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Gary Bown

04/16/14
Emotions in the Arts
Dr. Robinson
I llustration of the Paradox of Fiction in Relation to Walton and Radford Theorization as
Based on J ames and Solomon
Art comes in many forms; however, fiction is an exceedingly unique example. Fiction
causes one of the greater debates of emotion philosophy; it creates a paradox, the Paradox of
Fiction. The Paradox of Fiction ultimately differs for philosophers based on the heated debate of
emotions themselves and dealing with their rationality. Here in, the paper will discuss what the
paradox consists of, the paradoxs different approaches with respect to James and Solomon, and
finally a focus on theories dedicated to the solution of the paradox a la Walton and Radford.
The Paradox of Fiction is relatively simple, yet complex when broken down. The best
(and considered the initial) example of the paradox is elaborated by Radford; furthermore, the
paradox he suggests runs on several premises: the situation/object of the emotion we are moved
by must be believed to be real, the fiction we partake in is known to not be real, and fiction
moves the audience via emotions. To elaborate, emotions (for the most part) require a focusing
object. As a classic example, Aristotle describes anger as a perceived slight or offence made by
someone. If Jones scratches your new car, you are angry with Jones; Jones is the object. The
object, furthermore, requires a belief in the object. If it turns out Jones did not scratch your car,
there is no more anger. To explain, the anger is dissipated because there is no object on which to
focus. If an object is not real, then the object cannot be believed to be real and does not hold as
an object of emotional focus. The second premise deals with object within the fiction. At any
point or time in a good novel or a play, one may be absorbed into the work and very focused.
Regardless of the focus, the audience in question does not truly believe in the circumstance. As
the audience enters the theatre, the audience knows from the very beginning that all they will be
presented with will not be real and is fictitious. The last premise is the issue itself. The emotion
requires a believed object. Fiction presented to an audience is known to not be real and is
fictitious. Regardless of the audience knowing the fiction is false, the audience is still moved by
emotion, therein creating the paradox.
To understand the paradox, the emotion theories of James and Solomon must be first
understood and then utilized to approach the problem. In short, Solomon understands emotions
as judgments. He is known for his theory upon which many more judgment theorists base their
own theories. He believes that emotions are the evaluation (or set of evaluations) of a
situation/object. Going back to Jones, he scratches your car. You judge that Jones has wronged
you; therefore, you are angry with Jones. The essential order is object/situation/stimulus,
perception of the aforementioned, the cognitive evaluation of the aforementioned, and finally the
emotion is felt as the determined evaluation. From a Solomonian view, the paradox would be
approached in this manner. Premise one is correct as the object requires a belief or judgment.
Premise two is correct as the fiction is fiction and is not judged to be real at any time. Premise
three is invalid as premise one and two are valid. Solomon would explain the emotional response
in a few ways; however, he would mainly conclude that whatever emotion is supposedly felt is
not a true emotion. He would establish, as Radford tires as we will see later, that the emotion is
simply an arousal from partial judgments that cannot be turned into a true judgment leaving a
state of untrue emotion that is felt. Solomon may also take the pseudo-emotional stance as
described by Walton. Moving on, James has the complete opposite theory. For James, emotions
are the states aroused by stimulus and then identified as the emotion. For example, you see a
bear, your body clenches, heart races, and you enter flight or fight mode. You perceive the bodily
changes and you identify that you feel fear. The essential Jamesian order is
stimulus/situation/object, bodily changes in response to the aforementioned, perception of the
changes, and the perception is the emotion. For James, premise two and three are true. By James,
you can know an object is not real, but your body does not know. To James, the body simply acts
out in evolved patterns based on stimuli; therefore, premise two and premise three can coexist.
Premise one is invalid to James as he rejects the judgment theory and does not need a belief in
the object, thereby, solving the problem. Radford mentions such solutions, but does not elaborate
on them considering them poor answers.
Knowing the two main branches on emotional foundation, Walton and Radford elaborate
on the subject matter more thoroughly. Walton solves the paradox via the elimination of premise
three. Charles, who fidgets and tenses and screams as he watches a horror movie, does not, I
argue, really fear the Slime portrayed on the screen. (Walton, 39) Walton describes the
emotional arousal felt as a pseudo-emotion and simulation. He takes what is known as simulation
theory and utilizes it for the paradox. He belays that as Charles views the Slime, Charles puts
himself in the situation and then acts out the simulation in the real world with certain traits of the
emotion he believe he would experience, thus establishing the pseudo-emotional state as
portrayed. He further describes the simulation in terms that spans for all age groups: imagination.
He attributes the same imaging of a child as those of the feelings found in response to fiction.
The audience imagines the situation and feels an emotional state. The main detractor he
expresses is in Mortan who establishes some good counter arguments. He describes Waltons
theory as having no real world accountability. (Walton, 44) Mortan elaborates that if Walton
does not believe fiction inspires true emotion then the experience is simply a falsehood which
feels incorrect given the strength of the feelings. Walton dismisses this claim by elaborating that
the emotional state is not an emotion, but can feel real and have just as much intensity. The
emotional state is not a lie, but simply not the true emotion that is involved with real events.
Imagination, as he reiterates, is quite powerful. Walton bases his theory directly on Solomonian
judgment theory because it is clear he requires true emotion need a true belief in the object. He
