 1991.
The requisites probably are:
a. Initiation, either thru direct action by the people or thru a preparatory recall assembly; and
b. Election

2. Who may be recalled
Art 155. IRR Who may be recalled. Any elective provincial, city, municipal or barangay official may be recalled for loss
of confidence in the manner prescribed in this rule provided that no recall may be instituted against said elective local
official who have been the subject of a previous recall election held during the same term of office.

3. Grounds for recalls
Loss of confidence, which is a political question
4. When recall may not be held
See Section 74, LGC of 1991

5. Procedure for recall
See Section 70, supra

6. Effectivity of recall
See Section 72, supra
Local Initiative and Referendum (Sec. 120-127, Art. 133-153, IRR)
*Sec. 120, LGC. Local initiatives defined. Local initiative is the legal process whereby the registered voters of an
LGU may directly propose, enact, or amend any ordinance.

*Sec. 121. Who may exercise. The power of local initiative and the referendum may be exercised by all registered
voters of the provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays.

*Sec. 122. Procedure in local initiative.
a) Not less than 1,000 registered voters in case of provinces and cities, 100 in case of municipalities, and 50 in
case of barangays, may file a petition with the sanggunian concerned proposing the adoption, enactment, repeal or
amendment of an ordinance.
b) If no favorable action is taken thereon by the sanggunian concerned within 30 days from its presentation, the
proponents, thru their duly authorized representatives, may invoke their power of initiative giving notice thereof to the
sanggunian concerned.
c) The proposition shall be numbered serially from Roman numeral I. The COMELEC or its designated
representative shall extend assistance in the formulation of the proposition.
d) 2 or more propositions may be submitted in an initiative.
e) Proponents shall have 90 days in the case of provinces and cities, 60 days in the case of municipalities, and 30
days in the case of barangays, from notice mentioned in subsection (b) hereof to collect the required number of
signatures.
f) The petition shall be singed before the election registrar, or his designated rep. in the presence of the
representative of the proponent and a rep. of sanggunian concerned, in a public place in the LGU, as the case may be.
Stations for collecting signatures must be established in as many places as may be warranted.
g) Upon the lapse of the period herein provided, the COMELEC, thru its office in the LGU concerned for their
approve within 60 days from the date of certification by the COMELEC, as provided in subsection (g) hereof, 45 days in
the case of municipalities, and 30 days in the case of barangays. The initiative shall then be heard on the date set, after
which the result thereof shall be certified and proclaimed by the COMELEC.

*Sec. 123. Effectively of local propositions. If the proposition is approved by a majority of a vote cast, it shall take
effect 15 days after certification by the COMELEC as if affirmative action thereon had been position is considered
defeated.

*Sec. 124. Limitations of local initiative.
a) The power of local initiative shall not be exercised more than once a year.
b) Initiative shall extend only to subjects or matters which are within the legal powers of the sanggunian to enact.
c) If at any time before the initiative is held, the sanggunian concerned adopts in to the proposition presented and
the local chief executive approves the same, the initiative shall be canceled. However, those against such action may, if
they so desire, apply for initiative in the manner herein provided.

*Sec. 125. Limitations upon sanggunian. Any proposition or ordinance adopted thru the system of initiative and
referendum as herein provided shall not be repealed, modified, or amended by the sanggunian concerned within 6
months from the date approval thereof and may be amended, modified, or repealed within 3 years thereafter by a vote of
of its members: Provided, that in case of barangays, the period shall be 18 moths after the approval thereof.

*Sec. 126. Local referendum defined. Local referendum is the legal process whereby the registered voters of the
LGUs may approve, amend or reject any ordinance enacted by the sanggunian.
The local referendum shall be held under the direction and control of the COMELEC within the 60 days in case of
provinces and cities, 45 days in case of municipalities and 30 days in the case of barangays.
The COMELEC shall certify and proclaim the results of the said referendum.

*Sec. 127. Authority of courts. Nothing in this chapter shall prevent or preclude the power courts from declaring
null and void any proposition approved pursuant to this Chapter for the violation of the Constitution or want of capacity of
the sanggunian concerned to enact the said measure.

NOTE: Articles 133-153, IRR are roughly the same Section 120-127 above. However, we should take note of Art.
145, IRR, which basically states the number of signature required.
1) In a province or city at least 10% of the registered voters therein, with each legislative district represented by
at least 3 % of the registered voters therein.
2) In a municipality at least 10% of registered voters therein, with each barangay represented by at least 3% of
registered voters therein.
3) In a barangay 10% of registered voters therein.