also clearly presumes the feelings felt to be void on at least some level of true emotional
experience. Looking elsewhere, Radford does not give an answer to the paradox, but gives
several and, subsequently dismisses, each reaching a conclusion that means the paradox is
unsolvable. Radford, unlike Walton, takes both Jamesian and Solomonian stances. He tries
premise one and two for fault or error. He suggests in several examples that at some point the
audience enters some belief about the fiction. When we read the book, or better when we watch
a play and it works, we are caught up and respond and we forget or are no longer aware we
are only reading a book or watching a play. (Radford, 71) The suspension of disbelief as he
suggests falls short as on some level we do know it is not real. Unable to fault premise two, he
tries a Jamesian approach and suggests perhaps it is just a biological evolutionary trait that
causes irrational emotional response to the unreal regardless of the individuals mental faculties.
Although James whole-heartedly agrees, Radford dismisses this as well because he finds the
solution to be a cop out and is lacking therein. Radford, unlike Walton, does not go after premise
three as he does believe that the response truly is an emotional one due to its strength and relative
feeling nearly indistinct from normal emotions. Radford cannot dismiss or alter premises one or
two and he cannot reject premise three; therefore, Radford considers the problem unsolvable.
Walton and Radford give very unique answers; however, each has faults. Walton
considers the movements caused by fiction to be pseudo-emotional states. While he does credit
imagination being powerful, the feelings felt can be nearly indistinguishable from the real world
counterparts. Although Walton may explain several of the issues in the paradox, he is heavily
dependent on pure judgment theory, which itself fails to explain certain real world occurrences
of emotion such as fear of a very passive dog from having a traumatic childhood experience
involving a dog bite. The simulation theory does merit more inquiry; however, the scope is
ultimately limited to cognitive theories and, therefore, is lacking. Radfords null solution is
honestly a better take on the situation. As a scientist it is impossible to simply say it cannot be
solved; however, Radford delivers very good insight into the problems of the Paradox of Fiction
from several angles instead of one answer. The multi-faceted approach is better as the paradox,
as shown, is fairly complex and one simple view of it should not suffice to solve it. Radford, like
Walton, is limited in judgment theory. Although he gives a significant platform for Jamesian
theory as compared to Walton, he dismisses those solutions for their simplicity as well as his
holding of emotion being, at least on some level, cognitive. Positions such as this (most
comparable to Lyons) is understandable as both pure James and Solomon are deeply flawed,
Solomon as shown with the dog example and James has issues with explaining higher level
emotions such as grief. Ultimately, Radford poses the better solution because he is not a pure
judgment theorist and is flexible enough to admit other ideas and dismiss his own, whereas
Walton simply alters his theory and explains away dismissive arguments.
Although the paradox has been discussed, the Paradox of Fiction requires examples of
actual fiction in order to better illustrate it. An excellent example is the classical tragedy of
Sophocles, Oedipus Rex. The opening scene is set with the city of Thebes in total misery under
some otherworldly force. The lamentation and suffering of the people is palpable even before
Oedipus arrives. In the case of Walton, one would simulate the suffering; however, the audience
cannot truly begin to imagine the suffering of such a different age (although Walton would argue
they could). Radfords more Jamesian solutions do explain the feelings of pity and sadness for
the people as an evolutionary trait toward higher social structure (as humans are a highly social
species). The Theban people learn that an old wound needs to be healed in order to lift the
misery which turns out to be the murder of the old king. Oedipus is in fact the murderer, yet he
does not know until the very end. However, the pity for Oedipus is unlike the pity for the city of
Thebes. Oedipus was cursed by fate to kill his father and sleep with his mother. A fate as cruel as
this goes beyond the scope of Walton. One cannot accurately simulate the act of murdering their
father and sleeping with their mother without some severe mental trauma (i.e. psychopaths who
actually end up doing this). The best the audience can do is guess with vague statements as to
how they would feel in such a scenario. Although Radford does not have a conclusive answer,
Waltons answer is not practical for all fiction and is thereby detrimental. I would blot out from
my mind what happened next! For the king ripped from her gown the golden brooches that were
her ornament and raised them, and plunged them down into his own eyeballs, crying No more,
no more shall you look on the misery about me, the horrors of my own doing!... (Sophocles,
17) I am hard pressed to believe that an audience can feel the pseudo-horror of plucking out
their own eyes with the pin of their wife/mother who just killed herself because of they are them
and killed their own father. Such situations seem to require greater powers than imagination.
To conclude, the Paradox of Fiction is a complicated puzzle to tackle. In order, to answer
it, one must first look at emotional basis from a Jamesian to Solomonian position. The problem
presented has been attempted by both Radford and Walton. While Radford does not give a
conclusion further than the paradoxs insolvability, Walton expresses a pure cognitive view that
discusses the feelings as pseudo-emotions. The Walton theory does not seem to hold up in the
long run because of its inability to express emotions that would be impractical to imagine and
its pure judgment basis which, as seen with Solomon, does not hold water as a total theory for
the basis of emotion. Radfords solution is superior as it concedes points to judgment and
Jamesian theory while illustrating some of the deeper and more complex portions of the paradox.
At the end of the day, the Paradox of Fiction has yet to be solved. All that can be said is that
works of fiction such as Oedipus Rex do make us feel something, real emotion or not.

It has been an absolute pleasure
~Gary L Bown Jr~

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