. Disciplinary Action (Art. 124, IRR)
*Article 124. Grounds for Disciplinary Action.
a) An elective local official may be censured, reprimanded, suspended or removed from office after due notice
and hearing on the following grounds:
1) Disloyalty to the republic of the Philippines.
2) Culpable violation of the Constitution.
3) Dishonesty, oppression, misconduct in office, gross negligence or dereliction of duty.
4) Commission of any offense including moral amplitude or an offense punishable by at least prison
mayor which is from 6 years and 1 day to 12 years imprisonment.
5) Abuse Authority
6) Unauthorized absence of 15 consecutive working days, in the case of the local chief executive and 4
consecutive sessions in the case of members of the sanggunian panlalawigan, sanggunian panlungsod, sangguniang
bayan and sangguniang barangay.
7) Application for, or acquisition of, foreign citizenship or residence or the status of an immigrant of
another country; and
8) such other grounds as may be provided by the Code, RA 6713, RAC of 1987, RPC and all other
applicable general and special laws.
b) An elective local official may be removed from office on the grounds enumerated in paragraph a, of this article
by order of the proper court, or the disciplinary authority whichever first acquires jurisdiction to the exclusion if the other.

1. Grounds for Suspension and Removal (Sec. 60, LGC)
*Sec. 60 Grounds for disciplinary action. (Same as Article 124, IRR above).
1. Procedure (Sec. 84, LGC)
*Sec. 84. Administrative discipline. Investigation and adjudication of administrative complaints against appointive
local officials and employees as well as their suspension and removal shall be in accordance in the civil service law and
rules and order pertinent laws. Te result of such administrative investigations shall be reported to the CSC.

3. Preventive Suspension (Section 63-64, 85-87, LGC, Art. 127, IRR) Read also section 42, PD 807
(now Sec. 52, RAC of 1987)

*Section 63. Preventive Suspension.
a) Preventive Suspension may be imposed:
1) By the president, if the respondent Is an elective official of a province, highly urbanized or independent
component city.
2) By the governor, if the respondent is an elective official of a component city or municipality.
3) By the mayor, if the respondent is an elective official of a barangay.
b) preventive suspension may be imposed at any time after the issues are joined, when the evidence of guilt is
strong, and given the gravity of the offense, there is great probability that the continuance in the office of the respondent
could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence: provided, that
any single preventive suspension of local elective officials shall not extend beyond 60 days: provided further, that in the
event that several administrative cases are filed against and elective official, he cannot be preventively suspended for
more than 90 days within the single year on the same ground or grounds existing and known at the time of the first
suspension.
c) Upon expiration of the preventive suspension, the suspended elected official shall be deemed reinstated in
office without prejudice to the continuation of the proceedings against him, which shall be terminated within 120 days from
the time he as formally notified of the case against him. However, if the delay in the proceedings of the case is due to his
fault, neglect, or request, other than the appeal duly filed, the duration of such delay shall not be counted in computing the
time of termination of the case.
d) Any abuse of the exercise of the power of preventive suspension shall be penalized as abuse of authority.

*Sec. 64. Salary of respondent pending suspension. The respondent official preventively suspended from office
shall receive salary or compensation including such emoluments accruing during such suspension.

*Sec. 85. Preventive suspension of appointive local officials and employees.
a) the local chief executives may preventively suspend for a period not exceeding 60 days any subordinate official
or employee under his authority pending investigation if the charged against such officials or employee involves
dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty, or if there is reason to believe that the
respondent is guilty of the charges which would warrant his removal from the service.
b) Upon expiration of the preventive suspension, the suspended official or employee shall be automatically
reinstated in office without prejudice to the continuation of the administrative proceedings against him until its termination.
If the delay in the proceeding of the case is due to the fault, negligence or request of the respondent, the time of the delay
shall not be counted in the computing of the period of the suspension herein provided.

*Sec.86. Administrative investigation. In any LGU, administrative investigation may be conducted by a person or
committee duly authorized by the local chief executive. Said person or employee shall conduct hearings on the cases
brought against appointive local officials and employees and submit their findings and recommendations in the local chief
executive concerned within 15 days from the conclusion of the hearings. The administrative cases herein mentioned shall
be decided within 90 days from the time the respondent is formally notified by the charges.

*Sec. 87. Disciplinary charges. Except other wise provided by the law, the local chide executive may impose the
penalty of removal from service, demotion in tank, suspension for not more than 1 year without any fine in an amount not
exceeding 6 months salary, of reprimand and other wise disciplined subordinate officials and employees under his
jurisdiction. If the penalty imposed is suspension without pay for not more than 30 days, the decision shall be appealable
to the CSC, which shall decide the case within 30 days from receipt thereof.

*Article 127, IRR. Exactly the same as Sec. 63, LGC

*Sec 52, RAC of 1987. Lifting of preventive suspension pending administrative investigation (Book V, Subtitle A
on CSC, chapter 6). When the administrative case against the officer or employee under preventive suspension is not
finally decided by the disciplining authority within the period of 90 days after the date of suspension of the respondent who
is not a presidential appointee, the respondent shall be automatically reinstated in the service: provided, that when the
delay in disposition of the case is due to the fault, negligent or the petition of the respondent, the period of delay shall not
be counted in computing the period of suspension herein provided.

Kinds of preventive suspension (with regards to civil service employees who are charged with offense punishable
with suspension or removal) (revised administrative code of 1987)
1) Preventive suspension, pending investigation.
2) Preventive suspension pending appeal, if the penalty imposed by the disciplining authority suspension
or dismissal.